Kargil War Thread - VI

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya_V » 27 Nov 2011 18:44

From the link apart from ABV quite a few people in both RAW and ARMY underestimated the Pakis intentions.

The study titled ‘Perils of Prediction, Indian Intelligence and the Kargil Crisis’, said Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had also warned in its October 1998 assessment that Pakistan Army might launch “a limited swift offensive with possible support of alliance partners (reference to mercenaries)”.

The study suggests that RAW’s report seen against its otherwise sanguine estimate of the risk of war appeared “incongruous” and immediately prompted verbal queries from the Army.

It added that in its next six-monthly threat assessment, RAW omitted any reference to a “limited offensive” and depicted the Pakistani threat as consisting only of mercenaries.

The study suggests that Indian intelligence agencies accurately assessed Pakistani intentions prior to the Kargil crisis but “went wrong in predicting the specific form in which these would be enacted.”

The study by CLAWS suggests that between them, RAW, IB and Army intelligence had produced 43 reports during June 1998-May 1999, which were later found to have a bearing on Pakistani intentions at Kargil. (agencies)

From the other report

The study says the analysis, origins and destinations of these reports are quite revealing: Army intelligence produced 22 reports, none of which were shared with any civilian agencies including the JIC. RAW generated 11 reports, of which seven were widely disseminated and four were shared only with the Army. IB produced 10 reports, of which three were

“But credible reports suggest that RAW was informally pressured to retreat from the alarming projections it had made in October 1998, as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was preparing to undertake a peace journey to Lahore,” says the report.

Looks like the WKK prevailed on ABV to ignore the obvious intentions of Pakis

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby RKumar » 27 Nov 2011 20:37

I had posted what can be said in few words well back in May, 2010


RAW had repeatedly warned the highest levels much ahead about Kargil but no one listened to them. All the reports were thrown to bin.
- Poltical leaders had too much faith in the dialog.
- army was not able to confirm it so gave negative feedback to higher command.

For this I can not provide any link and more details.

Aditya_V wrote:RAW generated 11 reports, of which seven were widely disseminated and four were shared only with the Army.

7 reports are more then enough, to get backing of follow branch those 4 having specific information at local level. Could not verify/happening and were fed to bins :((

But I sincerely hope things are better... but difficult to know.

Aditya_V wrote:“But credible reports suggest that RAW was informally pressured to retreat from the alarming projections it had made in October 1998, as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was preparing to undertake a peace journey to Lahore,” says the report.

What difference another report could make where 11 couldn't.

I think it is more a political, bad habit, political influence and drop a name of previous ruling party to find a cause for next elections. As my PoV PM is answerable for every good and bad thing which happen in a country... how many charge sheets or cases should be filled against PM or a ruling party???

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby saip » 27 Nov 2011 20:55

Not that we did not know, but just in case anyone doubted about the Paki army participation in Kargil


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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 28 Nov 2011 04:51

Will go thru the CLAWS report and make my views felt. At the top level it looks like analysts are looking at it as if some thing went awry. Yet if you look at the whole picture from 1947 TSP raiders in J&K to Mumbai there is a systemic problem plaguing the Indian security system from politicians to intel officials to military. Its a whole environment/underlaying circumstances that festers these repeated failures which are periodic outbreaks of the environment. Even after POKII when it becomes critical to be more aware the system is still supine and staggering in stupor.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 28 Nov 2011 08:05

I wrote two articles on Kargil Surprise.

The first one was based on preliminary press reports in India. Its in the inaugural issue of Bharat Rakshak Monitor and compares the factors of surprise that appear to be prevalent based on new reports.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... -MON7.html

Subsequently the KRC report came out and had even more details. I wrote a commentary and review of the KRC report and in the May- June 2000 issue of BRM. KS garu was appreciative of the review as being most comprehensive in its scope that he has seen or made aware of.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... amana.html

The odd thing is the CLAWS paper writer seems to be familiar with Bharat Rakshak (ref. 71, 81 and 100) as he quotes in the ref section but is totally unaware of these BRM articles! it might have helped as he is on the path to uncovering the issues but not there yet.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 28 Nov 2011 10:55

My short answer is risk homeostasis is what lead to Kargil Failure.


IB was split in 1968(?) due to the intelligence failure in 1962. This led to great success in 1971 war. Due to this success, the GOI security apparatus:babus and military became more risk prone due to the existence of RAW. RAW was doing excellent job of threat evaluation so no need for others to act. In other words they stopped thinking and becoming self aware of the threats to national security. They don't have accountability. Any mistake they can blame it on others.

This is the underlaying circumstances that led to the repeated failures.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Pratyush » 28 Nov 2011 18:11

The interesting question is whether the KRC, had access to the reports in question. If yes, then the release of this report has no meaning, in real terms. However, the timing and the previous actions of this particular GOI, certainly raises questions as to why now. When the GOI is in deep $hit and is clutching at the straws to deal with the opposition & civil society combined.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 04 Dec 2011 01:57

Operation Safed Sagar details in this youtube video. Every picture has new info.

Altair wrote:
Our pilots speak of how we gave F-16's a run for their life during kargil war with Mig-29's and M2000
Must watch video for Jingoes

Btw head of all that is a BRF member.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 04 Dec 2011 04:35

why the jags didnt work in Kargil?

X-post from LCH thread....

tsarkar wrote:.....

Nick_S wrote:Why did the Jags not work well with LGBs in Kargil?
Because the integration work on Jaguars were not complete. From the CAG report http://www.cag.gov.in/reports/defence/2 ... apter3.htm
The CCS approved a proposal of the Air Force in May 1996 [TS - way before Kargil] for procurement of 15 laser designator pods with thermal imagery for fitment on 10 Jaguars and 5 Mirage-2000 aircraft and modification of 30 Jaguar aircraft for carrying the pods at a total cost of Rs.125 crore. The Ministry concluded a contract with foreign firm ?D? in November 1996 for procurement of 15 laser designator pods with thermal imagery at a total cost of US $ 27.11 million, equivalent to Rs.95 ( 1 US $ = Rs.35) crore to be delivered between March 1998 and February 1999 in two phases.

The flight test and certification on Jaguar aircraft, which was planned to be conducted by March 1998, was completed by the ASTE (Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment), only in December 1999[TS - long after the war], after a delay of 20 months. The delays were attributable mainly to delay in software development and change in modification scheme of the aircraft by HAL owing to mechanical problems. Similarly, certification on Mirage-2000 aircraft was also delayed by nine months[TS - but completed in time for Kargil].

Only one twin seater Jaguar aircraft had been modified by HAL, Bangalore as of May 2000 and the fleet modification of 29 Jaguars was yet to commence.[TS - I believe this bird tried, but didnt succeed because it wasnt tested and defects ironed out]

Fitment of an auto pilot on the Jaguars is mandatory for executing missions with laser designator pods. While the availability of auto pilots for Jaguar aircraft is unlikely at least before 2002, mismatch and inadequate planning have seriously undermined the fleet modification of Jaguars with laser designator pods.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Vivek K » 04 Dec 2011 04:55

^^^^ Mera Bharat Mahaan! MMRCA mata ki jai ho! LCA bhrata ki Jai ho! NLCA (will fly soon) ki Jai ho!!

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 04 Dec 2011 06:58

Sanjay please give a description of the link as a courtesy to fellow members.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby sanjaykumar » 04 Dec 2011 08:58

This is is a discussion on the history of deliberate thinning out of the Kargil Batalik Drass scetor intermediate between the Valley and Siachen, dating back about 15 years prior to the war. (My own comment is was this really negligence or was it a trap?) Capt Sidhu is excoriating poor planning, lack of ammunition, and use of troops not trained for mountain warfare.

What is more of interest to me is that such a public discussion can never take place in China or Pakistan. Which makes one respect India, warts and all.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby rohitvats » 04 Dec 2011 13:44

^^^General Malik has discussed the aspect of the thinning of the sector in detail and given reasons for the same.

for example, the Gurez based 28 Infantry Division was raised to look after exactly the area which 8 Mountain Division started to look after Kargil. But the rise of militancy and efforts to ensure that TSPA could not launch any surprise conventional attack meant that this division was shifted to Gurez. Mind you, Gurez is the back-door entry point into the Valley. This, increased insurgency, along with peace accord with China meant the Leh based 3 Div also lost an Infantry Bde to the valley.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby SSridhar » 05 Jan 2012 15:44

Kargil becomes a tourist spot - From Guns to Roses - Business Line
From a theatre of one of the grimmest battles fought and won by the Indian Army, Kargil is all set to transform into a tourist hotspot.

The Civil Aviation Ministry is considering permitting regular commercial flights to this famous battleground located some 9,600 ft above the sea level.

“Permission may be granted to start operations from the summer schedule starting the last Sunday of March,” a person familiar with the development told Business Line.

The Kargil airport, which is under the jurisdiction of the Indian Air Force, was built by the Airports Authority of India with Central budgetary support and handed over to the Air Force in 2003. It has a civil enclave managed by the State Government.

This airport is located about 10 km from the town.

The runway is 6,100 feet long, which is good enough for a regional jet to operate. Considering the weather situation, flight operation is possible between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Jagan » 10 Jan 2012 06:25


With regret I informed you that Gp Capt A Perumal, SC, (17150) (Retd) passed away early hours yesterday in Salem, TN (about 155 kms from Coimbatore / Bangalore). He was with his family at a picnic with his school mates (Sainik School, Amravithinagar) on Saturday, 06 Jan 12, when his had a massive heart attack. He was rushed to a hospital and later passed away.
Gp Capt Perumal, after retiring from the IAF, was a pilot with Indigo and, later, joined a Charter company in the Bangalore. He was awarded Shaurya Charka on 26th Jan 2006 for his gallant action in the 1999 Kargil Conflict (he was awarded five years later!). During his recce mission on the Canberra, his aircraft was hit by a missile, crippling one engine. He managed to fly away from the conflict zone and landed in Srinagar.
On a personal note, Perumal was student in DSSC (2002-03) when I was his DS. . A humble and gentleman to the core. We will miss him!
Our prayers are for Mrs Perumal and his daughter (studying in Australia) and his son (Class XI in Bangalore) to bear with this loss.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby MN Kumar » 11 Jan 2012 19:17

Jagan is it possible to add a url on his page about the incident for which the Late Group Captain was awarded.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya G » 06 Feb 2012 20:56

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120206/j ... 098135.jsp

It is not widely known that during the Kargil war in 1999, the French approved with lightning speed the adaptation of Indian Air Force Mirages in tandem with equally speedy Israeli supplies of laser-guided bombs which they delivered in Srinagar: without such French and Israeli support, India could have lost Kargil to Pervez Musharraf’s perfidy.

Hainji? :roll:

Per Phil Camp article @ BR:

The Mirage 2000 were supplied with Thomson-CSF Laser Designator Pod, known as ‘ATLIS’ which was capable of delivery of Matra 1000 kg LGBs, which were purpose built for destruction of reinforced targets. These weapons were highly capable but were very expensive. It was decided to augment their capability by adding the 1000 lb bomb coupled with Paveway II laser-guided bomb kit. The IAF had ordered a number of these, but they had been supplied with an incorrect part. Because of the nuclear test performed by India, they were on the embargo list and were unable to get the correct parts sent as replacements. Consequently IAF technicians had to remanufacture this part in order to make the Paveway serviceable for use on the Mirage.

While one video in from NDTV(?) describes that it was the Litening pod integration that was done in haste during Kargil war.

So whats the real story?

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby tsarkar » 09 Feb 2012 19:48

It is not widely known that during the Kargil war in 1999, the French approved with lightning speed the adaptation of Indian Air Force Mirages in tandem with equally speedy Israeli supplies of laser-guided bombs which they delivered in Srinagar: without such French and Israeli support, India could have lost Kargil to Pervez Musharraf’s perfidy.
The Telegraph report smacks of French propaganda.

Refer CAG report few posts above, the LGB program was conceptualized after GW1 and implemented from 1996 onwards.

http://www.cag.gov.in/reports/defence/2 ... apter3.htm

The flight test and certification on Jaguar aircraft, which was planned to be conducted by March 1998, was completed by the ASTE (Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment), only in December 1999[TS - long after the war], after a delay of 20 months. The delays were attributable mainly to delay in software development and change in modification scheme of the aircraft by HAL owing to mechanical problems. Similarly, certification on Mirage-2000 aircraft was also delayed by nine months[TS - but completed in time for Kargil].

The Jaguar took time because it was a much older design vis-à-vis Mirage and its computers, hardware and wiring had to be completely changed. But Mirage was ready before Kargil.

At that point in time, Mirage, MiG29 and MiG21 were designated for Air Defence while Jaguar and MiG27/23 for Ground Attack. After the limitations of GA types, Mirage was deployed for GA.

So no special French assistance was received, nor any last moment modifications to aircraft/pods made.

The bombs required jugaad, as correctly pointed by Phil.

Hearsay - Apparently LGB kits couldn’t be mated to the British bombs in service, and finally some Spanish built bombs based on US design were found in some obscure airbase in SWAC apparently being procured for Gnat, that were compatible with the kits. So these were mated together using desi make-do and the rest is history.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 09 Feb 2012 21:39

TS, Makes sense that the PavewayII would fit the Mk82 based designs. Gnat did have some imported ombs. Were they 1000 lbs or 500lbs? However these kits were from UK supplied material. And the Indian 1000lbs were UK based ones.
In IAF personnel memoirs there is disenchantment with UK supplied stuff in 1965. So it could be usual perfidy of the UK.

Also the Matra maal was for special use and didn't want to waste it in case of escalation.

SKMji told us.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby aniket » 09 Feb 2012 22:18

On knowledge based on Dateline Kargil,the Air Force mated WW2 bombs with infra red ray kits.The aircraft would throw out a beam and the bomb would follow it and destroy its target along with PGM's.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya G » 09 Feb 2012 22:28

tsarkar wrote:
Hearsay - Apparently LGB kits couldn’t be mated to the British bombs in service, and finally some Spanish built bombs based on US design were found in some obscure airbase in SWAC apparently being procured for Gnat, that were compatible with the kits. So these were mated together using desi make-do and the rest is history.

This is attested by Phil Camp as well.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya G » 09 Feb 2012 22:54

Aditya G wrote:While one video in from NDTV(?) describes that it was the Litening pod integration that was done in haste during Kargil war.

According to following video, in which Gp Capt KI Ravi, Chief Engg Offr Gwalior reveals that it was the Israeli Litening pods that was employed in the war:


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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya G » 04 Mar 2012 08:46


Lieutenant General Khwaja Ziauddin (Retired) nominated as army chief and promoted to four star on 12 October 1999 who had served as Director General Inter-Services Intelligence Agency from 1998 to 1999 in an interview in November 2010 with Pakistan’s GEO TV made following important revelation:


General Ziauddin summed up General Musharraf as a chronic liar.

· General Ziauddin stated that General Musharraf literally begged Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to go to Washington on 4th July1999 and request President Clinton to ask the Indian military to agree to a cease fire and give safe passage to Pakistani troops stranded in Kargil and to request India not to escalate the conflict.


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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 09 May 2012 08:37


Peter R. Lavoy, "Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict"
English | ISBN: 0521767210 | 2009 | 426 pages |

The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan near the town of Kargil in contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark event not because of its duration or casualties, but because it contained a very real risk of nuclear escalation. Until the Kargil conflict, academic and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred largely on the theoretical level. This deep analysis of the conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states interact during military crisis. Written by analysts from India, Pakistan, and the United States, this unique book draws extensively on primary sources, including unprecedented access to Indian, Pakistani, and U.S. government officials and military officers who were actively involved in the conflict. This is the first rigorous and objective account of the causes, conduct, and consequences of the Kargil conflict.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby koti » 09 May 2012 11:29

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya G » 13 May 2012 09:40

http://in.news.yahoo.com/kargil-hero-re ... 14152.html

A Kargil hero who is ready to fly again
By A.S.R.P. Mukesh | www.telegraphindia.com – 4 hours ago

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby pragnya » 25 Jul 2012 11:12

However, when the then Prime Minister asked the then Air Force Chief for advice, the former was told that if we crossed the LoC, it will escalate to a full-fledged war.

This advice was neither here nor there, as it was obvious and a matter of commonsense.

When an enemy dares to occupy your territory, the only sensible military response is to cut-off his supply lines in the rear and let the intruders starve on such great heights instead of taking huge casualties of young officers and men. Why did the prime minister not question the air chief on his advice and asked him for an alternative strategy to recover our land.

Were the prime minister and the air chief indulging in the widespread Indian culture of ‘logic of convenience’?
The orders reportedly given by the principal secretary to the prime minister (not by the prime minister) to the military chiefs was air-power will not be used but the army is allowed ‘hot-pursuit’ in the area of ingress. The hot-pursuit is normally conducted from your borders into the contiguous borders of the enemy country.

It is strange that in his ignorance, the principal secretary was asking the army to climb height ranging from 15000 – 20000 ft. in hot-pursuit to evict the intruders! Is it possible to run-up to chase the intruders to these heights? Is that a worthy political order to the military? Why did the prime minister not intervene with clear directive? Was the air chief being timid in his approach? Is the air force not supposed to come to the immediate rescue of the army? If the enemy dares to cross the LoC and occupies your territory in the mountains, will we not cross the LoC by using air power to neutralize his intensions, instead of young officers and men being made to climb the unusual heights and absorbing huge number of casualties?

Martyrs of Kargil and the military lessons for India

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Hiten » 29 Jul 2012 11:33

Lt. Gen Chandrashekhar, who then was the VCOAS, gives his account of the Kargil War

http://generalchandrashekhar.blogspot.i ... rview.html

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 30 Jul 2012 06:13

Hiten wrote:Lt. Gen Chandrashekhar, who then was the VCOAS, gives his account of the Kargil War

Kargil Overview

Wednesday, 25 July 2012
KARGIL WAR – AN OVERVIEW by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar (PVSM AVSM)

The Kargil ingress by Pakistan occurred in the first week of May 1999, shortly after the February 1999 Lahore-Agreement between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. This happened at a time when the tensions between the two neighbours were believed to have de-escalated and mutual relations were on the upswing. Imagine the surprise and sense of dismay in India, when the intrusions were detected during the second week of May 1999. The overall political environment, the nuclear capability demonstrated in 1998 and the improved military situation in Jammu & Kashmir did not justify the development. There is no doubt that the nation was taken by total surprise and the Army and civilian intelligence agencies did not anticipate it.

Much has been written on the Kargil War by experts on both sides– its political and strategic objectives, the conduct of military operations, the nuclear angle, the excessive number of casualties, and the diplomatic and media efforts. However the difficulties in handling the conflict, the ground realities and the higher direction of war, have not been sufficiently examined. Without going into the specific ground operations, which have already been covered in a number of books published on the subject, I believe it is necessary to explain the actual situation as it was in the area of Kargil at that time, and the larger context of the regional environment. Having been closely associated in the entire operational planning of the Kargil conflict, as the then Vice-Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) of the Army, I believe it is also useful to share my knowledge and perception of the follow-up measures undertaken during and after the Kargil War, and our response to restore the situation.

Most of the public coverage during that time focused on the government’s alleged complacency, the criticism of the Lahore venture in hindsight, and a limited understanding of the Kargil intrusion purely as a huge intelligence failure. I believe that the widespread acceptance of such a one-sided perception led to not just national embarrassment, but also contributed to the continuance of avoidable conflict and to our ultimate loss of 527 killed and 1363 soldiers wounded in the battle.

The True Scenario

It is correct to an extent, that the Army had in a certain measure failed to read the events correctly. The absence of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on a foreign visit in the initial period also added to the perception that the Army and Government were taking matters lightly. I can state unequivocally that this was not so. As the VCOAS during this period, I was well aware that it was the overall geo-political environment and lack of intelligence that took everyone by surprise - rather than any lack of effort or planning. We in the Army HQ, once the initial assessment of the situation was made, were totally involved day and night in planning the operations to evict the infiltrators.

The criticism that the Army was slow to react was also unreasonable, and very far from the truth. There were even absurd allegations made in some quarters that the Army had kept the Ministry in the dark. The fact that such allegations came forth - despite the regular personal interactions with the MoD at the senior level and despite the Army reporting the situation on a daily basis, as is the practice, and also declaring in-the-situation reports that some of its soldiers were wounded in the patrol clash in the sector - was not just surprising to us but also very disheartening. It must be understood that the Army has to depend on the other Intelligence Agencies for information other than tactical information, and it does not have any resources or authority to deploy the other Intelligence Agencies. In the initial days of the incursions, in the absence of any information from any of the agencies who have the responsibility and the duty to provide such intelligence, the Army itself had no clear picture of the situation. It therefore assessed such information as it did obtain through its own observation, as a case of routine infiltration. It was not, either at that time or later, appreciated by most of our nation that the Armed Forces, particularly the Army was responding as best as they could in a situation that was not a planned military operation but a reactive response to the ingress in the unoccupied gaps of our territory.

As soon as we became aware of the nature of the infiltration, we at Army HQ, along with HQ Northern Command, were simultaneously engaged in doing the best possible to obtain detailed information about the enemy, and in speedily building up additional resources from other sectors. This was notwithstanding the handicaps that the Army faced due to the surprise-factor achieved by the enemy, and the fact that logistics in the mountains are complex and take considerable time and effort. The issues were many, ranging from a total lack of intelligence about the enemy, to the slow progress in launching operations due to poor infrastructure and the difficult terrain, problems in mobilization of forces, and the disinformation due to the Pakistani war propaganda. :eek:

The reasons that the Army could not itself detect the specific extent of the infiltration initially, was primarily due to the extremely inhospitable terrain along the LoC (at an average height of 12000 feet) and the extreme weather conditions. The enemy had planned its move well, and made good use of adverse weather conditions and the winter months for the intrusion. The area is large with very wide gaps in the Mashko-Dras and the Batalik–Kargil sectors, many of which have been traditionally un-held. The effective patrolling of such a terrain was, and is, difficult. Patrolling was therefore, selectively carried-out and limited during the sub-zero temperatures in winter. Since the gaps were large, there was inadequate ground observation or contact. The monthly Army Aviation helicopter sorties flew only when the weather was clear and followed predictable routes, operating more as communication flights, and did not locate any unusual activities.

The air-photographs of the ingress could be obtained only by 14 May 1999 through the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) as the IAF aircraft earmarked for such missions had developed some technical problems. The satellite imagery provided did not have the requisite resolution to pick up any details of enemy positions. The Army thus lacked support of technical intelligence, such as satellite-imagery, night–vision devices or even air photographs taken periodically to detect any deployment or additional infrastructure development. Some would question the Army’s wisdom in keeping such large gaps as blind spots without any means for their surveillance and creating any military capability for any intervention or reactive response in this area in all the years since 1948.

I will only say that the Armed Forces of India perform the best that they can with the means that they have at hand; there are certain decisions that the civilian leadership takes on behalf of, and sometimes despite the advice of the Armed Forces. That the Armed Forces continue to discharge their duties within these constraints should be seen as even greater proof of their ability and restraint rather than otherwise. The Kargil conflict, notwithstanding the initial surprise, demonstrated the traditional Indian national resolve to hold onto and fight for what is rightfully ours, whatever the cost. This was also demonstrated in the earlier Indo-Pak wars. It seems to me that as a nation we still do not sufficiently appreciate the conditions under which the Armed Forces operate, or the fact that they are human beings operating for the most part under extremely adverse conditions, or that we should be aiding their efforts through timely and prompt access to such technology as can help them in such adverse conditions.

I have a fairly intimate understanding of the terrain and deployments, and first-hand knowledge of the challenges that deployment in such a terrain entails. I spent a number of years in this sector, at different stages of my long service in the Indian Army. My very first posting after being commissioned as a young officer was with my battalion (2/4 GR) in the Kargil sector, and then as a sub-unit commander in an adjoining sector in Ladakh. From my experience in dealing with the manifold issues in surveying and defending the LoC in J &K as a Brigade Commander in 1984-5, and later as the Chief of Staff of the HQ 15 Corps in 1991-93, I was more than aware of the larger constraints of the defence of this region. I had also been in the area during the actual conflict in May 1999 and discussed the situation on the ground with the concerned formation commanders, Major Generals V. S. Budhwar and Mohinder Puri.

The Impact of Political Decisions

The Indian political leadership has of course always displayed total confidence in its Armed Forces and institutions. Even when the international opinion was not favourable during the initial stages of the Kargil War, it gave directions to the Armed Forces to evict the intruders without enlarging the conflict elsewhere. This policy of restraint to keep the conflict localized may have been appreciated by international powers, but has been a major disadvantage in the actual conduct of operations. India has adopted a similar policy of restraint even in the earlier wars, and during the recent Mumbai attacks. In fact, the restriction of not crossing the LoC has no military logic, when the adversary has already violated the borders.

What is also little appreciated is that we had no troops to react with in the area of intrusion, or any reserves with the local Brigade, the reason being that all its Units were already deployed on other parts of the LoC. The only troops available in J&K were already committed in the ongoing Counter Insurgency (CI) operations down below in the Valley, across the Zojila pass. The pass is snowbound and closed from October to May for any movement. All the available troops in J&K had to be dis-engaged, moved over a distance of 150 kilometers, and had to undergo a minimum acclimatization period of seven days, before being launched for the operations in the high-altitude sector. The Artillery units had to move from the plains sector along with ammunition. The logistics support needed, had to be built-up.

It must be conceded that the Army also failed to read the few isolated indicators that did come. There were unconfirmed reports from some sources of fresh-road construction across the LoC on the Gultari–Shakma axis, opposite the Kargil Sector. This information was interpreted as routine improvement works. There were reports of induction of long-range artillery guns, apart from the ongoing medium artillery shelling of the Kargil-Dras road. The artillery fire was seen by us as reactive retaliatory fire to our interdiction of the road in the Neelam valley which we had undertaken to disrupt the winter stocking convoys in the POK.

{Fog of war}

However, these reports came in piecemeal, as isolated events, and at different times. As the VCOAS, I would have been apprised by the DGMI, of any unusual activity and of any important developments or reports, if these had been noticed. Infiltration in J&K has been occurring for a long time. After the initial ingress was detected, the ground commanders read the infiltration as routine, having seen it regularly for the past decade. The Army formations thus, at first considered this too as a case of the periodic infiltration regularly encountered over the past ten years and hence not a matter that could not be handled in the normal course. The IB and the RAW inputs also failed to project the likely Pakistan designs or ingress, notwithstanding some reports of improvement of tracks and defence-works.

{Surprise and deception by the enemy}

One of the other reasons for the lack of an independent analysis in the Army and its dependence on a conditioned response may perhaps have been due to its total focus and long-term engagement on the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley. The Kargil sector on the other hand was considered comparatively a low threat area due to the majority of friendly Shia Muslims, who did not support the separatists. The extremely difficult terrain and friendly population were considered as a sufficient safeguard and the entire focus remained in the Valley and on the Siachin-Glacier. In fact even the reserve formations had been de-inducted earlier on for employment in the Valley. This lack of deployment, the fact that the Indian Army was stretched thin on internal CI responsibilities, and the large gaps traditionally un-held by us, were well exploited by the adversary to infiltrate forces in small groups throughout the winter to achieve total surprise. As a nation, we had also under-estimated Pakistan’s obsession with and its deep resentment against the success of the Indian Armed Forces in previous Wars. General Musharraf publicly accepted in his book In the Line of Fire that the Kargil operations were planned to take revenge for the 1971 War and the 1984 Indian action in the Siachin Glacier.

{Note for our Siachen vacaters!!!}

The Strategy Adopted

After the initial apparently slow response, the nation forcefully went about exposing Pakistan’s complicity in the Kargil ingress, and the involvement of its regular troops in the garb of irregulars. The correctness of the Indian stand was thereafter understood, nearly one month after the ingress. Armed forces were instructed to make all the necessary preparations for various contingencies but were to restrict operations within the Kargil sector. The IAF was directed to mount operations without crossing the Indian airspace. In fact, even the general mobilization for war was not ordered and severe tactical restrictions were placed on the Armed Forces by not crossing the border or developing operations elsewhere due to strategic considerations. The operations were not enlarged to the other sectors and limited to the area of ingress as per the Government’s directions, notwithstanding the severe tactical disadvantages and tremendous costs in men and material.

It is with sadness and regret that I recollect the energy and time spent by the political leadership in debates for and against enlarging the conflict, the discussion on defense purchase scandals and scams in the procurement of military equipment, and the questions asked on the Government’s inability to combat insurgency in J&K and on Pakistan’s ability to internationalize the Kashmir issue - all at a time when so many of our soldiers were battling not just the enemy and adverse conditions but also a lack of adequate equipment, stores and battle gear. The emphasis on the part of the media and our political leaders should have been on ensuring that the urgent and desperate needs of our soldiers in conditions of War were met, by speeding up bureaucratic hurdles. Unfortunately this was not the case.

To make up the shortages, procurement of defence equipment was on paper put on fast track, but the fact that defence equipment takes time to procure was not realized by the successive governments. There were large-scale shortages of weapons and equipment with the units, as also in the artillery ammunition, night fighting capabilities and communications systems. Our procurement system failed to make up the shortages despite concluding 129 procurement contracts for stores worth Rupees 2175 crore, on emergent basis. It needs to be understood that defence equipment is not available off the-counter, from a grocery store or a market. It needs time for assembly, testing and training by troops. Defense preparedness has to be done over a period of time as a regular process and has to be given adequate funding. The Indian defence budget at 2.5% is not only low but remains under-utilized due to procedural delays. The Mumbai attacks have again highlighted the institutional and intelligence weaknesses that continue to exist in our system.

Long Term Implications

Such recurrent reluctance in important matters of national security bring into question our political resolve and our lack of decisive capability. The Kargil Committee Report, after the operations were concluded became an issue of ‘mud-slinging’ and politics, rather than correcting the inadequacies in the planning and direction of war. Although a number of recommendations were implemented, a few key important ones, such as the creation of the CDS, integration of the Armed Forces HQ with the MoD and greater delegation of the defence budget to the users have still been held back, more than a decade after Kargil. Even today, the modernization programme continues to suffer due to lack of political resolve and institutional weaknesses. The funds earmarked remain unutilized due to lack of decision making and are surrendered, thus adversely affecting our military capability. We still do not have an institution to render single point advice and military assessment to the Government.

Military strategy cannot be planned in a political vacuum. A clear directive regarding political intentions and objectives must be given by the national leadership. In our system the Service HQs formulate their individual operational plans; these are factored for joint-ness by the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), discussed with the Raksha-Mantri (RM) and thereafter presented to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approval. We do not have a Chief of Defence Staff [CDS] to render full-time military advice to the National Security Agency or to the CCS. The COSC is an ex-officio Committee, which operates when required in addition to their other primary tasks and cannot devote exclusive attention to the higher defence management, or to coordinate and monitor military operations on a regular basis. The three Service Chiefs meet in the COSC as equal partners and attempt consensus for agreement, which many times may not happen. The chairmanship goes to one of the Chiefs on protocol seniority, without any authority to decide on contentious issues or override dissent.

In the Kargil Conflict, as we know, the initial assessment was not correctly made due to lack of intelligence inputs since we did not – and still do not - have an integrated intelligence agency. We lost valuable time since a reasonable tactical picture emerged only after the Air photographs/ radio intercepts of the sector were made available to the Army. These were obtained by 14 May, whereas the patrol–clashes had occurred on the 5th May. The ingress had reportedly commenced in small groups, as early as January 1999, as revealed from the captured diary of a Pakistani officer after the war. There was no information of the enemy or the ground situation, to any of the intelligence agencies – military or civil. It is to the credit of the field formations, who were inducted hurriedly from all over the country, that once the gravity of the situation was discerned, they threw themselves in preparations to evict the enemy, with great effort and courage against great odds. Had there been timely information through technical sources or an independent intelligence coordination agency with an objective analysis at the highest level by the NSA/ CDS, we would not have had to react with such little preparation time, and we would not have had to lose so many fine Indian soldiers.

At the time of the Kargil War, the COSC did meet, and handled most of the issues with understanding and total cooperation and maturity but it functioned more as a briefing and information sharing meeting. The requests of the Army for employment of attack helicopters for quick retaliation on the enemy infiltrators in the initial detection were not agreed to by the IAF due to differing perceptions on their employment and the threat of shoulder-fired missiles of the intruders. The basic fact that we need quick reaction capability and information advantage over our adversary to respond appropriately was indeed realized - but was not exercised due to considerations of safety of the helicopters. Had we obtained the latest satellite-imagery, deployed unattended electronic sensors and night-vision devices in the area, we would have been forewarned and perhaps avoided the pain of loss of many gallant lives at Kargil.

The eviction of the intruders often entailed mounting frontal attacks through narrow ridges dominated by the enemy. In such a landscape, the neutralization of the enemy defence-works by our artillery achieved limited results due to the nature of the ground in the mountains. The employment of the IAF aircrafts with laser-guided munitions for ground–attacks, and the Bofors medium-caliber artillery contributed significantly in weakening the enemy’s resolve, and assisted the valiant attacks of the ground forces on these formidable heights. Although mountainous terrain does not lend to effective neutralization, nonetheless, as regularly reported in the media, there were a number of gallant attacks by our infantry units led by highly motivated young officers while evicting the enemy from their dominating position. There were many acts of heroism against great odds by the infantry units which are not being described here. The importance of physical fitness and the need for younger profile of the commanding officers in the infantry was felt for combat in battle. As always all the Indian Army units deployed for battle irrespective of their Arm or Service delivered their might fully and displayed acts of highest gallantry while re-taking or supporting the attacks on these formidable heights.

The Larger Picture

The Kargil war was significant for the impact and influence of international opinion to both sides. Kargil news–stories and war-footage were often telecast live on Indian TV and many web-sites provided in depth analysis of the conflict. It was important to project the correctness of the Indian point of view, due to Pakistani attempts of denying involvement of its forces and linking the ingress to the Kashmiri freedom-fighters and even disputing the very alignment of the LoC. This was successfully done by releasing the original maps, officially delineated at the Shimla-Agreement, the details of the signal-intercepts implicating Pakistani senior commanders, exposing the captured Pakistani soldiers and the weaponry used by the so-called irregulars. This was achieved by the dynamic diplomatic efforts of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and by our efforts to highlight Indian restraint of limiting the conflict to the international community so effectively that even China, the all-weather ally of Pakistan, did not support or intervene in this conflict. Regular briefings of foreign diplomats in India jointly by the spoke-persons of the Army, IAF and MEA as also of the Media, which acted as a force-multiplier, contributed in clearly communicating the Indian stand.

Finally, the Indian position was accepted by major international powers, the G-8 nations, the European Union and the ASEAN, but the success came at a great cost and after initial frustrations of lack of credible evidence, the slow progress of ground operations, substantiated only later by the capture of enemy held heights and the Pakistani soldiers. Two months into the conflict, the Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges, but it was the American pressure on Pakistan which hastened the pull-out from the remaining locations. At the end of the war Pakistan, looked isolated and the Indian stand stood vindicated. The media both the electronic and the print-media played a very positive role to shape the international opinion in our favour.

Since both countries were nuclear armed, many in the international community were concerned that if the conflict intensified, it could lead to a nuclear war. Pakistan reportedly threatened on May 31 that any escalation of conflict could lead to use of all arsenal at her disposal. Pakistan also accused India of using Chemical Warfare against the Kashmiri fighters. The nuclear factor was considered in-depth by the COSC and the CCS. The USA, it is understood, persuaded Pakistan to desist from deploying nuclear weapons and assured them that India had not deployed any nuclear weapons although, both sides, reportedly took some preparatory steps. The American diplomacy played an important role in the nuclear restraint by the two sides. India successfully campaigned against Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship and showcased a cache of gas masks to indicate Pakistan’s preparations of a NBC war. This was a major restraining factor in not enlarging the area of engagement beyond Kargil. Notwithstanding such public posturing, the lack of a nuclear war fighting capability was obvious on both sides. The nuclear doctrine of India itself perhaps needs a relook.

Follow-up Measures

The Kargil War has a number of lessons both for the military and for various civil institutions. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the government took a number of steps to rectify the shortcomings in the defence preparedness, following widespread media reportage about military procurement irregularities and criticism of intelligence agencies like RAW, which failed to predict the intrusions or the identity of the infiltrators. The Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) have now closed the cases of procurement irregularities due to lack of credible evidence, but the nation has lost valuable time and resources to modernize the Armed Forces. On the diplomatic front, it is interesting that relations with the USA, Russia, South Africa, Israel and France, which discreetly aided India with defence procurements, improved.

The recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee Report were on the whole addressed in a professional manner to enhance defence capability. Our political leadership then, did show considerable maturity and wisdom in carrying out institutional reforms. The needs of the Armed Forces were re-examined with particular requirement of improving their pay and allowance, looking after the battle casualties, medical and housing facilities. Some of the steps initiated to enhance defence capability are indicated below:-

(1) The MoD and the other players involved have commenced work on evolving a nuclear strategy and on integrated command and control structure. The Defence Forces have streamlined their mobilization & deployment plans. Some of the areas/sectors which were thinly held have been reinforced by raising additional forces and formations. The road network and logistics structure in the border region is being enhanced.

(2) An integrated joint staff under a new HQ has been established for greater joint-ness; however it does not enjoy any independent authority in the absence of CDS. A separate Defence Intelligence Agency for the three services and a joint procurement planning wing has been created under the integrated defence staff (IDS).

(3) A Defence Acquisition Cell and a separate defence procurement board have been created to streamline defence modernization and fast-track induction of weapon systems. However on the ground there are delays due to indecisions and fixed mind sets.

(4) Strategic forces command and amphibious forces Headquarters have been created and placed under the HQ IDS. Border surveillance and the communications systems are being upgraded. The counter-terrorism mechanism and the Intelligence Services are being re-vitalized to improve our response to security threats.

However, a few anomalies still continue in the pay and allowance and the pension entitlements of the defence forces. These, needless to say, must be settled speedily. And while, on the one hand, defence procurement procedures have been streamlined and financial powers of services enhanced, the actual defence procurements and modernization programmes have got stuck in corrupt practices and political controversies. Thus, though the Kargil conflict has made the nation aware of many shortcomings and given an impetus to security preparedness, our institutional weaknesses and political indecisions have not allowed the Armed-Forces the desired levels of modernization. The political leaders have not been able to overcome the institutional delays and implement much needed reforms.

This paper is primarily based on my personal recollections of the Kargil War as the VCOAS, and supplemented by information from A Soldier's diary: Kargil, the Inside Story, by Harinder Baweja, 2000, Books Today; and Kargil War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_War accessed on 6 May 2009

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 31 Jul 2012 21:28


ramana wrote:This thread is really about how to think geostrategically.

Nightwatch July 30, 2012

Notes for analysts:
Introduction to Strategic Intelligence Warning. DIA has announced that reconstitution of Indications and Warning is a key component of its five year plan. Warning failures associated with the Arab Spring were cited as prompting this rediscovery of old truths.

Bravo to DIA for remembering that warning is the foundation of US intelligence. Being smart is less important than being safe, as a government activity.

The Mission

Strategic intelligence warning is the one of the two primary missions of US intelligence, according to the National Security Act of 1947. The first is to use intelligence to help keep the country prosperous and safe under all circumstances. Warning is the second mission. Discussion and debate about these missions may be found in the Congressional debates and legislative history of the National Security Act.

The intent of Congress in 1947, as documented in the legislative history of the National Security Act, was that Pearl Harbor attacks should never occur again. Their prevention was the reason Congress and a very reluctant President Truman approved the US intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense and in the then-new CIA.

Every intelligence analyst who has not read the National Security Act of 1947 and National Security Council Intelligence Directive -1 (NSCID-1) is deficient.

DIA, to its great credit, is trying to get back to the foundations of US intelligence: helping keep the Republic safe by providing intelligence warning.

This and subsequent essays are devoted to presenting to DIA Readers the history and foundation of warning that is in danger of being lost and does not need to be recreated.

These essays are derived from first-hand experience in DIA's own history in the Directorate of Intelligence, J2, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and from the warning experiences of the National Indications Center, the Strategic Warning Staff, the National Warning Staff and, much later, the Office of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, established following the intelligence failures in 1973.

What is warning?

When NightWatch joined the Strategic Warning Staff in 1979, no one in the Staff or in the office of National Intelligence Officer for Warning could provide a definition of "warning." Warning was presented by a senior DIA warning officer as, "anything anyone wants to make of it."

NightWatch asked how can you ask analysts to do well what their supervisors cannot define?

An interagency group was formed by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, David Y. McManis, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, which was another major US intelligence and warning failure. The members were intelligence and policy professionals who shared the concern about the lack of precision and the three decades of strategic intelligence failures in warning. They came up with a definition which they coordinated with all intelligence and operational organizations. It was a J2 and J3 definition in the early 1980's.

The definition, which was approved unanimously in multiple National Intelligence Estimates on warning topics and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 1, The Joint Dictionary, is as follows:

"Warning is a communication about a threat in a form, a time and a fashion to decision-makers to enable them to manage the threat by deterring or avoiding it or by preparing for its occurrence."

A threat was defined as damage that will occur in a foreseeable and measurable time frame, unless it is managed.

Every word in the definition is important.

What is Surprise?

Surprise is a multiplier of other effects. It cannot be studied without reference to some other action - such as a surprise tornado or a surprise expulsion of US forces. Surprise cannot be avoided, but the damage can and the multiplier effect can be negated completely. In summary, those are the lessons documented by the DIA J2 between 1998 and 2006.


The radical departure reflected in the 1979 definition of warning can only be appreciated against earlier discussions that governed US intelligence between 1947 and 1970. The National Security Council Intelligence Directive-1 (NSCID -1) in 1950 directed all agencies to engage in warning. DCI directives implementing the NSCID defined warning as all those measures necessary to avoid surprise.

In late 1983, DCI William Casey told NIO/W McManis that he did not want to be surprised by anything. Zero tolerance for warning failure and a seamless web of warning, are the words Casey used. . Casey spoke in the language of policy-makers, not intelligence analysts.

Thirty years of trying to avoid surprise resulted in repeated surprises, during the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's plus great damage to US national security interests in those decades. The statement by the Deputy DIA Director indicates the same tired, old failures afflicted DIA analysis of the Arab Spring in 2010… needlessly.

The great breakthrough was in the late 1970's when the interagency group recognized that surprise is a multiplier of good and bad developments. In connection with threats, surprise is a multiplier of damage.

Forty years of study by the US Intelligence Community, including ten years by the DIA J2, established that surprised cannot be studied by analysts as a unique topic, but only in connection with threat, which includes damage. Surprise is an adjective in its earliest definition, as in surprise attack or surprise birthday party or surprise condition. It is a noun only in an elliptical or metaphorical sense.

Surprise also refers to the alertness and readiness condition of US intelligence, not the actions of the intelligence target.

Many academic writers and 60 plus years of National Warning Staff and DIA J2 experience in strategic intelligence warning have established that surprise is not avoidable, but damage is.

The lessons of the National Warning Staff and the DIA J2 are that by concentrating on avoiding surprise, as an analytical challenge, the analysts will surely be surprise! However, by focusing on the potential damage --the threat -- the damage and the surprise condition both can be avoided.

Secondly, if damage cannot be avoided or occurs under conditions of surprise but US intelligence and US forces are warned and on alert, damage will be de minimis because early warning enabled readiness.

Indicators …

Analysis of symptoms, or indicators, is the oldest structured analytical technique in US intelligence history and it works with incredible accuracy. -- at least 90% accuracy in the DIA J2 experience.

For example, an indicator of the strength of the al Asad regime is that it not only cleared neighborhoods in Damascus, but also mounted a major attack against neighborhoods in Aleppo. in less than a week. This regime is not yet in danger of collapse. An indicator of its pending collapse would be abandonment of Aleppo to defend Damascus.

Qualitative indicators indicate processes at work. Quantitative indicators do not work. They were tried for three generations after World War II and failed.

Qualitative -- living systems -- indicators indicate that Syria, as a living system, is healthier than western media report. because it can defend its center and its key assets outside the center. The indicators indicate shrinkage, but not that collapse is imminent.

The 60 years of experience in analysis of indicators in US intelligence warning will be addressed in a future essay.

Now lets re-read the article by Lt Gen. Chandrasekhar and try to make sense.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Paul » 01 Aug 2012 02:44

Can Game theory scenarios be used to Warn of oncoming threats?

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby rajatmisra » 04 Aug 2012 21:51

The article by VCoAS states that Satellite photographs and air Photographs were of inadequate resolution. This is surprising. What about the foxbats - were they used?
Do we have any recce air crafts or satellites capable of enough resolution photographs currently or not?

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby member_23658 » 14 Aug 2012 20:15

Interview with Yogendra Singh Yadav PVC. What an amazing man :
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/s ... 120814.htm

Twenty-two highly-trained men approached the Pakistan-occupied peak via a vertical cliff at an altitude of 16,500 feet.

The Param Vir Chakra citation said Yadav 'Unmindful of the danger involved, volunteered to lead and fix the rope for his team to climb up. On seeing the team, the enemy opened intense automatic, grenade, rocket and artillery fire, killing the commander and two of his colleagues and the platoon was stalled. Realising the gravity of the situation, Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav crawled up to the enemy position to silence it and in the process sustained multiple bullet injuries. Unmindful of his injuries and in the hail of enemy bullets, Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav continued climbing towards the enemy positions, lobbed grenades, continued firing from his weapons and killed four enemy soldiers in close combat and silenced the automatic fire.'

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby nakul » 14 Aug 2012 20:25

Here is a more colorful description

Yogendra Singh Yadav was a member of an Indian grenadier battalion during a conflict with Pakistan in 1999. Their mission was to climb "Tiger Hill" (actually a big-ass mountain), and neutralize the three enemy bunkers at the top. Unfortunately, this meant climbing up a sheer hundred-foot cliff-face of solid ice. Since they didn't want to all climb up one at a time with ice-axes, they decided they'd send one guy up, and he'd fasten the ropes to the cliff as he went, so everyone else could climb up the sissy way. Yadav, being awesome, volunteered.

Half way up the icy cliff-o'-doom, enemies stationed on an adjacent mountain opened fire, shooting them with an RPG, then spraying assault-rifle fire all over the cliff. Half his squad was killed, including the commander, and the rest were scattered and disorganized. Yadav, in spite of being shot three times, kept climbing.

When he reached the top, one of the target bunkers opened fire on him with machine guns. Yadav ran toward the hail of bullets, pitched a grenade in the window and killed everyone inside. By this point the second bunker had a clear shot and opened fire, so he ran at them, taking bullets while he did, and killed the four heavily-armed men inside with his bare hands.

Meanwhile, the remainder of his squad was standing at the top of the cliff staring at him saying, "dude, holy shit!" They then all went and took the third bunker with little trouble.

For his gallantry and sheer ballsiness, he was awarded the Param Vir Chakra, India's highest military award. Unlike the Medal of Honor, the Param Vir Chakra is only given for "rarest of the rare gallantry which is beyond the call of duty and which in normal life is considered impossible to do." That's right, you actually have to break the laws of reality just to be eligible.

It has only been awarded 21 times, and two thirds of the people who earned it died in the process. It was initially reported that Yadav had as well, but it turns out that they just mistook him for someone less badass. Or they just figured no real human being could survive a broken leg, shattered arm and 10-15 fresh bullet holes in one sitting.

From: 5 Real Life Soldiers Who Make Rambo Look Like a Pussy | Cracked.com http://www.cracked.com/article_17019_5- ... z23X7odR7e

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby member_23658 » 14 Aug 2012 20:43

Haha, good one.
By the way, the interview link has a lot more details in his own words on what actually happened. His group was ambushed by a much larger paki force and 6 of the 7 jawans were killed after sending 10-12 pakis to meet their 72. the surviving pakis pumped the dead jawans and yogendra with bullets to make sure they were dead. He got arround 15 bullets, pretended to be dead, evesdropped on the enemy plans, then lobbed a grenade and shot a few chaps, and made it back to the camp below with a broken arm and 15 bullets in him, to report what he had overheard. Mindboggling superhuman stuff.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Prem Kumar » 15 Aug 2012 22:21

Another badass description of Yadav's bravery. Colorful, to say the least. It has details of where he took the bullets & how he busted Porki ass. Not sure of the authenticity of the details but fun reading.


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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby arijitkm » 06 Sep 2012 23:28

Call to reign in Pak’s armed forces’ ‘adventurism’ following Kashmir, Kargil debacle

The Pakistan Senate has been told to put a halt to the “adventurism” of the armed forces and set them on the right path in order to improve the law and order situation in Quetta, Karachi and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Awami National Party (ANP) senator Abdul Nabi Bangash said even though Pakistan was going to celebrate Defense Day on Thursday today, the citizens “should not forget that top officials of the armed forces are doing adventurism”.

“In the Kargil War, several Pakistani soldiers and officials sacrificed their lives and capture the Kargil area. Col. Sher Khan and others sacrificed their lives for the sake of country, but later every thing was forgotten,” the Daily Times quoted Bangash, as saying.

“Today, neither the Kashmir issue nor the other disputes with the neighbouring country are resolved. Kashmir and other issues were intentionally not resolved because after it there will be no justification for the massive security forces,” he said.

“From General Ayub Khan to Musharraf, all played havoc with the country,” he further added.

After the Kargil dispute, the then Pakistani army chief and his commanders refused to accept bodies of Col Sher Khan and others. The Pakistani forces accepted their bodies when the Indian Army said that they were going to honour them with Indian awards,” he said.

Bangash suggested that the forces’ budget should be presented in parliament.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby VinodTK » 22 Sep 2012 18:49

Kargil war was a poor test of India's air warfare capability: US think-tank
WASHINGTON: Kargil conflict was a "poor test" of India's air warfare capability, a prominent US think-tank has said, warning that with threats of future wars with Pakistan and China persisting, Indian defence establishment has to prepare accordingly.

"Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, the IAF's fighter pilots were restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they had more room for maneuver," said the think-tank in a report released yesterday.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 22 Sep 2012 21:00

Thats dumb when you consider Kargil was mainly a ground war in the high mountains!

Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War
By Benjamin Lambeth

Benjamin Lambeth is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a position he assumed in 2011 after a thirty-seven- year career at the RAND Corporation. A longtime specialist in international security affairs and air warfare, he holds a doctorate in political science from Harvard University and served previously in the Office of National Estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency.

High in the mountains of Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1999, India and Pakistan fought in an intense border clash for limited but important stakes. Overshadowed by NATO’s higher-profile air war for Kosovo, the Kargil War ensued for seventy-four days at a cost of more than a thousand casualties on each side. Yet it remains only dimly appreciated by most Western defense experts—and barely at all by students and practitioners of airpower.

Nevertheless, it was a milestone event in Indian military history and one that represents a telling prototype of India’s most likely type of future combat challenge. The Kargil conflict was emblematic of the kind of lower-intensity border skirmish between India and Pakistan, and perhaps also between India and China, that could recur in the next decade in light of the inhibiting effect of nuclear weapons on more protracted and higher-stakes tests of strength.

The experience offers an exemplary case study in the uses of airpower in joint warfare in
high mountain conditions and is key to a full understanding of India’s emerging air posture.
It is the one instance of recent Indian exposure to high-intensity warfare that provides
insights into the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) capabilities, limitations, relations with its
sister services, and interactions with India’s civilian leadership.

In the Kargil War, the IAF
rapidly adapted to the air
campaign’s unique operational
which included
enemy positions at elevations
of 14,000 to 18,000 feet,
a stark backdrop of rocks
and snow that made for uncommonly difficult visual target acquisition, and a restriction
against crossing the Line of Control that forms the border with Pakistan.
question, the effective asymmetric use of IAF airpower was pivotal in shaping the war’s
successful course and outcome for India. Yet the conflict also highlighted some of India’s
military shortcomings.
The covert Pakistani intrusion into Indian-controlled Kashmir
that was the casus belli laid bare a gaping hole in India’s nationwide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability that had allowed the incursion to go undetected
for many days. It further brought to light the initial near-total lack of transparency
and open communication between the Indian Army’s top leaders and the IAF with
respect to the gathering crisis

All things considered, the conflict was a poor test of India’s air warfare capability.
Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, the IAF’s fighter pilots were
restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They
were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they
had more room for maneuver.

On a strategic level, the Kargil War vividly demonstrated that a stable bilateral nuclear
deterrence relationship can markedly inhibit such regional conflicts in intensity and
scale—if not preclude them altogether. In the absence of the nuclear stabilizing factor,
those flash points could erupt into open-ended conventional showdowns for the highest
stakes. But the Kargil War also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is not a panacea.

The possibility of future conventional wars of major consequence along India’s northern
borders with Pakistan and China persists,
and the Indian defense establishment must
plan and prepare accordingly.

US think-tank asks India to prepare against threats along northern b

US think-tank asks India to prepare against threats along northern borders

http://timesofindia .indiatimes. com/india/ US-think- tank-asks- India-to- prepare-against- threats-along- northern- borders/articles how/16498003. cms

Indian defence establishment 'must plan and prepare accordingly' for the possibility of future conventional wars with Pakistan and China, a US think-tank has said.

NEW DELHI: Holding that the possibility of future conventional wars of major consequence along India's northern borders with Pakistan and China persists, a prominent US think-tank says the Indian defence establishment "must plan and prepare accordingly" .

In a 70-page report titled, "Airpower at 18,000: The IAF in the Kargil war", the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says the 1999 Indo-Pak conflict demonstrated on a strategic level that a stable bilateral nuclear deterrence relationship can markedly inhibit such regional conflicts in intensity and scale - if not preclude them altogether.

"In the absence of the nuclear stabilizing factor, those flash points could erupt into open-ended conventional showdowns for the highest stakes," it says. But the study goes on to add that the Kargil war "also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is not a panacea", and consequently India must plan and prepare for the future.

The study also underlines — as is well-documented by now — some of India's military shortcomings. For instance, the gaping holes in the country's real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability that allowed the incursion by Pakistani Army regulars and others "to go undetected for many days".

"It further brought to light the initial near-total lack of transparency and open communication between the Indian Army's top leaders and the IAF with respect to the gathering crisis. All things considered, the conflict was a poor test of India's air warfare capability," it says.

As earlier reported by TOI, the then Army and IAF chiefs, General V P Malik and Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, squabbled with each other over the conduct of operations. Gen Malik has written how ACM Tipnis was reluctant to use airpower in the initial days of the conflict.

ACM Tipnis went on record to retort that an "embarrassed" Army was initially reluctant "to reveal the full gravity" of the situation, arising from the presence of Pakistani intruders in the Kargil heights, to the government. As the conflict progressed, both Army and IAF, however, got their act together. IAF pitched in with ground strikes by its MiG-21s, MiG-27s and Mirage-2000s to help Indian soldiers evict the Pakistanis from the icy heights. :eek:

The study says, "Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, IAF's fighter pilots were restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they had more room for manoeuvre."

Again an article to dissect Indian capabilites in the absence of Indian analysis.

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