Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[Samudragupta]

The US designation of Afghanistan as its major non-Nato ally not only reinforces the essence of the US-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed early May, but also shows its commitment to the stability, or in other words, emergence of Afghanistan. The US is keen to make it amply clear to the neighbours of Afghanistan that it (Afghanistan) is not to be abandoned this time around, so they better give up hope to manoeuvre to their advantage its internal affairs at the cost of its stability and prosperity.

The designation followed by donors’ pledges of $ 16 billion should be added to several other facts, which point to the most probable emergence of Afghanistan. First is the sustainable structure and, thus far, effective working of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the intelligence agency of Afghanistan. So far, its output is that its existence has begun to be felt in the region and no cracks or internal rifts in its structure are reported. In the modern complex and globalised world, an intelligence agency has a very significant role to play in the stability and security of any state. In matters of security, it is reckoned as the real powerhouse and brain of a state.

The NDS has been successfully repulsing some of the brutal/bloody attacks on government installations. It has captured and unmasked several key Taliban commanders who are now in its custody. More spectacular was the role it seemingly played in co-opting and re-socialising them and having their desertion ceremonies widely covered by media. The fleeing Taliban would talk to media about the way they, as per their claim, were misguided and exploited and their sheer patriotic sentiment impelled them to surrender before the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). They would spew poison against the ISI and Pakistan and would attribute all dirt to them. It is quite easy to discern from the videos, which are available on the internet, that the proverbial brain is behind the whole project. The idea behind the project is to enjoin upon fellow countrymen to hate the Taliban as proxies of neighbours, and for stability and prosperity look towards President Karzai and co.

Besides that, it claimed after the May 2, 2011 operation to have been the first to trace Osama bin Laden and tip off crucial information to the US, which led to his killing. No state dared to disprove the claim. Afghanistan’s realistic response to critical issues like cross-border terrorism and regional strategic game-play seems to be based on concrete policy input from this emerging institution. The NDS owes this brilliance to the fact that it has been working with the CIA for 10 long years in a state (Afghanistan) that has been the focal point of regional intelligence agencies for more than three decades. It will gain more strength as it has to work with the agency for the next ten years.

Moreover, the ANSF is all set to take operational control from foreign forces by 2014. It is fighting against the Taliban determinedly, and its credibility with the average Afghan is building rapidly. Those who are waiting for the ANSF to fall apart are always quick to warn that it will not be able to exert control over peripheral areas from where the insurgents could stage a forceful comeback and ignite a bloody civil war, which will only be a matter of time. After all, Pakistan, Turkey and even China among other developed states, have failed to control the peripheral areas. For Afghanistan having started from scratch, this should not be projected as a singularly huge issue.

By the end of 2014, Afghanistan will have a 350,000 strong security force, which will not be though in line with the standard counterinsurgency models but also not much less satisfactory. Afghan security forces are leading 40 percent of operations nationwide. These soldiers are “better than we thought”, says General John Allen, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan. The forces are also greatly helped by the growing unpopularity of the Taliban who want to backdate Afghanistan to 2000. For a 30 million population, a force consisting of 350,000 personnel is enough.

Third, the strategic agreements Afghanistan has signed with different states, especially with the US and India, not only provide strategic and political safeguards for its emergence but also facilitate the process. The major threat to the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan is not incompetence or inactiveness of Afghans but the destructive interference of the regional states. The emergence of Afghanistan is guaranteed if regional states are stopped from interfering in its internal affairs. Squarely this is the objective Afghanistan’s strategic agreements with the US and India are targeted at.

It is easy to discern from the tone and tenor of the Afghan-US SPA that its prime objective is to pass a strong message to Afghanistan’s neighbours that ‘if you mess with Afghanistan you will be messing with the US’. The designation of Afghanistan as a non-NATO ally reinforced this message. The Indo-Afghan strategic agreement has more to do with building the ANA and general development than withmessages to the regional states. These three states — Afghanistan, the US and India — are getting closer every day and their strategic flirting is all about the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has signed similar agreements with Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Australia.

There are certain other facts that support the notion of emergence of Afghanistan. Over the past 10 years, 4,000 schools have been built and 1,000,000 new teachers recruited. Today, girls make up 37 percent of the seven million students in primary and secondary schools. The co-educational American University is also working unhindered. Every year 52 Afghan students go to the US for higher study as Fulbright Scholars.

Afghanistan’s GDP has more than tripled in the last decade, averaging “around nine percent a year, with notable gains in infrastructure, telecommunications, and financial and business services”. There is every probability that Afghanistan is going to emerge as a normal and stable state. Will it be allowed to emerge is to be seen. With the US and the international community sincere in draining the swamp in the region, the onus is on the regional states to welcome the emergence of Afghanistan as a win-win situation for both the region and individual states. Instability in Afghanistan will feed terrorism, which is eating into the stability and prosperity of the region.

IS the TSPA accepting defeat?

[shyamd]

No way. They will launch an offensive when the time is right. We must prepare.

In their eyes they just defeated US, now will they stop for India/Russia/Iran ?

[Samudragupta]

India "should spare no effort, politically, diplomatically, economically and through military assistance to ensure that Pakistani efforts to convert Afghanistan into an extremist run, pliant and client state are frustrated".

Naresh Chandra Panel recommendation....i think that is consistent with what u hv posted....

[shyamd]

^^ No one understands the scale that we are intervening to help our friends in Afghanistan.. We are at war.

Behind the Lines: Afghani hearts and minds

By JOANNA PARASZCZUK
07/26/2012 22:37
Developing Afghanistan’s civil society could counter Iran’s growing influence in the region, experts say.
A MAN buys an ‘Ensaf’ newspaper at a kiosk in Kabu Photo: REUTERS
Israel and the US should consider whether a fresh approach to Afghanistan could provide them with strategic advantages in the region, a new report published by Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies recommends.

The report comes in the wake of calls by former US under secretary of defense for policy Michèle Flournoy for the two countries to strengthen their links with Afghan civilian leaders and the country’s nascent civil society.

Report co-author Gilead Sher, a senior INSS research associate and former Prime Minister’s Office chief of staff, said that he and his colleague, new media expert Orit Perlov, examined Afghanistan’s civil society to reveal where Israel and the US could forge future alliances to counter the Iranian threat.

Considering strategies to engage regional actors in Afghanistan to counter Iran’s influence in the region is highly important, Sher said because Tehran has openly threatened to eliminate Israel with the help of its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas.

That Iran has considerable influence over its former Taliban-dominated eastern neighbor is unsurprising since the two countries share a border as well as historic, religious, cultural and linguistic ties.

Since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001, Iran has invested heavily in Afghanistan’s infrastructure, particularly in the country’s western provinces, providing almost $1 billion in aid. Now, as the US and NATO forces prepare to withdraw their troops beginning in 2014, Tehran is ramping up its efforts to exert leverage over Afghanistan.

According to Ahmad Khalid Majidyar, a senior research associate in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Tehran continues to use Afghanistan as a proxy battlefield against the US, although Washington has tried to seek Iran’s help to stabilize Afghanistan.

Majidyar added that over the past decade, Iran has provided the Taliban with “measured” financial, training and arms assistance, both to project power and to deter the US from considering a military strike against Tehran’s nuclear installations.

However, Iran does not want a return of the extremist Sunni Taliban movement, which is ideologically and politically opposed to Shi’a Iran and is aligned with Tehran’s regional competitors Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Majidyar said.

“By aiding the insurgents in Afghanistan, Tehran wants to send a message to Washington that it could undermine its efforts to stabilize Afghanistan if it is threatened militarily over its nuclear issue,” he added.

As well as developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure, Iran has made serious attempts to make inroads via “soft power” methods, including bribing Afghan politicians to impact policies in favor of Iran, assisting and organizing Shi’a groups and funding pro- Iran charities like the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, Majidyar noted.

“Iran has also invested considerable amounts in pro-Iranian and anti-American print and broadcast media in Afghanistan,” he added.

A report this month by Reuters claimed that almost one third of Afghanistan’s media is backed by Iran either financially or through content provision.

In April, Afghanistan’s National Directorate for Security announced that several Afghan TV channels and a news agency received financial support from Tehran and that the Tamadon and Noor TV channels had broadcast pro-regime propaganda.

National Directorate for Security spokesman Lotfullah Mashal also said that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard-affiliated Fars News and the state-owned PressTV are both operating illegally in Afghanistan.

Iran’s increasing influence over Afghanistan’s media could have serious implications for the US and Israel, regional analysts say.

Steven Kleinman, a former US intelligence officer and director of strategic research at the Soufan Group security consultancy, warned that the US and Israel must take Tehran’s influence over Afghan media seriously.

“While most people think warfare is about physical weaponry, the end state of those devices in the physical realm has always been about influencing the cognitive realm: decision-making, morale and the population’s belief in a sovereign to protect them,” Kleinman said.

“The sage use of the media is simply a far more direct and cost-effective means of achieving through the airwaves what was once only achieved on the battlefield. And if there is one thing those inside the Islamic Revolution in Iran have learned, it is how to influence minds on a large scale,” he added.

Meanwhile, INSS’s Sher also called Tehran’s sponsorship of Afghan media “a source of serious concern.”

However, analysts stress that even though Iran has upped its efforts to influence Afghans’ hearts and minds, Tehran has so far failed to derail Kabul’s ties with the West.

Despite Tehran’s push to step up its influence by exporting ideology, there is considerable tension between the two countries.

Part of the tension stems from Afghanistan’s desire to be an independent country, while Iran has viewed the presence of NATO forces in its neighbor with great suspicion.

In March, Afghan leaders accused Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of “blatant interference in Afghan affairs” after he blamed US troops for “all the ills in Afghanistan” during a regional conference in Tajikistan.

Following that incident, Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s spokesman told Radio Free Europe that his country did not want to be a “battleground for a US-Iran conflict.”

Tehran-Kabul tensions also grew after Afghanistan signed a long-term strategic agreement with the US on May 1, signifying that Washington is prepared to continue supporting Afghanistan after troops withdraw, and raising Iran’s fears that the US would establish permanent military bases in the country.

Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said the agreement would “intensify insecurity and instability in Afghanistan.”

Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Afghanistan’s Tolo News last week that Iran wants to help train Afghan national security forces.

Salehi said that Kabul and Tehran are in the process of “drafting a strategic agreement” that would boost cooperation between the two countries after the withdrawal of foreign troops and that Iran has a demonstrable interest in Afghanistan’s future, Tolo News said.

Salehi referred to a May agreement Tehran signed with Kabul granting access to international waters via Iran’s Chabahar Port.

Meanwhile, Chabahar Port Authority CEO Shahbaz Yazdani told reporters this month that Iran wants to build a railway network connecting the port with Zahedan on the Iran-Afghan border.

Despite Iran’s best efforts, regional experts say Afghans still look to the West, and not to Iran, for guidance.

AEI’s Majidyar noted that the Loya Jirga, Afghanistan’s grand assembly of tribal leaders, the country’s parliament and civil society unanimously backed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States.

Meanwhile, INSS’s Perlov said that after following around 160 Afghan blogs, key themes that emerged included Afghans’ keenness to explore relationships with the West, including via Israel.

Although Afghanistan mostly lacks an intellectual middle class, Perlov says her research uncovered a small but lively Internet and social networking culture that she said sheds light onto Afghans’ attitudes to key issues.

Afghan bloggers talk more about India and Pakistan than about Iran, and while Israel is not at the center of their attention, they see the Jewish state as a gateway to the West, she said.

“Afghans had no fear about talking to Israelis,” Perlov noted.

Afghan civil society may be weak, but it is growing – and activists are also using the media as a tool to influence.

The Kandahar-based nonprofit group Afghans for Civil Society, for example, has established the city’s first independent radio station, Afghan Azada (“Liberty”) Radio, which trains local journalists while offering news, Afghan history, music and information on other issues like health and education.

Meanwhile, aid from the US, the West and regional countries also reduces Iran’s influence over Afghanistan.

Perlov noted that one way for Israel to develop its ties to Afghanistan could be via India, whose soft power in Afghanistan is on the increase.

Mumbai – which has geographical as well as historical, cultural and commercial ties with Kabul – has already provided Afghanistan with over $2 billion in aid and, in October, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed agreements with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to help train Afghanistan’s security services as well as to provide aid with education, development and energy.

“Afghans want connections with the West,” Perlov said – an observation supported by AEI’s Majidyar, who warns that Iran is ultimately seeking to block those ties.

“The majority of Afghans still would rather be partners with the Western nations than with their immediate neighbors, Iran and Pakistan,” Majidyar said.

“But as foreign troops are withdrawing, Iran has doubled up its efforts to change that equation.” •

Many of the projects that Iran is talking about to Afghanistan is Indian backed! Good to see that Iran wants to train the ANSF - anything to remove TSP influence from there and Iran actually holds the keys here.

However, the US/Israeli strikes will cause short term negative consequences. Long term US/Iran could be aligned if India can broker an understanding. Hillary says they are already talking to Iran on Afghanistan.

Tehran Builds on Outreach to Taliban

By MARIA ABI-HABIB

KABUL—Iran has allowed the Taliban to open an office in eastern Iran and discussed providing them with surface-to-air missiles, ramping up the potential for cooperation with the insurgents, according to senior Afghan and Western officials.

Iran's shift came after the U.S. and Afghanistan sealed a long-term partnership agreement in May, and in an effort to expand its options for retaliation should its nuclear facilities be attacked, the officials said.

Iran, a Shiite theocracy, wasn't friendly with the Sunni Taliban government ousted by the U.S. in 2001 and hasn't permitted an official Taliban presence in the country until now. But these days both sides "see America as the bigger enemy" a Western official in Kabul said.

"Iran is willing to put aside ideology and put aside deeply held religious values…for their ultimate goal: accelerating the departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan," the official said.

The Iranian Embassy in Kabul and consulate in Herat, in western Afghanistan near the border with Iran, didn't respond to requests for comment.

A member of the Taliban's leadership council, the Quetta Shura, set up an office in the eastern Iranian city of Zahedan in late May, according to a senior Western diplomat in Kabul and a senior Afghan official. Zahedan sits near the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan and on an easy transit route from the Pakistani city of Quetta, where the Taliban leadership is based.

The office is intended to allow Iran to coordinate with the Taliban against the U.S., the officials said.

In intercepted communications in early July, members of the Quds Force, a special unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, discussed plans to send surface-to-air missiles to insurgents in Afghanistan, according to the Western official. There is no information that Iran has delivered such missiles to the insurgents, Western officials said.

A U.S. decision to supply such missiles to the mujahedeen in the 1980s proved a game changer during the Soviet occupation, precipitating a Soviet withdrawal.

Iran has allowed the Taliban to open an office in eastern Iran and discussed providing them with surface-to-air missiles.

The U.S. has committed to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, but will maintain bases, mostly for special forces, after that.

The possible introduction of surface-to-air missiles should be seen as Iran's contingency planning if its nuclear facilities are attacked by Israel or America, coalition officials say. The Obama administration has described such a strike as an option if Iran proceeds with nuclear weapons production; Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

The dozens of U.S. bases in Afghanistan are on Iran's doorstep, and would be the most effective way for Iran to strike back if it is attacked first, officials say.

"Something significant would have to change…a strike against the home nation," for Iran to introduce surface-to-air missiles, a senior coalition military official in Kabul said. "Then, red lines will be crossed and things will probably change."

The official said the Iranians continue to provide "low-level lethal support" and training in Iran to the insurgency, but hold back from supplying "signature weapons" such as the explosively-formed penetrator, or EFP, mines that were widely used by pro-Iranian insurgents against U.S. troops in Iraq. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul declined to comment.

The increase in Iranian support for the Taliban comes after Tehran failed in its campaign to scuttle the U.S.-Afghan agreement in May, which establishes long-term U.S. military presence here post-2014.

Iran's ambassador to Kabul at the time urged Afghan lawmakers to vote against the agreement, and threatened economic reprisals such as the expulsion of millions of Afghans working in Iran if they didn't. The warning caused a public uproar in Afghanistan. Both houses of parliament proceeded to ratify the pact, and the Iranian ambassador was recalled in a low point in relations between the two countries under Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

In June, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad escalated the issue, warning Mr. Karzai during a meeting at a regional conference in Beijing that Afghan civilians living around U.S. bases should be removed "for their own safety," according to senior Afghan officials familiar with the conversation.

Afghanistan's intelligence service in July said Iran was sending infiltrators into the country among the hundreds of Afghan refugees it deports every month, according to a Western military official who read the classified report. That coincides with what Western and Afghan officials say is increased Iranian surveillance of coalition military bases and U.S. government infrastructure in Afghanistan.

"Iran is the only neighboring country opposed to the Strategic Partnership Agreement," said a senior Afghan official close to Mr. Karzai. "Afghanistan is determined to have friendly and deep brotherly relations with Iran and this is our policy."
—Yaroslav Trofimov and Ziaulhaq Sultani contributed to this article.

[ramana]

US is in covert war with Iran since before fall of Shah of Iran. The beneficiaries has been Sunni/Arab/TSP.

[Johann]

The first two years of the Carter administration's overall foreign and defence policy were thoroughly incoherent because there were two competing factions and Carter exercised little leadership over them.

The hawks of the Carter administration like Brzeziski were all pro-Shah.

The State Department on the other hand was anti-Shah.

What the embassy hostage crisis did ultimately was destroy the anti-Shah, pro-revolution wing.

When the US and the Shah were close and Iranian oil revenues high (1967-77), the Gulf Sheikhdoms played a distinctly secondary role in the region.

The loss of the Shah made the US much more dependent on the Sheikhdoms, and their permanent fear ever since (especially since 9/11 and Iraq) has been that the US and Iran will resume their interrupted relationship.

[brihaspati]

Johann,
the anti-Shah faction is alleged by a section of the admin of having engineered the expulsion of the Shah, arranging for conveying Khomeini from safe haven in a NATO nation to Iran, and even allowing the hostage taking to spped up the exlusion fo Carter - and then promptly go for the secret contra deal and release.

Under that scenario, getting rid of the shah therefore was part of the admin or more accurately the establishments long term gaming.

[brihaspati]

Many moons ago, even the Aghan Taleb's/jihadis turn towards India was summarily dismissed by claiming that there was going to be no real "withdrawal" by US from AFG. Even after the the formal "withdrawal" in 2014 - the insinuation was that US military intervention capabilities would remain the same!

If we are so cocksure of US military stranglehold presence remains there, and the billions being invested in AFG by India, and all the training being given militarily to Afghan security forces are so effective - why the fear of jihadis turning their sweet attention to J&K? Surely GCC and the Saudis will come to the hep fo their increasingy-close friends in Delhi, and order the Pakis to desist!

[Johann]

Johann,
the anti-Shah faction is alleged by a section of the admin of having engineered the expulsion of the Shah, arranging for conveying Khomeini from safe haven in a NATO nation to Iran, and even allowing the hostage taking to spped up the exlusion fo Carter - and then promptly go for the secret contra deal and release.

Under that scenario, getting rid of the shah therefore was part of the admin or more accurately the establishments long term gaming.

B,

The oil boom after 1967 gave the Shah the resources to be an absolute monarch.

The realpolitik elements of the American establishment like Kissinger and after him Brzezski had no problem with that. They also saw no alternative to the Shah, and backed him to the hilt throughout the crisis. They stayed personally loyal in their friendships after the fall as well.

Liberals in the State Dept on the other hand not only disliked absolute monarchy ideologically, they saw absolute monarchy as unsustainable given the massive growth of the middle class and political consciousness all the way down to the villages.

Their American liberals connection was to people close to Mossadegh, especially Bazargan - liberal nationalists who were also practicing Muslims.

The Khomeinists in their power struggle with the liberal nationalists had to destroy Bazargan's relationship with America in order to destroy Bazargan. That is what the embassy hostage crisis was really about initially. However what it did was destroy the people the people on the other end of the relationship as as well - the liberal State Dept types sympathetic to the revolution overall.

The American realpolitikers had lost their connection to Iran when the Shah fell and the monarchists either fled or were purged, and the American liberals lost it when Bazargan and his allies were purged.

There were a lot of faulty assumptions in both Iran and the US that led to the situation. American liberals didn't understand the politics inside the Muslim wing of the revolution, and had no idea how vulnerable Bazargan was, or how ruthless the Khomeinists were. That was exposed during the embassy crisis, and it permanently destroyed their credibility in the US with regards to anything to with Iran. On the Khomeinists side there was no idea that this would have a lasting effect on US-Iranian relations.

The only comparison I can make is the way that American liberals supported the Mao and the Communist revolution in China, until they were destroyed at home by the Korean war and the ferocity of Mao's anti-American rhetoric and action. Throughout this American hawks supported Chiang Kai Shek to the hilt. The 1948-68 US-PRC mutual diplomatic freeze and hostility is very much like Iran and the US after the embassy crisis.

That is exactly why the Gulf states know and fear the possibility of a 'Nixon goes to China' moment, and the geopolitical earthquake it would represent. Ultimately it was the Mao facing Soviet pressure that decided they couldn't simultaneously afford permanent hostility with the US anymore. In the same way it going to have to be Khamenei, or the next 'Supreme Leader' who decides they can not afford permanent hostility with the US. Either that or the system crumbles from within like Poland with Solidarity versus the Party.

Either way, the Gulf states know that the odds favor eventual US-Iranian rapprochement, and they fear what that means. Iraq used to be their fallback defence, but the US insistence on overthrowing Saddam and allowing elections meant that Iraq has been lost to the Shia. That is something they still haven't forgiven the Americans for.

So what are the Gulf monarchies left without Iraq? Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is why the Gulf states will continue to fund Sunni extremism within Pakistan and Afghanistan. They need hundreds of millions of frothing Sunni fundamentalists available on call.

In the long term, India's willingness to act as a regional balancer trusted by the Saudis and Emiratis is important to regional stability. It is the only alternative to Gulf dependence on Sunni fundamentalism in Af-Pak.

[member_23692]

^^^^ great analysis. One of the best I have read on this forum

Americans have missed many opportunities over the past twenty years or so to bring about "a Nixon goes to China" moment vis-a-vis Iran. They could have had openings with the likes of Ali akbar Rafsanjani, Ali Khatemi and even with Ahmedinajad, if they had played their cards right, but they were too blinded by the pro-Sunni lobby which has suprisingly gained significant influence over the last 30 years or so. The presence and influence of this lobby is not well known and not well understood, as this lobby mainly consists of red white and blue American executives, large and influential corporations, and even Wall Street types, who all have co-mingled their business and financial affairs with the Gulf Arabs to the extent of having a sick co-dependence on them. This is what oil money accumulated over the past 70-80 years has bought these Gulf Emirates. It is this same lobby that keeps Pakistan in business.

Eventually, if the West or even the rest of the non-Islamic world including China(who seems to think it is immune to massive Islamic invasions and conversions) has to have any chance against the Islamic hordes and savages overrunning everything and taking the world back to the stone age (look at the Pushtoon portion of Afghanistan, the tribal areas of Pak and the entire Pak in general for a preview of what that world might look like), the Americans will have no choice but to bring about a rapproachment with the Shias, align with them to decimate the Sunnis, and thereby bringing about a forced "reformation" within the Islamic world lead by the already relatively slightly more moderate Shias. Once that happens and "co-existence" replaces "Jihad" as one of the tenets of the new reformed Islam, the world may have a chance to evolve to a more civilized state.

The Americans are making a huge mistake by coddling these Sunnis and delaying an alliance with the Shias under the influence of its powerful pro-Sunni lobby, which is really preventing the Washington policy circles from thinking straight. If they were to think straight, they would very easily see the obvious, that it is the Sunnis whose brand of fundamentalism is an anethema to the West and it is the Sunnis that hate everyone else and that it is the Sunnis who think nothing of slitting people throats in a "halal" manner (slowly) and it is part of the Deobandis and the Salafis who are the most intolerant and it is their hidden agenda to convert the whole world and go back to the caves. If the Americans think straight, and with a clear lense not dirtied with Gulf Arab oil and money, then they would not be confounded by Paki "treachery". Paki behaviour will then be perfectly understandable and predictable, once they understand the true nature of the Sunnis. And then, never again will they make the mistake of going into Iraq of even Afghanistan to tackle radical Islam, instead they would squeeze the Pakis(the body of the snake) and the Saudis(the head of the snake).

But time is running out. The Sunni Islamic Caveman is on the march. They have the energy on their side and the oil money to buttress that energy and to buy influence in all the right places. Will the Americans realize in time what a deadly disease these Wahabis are and wake up to ally with the Shias ? I give them a 50-50 chance. If and when that happens it will be the West, the Shias, the Chinese and the Russians against these Cavemen Sunnis and where will India stand in all of this ? Under “domestic vote bank compulsions” and with memories of colonial time atrocities still alive and Indians being Indians (suspicious by nature, second guessing everything, refusing to believe in anything and having tendencies of extracting defeat from the jaws of victory), we will be “NON-Aligned”!

Otherwise, if everything in the world worked as it should, and if God exists and God is good, then there is no better time and there is no better country than India to play a "Pakistan" in the American's "Nixon goes to China" moment with Iran. India, however, will never step up to the plate and right now, and it seems at the moment at least, the Americans are also doing an "India" to themselves.

[Samudragupta]

odds favor eventual US-Iranian rapprochement

Why?

[member_23692]

odds favor eventual US-Iranian rapprochement

Why?

Please read my post above to see the exact and direct answer to your question. If you have two enemies, always align with the weaker of the two to finish the stronger off.

[Johann]

Samudragupta,

Firstly, US and Iranian differences are not as deep as they seem.

Secondly, many revolutions, and the revolutionary dictatorships that follow need external enemies for a variety of reasons, but those reasons can and do pass over time.

R Sangam,

It is true that the US has missed opportunities but I wouldn't say that the ball lies in the American court when it comes to Iran any more than it lay in the American court when it came to the PRC. It is the dictators that must decide where their interests lie.

The biggest roadblock to US-Iranian normalisation is that both Khomeini and Khameini have consistently opposed it from first principles.

Khameini has consistently fought off pressures from all of his presidents - Rafsanjani, Khatami, and yes, even Ahmadinejad- for normalisation.

Anti-Americanism endeared them to a lot of angry Arabs, and was a useful ideological tool against foreign enemies like the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and internal enemies like the liberals. The cost-benefit ratio of Anti-Americanism from the perspective of securing the regime has to change.

Most Iranians have a relative in the states, and Iranian-Americans are an extremely successful group - the majority are dual passport holders. So there are a lot of opportunities for track II communication.

Of course India can still play a very important role in such a normalisation.

However with or without normalisation, as I said earlier Indian engagement with the Gulf in the context of Gulf fears of Iranian domination is essential. Its the only way to persuade the Gulf states (who are run by pretty rational people, even if they are devious and hypocritical) that they don't need to rely on Sunni extremism in Af-Pak to manage the threat from Iran. In fact any US-Iranian rapprochement would make Indian-Gulf arrangements even more vital in that regard.

[member_23692]

^^^^ I think Iran is like a caged tiger and has been for a while, ever since Khameini took over. They have had almost no friends with the exception of Syria and half of Lebanon (which together dont amount to much, even in the middle east other than when it comes to Israel, where they together add marginally to Israel's insecurities). They have been suffering from a myriad of internal problems and stagnation, even worse than what India suffered during its 50 year flirtation with Nehruism. Further compounding their problems is the fact that it is not a natural thing for a Shia society to be ruled so completely by mullahs, as Shia ideology promotes a kind of separation between church and state (I dont mean to say that it does not permit any role for the mullahs whatsoever, but nowhere close to the role mullahs have been playing in Iran since 1979), so psychologically even the pious rural shiite Iranians are not entirely comfortable with this setup, far less than the comfort level the Pushtuns have with Taliban or say if it came to that, the Pakis will have with Taliban.

Given the above, I think the ball has been in the US court for a while. All the US had to do was allow [edited] the Iranian cleric [edited] a win which would have allowed the mullahs to pretend to the whole world that they achieved [edited]success in other words, some symbolic apology of some sort for Shah's rule, and the mullahs would jump towards normalization.

It is a matter of opinion, of course. You may differ from me on this and it would be perfectly reasonable. I really have no way to prove, what I am saying is true, its just a strong hunch based on my thirty year study of Iran-US relations.

You could have used language I used to convey the thoughts. Thanks ramana

[ramana]

Johann, The US disenchantment with the Shah came after he held the celebrations for 2500 years anniversary of Cyrus the Great. They started worrying that the Persians were asserting their old identity and possible hegemony. It ties in with the stated US goal of not letting any regional hegemon develop.

All this liberals and nationalists is smoke screen.

[Johann]

Johann, The US disenchantment with the Shah came after he held the celebrations for 2500 years anniversary of Cyrus the Great. They started worrying that the Persians were asserting their old identity and possible hegemony. It ties in with the stated US goal of not letting any regional hegemon develop.

Ramana,

The celebrations were in 1971.

The US in the 1970s quite deliberately supported Iran's quest to be the regional hegemon. Like Israel the policy was to never say no to the Shah on anything other than nuclear weapons.

The Shah's Iran like Israel was the bedrock of US Cold War strategy in the ME.

Unfortunately it is precisely the same blind American support for the Shah when state repression against any kind of dissidence was at all time highs that made anti-Americanism was the core ideological elements of the 1979 revolution that united Marxists and Islamists alike.

All this liberals and nationalists is smoke screen.

The Carter White House in January 1978 no more expected or wanted to see the Shah out on his ear than the Obama White House in January 2010 expected or wanted Mubarak out.

The more oil money the Shah had, the more unconditional support the US gave him, and the more he suppressed political freedoms at home. The more he cracked down, the deeper and wider hatred for the Shah and his foreign support grew.

It was a vicious cycle.

People like Kissinger and Brzezski refused to acknowledge it.

Other people like Cyrus Vance thought they could pressure the Shah into reform as Kennedy did in the 1960s.

The Kennedy's support to the Shah for example was entirely contingent on him adopting a domestic reform programme. The result was positive for both Iran, the Shah, and the US. The Carter administration tried something similar and botched it badly.

The fight within the policy establishment in the Carter years as to whether to let the Shah into the US for treatment as he was dying of cancer is a matter of public record. Its worth examining.

The success or failure most US president's foreign policy programmes depends on whether they are focused and creative enough to turn the disagreements of the thesis and antithesis into synthesis, which then becomes consensus.

That is what winners like FDR, Kennedy and Reagan did. Others like Carter flip and flop back and forth.

[CRamS]

Let me remind folks once again that as JohannJi pointed out, the US Iranian differences are not as deep as they seem. (I think its was in last Sunday's NYT, they had a piece on how US might emulate Iran in implementing healthcare reforms). Remember, Iran has a huge TFTA population, like Indian elites who you see on DDM who would do US bidding. Sooner or later, Iran will be back as a little pawn in US's hip pocket, and nobody will talk about Iran after that. The current hoopla is all about the minuscule theoretical "threat" that Iran's potential nuke program poses to US's treasured munna Bibi. Witness how Romney and Obama are each trying to outdo one another to make sure Bibi is happy. Wish India got a fraction of US help in fighting TSP that Bibi gets from US in annihilating any semblance of resistance against his unjust, barbaric occupation of Palestinians . The whole thing is about replacing self-respecting Iranians with US-loyalist Iranian TFTA. Thats all there is to it.

[Samudragupta]

Johann,

Let me rephrase the question like this....

Why do US need Iran and why do Iran need US....the current relationship between Iran and US can best be described as reactionary.....Why do US and Iran need to mend?

[shyamd]

Central Asia, Russia , they are a regional power that need to be kept nice and they overlook the straits where much of the oil passes through, oil and gas.

[Johann]

Johann,

Let me rephrase the question like this....

Why do US need Iran and why do Iran need US....the current relationship between Iran and US can best be described as reactionary.....Why do US and Iran need to mend?

In a world where Sunni fundamentalism is growing, and where Turkey and the GCC are building closer ties, Iran is going to find itself very isolated. From 1979 onwards they hoped helping fighting Israel and supporting Palestine would be enough. It isn't anymore.

Iran for its part has a great deal to offer the US in every arena.

[Hitesh]

The 1979 hostage crisis would be very hard to overcome. The only way that Iran could have open relations to US is to remove the mullahs from power and thoroughly dismantle the theocracy and remove any nuclear program and declare Israel as a peaceful country and recognize its right to existence.

A very tall order.

[Virupaksha]

The 1979 hostage crisis would be very hard to overcome. The only way that Iran could have open relations to US is to remove the mullahs from power and thoroughly dismantle the theocracy and remove any nuclear program and declare Israel as a peaceful country and recognize its right to existence.

A very tall order.

yawn, that didnt stop the contra affair during the great "Ronald Reagan" did it? US was never bound by any morals nor will it be in future. They are for lesser countries.

Every law of strategic consequence has a clause which says can be overriden by national interest.

[Hitesh]

That was different. It was clandestine and there was a big uproar when details came out.

This one, it would be very hard to keep it under wraps. It has to be in the open for anything to be effective and that is hard to do when the mullahs have to take the steps I have outlined above.

[Johann]

The 1979 hostage crisis would be very hard to overcome. The only way that Iran could have open relations to US is to remove the mullahs from power and thoroughly dismantle the theocracy and remove any nuclear program and declare Israel as a peaceful country and recognize its right to existence.

A very tall order.

yawn, that didnt stop the contra affair during the great "Ronald Reagan" did it? US was never bound by any morals nor will it be in future. They are for lesser countries.

Every law of strategic consequence has a clause which says can be overriden by national interest.

Iran-Contra was an enormous political scandal in both Iran and the US.

Khomeini had to end contacts with America as soon as the deal was leaked to the press. Reagan did the same. Neither leader could be seen by their domestic supporters and opponents to be dealing with the other.

If Reagan hadn't presided over victory the cold war it would have tarnished his legacy forever, the way that Clinton would have been remembered for perjury if he hadn't done such a good job of turning the US economy around.

[Prem]

US sweetens Taliban prisoner proposal
Massa ka Pattassa

WASHINGTON: The Obama administration, in a move aimed at reviving Afghan peace talks, has sweetened a proposed deal under which it would transfer Taliban detainees from Guantanamo Bay prison in exchange for a U.S. soldier held by Taliban allies in Pakistan.The revised proposal, a concession from an earlier U.S. offer, would alter the sequence of the move of five senior Taliban figures held for years at the U.S. military prison to the Gulf state of Qatar, sources familiar with the issue said.U.S. officials have hoped the prisoner exchange, proposed as a good-faith move in initial discussions between U.S. negotiators and Taliban officials, would open the door to peace talks between militants and the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.The revised proposal would send all five Taliban prisoners to Qatar first, said sources who spoke on condition of anonymity. Only then would the Taliban be required to release Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, the only U.S. prisoner of war.Previously, U.S. officials had proposed dividing the Taliban prisoners into two groups, and requiring Bergdahl's release as a good-faith gesture to come before the second group of prisoners would be moved out of Guantanamo.Bergdahl, now 26 years old, disappeared from his base in southern Afghanistan in June 2009 and is believed to be being held by Taliban militants in northwestern Pakistan.The White House and the Bergdahl family declined to comment on the revised proposal for a deal.The altered transfer plans were discussed with Qatari officials during a visit in mid-June by Marc Grossman, U.S. President Barack Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the sources said. It was unclear if the altered proposal had been put forward before those discussions.Qatar, which is hosting a number of Taliban officials, has played a key role in almost two years of initial, secret discussions between U.S. officials and representatives of the shadowy militant group, which remains a formidable enemy in Afghanistan even as U.S. and NATO troops begin to withdraw.As part of a process the Obama administration hoped would lead to substantive talks on Afghanistan's future, the Taliban's leadership had planned to formally open a political office in Doha. But the Taliban announced in March it would withdraw from the talks, citing what it said were inconsistencies in the U.S. negotiating position. U.S. officials are now cautiously seeking to prepare the ground for a resumption in talks. But any negotiations involving the Taliban, even preliminary ones, could pose a political risk for Obama months before the U.S. presidential election.

[CRamS]

JohannJi,

The point is that for US, there are no absolutes. I always go by what is in US interests. If the need be, even today's "evil", Iran, and Hugo Chavez will become allies. If the need be, all of TSP's crimes against humanity starting with the rape of Bangladesh will come out.

[pentaiah]

Unkil dates (one night stand) the World delivers(the baby)

Lock up your daughters( aka resources)

and
Keep at a safe distance

[shyamd]

India Consortium Bids for Afghan Deposits
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087 ... 50932.html

[ramana]

And folks keep cribbing about NDA and the release of prisoners to get the hijacked plane from Kandahar.

[ShauryaT]

In a world where Sunni fundamentalism is growing, and where Turkey and the GCC are building closer ties, Iran is going to find itself very isolated. From 1979 onwards they hoped helping fighting Israel and supporting Palestine would be enough. It isn't anymore.

Iran for its part has a great deal to offer the US in every arena.

Also not to forget, even though worldwide Shia population is in the teens, in the middle east Shia:Sunni populations are move evenly matched. If the fall of Saddam was a net minus for the Sunnis, fall of Syria will be a net plus. This game of picking favorites will go on, to keep this region from not falling apart or coalescing to become a threat to key western interests rooted in oil first and then geo-political access. This game of divide and rule, which serves the west as they see them will go for some time till this regions' oil/gas are key energy resources for the world. The only way this game will shift in a significant manner is if, powers like China and India rise to challenge the west's hegemony in this region and re-assert their authorities.

[shyamd]

Pak forces struck an Afghan border commanders convoy in Kunar and fighting has been on since 4am. Fighting with just guns looks like.

[shyamd]

India steps up efforts to bring C Asia closer

Jayanth Jacob, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, August 15, 2012

While marking the 65th year of India's Independence, 2012 has acquired considerable relevance on the global scene. It also observes the 20th anniversary of the erstwhile Soviet Union's collapse, and the birth of many Central Asian countries that are of strategic importance to India.

Meanwhile, India is reworking its Central Asian policy to woo several countries in the region, hoping it would be able to make up for lost time in the resource-rich Central Asia – where the Chinese have made huge inroads.

Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, which are in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan, are on the same page as India. As part of its security and military ties with the country, which shares 1,206-km and 414-km boundaries with Afghanistan and China respectively, New Delhi has taken over an air base called Ayni. It is also planning to upgrade the military hospital there.

"We have close contact with Central Asian countries in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan," an official said, adding that occurrences in Afghanistan have direct security implications for India. And with the deadline for withdrawal of US troops nearing, interactions with the former Taliban-ruled country have become more frequent.

India hopes that its Connect Central Asia Policy would provide much-needed impetus to tie-building measures. While the main focal areas for expanding its Central Asia footprint are trade, transit, capacity building and agriculture, India is well aware that the region has immense potential in hydro power as well as mining. The key countries in the region include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Plans are afoot to establish 14 direct flights between India and five Central Asian countries to boost tourism, trade and commerce. However, despite these efforts, India still has a long way to go before it can match other superpowers on the scene. While India's trade with Central Asia accounts for $500 million, the figures on the Chinese and American charts amount to a whopping $29 billion and $26 billion respectively.

[shyamd]

An Update from a source: Good news is IAF is still in Ayni and good progress has been made in training the ANA boys in India. Whole thing is being kept under wraps because of terror threats

[kmkraoind]

"Nobody shares Pakistan’s vision for Afghanistan" - The Hindu

I don’t see a lot of change in terms of US-Pak relations in terms of Romney being elected, but Governor Romney hasn’t shared a lot of his foreign policy ideas. I think that the real factor shaping US-Pak relations right now is that nobody in the world shares Pakistan’s vision for Afghanistan after an American withdrawal. The Americans certainly don’t like some of the groups the Pakistanis are supporting, but the Russians don’t want to see Afghanistan become a kind of petridish for all kinds of religious radicalism, the Chinese think that’s a terrible idea, the Iranians don’t like it, and the Indians don’t like it. Not only that, a great many Afghans don’t like it. So Pakistan has set itself objectives in Afghanistan that are not very realistic. If I were advising the US on this, I would say, let’s not make us the issue, let reality be the issue, that Pakistan is trying to accomplish something it may not be able to accomplish, rather than giving Pakistan the opportunity to bash the United States every time reality falls short of Pakistan’s hopes. But precisely because so many interests are involved, and because Afghanistan itself is such a complicated place, its future is very difficult to predict.

Pakistan is now a lunatic shouting and creating a ruckus at street, no body is caring, listening or giving weightage to it. At the same time, not body wants to tame him, because he is mad and no body knows how he behaves.

[shyamd]

Playing out more or less as planned
Tehran track

The Indian Express : Fri Aug 24 2012, 03:17 hrs

Ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tehran next week, the Iranian consent to Indian investment in the Chabahar port has thrown into sharp relief New Delhi’s tortuous balancing act on Iran. The prime minister will be in Tehran for the NAM summit and all eyes will be on the bilateral engagement. This visit comes amidst Iran’s growing confrontation with the US and the West as well as with the Arab states of the Gulf. Therefore, it would not be a surprise if Iran were to use the summit to mobilise support for its defiance of the US. For India, the dilemma lies in the political signal the investment will send out at this juncture.

The Chabahar port will provide Delhi with access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan, which blocks India’s land routes. The idea dates back to the visit of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to India in 2003 and a trilateral understanding reached then between Delhi, Tehran and Kabul. The port will link western Afghanistan with the Iranian coast via the Zaranj-Delaram road constructed by India on the Afghan side and a road constructed by the Iranians on their side. Chabahar had languished since 2003. But, seeking to break out of international isolation, Iran is now eager to revive the project and draw India into it — at a time when India’s payment in rupees for Iranian oil has made project exports to Iran attractive.

The strategic and economic importance of Chabahar for India is very real. However, having just been put on the US list of countries exempted from the Iran sanctions, India would also want to stay clear of US sanctions. Nor would it want to jeopardise its large economic interests in the Gulf Arab states by tilting towards Iran. Above all, Afghanistan’s reported reluctance to press ahead with the trilateral venture has rightly made Delhi pause. In this case, India has no choice but to carefully calibrate the pursuit of its multiple interests in the region.

Iran factor in India’s Afghan Policy
Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services

Smruti S. Pattanaik

August 24, 2012

As the date of withdrawal of foreign combat troops from Afghanistan draws nearer, New Delhi is determined to play a larger role in the conflict-prone country, in spite of reports of expanding Taliban influence. While some analysts are emphasising the threat of Taliban and cautioning India to lessen its engagement in Afghanistan, unlike in the 1990s, India is no longer considering ‘withdrawal’ as an option. Moreover, because of continued American presence and long-term assured international engagement in reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, it would be difficult for the Taliban to repeat their performance of the 1990s.

At the moment, a confident India is moving ahead with its plans to provide necessary training to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to make them combat-competent. Ensuring smooth security transition is the key to larger political stability of Afghanistan. India’s Afghan policy is driven by the twin themes of stability and development. A stable Afghanistan is less likely to act as a sanctuary for terror, and pose security threats to the countries in the neighbourhood. In addition, India has other geo-political interests; Afghanistan can provide it with the crucial link (via Iran) to central Asia. Thus Indian investment is aimed at providing critical developmental support and generating goodwill which can be converted into political capital to boost its staying power in Afghanistan.

India has pledged $2 billion worth of aid to Afghanistan. Some projects have already been implemented and some are in the pipeline. India has now proposed community based development projects worth $100 million which it plans to undertake in all the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. These projects would be implemented in the following sectors: agriculture, health, education and rural development. It will be used to provide vocational training, sanitation and drinking water facilities. The number of scholarships for the Afghan students has been raised from a total of 650 to 1000 students per year. India is also planning to allocate an additional $120 million for Salma dam project to meet the escalation cost caused by delay in project implementation. This dam could not be completed as per schedule in 2010 due to worsening security situation in the area resulting from frequent gun-battles between the Taliban and the project security personnel. This project is vital as it will generate 52 MW of power and irrigate 40,000 hectares of farm-land touching the lives of ordinary Afghans.

In this context, to ensure its long-term engagement with Afghanistan, it is imperative for India to work on its relations with Iran which provides vital connectivity with Afghanistan through Chabahar, to sustain India’s presence there. Recently, Pakistan allowed Afghanistan to receive 100,000 tonnes of wheat from India out of its total pledged amount of 250,000 tonnes. This trade consignment is part of the trade and transit Agreement signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan and under this arrangement Afghanistan is allowed to import wheat from India through the Karachi port. However, Pakistan is not willing to allow India overland transit through its territory.

After a long wait (and several meetings), Ahmedinijad government has finally approved $100 million Indian investment in Chabahar port. This has been pending for long due to political reasons. India’s relations with Iran have been strained due to India’s vote in the IAEA. Moreover, because of international sanctions, India is presently facing problems to pay Iran for its oil. There is an argument that by building roads and transportation links India would be able to pay Iran through other means. Notwithstanding US pressure, it is in the strategic interests of India to invest in the Chabahar port as an alternative link with central Asia.

As per some media reports, India wants Afghanistan to be part of this link project and sign a trilateral Agreement on the sidelines of Non Alignment Summit which is going to be held in Tehran on August 30-31, 2012. Kabul has so far been noncommittal about this proposal fearing US reprisal. However, in January this year India assured Iran that it would build the missing part of the road and rail links to connect Iran to Afghanistan and beyond. Lately, some Afghan scholars are proposing an India-Iran-Afghanistan trilateral on the lines of several multilateral arrangements that Kabul has forged with its neighbours. There were also reports that the foreign ministers of these three countries had met in New York in 2010 and discussed the possibilities of initiating such a mechanism. But no progress could be made because of US pressures.

There is no reason why India should not be cooperating with Iran to make its presence in Afghanistan sustainable. Since India is aspiring for a larger role in Afghanistan as envisaged in the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two countries, any strategy to have an expanded presence in Kabul would require close cooperation with Iran for better access to Afghan territory through Chabahar. In spite of US pressure, Afghanistan has maintained its links with Teheran. It has recently admitted that it did receive regular cash aid from Tehran.

If US wants India to play a larger role in Afghanistan beyond 2014, and coordinate its efforts with the international community to stabilize Afghanistan, it should take a pragmatic look at India’s engagement with Iran. The US knows quite well that Pakistan has refused to provide land transit to India to trade with, or even send essential items to Afghanistan. Keeping in mind the distance and time factor to send goods to Afghanistan through Iran, India had to convert wheat into fortified biscuits to prevent it from rotting during transportation. Even India had to move five mega transformers for Salma dam project by air. Thus Iran remains crucial for India’s engagement with Afghanistan and central Asia.

India is part of many multilateral initiatives on Afghanistan. Recently, India also held Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan to encourage private sector investment there. A seven-member Indian consortium, led by the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), has won the bid for three iron ore mines with estimated reserves of 1.8 billion tonne at Hajigok in 2011. It is also interested in bidding for some copper mines in Afghanistan. To transport these mined minerals from Afghanistan Iran provides the only alternative route given Islamabad’s intransigence to allow India transit and trade.

Thus, there are compelling reasons for India to collaborate closely with Teheran to make its Afghan policy successful. In fact, from a pragmatic point of view, India, US and Iran have a convergence of interest in Afghanistan and they should work together to stabilise Afghanistan. However, rather than coordinating their policies towards Afghanistan, US and Iran are engaged in a meaningless confrontation in Afghanistan. Iran wants the US to leave Afghanistan, while the US wants Iran to stay away from the internal conflict in Afghanistan.

In this context, India has limited options; it has to work with the US to stabilise and rebuild Afghanistan and simultaneously, it has to have friendly relationship with Iran to access Afghanistan through its territory in order to sustain its links with Afghanistan. India has its security interests at stake in Afghanistan and would not like the return of a regressive regime in Afghanistan; therefore, it needs to stay engaged in Afghan beyond the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Since India-US relationship has matured in the meanwhile, India’s strategic relationship with Iran should not hurt the US too much. Even if it does, since India has no other alternative, it should not hesitate to pursue a policy independent of US priorities.

More on the whole issue:

India in a bind as Iran okays port investment

L

PranabDhalSamanta : New Delhi, Thu Aug 23 2012, 01:26 hrs



India is caught in a diplomatic bind ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Iran for the NAM Summit next week. And it’s ironically because of the Ahmadinejad regime giving its consent to Indian investment in Chabahar port, which would provide India an alternative access to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan.

The proposed agreement will allow India to invest up to $100 million in the project. While technically the investment may not be covered by the sanctions regime against Iran, sources said, the larger question is the political signal it might send out.

India has just been put on the US’s list of countries exempted from Iran sanctions despite having had strong commercial links with Tehran. One of the key criterion for this was that India showed a declining trend in its oil imports.

Also, India was keen that Afghanistan be roped into the Chabahar agreement and a trilateral document be considered for finalisation on the margins of the Non-Aligned Meet, but Kabul has been cold to the suggestion so far .

The Indian argument has been that Afghanistan would be the ultimate beneficiary of such an arrangement and must commit itself to trading through Chabahar, else the entire exercise could get economically unviable. To that extent, India wants the MoU to specifically cover export to a third country from the port.

Given Afghanistan’s reluctance, the Indian side too has developed second thoughts on the matter, even though the MoU is said to be still under active consideration. It’s quite possible, sources said, that the intent could be signalled during the PM’s visit, but the agreement delayed until all loose ends have been tied up. In any case, a Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement is in the works to fill up the outcomes column for the visit.

The dilemma for India is that Chabahar serves its strategic interests. Delhi has been pushing for it with Iran for close to a decade. In fact, the origins of this connectivity project lie in another trilateral understanding, signed in 2003 between India, Iran and Afghanistan. The agreement covered building a road link from Chabahar to the Afghanistan border by Iran, from where India would construct a 135-mile road on the Afghanistan side between Zaranj and Delaram, which is located on the main Kandahar-Herat highway.

While India has finished constructing the Zaranj-Delaram road despite attacks from terror groups, the connecting link to Chabahar is also ready from the Iranian side. The development of the port is the only aspect of the arrangement that has not taken off, and Tehran has now suggested a fresh MoU to faciliate Indian investments. To get this far, the Iranian government had to undertake a major domestic exercise to designate Chabahar as a sort of a special economic zone to qualify it for receiving foreign direct investment under its own laws.

According to the proposed agreement, the investment can range from $15 million to $100 million depending on the construction activity India would like to undertake. Given India’s stakes in the overall project, India was looking to invest as extensively as it could.

However, a political call would be necessary for India to go ahead with this MoU at this time.

Linked to this is the issue of settling oil bills with Iran given that international banking channels have all been frozen. Project exports was being seen as one way to settle these pending amounts.

Ball is in Karzai's court... Does he want us to help Afghanistan.

[shyamd]

Update to above - India Iran and Afghanistan will be holding a trilateral meeting focused on the chabahar port issues on 26th August - MEA

[Samudragupta]

What is that Iran is putting in the table?

[shyamd]

Transit access obviously since Chabahar is in Iran


---------
Guys can someone please post some articles from the meeting yesterday please? It's extremely important

[Lilo]

Seventeen party-goers 'found beheaded' in southern Afghan village

The Taliban beheaded seventeen party-goers, including two women dancers, in Afghanistan's volatile Helmand province as punishment, recalling the darkest days of rule by the ultra-conservative Islamist insurgents before their ouster in 2001.

The bodies were found on Monday in a house near the Musa Qala district where a party was held on Sunday night with music and mixed-sex dancing, said district governor Nimatullah. Men and women do not usually mingle in Afghanistan unless they are related, and parties involving both genders are rare and kept secret.

The killings, about 75 km (46 miles) north of the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, came at the beginning of a violent 24 hours for NATO and Afghan authorities in which 10 Afghan soldiers were killed in a mass insurgent attack, also in Helmand, while two US soldiers were slain by a rogue Afghan soldier.

"The victims threw a late-night dance and music party when the Taliban attacked" on Sunday night, Nimatullah, who only has one name, told Reuters. There were no immediate claims of responsibility.

[ramana]

Nightwatch 24 August 2012

Afghanistan: Special comment: This week Coalition forces commander General Allen said that only ten of Afghanistan's now 405 districts, in 34 provinces, are responsible for half of the violence in Afghanistan.


They are Sangin, Nowzad, Musa Qala, Kajaki, Nad e Ali, Nahr e Sarraj in Sangin Province plus Pol-e-Alam in Lowgar Province and Maiwand, Panjwai and Zherai in Kandahar Province.


Allen's list is not a metric of progress. For several years NightWatch published highly detailed evaluations of the insurgency, district by district and below. Four years ago, the only district that would not have been included in a similar list of the worst districts in Afghanistan is Pol-el-Alam in Lowgar Province. Districts in Ghazni, Paktia and Paktika Provinces would have been included.

Allen's list is an indictment of a failed policy and failed military strategy. Nothing has changed in four or more years. Nothing the US has done has reduced the volatility of the 12 or 13 Pashtun provinces in southern Afghanistan and the dozen or so districts that formed the heart of the insurgency.

UN surveys from 20 or more years ago reported that Pashtuns had deep and historic links to Pakistan and Iran. There were no jobs in Afghanistan so most Afghan men worked in adjacent countries. In the face of adversity, the men left to find work and to return after conditions improved. This is information is easily accessible on the Internet.

It means people in border regions had long established "rat lines" leading outside Helmand, Kandahar, Lowgar and all the other border provinces. When US or UK forces moved in, the anti-government and anti-foreign Pashtuns moved on the rat lines to friends and family outside the areas of the US or UK surge. Now they have returned, after the western surge forces left. This is how Afghans have survived for centuries, whether the enemy was lack of rain or foreign invaders.

Afghanistan, as a land-locked country, is a component of a multi-national economic and social system, with southern and northern regions demarcated by the Hindu Kush. No war can be won in Afghanistan without winning it in Pakistan, in eastern Iran, and the southern reaches of the "Stans." Alexander the Great apparently understood that better than all subsequent western generals who tried.

General Allen's comments are testaments to military failure, in detail by district, after more than a decade of spent treasure, dead American young soldiers and dead Afghan allies and civilians. The obvious conclusion is the US political and armed forces leadership does not know how to fight a counter-insurgency to a successful conclusion, as both India and Sri Lanka have.

It might have been wise to consult India and Sri Lanka about how to defeat an insurgency in South Asia.

Now once he starts calling it Indian sub-continent then we know he is getting wisdom.