Indian Foreign Policy

[ramana]

ARMS AND THE COUNTRY --- Kanwal Sibal

That India should be the world’s largest importer of arms is a serious indictment of the state of indigenous defence manufacturing. India should have built domestic capability on an accelerated basis in view of the enduring combined threat from China and Pakistan and Western technology denial regimes applied to us. India cannot have genuine strategic autonomy without possessing an independent defence production base. We have, unfortunately, not been able to leverage our large-scale imports for obtaining the level of transfers of technology needed by us. Fortunately, the size of the Indian market has persuaded countries like France and Germany to reduce their defence supplies to Pakistan.

I don't know what Kanwalji is cribbing about?INC has been very successfully leveraging hafta. Since Nehru times. Ie wants tech transfer along with hafta?

[arun]

X Posted from the TSP thread.

Hindustan Times – C Fore survey covers some interesting foreign policy related questions.

Among them:

Q7. Please tell us your view on the following countries: ...............

Q8 With regard to Pakistan, India should follow a policy of: ..............

Q9 Should India send troops to Afghanistan to protect its interests in that country?

Q10 India's economic interests around the world are growing.Should the government review India's policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries to protect Indian interests?

Q11 If the price of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is for India to follow pro-US, pro-West policies, the government should: ............

Read it all:

Majority of Indian's Are Liberal

[nvishal]

arun, the average indian will not understand most of those questions; the feedback is dominated by college teens most probably. There's a general problem with surveys in india. They hardly represent the population.

[Virupaksha]

prime minister MMS speech at the NAM summit

I would say a very very important speech in the context of our foreign policy.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/ ... 839792.ece

Below is the map of NAM member countries, dark blue members, blue observers. - i.e. almost the whole world except nato and russia. It is very important to look at that to understand who is the message aimed at



My most general impressions from the speech:
1) Extraordinary emphasis on WANA (possibly required as well with the WANA spring and all, but it comes at the expense of all the other countries.)
2) Look east policy is being given a backseat, only a cursory mention of it and even after that an equal-equal to WANA
3) wants to channelize NAM to reform IMF, world bank and ilk and create competing structures
4) Extends complete and whole hearted support to Palestine (The setting didnt required nothing even in the extreme case except a cursory mention, but this emphasis means rollback of PVNR and ABVs policies of turning back on Israel.)

[D Roy]

Gentlemen,



You are absolutely right about the WANA focus. It has been decided that WANA is the future for our energy security.

Interestingly, Israel with its Leviathan find is also extremely important in this scheme of things.

There is complete continuity on Israel, in fact sickular Khangress is even more gung ho about it . As is a certain Didi from paschim Bangal.

[SSridhar]

My most general impressions from the speech:
. . .
4) Extends complete and whole hearted support to Palestine (The setting didnt required nothing even in the extreme case except a cursory mention, but this emphasis means rollback of PVNR and ABVs policies of turning back on Israel.)

Why should we roll back on Israel ? What benefits would accrue to us ?

[krisna]

wana front--
Has been a spurt in activities wrt saudia barbaria relations.
unkil pressing India on eyeran, ksa stepping up oil supplies in return
gcc trying to involve India,


look east--
after intial flurry of activities with to and fro visits to many countries, things have quitened.
panda has softened relatively due to its own leadership change issues.
Maybe India is going soft due to the above.

[Virupaksha]

My most general impressions from the speech:
. . .
4) Extends complete and whole hearted support to Palestine (The setting didnt required nothing even in the extreme case except a cursory mention, but this emphasis means rollback of PVNR and ABVs policies of turning back on Israel.)

Why should we roll back on Israel ? What benefits would accrue to us ?

SSridhar ji,

Israel part was my reading of his speech, that is why I put it in brackets. He didnt actually mention that. But one doesnt say that stuff, if he understands that speech is read by israel as well. Foreign secretary saying those words carry a whole lot of difference than when prime minister or foreign ministers read out prepared speeches.

Regarding the benefits, I believe it is more to do the strategic compulsions of the arab and iranian world - i.e. WANA as well as the usual congress muslim appeasement. After breaking ground with prime ministerial visits during ABV, I do not see much progress. After MMS the last high profile political visit (I know) is for an agricultural visit was in 2006 by Pawar, KamalNath and co. There have been some tourism related stuff as well. Israel Army chief also visited during 2010, but I do not know any more strategic visits/agreements/ties. It seems to me like we are trying to box Israel ties to military equipment (and high technology not directly receivable from US), tourism and agriculture. I personally consider this a rollback from ABV time.

[Philip]

I disagree about a "rollback" on ties with Israel.This does not mean that one is indifferent to the plight of the Palestinians,where the Israelis have treated them many a time abominably .The savaging of the stone-throwing children of the intifada and pushing the Palestinians into barely survivable latter-day ghettoes, has to end,as well as the rampant spread of Israeli's settlements usurping ancient Palestinian owned lands.These acts have only in the long run harmed Israel,as one cannot have a flourishing,rich and powerful Israel on one hand,living cheek-to-jowl with the equivalent of Dharavi under Israeli thrall surrounding it on the other.

Our support for Israel is based upon democratic principles,which many nations even in the west choose to follow selectively,as when Hamas won the Gaza elections ousting the Pal. Authority of the late "Abu Amar" (Arafat).Not that it is the key factor,but our ties with Israel also show the so-called Muslim world that paying lip service to ties with India while supporting the terrorist entity called Pakistan to the hilt,as the Saudis do,will ensure that India always has an insurance policy such as our ties with Israel and Iran.

While we have lost the art of Nehruvian diplomatic finesse,that reached its height during the era of Mrs.G.,The "Nehruvian" doctrine which served India very well during the better part of the last century,has to be fine tuned to suit the changing realities of the 21st.The two warring CW blocs have exploded,and their entities are instead of being closely-entwined together with common purpose,are now more like orbiting satellites or moons around a large planetary system ,whose paths are asymmetric as the gravitational force of the former opposing entities impinge upon their orbits.Sometimes,the former rival system "captures" a drifting planet ,or even loses one of its own to the opposing "pull".This could be due to socio-economic factors,energy architecture,or for military/strategic reasons as we have seen in many of the conflicts today.

Our diplomats today have lost that Nehruvian art of diplomacy that earned India a very high standing in global affairs.India was the toast of Africa and in the former colonies of the imperialists.Today ,who is enthused by a visit from our good witch-doctor and his peddling snake-oil .Our leadership of the erstwhile NAM has plummeted.That too when we were a poor nation materially,but were as wealthy as Croesus in our ideological and humanitarian policies."Singh,Scamsters & Co.",have brought Indian diplomacy down to its lowest level ,where little time has been spent upon strengthening our ancient tiers with nations across the globe,who are now receiving large largesse from our mortal enemy China,that too right on our doorstep in Lanka!

We once helped set the agenda for debating the world's most serious issues,like fighting apartheid in S.Africa,taking on even the British and so-called "iron lady" Mrs. T. with our very own original "iron lady" Mrs.G.! Or liberating opressed E.Pak and creating a new nation called Bangla Desh! That too without the help of nuclear threat like yanqui wild west/gangsta behaviour.Our current "lion" in charge,takes his cue from his masters of the west,or mistress of Janpath.

[Virupaksha]

Fat load of good, all that Nehruvian crap did to us.

I really dont care, if the crapolicy did something good faraway in the world. If it did, its only a bonus. The prime criteria is what did India get out of it - the real answer, is zero infact negative. 1962 was a direct result of those fantasies, which generated jealosies in Mao.

[SSridhar]

Virupaksha, WANA need not be at the cost of Israel. Diplomacy is no longer a zero-sum game as the bi-polar world has disappeared and the existing pole is not strong as it used to be, either. The Clausewetzian definition of statecraft being the ability to maximize profits while minimizing risks, is the only thing to follow. Of course, perceptions would differ on what is a profit or what is a risk or how much to profit and how much risk to take. Our long-standing mistake (again due to Nehru & others) was to neglect a normal state-to-state relationship with Israel for fear of offending West Asian Islamist countries and/or domestic vote banks. Nehru & Co were also standing on high-moral grounds, a trait appreciated in individuals but not in statecraft. The West Asian countries roundly rebuffed us and instead sided with Pakistan until the mid-90s when liberalization and its benefits reached them in the form of increase in POL imports or investments etc. This Indian policy was a gross distortion and is to be directly attributed to the myopic and communal outlook of some INC leaders who otherwise claimed to be secularists. If two of the most affected neighbours, Egypt & Jordan, can have full diplomatic relationship with Israel, then what is our problem ? We see daemons in every shadow.

Every country has its own strengths. Israel cannot be of use to us in anything other than defence or agriculture technologies. It can also share intelligence with us. We have very important on-going defence projects with them. The viciousness in relationship between West Asian countries and Israel has largely disappeared. I think we should no longer stick to fossilized ideas that Indo-Israel relationship would cost us Indo-WANA relationship.

[Virupaksha]

SSridhar ji,
Israel was in context of not WANA, but Palestine.

otherwise I agree with your post.

[nakul]

India has been supporting Palestine since its inception. Israel has been supporting India for almost as long. I don't think India's calls for Palestinian freedom can be termed as more than chai - biskut in a Muslim country. We are not idiotic enough to call for Israeli support in a Muslim country. In Indian culture, we speak well of the host. This is a good time to increase trade with Iran and we are pushing for wheat exports to Iran.

[nvishal]

Israel is a god-damn colony.

The only reason we keep a foot inside israel is because it sells india some sub-standard weapons. You guys talk as if israel "donates" the artillery to india.

Roughly half of the world jewish population tucked in one space. Around 20,000sqkm(roughly equivalent to the size of mizoram), a few nuclear pounding will wipe it clean. I can't help but be very pessimistic about israel's future.

[JE Menon]

nvishal,

The Israelis believe they are chosen by god, not damned by him/her/it.

About the quality of the weapons from Israel, I really doubt they are sub-standard - although there are others more knowledgeable on the forum who can contribute on that. Neither Israel nor India donates anything; it is a well established business as well as strategic relationship that is chugging along nicely with a low profile.

As for the "nuclear pounding will wipe it clean" idea, that will depend on whether whoever is doing the pounding is ready to be pounded to dust themselves - and maybe their friends as well.

[Lilo]

Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture
China in the Twenty-First Century: What India Needs to Know About China’s World View

India International Centre, August 29, 2012.
Shyam Saran

Respected Ambassador Rasgotra, respected Shrimati
Subrahmanayam, Chairman, Global India Foundation, Vice-Admiral
Jacob,Vice-Chairman, Ambassador Salman Haider, Member Secretary, Shri
O.P. Mishra, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you, Ambassador Rasgotra for chairing this memorial lecture. I am
honoured by the presence of one of my most respected peers.
I consider it a privilege to have been invited to deliver the Second
Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture, which gives me an
opportunity to pay homage to the memory of a distinguished public
servant, a meticulous scholar and one of India’s great strategic thinkers. I
thank Global India Foundation and its President, Shri O.P. Mishra, for
according me this privilege. My own engagement with Shri Subrahmanyam
goes back to 1979 when I met him on the eve of my travel to Geneva as a

UN Disarmament Fellow, on the advice of another very distinguished
diplomat, the late M.A. Vellodi. I recall Secretary Vellodi telling me that
there was no better informed and knowledgeable person in India who
could acquaint me with the intricacies of disarmament and international
security and India’s own positioning in this domain. This began a process
of education at the feet of an extraordinary individual, off and on, over the
next three decades. There are scores of people like me who have imbibed
a sense of India’s geopolitical role, it’s strategic compulsions and
opportunities and, above all, the need to undertake dispassionate and
rigorous analysis of issues, though I am not certain how many of us would
measure up to his high standards. Nevertheless, I feel emboldened today
to offer you some ideas on a subject that he was convinced, would remain
a major preoccupation for India in the decades to come, the challenge of
an ascendant China. Much of what I will say is drawn from my own
experience of China, an abiding fascination with its unique civilization and
a deep respect for its philosophical and cultural heritage. My justification
for indulging in this rather broad sweep analysis is that managing the
China challenge requires a much deeper understanding of the nature of

Chinese civilization, its cultural particularities and the worldview of its
people, formed layer upon layer, over five thousand years of unbroken
though sometimes tumultuous history. China is undergoing a dramatic
transformation and its traditional culture and ways of thinking can no
longer be sourced only to persistent templates derived from the past. One
has to only look at how modern, digital culture has pervaded Chinese
society, in particular, its youth, to be cautious in making judgments about
the country’s view of itself. Nevertheless, there are certain deeply rooted
elements that shape China’s psyche and its world view that are worth
careful reflection, including where India fits into that broad consciousness.
At various points, I will also try and contrast Chinese and Indian cultural
and philosophical traits, so that one is better prepared in adjusting one’s
own template in judging Chinese behaviour.
If there is one singular and unique feature of Chinese civilization that
distinguishes it from other major civilizations, it is the use of Chinese
ideograms and characters, that survive with few changes to this day, since
they first appeared on oracle bones, some three thousand five hundred
years or more ago, during the ancient Shang dynasty. Chinese language

has no alphabet. Each character is a word in itself and a decent vocabulary
requires memorizing at least three thousand characters. A scholar may
aspire to a vocabulary of five thousand. “Classical Chinese”, in the words
of one scholar, Peter Hessler, the author of Oracle Bones, “connected
people over space and time”. “It provided a powerful element of unity to
an empire that, from another perspective, was a mish-mash of ethnic
groups and languages”. After I had learnt Mandarin in Hong Kong in the
early 1970s, I would often communicate with the local Cantonese using my
new found knowledge of Chinese characters, because my Mandarin was as
unintelligible to them as their Cantonese dialect was to me.
What is to be appreciated in this context is the importance of the written
word in Chinese culture and the transformation of Chinese ideograms into
an essential element in Chinese aesthetics. Calligraphy is a much admired
accomplishment and characters appear as an integral component in
paintings as well as Chinese pottery.
Contrast this with Indian culture, where the spoken word is pre-eminent. The ancient Vedas were heard as “Srutis” and were then
remembered as “Smritis”. The written word came much later. Mantras get

energized only when they are recited in the correct rhythm and tone.
Beauty is imparted and sought through arrangements of sound; imagery is
not of the same order . To an Indian, Chinese music sounds stilted and
archaic, while Indian classical music is a breathtaking mastery of seven
notes and several microtones in between, forever reinventing itself. It is
for this reason that I consider Chinese to be a predominantly visual
culture, a legacy of the ancient ideogram, while India’s is a predominantly
aural culture, where spoken word, the musical note, the sacred mantra,
were to become the defining characteristics of the culture. This difference
in civilizational trajectory has its impact on how our two cultures perceive
the world around us and interact with one another. The emphasis on the
written word led to an immense treasury of historical documentation in
China. The Chinese pilgrims, Fa Xian and Xuan Zhuang left elaborate
records of their journeys to India and its great universities of Taxila,
Nalanda and Vikramshila. In contrast, while it is estimated that the
beginning of the 6th century A.D., the number of Indian Buddhist monks
and teachers in China were upwards of three thousand, no accounts of
China, as they perceived their adopted country, have surfaced so far. Only

some legends survive in temples associated with the more famous among
them, such as the Shaolin temple linked with the Zen master, Bodhidhama
and the Fei Lai Feng temple, or the Peak that Flew Over, located in
Hangzhou, associated with the Buddhist monk, known only by his Chinese
name, Huili. Huili came from Rajgir and chose the location of his temple at
the foot of a peak that resembled Gridhkuta in his native town. Hence the
Peak that Flew Over.
The great value attached to the written word, bound as it has been
with Chinese aesthetics and the thought process of a complex culture, has
combined with an enormous and detailed historical record to provide a
contemporary reference point and multi-faceted prism through which the
world is perceived. Even to this day much of Chinese discourse is
conducted through historical analogies, some of which are explicit and
well known. Some are artfully coded and the language lends itself easily to
innuendo and ambiguity. The contrast with India will be apparent where
history is often a distraction.
In Chinese diplomatic behavior, this cultural particularity poses
unusual challenges to any interlocutor or negotiator.

The Chinese will insistently demand and sometimes obtain
explicit formulations from friend and adversary alike on issues of
importance to their interests, but will rarely concede clarity and finality in
formulations reflecting the other side’s interests. Thus, there is the
recurring demand that India reaffirm, time and again, its recognition of
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In 2003, during PM Vajpayee’s visit, China
conceded Sikkim as a part of India but this was not explicitly recorded in a
written formulation. In 2005, during Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, China
went a step further and handed over maps of China, showing Sikkim as
part of India. Recently, some Chinese scholars have pointed out that the
absence of an official statement recognizing Indian sovereignty leaves the
door open to subsequent shifts if necessary.
I also recall seeing the record of conversation between R.K.
Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou en-lai in 1962, some months before the
border war erupted in October that year. R.K. Nehru drew attention to
reports that China was leaning towards the Pakistani position that Jammu
and Kashmir was disputed territory. He recalled to Zhou an earlier
conversation, where when asked whether China accepted Indian
sovereignty over J&K, he had said, rhetorically- Has China ever said that it
does not accept Indian sovereignty over J&K, or words to that effect. At
this latest encounter, Zhou turned the same formulation on its head, to
ask, Has China ever said that India has sovereignty over J&K? Much of the
misunderstanding and lack of communication that has characterized India-China relations may be sourced to the failure on India’s part to be
conversant with Chinese thought processes. It is easy to accuse the
Chinese of betrayal, as Nehru did after the 1962 war, but a clear
awareness that deception is, after all, an integral element of Chinese
strategic culture, may have spared us much angst in the past. Such
awareness should certainly be part of our confronting the China challenge
in the future.
Deception, let me add, is not unique to Chinese strategic
thinking. The Mahabharata has examples of its efficacy and Chanakya is an
ardent enthusiast. But in China it is accorded a value much more
significant than in other cultures. I think many in this well-informed
audience may be familiar with the Chinese classic, The Romance of the
three Kingdoms, and the oft-quoted “Ruse of the Empty City”, depicted
therein, which is a favourite part of Chinese lore. This was resorted to by
the famous Shu Kingdom general Zhuge Liang. The general was in danger
of being besieged and over-run at the fortress city of Xicheng by the Wei
army, while his main forces were located a long distance away. Zhuge
Liang ordered all the city gates to be opened and asked his soldiers to don
the clothes of ordinary householders, going about their normal activities,
while he parked himself on top of one of the city gates, calmly playing the
Chinese string instrument, the Qin. The Wei general, Sima Yi, confronted
with this strange spectacle, suspected that he would run into an ambush
as soon as he entered the city gates and withdrew. And the day was saved
for Shu. Zhu Geliang is credited with the observation that to win a war, it
was necessary to steal into the mind of one’s enemy, observe his thought
processes, and then fashion the appropriate strategy. There is no moral or
ethical dimension attached to deception and the Chinese would find it odd
being accused of “betrayal”, in particular, if the strategy of deception had
worked. What is required from our strategists and diplomats is to
understand this important instrument in the Chinese strategic tool-box and
learn to deal with it effectively. Perhaps we should take to heart Zhuge
Liang’s advice and enter the mind of our Chinese interlocutor to judge his
mental and psychological construct.
Another important feature of Chinese thinking is what I would call,
“Contextualizing”. Significant decisions and actions must always be
located in a broad assessment of political, economic, social and even
psychological factors that constitute the stage setting for the proposed
activity. This lends an inherent prudence to Chinese strategic thinking, but
once events have brewed to the right mix and the timing is right, action
must be swift and decisive. The Chinese strategist may wish to avoid war,
if such a war carries inordinate risk. However, the use of force is an
essential and accepted part of pursuing national interests and war is not
necessarily an unmitigated evil. The Indian attitude towards the use of
force and the dangers of war is more ambiguous. The use of force is often
seen as a failure of diplomacy not an extension of it. And this is an
important difference between the two countries. The conversations between
Nehru and Mao in 1956 on the nature of war reflects this clearly.
Let me try and illustrate this by examining some of the events leading up to
the 1962 border war. In January 2005, Chinese TV broadcast a
documentary entitled “The Secret History of the China-India War”. This
documentary is important for two reasons. It painstakingly spells out the
domestic, regional and international context within which the decision to
launch the attack against Indian border forces was taken. It refers to the
hesitation within certain sections of the party leadership to “make an enemy
out of India”, at a time when China was still recovering from the ravages of
famine and the disastrous consequences of the 1958-61 Great Leap
Froward. The international situation was also not judged to be favourable.
The ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, the commentary says, had
now become a state to state conflict as well. The United States continued
with its hostile policies towards China and the Chiang regime in Taiwan
was becoming more aggressive. This is an example of the “contextualizing”
approach. This probably corresponded to the assessment of Chinese posture
on the Indian side; briefly, that while border skirmishes would continue,
China was unlikely to engage in a full-scale war.
However, from summer of 1962, the “context” had begun to change and the
clues to this change were missed by the Indian side. After having retreated
to the “second line of leadership” in the wake of the failure of the Great
Leap Forward, Mao plotted his return to absolute leadership, using the PLA
with the new Defence Minister Lin Piao, who had replaced Marshal Peng
Tehuai, as an ally. The TV documentary points to differences of opinion
within the Party leadership on the border issue. This, it said, was settled by
the denunciation of those who counseled restraint, as “right opportunists”.
While having temporarily ceded the administration of the Party and the
Government to other veteran leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, Mao
appears to have taken charge of issuing directives to the PLA personally, on
handling border tensions with India. It was he who decided in August 1962,
to engage in a full scale military assault on Indian forces, and to “liquidate
the invading Indian army”. But this was done only after his commanders
had reported that the Indian side simply had neither the numbers nor the
equipment to withstand a Chinese attack, particularly if the attack was of an
unexpected scale . On the international front, too, there was a window of
opportunity, mitigating some of the constraints cited earlier. In June, 1962,
the Chinese ambassador, Wang Bingnan had enquired from his U.S.
counterpart in Warsaw whether the U.S. would take advantage of India-China border tensions, to encourage a Taiwanese attack on the mainland.
He obtained a categorical assurance which he claims, in his memoirs,
played a big role in the decision to go to war with India. Thanks to the
impending Cuban missile crisis, the then Soviet Union sought Chinese
support by conveying its intention to side with China in the border conflict
with India. China may not have known about the looming US-Soviet crisis,
but it certainly profited from the Soviet change of heart, temporary though
this proved to be. Perhaps it is too much to expect that Indian decision
makers would have connected these dots together, but that is precisely what
is necessary in dealing with China.
The other example of the importance of contextualizing may be seen
through a contrary example. In 1971, during the Bangladesh war, US and
China were allies supporting Pakistan. Kissinger tried to persuade the
Chinese to attack India along the Sino-Indian border as a means of relieving
pressure on their common ally, Pakistan. In the papers of Alexander Haig,
who was White House Chief of Staff at the time, it is reported that he did
receive a formal reply from the Chinese side, conveying that China had
decided not to move troops to the Sino-Indian border. On can confidently
surmise that the constraining ‘context’ in this regard was the Indo-Soviet
treaty of 1971.
Lest any one believes that Chinese strategists always get things right, I
would like to recall what happened in 1986 during the Wangdung Incident
in the Eastern sector. In 1985, China began to signal that the so-called
“package proposal” for resolving the border issue, essentially legitimizing
the post-1962 status quo, was no longer on offer. In official talks, Chinese
officials stated explicitly for the first time that since the disputed area in the
Eastern sector was much larger than in the Western sector, India would
have to make significant concessions in that sector and China would
reciprocate with appropriate concessions (unspecified) in the West. It was
also conveyed to us that at a minimum, Tawang would have to be
transferred to the Chinese side. When we pointed out that just 3 years back
in 1982 Deng Xiaoping had himself spelt out the package proposal as we
had hitherto understood it, the response was that we may have read too
much into his words. The shift could have been related to a greater level of
confidence following China’s rapid growth and the fact that a young and as
yet untested Prime Minister had taken office in Delhi. This was followed by
the discovery in the summer of 1986 that the Chinese had crossed the
Thagla Ridge and occupied a feature called Le, built permanent barracks as
well as a helipad. In my view this was in some way linked to the hardening
of the Chinese position on the border and the new insistence on India
making concessions in the Eastern sector. I recall accompanying
Ambassador K.P.S. Menon to lodge a protest with the then Chinese
Assistant Foreign Minister and being witness to a most undiplomatic,
offensive and vituperative harangue by the latter. He claimed that China
was, of course, on its own territory, that it was only “strengthening border
management” after the neglect of recent years and that India would be
prudent not to over-react . Soon thereafter I was transferred from Beijing to
Tokyo, but en route in Delhi I attended a strategy session called to discuss
our counter moves. There was, I admit, a reluctance to take any military
counter measures. However a couple of weeks later I learnt that the then
Army Chief, Sundarji, had airlifted troops and occupied the parallel ridge,
known by the peaks Lurongla, Hathungla and Sulunga , overlooking the
Sumdorung river. Two forward posts, Jaya and Negi, were set up across the
river just below the ridge and only 10 metres from a Chinese forward post.
The Chinese were taken completely by surprise as perhaps were our own
political leaders. The then External Affairs Minister, Shri N.D. Tiwari was
transiting Beijing on his way back from Pyong Yang after attending the
Non-Aligned Coordination Bureau meeting that September, to try and
assuage Chinese anger. I was accompanying him en route to Tokyo having
been deputed to Pyong Yang to assist our delegation. Senior Chinese
Foreign Ministry officials were at hand at the airport to receive our
delegation. In the brief exchange that took place at the airport, our
Minister’s protestations of peace and goodwill were met with the not
unreasonable comment that while our leaders were talking peace they were
making aggressive military moves on the ground at the same time. China
would only be satisfied if Indian troops vacated the ridge they had
occupied. China would not be fooled; it would “listen to what is said, but
see what action is taken.”In later talks we agreed to vacate the heights on
our side if the Chinese retreated behind the Thagla ridge, but since they
were not ready to do so, we stayed put as well. While we may not have
planned it this way, the Chinese judged our actions through their own
prism: that we had countered their unexpected move by a well orchestrated
counter move of our own. Subsequently, I am told, that the offensive and
overbearing tone adopted by Chinese Foreign Ministry officials also
changed to being more polite and civilized The next several years were
spent in the two sides discussing disengagement in this sector and finally
in 1992, the eyeball to eyeball confrontation was ended and a number of
confidence building measures adopted. The lesson to be drawn is not that
we should be militarily provocative but that we should have enough
capabilities deployed to convince the other side that aggressive moves
would invite counter moves. This is the reason why it is so important for us
to speed up the upgradation of our border infrastructure and communication
links along all our borders, not just with China.

In dealing with China, therefore, one must constantly analyze the
domestic and geopolitical environment as perceived by China, which is the
prism through which its strategic calculus is shaped and implemented.
In 2005, India was being courted as an emerging power both by Europe
and the U.S., thereby expanding its own room for manoeuvre. The Chinese
response to this was to project a more positive and amenable posture
towards India. This took the shape of concluding the significant Political
Parameters and Guiding Principles for seeking a settlement of the border
issue; the depiction of Sikkim as part of India territory in Chinese maps and
the declaration of a bilateral Strategic and Cooperative Partnership with
India. In private parleys with Indian leaders, their Chinese counterparts
conveyed a readiness to accept India’s permanent membership of the
Security Council, though it was not willing to state this in black and white
in the Joint Statement. Since then, however, as Indian prospects appeared
to have diminished and the perceived power gap with China has widened,
the Chinese sensitivity to Indian interests has also eroded. It is only in
recent months that the tide has turned somewhat, when China has been
facing a countervailing backlash to its assertive posture in the South China
Sea and the US has declared its intention to “rebalance” its security assets
in the Asia-Pacific region. There has been a setback to Chinese hitherto
dominating presence in Myanmar and a steady devaluation of Pakistan’s
value to China as a proxy power to contain India. At home, there are
prospects of slower growth and persistent ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and
Tibet. A major leadership transition is underway adding to the overall
sense of uncertainly and anxiety. We are, therefore, once again witnessing
another renewed though probably temporary phase of greater friendliness
towards India, but it’s a pity that we are unable to engage in active and
imaginative diplomacy to leverage this opportunity to India’s enduring
advantage, given the growing incoherence of our national polity.
I will speak briefly on Chinese attitudes specific to India and how
China sees itself in relation to India. While going through a recent
publication on China in 2020, I came across an observation I consider apt
for this exercise. The historian Jacques Barzun is quoted as saying:
“ To see ourselves as others see us is a valuable gift, without doubt.
But in international relations what is still rarer and far more useful is to see
others as they see themselves.”

It is true that through their long history, India and China have
mostly enjoyed a benign relationship. This was mainly due to the
forbidding geographical buffers between the two sides, the
Taklamalan desert on the Western edges of the Chinese empire, the
vast, icy plateau of Tibet to the South and the ocean expanse to its
East. Such interaction as did take place was through both the caravan
routes across what is now Xinjiang as well as through the sea-borne
trade routes across the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, linking
Indian ports on both the Eastern and Western seaboard to the East
coast of China. India was not located in the traditional Chinese
political order consisting of subordinate states, whether such
subordination was real or imagined. In civilizational terms, too, India,
as a source of Buddhist religion and philosophy and, at some points in
history, the knowledge capital of the region, may have been
considered a special case, a parallel centre of power and culture, but
comfortably far away. During the age of imperialism and colonialism,
India came into Chinese consciousness as a source of the opium that
the British insisted on dumping into China. The use of Indian soldiers
in the various military assaults on China by the British and the
deployment of Indian police forces in the British Concessions, may
have also left a negative residue about India and Indians in the
Chinese mind. This was balanced by several strong positives,
however, in particular the mutual sympathy between the two peoples
struggling for political liberation and emancipation throughout the
first half of the 20th century. To some extent, these positives continued
after Indian independence in 1947 and China’s liberation in 1949 and
were even reinforced thanks to Pandit Nehru’s passionate belief in
Asian resurgence and the seminal role that India and China could play
in the process. However, such sentiments were soon overlaid by the
challenges of national consolidation in both countries and the
pressures of heightened Cold War tensions. With Chinese occupation
of Tibet in 1950, India and China became contiguous neighbours for
the first time in history. When the 1959 revolt in Tibet erupted and the
Dalai Lama and 60,000 Tibetans sought and received shelter in India,
the differences between the two sides on the boundary issue, took on a
strategic dimension, as has been pointed out most recently by
Kissinger in his book “On China”. The 1962 War was not so much
about the boundary as it was a Chinese response to a perceived threat
to China’s control over Tibet, however misplaced such perception
may have been. The comprehensive defeat of Indian forces in the
short war and the regional and international humiliation of India that
followed, allowed China to conveniently locate India in its traditional
inter-state pattern, as a subordinate state, not capable of ever matching
the pre-eminence of Chinese power and influence. Since 1962, most
Chinese portrayals of India and Indian leaders in conversations with
other world leaders or, more lately, in articles by some scholars and
commentators, have been starkly negative. An Indian would find it
quite infuriating to read some of the exchanges on India and Indian
leaders in the Kissinger Transcripts. In recent times, Chinese
commentaries take China’s elevated place in Asia and the world as a
given, but Indian aspirations are dismissed as a “dream”. There are
repeated references to the big gap between the “comprehensive
national power” of the two countries. India’s indigenous capabilities
are usually dismissed as having been borrowed from abroad. In an
interesting research paper entitled “Chinese Responses to India’s
Military Modernization”, Lora Salmaan refers to the “over
confidence” phenomenon that characterises Chinese comparisons of
their own capabilities vis-à-vis India. She points outs that Indian
claims of domestic production and innovation are frequently
dismissed by Chinese analysts by adding the phrase “so-called” or
putting “indigenous” or “domestic” under quotes. She concludes that
“These rhetorical flourishes suggest elements of derision and
dismissiveness in Chinese attitudes towards India’s domestic
programmes and abilities.”
This dismissiveness also colours Chinese analysis of Indian
politics and society. The usual Chinese refrain is that India is chaotic
and undisciplined and does not have what it takes to be a great power
like China. In an article entitled “Why China is Wary of India”, the
commentator Peter Lee relates an interesting story of what transpired
at a Washington Security Conference:
“A Chinese delegate caused an awkward silence among the
congenial group at a post-event drinks session when he stated
that India was “an undisciplined country where the plague and
leprosy still exist. How a big dirty country like that can rise so
quickly amazed us”.
Currently, there are two strands in Chinese perceptions about
India. There are strong, lingering attitudes that dismiss India’s claim
as a credible power and regard its great power aspirations as
“arrogance” and as being an unrealistic pretension. The other strand,
also visible in scholarly writings and in the series of leadership
summits that have taken place at regular intervals, is recognition that
India’s economic, military and scientific and technological
capabilities are on the rise, even if they do not match China. India is
valued as an attractive market for Chinese products at a time when
traditional markets in the West are flat. China is also respectful of
India’s role in multilateral fora, where on several global issues Indian
interests converge with China. I have personal experience of working
closely and most productively with Chinese colleagues in the UN
Climate Change negotiations and our trade negotiators have found the
Chinese valuable allies in WTO negotiations. In such settings Chinese
comfortably defer to Indian leadership. I have also found that on
issues of contention, there is reluctance to confront India directly, the
effort usually being to encourage other countries to play a proxy role
in frustrating Indian diplomacy. This was clearly visible during the
Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna in 2008, when China did
not wish to be the only country to oppose the waiver for India in
nuclear trade, as it could have since the Group functions by
consensus. China may have refused to engage India in any dialogue
on nuclear or missile issues, but that does not mean that Indian
capabilities in this regard so unnoticed or their implications for
Chinese security are ignored. It is in the maritime sphere that China
considers Indian capabilities to possess the most credibility and as
affecting Chinese security interests. These two strands reflect an
ambivalence about India’s emergence - dismissive on the one hand, a
wary, watchful and occasionally respectful posture on the other.
Needless to say, it is what trajectory India itself traverses in its
economic and social development that will mostly influence Chinese
perception about the country.
Additionally, how India manages its relations with other major
powers, in particular, the United States, would also be a factor. My
own experience has been that the closer India-US relations are seen to
be, the more amenable China has proved to be. I do not accept the
argument that a closer India-US relationship leads China to adopt a
more negative and aggressive posture towards India. The same is true
of India’s relations with countries like Japan, Indonesia and Australia,
who have convergent concerns about Chinese dominance of the East
Asian theatre. I also believe that it is a question of time before similar
concerns surface in Russia as well. India should be mindful of this in
maintaining and consolidating its already friendly, but sometimes,
sketchy relations with Russia. The stronger India’s links are with
these major powers, the more room India would have in its relations
with China.

It would be apparent from my presentation that India and China
harbour essentially adversarial perceptions of one another. This is
determined by geography as well as by the growth trajectories of the
two countries. China is the one power which impinges most directly
on India’s geopolitical space. As the two countries expand their
respective economic and military capabilities and their power radiates
outwards from their frontiers, they will inevitably intrude into each
other’s zone of interest, what has been called “over-lapping
peripheries”. It is not necessary that this adversarial relationship will
inevitably generate tensions or, worse, another military conflict, but
in order to avoid that India needs to fashion a strategy which is based
on a constant familiarity with Chinese strategic calculus , the changes
in this calculus as the regional and global landscape changes and
which is, above all, informed by a deep understanding of Chinese
culture, the psyche of its people and how these, too, are undergoing
change in the process of modernization. Equally we should endeavour
to shape Chinese perceptions through building on the positives and
strengthening collaboration on convergent interests, which are not
insignificant. One must always be mindful of the prism through
which China interprets the world around it and India’s place in that
world. It is only through such a complex and continuing exercise that
China’s India challenge can be dealt with.
Sometimes a strong sense of history, portions of which may be
imagined rather than real, may lead the Chinese to ignore the fact that
the contemporary geo-political landscape is very different from that
which prevailed during Chinese ascendancy in the past. Merely
achieving a higher proportion of the global GDP does not guarantee
the restoration of pre-eminence. Ancient China was not a globalized
economy. It was a world in itself, mostly self sufficient and shunning
the less civilized periphery around it. Today, China’s emergence is
integrally linked to the global economy. It is a creature of
interdependence. Similarly, today the geopolitical terrain is populated
by a number of major powers, including in the Asian theatre. A
reassertion of Chinese dominance, or an assumption that being at the
top of the pile in Asia is part of some natural order, is likely to bump
up against painful ground reality, as it has since 2009, opening the
door to the US rebalancing. The recent reports of a slowing down of
Chinese growth should also be sobering.

On the Indian side, the failure to look at the larger picture often
results, by default, in looking at India-China relations inordinately
through the military prism. This also inhibits us from locating
opportunities in an expanding Chinese market and in promoting a
focus on the rich history of cultural interchange and the more
contemporary pathways our two cultures have taken in fascinating
ways. This covers music, dance, cinema, literature and painting.
Chinese successes in development and its focus on infrastructure do
have lessons for India which should be embraced. And if China, for
its own reasons, is willing to invest in India’s own massive
infrastructure development plans, why not examine how this could be
leveraged while keeping our security concerns at the forefront? There
are many areas of grey and it is for dispassionate strategists on both
sides to explore and help shape a future for China-India relations that
aspires to be as benign as it has been for most of the past.
I thank you for your attention.

[ramana]

US worries that India will stand aside.....

VIEW FROM WASHINGTON
Resurrecting A Ghost
A return to nonalignment is misguided, potentially dangerous, and would leave India perilously vulnerable
ASHLEY J. TELLIS
http://www.outlooki ndia.com/ article.aspx? 282097

India’s foreign-policy establishment is in the process of disinterring a long-dead grand strategy from its Cold War grave. “Nonalignment”— the doctrine that calls upon India to refuse staunchly any strategic alliances with other actors— has re-entered the broader foreign policy discourse, with the centre-left championing such policies in the guise of promoting “strategic autonomy.” The credo was touted in an independent report titled Nonalignment 2.0, which offers the vision of “allying with none” as a grand strategy for India in the coming years.

At first glance, nonalignment presents an attractive option for a rising India. It promises freedom from entangling alliances as well as the chance to advance Indian exceptionalism against the Machiavellian imperatives of traditional international politics. Most importantly, it holds out the prospect that India can chart its own path free from machinations of external actors, an understandable objective for a country scarred by its colonial past.

But in light of India’s growing strategic vulnerabilities, a return to nonalignment is misguided and potentially dangerous. The doctrine has three major weaknesses that would leave India perilously vulnerable:

First, nonalignment struggles to reconcile competing strands of realism and idealism. On the one hand, Indian policymakers acknowledge the nation inhabits a Hobbesian world characterized by troublesome neighbours and endemic geopolitical competition. Despite avowed recognition of the dangerous environment, the doctrine counsels India to rise above conventional international politics, to avoid behaving like other great powers as it becomes one and instead blaze new paths for the conduct of powerful nations.
Advocacy of moralpolitik in an amoral world is grounded in nonalignment’s fervent but suspect belief in the power of example. According to its proponents, India’s developmental and democratic successes within would help inspire a following abroad, thus bequeathing an exemplary power allowing India to gain in global stature and influence. This coruscating idealism, however, is at odds with the reality that great-power competition will be alive and well in the future global system. If power politics is in no danger of extinction, then the critical task facing India is maximization of national power through smart choices at home and abroad. Expansion of India’s material power in the realms of economic growth, technological advancement, and institutional capacity could make all the difference— with the benefits of example accruing thereafter for free.
It’s clear that consolidating material success cannot be subordinated to the chimerical pursuit of an ideal international order, in which India’s exceptionalism has room to flourish, so long as the tyranny of great-power competition remains untamed. In this respect, India’s new advocates of nonalignment are akin to an older generation of idealists in the United States. From the moment of its founding, the American nation, too, entranced by the Enlightenment and republican ideals, sought to promote a novus ordo seclorum, an ongoing quest for new order for the ages, permitting the country to preserve exceptionalism in the face of all international pressures toward conformity. While many Americans would like to believe that the United States is unique in its global behaviour, the truth is that the country behaves more or less like the great powers that preceded it.
Constraints of international competition would ensure that India suffers the same fate.
Although states differ in details of how they conduct themselves, with history, domestic politics and strategic culture accounting for much of the variance— there’s little doubt that India, too, would eventually succumb to protecting its own interests, if it doesn’t do so already. If the demands of national power came into conflict with the obligations of principle, New Delhi would unlikely sacrifice tangible gains to meet certain ideational aspirations. India’s switching to a more accommodating posture towards Burma’s military rulers to curb Chinese influence is just a recent example. Nor should India be enjoined to do so, as the nonalignment advocates might suggest, because such actions could be devastating for a still-weak country struggling to thrive in the cutthroat world of international politics.

{Ashley bhai forgets that the dangerous neighborhood was fostered and nurtured by the West led by US. Their two minions/snakes:PRC and TSP have turned to bite them and now the West threatens India that they will step aside if these two snakes bite India. Ashely shouldnt forget that India knows how to tame snakes as it is the land of the snake charmers and failing that its also the land of the mongoose which kills snakes if the dont listen to the snake charmer.}


A second and more problematic flaw in nonalignment as a grand strategy is its conviction that refusing to align with other great powers remains the best organizing principle for India’s foreign relations because it preserves the nation’s “strategic autonomy.” This attempt to equate nonalignment with preventing loss of sovereign agency confuses ends and means. If nonalignment were primarily about the end, states seeking to avoid strategic policies that were defined elsewhere from their own capitals, then all states would necessarily be nonaligned.

{As they should be for a peaceful co-existence. Its the problem of dominance to recreate Imperial Rome that is the problem. The Empire will get you to ruination.}

But when nonalignment is defined as a means— “the avoidance of sharp choices,” asNonalignment 2.0 aptly puts it— then it becomes more dangerous, thanks to India’s strategic circumstances. In the north, China is a rising geopolitical competitor whose potential threat to Indian security interests is only complicated by two countries’ burgeoning bilateral economic relationship. In the west, Pakistan continues to pose dangers to India because of a peculiar combination of increasing state weakness married to a propensity for perilous risk-taking.

Together, these threats to Indian security suggest that New Delhi should invest in preferential strategic partnerships with the enemies of its enemies because such affiliations could help mitigate the perils posed by India’s immediate adversaries. Oddly, however, nonalignment supporters take the opposite tact, running away from preferential partnerships in a quest for strategic autonomy. Accordingly, they fundamentally misread what success requires, especially when political competition coexists with economic interdependence and containing adversaries is not a realistic option.

The strategy of nonalignment might make sense if India could muster the necessary resources to cope with its strategic challenges independently. Yet the doctrine’s third weakness consists of its failure to assess whether the transformative reforms necessary to build India’s comprehensive national power can in fact be consummated, considering the current circumstances of India’s domestic politics. The realities of Indian politics suggest that the successful “internal balancing” required for the realization of genuine strategic autonomy could fall on hard times. India’s capacity for resource mobilization is undermined by the disarray of its two national parties, the continuing ebb of power away from the national centre and towards the states, the rise of powerful regional parties, and the advent of populist politics focusing on economic redistribution rather than growth. Accordingly, India’s national security managers ought to treat the
doctrine’s exhortation to eschew preferential strategic partnerships with a friendly power like the United States with scepticism.

{India's million mutinies are India's issues to sort. Not for others to meddle.}

Ultimately, nonalignment fails to recognize that when internal balancing is impeded, external balancing becomes imperative. At a time when the growth of Chinese power continues unabated and different threats posed by China and Pakistan continue to grow, New Delhi must give serious consideration to accelerating the growth in its own national capacities through tightened affiliations with a small number of friends and allies. Instead of avoiding coalitions, New Delhi should thus enter into preferential strategic partnerships taking the form of high-quality trading ties, robust defence cooperation and strong diplomatic collaboration. To be successful, India needs these ties with key friendly powers throughout the world— especially the United States— because neither its example as a successful democracy nor its efforts at internal balancing are likely to produce the security necessary to its well-being. India’s strategic challenges are grave and
increasing. New Delhi must recognize that the strategic solution to the country’s predicament cannot consist of simply resurrecting nonalignment in a new guise.
____________ _________ _________ __

Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Rights: Copyright © 2012 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.

I said many times this is not our fight and we should stand aside while the world order gets sorted.

[svinayak]

{{Ashley bhai forgets that the dangerous neighborhood was fostered and nurtured by the West led by US. Their two minions/snakes:PRC and TSP have turned to bite them and now the West threatens India that they will step aside if these two snakes bite India. Ashely shouldnt forget that India knows how to tame snakes as it is the land of the snake charmers and failing that its also the land of the mongoose which kills snakes if the dont listen to the snake charmer.}

A second and more problematic flaw in nonalignment as a grand strategy is its conviction that refusing to align with other great powers remains the best organizing principle for India’s foreign relations because it preserves the nation’s “strategic autonomy.” This attempt to equate nonalignment with preventing loss of sovereign agency confuses ends and means. If nonalignment were primarily about the end, states seeking to avoid strategic policies that were defined elsewhere from their own capitals, then all states would necessarily be nonaligned.

{As they should be for a peaceful co-existence. Its the problem of dominance to recreate Imperial Rome that is the problem. The Empire will get you to ruination.}

The west promoted all these snakes during the cold war and now they want India out of non alignment



It is their selfish reason they want alignment. India has to test 50 times and see what kind of articles will come

[nakul]

The articles from pro US sources are like this:

1. blah blah
2. blah blah blah
3. blah blah blah blah
4. align with the USA

[nvishal]

China is opportunistic. It won't fight a war if it thinks it will loose.

A non-violent way to contain china is to disrupt its economy. A large military needs a very large fee to maintain it.

[SSridhar]

Israel is a god-damn colony.

The only reason we keep a foot inside israel is because it sells india some sub-standard weapons. You guys talk as if israel "donates" the artillery to india.

Roughly half of the world jewish population tucked in one space. Around 20,000sqkm(roughly equivalent to the size of mizoram), a few nuclear pounding will wipe it clean. I can't help but be very pessimistic about israel's future.

nvishal, if Israel is selling sub-standard armament, why is India continuing to buy them ? After all, we are the buyers and we can go to somebody else. And, pray, who is talking here about 'donation' when we pay through our nose for purchases we make and we all know that.

Why are you talking about wiping off Israelis with nukes ?

[nawabs]

Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond

http://www.idsa.in/book/GrandStrategyfo ... 0andBeyond

The Grand Strategy Addresses Important Elements of India’s National Security Strategy

New Delhi: The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses’ publication titled ‘Grand Strategy’ for India 2020 and Beyond’ presents perspectives on diverse issues, ranging from security concerns; socio-economic challenges; regional and internal security challenges; emerging challenges in foreign policy domain etc. that are of importance to India’s grand strategy.

Edited by IDSA Scholars Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Ms Princy George, the volume addresses recent and emerging security threats, such as left wing extremism, international terrorism, climate change and energy security and the role of these for framing a national security strategy for India. The authors in the volume offer insightful answers to questions, such as: What might India do to build a cohesive and peaceful domestic order in the next decades? How could India foster a global consensus on the global commons that serve India’s interests and values? What strategic framework will optimise India’s efforts to foster a stable and peaceful neighbourhood?

The Book is the product of a four-day international conference on India’s National Security Strategy held on 20-23 December, 2010 at the IDSA. The conference launched the IDSA National Strategy Project (INSP), an initiative to provide a forum for interdisciplinary dialogue among specialists in international studies, economists, strategic experts and other groups with an interest in India’s strategic affairs.

In the past two decades, India has undergone dramatic transformations in the economic, social and political spheres. The country has radically transformed its economy and is now projected to be on course to become the third largest economy in the world by 2030. Besides this spectacular economic growth, Indian democracy has steadily consolidated and expanded its scope and remit in the post-independence era. The recent successes of civil society groups in mobilising public support for various causes are testimony to the power and resilience of democratic India’s ability to negotiate conflicts within the society through peaceful methods. However, despite its numerous successes, India faces enormous challenges at the domestic, regional and global levels.

Given the complex policy environment of the coming decade, rife with challenges that emerge out of the interface of crosscutting and dynamically interacting domains, a renewed focus on rethinking India’s security strategy is imperative. Such an exercise should be geared towards bridging the gap between traditional disciplinary approaches of strategic analysis and the contemporary need to go beyond disciplinary silos to capture a comprehensive view of the world. As no single institution, discipline or profession is singularly sufficient to carry out the dynamic exercise of framing a security strategy for India that is forward-looking and illuminates the whole range of policy options available to our policymakers in the coming decade, a need was felt to supplement the current framework of disciplinary research with insights from a range of academic disciplines and experience streams at different levels in think tanks and government agencies.

Dedicated to late Shri K. Subrahmanyam, who is the principal inspiration behind the INSP project, the volume has been compiled in the spirit of interdisciplinary dialogue. It aims to stimulate date and discussion in the coming months and be helpful in fostering consensus on important elements of India’s national security strategy. Keeping in view the dynamic nature of the security environment.

Through the volume and the succeeding project report on ‘Towards a National Security Strategy for India’, IDSA hopes to offer strategic perspectives on bilateral relations with key countries and other issues of significance for India.

The ‘E’ version of the book is now available on IDSA website: www.idsa.in

[nagesh]

I feel the mods must check the antecedents of this chap nvishal,and decide if he shud be allowed in this forum.He appears to be yasser arafat incarnate.

Israel is a god-damn colony.

The only reason we keep a foot inside israel is because it sells india some sub-standard weapons. You guys talk as if israel "donates" the artillery to india.

Roughly half of the world jewish population tucked in one space. Around 20,000sqkm(roughly equivalent to the size of mizoram), a few nuclear pounding will wipe it clean. I can't help but be very pessimistic about israel's future.

[ramana]

A link to the IDSA e-book.

One short comment: The title is grand strategy for 2020 and beyond. Thats only 8 years away. More like tactics than strategy.

Will read and compare to what the Business Strategy folks say.

GrandStrategyforIndia2020andBeyond

[Vipul]

India foreign Policy: No frills.

DOWNTOWN YANGON, MYANMAR’S once-shuttered main city, is home to a large Indian diaspora. Many turned out to hear a speech from India’s prime minister during his first visit in May. “Keep a place in your hearts for India,” Manmohan Singh implored a gathering of businesspeople.

Nothing Mr Singh does is electrifying. The same day he turned a historic meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy activist, into a stilted and awkward affair. His talk of a cross-border bus service, and mutual trade worth $5 billion by 2015, set few hearts racing. A group of resident Bengalis in a hardware shop, buying materials for a goat cage, shrugged when they heard that Mr Singh was in town.

That he got to Myanmar at all was an achievement, even if he came long after nimbler leaders from Britain, Bangladesh, South Korea and elsewhere. The machine that guides India abroad is slow and cautious. “We run a no-frills policy,” concedes a senior official. “We’re not trying to cut a grand figure abroad, it’s a realist approach.”

Put less kindly, India is still punching well below its weight in foreign affairs. Shashi Tharoor, a Congressman from Kerala and one-time under-secretary-general at the United Nations, thinks India is trying to do more but is devoting far too few resources to achieving its foreign-policy goals.

The country’s economy is more closely enmeshed with the rest of the world than ever. Foreign trade is now equivalent to 43% of GDP, against just 16% two decades ago. By last year India’s two-way trade was worth a total of $794 billion. In March SIPRI, a Swedish think-tank, ranked the country as the largest single importer of weapons, with a 10% share of the world’s total. Long a recipient of aid, the country is fast becoming a donor, dishing out aid and soft loans worth billions of dollars every year. It also has a growing appetite for energy, mineral, commercial and other interests in Africa, Central Asia and elsewhere. And it is an enthusiastic joiner of international groups.

All this speaks of rising ambitions, even if most foreign-affairs experts wisely eschew any talk of an incipient superpower. But the means are limited. Mr Tharoor notes that the foreign service has only about 800 diplomats, less than a fifth of China’s and roughly the same as tiny Singapore’s (see chart 6).

Overstretch is evident: a single official in Delhi has to liaise with 19 Latin American ambassadors, says Mr Tharoor. There are few people to handle difficult cross-regional topics such as water resources or climate change, and few linguists fluent in tongues helpful beyond Asia. Dynamic Indian firms establish themselves in new markets without government help, but they grumble that rivals, notably state-owned Chinese ones, enjoy cheap credit and diplomatic backing.

“India’s state is a 65-year-old who has fat in all the wrong places,” concludes C. Raja Mohan, a foreign-affairs expert. It has too few border guards, customs officials, diplomats and soldiers, but far too many pen-pushers in the coal and steel ministries. After decades of facing inwards, Indian universities, think-tanks and commentators are only just beginning to show an interest in foreign matters beyond Pakistan, so as yet there is only a small corps of experts outside government to help advise policymakers. Pointlessly strict secrecy rules lock up official foreign-affairs documents for good.

Some even wonder how much of a grip the national government in Delhi is able to keep on foreign policy. Regional satraps who bully Mr Singh on domestic issues have also caused sudden foreign-policy reversals. Last year Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal’s chief minister, scuppered an Indian water-sharing deal struck with Bangladesh. In spring this year a Tamil ally of Mr Singh’s government helped to get India to vote against Sri Lanka at the UN over war crimes, reversing its policy.

Even so, India’s star is rising abroad. Sensibly, its goals are limited: to ensure that its foreign relations serve its big transformation at home. That goes down better with its foreign partners than its sermonising of old. Its three main concerns today are America, China and its immediate region.

Relations with America have thrived ever since a civil nuclear deal agreed with George W. Bush seven years ago. Cultural ties via India’s diaspora in America help, as do stronger trade links. The two countries also share the experience of running big, expensive, religious, materialistic and messy democracies in which central governments are constrained by powerful states.

America is now one of India’s biggest weapons suppliers. Mr Mohan points to defence orders worth $10 billion for C130 and C17 aircraft, missiles and more, and says another $10 billion is lined up. Last year America failed to sell India a big consignment of fighter jets, but that caused only a temporary ripple of bilateral irritation. Close co-operation in counterterrorism, marine exercises and anti-piracy efforts continues.

Our interactive map demonstrates how the territorial claims of India, Pakistan and China would change the shape of South Asia.The two powers’ interests are converging. India, temporarily on the UN security council, has voted three times with America against Iran over that country’s nuclear programme (though it has been cagey over Syria). The two collaborate in Afghanistan, where India is a big civilian donor. Crucially, America is increasingly adopting India’s stance against extremist groups based on Pakistani territory. Awkward issues of old, such as who should run Kashmir, no longer get aired.

India wants America to preserve its ties to Pakistan, since no one else, certainly not China, would help moderate Pakistani behaviour. But American ties with India will get more important, though there will be no formal treaty. And India will increasingly engage with the West.

One big reason is its second concern: China’s rise. The two Asian powers are developing closer ties, notably in trade. But they also vie with each other. A China expert in India’s foreign ministry says that bilateral trade, worth just $2.9 billion in 2000, should pass $100 billion in 2015. But he explains with equal enthusiasm that India has made rapid gains in domestic military mobility. A decade ago it took two months to move several army divisions to defensive positions on a disputed border in the north-east; now, thanks to better roads, it takes just two weeks.

In Myanmar, and elsewhere in the region, the two Asian giants compete for influence and energy supplies. At the same time India is wary of China’s ability to make trouble, for example over Tibet and the Dalai Lama (who lives in India). And disputes continue along the still unfixed India-China border, the site of a humiliating frontier war 50 years ago that India lost.

India wants a stronger military deterrent. In April it test-fired a home-built long-range nuclear-capable missile, the Agni-V, which in theory could strike China’s big cities. And it is putting more soldiers and aircraft at permanent forward bases along the border.

Farther east, too, India is forging links with democracies and those already close to America. Ties with Australia will improve as it looks poised to announce that it will sell uranium for India’s domestic nuclear plants. India has become modestly active in oil exploration in the South China Sea. And it is a big recipient of aid and investment from Japan.
Last, and long overdue, India is doing more to improve relations in its region. Mr Singh says he is ready to visit his own birthplace in Pakistani Punjab if only Pakistan would do more to stop terrorists who attack India, or at least to agree to India’s requests for more open trade. India is also trying to boost trade by building better border infrastructure and loosening non-tariff barriers. This month the countries’ foreign ministers at last signed a deal easing their bilateral visa regime.

Though still poorly resourced, India’s foreign affairs seem better run than they have been for a long time. Gone are the days when Indian leaders abroad somehow managed to appear arrogant, moralising and ineffectual all at the same time. India’s policy may lack frills, but at least it has a clear purpose.

[svenkat]

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/brajesh-mishra-strategic-czar-of-vajpayee-era-passes-away/article3946473.ece

[svinayak]

India foreign Policy: No frills.

Though still poorly resourced, India’s foreign affairs seem better run than they have been for a long time. Gone are the days when Indian leaders abroad somehow managed to appear arrogant, moralising and ineffectual all at the same time. India’s policy may lack frills, but at least it has a clear purpose.

This is a patronizing article.

Lot of false information and the map is included as if Tibet is real part of China as a legitimate region.

http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailycha ... r_disputes

These articles helps to legitimate the boundaries of PRC and Pakistan.

This racist mouth piece needs to be shut down permanently

This issue of the Economist has been barred from circulating in India. Indian customs has impounded all print copies. The Indian govt. is objecting to the depiction of Chinese and Pak claims on Indian territory!

[nawabs]

PRESS RELEASE: MEA To Declassify A Large Number of Documents, Says Pinak Chakravarty

http://idsa.in/pressrelease/MEAToDeclas ... hakravarty

Following the recent declassification of 70,000 files, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is in the process of “finalizing a major project to declassify another set of 220000 files- records covering: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, Iran and Sri Lanka, East Asia, Eurasia and the Americas” revealed Mr Pinak Chakravarty, Special Secretary, Public Diplomacy, Ministry of External Affairs. Mr Chakravarty was addressing at the International Seminar on ‘Early Years of Nuclear Cooperation and Non-Proliferation: A Dialogue on Nuclear Historicities’ organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses along with the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) on October 10, 2012

Throwing light on India's nuclear policy, Mr Chakravarty said it “remains firmly rooted in the basic tenet that our country's national security, in a world of nuclear proliferation, lies either in universal, non-discriminatory disarmament or in the exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all”, adding that “India’s nuclear doctrine, therefore, includes ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states”.

Also Speaking on the occasion was co-director of NPIHP, Dr Christian Ostermann, who said that NPIHP aims at making “a contribution to policy analysis by deepening understanding of the goals, interests, the situational circumstances, and the character of nuclear and non-nuclear states in relation to their nuclear outlooks and strategies, that is not a history of the weapons themselves, but their underpinning politics.” He further added that “only by looking at the underlying politics can we begin to explain the widely divergent nuclear postures chosen by states like China, Pakistan, or the United States.”

Dr Ostermann described “Triangulation and multilateralization of our archival efforts through a global network of researchers and institutions” as one of the “most fruitful methodological approaches” to “excavate the documentations from the frequently uncooperative clutches of security establishments and archives.” He further advocated the “use of local and provincial archives when central state archives remain closed” as another approach to gather information.

Welcoming MEA’s recent unprecedented release of over 70,000 documents pertaining to India's post-1947 diplomatic and foreign policy history, Dr Ostermann said that the Ministry’s decision “effectively ends an era in which India’s role in the Cold War was researched and told based on documents from other countries—from Russia, China or Hungary.”

Earlier, in his welcome speech, Director General, IDSA, Dr Arvind Gupta said “Framing a proper Indian perspective, understanding an interpretation on these key issues and redressing the knowledge gaps is one primary objective of our nuclear history project. We seek to undertake this process by exploring all available sources from archives and inputs shared through oral history interviews.”

Referring to MEA’s decision of declassifying more documents, Dr Gupta said, “The Ministry of External Affairs’ recent declassification of a large number of files pertaining to India’s foreign policy is a step in the right direction. Some of these files, which are now available with the National Archives, pertain to the nuclear issues. More files need to be declassified.”

[ramana]

lets see if there are any files about US suggestions to India prior to 1968?

[sum]

S.S. Menon on Late Brajesh Mishra. A good read:
Old-fashioned patriot

He was the quintessential realist, untrammelled by ideology and preconceived notions, who took the world as he found it, in not very good or appealing shape, and worked it to his country’s purposes. For above all things he was a patriot, of the old-fashioned kind, with a strong sense of the national interest and the national purpose to build a strong and prosperous India, which would enable us to control our own fate.

In this quest he was tireless. But his was no unthinking nationalism, no take-no-prisoners and the devil-take-the-hindmost kind of patriotism. In the Foreign Service, and later in the world, his negotiating skills were legend. Many of us here have stories about his negotiating skills. Having watched him negotiate with the Chinese during a secret visit in November 2000, and with Tariq Aziz in Islamabad in 2004 before the Vajpayee visit, I asked him over an evening drink how he negotiated. His reply was, as always, simple, practical and direct. “Always give the other man something to take away from the table. As little as possible, but something. Otherwise he has no interest in doing what he has promised you.”

In each of his diplomatic achievements, whether re-engaging with the major powers after the 1998 nuclear weapon tests, building the strategic partnership with the United States, or reaching out to Pakistan in 1999 and 2004, or the free trade agreement with Sri Lanka in 2000, this was the principle he followed.

As someone whose job was created by Mishra, I am also acutely aware that we owe the present shape of our national security structures in very large part to his energy, and that of his collaborators. He built to last. When these structures were reviewed after 10 years by a Task Force, they actually suggested more of the same rather than a radical restructuring.

That so much was achieved in such a short time by him is truly remarkable, and tribute to the partnerships he built, with Mr. Vajpayee, with K. Subrahmaniam, and with countless others, of all ages and across party lines. The relationship with PM Vajpayee was truly unique and the true root of much of his achievement.

Of course there will be regrets at his passing. For the un-drunk bottle of whisky that I had saved for his recovery from surgery. For the unwritten book that I pressed him for, until he said that he would not write a book that was not honest and that there were truths he could never reveal. And most of all for the advice that we had got used to relying upon.

[gunjur]

EDIT: sorry was a repost

[ramana]

MEA Declassified files list at IDSA

Only file names!

[arun]

X Post from the India EU News and Analyses thread on the Enrica Lexie case where Italian Marines murdered Indian fishermen.

Speaking of the murderous Italian Marines case ...............

The Ferrari Formula 1 team is trying to be ultra cute by supporting the Italian Marines on board the Enrica Lexie who murderered two Indian fisherman and are facing the justice system in India.

For this inappropriate support of murderers the Ferrari team will not be getting my support during the Indian GP:

Ferrari's show of solidarity for Italian sailors held in India

The inappropriate behaviour of Ferrari has not gone down well with our MEA who have said "using sporting events to promote cause which are not of a sporting nature is not in keeping with the spirit of sports." :

MEA not amused, says F1 team decision not in spirit of sports

The National Fishworkers’ Forum has also objected :

Fishermen protest against Ferrari

[arun]

X Posted from the India-US Strategic News and Discussion thread:

India's woman in Washington wrestles with tough issues

[Rony]

Farewell, farewell but no welcome - Why India’s man in London was unable to take up Swiss assignment

Stories abound about ministers in Delhi refusing to move out of their spacious bungalows long after losing their jobs. Now there is a variation on that theme — an ambassador who is staying put despite retiring from the diplomatic service.

The reluctance of Chitra Narayanan, India’s ambassador in Switzerland since August 2008, to move from her post has caused an embarrassing logjam.Worse, in the eyes of western diplomats, it has turned India’s foreign service into something of a joke.This is because Rajesh Prasad, appointed ambassador to Switzerland back in June, was attending one farewell party after another in London, including one from the British Foreign Office and another from the Indian Journalists’ Association, but his departure date for Bern always kept getting postponed.

Finally, he was given the green light and advised he could get his packing done and proceed to Bern.

But almost on the eve of his departure, Prasad, who was getting pretty fed up with being kept waiting, has been told to return to Delhi and Chitra won’t move from Bern.

A source in Bern told The Telegraph: “She is the daughter of a former President, didn’t you know (the late K.R. Narayanan)? The people in the MEA (ministry of external affairs) have been overridden.”

[Rony]

India: the warped history and geography of NonAlignment 2.0

[Aditya_V]

Farewell, farewell but no welcome - Why India’s man in London was unable to take up Swiss assignment

Stories abound about ministers in Delhi refusing to move out of their spacious bungalows long after losing their jobs. Now there is a variation on that theme — an ambassador who is staying put despite retiring from the diplomatic service.

The reluctance of Chitra Narayanan, India’s ambassador in Switzerland since August 2008, to move from her post has caused an embarrassing logjam.Worse, in the eyes of western diplomats, it has turned India’s foreign service into something of a joke.This is because Rajesh Prasad, appointed ambassador to Switzerland back in June, was attending one farewell party after another in London, including one from the British Foreign Office and another from the Indian Journalists’ Association, but his departure date for Bern always kept getting postponed.

Finally, he was given the green light and advised he could get his packing done and proceed to Bern.

But almost on the eve of his departure, Prasad, who was getting pretty fed up with being kept waiting, has been told to return to Delhi and Chitra won’t move from Bern.

A source in Bern told The Telegraph: “She is the daughter of a former President, didn’t you know (the late K.R. Narayanan)? The people in the MEA (ministry of external affairs) have been overridden.”

This Chitra Narayan must be a conduit for swiss bank dealings, cant think of any other reason for this sad state of affairs.

[chetak]

{quote="Rony"}Farewell, farewell but no welcome - Why India’s man in London was unable to take up Swiss assignment

Stories abound about ministers in Delhi refusing to move out of their spacious bungalows long after losing their jobs. Now there is a variation on that theme — an ambassador who is staying put despite retiring from the diplomatic service.

The reluctance of Chitra Narayanan, India’s ambassador in Switzerland since August 2008, to move from her post has caused an embarrassing logjam.Worse, in the eyes of western diplomats, it has turned India’s foreign service into something of a joke.This is because Rajesh Prasad, appointed ambassador to Switzerland back in June, was attending one farewell party after another in London, including one from the British Foreign Office and another from the Indian Journalists’ Association, but his departure date for Bern always kept getting postponed.

Finally, he was given the green light and advised he could get his packing done and proceed to Bern.

But almost on the eve of his departure, Prasad, who was getting pretty fed up with being kept waiting, has been told to return to Delhi and Chitra won’t move from Bern.

A source in Bern told The Telegraph: “She is the daughter of a former President, didn’t you know (the late K.R. Narayanan)? The people in the MEA (ministry of external affairs) have been overridden.”{/quote}

This Chitra Narayan must be a conduit for swiss bank dealings, cant think of any other reason for this sad state of affairs.

The other reason is the very same sense of entitlement that her dear father had.

IIRC, Her very entry into the corps diplomatic was controversial too. Here again papa had to "stress" the dalit credentials when she could not make the grade repeatedly.

[SSridhar]

I.K.Gujral, author of key foreign policy doctrine dies - Vidya Subramaniam, The Hindu

He was Prime Minister for less than a year, and at that by accident: because the other contestants squabbled furiously and pulled each other down. Yet Inder Kumar Gujral left behind a foreign policy legacy so path-breaking that it became the touchstone for the conduct of India’s relations with its immediate neighbours.

The author of the celebrated Gujral Doctrine (a set of five principles based on unilateral accommodation) died here on Friday — at age 92,

So, this obnoxious concept of 'unilateral accommodation' becomes 'celebrated' and 'path-breaking' and a 'touchstone' ? No wonder, Indian foreign policy has been continuously in tatters.

[abhishek_sharma]

National Interest: Accidentally, in history

In Pak, Sharif mourns a friend