India-Russia: News & Analysis

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 May 2012 03:55

X-post...

abhishek_sharma wrote:George Kennan had to leave the US State dept due to his differences with Dulles. He joined Robert Oppenheimer's Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. The institute boasted of people like Einstein, von Neumann, Godel etc. The mathematicians and physicists objected to the appointment of Kennan because he had no scholarly accomplishments. Oppenheimer's influence helped him to get in, but Oppenheimer asked him to produce scholarly output. The result was a great book "Soviet-American relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the war", which quickly won 4 prizes and removed all doubts about his abilities. It is considered one of the best books for understanding Russia during/around the Russian Revolution.

The book is available free:

Soviet-American relations, 1917-1920 volume 1 (Russia Leaves The War)

Soviet-American relations, 1917-1920 : volume 2 (The Decision to Intervene)

To truly understand the FSU and how it was formed please read these two books.

Roperia · Post by **Roperia** » 18 May 2012 15:23

From Russia, no love

Mr. Putin skips G-8 as a snub to Mr. Obama and prepares to visit China as the first country outside of the former SU states. Important article to read.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 21 May 2012 14:47

Roperia wrote:From Russia, no love

Mr. Putin skips G-8 as a snub to Mr. Obama and prepares to visit China as the first country outside of the former SU states. Important article to read.

The snub part is exaggarated , He is busy with Government formation and he spoke with Obama and said so in as many words ....but Medvedev made it and dont think the out come will be any different say if putin made it too. There was no agreement in Missile Defence too on the cards to nothing was expected from G-8 summit.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 21 May 2012 14:49

Nice write up on Common Economic Space

Russia for a close knit economic alliance

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 21 May 2012 23:06

IDSA COMMENT
Russia’s Destiny is now in Putin’s Hands

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 May 2012 23:44

Hyperbole to attract readers. Russia is too big for it to be in anyone's hands. Not to say Putin has important role.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 21 Jun 2012 00:05

Joint Indo-Russian military exercises to be held in August

The officials from the Indian Armed Forces today announced that they will be holding the fourth edition of the joint Indo-Russian army exercises in August 2012.
The exercise, which will have counter-terrorism operations as its main focus, will be conducted in the Asian part of Russia, near its border with China and Mongolia.

Army officials said that a total of 250 soldiers from both sides will attend the military drills, which has been codenamed as Indra 2012. The army also said that from this year onwards, the exercise will be an annual affair. The Armed forces of both India and Russia conducted their first joint military drill in 2005. The drills were conducted in the Indian state of Rajasthan, attended by elite troops from both the sides.

Russia hosted the second edition of the Indra drills, which were conducted in the European province of Pskov, located close to the Lithuanian and Latvian borders of the Eurasian nation. The third edition was conducted in the Chaubatia garrison, near the resort town of Ranikhet, in the Northern Indian state of Uttarakhand.

According to the Russian sources, the current edition of the drills will be conducted in the Republic of Buryatia, in the Siberian region of Russia. The region falls under the Russian Army’s Eastern Command. Unlike the other Russian provinces, Buryatia is home to an indigenous Asian minority, the Buriots. Buriots and other Asians make up close to 30% of the Republic’s population, outnumbered only by the Russians.

The schedule for the drills was first announced in February this year by the Indian officials. Last year, Russia had called off the drills, which were about to be conducted there, due to some technical issues. A planned bilateral naval exercise between the two nations was also cancelled, as the Russia Navy was busy in conducting rescue operations in the tsunami hit areas of Japan.

India had conducted joint military exercises with Singapore and Indonesia, early this year. Indonesian troops joined their Indian counterparts for a training operation in the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairangte in Mizoram, on February 2012. The exercise lasted for more than three weeks.

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 30 Jun 2012 06:14

MKB on the unfolding dynamics of the New Great Game and Russia's moves in it.

A Russia House on the Indian Ocean

The building blocks of the historic visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pakistan in September have begun arriving in Islamabad. It is a poignant moment in the region's history and politics. This will be the first time a Russian president visits Pakistan since its birth in 1947.

The Russians are fabricating some hardy bricks for the mansion they hope to build in the region which forms a beachhead on the Indian Ocean - a mansion large enough for their friends in Pakistan and in the neighboring countries of India, Iran and Afghanistan to consort with them.

But then, the very sight of the Russian bricks infuriates the United States. The point is, this Russia House will stand bang on the way of the New Silk Road that the US has been planning, which also needs to run through Pakistan. If the access is blocked, it becomes problematic for the US to keep together the body and soul of the tens of thousands of its troops who were hoping to settle down in the Hindu Kush and Central Asia as pioneers in the "Wild West" of China's Xinjiang and on the "soft underbelly" of Russia.

In sum, the battle is joined for influencing Pakistan's future. The stakeholders are many and a keen struggle lies ahead, since at the core of it lies a host of other issues of profound consequence to world politics - energy security of the two big power-houses of Asia (China and India), the future of the New Middle East, and of course, the US strategy to contain Russia and China.

Moscow deputed a talented and vastly experienced diplomat to visit Pakistan in May to make an estimation of the lay of the land. He was a surveyor of great experience whose reputation is the stuff of legends in the Hindu Kush mountains - Ambassador Zamir Kabulov, Russia's point person for Afghanistan. By the choice of Kabulov, Moscow also gently stated its broad intentions as regards its architectural design, namely, that it is a mansion with Afghan characteristics.

Following up on Kabulov's visit, Russian experts began arriving in Pakistan. The proposals they brought are of momentous significance to the long-term security and stability of the region. Moscow has zeroed in on energy cooperation as the fulcrum of its nascent cooperation with Islamabad.

A six-year old idea reappears ...
This is a shrewd decision by Moscow since energy security is a key issue in Pakistan's political economy today, no less important than terrorism. Much of Pakistan gets only a few hours' electricity in a day and the people's rancor is visible. Moscow has assessed that energy security is integral to Pakistan's capacity to maintain "strategic autonomy" as a South Asian power of standing and, therefore, by assisting that country in this sphere, Russian geopolitical interests in a vast swathe of the Greater Middle East stretching from the Persian Gulf to China's Autonomous Region of Xinjiang would also be served.

Besides, in immediate terms, mutual understanding with Pakistan is becoming an imperative need for Russia in the post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan, where the Western powers would have withdrawn the bulk of their troops but are nonetheless establishing an open-ended, sizeable military presence of tens of thousands of combat troops.

Russia and Pakistan are joined in their opposition to the long-term occupation of Afghanistan by the West; Russia hopes to influence Pakistani policies with regard to Afghanistan's future and, in turn, cooperation with Pakistan enhances the overall Russian resilience to play an effective role in the stabilization of Afghanistan and in providing security to Central Asia; and, equally, a strong relationship with Pakistan - in the field of energy security, in particular - can provide yet another underpinning for Russia's strategic ties with other key regional powers, especially China, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Last but not the least, Pakistan is a valuable interlocutor for Russia with regard to the activities and movements of the militants operating in North Caucasus.

Having said that, Russia weighs its options carefully and is averse to embarking on Soviet-era adventures that might be a drain on its resources. The priority of the Russian leadership lies in regenerating and innovating the economy and building the national strength, and in the case of Pakistan, Moscow estimates there could be an interesting partnership of much economic value to Russia and of mutual benefit.

All in all, Moscow's strategy is to develop new sinews of cooperation with Pakistan that are sustainable, durable, and which dovetail with Russia's vibrant strategic partnerships with China, India and Iran.

Put differently, the Russian approach becomes a necessary regional-policy "adjustment" or even a pre-requisite to the impending admission of Pakistan and India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as full members. Putin is an action-oriented statesman and the unhappy part is that six long years have passed since he first proposed at the SCO summit in Shanghai in June 2006 the setting up of an energy club within the regional grouping comprising the energy producing countries of Russia, Iran and the Central Asian countries and the three big energy consuming countries of China, India and Pakistan.

It was at the very same Shanghai summit of the SCO that Putin came out openly for the first time to say that Russia's energy leviathan Gazprom was willing to take part in the construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Putin said in his address, "Gazprom is ready to take part and provide technological and, if necessary, financial assistance, and we are willing to provide an unlimited amount of it, especially for a project that is certain to take off."

Putin's idea is that the oil and gas exporters within the SCO have been competing for promising markets (such as China or India), and to coordinate the moves SCO needs an energy club, which will act as a coordination center uniting both energy producers and the three key consumers.

One major Central Asian player who has stayed out of the SCO so far has been Turkmenistan, and it is a bit awkward to speak of an energy club in the region that doesn't include such a large-scale gas producer. Russia also has some gas disputes with Turkmenistan - with which, however China has a warm relationship built around energy cooperation.

A little-noticed development of great significance was that Chinese President Hu Jintao invited the Turkmen president to visit Beijing at the time of the SCO summit last month - and the latter accepted. Suffice to say, China is keen to harmonize its regional policies with Russia and would even lend a hand to Moscow's efforts to coordinate the impulses of energy security amongst and within the SCO member countries and observer countries.

A stunning thing is that the proposals brought by the Russian experts in the past week to Islamabad essentially pick up the threads of Putin's 2006 proposal. According to the details available so far, Moscow has made the following proposals to Islamabad:
Russia can offer financial and technical assistance for Pakistan's multi-billion dollar gas and power import projects that are in the pipeline.
Specifically, Russia is interested in participating in the two big gas pipeline projects on the anvil, namely, the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and the IP [Iran-Pakistan]. Russia prefers that the cooperation is negotiated at the governmental level through direct negotiations rather than through bidding.Russia is also keen on participation in the Central Asia and South Asia (CASA) project, which was originally floated in 2006, to bring to Pakistan via transmission lines across eastern Afghanistan 1,000-1,300 megawatts of surplus energy during the summer months from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. (The project has the backing of the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank.)
Russia will be willing to cooperate in the exploration of oil, gas and minerals in Pakistan.

Unsurprisingly, Islamabad has eagerly responded to the Russian proposals. The following understanding seems to have been reached at the talks, which concluded in Islamabad on Wednesday:
Pakistan welcomes the Russian proposals;
Specifically, Pakistan is agreeable to negotiate the contracts with the state-owned Russian energy companies on a government-to-government basis and will be willing to amend its public procurement rules accordingly;
Steps will be taken to conclude a memorandum of understanding to move ahead with the identified projects during Putin's visit;
As regards the IP, Pakistan has already floated the tenders for awarding contracts for the pipeline procurement and construction work for the US$1.5 billion project. Russia's Gazprom may also participate. Pakistan proposes to give weight to bids that have a financial package attached. (China and Iran have also shown interest in the project.)
Meanwhile, Pakistan will hand over to Russia by mid-July a draft agreement for financial and technical assistance from the latter for the IP project.
Russia has agreed to finance the rehabilitation of the Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants.

... which infuriates the overlord
These developments constitute a daunting challenge to the US' regional strategies in Asia and the Middle East. The ramifications are quite far-reaching. First and foremost, Pakistan's "defection" from the Western camp all but amounts to a crippling blow to the US' New Silk Road Initiative aimed at rolling back the Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia. Along with that, the US' dreams of getting access to the vast mineral resources of Central Asia and Afghanistan would also suffer setback.

On a practical plane, Pakistan's geography has been the lynchpin of the US regional strategies in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and without Pakistan's cooperation no viable (non-Russian, non-Iranian) communication link with those regions is sustainable, which in turn, jeopardizes the plans for the establishment of a permanent US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military presence in the region in the "Eurasian heartland".

Indeed, energy security is the Achilles heel of Pakistan's political economy, and it debilitates Pakistan's capacity to develop a strategic autonomy that safeguards its vital interests and core concerns and, conversely, the current level of acute energy deficiency makes Pakistan very vulnerable to US pressures. Therefore, the helping hand from Russia, even if it is self-seeking, would have serious geopolitical implications for the US regional strategies insofar as it results in augmenting Pakistan's independence and resilience and creating space for it to navigate its way through a particularly difficult and dangerous corridor of time when it is beset with existential problems.

Again, a coming together of the energy producing and energy consuming countries of Asia is the ultimate nightmare scenario for the US, which fears exclusion from the ensuing matrix of regional cooperation involving countries that happen to be spearheading the fastest-growing region in the world economy. The entire US strategy in the post-Soviet era had aimed at forestalling such a catastrophic eventuality that might put paid to the US efforts to get embedded in the "Eurasian heartland", which includes or overlooks some of the major regional powers in the coming decades - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan and Iran. (Turkey's admission as a "dialogue partner" of the SCO - at China's behest - at the Beijing summit last month further unnerves the US.)

To be sure, a host of other issues also arise. The Russian moves in Pakistan effectively outflank the US' policies to isolate Iran. If hostilities erupt between the US and Iran, Washington faces almost near-total isolation in the region between the Persian Gulf and Malacca Strait. On the other hand, the IP project (which seems a priority for Russia and China alike) would have a devastating impact on the US' Iran policy, as it would manifoldly enhance Iran's strategic prowess. The US will factor in that it is a matter of time before China gets connected to the IP gas pipeline. These communication links effectively help China also to reduce its dependence on the Malacca Strait.

Worst of all, Washington is unsure of India's approach to the emergent geopolitical shift that Russia is triggering. India and Russia have traditionally enjoyed mutual trust and confidence. India and Iran also enjoy fundamentally strong ties, which have even withstood the US pressure. India is independently working on the normalization of its ties with China, and the two countries have made appreciable headway in this direction. (Curiously, the Indian and Chinese state-sector energy companies recently concluded a memorandum of understanding agreeing not to outbid each other in third countries and to cooperate across-the-board including in the two countries' domestic sector.)

Most important, energy security is becoming a gnawing worry for the Indian leadership as the economy expands rapidly and the need for assured access to reasonably priced energy sources is becoming an all-consuming passion in the country's external policies. (India's External Affairs Minister S M Krishna is heading for Tajikistan, which is the energy source of the CASA project, on Tuesday.)

The US' diplomatic and politico-military options to counter the Russian moves in Pakistan would lie principally in the direction of influencing the policies of Pakistan and India. The US is pursuing a mixed approach toward Pakistan, alternating soft signals with a flexing of muscle that is vaguely assuming threatening overtones already. At one point recently, it all but seemed that the US would render an apology of sorts for the massacre of Pakistani troops in a US military strike last November on the Afghan-Pakistan border following which the reopening of the Pakistani transit routes for the NATO convoys could be expected within the month of June.

However, following the Russian-Pakistani confabulations, the US line has hardened. Another attack has taken place on Monday on Pakistani troops (18 of whom were brutally beheaded) by militant groups of obscure background operating from "safe havens" inside Afghanistan. It doesn't need much ingenuity to work out that the US forces in Afghanistan prefer to look away from what these militants are doing right beneath their nose. (Curiously, these militant "safe havens" also happen to be in the region through which the CASA transmission lines from Tajikistan will have to pass.)

At any rate, on Wednesday, the US' commander in Afghanistan, John Allen, came down to the Pakistani army headquarters in Rawalpindi to propose to the Pakistani army chief Parvez Kayani that the two sides could undertake "joint operations" against the militants operating along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

This is indeed going to be a cat-and-mouse game. The signs are ominous. The relentless drone attacks through the recent months have destabilized Pakistan's tribal areas adjacent to the border with Afghanistan. The drones are causing a lot of civilian casualties, so much so that the United Nations officials begin to wonder if these wanton killings would constitute "war crimes".

The drone attacks infuriate the people who live in the tribal areas and in turn are fueling anti-government sentiments, while Islamabad looks helpless in stopping the US from violating the country's territorial integrity. Quite obviously, Pakistan is hunkering down, and the US won't allow that to continue. The indications are that the US will step up pressure on Pakistan and escalate the tensions in a calibrated way.

A paradigm shift
The heart of the matter is that Pakistan's "strategic defiance" has taken the US by surprise. The US always counted on the perceived comprador mentality of the Pakistani elites and has been somewhat thrown off balance in discovering that those very same elites (the military leadership, in particular) are no longer what they were supposed to be.

Of course, this is a flawed perspective and at the root of it lies Washington's unwillingness to countenance an honest appraisal as to why this paradigm shift has occurred at all. The US doesn't have to look far to realize the complexities. The latest survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, released on Wednesday, shows that 74% of Pakistanis "hate" the US and hold President Barack Obama in exceptionally low esteem. Interestingly, the most popular Pakistani politician today is Imran Khan (70%), whose main plank is that Pakistan should pull out of the war in Afghanistan and demand that the US troops should pack up their gear and leave the region for good with their war machinery.

The US faces a more complicated challenge with regard to India. Washington has audaciously complimented New Delhi recently by naming India as the "lynchpin" in its Asia-Pacific strategies. But to the discomfiture of the US, India's response has so far been one of deafening silence, while demonstratively distancing itself from any perceived "ganging-up" against China. On the other hand, a crucial mass is steadily accruing in the Sino-Indian normalization. Equally, India has been carefully sequestering its dialogue process with Pakistan from the chill and vagaries of the US-Pakistan standoff. Even with regard to Iran, India has drawn a bottom line and made it clear that it won't be pushed around - and the current signs are that Washington has finally got the point.

Having said that, the US will endeavor to butt into the India-Pakistan dialogue and try to turn its focus away from a broad-based approach in a constructive spirit to the highly emotive issues of Pakistan's support of terrorism and the fidayeen attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, which deeply scarred the Indian psyche and still arouse Indian suspicions regarding Pakistani intentions.

With regard to energy security, the US has encouraged Saudi Arabia to offer a big hand to India, with the hope of encouraging it to reduce its dependence on Iranian oil and in overall terms to wean India away from the IP gas pipeline project. Ideally, Washington would seek a cozy three-way embrace between the US, India and Saudi Arabia, which would keep the Indians away from the alluring thoughts of an SCO energy club.

But the US is unsure, as the Indians also have their preferences and a passion for keeping their thoughts to themselves while making independent choices about how to go about realizing their national objectives in a complicated regional scenario.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 06 Jul 2012 13:36

Technical concerns: Why Russia worries about missile defense

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 22 Jul 2012 23:24

Interview of the ambassador of Russia, Alexander M. Kadakin, to Siddharth Zarabi of CNBC TV 18 Channel.

Russia, India all-round cooperation partners – ambassador

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 23 Jul 2012 05:05

Lilo wrote:MKB on the unfolding dynamics of the New Great Game and Russia's moves in it.

A Russia House on the Indian Ocean

The building blocks of the historic visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pakistan in September have begun arriving in Islamabad. It is a poignant moment in the region's history and politics. This will be the first time a Russian president visits Pakistan since its birth in 1947.

The Russians are fabricating some hardy bricks for the mansion they hope to build in the region which forms a beachhead on the Indian Ocean - a mansion large enough for their friends in Pakistan and in the neighboring countries of India, Iran and Afghanistan to consort with them.

But then, the very sight of the Russian bricks infuriates the United States. The point is, this Russia House will stand bang on the way of the New Silk Road that the US has been planning, which also needs to run through Pakistan. If the access is blocked, it becomes problematic for the US to keep together the body and soul of the tens of thousands of its troops who were hoping to settle down in the Hindu Kush and Central Asia as pioneers in the "Wild West" of China's Xinjiang and on the "soft underbelly" of Russia.

In sum, the battle is joined for influencing Pakistan's future. The stakeholders are many and a keen struggle lies ahead, since at the core of it lies a host of other issues of profound consequence to world politics - energy security of the two big power-houses of Asia (China and India), the future of the New Middle East, and of course, the US strategy to contain Russia and China.

This is part of the larger process of re-establishing the silk route. The silk route was always used for high value, high profit items, and today there is no higher-value, higher profit product than energy. These processes will ultimately help tame the Pakistani establishment by eroding its influence in Afghanistan over the long term.

However the reference to the Great Game is misleading. That was a bipolar, zero sum conflict. Although there is very real competition the US is not playing a zero sum game in Central Asia.

The fact is that Russia both after 9/11, and once again post-2009 has been facilitating US access because it's main partner in 'managing' Central Asia -the PRC- is not willing to use its blood and treasure to contain the Taliban menace in Af-Pak.

RSoami · Post by **RSoami** » 02 Aug 2012 14:26

http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/rus ... 91204.html

http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Putin+ ... story.html

http://rt.com/politics/putin-nato-afgha ... novsk-618/

Russia wants NATO to stay in Afghanistan

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 12 Aug 2012 22:42

Russia looks to build strategic leverage in Pakistan

ashish raval · Post by **ashish raval** » 12 Aug 2012 23:01

^^ Indian friendship was never going to deliver for Russia because they had bet on wrong horse India for access to warm port. Russians thought that India will some how take rest of Kashmir which will give them access to Indian ocean. This never materialised however since India was ideologically socialist nation with communist leaning they kept on going as it gave some hard cash for its scientific research to go on too. As soon as India started leaning towards amirkhans Russia sensed the opportunity that they can somehow get rent boy to give it access because chini's did it successfully. This persuaded Russian foreign policy makers that Pakistan was better bet than India. They can kill many birds with getting closer to rent boy and there is no point in backing a nation which is very weak in foreign policy and has no clear objectives going forward in future and one who lives by day.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 14 Aug 2012 08:29

ashish raval wrote:^^ Indian friendship was never going to deliver for Russia because they had bet on wrong horse India for access to warm port. Russians thought that India will some how take rest of Kashmir which will give them access to Indian ocean. This never materialised however since India was ideologically socialist nation with communist leaning they kept on going as it gave some hard cash for its scientific research to go on too. As soon as India started leaning towards amirkhans Russia sensed the opportunity that they can somehow get rent boy to give it access because chini's did it successfully. This persuaded Russian foreign policy makers that Pakistan was better bet than India. They can kill many birds with getting closer to rent boy and there is no point in backing a nation which is very weak in foreign policy and has no clear objectives going forward in future and one who lives by day.

err, Have you seen the latest map of Russia in the past 2 decades?

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 08 Sep 2012 17:51

Interview with Vyacheslav Trubnikov, member of the governing board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences

"I Believe that Russia’s Only Real Strategic Partner is India”

Andrey Frolov

Interview with Vyacheslav Trubnikov, member of the governing board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Army General Vyacheslav Trubnikov is a member of the Governing Board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Joined the KGB in 1967, and served in the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence). Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1996-2000. Appointed as first deputy foreign minister in 2000. Awarded the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in 2001. Russian ambassador to India in 2004-2009.

Q: What was the role played by the various Russian government agencies in formulating Russian foreign policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s?

A: The various government agencies each play their different roles. Naturally, the main agency in charge of Russian foreign policy is the Foreign Ministry. It formulates and implements the Russian policies on the international arena. The Russian President formulates and approves the main principles and objectives of Russian foreign policy. Of course, an important supporting role is played by the economic agencies and institutions which oversee economic ties with foreign countries, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Economic Development, and other agencies such as Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation).

The key role is played by the President and the Foreign Ministry. In addition, the Foreign Ministry’s remit includes coordination of the activities of all the other government agencies on the international arena.

Q: It is often said that compared to Soviet times the role of the Foreign Ministry has greatly diminished, and the Presidential Administration has a greater say in foreign policy matters.

A: When we make comparisons with Soviet times, it must be taken into account that in those days the main coordinating role in Soviet foreign policy belonged to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Foreign Ministry played second fiddle in formulating guidelines and instructions for other government agencies. That role primarily belonged to the International Department, which worked to fairly high professional standards. There is a widespread opinion that the top Communist Party officials were prone to making erratic and arbitrary decisions – but that opinion is not entirely correct. Coordination was very professional, and we never had various Soviet ministries and government agencies contradicting each other on the international arena; they all spoke with one voice.

Back in those days, neither did we have, for example, chiefs of General Staff making foreign policy statements – that would have been seen as an intrusion into another agency’s remit, i.e. the Foreign Ministry’s remit. In Soviet days there was a very clear separation of responsibilities, and everyone always toed the lines drawn by the Politburo. I am not glorifying that system, but nevertheless it was quite effective. I think that these days, the role that used to be played by the Politburo is now being played by the Presidential Administration. But there is no point trying to draw direct parallels. The Presidential Administration uses different methods compared to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

That is why it would not be entirely correct to say that the Foreign Ministry is playing a lesser role these days. The ministry’s main focus is implementing the country’s foreign policy course as opposed to formulating any new foreign policy objectives or principles. In any event, all the proposals formulated by the Foreign Ministry are subject to the President’s approval.

Q: What, then, is your opinion of the statement made by the former Russian ambassador to Libya, Vladimir Chamov, after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution on Libya in 2011? Was that a one-off event, or an indicator of the existing “diversity of opinions” within the Russian Foreign Ministry?

A: It is important to understand that just like every other ambassador, Vladimir Chamov was appointed by the President, and therefore he had the right of addressing the President directly. It is a different matter, of course, that he used that right to voice an opinion which ran counter to the foreign policy course pursued by the Foreign Ministry. In such a situation an ambassador must reconcile his views with the position of principle adopted by the Russian foreign policy makers. I believe that such statements must be agreed, one way or another, with the top Foreign Ministry officials. If the ambassador’s views are not supported by the top Foreign Ministry officials, he must pursue the political course set by the ministry - but he still has the right to express his own opinion to the President of the country. In their policy decisions ambassadors must abide by the instructions they receive from Moscow.

For example, when I was appointed ambassador to India – shortly before Vladimir Putin’s visit to that country (in December 2004), there was a meeting with the top Foreign Ministry officials. When the President was announcing my appointment to the Foreign Ministry, he said in no uncertain terms at that meeting that Ambassador Trubnikov has the right to write not only to the top Foreign Ministry officials, but also directly to the President.

I believe that in the case of Libya the ambassador essentially contravened the Russian position at the UN Security Council which had already been approved by the President. Therefore he was not merely voicing a different opinion or an alternative proposal - he essentially started to argue with the country’s leadership. Had he expressed his point of view in a timely fashion, I believe that it would have been taken into account.

Q: Do you think it likely that some of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might take action as a coalition in the event of a destabilization in Central Asia following the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces from Afghanistan after 2014?

A: Obviously, the SCO counterterrorism center has done some contingency planning for possible terrorist attacks. That is why they hold various maneuvers and exercises. As for the extent to which the current composition of the SCO enables the counterterrorism center to conduct operations in the member states, that depends on some very important details. These details are being addressed, and to a certain extent these questions have been addressed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

I think that the CSTO has a lot more instruments to stabilize the situation if it starts to deteriorate following the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2014, because the CSTO has already worked on these issues and has done a lot of planning. I am talking about the modalities of foreign troop presence on the territory of this or another country, about compensation for any damage, etc. All these issues must be addressed beforehand, i.e. the basis and the mandate for troop deployment; compensation to be paid by the SCO for possible casualties among the citizens of the country in which the troops are deployed, or among the troops themselves; compensation for possible damage to the environment, etc.

As far as I am aware, at present the SCO does not have any detailed plans for participation in efforts to stabilize the situation in its member states - not in publically available sources, anyway. In contrast, the CSTO works on such plans on a continuous and systemic basis. The CSTO’s planning for possible events in Central Asia is much more detailed, and its experience in this area continues to grow.

Q: What is your opinion about the proposed international Arms Trade Treaty? What would be the consequences of the adoption of that treaty for arms trade and defense industry cooperation between Russia and India?

A: It depends on whether Russia signs up to that treaty. If it does, the country will obviously be bound by certain commitments as part of that treaty, just like all the other countries that sign up. I think it would be very difficult to secure the support of defense industry companies for some general clichés which would essentially negate the principle of free competition in foreign markets.

Personally, I do not believe that the international community and the global defense industry are ready to sign an international treaty that all the parties could live with. We are still far from identifying solutions even in such narrow segments as anti-personnel mines, small arms and light weapons, etc. The progress achieved so far in these areas gives little reason for optimism that we can reach an agreement any time soon.

Besides, let us not forget about the arms importers. Those countries also have their own views about the conduct of the exporters. I think they also want to maintain free competition. This enables them to buy quality weaponry at lower prices from the competing suppliers.

So I believe it is way too early to speak about any possible consequences of such a treaty being signed for the arms trade and defense industry cooperation between Russia and India.

Q: How likely do you think India and the United States are to become close military-political partners? In recent years the two countries have stepped up security contacts. There have also been security consultations between the United States, Japan, India, etc.

A: In the early 2000s, after the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the campaign in Afghanistan, the focus of America’s partnership with South Asian countries shifted from Pakistan to India. That principle is well in line with America’s hedging strategy on China.

The Americans interpret that strategy as “hedging risks”, but the word “hedge” also has another meaning, so “hedging” can also mean “to build a hedge, or a fence, or a cordon around China”. Of course, the United States wants to involve India in that strategy.

But the priority of India’s foreign policy has always been to ensure the country’s own security and to protect its own national interests using its own resources and partnership with tried-and-tested, reliable partners, such as the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that in 1971 the two countries signed a peace, friendship and cooperation treaty, which included Soviet participation in providing India’s security. As a result, the 1971 conflict over Bangladesh between India and Pakistan was resolved in India’s favor, because the treaty prevented third countries from intervening in that conflict.

Even though India regularly participates in joint naval maneuvers with Australia, Japan, the United States and the Philippines, there is always the proviso that this participation aims to protect India’s national security interests on the high seas and is not directed against any third countries.

Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that, thanks to energetic efforts by the Americans, their military-political cooperation with India is now aiming to establish strategic partnership between the two countries. That course has been declared by both countries - but for now it is limited to sporadic participation in multilateral military exercises or in traditional bilateral military exchanges, which have existed for decades.

It is also obvious that the two countries have stepped up military and technical cooperation, which is in line with India’s strategy of diversifying its sources of weaponry, equipping it armed forces with the most advanced hardware, and acquiring cost-effective weapons technologies.

This is why our tried and tested principle which India has always liked – i.e. a good balance between the price and the quality of our weaponry – is now shifting towards greater quality, as the Indians are now prepared to pay higher prices. Of course, sales of American military transports to India are not in Russian interests. Before the Indian contracts for the Lockheed C-130J Hercules transports and the Boeing P-8I Poseidon patrol aircraft, the Soviet Union and Russia had that market to themselves. Indian military transport aviation used to operate only Il-76 and An-32 aircraft; these days things are different.

To conclude this analysis of Indian-American cooperation, one thing is obvious: over the past two decades the Americans have been systemically filling certain niches in India’s foreign policy setup. In the meantime, Russia has had to plug the gaps in our cooperation with that country, which is very close to us. These gaps appeared while Russia was preoccupied with establishing closer relations with the West.

Q: Would it therefore be safe to say that Russia has lost the [Indian] market of military-transport aviation, for reasons which included delays with the signing of the MTA program?

A: I don’t think so. The thing is, those were not unreasonable delays. Speaking of the MTA program, these are extremely important issues for India. The Indians want to build their military and technical cooperation with foreign countries according to modern principles, through joint R&D projects, as well as joint manufacturing, fitting out and marketing. The Indians say to us, “You tell us that you are offering us the very latest aircraft - how come you don’t have these aircraft in service in your own country? We want you to sell us the kind of weaponry that your own armed forces are using and are happy with. We don’t want to buy half-baked hardware. We want well-polished systems, along with the technology for making them”.

In the case of MTA we are talking not even about joint manufacturing but about joint development. In other words, this means participation at the R&D stage, when the Indians have the opportunity to acquire Russian technologies and then use them in local manufacturing. The Indian Foreign Ministry has its own department in the MoD; that department is in charge of buying weapons, and it dictates the terms of the contracts. Sometimes the Finance Ministry refuses to approve contracts which do not include the transfer of technology for the weapons systems being sold. It is important to the Indians to receive the production technology rather than just a flying prototype.

This is why I think that the Su-30MKI fighter program, which involves joint production, is a good example of cooperation. That is the kind of cooperation that India is happy with, because it also includes the training of specialists. Or take another project, the BrahMos cruise missile. It is an excellent missile; it has sea-based and ground-based versions; the air-launched version is now in development. The Indians are asking Russia to facilitate this process. And in these situations the delays are sometimes caused by Russia, whereupon the Indians try to find solutions elsewhere. They have a project to build a hypersonic missile using the BrahMos design.

Q: Will this be their own independent project?

A: I don’t think so. BrahMos is a joint enterprise, with 50-50 participation, so the Russian companies will have to be involved. But the Indian companies are very actively involved in that project, too.

Q: How serious do you think is the danger of India shifting the focus of its military and technical cooperation to the United States, for political motives?

A: This is not going to happen. India does not have any political motives for such a shift. India has a purely pragmatic approach; it wants to receive the very best weaponry at the lowest possible price. It is no coincidence that the “deal of the century”, the fighter contract, has been awarded to Rafale rather than, say, the F-16, F/A-18, Eurofighter or Russia’s own MiG-35. The Indians have a choice, and they are diversifying for motives which are not political. They are led purely by pragmatic considerations and by the pursuit of their national interests.

Q: But Rafale is not a very “polished” aircraft, either?

A: That does not matter. The French have promised to transfer the technology.

Q: Is there a possibility of serious foreign policy disagreements between Russia and India? And if there is, how can that affect military and technical cooperation between the two countries?

A: Speaking of military and technical cooperation, the Indians are not really led by any political motives. They are led by pragmatic considerations; they want their weapons contracts to meet the criteria which I have already outlined.

As for possible foreign policy differences between the two countries, I believe that India is Russia’s only genuine strategic partner. We have never had any conflicts; neither do we have a common border. And the main principles of our two countries’ foreign policy are either identical or very close.

We both believe in the supremacy of the UN in international politics, and we both uphold the principles of international law. Russia understands India’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council – but we also believe that reformatting the Security Council alone would hardly make much sense. We should avoid dividing the UN. We should think about reforming it and about the role an enlarged Security Council would play if it gains new permanent members with the same set of prerogatives that exist now, including the right of veto.

In other words, we may have different interpretations; we may have different views of some international problems, but we never come into conflict. We do not have any potential sources of conflict, and I don’t believe that any such sources will appear in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, we are now pursuing closer international cooperation, including cooperation in the China-India-Russia format and in the BRICS format, so we are gaining more common ground.

Q: What are the main risks for Russian-Indian military and technical cooperation in the medium time frame? What measures do you think must be taken to secure Russia’s current role and place in the Indian and other defense markets?

A: First of all, we must continue to meet the Indians’ main requirement, i.e. to cooperate in developing new weapons systems. In that sense, BrahMos is an excellent example for our cooperation now and in the future. We must produce military hardware which involves bilateral cooperation at every stage of its lifecycle, from R&D to the supply of components, manufacturing and marketing. In addition, the products we offer to the Indians must be the products which have already been tested in our own armed forces. The time when we proudly said that even our own army doesn’t have the kind of weapons we are offering is long in the past. The Indians don’t need such weapons.

Speaking of the risks, let us return to Russia’s failure to win the contract for 126 fighters; Russia was unable to meet India’s requirements for that contract. Let us also think about how we can meet the requirement for placing orders with Indian companies, about awarding up to 30 per cent of subcontracts to the Indians, and about the so-called offset arrangements. In the already mentioned fighter contract, such arrangements accounted for 50 per cent of the value of the contract. How could Russia meet 5bn dollars worth of such requirements?

The Indian contract for the Admiral Gorshkov, the former Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser, is an example of an unsuccessful contract. To a certain extent, it has spoiled the climate of our relations in military and technical cooperation. I am talking about the delays with the delivery date, and the uncertainty over the final price of the upgrades (which has grown from 800m dollars to between 2bn and 3bn dollars). The Indians are prepared to pay that kind of money, but they want the ship, which they will use as the flagship of their Eastern Fleet, to be delivered as soon as possible. The Indians already have everything ready for that ship, including the infrastructure and the crew. Our constant delays have poisoned the climate of military and technical cooperation far worse than the delays with the MTA program.

Q: Have there been any precedents of Russia refusing to sell to India some weapons systems? If so, what were the reasons?

A: I am not aware of any such precedents. Russia and India have a clear understanding of what kind of weapons we cannot sell them – for example, in view of the fact that India is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A moratorium alone is not enough. There are some lines that Russia cannot cross owing to its international commitments. The Indians are aware of it, and they are not making any “provocative” requests. But as far as I know Russia has agreed to sell everything the Indians have actually asked for.

For example, we were aware that the Indians were developing a naval propulsion reactor for their nuclear submarine – but Russia would not have been able to supply such a reactor to them because we are bound by international commitments. Nevertheless, we have provided some degree of assistance. By the way, I was present at the launch of that submarine – I had to delay by several days my departure from the post of the Russian ambassador to India so as to be able to attend the ceremony.

Q: What can you say about the delivery of the Nerpa nuclear submarine, from the point of view of Russia’s international commitments?

A: This is a lease arrangement; it is allowed by Russia’s international commitments because the Indians have no access to the technology of the nuclear propulsion reactor installed on that submarine. In addition, they are bound by the commitment not to equip the sub with nuclear missiles. The submarine itself can carry such missiles, but we have supplied it in strict compliance with the requirements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In other words, Russia abides by all the international agreements, which is especially obvious against the backdrop of the signing of the peaceful nuclear energy cooperation agreement (the so-called 123 Agreement) between India and the United States.

prashanth · Post by **prashanth** » 08 Sep 2012 19:18

^^
From the interview...

For example, we were aware that the Indians were developing a naval propulsion reactor for their nuclear submarine – but Russia would not have been able to supply such a reactor to them because we are bound by international commitments. Nevertheless, we have provided some degree of assistance.

Never doubted it.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 09 Sep 2012 02:00

A Threat to Public Order: Or, How My Love of Belarusian Tractors Got Me Arrested by the KGB

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Sep 2012 20:49

126 trillion barrels of oil equivalent biomass in Bazhenov Oil shale in Russia

The discover at Bazhenov will bring Russian crude reserves to Saudi level

In the Oil game, Russia has the longest suit to play

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Sep 2012 21:09

Russia-India trade to double in 3 years

Bilateral trade between Russia and India is set to double over the next three years to $20 billion, compared to $9 billion in 2011.

A statement to this effect was made by Vijay Kalantri, President of All India Association of Industries and one of the founders of the Russian-Indian Trade Association in Mumbai.

Mr.Kalantri is flying to Moscow on Friday to attend the 43rd session of the General Assembly of the World Trade Centers Association due to take place from the 22nd to the 26th of September.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Sep 2012 21:11

Vladimir Putin’s Pakistan visit and India

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 25 Sep 2012 21:16

Austin wrote:126 trillion barrels of oil equivalent biomass in Bazhenov Oil shale in Russia

The discover at Bazhenov will bring Russian crude reserves to Saudi level

In the Oil game, Russia has the longest suit to play

A cursory look at the world map shows that India will do well by recapturing PoK and making a trade/energy corridor between Russia and India. This would solve many strategic and geopolitical challenges that India faced for past 100 years.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 25 Sep 2012 21:34

RamaY wrote:
Austin wrote:126 trillion barrels of oil equivalent biomass in Bazhenov Oil shale in Russia

The discover at Bazhenov will bring Russian crude reserves to Saudi level

In the Oil game, Russia has the longest suit to play
A cursory look at the world map shows that India will do well by recapturing PoK and making a trade/energy corridor between Russia and India. This would solve many strategic and geopolitical challenges that India faced for past 100 years.

Basically that is one reason USA is not willing to lose control over the region. Syrian regime is being overthrown to allow Saudi Oil and Qatari Gas to reach Europe, thus breaking Russian hold over the Europeans. Keeping Germany in the American sphere of influence is very important for USA. So Germany cannot be allowed to get closer to the Russians.

Similarly USA wants India to buy Oil from the Saudis rather than from the Russians so no path for Indians through Central Asia.

Through Saudi Oil, Americans want to control the other countries.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Sep 2012 21:54

Well Europe is a major net gainer from Russian Gas and Germany major user of Russian Gas via Nord/South stream , now UK too have jumped into this and Japan is building LNG terminal, Plus China has built its own pipeline and India has stake at Sakhalin.

So beyond geopolitics its the economics which play a major role plus the reserves logistics and investment also counts.

So its not the case that US would want Saudi to do this or that , US IMO is more worried about its own energy security and Saudi plays a key role in it.

Also one should also note that Europe , China and India and other major gas/oil consumer would want to diversify its source so as not to depend on a single source majorly , which means all the major gas/oil producing nation will remain in business.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 28 Sep 2012 08:38

Russian President Vladimir Putin calls off Pakistan visit

Putin’s decision not to visit Pakistan has disappointed Islamabad but does not take away from the importance Russia attaches to rapprochement with a former foe

What was billed as a ground-breaking first ever visit by a Russian President to Islamabad next week has ended in disappointment for Pakistan with Vladimir Putin’s decision not to go.

President Putin was to attend a summit of the quadrilateral forum of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan that Islamabad was scheduled to host on October 3. Pakistani officials were expecting the Russian leader to arrive a day earlier for an official bilateral visit.

For weeks Pakistani media were agog over the anticipated Putin’s visit describing it as “historic” and “landmark”, even claiming that Pakistan “would be on top of the list of countries Putin would be visiting this year.”

However, a few days before his expected arrival in Islamabad, Mr. Putin sent a letter to Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari informing him that he would not be coming. This has compelled Islamabad to “reschedule” the quadrilateral summit.

Russian diplomats say that Mr. Putin’s visit was indeed discussed but insist it was not been cancelled simply because it was never confirmed in the first place.

“Russia agreed to take part in the quadripartite meeting, but we never said Mr. Putin will lead the Russian delegation,” said Mr. Zamir Kabulov, head of the 2nd Asia Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry, which looks after South Asia and Iran.

Three MoUs

Pakistani leaders are themselves to blame for the flop. According to Mr. Kabulov, the sides had readied for signing just three non-binding memoranda of understanding — on the expansion of the Pakistan Steel Mills, on cooperation in energy and education. They are largely a reiteration of agreements signed last year when Mr. Zardari visited Moscow. The Kremlin was apparently concerned that the visit was going to be long on ceremony and short on substance.

“Russian-Pakistani relations have been on the rise in recent years but progress has been mostly at political and emotional levels, while economic ties have lagged behind,” he said.

Pakistan wants Russia to overhaul the Karachi steel mills, undertake several power sector projects and help prospect for oil and gas, but details of the deals are yet to be finalised.

“Declarations are galore but they have little impact on the ground,” the Russian diplomat told The Hindu.

Moscow is also worried over a lack of progress on major regional projects approved by the leaders of the quadrilateral forum at their meeting in Sochi two years ago. These include the Central Asia-South Asia electricity transmission from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (CASA-1000), and the construction of rail tracks and motor roads from Tajikistan to Pakistan to create new trade routes in the region.

Russia has thrown its weight behind these ambitious energy and infrastructure projects, with Mr. Putin pledging to invest $500 million in CASA-1000 and offering to help fund and build the other projects. Yet, they have made hardly any headway.

“The Asia Development Bank, dominated by Japan, and the U.S.-controlled World Bank appear reluctant to support ventures where Russia plays a lead role,” Mr. Kabulov said, adding though that Russia would still support the regional projects if they are undertaken by Western, not Russian companies.

“Big-time economic projects will work for peace and stability in Afghanistan and help normalise bilateral relations in the region, including India-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran ties,” he said.

Those in India who are suspicious of rapprochement between Russia and Pakistan need not rejoice at Putin’s failure to visit Islamabad. In his letter to Mr. Zardari, Mr. Putin voiced confidence that the upward trend in relations between Moscow and Islamabad would continue.

The Pakistani Foreign Ministry quoted Mr. Putin as expressing his eagerness to “jointly enhance our efforts to further develop Russian-Pakistani ties and advance mutually beneficial trade and economic projects.”

.....

He stated though that Russia’s engagement with Pakistan would not be at the expense of Moscow’s relations with New Delhi.

“India remains our special privileged strategic partner and Putin’s coming visit to New Delhi will demonstrate our commitment to deepen and enrich this partnership.”

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 06 Oct 2012 13:19

Lavrov says no to Russian role in resolving Kashmir issue

The recent improvement in diplomatic ties between India and Pakistan are welcomed by Russia, the minister said during a joint news conference with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar.

“We discussed this issue. We welcome steps Pakistan and India have taken on confidence-building measures. Both countries are capable of settling their issues on their own without any foreign assistance,” Lavrov was quoted by sections of the Pakistani media as saying. The two countries have “established diplomatic traditions” and the ongoing contacts between India and Pakistan are a good development, Lavrov added.

The cancellation of Putin’s visit to Pakistan

When members of the Pakistani media questioned Lavrov on the cancellation of Putin's visit to Pakistan, the Russian Foreign Minister said it was because of Putin's “tough schedule.” Lavrov added that the Russian president had sent a message to his counterpart Asif Ali Zardari in this regard and expressed hope that dates would be arranged for a meeting in future.

Pakistan Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is on a three-day visit to Russia at the invitation of Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of General Staff of Russian armed forces. Kayani is also expected to meet President Putin.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 06 Oct 2012 15:46

Cancelled because of the Dushanbe meeting and Gorshkov issue apparently.

abhischekcc · Post by **abhischekcc** » 06 Oct 2012 16:48

India must have really squeezed Russia's balls to get Putin to cancel his visit. I wonder what all contracts we threatened.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 08 Oct 2012 17:28

cross post

Russia is strengthening its backyard. It won't be long before Russia is overtaken by China & India. Before that happens, it needs to get the maximum no of countries under its influence. India has been sparring with hosting a base in Tajikistan which Russia squarely sees as within its sphere of influence. What better country than Pakistan to keep India's claws away from Central Asia. With Pakistan under its influence, Afghanistan will automatically fall to the Russian side. It will finally have its denied connection to the subcontinent without hostile countries blocking its path.

This way India is kept away from meddling in affairs in Central Asia. China is being shood away using military pacts like CSTO. I suspect Russia has plans for Georgia too now that regime change has happened there. Japan is a good ally if they make themselves available. This is the golden perios for Russia where US is weakened and China is not very powerful. Make hay while the sun shines on Mother Russia.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Oct 2012 14:02

Russia and India must work out their united Central Asian spheres of influence and avoid becoming rivals in the region.These states used to be former members of the USSR and Russia still has significant clout in these countries and needs them to be a buffer against becoming NATO stooges,as has happened with some of the former Warsaw Pact nations.The great tragedy of US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War has been the US's greed to "acquire" former Cold War rivals into its sphere of servility.With the US its always "my way or the highway".Independent thinkling nations like India are an abomination to it which is why it it spending so much energy and time in seducing or blackmailing Asian/MAM nations and their leadership.

Russia needs to improve its cultural face in India which was far more active during the CW.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 09 Oct 2012 14:13

Russia & India should probably divide the region with Tajikistan being the last country in Russian influence. Afganistan & Pakistan fall in in the Indosphere. This should allow both sides to work together since the areas reflect the realities where Tajikistan was the boundary of USSR while Afghanistan has always been the subcontinent gateway to the outside world.

I think Russia recognizes India can play only a limited role in Afghanistan with a hostile Pakistan standing in its way. It would be better if they work together in Afghanistan with India understanding the people in a way that no Russian or American ever can. They can provide military help while we take the economic help that makes India dear to Afghans. Pakistan should be strictly kept outside and this is a real possibility unlike the last time around. Even China would be a player going by their strategic agreements with Afghanistan. Both India & Russia are wary of it and would suit both's interests to keep it restricted to a bit player. A strongly armed Afganistan will keep Pakistan tied down on its western front with the Afghans who would not hide under the burqa of secularism to deliver a slap to the Pakis as and when required.

Russia would need India to contain China as well as an economic partner. With only an economy of 7.5 trillion, it has not been shy at throwing its weight around with countries such as Japan. Russia knows that Central Asia could be next. No wonder both Russia & USA are trying to woo India for their somewhat aligned goal of containing China.

Suppiah · Post by **Suppiah** » 09 Oct 2012 14:25

I really doubt we have a conflicting agenda with the ruskies in Central Asia - both are to contain terrorism and keep a finger in the pie to prevent Unkil from becoming too active. So they should not bother, in fact, actively encourage India. The only situation is if/when we get so close to Unkil that what we do is seen as proxy for Unkil. To really look at it, even Unkil and Ruskies do not have fundamentally conflicting ideas, they too want less terror and more business flowing. It is just Putin that sees Russia as not a great western but power but in a negative sense as "not-Unkil" and therefore acts strange..

I think that will settle with time...after all, it is mere years since Russia lost its clout as a == with Unkil. This is the rona-dhona-throw-temper tantrm phase of acceptance. Once this phase is over, the next phase will be clear acceptance of reduced status and maximise strategic gains within that space, as France, Germany and UK are trying to do....

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 09 Oct 2012 14:26

We use Iran instead of TSP. Problem with Russia is that they don't have much to offer the Central Asian states - so the central asians are looking southward and toward Iran - PRC to open up access lines. As you can see Uzbekistan is asking to be removed from the CSTO.

Russia and the US see more or less eye to eye on Afghanistan and don't forget the US are using russian bases already for transport of equipment etc.

Russia Iran India and even PRC need to get together to ensure that the afghan govt survives, as fundamentally TSPians cant be trusted and it will come back to bite all these nations if they do nothing.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 09 Oct 2012 14:47

^^^

The TSP is not limited to the land route. It is the undue influence it weilds in Afganistan partly due to its powerful military. The Afghan Pak mil balance is just too wide which allows it to bully Afghanistan with ease. A rearming of Afghanistan by its friends would not only strengthen Afganistan but also force Pakistan to reallocate its assets to the Af - Pak border.

This can only be done by Russia. They refused our assistance of sending a WSI Dhruv following the Kabul attack. That leaves US & Russia as the other source but Unkil will only be too sensitive to balance Afghanistan & Pakistan not unlike Pakistan & India. Russia can provide some old refurbished airframes for cheap and deliver without too many noises from the Pakis. Moreover, India is still a smaller military power and the Iran route will be solely to economic help AFAIK.

Russia doesn't want terrorism in its southern flanks and Afghanistan will be the conduit used since Pakistan doesn't share borders with the ex USSR territories. CSTO is a good way to station ground troops in far flung areas. I hope Russia, India & Iran have a game plan to deal with post 2014 since Pakistan is already executing its.

Suppiah · Post by **Suppiah** » 09 Oct 2012 14:51

If Ombaba comes back, 2014 will most likely slip..TSPs plans may just be aeroplans.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 09 Oct 2012 15:01

nakul wrote:^^^

The TSP is not limited to the land route. It is the undue influence it weilds in Afganistan partly due to its powerful military. The Afghan Pak mil balance is just too wide which allows it to bully Afghanistan with ease. A rearming of Afghanistan by its friends would not only strengthen Afganistan but also force Pakistan to reallocate its assets to the Af - Pak border.

Under-way - see the agreement signed between India & Afghanistan. PRC has made an offer as has Iran.

This can only be done by Russia. They refused our assistance of sending a WSI Dhruv following the Kabul attack. That leaves US & Russia as the other source but Unkil will only be too sensitive to balance Afghanistan & Pakistan not unlike Pakistan & India. Russia can provide some old refurbished airframes for cheap and deliver without too many noises from the Pakis. Moreover, India is still a smaller military power and the Iran route will be solely to economic help AFAIK.

India is training the AN Air Force in certain central asian states for the last few years. They are using Russian heli's - as you can see in their recent humanitarian missions.

Russia doesn't want terrorism in its southern flanks and Afghanistan will be the conduit used since Pakistan doesn't share borders with the ex USSR territories. CSTO is a good way to station ground troops in far flung areas. I hope Russia, India & Iran have a game plan to deal with post 2014 since Pakistan is already executing its.

In the works - but at the moment its just being dealt without too much limelight but with at the NSA level.

Our mission there is to tie Pak down and make 2 front issues for them and keep the jihadi's away from J&K.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 14 Oct 2012 23:32

Russia won't arm India's enemies: Dmitry Rogozin

Russia today firmly assured India that it will not arm its "enemies" with visiting Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin also indicating Moscow's willingness to expand cooperation in defence production by building a new transport aircraft and battle tanks.

"You must understand that we do not deal with your enemies. We don't deliver any arms to them.... If you see otherwise, you may spit on my face," Rogozin told reporters here when asked if Russia would supply arms to Pakistan.

He said Russia has no restrictions in delivering arms and weapons to India "because there are no conflicts and contradictions in our relations".

"We never created problems for India on its frontiers in difference from other countries. That is a political advantage (for Russia) as a friend of India," the Russian leader said.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 15 Oct 2012 00:06

I guess in all medium to moderate powers in the world, India is the only country that doesn't want to claim the land that is truly belongs to it and that would open the entire geopolitical space that it ever needs.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 15 Oct 2012 02:42

well Russia is meekly toning down its rhetoric against Turkey for its aircraft being force landed

so much for its power

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 15 Oct 2012 04:43

Russia invites ONGC to buy stake in Madagan 2 field

in the northern part of the Sea of Okhotsk
..
Russian Energy Deputy Minister Yury Sentyurin told reporters on the sidelines of energy conference Petrotech.
..
at the India Russia Joint Working Group meeting on Saturday. .. added that the size of any possible stake was up for negotiation.
..
D. K. Sarraf, Managing Director of ONGC Videsh Ltd, the overseas investment arm of ONGC, confirmed that the company has viewed data relating to the field.
..
Recoverable resources in the area are estimated at 2.8 billion tonnes of oil equivalent, according to Rosneft's annual report.
..
ONGC already has a stake in Russia's Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project in the Pacific, and in 2008 it bought the Imperial Energy oil company in western Siberia.

The oil field is located perhaps near far east of Russia, not too sure though.