Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

[SSridhar]

From the archives of The Hindu - Nov. 15, 1962

Determined to repel Chinese

Without a single dissentient voice, the Lok Sabha on November 14 declared the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive the Chinese aggressor from the Indian soil. Winding up the six-day debate in which 165 members expressed their unflinching determination to fight the Chinese, Prime Minister Nehru concluded on a note of peace. He said that in a war between India and China it would be manifestly absurd to think in terms of victory for one side and bringing down the other to the knees. {But, that was what had exactly happened by the time this practitioner of Realpolitik had uttered these words.}

British supply of arms

Mr. Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth Secretary, said on November 13 that arms sent to India by Britain had been offered as a gift. He was answering a question in the House of Commons on the amount of aid given to India for its border fighting with Communist China. Mr. Sandys replied: “The Indian requests for arms have so far consisted of an order for small arms and ammunition. “We have met this order in full”. A substantial part of it was sent at once by air and the remainder has already been shipped. We have offered to supply these items as a gift from the British Government.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov. 16, 1962

Our troops attack

Indian defenders swung into action in the Lohit Frontier Division near the Burma border, a few miles north-west of Walong, when the strongest ever patrol party launched an attack on one of the Chinese-held positions in this area, on November 14. Our troops have not only stemmed the Chinese advance but seem to be taking action to clear the enemy hordes from the Indian soil. On November 13, the Chinese aggressors fired at one of the Indian positions with automatic weapons but there were no casualties on our side. This exchange also took place in the vicinity of Walong. In the Kameng division of NEFA (In Towang sector) too, our troops displayed initiative to prevent the Chinese from stabilising their ill-gotten gains.

Arms supply to India

Though American correspondents reporting from India have tended to give the impression that Mr. Nehru was being over-optimistic in expecting Moscow to go through with her promises, Administration circles in Washington do not quite share this disbelief. The U.S. view seems to be that in the context of the current Sino-Soviet relations, any military equipment sent from Russia to India will have symbolic value far surpassing its military worth.

Arms got from U.S.

The Indian Government have given formal assurances that the arms and military equipment they are receiving from the United States would be used only to repel Communist Chinese aggression. The Indian pledge was contained in an exchange of notes in Washington formalising the military assistance which the United States has airlifted to India to meet the threat of Chinese attacks on India’s border.

Second line of defence

As part of a four-fold scheme to strengthen the second line of defence, the Government of India have proposed to make N.C.C. training compulsory for all university students in the country. This was indicated in New Delhi on November 15 by both the Prime Minister and the Home Minister At present the N.C.C. covers 4.2 lakhs of students and an additional three lakhs are expected to be brought into its fold by the new proposal.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov. 17, 1962

Chinese attack held

Indian troops who cleared the Chinese from certain hill features in the vicinity of Walong in NEFA on November 15 were facing a massive counter attack in the same area. A spokesman of the Defence Ministry said that the Chinese attack can be regarded as the biggest so far in NEFA. November 16’s Indian casualties of ten killed and twenty wounded gives an indication of the magnitude of the fighting.

Build-up by India

China on November 16 charged in a new note to India that a large number of Indian troops were being “massed at both ends of the border” and had opened heavy artillery fire in recent days “in preparation for a new attack.” The note repeated charges that one of the places where this was taking place was Chushul, a key town in Ladakh on the Indian side of what China regards as the boundary line. It said that while keeping a “close watch on the movement of Indian troops, the Chinese Government once again advises the Indian side not to reject the goodwill and appeals of the Chinese side for a peaceful settlement and for avoiding the expansion of the conflict — and also not to take Chinese forbearance and self-respect as a sign that China is weak and can be bullied.”

Transport planes supply

The United States is helping India procure transport aircraft from Canada and is discussing the sale of some U.S. transport planes to India, according to U.S. State Department officials. The State Department Press Officer, Mr. Lincoln White, said the United States would give “sympathetic consideration” to any formal requests received from India for transport planes.

Cut in arms aid to China

Czechoslovakia is cutting down her military supplies to China, or altogether stopping them in certain lines, according to the usually well-informed Financial Times , on November 14. China has apparently been relying to a considerable extent on the Czech arms industry and the cessation of supplies could mean either that she has already got all she needs, or that Czechoslovakia is refusing to help build up her forces any more.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov. 19, 1962

Chinese woo Tibetans

The Chinese in Tibet are taking special care these days to enlist the support of the local people in the prosecution of the war, it is learnt in Gangtok. Several rigid measures adopted earlier, particularly in respect of employment, have been recently relaxed. According to Xizang Prabong (Tibetan daily) the soldiers of the “People’s Liberation Army” have been instructed to be courteous to Tibetans, particularly in the border areas. Several batches of Chinese soldiers visited the homes of the Tibetan heroes who died in the defence of their country and paid their respects to the members of the families of the “martyrs”. The Chinese have also intensified anti-Dalai Lama propaganda in Tibet recently and are giving publicity to the newly-introduced land reforms.

Fierce fighting

The fall of Walong in NEFA to the Chinese on November 16 was officially confirmed on November 18. After taking Walong, the Chinese have pushed another ten or twelve miles south and were still maintaining pressure on the withdrawing Indian forces. The Chinese are now about 25 miles south of the McMahon Line in this area. Fighting is still going on. In the Kameng Division in NEFA the Chinese launched a major offensive on Saturday and the Indian troops near Jang were obliged to pull back to the main position in Sela Pass. The Chinese are obviously making a bid to take the Sela Pass and later in the night they made contact with the Indian forward positions at Sela Pass itself. Fighting is still in progress. The Indian troops have withdrawn in this area by about six or seven miles. The spokesman said that despite heavy casualties the Chinese kept on pouring in wave after wave. He admitted that the loss of Walong was “a big setback” to India.

Soviet friendship essential

The Guardian said in a leading article on November 17 that “both in war and in any efforts to end war the Indian Government clearly has much to gain by trying to ensure Soviet support or at least benevolent neutrality. It must not throw Mr. Khrushchev into Mr. Mao Tse Tung’s arms where he does not probably wish to go.”

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov. 20, 1962

Enemy gains in NEFA

In an unscheduled broadcast over All India Radio on November 19, Mr. Nehru said that fighting was still going on in Chushul {see the post below} area in Ladakh and that besides Walong in NEFA, Sela Pass and Bomdila had also fallen to the Chinese. In the Lohit frontier division, south of Walong, the forward elements of Indian troops continued to be in contact with the enemy. They are fighting back for every inch of the ground. In the Subansiri division, about 200 Chinese attacked one of the Indian patrols east of Taksing, 25 miles south-west of Longju as the crow flies. After inflicting casualties on the enemy, the Indian patrol returned to its base.

Arms from abroad

Mr. Nehru told the Rajya Sabha on November 19 that India was asking for “all the aid that we require” from friendly countries in fighting the Chinese invaders. “There is no inhibition about it and we propose to go on doing that,” he added. The Prime Minister described the situation as “not only a full-fledged war but a very difficult war for us because of various circumstances.” It was also “a kind of brutal and callous war. We are treating it as such and taking all steps to meet it”.

[SSridhar]

Don't forget the heroes of Rezang La - Mohan Guruswamy, The Hindu

The greatest acts of heroism and valour often happen when the odds are hopeless and death and defeat are inevitable. Throughout history, nations have always glorified such episodes in ballads and poems, by honouring heroes and commemorating such events. It is the common perception of such episodes in a people’s history that forge a sense of nationhood. Why else would we celebrate the deaths of a Prithviraj Chauhan or a Tipu Sultan? Or a Porus or a Shivaji who battled great armies with little more than a handful of brave comrades and immense courage? Of course we rejoice in the triumphs of an Ashoka or Chandragupta or even an Akbar, but that is about greatness and not heroism.

Even if it is true that the end of history is at hand, we can be sure that the annals of heroism will never cease being written. However endless these may be, the heroic stand of C Company of the 13 Kumaon at Rezang La on November 18, 1962 will always remain a more glorious chapter. The monument that stands at Chushul asks: “How can a man die better/Than facing fearful odds/For the ashes of his fathers/And the temples of his gods.” C Company was fighting for neither ashes nor temples, for there were none at Chushul. The loss of Chushul would not even have had much bearing on the ultimate defence of Ladakh. But in those dark days of 1962, Chushul became a matter of national honour.

Pivotal frontier point

Chushul is only 15 miles from the border as the crow flies and had an all-weather landing strip. It was the pivotal point of our frontier posts in this sector as it was astride the second route into Tibet from Leh about 120 miles further west. The road built after 1962 rises to nearly 17,000 feet, crossing the Ladakh range at the desolate and windblown Chang La pass, steeply descends into Tangtse and then goes on to Chushul. Between the Chang La and Tangtse, the road traverses beautiful scenery with dramatic sightings of wildlife. Golden marmots dart in and out of their holes and in the distance you can sometimes spot a snow leopard warily keeping an eye on man as it stalks ibex on the craggy heights

Chushul is at 14,230 feet and a village in a narrow sandy valley about 25 miles long and four miles wide, flanked by mountains that rise to over 19,000 feet. At the northern end it touches the Pangong Tso, a deep saltwater lake nearly a hundred miles long and which makes for a glorious sight. Also near Chushul is a gap in the mountains called the Spanggur Gap that leads to a beautiful lake, the Spanggur Tso that, like the Pangong, extends well into Chinese territory. China had built a road from Rudok in Tibet right up to the Spanggur Gap capable of carrying tanks. In the first phase of their assault on Ladakh in October 1962, the Chinese had overrun Indian border posts on the line between Daulat Beg Oldi near the Karakoram Pass to Damchok astride the Indus on the border with Tibet. Chushul was the solitary Indian position east of the Ladakh range. Geography favoured the Chinese and they were able to make a major concentration of men and material for an attack on Chushul.

Till September 1962, the defence of all of Ladakh was vested with 114 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig. T.N. Raina (later General and Chief of Army Staff). It consisted of just two infantry battalions, the 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and 5 Jat. Initially, only the Gorkhas were deployed in the Chushul sector and when the gravity of the Chinese threat was realised, 13 Kumaon, which was at Baramulla in the Kashmir Valley, was sent in to reinforce 114 Brigade. In the first week of October, the 3 Himalayan (later Mountain) Division was formed for the overall defence of Ladakh and the Chushul sector was entirely left to 114 Brigade. On October 26, 114 Brigade set up its headquarters at Chushul and braced for the attack.

The newly arrived 13 Kumaon began deploying on October 24 in the lull that followed the first phase of the attack. The forward defences of Chushul were on a series of hill features that were given evocative names such as Gurung Hill, Gun Hill and Mugger Hill. But C Company of 13 Kumaon got Rezang La which was about 19 miles south of Chushul. Rezang La, as the name suggests, is a pass on the southeastern approach to Chushul valley. The feature was 3,000 yards long and 2,000 yards wide and at an average height of 16,000 feet. Digging defensive positions and building shelters was hard going, for the men were still not acclimatised. Wintry winds made life even harder. At this altitude it took hours to bring a kettle to boil for tea. Whatever fruit and vegetables that came were frozen hard. Potatoes, even oranges, acquired weapon-grade hardness. More than the thin air and cold, the location of Rezang La had a more serious drawback. It was “crested” to Indian artillery because of an intervening feature. This meant defenders had to fight without the protective comfort of artillery. Both sides prepared feverishly, mostly within sight of each other, for the next attack, which came on that cold Sunday — November 18.

Most Kumaon battalions are mixed formations made up of hill men from the Kumaon Hills, Ahirs from Haryana and Brahmins from the northern plains. 13 Kumaon was the Kumaon Regiment’s only all Ahir battalion. The Ahirs, concentrated in the Gurgaon/Mewat region of Haryana, are hardy cattlemen and farmers. When the order to move to Chushul came, its commanding officer Lt. Col. H.S. Dhingra was in hospital. But he cajoled the doctors into letting him go with his men. Maj. Shaitan Singh, a Rajput from Jodhpur commanded C Company of 13 Kumaon. C Company’s three platoons were numbered 7,8 and 9 and had .303 rifles with about 600 rounds per head, and between them six light machine guns (LMG), and a handful of 2 inch mortars. The Chinese infantry had 7.62 mm self-loading rifles; medium machine guns and LMG’s; 120 mm, 81 mm and 60 mm mortars; 132 mm rockets; and 75 mm and 57 mm recoilless guns to bust bunkers. They were much more numerous and began swarming up the gullies to assault Rezang La at 4 a.m., even as light snow was falling.

The Ahirs waited till the Chinese came into range and opened up with everything they had. The gullies were soon full of dead and wounded Chinese. Having failed in a frontal attack the Chinese let loose deadly shelling. Under the cover of this intense shelling the Chinese infantry came again in swarms. C Company, now severely depleted, let them have it once again. Position after position fell fighting till the last man. C Company had three junior commissioned officers and 124 other ranks with Maj. Shaitan Singh. When the smoke and din cleared, only 14 survived, nine of them severely wounded. 13 Kumaon regrouped and 114 Brigade held on to Chushul. But the battalion war diary records that they were now “less our C Company.”

Ceasefire and after

The Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, but little more than what the survivors had brought back was known about C Company. In January 1963 a shepherd wandered on to Rezang La. It was as if the very last moment of battle had turned into a tableau. The freezing cold had frozen the dead in their battle positions and the snow had laid a shroud over the battlefield. Arrangements were then made to recover the dead under International Red Cross supervision. Brig. Raina led the Indian party, which recorded the scene for posterity with movie and still cameras. This tableau showed what had happened that Sunday morning. Every man had died a hero. Maj. Shaitan Singh was conferred the Param Vir Chakra. Eight more received the Vir Chakra while four others the Sena Medal. 13 Kumaon received “The battle honour Rezang La,” that it wears so proudly.

Few events in the annals of heroism can match this. C Company gave its all to defend Chushul, a small Ladakhi village, which for one brief moment in our history came to symbolise India’s national honour. At Thermopylae on September 18, 480 BC, 1,200 Greeks led by King Leonidas of Sparta died fighting the Persian King Xerxes’ mighty bodyguard called the Anusya or Companions. But Leonidas was fighting for a great prize. In July 481 BC, the Oracle of Delphi told him that in the next war with Persia either the King would die or Sparta be destroyed. Leonidas chose to die to save Sparta.

But C Company willingly sacrificed itself to save a little village and that makes its sacrifice all the more glorious. That is why we must never forget Rezang La.

[ramana]

SS,
There is a picture also of the soldier who won the Vir Chakra. Please post if possible.

[SSridhar]

Ramana, the Hindu no longer allows the photos to be copied.

[SSridhar]

Ex-IAF Chief Tipnis blames Nehru for 1962 defeat

A former IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal (retd) A Y Tipnis has sought to blame former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for India's defeat in the 1962 war with China, amid a continuing debate on why air power was not used during the conflict.

Speaking at a seminar 'India and China: After five decades of 1962 war' here, Tipnis also alleged that Nehru had surrendered national security interests to realise his "ambition" to be a world leader.

"It was more or less universally accepted perhaps grudgingly not openly in some Indian quarters that to serve the dubious purpose of political survival that Pandit Nehru with his grandiose vision of a conflict free non-alligned world surrendered vital national security interest to the ambition of being a world leader," he said.

The remarks made yesterday came against the backdrop of the recent comments by the current Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne that the outcome of the 1962 war with China would have been different had the IAF been used in an offensive role.

Asked to expand on his remarks, Tipnis today said Nehru was the "major contributor" for India's debacle.

72-year-old Tipnis, who had a three-year tenure as IAF Chief from December 31, 1998 was commissioned as a fighter pilot in 1960, two years before the hostilities broke out between India and China.

Tipnis said he had also seen an Army Chief in those days being "ticked off" like a school-boy by Prime Minister Nehru for his alleged petulance.

[pentaiah]

In the 1962 war China annexed part of Indian territory in Leh, Kashmir. The border problem dates back to the British times. The McMahon Line was drawn up by the British when they ruled India and pre-communist China was weak.

The bitter truth is that India is afraid of China. The Indian timidity stems from the fact that India is being weakened by three major factors; Corrupt bureaucracy, communal elements in Indian polity and weak cowardly leaders

India always wants to settle the issue peacefully. China in contrast has been aggressive.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov. 21, 1962

Chaudhary is Army Chief

The Prime Minister announced on November 20 that General J.N. Chaudhary has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army replacing General Thapar. The news was received with loud cheers from both Houses of Parliament. Mr. Nehru said that General Thapar made a request for long leave this morning on grounds of health and the request was granted with immediate effect. Mr. Nehru said that it was on the recommendation of General Thapar that his successor was chosen. Gen. Chaudhary assumed office on November 20.

Nehru’s appeal to people

Thousands of people began crossing the Brahmaputra from Tezpur on November 20 as news of the Chinese advance in Kameng division of NEFA and elsewhere came into this peaceful plantation town. The ferry service and trains carried them across. There were no signs of panic. People lined up in an orderly fashion — women, children and the infirm getting highest consideration. Civilian authorities provided transport to the ferry stations. Although rumours had been afloat about the battle for Bomdila in Tezpur on November 19, the first official confirmation of the fall of the Kameng division administrative headquarters was received in Mr. Nehru’s broadcast to the nation on November 19. People crowded round radio receivers and listened to the Prime Minister’s appeal with calm dignity. {Wonderful in spite of the bad news}

[SSridhar]

From the archives of The Hindu - Nov. 22, 1962

Ceasefire by China

A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry announced on November 21 that Mr. Nehru had received a communication from Mr. Chou En-lai enclosing the ceasefire proposal already released by Peking Radio. The spokesman said that it was a unilateral proposal of the Chinese Government and there was nothing for the Government of India to do at present. He said that the Government of India would decide on the next step after observing whether the Chinese Government really implemented the proposal they have announced. The spokesman said that the Chinese communication stated that even if the Indian Government failed to respond to their proposal in good time, the Chinese Government would take the initiative to carry out the measures they have outlined as scheduled.

Canadians’ offer

Many Canadians have offered to fight for India against the Chinese invasion, Mr. Rajendranath Gupta, Press Attache for the Indian High Commission, said in Ottawa on November 20. He said the offers have come from all parts of Canada, and were mostly submitted by war veterans or Canadians who have had some connection with India. They began about two weeks ago and new ones still were being received. Nineteen written applications for membership in the Indian Army had been received by the High Commission.

Macmillan’s comments

Mr. Macmillan, British Prime Minister, answering questions in the House of Commons on November 21, said it was for the Indian Government to determine whether the Chinese cease-fire offer was “an acceptable basis for negotiation.” He said: “The Indian Government have always made it clear that they are ready for settlement by negotiation. “We, for our part, will welcome a peaceful outcome, if this can be obtained with justice and honour to India.” He added: “It is for the Indian Government to determine whether the Chinese proposals constitute an acceptable basis for negotiations. In all these matters, we are maintaining the closest touch with the Indian Government and for this purpose a mission has left for India.”

[SSridhar]

From the archives of The Hindu - Nov. 23, 1962

No surrender to threats

Prime Minister Nehru, addressing a children’s rally in New Delhi on November 22, declared that India was not a country to be cowed down by threats and was prepared to offer maximum sacrifices for safeguarding her freedom. He said, “The enemy is on our soil. All kinds of threats are extended to us. No country can submit to such threats, much less India.” The Prime Minister stated it was true that Indian troops had suffered some reverses, “but we are a people determined to protect our independence and make it “complete and invulnerable.” Mr. Nehru said that the invasion by China had proved the country with an opportunity to strengthen herself and show to the world that the people of India loved their freedom and that they were prepared to offer the maximum sacrifice for it. Any nation which hesitated or wavered to pay this price always lost its freedom.

India’s reply to China

India’s reply to the Chinese Government’s cease-fire proposals may not be decided until after the Chinese begin withdrawal which they have announced for December 1. There is, however, reason to believe that the Government of India would reject the terms proposed by the Chinese. Official analysis of the Chinese proposals has led to the conclusion that it is in essence the same as the one outlined by Mr. Chou En-lai in his letter dated November 4 with the addition of the voluntary cease-fire and withdrawal. In broad terms, the Chinese offer to withdraw behind the McMahon Line and India in return should let them retain whatever they have taken in Ladakh.

Peking’s ruse exposed

Prime Minister Nehru has rejected the Chinese three-point proposals of October 24 and has described them as amounting to retention by China of the gains of her earlier aggression plus such other gains she could secure by negotiations from the latest aggression. In his letter dated November 14 to Mr. Chou En-lai, Mr. Nehru has reiterated his demand for the withdrawal of the Chinese to positions held by them prior to September 8, 1962 and says “This is the minimum corrective action necessary.”

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov. 24, 1962

Move against air attacks

The Delhi Administration has started digging trenches in the capital under its Civil Defence Programme to meet surprise air attacks. It has started this work in co-operation with the Delhi Municipal Corporation and the New Delhi Municipal Committee. The Administration has tentatively decided to have over a lakh of trenches in and around the capital. Schools and colleges throughout the Union territory of Delhi have been asked to dig trenches for students and the staff.

Peking’s peace proposal

The Congress High Command on November 23 endorsed the Government stand of “wait and see” in regard to the latest Chinese proposals for ending the border conflict. Though no resolution was passed, the consensus of opinion at the meeting, according to the party Secretary, Mr. K.K. Shah, was that the latest Chinese communication offering unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal, required the deepest and careful study before a decision could be taken on it.

De facto cease-fire

The Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha on November 23 that “there has been no firing by either side in NEFA and Ladakh since November 22. Mr. Nehru’s statement thus confirms that the Indian forces have been instructed to respond to the Chinese “cease-fire”, and not to resort to shooting except in retaliation. Mr. Nehru said that the Chinese forces were somewhere between Bomdila and Foothills, and “have not made any advance of any kind anywhere.” The leader of the Swatantra Party, Mr. N.G. Ranga expressed satisfaction at the arrival of the military mission from Britain and the United States.

U.S. withholds comment

United States officials in Washington on November 22 withheld immediate comment on the reported cease-fire in the India-China border fighting. The officials noted that the Indian Government had taken a “wait and see” attitude towards the Chinese offer of a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of troops and they said no clear determination on the situation could be made until New Delhi decided how to treat the Chinese move.

[ramana]

Total cognitive dissonance on part of GOI. The Chinese are occupying Indian territory and GOI wants to sham China.

[SSridhar]

Total cognitive dissonance on part of GOI.

Ramana,

GoI was Nehru those days. The series of posts shows Nehru's continued bluster in the face of mounting collapse of his policies. He could get away with it because of the careful build-up of his image in Indian minds. He should have gone along with Krishna Menon and Gen. Thapar.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu

Quiet continues

It is all quiet both on the NEFA and Ladakh fronts for the fourth day to-day. According to an official spokesman in New Delhi over a thousand Indian military personnel, including officers have returned to Assam from the forward areas in the NEFA. The U.S. and the U.K. military officials will visit Tezpur and other areas. It was stated officially that they will discuss with the local Commanders the question of equipment and supplies India has asked for. The other members of the U.K. and the U.S. fact-finding missions, had a busy day in New Delhi. Both Mr. Duncan Sandys, leader of the British mission, and Mr. Averell Harriman, leader of the American mission, met the Finance Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai.

India’s offer to Pakistan

The Prime Minister’s offer to Pakistan for signing a “no war’ pact still stands, a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said in New Delhi on November 25. He added: “The offer is there. It has always been there and it has never been withdrawn.” The spokesman was replying to a correspondent who had asked whether the offer made by Mr. Nehru to Pakistan a few years ago still stood.

The talk of a 'no war pact' to Pakistan should have been avoided when India had collapsed on the eastern front.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov 28, 1962

Non-alignment policy

Prime Minister Nehru said on November 26 that India hoped to continue to follow the policy of non-alignment “subject to one fact — that war conditions create their own momentum.” In a recorded interview for British television, he said that if India was getting a great deal of help from the United States, “we are very grateful for it.” “It doesn’t necessarily follow that we enter into a war alliance with them,” he told the British Broadcasting Corporation reporter, Ludovic Kennedy. If there was a “coming together for a common object” it did not necessarily mean that India should “even in the theory give up non-alignment.” On China’s reasons for the border war with India, Mr. Nehru said one possible explanation was the revival of an “old and curious urge.” “The Chinese have always tended to expand whenever they are strong enough to do so, and they seem to think that anything that once belonged to them, or owed allegiance to them, should return to them.”

Stiff resistance

General Paul Adams, senior military member of the U.S. fact-finding mission now in New Delhi, said that he was convinced that the Indian Army put up a good fight at Sela Pass in the NEFA. The Indian Jawans came back with their personal weapons and “right now what they want to do is to get up there (Sela) and get after the Chinese. They have courage, stamina and will.” In a statement on November 27 after his return from a visit to the Indian Army in the NEFA, General Adams said: “I have known the Indian Army in many places in the world and I have seen them fight magnificently all over the world. In the present situation, they have been in the position of a peaceful man struck by an aggressor. The aggressor has the advantage of surprise. I do not think there has ever been an army in history that did not experience some difficulty in the beginning when it was hit by surprise. Fighting in these mountains on the roof of the world as the Indian Army has to fight at this time with their forces widely separated, by something like 1000 miles between two combat zones, is one of the most difficult problems that can face any fighting force,” he added.

[SSridhar]

From the Archives of The Hindu - Nov 29, 1962

Chou’s evil designs

“China, in its policy of expansionism, believes first in isolating its victim from the non-Afro-Asian group and then from other Afro-Asian countries to have things in its own way and all this in the name of Afro-Asian solidarity,” an External Affairs Ministry spokesman said on November 28, in reference to the recent circular addressed by the Chinese Prime Minister to heads of Governments of Afro-Asian States. Mr. Chou En-lai’s significant statement says: “The Chinese Government considers that in dealing with the boundary questions, we should clearly discern that these are issues between Asian and African countries and the imperialist Powers; we should be on guard lest we be taken in by the imperialist attempt to sow discord among us.”

Defence of India Bill

The Lok Sabha on November 28 unanimously passed the Defence of India Bill, 1962, which seeks to replace the ordinance of the same name promulgated by the President to meet the Chinese aggression.

Mr. B.N. Datar, Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs, in his reply to the third reading of the Bill, assured the House that the powers listed in the Bill would be used at all levels as “fairly, judiciously and humanely” as possible, consistent with the safety of the country and defence of the nation.

[SSridhar]

From the archives of The Hindu

Nehru, Ayub to meet

It has been officially announced that the Pakistan President and Prime Minister Nehru have agreed that a “renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their countries on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship”. A joint statement issued by the two Governments adds that “in consequence, they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement.” The statement says that initially these discussions will be conducted at the Ministerial level and “at the appropriate stage, direct talks will be held between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub”. {Why am I including this in a China thread ? That's because, Kennedy was pressured by Ayub to ask Nehru to settle the J&K issue as a condition for allowing the US to supply arms to India. So, as soon as the unilateral ceasefire was announced by the Chinese, the India-Pakistan dialogue started, without wasting too much time. That was the reasom that GoI also revived its earlier 'No War Pact' with Ayub}

Chou’s letter to Nehru

Mr. Nehru has received a fresh communication from the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai. The letter, received on November 29, is presumed to be in reply to Mr. Nehru’s letter of November 14 to Mr. Chou En-lai, rejecting the October 24 three-point proposals. Meanwhile, the clarifications given by Peking on the latest Chinese cease-fire proposals are stated to be confusing. According to a Press report from Hong Kong published on November 29, the Chinese Government, in clarifying its statement of November 21, is understood to have informed the Government of India that after withdrawing its invasion forces, it would leave “civil police posts” along the McMahon Line, including Khinzemane and Longju, in the eastern sector; along the Sino-Indian boundary in the middle sector, including B

Chinese espionage

Informed circles in Tezpur on November 29 thought that a well-knit espionage system in the NEFA had possibly aided the Chinese in their surprise shock tactics in the launching of the outflanking move cutting off Sela from Bomdilla.

The pattern had shown a thorough knowledge of the terrain and for this reason the possibility could not be ruled out of the Chinese leaving behind large forces concealed in thick jungles while apparently withdrawing to the November 1959 line in terms of their latest unilateral declaration.

[ramana]

Bits and pieces show up about the 1962 debacle.

Who killed Nick Deak

....In 1962, for example, Deak warned the CIA that China was planning to invade India after his company’s Hong Kong branch was swamped with Chinese orders for Indian rupees intended for advance soldiers.....

Hong Kong was and is awash with expatriate Indian merchants who would have supplied the same innof if IB had developed the contacts instead of whatever they are doing.

Note the similarity of the Pakis buying snow jackets in Austria before Kargil in 1999 and again the signs were missed.

[Johann]

From the archives of The Hindu

Nehru, Ayub to meet

It has been officially announced that the Pakistan President and Prime Minister Nehru have agreed that a “renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their countries on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship”. A joint statement issued by the two Governments adds that “in consequence, they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement.” The statement says that initially these discussions will be conducted at the Ministerial level and “at the appropriate stage, direct talks will be held between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub”. {Why am I including this in a China thread ? That's because, Kennedy was pressured by Ayub to ask Nehru to settle the J&K issue as a condition for allowing the US to supply arms to India. So, as soon as the unilateral ceasefire was announced by the Chinese, the India-Pakistan dialogue started, without wasting too much time. That was the reasom that GoI also revived its earlier 'No War Pact' with Ayub}

Meanwhile Z.A. Bhutto and Chen Yi were negotiating the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement. The Chinese had in fact opened talks with Pakistan as they were making final preparations for their offensive in September to mid October 1962.

The Chinese let the Pakistanis keep everything they already had in their control in exchange for giving up all claims to what wasn't under either Indian or Pakistani control.

Bhutto always believed the PRC could and would do more for Pakistan than America although Ayub disagreed.

The Karakorum highway, just like the Pakistani bomb, the Khushab reactor and the JF-17 should all be named after Z.A. Bhutto

[ShauryaT]

x-post:

Important seminar on 1962, lessons and way forward, participants were VP Malik, AY Tipnis, G. Parthasarathy and B. Karnad amongst others.

Part One http://www.adrive.com/public/ET74vh/Ind ... v2012A.mpg

Part Two http://www.adrive.com/public/2vycDZ/Ind ... v2012B.mpg
Part Three http://www.adrive.com/public/3zAQFr/Ind ... v2012C.mpg
Part Four http://www.adrive.com/public/DYR7g7/Ind ... v2012D.mpg

Part Five http://www.adrive.com/public/F3JkAK/Ind ... v2012E.mpg
Part Six http://www.adrive.com/public/bNEJwd/Ind ... v2012F.mpg
Part Seven http://www.adrive.com/public/czRFwj/Ind ... v2012G.mpg

[ShauryaT]

x-post

REPORT ON NATIONAL SEMINAR ON INDIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: REMEMBERING THE PAST TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

Keynote Address- His Excellency Gen JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, Governor of Arunachal Pradesh
Opening Remarks by Chairperson – Gen VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), former COAS, Indian Army
A brief of the 1962 Conflict and its Aftermath: Maj Gen Ashok Kalyan Verma, AVSM, (Retd)
The Battle of Namka Chu: Lt. Gen Ravi Eipe, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
50 years of 1962 war: A comparative analysis of the political relationship between India and China, then and now: Inder Malhotra, Journalist and former Editor, The Times of India
Infirmities in Higher Defence Management: Has the situation been addressed?: Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
Assessing the Military capabilities of India and China in 1962 and 2012: Maj Gen GD Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd)

Certain viewpoints, which emerged in due course of discussion, were: -
 There is certain progress made on the maps. The entire border is mapped and digitised but several incorrect depictions on the maps need to be
addressed.
 The media in 1962 was as ill-informed as the Government and the military
leadership.
 K Subramanian should be thanked for his efforts in strategic thinking
otherwise India had no history of strategic thinking before.
 Chinese have no interest in settling the border disputes, we have to
defend it.
 Great deal of literature needs to be reexamined to study the Chinese
forces and their tactic which had such a devastating effect on India.
 There was no great scope for diplomacy from 1954 to 1962. GOI was doing everything under wrap, and policies were made without consulting
the armed forces.
 There has to be a greater interaction between the military and Ministry of External Affairs.
 Ministry of Defense must stop becoming a post office between the military and MEA.
 Tri forces need to be integrated.
 The whole Nation in the Nehru period was of the belief that Chinese had
cheated on India.
 Decision making has to be faster, the system needs to be changed

Remarks by Chairperson - Gen NC Vij, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd), former COAS
Current Contextualisation of the Strategic Setting of India-China Relations and the Rivalry in the Himalaya: Dr. Monika Chansoria
China’s Defence Doctrine and its Implications for India: Brig Narendra Kumar
Chinese Strategic Capabilities to include Space and Cyber Space and its impact on India: Air Marshall M Matheswaran.
Policy Options for India in the context of increased Chinese Military Capability: Ambassador Satish Chandra.



Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson
China‟s modernisation took place in 2004 and by 2025 they will achieve their desired levels of modernisation. Certain factors should be adhered to in order to deal with China‟s capability enhancements. Some suggestions are:
a) India should raisea strike corps.
b) There is a need to upgrade India‟s ammunition holding.
c) India needs to check her missiles ystems.
d) The adoption of asymmetric warfare could be deciding factor.
e) Cyber command is the need of the hour.
f) India should build its counter-missile defence systems.
g) There should be a build up on missile systems and precision ammunitions.
h) Services in India should be made part of National Strategic Planning
Committee.
i) There should be a regular presentation by the three Chiefs on the
preparedness of India‟s forces.
j) National leadership should be made a part of such presentation on
preparedness of India‟s forces.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^^
In fact the Lok Sabha should demand that the 3 service chiefs give quarterly assessment to the Parliament about Chinese capabilities and Indian capabilities.

[SSridhar]

From the archives of The Hindu

U.S. arms aid

The United States will undertake a very large military aid programme for India if India makes progress in settling its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, a top U.S. diplomat said in Washington. Mr. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, said: “There is probably a better chance now than ever before” to settle the Kashmir controversy. But he cautioned: “It is going to be more difficult for the United States and the United Kingdom to give military aid both to Pakistan and to India if a considerable part of it is used for defence against each other. Some agreement must be reached to disengage the forces.”

To be read in conjunction with this earlier post.

[SSridhar]

From the archives of The Hindu

Communists in detention

The Union Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, suggested to the States to review the individual cases of Communists, who have been detained under the Defence of India Rules, to determine if any of them could be released. Mr. Shastri told a conference attended by several Chief Ministers that a number of representations had been made to him by the Communists that even those who had already condemned the Chinese attack against India had been arrested. In the light of such representation, he said, the States might look into the individual cases.

[vishvak]

How is none of our educated establishments point out utter hypocritical diplomacy from USA - ignoring terrorism on one hand by pet pakis in India & lecturing India on the other.

We need a very strong policy approach standards for such duplicious blackmail including handling of Nobel coveting individuals.

[ramana]

US contemplated nuking China after 1962 war

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20121225/world.htm#1

Washington, December 24

Six months after the 1962 Chinese aggression on India, the US had contemplated using nuclear weapons in the event of another attack from Beijing as it was determined to prevent an Indian defeat at the hands of the Communists.

The then US president, John F Kennedy, at a meeting with his top military aides on May 9, 1963, had expressed clear determination not to let Beijing defeat New Delhi, with his defence secretary even talking about using nuclear weapons against China if it launched another attack against India.

The book cover

These disclosures have come in a just released book 'Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings of John F Kennedy' co-authored by Ted Widmer and Caroline Kennedy.
"I gather we're coming to the defence of Israel and Saudi Arabia. What I think we ought to think about is, (unclear) it's desirable (?) for us, to give India a guarantee which actually we would carry out. I don't think there's any doubt that this country is determined that we couldn't permit the Chinese to defeat the Indians," Kennedy said.
"If we would, we might as well get out of South Korea and South Vietnam. So I think that's what we'll decide at the time. Now, therefore, I don't mind making, seeing us make some commitments. Now, if it is politically important," he said.

Kennedy was quoted by the book as making these remarks in the White House meeting with his Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Davenport "Max" Taylor.

Kennedy was the president of the US from 1961 until his death in 1963. The book is a selection of audio recordings of Kennedy's conversations and meetings at the White House.

The recordings have been selected from the hidden recording systems in the Oval Office and in the Cabinet Room installed by Kennedy in July 1962, in an effort to preserve an accurate record of Presidential decision-making in a highly charged atmosphere of conflicting viewpoints, strategies and tactics. PTI

Wonder if it had any impact on events of Nov 1963?

The PRC attack probably had deeper ramifications then we realize.

An attack is like a riot. Nothing is spontaneous. Needs a lot of organization and mustering of resources and back room deals.

[Sanku]

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-r ... /1068806/0

The road to Tashkent

How the Soviet Union brought India and Pakistan to the negotiating table after the 1965 war

As early as August 18, 1965, the Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, had written to his Indian counterpart, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Pakistan President Ayub Khan, asking them "not to take any steps that might lead to a major conflict". He wrote again on September 4 appealing for "an immediate cessation of hostilities and a reciprocal withdrawal of troops behind the ceasefire line". He also offered the Soviet Union's "good offices" in negotiating a peaceful settlement of differences between India and Pakistan. Neither country reacted to this offer for the obvious reason that two days later the war had escalated, and the Indian army was on the march to the prized Pakistani city of Lahore.

On September 18, Kosygin sent his third letter to the two South Asian leaders, proposing that they "should meet in Tashkent or any other Soviet city for negotiations", and even offered to take part in the discussions himself, "if both sides so desired". He underscored his serious concern because the war was taking place "close to the Soviet Union's borders".

Shastri waited until September 23, when the ceasefire came into force, before disclosing to Parliament the Soviet offer, adding that he had "informed Mr Kosygin that we would welcome his efforts and good offices". In Pakistan, however, there was complete silence on the subject because of its extreme reluctance to take part in Soviet-sponsored negotiations.

"Ayub," records his closest confidant and biographer Altaf Gauhar, "was quite disturbed that the US and the British should leave the field to the Soviet Union... the subcontinent had been traditionally the area of Western influence, and the induction of the Soviet Union into the region as a mediator would only strengthen India's position". Consequently, even after agreeing to the Tashkent talks on November 11, he decided to go to London and Washington to persuade Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, and US President Lyndon Johnson to so arrange things that some "self-executing machinery" could be set up to resolve Kashmir, preferably before the Tashkent meeting. In both capitals he drew a blank. Wilson bluntly told Ayub that China was the "greatest danger in the region because it was far more expansionist than the Soviet Union or India". His foreign secretary added that in its present mood, "China was an extremely dangerous friend to have". Wilson's concluding remark at the end of a marathon meeting was: "We cannot hurry the Kashmir issue, though we realise the conflict is driving India and Pakistan to orbits we fear".

On way to Washington, Ayub stopped over in New York to deliver a speech at the UN General Assembly. He devoted it almost entirely to Kashmir and ended his oration with the demand: "Let India honour her agreement as we would, to let all the people of Kashmir settle their own future through self-determination, in accordance with past pledges." In Washington the next day, at his prolonged meeting with Johnson, he returned to this theme and said with some emotion that the Kashmir problem must be resolved. "If India could not comply with the UN resolutions then arbitration by an independent body was the only peaceful way to settle the dispute."

According to Gauhar's account, Johnson said little about Kashmir but dilated at some length on America's problems in Vietnam, where both the Soviet Union and China were helping North Vietnam. The US president then told his guest that he was "praying for the success of the Tashkent meeting". Whereupon Ayub "regretted" that US and Soviet policy "had come to coincide in India, and that was why the Soviet Union was helping India, and the US, too, had allowed itself to be 'suckered' by the Indians".

While the two presidents were engaged in one-to-one talks, Pakistan officials told their American opposite numbers that throughout the "crisis", the feeling in Pakistan was that the US "had let down Pakistan and equated it with the aggressor". Ayub said the same thing somewhat politely at his final meeting with Johnson: "Let us hope we get more comfort in future out of our alliance with the US."

As was perhaps to be expected, China acted promptly to vindicate Johnson's apprehension that it would "fish in troubled waters" in both South Asia and Indochina. No sooner had Pakistan announced its willingness to partake in the Tashkent talks under Soviet auspices, that the Chinese tried to throw a spanner in the works by suddenly opening fire on two Indian posts on the Sikkim-China border and making repeated intrusions across this frontier. What added to Indian worries was a report by the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies that China had "massed 15 divisions in Tibet, of which at least six were stationed near the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal". However, New Delhi's assessment was that Beijing was only trying to create tensions and wasn't paving the way to a renewed invasion.

Shastri's greater worry was about the withdrawal of troops to the positions they held before Pakistan's infiltrations into Kashmir on August 5. The Indian army had paid a heavy price to wrest from Pakistan the highly strategic Haji Pir Pass, the most convenient route for Pakistan's infiltrators. There was a strong feeling in the country that Haji Pir should never be returned to Pakistan. Though normally a cautious man, Shastri himself intensified this sentiment by declaring repeatedly that if Haji Pir were to be given back to Pakistan, "some other prime minister would do it".

Meanwhile, the Soviets invited foreign minister Swaran Singh to Moscow a week before the start of the Tashkent conference. The message he brought back was that while the Soviet Union stuck to its traditional stand that Kashmir was a part of India, it was also of the firm view that peace between India and Pakistan must be established on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution of September 20, which demanded the "withdrawal of all armed personnel to positions held prior to August 5, 1965".

This, as we shall see, was to be a source of great trouble during the Tashkent talks, as well as afterwards.

The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator

[svinayak]

Shastri's greater worry was about the withdrawal of troops to the positions they held before Pakistan's infiltrations into Kashmir on August 5. The Indian army had paid a heavy price to wrest from Pakistan the highly strategic Haji Pir Pass, the most convenient route for Pakistan's infiltrators. There was a strong feeling in the country that Haji Pir should never be returned to Pakistan. Though normally a cautious man, Shastri himself intensified this sentiment by declaring repeatedly that if Haji Pir were to be given back to Pakistan, "some other prime minister would do it".

Meanwhile, the Soviets invited foreign minister Swaran Singh to Moscow a week before the start of the Tashkent conference. The message he brought back was that while the Soviet Union stuck to its traditional stand that Kashmir was a part of India, it was also of the firm view that peace between India and Pakistan must be established on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution of September 20, which demanded the "withdrawal of all armed personnel to positions held prior to August 5, 1965".

The India of 1965 did not have the weight to push its national interest.
After JLN the state was not able to gain influence and the leadership did not behave as the winning state.

[ramana]

http://www.aerospaceindia.org/Books/New ... Unsung.htm

Center for Air Power, New Delhi think tank on IAF role in 1962

Unknown and Unsung
Indian Air force in Sino-Indian War of 1962

Author : Air Marshal Bharat Kumar PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Year of Publication : 2013

ISBN : 978-93-81904-41-1


One of the many neglected chapters in the Indian military history is the role played by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The only document on the subject is a 25-page chapter in the unpublished Official History, which fails to do justice to the vital and remarkable role played by the IAF in some of the most hostile operating conditions found anywhere in the world. This work attempts to fill this vital gap.

The Indian Air Force had been involved in the build-up in Ladakh and NEFA right from the time the first of many posts was set up in 1950. Thereafter, it was its responsibility to support and sustain the posts set up in both the sectors as well as various patrols that were sent forward to show the Indian flag. The IAF was also involved in the Army's build-up. This was one continuous operation for the IAF, day in day out - the only break that the aircrew could get was due to bad weather.

The main test for the IAF came when the Indians and Chinese came face-to-face at Thagla ridge and the Chinese invasion commenced soon thereafter. The demand for airlift suddenly increased manifold with an urgency associated with forces that have been caught unprepared. The IAF met the challenge, the ground crews working round the clock and the aircrews flying in conditions that are difficult to imagine. There is no other instance in aviation history wherein any air force has been able to increase its effort almost ten times - the lAF's resources were already stretched even before September 1962. Each and every demand of the Army was met without a murmur and not a single adversity could be attributed to the inability of the IAF to deliver. What is not surprising is that the credit that is due to it for its efforts has eluded it so far because no attention has been paid to the role played by the IAF in this war.

The story would have been altogether different if the combat elements of the IAF had been utilised - the reasons for the same still remain shrouded in mystery. Another chapter in the LAF's history about which very little is known is its efforts to modernise post 1962. This work attempts to unravel these mysteries as well as describes the valiant efforts of the air warriors of the IAF.

The magnitude of political collapse in 1962 was such that even monumental efforts got no recognition.

[kumarn]

Triumph and tragedy at Tashkent

At the guesthouse where the Pakistani delegation was staying, sad to say, the news was greeted with uproarious joy, even though the next morning Ayub was to be one of Shastri's pallbearers. Disturbed by the noise, Bhutto opened his door, saw senior members of the delegation in a boisterous mood, and demanded of his foreign secretary: "What is this Aziz?" Aziz Ahmed replied: "Sir, the ******** is dead". Bhutto: "Which one?"

[chetak]

Triumph and tragedy at Tashkent

At the guesthouse where the Pakistani delegation was staying, sad to say, the news was greeted with uproarious joy, even though the next morning Ayub was to be one of Shastri's pallbearers. Disturbed by the noise, Bhutto opened his door, saw senior members of the delegation in a boisterous mood, and demanded of his foreign secretary: "What is this Aziz?" Aziz Ahmed replied: "Sir, the ******** is dead". Bhutto: "Which one?"

Nothing has changed except that some real ******** on the "Indian side" are still alive and thriving.

[Anand K]

The magnitude of political collapse in 1962 was such that even monumental efforts got no recognition.

I was always curious on how air power might have titled the balance. I mean, at 1962 force levels, logistics & serviceability, intelligence setup required for efficient use of air power etc.
Would a few CAS strafing runs or a few tonnes of iron bombs made all the difference? Would aggressive airdrops helped the soldiers in the far-off isolated posts? I mean, secure air drop zones and mountain terrain and all that.

Here's something from BR archives itself.

Experts please help.

[srin]

Triumph and tragedy at Tashkent

The story of Haji Pir is interesting ...

In India, the harshest criticism not only by the political class, but also by members of the PM's family, was focused on his decision to "give away" Haji Pir, which he had vowed never to do. Little did his critics know that Kosygin had explained to him the dire consequences of defying the UN Security Council's resolution insisting that the armed personnel of both countries "return to the positions they had occupied before August 5", when Pakistan's infiltrations into Kashmir were first detected.

Another take (from tactical perspective) ... Return of Haji Pir Pass in 1965 – Myth and the Reality

When negotiations commenced in January, 1966 between India and Pakistan under the aegis of Soviet Union, India had to view the threat posed by Pak dagger into Indian heart in Chhamb Sector. Since Pakistani forces had already reached Fatwal ridge only four Kms. from Akhnoor, it could always resume operations for capture of Akhnoor. The author understood this implication better in 1987 when he was commanding his unit near Jauriyan, a few kilometers west of Fatwal Ridge. The Indian policy makers at that time did not visualize infiltration threat through Uni-Poonch bulge and hence it was decided to return Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan and ask them to withdraw from Chhamb Sector since it would not have been advisable to let Pakistan point a dagger at Akhnoor and thereafter at Jammu. It was too high a risk to take. So Prime Minister Shastri was left with no option. Whether he died due to a feeling of guilt will remain a mystery. But in hindsight, India was remiss in not capturing Haji Pir Pass in 1971 war. It was the only worthwhile objective on the Western Front. Thus ends the myth and reality of return of Haji Pir Pass by India after 1965 war. May Shahstri’s soul rest in peace.

[ramana]

X-Post..

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/n ... epage=true
U.S. planes used Indian airbase to snoop on China



U.S. spy planes took off at least four times from an Indian airbase in Odisha for spying missions against the Chinese, according to a newly declassified history of the CIA’s U-2 spy plane programme, obtained by the National Security Archive (NSA) under the Freedom of Information Act.

The U.S.’s action was not borne out of affection for India but was dictated by two factors — first, the losses suffered in flying over the Soviet Union forced it to shift its spying assets to east Asia and, second, it had to keep a close eye on the Chinese, who were active in disputes with Taiwan and involved in the Korean peninsula.

According to other accounts, this cooperation in overflight, refuelling and basing led to the CIA transferring hi-tech equipment to India after the base closed in 1967 to keep an eye on China’s western region that was out of bounds for U.S. spy planes.

The first deployment of U.S. pilots and ground handlers to the Charbatia airbase ended in May 1964 with the death of Jawaharlal Nehru. It resumed a few months later and the archives record at least three flights in the post-Nehru phase, in addition to the one before his death.

The U.S. detachment stayed on at Charbatia till 1967 and served as an adjunct to the main operational base for American spy planes in Thailand.

Were more flights undertaken from this base?

According to the NSA, this might be the case because a lot of details are missing.

The information gleaned from aerial surveillance was yet another aspect of the close India-U.S. intelligence cooperation in the run-up to the 1962 India-China war and later. The secret surveillance flights began after Nehru allowed the Intelligence Bureau to join hands with U.S. agencies in the area of technical intelligence.

This permission was preceded by an eight-paragraph agreement signed by U.S. President John F Kennedy and President S. Radhakrishnan in June 1963.

According to the CIA, “Charbatia was still not on in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964 Detachment G staged another mission from Takhli.

0The first mission out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were postponed.

“The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but others remained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G returned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions, satisfying all requirements for the Sino-Indian border region. By this time, however, Takhli had become the main base for Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967,” said the report.

The India-U.S. cooperation in the area of intelligence, and its limitations — though not the spy plane flights — were also detailed by the late B. Raman.

“The U.S. intelligence, with the approval of John F Kennedy, agreed to supply the required equipment and train IB officers who would be using this equipment. However, it imposed a condition that this equipment would be used only for the collection of technical intelligence from China and not from Pakistan,” he wrote in The Kaoboys of RAW, an account of his days with the Research and Analysis Wing.

[ramana]

The magnitude of political collapse in 1962 was such that even monumental efforts got no recognition.

I was always curious on how air power might have titled the balance. I mean, at 1962 force levels, logistics & serviceability, intelligence setup required for efficient use of air power etc.
Would a few CAS strafing runs or a few tonnes of iron bombs made all the difference? Would aggressive airdrops helped the soldiers in the far-off isolated posts? I mean, secure air drop zones and mountain terrain and all that.

Here's something from BR archives itself.

Experts please help.

...Studying our Operations

It has taken a series of Chief Instructors, Senior Instructors, and DS of the Air Wing at DSSC to obliterate the false belief that in the mountains, bombs should be used to create land-slides to slow down the enemy. It took many years for the Air Wing DS / SI's to completely eliminate the thought process of "bombing for land-slides". This was done over some five to six courses by stressing this matter during Divisional discussions on ‘Defence In the Mountains’ and ‘Attack in the Mountains’. Fighter bombers are not the air arm of the GOC of a Div or a Corps. But if they are used as land-slide creators, they are in effect just that. The reason why Army DS, senior ones at that, spoke of land-slides as a part of CAS, is because it is the IAF pilots who gave them the idea in the first place partly influenced by romance from World War II movies like Guns of Navrrone and 633 Sqn etc.

about 633 Squadron movie...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/633_Squadron

633 Squadron is a 1964 British film,...

So the film was made after 1962, so Gp Capt Bewoor's charge that IAF pilots advocating landslides based on that movie is not correct.


Guns of Navarone.....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Guns_o ... %28film%29

The Guns of Navarone is a 1961 Anglo-American action/adventure war film directed by J. Lee Thompson and based on Alistair MacLean's 1957 novel The Guns of Navarone about the Dodecanese Campaign of World War II...

Now we need to know when this movie was released in India?


However I agree with the rest of the paper that India needs to study the wars fought nearby and not some far away operations.

[Anand K]

Perhaps they got the idea from the books..... which were written in '56 and '57? Or from actual RAF plans to destroy German bases/ships in fjords?
Anyway, what is the golden standard for bombing in mountains likethe fr1ghin Himalayas? Forget pre '62, even the modern B-52Hs plastering Afghan hills don't come anywhere close, right?


PS: The arty/bombing Blue on Blues in '65 and '71 are rather well kept secrets, unlike in the AF with that friendly fire incident which downed a fighter. If this sort of thing happened in Kargil in the age of media vultures....

PPS: I remember a TV short on a '71 War Blue-on-Blue (actually an accidental weapon discharge inside the safety of the base) which is hushed by a Colonel..... I remember it was Jayant Kripalani who played the Colonel. However, this officer acted in the interests of deceased Sardarji NCO who is scheduled for a bravery award for extraordinary combat actions the previous day.
He killed a dozen enemies and captured difficult positions the day before IIRC.... and he always said "there is no bullet with my name on it". When he is dying the hero, the company doctor, tries to keep him alive repeating this like a chant but the Sardar says- "lagta hei ki woh goli.... dushman ke paas nahi tha" and dies. His death inside the base would raise unwanted questions on the details of the incident and media might raise a stink (like fragging) and the award might not happen. He convinces the protagonist to smuggle the body from the base and cremate it inside a forest and list the deceased as MIA. The rest of the episode was about him visiting the family of the Sardar.

[ramana]

Thanks to Cosmo_R for this link to late Jasjit Singh's views on 1962


Face to Face with Air Cdre Jasjit Singh

We provoked the Chinese
Akash Bisht/ Sadiq Naqvi Delhi

As a fighter pilot, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has served the country at the frontline in many a battle, including in the war with China in 1962. A decorated soldier, he was posted at Tezpur in Assam when the war broke out. Post-retirement, he has served as the director general of premier strategic institutions like the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA). Currently, he now heads the Centre for Air Power Studies. Excerpts from an interview with Hardnews:

What was the immediate provocation of the war with China in 1962?

My opinion is a minority view. We provoked the Chinese. Jawaharlal Nehru was famous and the media quoted only half the sentences of what he said. Like, he had given orders to get certain areas vacated and the army had been given orders to do this. However, what went missing in the whole concept was the second part of the sentence — when the army is ready. So, I can’t see how the PM can be faulted on this subject. This, many believed, led to the provocation.

The Chinese had already prepared and we had enough military intelligence in May 1962. I was in the Air Force. We flew over the area and there were no signs of tension. At that point of time, there were no roads in the Himalaya and the British had built hill stations at 5,000 feet and only Shimla was higher at 7,000 feet. Beyond that there was a road for next 15 miles till Kufri. From there the Tibet border was 140 miles, there was a similar scenario in the east, and in Ladakh. Between 1947 and 1962, the elected government had a compulsion to feed the 85 per cent people living below the poverty line. So, roads were not the government’s priority, development was. There was Gandhi’s model of development of villages and Nehru’s vision of putting the industry first. He was of the opinion that unless we produce steel and cement, we won’t be able to even build houses, in villages.

Also, at that time, the world admired India which was full of paradoxes. The first paradox was that India had such great poverty and yet it was treated as a major power that was invited for the conference that created the United Nations. India’s example was sought by the bulk of the decolonising world. Therefore, this global status of India added up with the charisma of Nehru. And then there was China with similar situations. They had enormous poverty, but they followed a different route under Mao and communism. There was a great difference between the power flows from the barrel of the gun principle and the power of ideas that functioned in India. It was inevitable that the two would a clash. On two counts, Mao had problems with India. One was that the developing world should be looking at China as the leader of the third world. He was worried. Why are they going to India? Nehru, educated in the West, a neocolonial, used the language that suited that particular period. Mao became paranoid with this issue of leadership. Why Nehru? Former diplomats would tell you that the real tension started in Bangkok during the Afro-Asian meeting.

The other issue with Mao was that he was willing to accept the leadership of Stalin as long as he was alive. His methods and that of Stalin weren’t very different. After Stalin died and Khrushchev took over, Mao felt that China should now be the leader of the Socialist bloc. And there was no way that Khrushchev was going to give him that and that is where the real Soviet-Sino tensions grew. The classified documents of that period reveal that meetings between Mao and Khrushchev between 1956 and 1958 turned into heated discussions. These two factors played very heavily on Mao and one of them was that Khrushchev was doing his best to come closer to India. What we tend to forget about Indo-Soviet friendship is that, for the first eight years after Independence, the Soviet Union didn’t like India and there was serious tension. Then Nehru sent some high-profile people as ambassadors to Soviet Union and because of his standing as a philosopher gained some respect from Stalin.

The Chinese worldview was different. Their aims, goals, strategies were different from that of India and they wanted to be treated as the leader of the world including the socialist bloc. This is the Middle Kingdom syndrome wherein others come to pay homage but the emperor doesn’t go. So, they waited till India and Pakistan recognised the People’s Republic of China. There is a very interesting letter from Mao to Stalin wherein Mao mentions since India and Pakistan have recognised China, now is the time to send the Army to Tibet. If India had not recognised China, they would have waited a little longer. Having recognised China, the onus was on us whether to fight or oppose this. Nehru tried to build up a friendship. The government was criticised in 1954 for not settling the border issue. Nehru preferred Panchsheel because China was not a part of the UN and Panchsheel had the same provisions and obligations as the UN — peaceful coexistence, no interference in internal affairs, and so on. This moderated China’s problems with India. It did not last very long. China had problems assimilating Tibet whereas India was successful in assimilating all the princely states. This jealousy, this hatred, was behind their tirades against India. The Chinese side was of the view that they should teach India and Nehru a lesson.

Some experts claim that the war was to divert attention from the internal crisis that the Chinese were undergoing…

No, it is wrong. You can put it anyway but what was happening in China in 1962 had nothing to do with the war. The Cultural Revolution that destroyed China happened in 1967, a good five years after the war. It is the external picture, the image of India, that is why they wanted to teach India a lesson.

They did attempt another aggression in 1967…

Yes, but that was the last time. Never after that. In my judgment, it was to check India’s preparedness. India responded bullet to bullet.

So, coming back to 1962…

The frontiers were not clearly defined. Towards the end of the great game in the 19th century, Lord Curzon was the viceroy and his main concern was Russia. China was weak. It had no control over Tibet, no control over Xinjiang. Nehru tried sorting it out with the Chinese and there were discussions. Even the Chinese did not know where the frontier was. So, when the problem first started in 1956, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) manned the northern border while the ministry of external affairs managed Arunachal Pradesh. The Army was called in to take over the border in 1960 with substantial logistics. It was arduous to cover the entire 4,000 km border and therefore it got delayed to 1961. The army had been making a lot of noise about the need for roads. There were no roads to go up to the border and that was a disadvantage. It became worse because the army had not settled down. It was under these circumstances that the war took place. We made mistakes by not anticipating what the Chinese could do or would do. So, we lost the war, but actually, we didn’t lose the war, we lost battles. In some battles, India stood firm and the Chinese couldn’t advance. Later, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew. Nehru refused to accept the ceasefire and technically India is still at war with China. India did not accept the ceasefire. This was followed by a unanimous resolution in Parliament in November 1962 that India must take back its territory. We haven’t taken it back. It took a lot of effort to expand our forces, a national emergency was declared and it took 10 years for the expansion to
take place.

Was the Indian Air Force not adequately used?

We had the fighters and the Chinese complained of 50-51 air violations because there was no defined border. The Air Force was all the time on alert and we did several surveys of the NEFA valley. China prepared for this war for at least two years, but negotiations were going on and the Chinese would always complain that there was no demarcated border. They accepted the customary borders and from 1954 to 1960 they kept on changing their position. There was a fascinating letter from Nehru to Zhou Enlai wherein he writes that Mr Prime Minister, it would be very difficult to pass a resolution on the border dispute as long as China has the concept of mobile frontiers. The challenges that the army had to put up with in this area were immense. We had only one brigade, the No 7 Brigade. The bulk of the soldiers was walking on foot. Only a few were being air-dropped because there wasn’t enough space in the aircraft and the peaks were very steep. It was also getting difficult for the Army to operate at such heights. To be able to fight in such extreme conditions was very difficult. The difficulty of fighting the war was enormous. The advantage that the Chinese had was of enormous preparation for at least two years. In 1960, Zhou Enlai stayed in India for two weeks to meet various leaders, to get a sense of India. In China, things were getting messy. There was a revolt in Tibet and it spread to parts of Sichuan province that had a large population of Tibetans.

The two prime ministers then decided that they should at least allow officials from both sides to sit together and collect all the historical evidence to see where the borders have been. They agreed that, once they had all the evidence in place, they would take a political view. In 1960, two teams were set up in New Delhi and Beijing. In February, 1961, they put together a report and which ran into 641 pages. The mistake that India did was to publish this because the sum total of all this was that the Indian case was very strong. It was almost 100 per cent correct on where the border was. The Chinese had no case at all. By publishing it, we created a problem for ourselves. After it was published, the Chinese lost face and they needed to do something to get it back. Hence, the war. Also, the Americans had told China that if there was a war with India then they would not interfere. So, by September/October, their troops had started to move towards the border, while in India there was chaos.

VK Krishna Menon, then defence minister, is also to be blamed for the underpreparedness. He was a good leader. He gave a boost through indigenisation, but in terms of managing the armed forces he virtually destroyed the entire higher defence organisation. Our defeat in the war can be attributed to the failure of the defence organisation and management. Menon acted like a senapati (commander-in-chief) who decided which general or commodore should go there. The system was meaningless to him because he had no experience. Although the higher defence organisation was set up in 1947, after 1957 it became non-existent. By 1962, the files that the Chief of Army Staff had sent to him were just lying on his table and nothing was being done about them. He was in the habit of insulting the chiefs and his officers. He was also insulting defence secretaries. One of the defence secretaries was Pula Reddy and he would say, he is Pula Reddy, he can neither pull nor he is ever ready. The armed forces would apprise him of what was happening on the other side of the border. But he would not agree. He would just say that socialist countries don’t go to war. And he influenced Nehru.

Also, there were other important developments. Khrushchev had got the Russians involved in the Cuban Missile crisis. He invited the Chinese ambassador to a banquet and gave a long speech saying that if India is a friend, China is our brother. Also that Russia was willing to sacrifice the MiG-21 deal with India. The next day, Pravda actually published an article saying India is at fault — that demoralised the Indian leadership. It so happened that, after the first week of attack, there was a pause. By that time the Cuban missile crisis had been solved and Khrushchev announced that the MiG-21 deal would go through. The Chinese had come down to important positions. We lost in most areas, especially in the Northeast. In Ladakh, they gained some ground, but not any crucial ground. The Chinese were able to bring their tanks. We were underprepared. No airpower, no substantial military power. We had only three aircrafts. The first one was given on a trial to India when the war broke out. The MH13 tank was the only one which could be loaded on to it. The fuel was drained to make the aircraft less heavy and make way for the bulky tank. This is how in three sorties, three tanks were sent to Trishul. That’s how Trishul was saved. Or else, it would not have been part of India.

Indeed, it was the failure of the corps commander, Lieutenant General BM Kaul. The divisional headquarters were converted into corps headquarters without any additional troops. Kaul had no battle experience. He was a favourite not only of Nehru, but much more of Menon. He climbed up to Sila Pass at 16,000 feet, fell ill and had to be brought back to Delhi in an Air Force helicopter. He refused to hand over command. So we had a corps commander who was lying sick on a hospital bed in Delhi, refusing to hand over command, while the defence minister was not appointing a new corps commander. What do you expect? The defence committee of the cabinet was not allowed to function under Menon. The country’s military was demoralised.

From the print issue of Hardnews : OCTOBER 2012

Quite a few causes for the war and its outcome.