arey baba at least wait for series production to start before casting your evil eye on thisWell analogy could be the same where HAL can make good MKI or Jaguar but when it comes to LCA is falls far short of mark.

arey baba at least wait for series production to start before casting your evil eye on thisWell analogy could be the same where HAL can make good MKI or Jaguar but when it comes to LCA is falls far short of mark.
Arun Menon wrote:^^Hmm, T-90 must be real crappy for it to be beaten by a tank with such "poor production engineering." The question is what are "you" peddling?
Neither is Arjun, and was never intended to.nachiket wrote: The LCA is never going to replace every aircraft in IAF inventory.
Yes, what is even less comic is that 124 were ordered 10 years back and have yet not been delivered. The follow on order of 124 in principle is supposed to be answered with perhaps 50 by 2014.And when there are 4000 night-blind, obsolete tanks in use, ordering 124 Arjuns is not even funny.
500 T90s will be made because they will be accepted without trials. 500 more will be ordered because Russkies are squeezing our testimonials and will not hand over Armor and Gun ToT without further orders. Ammo for all the 1000 will be ordered because the T90 will not work with our ammo. 2 Billion $ more will have to be tacked on to the bank account, because basic cost of T90 will be calculated without a proper thermal imager or AC to cool the electronics. For the first six months 0 Arjuns will be made because 4000 modifications will be requested. All those modifications will be implemented. 10 Arjuns will be made. But Army will ask to stop production because they want a future tank weighing 20 Tonnes with 155mm man gun, 120mm secondary gun, 5 machine guns, 3 rocket launchers with electric propulsion capable of fording over Brahmaputra in full flood without preparation, able to ford up to andaman with preparation and able to drive up to Mount Everest to demonstrate trench crossing.mahadevbhu wrote:Arun Menon wrote:^^Hmm, T-90 must be real crappy for it to be beaten by a tank with such "poor production engineering." The question is what are "you" peddling?
lets place 1 billion $ in two bank accounts.
then lets see how many tanks of Arjun are made with them in 1 year. how many T 90 are made in 1 year with the same 1 billion $.
then using the x and y number of tanks above, lets have a small simulated battle in rajasthan. Non lethal war.
end result will tell us which choice is better.
See....HAVING tanks is better than having an awesome prototype.
and yes, I HAVE been involved with taking products from lab to market ; doing basic RnD to end marketing. and boy o boy...its not that easy to say "a" is better than "b" .
Sigh.....What can one say!Therefore,3-4 regiments of Arjun would be the max. required if the current thinking holds sway.
Correction: it was IA's decision to not pursue FMBT because it itself could not define what it should be. There were many conflicting requirements which made developing a tank impossible. Besides IA realised that there weren't any significant new breakthrough developments in the tank world over. Arjun MK.2 already incorporates the best philosophies and technologies of the "Western" tank design. From Mk.2, the logical way forward is incremental improvements to incorporate new developments or specific operational requirements.Philip wrote:...
I don't know why the CVRDE has thrown in the towel so early,so to speak regarding an FMBT,3 man crew and weight of 50t,with "all mod-cons" .In the future,some tank manufacturer will think outside the box and come up with a new concept.Change always takes place.At least the R&D could continue while developing incremental versions of Arjun.In the past it has done exactly that with the prototypes of Tank-Ex.
Somehow, have no doubt this will happen very soon!Russia is hoping to persuade India to shelve its $10 billion homemade Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) project and instead buy Russian BMP-3 vehicles, according to an Indian Defence Ministry source.
Actually Army or anyone else has said very little on the matter. BRF and we seem to the be only people intrested in it. The matter is not really in centerstage so to say.Surya wrote:but sanku
nowhere has the army said its only problem with ordering more tanks is the production aspect of it.
only you are bringing it up
Well at least not significant enough to be seen in public domain, I am sure Avadi would be making heavy weather of turning screws as well (HAL has in the past also done similar things) -- but the damage they can do not that line is really limited.The production aspect bedevils even the assembled tin cans
Please go back a page and read the discussion on the exact same question. This is also the exact same question being discussed in context of LCA and pretty much every other case in India.yantra wrote:For all those cribbing about production quality/reliability for Arjun - both T-90 and Arjun are produced in India and manufactured by PSUs - Ordnance Factories. If it can work for T-90, why not for Arjun?
That itself should set the stage for a 10,000 order from Desh so that we buy it, find the wrinkles, iron them out painfully and provide free user feedback to Russia so that they incorporate everything we painfully learnt and sell it back to us and to rest of the world as a F-BMP4!!BMP-3 is a terrible vehicle. its just about the worst choice for the role one can think of. if you import atleast find a good solution, not this reject which I believe even Russia does not use much.
Why?Sanku wrote:Net net, an Arjun production line is something that has to be made locally
Define "production line". Please. This should be fun to watch.Sanku wrote:where as a T 90 production line is something which is imported wholesale.
Er, isn't the Namica a BMP-2 derivative, and so a Russian design with some modifications to accomodate the missile launchers?The design capability of armoured vehicles on the country by the DRDO seems to lack ingenuity.I refer to the awkward missile carrier,the NAMICA.Just flip through the pages of any reference manual on worldwide armoured vehicles and ee the huge number and variety of vehicles ,many designed and produced by much smaller nations than India,that too with far smaller armies than ours.As with Israel,Russia and others,a long time ago we should've developed/initiated a time bound programme for developing a family of armoured vehicles given that our numbers required are so large.We can live with both imports/local manufacture as well as indigenous designs.One can't understand why the corporate giants have taken so long to get their act together,as most of them were planning to have JVs with foreign suppliers.Have these suppliers been stingy with TOT? Unless clear timeframes are fixed and adhered to,the disease of drift will continue and the "what me worry" of the babus,who warm their seats and procrastinate with an eye to make a killing in any deal,will persist. AKA has also been party to the problem with his ultra cautious attitude afraid to make swift decisions and using the axe to cut off deadwood.
More than Rs. 408 crore worth of tank-fired ammunition - 1,02,014 rounds - that made its way into army depots in 2009-10 were found to be faulty, much before completing the prescribed shelf life of 10 years, a latest CAG report has revealed.
While no thorough investigation and
analysis was conducted to find out why and how this took place, to meet the army's shortfall, ammunition worth Rs. 279 crore (16,000 rounds) had to be imported from Rosoboronexport, a Russian company.
As a result, the losses to the public exchequer due to unserviceable ammo and consequent imports totalled Rs. 687 crore.
The ammo defects included flimsy propellant material, cracks in combustible cartridge case, sticking of cartridge case in packing container, etc - considered critical for effective and safe firing.
In 2010, a task force exploring the possibility of rectifying the faulty consignment had opined that the ammo was beyond repair.
While the Army attributed the defects to insufficient quality control during manufacture, the ordnance factory that produced the ammunition attributed the 'faults' to design deficiencies, a charge denied by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the indigenous designers of the ammunition.
While the Army accepts ammunition only after appropriate quality assurance tests at various levels, any defect noticed during periodic test firing or otherwise during storage, is required to be thoroughly investigated, responsibility fixed and loss statements prepared for writing off the value of defective ammunition.
From 1997-2005, the Army had received about 3.5 lakh rounds of this ammunition valued at about Rs. 1400 crore.
"Contrary to the prescribed procedure, no serious investigation was concluded to ascertain the reasons for defects in the ammunition and to fix responsibility for such failure," the CAG report said.
In another finding in the CAG report, intervention by audit led to a saving of about Rs. 169 crore that would have been spent on 5.56mm bullets for INSAS rifles and .22 Rim Fire Tracer bullets, despite the defence ministry holding surplus stocks of such ammunition.
Recommending strengthening of internal controls in the ministry to ensure that procurement decisions are made based on available stock positions, CAG said, "The episode of placing of indent and obtaining approval for import when surplus stock of ammunition existed reveals deficiencies in monitoring inventory levels at ammunition depots."