Deterrence

[shiv]

KS estimates in one of his interviews that 2-3 tests will validate a TN capability. The pros of testing outweigh the cons.

Of what use is a nuclear test to a soft state?

India goes about showing the whole world that it is not willing to use even conventional power. A test would simply be a sort of fig leaf to cover our fundamentally weak responses.

It is possible that the 1998 tests gave many people in India such a big "high" where we thought "Wow we are powerful" that people are simply looking for that high again in the face of continuous proof of weak policies? If I was an enemy of India I would ROTFL because even with nukes India has failed to respond to conventional threats where we enjoy superiority.

India's nuclear posture is defensive. Others have to use it on us first. As long as no one nukes us they can fuk with us any which way and we WILL_NOT_RESPOND

Another test would only make me laugh. If you have strength, you need to be willing to show it rather than simply pointing to a bulge in the pants or a bulge in the desert floor and say "Lookee what's exploded underneath" . Last time around, everyone including many Indians did ROTFL and said your bloody bombs are fizzles. And we all got our chaddis in a twist because of that and are now desperate to test. There is nothing to stop that ROTFL happening again. All we need is some nonprolotullah seismologist to say "My signal was 2.5 and not 2.7" and we will have half of India weeping and howling and cursing the testers and saying "Testis needed again. Testis needed again"

Harrumph

[ramdas]

Shiv,

I agree that in the event of another test, the west will try to downplay yield. They are doing this right now for the NoKo test (claiming 6-7 kt when it really looks like 20 kt).

The main issue for us is that our own scientific establishment has no consensus on whether the TN was successful or not. Thus the need for testing, at least till a state is reached when DRDO and DAE agree about the availability of a proven thermonuclear weapon.

This will upgrade our deterrent qualitatively/quantitatively. It cannot be anybody's case that the deterrent should be left to atrophy without constant upgrading. While work is going on on the delivery systems side, the need for a proven payload of sufficient capability remains.

Maybe the reason for the soft conventional response (post 1985, not pre 1985) is lack of escalation parity/escalation dominance on the nuclear front. This is also a key reason why we need to upgrade our nuclear deterrent. This will also enable us to more confidently move away from no first use and adopt a stance that allows for use of nukes when faced with a threat from a superior conventional adversary.

Also, even a minimal deterrent of the ``use only when nukes are used against you" type gets eroded when the adversaries upgrade their capabilities unless upgrades happen at our end as well. I hope your point is not that we should stop upgrading our deterrent and be content with what is there with us right now.

[negi]

Well I think we are confusing issues here; no one cares what west has to say here nor does one worry about what BRF thinks about the yields the issue is voices of doubt came from within the same fraternity which was involved in the tests. Having a conflict of opinion is one thing and to go out in public and confront what one section of the team is claiming are two different things. This is not about getting chaddi in a twist for if we are doing this for a sake of argument I can go and even say that we don't need nukes nothing bad happened when we did not have one and now that we have some are we any better ? Pakis haven't changed their ways and China has been the same since 1962 so what gives ?

[shiv]

Pakis haven't changed their ways and China has been the same since 1962 so what gives ?

Negiji do you believe that India will change its ways? Or its yield? Or not have yield skeptics who jump up and welcome the underestimated nonprol yields?

Nothing will change in India either. We ain't gonna nuke no one no matter how much others develop. They will have to nuke us before we use our fizzles on them. The world spent 50 years testing thousands of nukes and India conducted one test. Why does anyone even think for one nanosecond that India will follow NoKo and test? Its just wistful thinking that's all.

[negi]

^ Well it is not about what I believe India can do or not do; all I am saying is that whatever be the CMD criteria it better have a coherent voice backing it specially if it is from the establishment; 1kt or 1mT does not matter however what matters is the team that did that test itself has conflicting observations and no one can overlook those; what we on BRF think about it is another topic.

[ramana]

First indication India is taking the subject seriously:

India sees Pakistani hand in North Korea’s nuclear test

[Rudradev]

Actually, Shiv's point about willingness to use conventional force highlights a very important aspect of testing.

1974: India tests. Cards are on the table. No funny business from Pakistan until the 1980s Khalistan terrorist movement.

Deterrence advantage: India.

1986: Cards have not been on the table for 10 years. Only inferential information available about Paki nuclear capability and intentions. Conventional initiative by India (Brasstacks) is halted by veiled nuclear threats from Pakistan. On the basis of only inferential information, India pulls back. This inferential "nuclear umbrella" covers up Paki terrorism in Kashmir for over a decade to come.

Deterrence advantage: Pakistan.

1998: Cards are on the table. India has at the very least, a 20 kT weaponized fission device. Pakistan's Chagai devices proved to be Chinese Pu test-drive models. By 2001, it is evident that:
a) India has at least ~100 devices of 20 kT, and workable delivery systems (Prithvi, IAF superiority established during Kargil war)
b) Pakistan has ~60 devices. Some might be Chinese Pu maal, but many are AQ Khans HEU fusskies. Also, Pakistan's delivery systems are unreliable (untried dingdongs, and PAF which had to hide in hangars during Kargil.)

With cards on the table, India was comfortable enough that Pakistan would be deterred from letting any conventional war escalate to nuclear. Parakram was launched with this understanding, in response to the Parliament attack. Significant political gains accrued.

Deterrence advantage: India.

2008: Cards have not been on the table for ~10 years. Once again, only inferential information is available about Pakistan's capacity improvements. We know they have been reprocessing Pu and abandoned the HEU fusskie models. We know they have been acquiring all manner of help in designing and manufacturing Pu devices, from the Chinese. We know they have been acquiring all kinds of tech-help from the Americans to secure their nuclear arsenal and improve C&C... ostensibly against the "Al Qaeda threat" but very much useful against India. And we know that they've been manufacturing scores of warheads every single year.

Meanwhile, India has been going slow in making any kind of advancement in our nuclear arsenal. We have not tested, and on the contrary we are doing everything we can to secure MMS' New Clear Deal. We (on BRF) don't know what assurances and roll-backs were made to the Americans during this period This was something K. Santhanam tried, indirectly, to warn us about when he revealed that S1 was a failure in terms of promised yield.

But the GOI knew. They knew exactly how much our nuclear weapons program had been compromised in exchange for the New Clear Deal. And they had inferential information about Paki nuke capabilities that might well have caught up, or surpassed our own between 1998-2008.

Result: With no cards on the table, and only inferential information about Pakistani capabilities, GOI sent only dossiers out in response to the 26/11/2008 attack. There was no conventional mobilization at all.

Deterrence advantage: Pakistan.

*****

We see a pattern here. Our willingness to use conventional force is directly dependent on who holds the deterrence advantage. If the cards are on the table, the deterrence advantage is with India. If they are not on the table, and only inferential information is available about Pakistani nuclear capabilities, the deterrence advantage is with Pakistan. If on top of this, India has been cutting down its own capabilities in exchange for a New Clear Deal, the deterrence advantage of Pakistan is only solidified further.

The NK test (which is in effect a Paki test) has put the cards on the table again... but only on one side of the table. It has clearly demonstrated that Pakis have a successful boosted fission device capability. S1 has not established that for the Indian side... the best we can count on is a 20 kT fission device.

If we want to recover the deterrence advantage, there is no question about it: we must put our cards on the table as well. We must test, and continue testing until our thermonuclear capacity is established beyond any doubt. Having cards on the table is essential so that we don't have to rely on inferential information. Relying only on inferential information gives the deterrence advantage to Pakistan, because of the way we view Pakistan fearfully as an irrational, abnormal state.

If we want to reclaim the deterrence advantage, and recover our freedom to exert conventional options, the only option is for India to test. Now.

[ramdas]

Rudradev,

One correction: the failure in S1 was of the secondary. S1 did have a boosted fission primary which worked perfectly. KS and BK acknowledge this as well. Given what KS says, this primary was also around20-25 kt.

The inferential capability giving pak deterrence advantage comes partly from statements from western observers about their larger production, partly from the inference that their boosted fission capability may be a primary for a chinese supplied TN design....

[ramana]

RD, Second ramdas. The S-1 primary was as he says and worked.
Pak deterrence is only through the US NPA ulema. The pages of this thread have multiple examples of it. Eg. Crapon et al.
At same time from TSP we know about failed Dingdongs or gaddhas.

In 26/11 it was not TSP deterrrence advantage but unpreparedenss of IA due to the constant procurement delays under the UPA govt.

[Rudradev]

Rudradev,

One correction: the failure in S1 was of the secondary. S1 did have a boosted fission primary which worked perfectly. KS and BK acknowledge this as well. Given what KS says, this primary was also around20-25 kt.

.

This does not contradict what I posted. As I mentioned... all we could be guaranteed of, AFTER Pokhran II, was a weaponized 20 kT fission device. That device is, in fact, the intended boosted fission primary stage of S1. It did not successfully touch off the TN secondary, but it worked fine as a 20 kT fission device. Until today, that's all we can be sure of having in our nuclear arsenal.

In 26/11 it was not TSP deterrrence advantage but unpreparedenss of IA due to the constant procurement delays under the UPA govt.

I disagree. "Unpreparedness" is a relative term based on the assumption that we are fighting a war of choice, against an arbitrary floating benchmark of mission success. You can be "unprepared" to defeat Pakistan completely in 5 days but quite prepared to defeat them in 3 weeks.

If India is making war out of choice then it can afford to be picky about meeting ideal levels of preparedness. If a war is forced on India, IA will have to fight conventionally with whatever it has. By many ideal standards we were "unprepared" for Kargil as well, but the IA fought and won regardless.

Does the compulsion of a terrorist attack like 26/11 qualify as a "war of choice" for India? An attack like 26/11 would ordinarily have forced a conventional reaction from any country against the sponsoring country, even if the ideal level of conventional "preparedness" was not immediately available to hand. What it came down to was the fact that MMS had let India's nuke program rest on the laurels of Pokhran II, while the Pakis had been racing ahead (i.e. NoKo and China had been racing ahead and giving everything to the Pakis) for an extra 10 years post 1998. That amounts to a deterrence advantage for the Pakis, even if the credit should (as always) go to NoKo and China.

We could not estimate their nuclear redlines with as much confidence in 2008, as we could in 2001. So we could not afford to risk a conventional response, and sent dossiers instead.

About Crapon etc... those guys just churn out "scary" propaganda for our general public consumption. MMS GOI by 2008 had much deeper access to higher levels in GOTUS analysis circles, than the NP Ulemas. They didn't need to hear about inferential Paki capability from small-time, self-styled media "experts" like Crapon, Cirincione etc. They had better sources, and still made the decision not to mount a conventional response to 26/11.

[shiv]

This is how I see the issue.

Historically the first and most important reason for wanting megaton bombs (one can get up to 500 kt (max) with boosted fission - using up lot of Uranium or Plutonium) was that missiles were too inaccurate. Like the Paki said "so what if it misses by a kilometer?" Missing by 10 km is not such a great idea because a 1 megaton bomb does only light damage beyond 7 km. See this table


Once missiles started getting more accurate, warhead sizes were rationalized and reduced a 100 or 200 Kt

The other very important reason for getting working thermonuclear bombs is that one can make a given amount of fissile material go a long way - that is to say that you can make more bombs out of your fissile material stock with a working TN warhead. As a rough guess (no inside info and pulling stuff out of memory of reading a couple of years ago) if we can make X bombs from the Pu we have now, we can make 2X or 3X bombs using the same amount of fissile material in a thermonuclear warhead.

A third reason for experimenting with very big bombs was the idea that the whole USSR could be destroyed.

Why does India need thermonuclear bombs? In my view the main argument is to increase the arsenal size by twice or three times the number we could otherwise get. But this brings me to the question of what any nation would do if they had nukes but not the tech for thermonuclear bombs and they too wanted many bombs. The only solution would be to produce more fissile material to make more fission and boosted fission bombs.

Once we look at this sort of response we have to ask whether our getting 300 bombs would be better than Pakistan's 100, or whether we would be better off having 800 warheads to match China's 400.

A question that I would ask even if no one else asks is, what would be the result of a worst case scenario if we used 300 bombs against Pakistan and were hit with 100 bombs from them, or what would be the result if we hit China with 800 bombs in exchange for 400 Chinese bombs on India.

When we speak of 200 nuclear bombs or 400 nuclear bombs, no one has been able to make me understand how different the end result would be if we were hit with 100 Pakistani 20 kiloton bombs versus our being hit by 100 Chinese 200 kiloton bombs. Similarly no one has been able to explain to me how much better China would feel by getting hit by 100 twenty kt Indian bombs versus 100 one hundred kt bombs.

What i am trying to say is that once you start getting into hundreds of bombs, the actual yield of the other guy's bomb becomes less and less relevant because the scale of destruction is very large. The point that this leads to is that it does not matter whether you have a working thermonuclear bomb or not as long as you have one heck of a lot of fissile material for shitloads of warheads.

Neither Pakistan nor NoKo are stupid. They are not testing to "refine a thermonuclear bomb". They are simply getting a regular fission or boosted fission bomb right. After that - if they can make 100 bombs they can deter anyone or screw anyone.

Trying to test a TN because we say we are a failed nuclear power only puts us on par with Pakistan and NoKo. I say that Pakistan and NoKo are not doing badly at all.

[pentaiah]

Again for purely against the pure terrorist state we may not require bigger bums.

The problem with Indian leadership is so predictable against being pro actively deterring the enemy we want to moralistic fig leaf to cover ourselves and be toyed with.

In the end a donkey in tiger skin is still a donkey braying or grazing

[Singha]

since our strategy is second strike launch after impact, we cannot hold on to the dharmic fig leaf of only needing small precise counter-force oriented warheads of the 10kt mould.

imo we need four variations
5kt to respond to tactical nuclear attacks in kind
10-15kt small device for the shourya/agni1 types - single warhead .. mainly on military targets like the korla airbase Ahuja sir took down in another thread
50kt medium device for attacks on smaller cities
200kt large device for the biggest area targets , preferably 3-4 in MIRV but until then in single warhead mode

given our paltry number of long range missiles, we got to make sure those that are able to launch and get through should deliver as much damage as possible.

I figure we can improve on the pokhran designs for the first two in weight of radioactive matter, reliability....and also proof our first 200kt device using a second series of tests. all must be designed and built for warfighting not science project mode.

pakistan is happily moving into its 2nd generation of warheads using north korea as the vehicle, with the benign cover of cheen in the back.

[negi]

Shiv ji I see bomb as just like any other piece of modern engineering; my point is simple the more types you make and test you get more data from the field to perfect your design. US had to go through those iterations in order to achieve whatever warhead in W-XX series is in active service. All I am saying is if the point is hey look we cannot test due to xyz reason I am fine with it but I do not buy the part about we don't need to test as what we have done is enough . If that is so Tejas and Arjun too can be absorbed in active service after their first series of trials .

If we are going to base our MCD around POK-I and Shakti-I device we need to test them more; how many trials did it take for Prithvi and Agni series to get inducted in service (how many launches did not meet critical mission parameters including launch failures ? ) in light of the above what is that makes us believe that single test of Shakti-I qualifies it to serve as a backbone of our MCD ?

[Varoon Shekhar]

"About Crapon etc... those guys just churn out "scary" propaganda for our general public consumption. MMS GOI by 2008 had much deeper access to higher levels in GOTUS analysis circles, than the NP Ulemas. "

Krepon/Crapon, Perkowich, Einhorn, Milholin et al try to either scare India or to fish for information, since they aren't sure or are clueless. They do this by scare mongering about nuclear war, or by deliberately putting out false information( like India has only 5 nuclear weapons, Agni 2 missile is not ready for deployment etc). They are hoping for a 'clarification' from the Indian government, really more precise information.

[ramana]

I think people are basing their ideas on "rational player" syndrome.
Once nuke war starts its irrational.

The importance of having a full range of escalatory weapons is to ensure the play stays in the rational regime.

So no matter what is POKII yields there is doubt and hence need to be cleared up eventually.


Or be ready for nuke blackmail as US power wanes and they want to play balance of power games in Asia.


As the rising power in Asia, its in PRC interest to ensure India stays down lest it is used against them by far away powers.

So whetehr India wants to or not it will be seen as a competitor and PRC actiosn will be based on that perception or misperception.


East India Company(EIC) type politics have become passe after the collapse of FSU.

[nachiket]

Does the compulsion of a terrorist attack like 26/11 qualify as a "war of choice" for India? An attack like 26/11 would ordinarily have forced a conventional reaction from any country against the sponsoring country, even if the ideal level of conventional "preparedness" was not immediately available to hand. What it came down to was the fact that MMS had let India's nuke program rest on the laurels of Pokhran II, while the Pakis had been racing ahead (i.e. NoKo and China had been racing ahead and giving everything to the Pakis) for an extra 10 years post 1998. That amounts to a deterrence advantage for the Pakis, even if the credit should (as always) go to NoKo and China.

What applies to India must apply to Pak as well. Their devices had fizzled worse than ours in 98 and they haven't tested again just like us. And NoKo racing ahead? Their tests failed so badly, it is a stretch to even call whatever they tested a nuclear weapon. If Pak has been supplied with whatever NoKo has, it is they who need to worry not us. So the pakis have no "deterrence advantage". MMS had no intention of attacking Pakistan after 26/11. To say that he hesitated because of some "deterrence advantage" the pakis had is quite frankly, ridiculous.

[ShauryaT]

What applies to India must apply to Pak as well. Their devices had fizzled worse than ours in 98 and they haven't tested again just like us. And NoKo racing ahead? Their tests failed so badly, it is a stretch to even call whatever they tested a nuclear weapon. If Pak has been supplied with whatever NoKo has, it is they who need to worry not us. So the pakis have no "deterrence advantage". MMS had no intention of attacking Pakistan after 26/11. To say that he hesitated because of some "deterrence advantage" the pakis had is quite frankly, ridiculous.

True it is a stretch to say MMS hesitated due to deterrence advantage of TSP. The IA has a very specific view of TSP nuclear capabilities and intentions.

But two things to keep in mind.

1. India needs to test, if it wants to keep its triad a credible force for deterrence. If we have X type of platforms for delivery a minimum of X times 3 successful tests are required to ascertain credibility, reliance etc. It does not matter, what in the eyes of our enemies represents a credible force. We need to do this for our users alone.

2. The debilitating effects or our weaker arsenal against an increasing qualitative and quantitative arsenal of PRC+TSP along with the potency of the west to play balancing acts cannot be taken lightly.

GoI should put efforts to establish the link between TSP and NoKo tests and publicize it. Only good for India can result from such an action.

[nachiket]

^^Yes I agree that India needs to test. It is quite clear that our TN second stage fizzled and we can never be certain of having fixed it unless we test again. Then there is the other problem of miniaturizing the warheads to fit on MIRVs, which will also need testing.
All I'm saying is worrying that the pakis are getting to test through NoKo is pointless. Even NoKo's latest test provided a much lower yield than what the paki devices provided back in 98. It is obvious that NoKo engineers don't yet have a handle even on the early designs provided to them by the pakis (which originally came from China of course) in return for their ding-dongs.

[ramana]

nachiket, How do you say the 5.1 Richter scale is lower than Paki tests?
Also compare the POKII Richter values without Chidambaram correction and with.

[nachiket]

Ramana ji, the South Koreans who are in the best position to measure the yield (besides the NoKo's themselves) and who have the most to fear from them estimated the yield to be 6-8 kt. Estimating the yield from the seismic activity is not something I can do (and it is not an exact science even for the experts without knowing the precise geology of the site. Knowledgeable members here had talked about this when discussing the estimates of Pokharan II). Even the highest estimates for the NoKo test were around 15kt, lower than what the pakis managed in 98.

[Rudradev]

What applies to India must apply to Pak as well. Their devices had fizzled worse than ours in 98 and they haven't tested again just like us

Not at all. The Pakis, PRC and NoKo are a commonwealth of nuclear weapons development. The Paki program has advanced in two ways since 1998:

1) At least two plutonium-producing reactors have come online in TSP with Chinese help. The devices tested in Chagai hills were Pu devices supplied by the Chinese. It was AQK's own HEU devices that "fizzled worse." The capability indicated is obvious: with Khushab producing at least 22kg of weapons grade Pu per year, the Pakis have incorporated a Pu-based weapons production line. All of this is AFTER their last "official" test in 1998. They don't need to test because they're using proven Chinese designs and know-how to build Pu devices. India has no such advantage.

2) The Uranium device designs in Pakistan's arsenal continue to be improved by data from NoKo tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 (plus a couple of possible sub-kiloton tests in 2010, see http://www.nature.com/news/isotopes-hin ... est-1.9972). Of these, only the first has been considered a "fizzle."

It does not matter what the absolute yields from these NoKo tests were (even though you're wrong on that; while the SoKos with their obvious motives to downplay the test came up with a public announcement of 6-8 kT estimate, other estimates have been as high as 20 kT.) The point about North Korea's weapons program is not the specific yields per test, but the fact that it is based on very little intrinsic capacity to generate WGU (and almost no capacity to generate Pu.) The NoKos aren't interested in testing to produce big bangs for a political statement. They are interested in scale-able designs that provide the largest possible yield with very little uranium, more so than wasting absolute quantities of uranium on super high-yield tests. The idea is that, once efficiency is established (something that was lacking in AQK's 1998 designs), low-yield test models can be scaled for U-based weapons of much higher yield. Pakistanis are very interested in this knowledge to improve their own HEU devices... and they have full access to it from the NoKo tests. So yes, Pakistan HAS in effect tested at least three times since 2006.

Thus the "distributed testing" (like "distributed computing") of prior Chinese Pu designs, plus ongoing NoKo HEU designs, is something that must be taken into account when assessing where Paki nuclear capability stands at any point in time.

In the face of this India has been standing stock-still. We do not test. Nobody else does our testing for us. We have our 20 kT fission device, period.

True it is a stretch to say MMS hesitated due to deterrence advantage of TSP. The IA has a very specific view of TSP nuclear capabilities and intentions.

I submit that IA's view of TSP nuclear capabilities and intentions differs qualitatively depending on the information available. When a lot of direct information is available... like in 2001, soon after the Chagai tests and Kargil war... then IA's assessments do not need to rely so much on inferential information. When much less direct information is available about recent developments... such as in 2008, with Pakistan taking full advantage of "distributed testing" for ten years... then IA's assessments must rely much more on inferential information.

In the case of Pakistan, more inferential information vs. less direct information gives Pakistan a deterrence advantage vs. India. That's because of how the Indian foreign policy establishment is conditioned to view Pakistan ("hai hai, crazy fanatical Muslims, they might do anything onlee.") Maybe it is a stretch to say that this ALONE made MMS hesitate to mount a conventional response against 26/11. But can you say with certainty that it was not a factor?

[ShauryaT]

In the case of Pakistan, more inferential information vs. less direct information gives Pakistan a deterrence advantage vs. India. That's because of how the Indian foreign policy establishment is conditioned to view Pakistan ("hai hai, crazy fanatical Muslims, they might do anything onlee.") Maybe it is a stretch to say that this ALONE made MMS hesitate to mount a conventional response against 26/11. But can you say with certainty that it was not a factor?

Yep!

[Supratik]

Judging by the size of Indian missiles it seems the standard Indian "maal" is a FBF of perhaps 150 KT. We are designing our missiles around what is reliable - hence they are unwieldy. The main challenge to further testing is going to come from the Americans. And it is mainly going to be economic i.e. sanctions. We should not test till the K4 and K5 are ready along with the SSBNs - just in case. And we reach 10T economy. The NoKo test may be for the H-bomb trigger. MMS lack of response to 26/11 had nothing to do with nuke capability of Pak but his own mentality which is closer to IK Gujral.

[pentaiah]

the issue is not at all maal its the issue of marad with respect to Inida. If that be no amount of Hydrogen or Krypto_night bum will eve deter anyone against India

[vasu raya]

if at all we test, we should test a fusion design as well since all those dams in Tibet need to be uprooted without radioactive contamination, if it can be fit on a aircraft dropped torpedo even better.

I hope we add the blocking or contamination of upstream rivers into our deterrence policy, we will reciprocate by contaminating all Chinese river sources.

[Rudradev]

Yep!

What makes you so sure... did our friend confirm this ?

[shiv]

1. India needs to test

Shaurya without arguing against that statement I just want to point out that this current round of calls for India to test, at least on BRF, have arisen because NoKo tested.

I believe that no other nation in the world will test on the basis of NoKo's test. Of course the yield estimates may be lies. Even if it was 20 kt they will say 10 because no one wants anyone to get scared to start testing

But as far as India is concerned we must not test as a reaction to NoKo tests. I am certain that
1. India will have to conduct a planned series of tests over 2 to 3 years during which we should do at least 10 series of tests. No more one-off-one-night-stand surreptitious quickie-nooky 1974/1998 style tests
2. It is certain that if India tests, China and Pakistan and Iran will test. Noko too will test again.

For these reasons it would be silly to test simply because NoKo tested. Our tests have to be planned to reach certain end results. It seems to me that whatever the real state of Indian nukes a whole lot of Indian observers are convinced that it is not good enough. So whatever happens India will need to conduct - over many years - at least 2 or 3 blasts that measure over 500 kilotons as detected by seismometers all over the world so that not only do foreign observers acknowledge the size of blast, bruised Indian psyches will not continue to harbour doubt that India is actually capable of conducting such huge blasts.

To me it seems that part of the problem is not just an Indian inability, but a general dissatisfaction and lack of sufficient pride in the magnitude and number of tests conducted and a feeling of lack of recognition and respect. Unless the latter requirements are met, no tests by India will be of any use.

[svinayak]

To me it seems that part of the problem is not just an Indian inability, but a general dissatisfaction and lack of sufficient pride in the magnitude and number of tests conducted and a feeling of lack of recognition and respect. Unless the latter requirements are met, no tests by India will be of any use.

This is psychological psy ops where the respect is never given. This is how they have kept the Indian elite asking for more. This has taken them more than 100 years to groom the Indian elite to this stage of their national pride.

[ShauryaT]

Yep!

What makes you so sure... did our friend confirm this ?

Just my read RD. All friends only have their own opinions.

Shiv ji: My statement on test and how much is long standing. I agree testing because NK tested is unlikely and also agree that unlikely that GoI will test anytime in the near future. The area of disagreement is with your feeling that it is a matter of pride that motivates some. Speaking for myself, I see it as a matter of interests and power ambitions. But in general you are right, even the mention of anything close to the idea that MMS may not be a traitor to the county has become haraam here. Any agreement with any policy of the current govt is automatically treated as supporting the "traitors". Sorry for the OT.

[shiv]

Shiv ji: My statement on test and how much is long standing. I agree testing because NK tested is unlikely and also agree that unlikely that GoI will test anytime in the near future. The area of disagreement is with your feeling that it is a matter of pride that motivates some. Speaking for myself, I see it as a matter of interests and power ambitions. But in general you are right, even the mention of anything close to the idea that MMS may not be a traitor to the county has become haraam here. Any agreement with any policy of the current govt is automatically treated as supporting the "traitors". Sorry for the OT.

Shaurya I would not sink into psychology except that deterrence is all about psychology.

It is easier to believe that the other guy has something to destroy you if he demonstrates that he has it convincingly. We have a situation where many Indians believe that
1. The Chinese are past masters in nuclear weapons tech and have shown the world in general and India in particular that they have what it takes to destroy India. Their own lack of testing since 1996 (or whenever) does not matter because they have enough experience and are continuing to test via NoKo. They have also stolen from USA. The Chinese deterrent is credible vis a vis India. We are deterred by them

2. Pakistan has got what it takes to destroy India because they have the Chinese to give them everything they need and they too are benefiting from NoKo testing. The Pakistani deterrent is credible vis a vis India. We are deterred by them

3. India on the other hand has not tested "convincingly" and is not keeping up to date because we are not getting data from anyone who is testing. Therefore the Indian deterrent is not a deterrent at all.

If the above three statements are correct what sort of testing should India be doing to change perceptions?

As I see it, India can only do something about statement no 3. We cannot change 1 and 2. We will continue to be deterred by China and Pakistan. If we are deterred by them what do we intend to do with our better and improved arsenal? If we are deterred, we are deterred no matter how good or how big our arsenal is.

What then do we gain by testing? I put it to you that what we can only hope to gain by testing is "confidence" that we too have "big bombs" and the latest miniaturized ones. We can only hope and pray that these new developments deter China and Pakistan. We cannot guarantee that. If they re start testing openly and improve and increase their arsenal in response to our tests we are back to square one.

In fact if the hypothetical news was released tomorrow, that India has 300x20kt boosted fission bombs would that still mean that we need to test?

If the answer is "Yes" it means that we are convinced that even 300x20 Kt bombs are not enough or not good enough.

If the answer is "No" it means that the PM can tell a lie that we have 300 bombs and make everyone happy.

Deterrence is deeply psychological.

[Supratik]

the issue is not at all maal its the issue of marad with respect to Inida. If that be no amount of Hydrogen or Krypto_night bum will eve deter anyone against India

Pak at its current capability is well taken care off with what we have. MIRVed A6 with the 150 KT FBFs is sufficient plus SLBMs are good enough for China. What difference does it make that you are targeting a Chinese city with a FBF or TN except that you have to account for more resources. Reliable TN weapon and further miniaturization has to wait. It is not a question of being "marad" but not being stupid. Unless something new happens e.g. NoKo testing H-bomb the Indian establishment is not going to test. The main challenge is not from Pak or China but from the USA. Unless you can deter the US specifically economically a protracted testing to perfect designs may not be feasible. This is my reading of the situation.

[Prem Kumar]

Rudradev: your analysis says that in 1998, the deterrence advantage was with India. Kargil disproves that theory. Our "dont cross LOC" self-imposed constraint only confirms that, if anything, Pakistan's deterrence vis-a-vis India worked

India must test, but over a period of time of its own choosing. It has to be spread over a few years to perfect the designs, gather information for simulation, confirm yields to our own satisfaction etc. The current GOI is not going to do it. But this shouldnt prevent us from raising slogans that "we should test now". In fact, such slogans must be raised every now & then to keep up the pressure on the Govt (or) at least to let them know that people havent forgotten about the need to test more

Even setting aside yield & other deterrence considerations for the moment, India should test for the following logistical reason: to finalize the warhead design, which would help finalize the throw-weight of our missiles, which would help finalize their dimensions, which would help finalize future Arihant dimensions, which would finalize the amount of power that its nuclear reactor needs to spit out etc.

It also helps to know the standardized yield for each warhead type, so that we can decide on MIRV configurations, warheads:decoy ratio etc

[shiv]

India must test, but over a period of time of its own choosing. It has to be spread over a few years to perfect the designs, gather information for simulation, confirm yields to our own satisfaction etc. The current GOI is not going to do it. But this shouldnt prevent us from raising slogans that "we should test now". In fact, such slogans must be raised every now & then to keep up the pressure on the Govt (or) at least to let them know that people havent forgotten about the need to test more

Even setting aside yield & other deterrence considerations for the moment, India should test for the following logistical reason: to finalize the warhead design, which would help finalize the throw-weight of our missiles, which would help finalize their dimensions, which would help finalize future Arihant dimensions, which would finalize the amount of power that its nuclear reactor needs to spit out etc.

It also helps to know the standardized yield for each warhead type, so that we can decide on MIRV configurations, warheads:decoy ratio etc

Prem, I am not going to argue against testing, but I think that testing for science and tech reasons or testing simply to comfort doubters that our bombs work or that they are bigger than S1 of 1998 are useless reasons that are as bad as our recessed and hidden policies.

Fact is that if it became public knowledge that we had 500 weapons based on the fission design tested in 1974 and refined in 1998, and that we were building another 500 of them then no one would worry whether they are 200 kt or 20kt because such numbers spell disaster for anyone even if 50% do not work or give only 25% of their yield. If one is going to wage nuclear war to lay cities and urban areas of a target nation to waste, it hardly matters whether your bombs are 80% efficient or 20% efficient. No enemy will be able to tell the difference between 50 million dead/injured and 100 million dead/injured. Who will count?

When you speak nuclear war it means making life unlivable after such a war. If you can kill or maim 50 million people and leave plenty of radioactive debris about you have your deterrence. The question of how much testing and how much efficiency is needed becomes moot as warhead numbers increase.

[Supratik]

Rudradev: your analysis says that in 1998, the deterrence advantage was with India. Kargil disproves that theory. Our "dont cross LOC" self-imposed constraint only confirms that, if anything, Pakistan's deterrence vis-a-vis India worked

There may have been four factors for not crossing LOC
1) US threats/pressures to preserve current territorial status of Pak. This was also evident in 1971 when IG was prevented from acting on west Pak. Unless we deter US in the future this variable will always be there.
2) Lack of preparedness in India to fight a war under nuclear environment in case things got out of hand.
3) Any war needs a clear cut political goal. Lack of clarity in thought on this in Vajpayee adminstration. JS said there would be no more map making in the subcontinent which is contradictory to the resolution passed in Parliament on POK. Why they made the change is unclear.
4) For the first time India saw a paradigm shift in political ideology and the BJP did not want to jeopardize its future if something went wrong i.e. lack of confidence.

So Pak deterrence may not have been the key factor. It may have been used as an explanation by various commentators to prevent future action by India. The Anglo-Saxon powers at present are determined to preserve Pak with or w/o deterrence.

[ramdas]

Shiv,

Good that you are getting into specifics. Indeed, the key to deterrence vis a vis TSP and PRC is that life should be guaranteed to be unlivable after a second strike from our side. This should mean the ability to mount a second strike that leaves around 10% of the pop. dead in PRC and 25% or so dead in TSP.

How many 20kt weapons would be needed for that ? Around 1000-2000. But there is no sign that we are building such numbers. If we want to stay with numbers within 300-400, we need weapons in the 200kt range. For such weapons to be proven testing is a must. The necessity of a combination of larger numbers with larger yields also stems from the fact that PRC is developing ABM defences. While they started after us in this area, they have much more money to throw on ABM type projects.

So, there are two clear choices: a large (i.e, 1000+ arsenal) of fission/(20 kt boosted fission) weapons or a medium (i.e, 300 odd) arsenal of TNs proven after a new round of tests. Either course will lead to ``international opposition". But we should decide on one of these and make it clear and explicit that we will follow the chosen course to its logical conclusion.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji a Nation willing to wield 500-1000 20KT warheads should be willing to test a few higher yielding ones also, no? Does not compute for someone willing to invest so much in a nuclear arsenal but unwilling to do what is more efficient and powerful and cheaper?

[shiv]

How many 20kt weapons would be needed for that ? Around 1000-2000. But there is no sign that we are building such numbers. If we want to stay with numbers within 300-400, we need weapons in the 200kt range. For such weapons to be proven testing is a must. The necessity of a combination of larger numbers with larger yields also stems from the fact that PRC is developing ABM defences. While they started after us in this area, they have much more money to throw on ABM type projects.

Ramana the numbers are arguable. The Hiroshima bomb was about 15 kt and resulted in about 90.000 dead and perhaps the same number injured.

If we extrapolate directly we get Hiroshma x 300 = 27 million dead and a similar number injured

I think one need to look at how many deaths and injured a nation can handle

How many dead and injured can New York handle in 10 days? Would 100.000 dead and 100,000 injured be too big to handle? i say it is too big. New York has about 6 beds per thousand population - which makes 40,000 beds. Most of the injured would be severe burns. The whole of the US hardly has 2000 burns beds But even 20,000 would not be enough for New York alone. New York does not have the services to handle such numbers. No city has. But than number is just one Hiroshima bomb. I use New York as an example of the most powerful and richest country in the world.

Even 300 Hiroshima bombs is too much for any nation to handle. A city would simply shut down given the scale of destruction.

I think your estimate of number of bombs is way too high.

[shiv]

Shiv ji a Nation willing to wield 500-1000 20KT warheads should be willing to test a few higher yielding ones also, no? Does not compute for someone willing to invest so much in a nuclear arsenal but unwilling to do what is more efficient and powerful and cheaper?

Shaurya the answer is a big yes for efficiency, science and tech and echandee. But when it comes to actually waging nuclear war it is not necessary. 20 kt fizzles or even 10 kt fizzles in the hands of a NoKo general are more than enough, given good delivery systems

[shiv]

New York handles about 200 deaths per day. In a disaster it is easy to see how the services might cope with 10 times that number - that is 2000 deaths in a day. Or maybe 5000 at a stretch. But 100,000 dead? And under debris. And another 100,000 people with burns and injuries?

Just one 15 kt blast?