Imagine that the center of Delhi gets nuked, killing 100,000 and leaving a vast area under rubble where people did not know if victims were alive or dead. What would others in Delhi do? Carry on as usual? Pack lunch and go to work next morning reading paper on Metro?
How about a "same to you" for Bejing?
What difference would it make to the city if it was hit with 100 kt versus 20 kt?
Check this chart for ref
http://i1116.photobucket.com/albums/k56 ... -table.jpg
Deterrence
Re: Deterrence
You are banking on reason and rational men being at the helm playing by rules that you recognize. There is no such thing and "assuming" such would be folly. There is only one assured answer to mad power. More power.
A 500 KT on beijing can add one more "0" to the casualty numbers. This is the only answer to a 500 KT on Delhi!
A 500 KT on beijing can add one more "0" to the casualty numbers. This is the only answer to a 500 KT on Delhi!
Re: Deterrence
IIRC, BK - the maximalist - has stated that the standard Indian weapon is a ~150 KT FBF and that the TN has not been weaponized. So where is the 20 KT device coming from? A MIRVed A6 carrying 4 devices plus two decoys is going to destroy most cities in China. A TN weapon is just going to give us more options. Also an ICBM will require further miniaturization. But who will you need to deter with an ICBM? The answer is clear but it will be a geo-political decision.
Re: Deterrence
The words maximalist or minimalist are perceptions on what one thinks will deter. I consider BK's view to be that of a realist.
Re: Deterrence
Shiv,
First of all, would a 20kt weapon be able to create Hiroshima level casualties in a well developed PRC city (with lower population density than 20000/sq. km ) ? Even by your table, a 100kt weapon damages about 3 times the area as a 20kt weapon. Beyond 100kt, area of destruction is more or less directly proportional to yield since firestorms (caused by intense heat whose intensity is inversely proportionate to the square rather than cube of the distance from ground zero) take precedence over blast damage. A 200kt warhead is thus, 6 times as effective as a 20kt warhead.
Also, 27m deaths and an equal number of injuries will be unacceptable to a democratic society/ western country (for which even an order of magnitude smaller damage would be unacceptable). Are you sure that the same holds for PRC/ TSP ?
After all, the USSR in WWII took a similar number of casualties with a similar population as today's TSP and still emerged as a superpower. What prevents TSP hopes that they can pull of the same feat using a superior nuclear arsenal ? As for PRC a higher ability to damage is required. Especially if after paying the price you mention, they can achieve strategic subjugation of our country (like East Germany was subjugated to the USSR).
Finally, even if you consider 300 20 kt warheads adequate, it is necessary to be able to ensure that 300 land on target. Given that our adversaries are likely to come up with ABMs, how many would we need to absorb a first strike and then have enough to make sure that 300 warheads land in the adversary's cities ? A massive arsenal of around a 1000 or more would be necessary. Alternatively, a more moderate number of higher yield weapons would provide the same deterrent capacity.
All in all, emphasizing minimality in the nuclear deterrent would erode its credibility. Relentless qualitative and quantitative improvements are a must until we achieve a far more powerful deterrent than we have at present. The very process of constantly upgrading deterrent capabilities ensures deterrent credibility.
First of all, would a 20kt weapon be able to create Hiroshima level casualties in a well developed PRC city (with lower population density than 20000/sq. km ) ? Even by your table, a 100kt weapon damages about 3 times the area as a 20kt weapon. Beyond 100kt, area of destruction is more or less directly proportional to yield since firestorms (caused by intense heat whose intensity is inversely proportionate to the square rather than cube of the distance from ground zero) take precedence over blast damage. A 200kt warhead is thus, 6 times as effective as a 20kt warhead.
Also, 27m deaths and an equal number of injuries will be unacceptable to a democratic society/ western country (for which even an order of magnitude smaller damage would be unacceptable). Are you sure that the same holds for PRC/ TSP ?
After all, the USSR in WWII took a similar number of casualties with a similar population as today's TSP and still emerged as a superpower. What prevents TSP hopes that they can pull of the same feat using a superior nuclear arsenal ? As for PRC a higher ability to damage is required. Especially if after paying the price you mention, they can achieve strategic subjugation of our country (like East Germany was subjugated to the USSR).
Finally, even if you consider 300 20 kt warheads adequate, it is necessary to be able to ensure that 300 land on target. Given that our adversaries are likely to come up with ABMs, how many would we need to absorb a first strike and then have enough to make sure that 300 warheads land in the adversary's cities ? A massive arsenal of around a 1000 or more would be necessary. Alternatively, a more moderate number of higher yield weapons would provide the same deterrent capacity.
All in all, emphasizing minimality in the nuclear deterrent would erode its credibility. Relentless qualitative and quantitative improvements are a must until we achieve a far more powerful deterrent than we have at present. The very process of constantly upgrading deterrent capabilities ensures deterrent credibility.
Re: Deterrence
Shaurya - the assumptions work both ways. The arguments opposing what I have written are equally full of assumptions. I have more to write - but maybe I will post that as a reply to Ramdas who poses questions that probably merit similar answers.ShauryaT wrote:You are banking on reason and rational men being at the helm playing by rules that you recognize. There is no such thing and "assuming" such would be folly. There is only one assured answer to mad power. More power.
A 500 KT on beijing can add one more "0" to the casualty numbers. This is the only answer to a 500 KT on Delhi!
Re: Deterrence
True. But for a city how much difference would 30,000 deaths and injuries make compared with 180,000 deaths? City services get overloaded with just 30,000 deaths and a 2 sq km destruction. For a radius of 3 to 4 km around the blast site people cannot enter and leave to go to places of work or shopping. All roads get clogged with people fleeing, or rescuers or the injured. For the effect it has on the life and functioning of a city there is hardly any difference between 20 kt and 200 kt. Both would be overwhelming. Would you be able to post any figures to say why a single 20 kt blast would not paralyse a city?ramdas wrote:Shiv,
First of all, would a 20kt weapon be able to create Hiroshima level casualties in a well developed PRC city (with lower population density than 20000/sq. km ) ? Even by your table, a 100kt weapon damages about 3 times the area as a 20kt weapon. Beyond 100kt, area of destruction is more or less directly proportional to yield since firestorms (caused by intense heat whose intensity is inversely proportionate to the square rather than cube of the distance from ground zero) take precedence over blast damage. A 200kt warhead is thus, 6 times as effective as a 20kt warhead.
What makes anyone certain that 200 kt per bomb would have any effect on this ruthless, heartless society?ramdas wrote:Also, 27m deaths and an equal number of injuries will be unacceptable to a democratic society/ western country (for which even an order of magnitude smaller damage would be unacceptable). Are you sure that the same holds for PRC/ TSP ?
Why don't you post some numbers and scenarios so I can have the opportunity of tearing them down with similar non-comparable arguments? After all the world survived after Krakatoa. Hiroshima is a thriving city today and Japan is a leading nation on earth, so nuclear weapons are useless. Everyone will survive nuclear war. Maybe we need to be nuked so that we too can come up like the USSR and Japan no?ramdas wrote:After all, the USSR in WWII took a similar number of casualties
Where are these ABM defences? Lets have some numbers. I say the Chinese will shoot down all our missiles and we will shoot down all of theirs.ramdas wrote:Finally, even if you consider 300 20 kt warheads adequate, it is necessary to be able to ensure that 300 land on target. Given that our adversaries are likely to come up with ABMs, how many would we need to absorb a first strike and then have enough to make sure that 300 warheads land in the adversary's cities ? A massive arsenal of around a 1000 or more would be necessary. Alternatively, a more moderate number of higher yield weapons would provide the same deterrent capacity.
Re: Deterrence
Shanghai has an area of 2500 sq km
As per the chart I posted:
1. A 1 megaton bomb would do total/severe damage to 55 sq km (2.2 % of Shanghai's area)
2. A 200 kt blast would do total/severe damage to 20 sq km (0.8% of Shanghai's area)
3. A 20 kt blast would do total/severe damage to 4 sq km (0.16 % of Shanghai's area)
All are useless. Even with a 1 megaton bomb 98% of Shanghai would be intact.
But Shanghai would be paralysed if you cause 25 to 50,000 deaths and injuries (or more) in one shot, if that shot was aimed at a commercially important area
As per the chart I posted:
1. A 1 megaton bomb would do total/severe damage to 55 sq km (2.2 % of Shanghai's area)
2. A 200 kt blast would do total/severe damage to 20 sq km (0.8% of Shanghai's area)
3. A 20 kt blast would do total/severe damage to 4 sq km (0.16 % of Shanghai's area)
All are useless. Even with a 1 megaton bomb 98% of Shanghai would be intact.
But Shanghai would be paralysed if you cause 25 to 50,000 deaths and injuries (or more) in one shot, if that shot was aimed at a commercially important area
Re: Deterrence
Shiv,
Even a heartless society has a threshold of damage beyond which it cannot accept. Such a threshold is higher for such a society (say, PRC/TSP) than for other societies. You seem to believe that there is no difference between 30000 dead and 180000 dead. The reality is that there is a difference.
Capacity to paralyze a few of the opponent's cities with strikes from a minimal deterrent does not amount to comprehensive deterrence. The goal should be to have the capability to make a nuclear aggressor cease to exist as a nation state. At the very least, it this means that the adversary must experience complete loss of central control (both in the civilian/economic and military sense).
As for ABMs, PRC recently tested one (around Jan 27 this year). While not deployed at present, it will be there some years down the line. In numbers (given PRCs penchant for mass production). Of course, nobody can argue that we need to make corresponding qualitative/quantitative improvements in our deterrent keeping this in mind.
Even a heartless society has a threshold of damage beyond which it cannot accept. Such a threshold is higher for such a society (say, PRC/TSP) than for other societies. You seem to believe that there is no difference between 30000 dead and 180000 dead. The reality is that there is a difference.
Capacity to paralyze a few of the opponent's cities with strikes from a minimal deterrent does not amount to comprehensive deterrence. The goal should be to have the capability to make a nuclear aggressor cease to exist as a nation state. At the very least, it this means that the adversary must experience complete loss of central control (both in the civilian/economic and military sense).
As for ABMs, PRC recently tested one (around Jan 27 this year). While not deployed at present, it will be there some years down the line. In numbers (given PRCs penchant for mass production). Of course, nobody can argue that we need to make corresponding qualitative/quantitative improvements in our deterrent keeping this in mind.
Re: Deterrence
That chart accounts only for blast effects. A megaton warhead would essentially damage 5% of Shaghai's area as a result. What about four or five such weapons ? This would be truly unacceptable damage compared to a single 20kt strike. It would be similar to the kind of damage PRC can inflict on our cities.
Re: Deterrence
No Ramdasji. We are going to disagree. I put it to you that you are simply using the heartlessness argument to set a standard that you think is right.ramdas wrote:Shiv,
Even a heartless society has a threshold of damage beyond which it cannot accept. Such a threshold is higher for such a society (say, PRC/TSP) than for other societies. You seem to believe that there is no difference between 30000 dead and 180000 dead. The reality is that there is a difference.
Capacity to paralyze a few of the opponent's cities with strikes from a minimal deterrent does not amount to comprehensive deterrence. The goal should be to have the capability to make a nuclear aggressor cease to exist as a nation state. At the very least, it this means that the adversary must experience complete loss of central control (both in the civilian/economic and military sense).
As for ABMs, PRC recently tested one (around Jan 27 this year). While not deployed at present, it will be there some years down the line. In numbers (given PRCs penchant for mass production). Of course, nobody can argue that we need to make corresponding qualitative/quantitative improvements in our deterrent keeping this in mind.
No large city can handle 20,000 dead and a large part destroyed and contaminated by nuclear material in one go and will remain paralysed as a city for several months after which it will recover.
If you kill 200,000, it will still remain paralysed for several months - maybe more after which it will recover.
Either way the city becomes useless as a contributor to war economy for several months. This will be as true for a Chinese city as it would be for an Indian city. I think it is a typical western/American tactic to say that the godless Chinese are particularly heartless and ruthless while Americans. good Christians that they are are humane. That is exactly what was said of the Soviets by the USA while it was the USA that wanted to destroy all of the USSR and then discovered that it will not be possible even with 20,000 nukes. I take this Chinese heartlessness argument with a bucketload of salt and put it to you that India is more ruthless.
Re: Deterrence
May I ask a rather horrifying question? If you live outside your home city and hear one day that your parents were killed by a nuclear bomb on your home city but discovered that your brother was safe would you advise that your brother continue to live in the nuked city because his suburb was relatively untouched? Would people be able to write what thoughts they have and what choices they might look at? Declaring everyone in a society as "heartless" Is easy but is only a convenient concoction to suit an argument
A city of 20 million that loses 20.000 people in one go, with another 20,000 injured will mean that a huge percentage of the people city get affected directly or indirectly by a death or injury or in rescue, evacuation, treatment and panic. Medical services would be overwhelmed leaving thousands without rescue or care. People who have injured friends or relatives would either riot or try to evacuate while others would pour in to see what happened to their relatives friends. Security forces would have to be mobilised to keep some people out and evacuate others. That city stops being a contributor to a war economy instantly, and continues that way for a while.
Do that to 20 cities in one day and you have waged nuclear war. It hardly matters whether you did it using 200 kt bombs or 20 kt bombs
A city of 20 million that loses 20.000 people in one go, with another 20,000 injured will mean that a huge percentage of the people city get affected directly or indirectly by a death or injury or in rescue, evacuation, treatment and panic. Medical services would be overwhelmed leaving thousands without rescue or care. People who have injured friends or relatives would either riot or try to evacuate while others would pour in to see what happened to their relatives friends. Security forces would have to be mobilised to keep some people out and evacuate others. That city stops being a contributor to a war economy instantly, and continues that way for a while.
Do that to 20 cities in one day and you have waged nuclear war. It hardly matters whether you did it using 200 kt bombs or 20 kt bombs
Re: Deterrence
The "nuclear arms race" was invented by the USA and all talk about nuclear weapon usage has been generated from US think tanks. The issue has not got as much public attention in India and we absorb US attitudes and values by reading the only available material which is from the US.
The US for example presents itself as a humane nation that will not tolerate even one small nuclear blast on its territory. On the other hand it says its adversaries are inhumane and will need to be wiped out (and will be wiped out) by overwhelming force.
This is great rhetoric that amounts to a lot of hot air. North Korea has successfully converted a "First use" America into a piddling NFU America. America does not want even one 6 kiloton NoKo nuke on its territory with the piddly 15 or 20,000 casualties that nuke may cause on a US city. Is the US then going to nuke North Korea with its overwhelming load of nukes to stop being attacked by NoKo. Not at all. The US is sitting by and watching, unable to do a damn thing other than say how poor NoKo is.
NoKo's deal leadel and Noko generals are not stupid. They realise that the US will not nuke them no matter how much they threaten anyone. They will get nuked by the US only if they use their nukes. So they will threaten and those threats have converted the brave USA into an SDRE type NFU mouse.
The argument that says "if NoKo uses its nukes the US has the means to rain death on North Korea" is a useless piece of mental masturbation because NoKo has no intention of getting rid of its trump card. It is open knowledge that Gen Macarthur wanted to nuke NoKo during the Korean war. Those people have lived through those empty threats and know fully well that the US is a nuclear mouse. It is only bluster and hot air that makes anyone imagine that the US is a nuclear tiger. The US will become a nuclear tiger only if someone uses nukes first. It is an NFU power.
Thousands of megaton nukes are useless if they are not going to be used. 2 six kiloton bombs are a big threat from a person who threatens to use them. It is easier if he uses them because it gives an excuse to attack him. But if he does not use them the retaliating hands are tied. Pakistan understands this psychology perfectly. They have India restricted in exactly the same way as NoKo restricts the USA. That is deterrence.
India is deterred by Pakistan and the US is deterred from using its nukes by NoKo.
But is Pakistan deterred from using nukes against India? In my opinion Pakistan uses irrationality as a game. When Pakistan readies its nukes irrationally for use on India, there is no way of saying whether Pakistan is really going to use a nuke or simply pretending. That is why Pakistan needs to be assured that it will be destroyed.
China is a different ball game. China does not openly threaten to use its nukes against India although the recessed threat is always present. India's game has continuously been one of "catch up" with China. India, over the years has made, using its media, an open declaration of its intention to use nuclear weapons against China. The calculated development of Agni missiles which were gradually declared as being more and more capable of reaching Beijing are an open threat. But unlike China, India's "open threat" is an NFU threat. You use nukes first and we use them in retaliation.
But aside from this, the Indian nuclear weapons program is among the most closed and secretive programs in the world. Nothing is known about Indian capability other than what has been officially declared via the media and designated spokespersons. Everything that is discussed - including my long 20 kiloton arguments are hot air simply because we have no clue about the exact nature and number of India's nuclear weapons.
If we are going to talk about numbers and yields of Indian nucler weapons we have to apply the same standards that we apply to Pakistan and NoKo and iran and ask "How many reactors? How much time? How much fissile material?"
And we will have to go by publicly declared estimates of all this material and based on that decide how much we can possibly make. That would be a start because the situation is really opaque.
If one takes non-prolotullah figures - India has material for 100-120 bombs. If they are right what is Karnad ranting about having lots of big bombs? Is it bluster or does he know something we don't know?
The US for example presents itself as a humane nation that will not tolerate even one small nuclear blast on its territory. On the other hand it says its adversaries are inhumane and will need to be wiped out (and will be wiped out) by overwhelming force.
This is great rhetoric that amounts to a lot of hot air. North Korea has successfully converted a "First use" America into a piddling NFU America. America does not want even one 6 kiloton NoKo nuke on its territory with the piddly 15 or 20,000 casualties that nuke may cause on a US city. Is the US then going to nuke North Korea with its overwhelming load of nukes to stop being attacked by NoKo. Not at all. The US is sitting by and watching, unable to do a damn thing other than say how poor NoKo is.
NoKo's deal leadel and Noko generals are not stupid. They realise that the US will not nuke them no matter how much they threaten anyone. They will get nuked by the US only if they use their nukes. So they will threaten and those threats have converted the brave USA into an SDRE type NFU mouse.
The argument that says "if NoKo uses its nukes the US has the means to rain death on North Korea" is a useless piece of mental masturbation because NoKo has no intention of getting rid of its trump card. It is open knowledge that Gen Macarthur wanted to nuke NoKo during the Korean war. Those people have lived through those empty threats and know fully well that the US is a nuclear mouse. It is only bluster and hot air that makes anyone imagine that the US is a nuclear tiger. The US will become a nuclear tiger only if someone uses nukes first. It is an NFU power.
Thousands of megaton nukes are useless if they are not going to be used. 2 six kiloton bombs are a big threat from a person who threatens to use them. It is easier if he uses them because it gives an excuse to attack him. But if he does not use them the retaliating hands are tied. Pakistan understands this psychology perfectly. They have India restricted in exactly the same way as NoKo restricts the USA. That is deterrence.
India is deterred by Pakistan and the US is deterred from using its nukes by NoKo.
But is Pakistan deterred from using nukes against India? In my opinion Pakistan uses irrationality as a game. When Pakistan readies its nukes irrationally for use on India, there is no way of saying whether Pakistan is really going to use a nuke or simply pretending. That is why Pakistan needs to be assured that it will be destroyed.
China is a different ball game. China does not openly threaten to use its nukes against India although the recessed threat is always present. India's game has continuously been one of "catch up" with China. India, over the years has made, using its media, an open declaration of its intention to use nuclear weapons against China. The calculated development of Agni missiles which were gradually declared as being more and more capable of reaching Beijing are an open threat. But unlike China, India's "open threat" is an NFU threat. You use nukes first and we use them in retaliation.
But aside from this, the Indian nuclear weapons program is among the most closed and secretive programs in the world. Nothing is known about Indian capability other than what has been officially declared via the media and designated spokespersons. Everything that is discussed - including my long 20 kiloton arguments are hot air simply because we have no clue about the exact nature and number of India's nuclear weapons.
If we are going to talk about numbers and yields of Indian nucler weapons we have to apply the same standards that we apply to Pakistan and NoKo and iran and ask "How many reactors? How much time? How much fissile material?"
And we will have to go by publicly declared estimates of all this material and based on that decide how much we can possibly make. That would be a start because the situation is really opaque.
If one takes non-prolotullah figures - India has material for 100-120 bombs. If they are right what is Karnad ranting about having lots of big bombs? Is it bluster or does he know something we don't know?
Re: Deterrence
Anyone with some sense of self preservation would imagine 300 weapons lost to first strike, 300 being duds, off course or intercepted and only 300 reaching where they need to.
So we need 1000 weapons, preferably of atleast 150kt yield to make sure even a couple that land on a city do a lot of damage and leave no wriggle room to wave it off under localized damage.
Once you enter the game there is no point being the lowest rung player..keep producing, testing, improving and competing with yourself even if you are on top because if you dont , the roi of these billions dollar arsenal will be left in doubt.
So i fully agree with what ramdas is saying. Either dont enter the game , but if you enter...standing around with a stick and a dhoti isnt going to scare the ruffians in the mohalla. It sure does not scare elements of the pakistan army who fully believe they can win a tactical and strategic nuclear war with india, perhaps with chinese help in the second stage and would like a chance to try that theory.
So we need 1000 weapons, preferably of atleast 150kt yield to make sure even a couple that land on a city do a lot of damage and leave no wriggle room to wave it off under localized damage.
Once you enter the game there is no point being the lowest rung player..keep producing, testing, improving and competing with yourself even if you are on top because if you dont , the roi of these billions dollar arsenal will be left in doubt.
So i fully agree with what ramdas is saying. Either dont enter the game , but if you enter...standing around with a stick and a dhoti isnt going to scare the ruffians in the mohalla. It sure does not scare elements of the pakistan army who fully believe they can win a tactical and strategic nuclear war with india, perhaps with chinese help in the second stage and would like a chance to try that theory.
Re: Deterrence
If 300 nukes land on us as part of first strike what is the meaning of self preservation? Exactly who or what part of oneself gets preserved?Singha wrote:Anyone with some sense of self preservation would imagine 300 weapons lost to first strike, 300 being duds, off course or intercepted and only 300 reaching where they need to.
First strike, by definition, occurs because of loss of deterrence. So your idea of keeping 1000 weapons is not for deterrence, but for second strike. Clearly if someone puts 300 nukes on us when we already have 1000 weapons, the latter was no use as deterrent.
If 1000 weapons are not deterrent, what number would guarantee deterrence?
Re: Deterrence
What is so wrong with having 10X nukes of MT capacity purely for punitive measures if 3X nukes of Any capacity, KT or MT, were to rain upon us in a first strike, say because 10X nukes didn't prove to be a deterrent?
Let those 10X nukes be megaton (MT) devices.
If you attack us, we will take your economy, electricity and water down with us.
"Deterrence" is just a family friendly expression like "collateral damage" created by the same people who named their war department the "Department of Defense". I don't really care if Indian nukes are for deterrence or for a kick in the face of the attacker as a second strike.
Let those 10X nukes be megaton (MT) devices.
If you attack us, we will take your economy, electricity and water down with us.
"Deterrence" is just a family friendly expression like "collateral damage" created by the same people who named their war department the "Department of Defense". I don't really care if Indian nukes are for deterrence or for a kick in the face of the attacker as a second strike.
Re: Deterrence
Nothing wrong. But I suggest that such numbers offer only psychological comfort are are unnecessary for deterrence. If one is looking for psychological comfort far beyond practical deterrence then those numbers are absolutely mandatory.PratikDas wrote:What is so wrong with having 10X nukes of MT capacity purely for punitive measures if 3X nukes of Any capacity, KT or MT, were to rain upon us in a first strike, say because 10X nukes didn't prove to be a deterrent?
But there is no guarantee that they will stop us or anyone from getting nuked.
There is, in my view, a "deterrence point" that will scare anyone and make him think twice about using nukes against you. If one argues that one is keeping X thousand nukes to nuke him back after he is finished with nuking you, that is totally useless. Your enemy won't care once he nukes you, because he has done his job and your millions of megatons have failed to deter him and you are left with nuking him out of existence even as you have lost a lot of what is dear to you. Despite having thousands and thousands of nukes. Your lost cities and dead people and screwed economy and radioactive water will never get better even if you nuke him out of existence. Simply because all your megatons did not deter him from nuking you. He is dead. And beyond unhappiness. You are alive and have no victory. Only death, destruction and fallout.
Ideally, he should be scared of nuking you first time. The meaning of deterrence is stopping that first strike from happening.
What arguments/evidence/literature is there to suggest that tens of thousands of nukes are a better deterrent than 25 nukes? There is none. It is purely a psychological comfort mechanism to imagine that your 10,000 nukes are better than 25 nukes as deterrence. Heck 2 nukes from NoKo are a deterrent to so many nations.
Re: Deterrence
If a nuke launched from a sub in the Indian Ocean fell upon India, would India be able to retaliate upon any specific country with certainty that we have identified the attacker correctly?
Doesn't the "it wasn't me" defence weaken India's deterrence as well despite a million MT of hypothetical nukes in the Indian arsenal? One might argue as devil's advocate that therefore no second strike is meaningful. We might as well meditate along the coast in dhotis.
Just because there is a case when the deterrent can fail, just like Amirkhan is worried about the THAAD's usefulness when they have the best nuclear deterrence in the world, doesn't mean we don't need a strong nuclear capability. Whether it deters or not is up to the sanity of the attacker. I still need it.
Doesn't the "it wasn't me" defence weaken India's deterrence as well despite a million MT of hypothetical nukes in the Indian arsenal? One might argue as devil's advocate that therefore no second strike is meaningful. We might as well meditate along the coast in dhotis.
Just because there is a case when the deterrent can fail, just like Amirkhan is worried about the THAAD's usefulness when they have the best nuclear deterrence in the world, doesn't mean we don't need a strong nuclear capability. Whether it deters or not is up to the sanity of the attacker. I still need it.
Re: Deterrence
Let's take a look at what this means for a far more familiar city: Mumbai (my hometown, in case this offends anyone.)shiv wrote:1. A 1 megaton bomb would do total/severe damage to 55 sq km (2.2 % of Shanghai's area)
2. A 200 kt blast would do total/severe damage to 20 sq km (0.8% of Shanghai's area)
3. A 20 kt blast would do total/severe damage to 4 sq km (0.16 % of Shanghai's area)
The following map is to scale per the sq. km. radius of total/severe damage.
The GREEN circle represents a 20 kT device, for 4 sq km. You just about knock out BARC (or, say, Navy Nagar) with one device. Not both.
The PURPLE circle is a 200 kT device for 20 sq km. You knock out BARC and a good bit of Mumbai's commercial/dockyard district, maybe from Sion-Chembur down to Parel-Mazgaon. Navy Nagar might still be partly functional, and considerable naval assets might survive, with only one 200 kT device on BARC. Likewise, a good proportion of Mumbai's industrial output, in MIDC, Powai etc. might survive.
The PINK circle at bottom shows a 1 MT device for 55 sq km. You can see that a single warhead causes total or severe damage to BARC, Navy Nagar and almost the entirety of Mumbai's commercial urban area.
North and east of this I've added four more pink circles showing the effects of four more 1 MT warheads. You lose downtown Mumbai, Navi Mumbai (including MIDC industrial district), Andheri-Kurla, Powai, Thane and the Western suburbs upto Vasai. You also effectively destroy any possibility of getting anything into our out of the city via Western and Eastern Express highways.
Think about how many direct hits with 200 kT nukes it would take to do equivalent amounts of damage. Then think how many 20 kT nukes you would need.
Now look at this picture and reach your own conclusions about survivability. No doubt, even the 20 kT on BARC will cause huge devastation unlike anything Mumbai has seen before. No doubt it will probably shut down commercial activity in most of downtown Mumbai for a while, and have very taxing effects on any contribution Mumbai is able to make to a war economy. But leaving naval assets intact, plus the MIDC, plus Thane and the Western suburbs all partially functioning... I wouldn't call that a "crippling" effect on Mumbai's contribution to the war economy. Much less than in peacetime, certainly. But nowhere near crippling.
So think about this. The little green circle (20 kT) is about as much damage as we can do to a Chinese city with one warhead, assuming all goes according to plan with launch and delivery. The pink circles are what five Chinese 1 MT warheads would do to Mumbai... silence it completely and permanently, as anyone who has spent time in Mumbai knows. This isn't anything to do with piskology... knowing the facts, any GOI facing down the Chinese in an escalation to nuclear conflict is 400% guaranteed to blink.
Re: Deterrence
Exactly.Singha wrote:Anyone with some sense of self preservation would imagine 300 weapons lost to first strike, 300 being duds, off course or intercepted and only 300 reaching where they need to.
So we need 1000 weapons, preferably of atleast 150kt yield to make sure even a couple that land on a city do a lot of damage and leave no wriggle room to wave it off under localized damage.
Couple of data points: During the Cold War, British strategic analysts determined that, given expected countervailing factors, it would take the dedicated targeting of no less than 50 x 1 MT weapons to be reasonably sure of destroying *Moscow* alone.
Likewise, US analysts' rule of thumb was that about 60% of their missiles could actually be expected to hit their targets and detonate successfully.
Since the Cold War, of course, there has dramatic improvement in BMD systems. Witness the Scud-Patriot battles during Gulf War I, which was more than 20 years ago. Missile defense has come a long way since then; so how far down should we revise the US analysts' figure? 40%? 20%? No way to know for sure. If you want to field a nuclear arsenal at all, you'd better have one large enough to take your worst-case scenario into account.
Re: Deterrence
Thank you for making it so clear in the map. 20kt weapons are useless for city targets whether first or second strike.
Shiv sir ... you are welcome to guess what will scare pakistan and china ..in the absence of any lowest minimum shivering hindoo number you are seeking from statements by their leadership let us err on the side of caution esp due to declared second use policy only. Pakis or cheen may be scared by ten nukes but we dont know...its more likely they will be scared and deterred only by a matching force minimum esp the pakis who strongly believe allah also plays in their team and are not good at thinking about the finer details of any game. Cheen are more pragmatic but when it comes to using tactical nukes to prevent a indian breakout and then daring india to retaliate while waving the big sticks, our leadership does need the backing of a mighty counterstrike force to feel at all capable of stopping shivering and talking back on equal terms. By their mere presence the big sticks open more room for action at lower levels should the pakis or cheen decide to use tactical weapons and dare us..we need to respond in kind and be able to safely dare them without starting to evacuate mumbai.
Pakis will traditionally start something without any backup plan or just half a plan and depend on natural skill, killer instinct, improvised sweep shots, allah and cheen in no particular order to emerge alive from the game
thats how they play it, we need to respect that mode of gameplay as well , because their leadership is born and bred for it..we cannot change them into the more cerebral chinese poker players who can faithfully be expected to follow all the theoritcal formulations written by experts over decades. A paki who is the last batsman can and will swing for a sixer when only a single is needed. The only rule to follow with tsp is expect all rules to be broken.
Shiv sir ... you are welcome to guess what will scare pakistan and china ..in the absence of any lowest minimum shivering hindoo number you are seeking from statements by their leadership let us err on the side of caution esp due to declared second use policy only. Pakis or cheen may be scared by ten nukes but we dont know...its more likely they will be scared and deterred only by a matching force minimum esp the pakis who strongly believe allah also plays in their team and are not good at thinking about the finer details of any game. Cheen are more pragmatic but when it comes to using tactical nukes to prevent a indian breakout and then daring india to retaliate while waving the big sticks, our leadership does need the backing of a mighty counterstrike force to feel at all capable of stopping shivering and talking back on equal terms. By their mere presence the big sticks open more room for action at lower levels should the pakis or cheen decide to use tactical weapons and dare us..we need to respond in kind and be able to safely dare them without starting to evacuate mumbai.
Pakis will traditionally start something without any backup plan or just half a plan and depend on natural skill, killer instinct, improvised sweep shots, allah and cheen in no particular order to emerge alive from the game
thats how they play it, we need to respect that mode of gameplay as well , because their leadership is born and bred for it..we cannot change them into the more cerebral chinese poker players who can faithfully be expected to follow all the theoritcal formulations written by experts over decades. A paki who is the last batsman can and will swing for a sixer when only a single is needed. The only rule to follow with tsp is expect all rules to be broken.
Last edited by Singha on 17 Feb 2013 16:00, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
Shiv,
I think you are too lax in estimating the deterrence point. At this rate, somebody will argue that one is enough: which is surely false, given the chances of even a conventional preemptive strike eliminating that one. If what you said about NKs two weapons are true, then why is NK moving towards more powerful weapons ?
The deterrence point should be defined as the point at which we can assure in all circumstances (including a hypothetical enemy first strike) sufficient retaliation to make the enemy lose existence as a nation state for the next several decades. This would the definition fordeterrence vis a vis TSP. For PRC, the words "nation state" should be replaced by "powerful nation state under CCP rule".
Only such a capability will guarantee that no first strike will be contemplated on us under any circumstances whatsoever. Anything less will still raise the cost of a first strike to something an adversary would not normally contemplate. Under exceptional circumstances, an adversary could still view a first strike as profitable if it results in his core national goal not being affected while India loses existence as a strong nation state.
Constant enhancement of firepower is a must. It is like for all military preparation. Lack of preparation is what ensures that ``war is interested in you" even if you are not interested in war. Thorough preparation for war is what ensures that you will not be involved in war as long as you do not will it yourself. The same is true even in the nuclear setting. Hope our policy makers understand this.
I think you are too lax in estimating the deterrence point. At this rate, somebody will argue that one is enough: which is surely false, given the chances of even a conventional preemptive strike eliminating that one. If what you said about NKs two weapons are true, then why is NK moving towards more powerful weapons ?
The deterrence point should be defined as the point at which we can assure in all circumstances (including a hypothetical enemy first strike) sufficient retaliation to make the enemy lose existence as a nation state for the next several decades. This would the definition fordeterrence vis a vis TSP. For PRC, the words "nation state" should be replaced by "powerful nation state under CCP rule".
Only such a capability will guarantee that no first strike will be contemplated on us under any circumstances whatsoever. Anything less will still raise the cost of a first strike to something an adversary would not normally contemplate. Under exceptional circumstances, an adversary could still view a first strike as profitable if it results in his core national goal not being affected while India loses existence as a strong nation state.
Constant enhancement of firepower is a must. It is like for all military preparation. Lack of preparation is what ensures that ``war is interested in you" even if you are not interested in war. Thorough preparation for war is what ensures that you will not be involved in war as long as you do not will it yourself. The same is true even in the nuclear setting. Hope our policy makers understand this.
Re: Deterrence
No Not at all Ramdas. All I am pointing out is that "deterrence point" is pure guesswork and everyone guesses a mark that they think will scare the other guy. The arguments made here for deterrence point are generally simply based on the idea that if nukes are bigger and more numerous the other guy will be more scared.ramdas wrote:Shiv,
I think you are too lax in estimating the deterrence point.
There is absolutely no basis for this guesswork. No one is able to provide any reason why more and bigger would be more scary to the other guy. It seems to me that everyone simply applies his own personal attitudes about what should scare the other party. This guesswork may be totally false or totally true depending on the individual on the other side. If it so happens that a national leader feels the other guy will be scared of smaller and fewer nukes - that can easily be the standard applied because there is no science or logic applied here other than the logic of raw emotion and subjective feelings.
Unfortunately there is zero proof for the idea that anyone is deterred by bigger and more weapons and there is at least some evidence of people with bigger arsenals being deterred by small arsenals. The absence of any science in this puts nuclear deterrence into the realm of emotional subjectivity. This is a dangerous thing because it is certain that the same variation and personal inputs occur in every country. It is all about psychology.
In my view there is a need to study why there is variability in threat perception and a need to understand what feelings can be leveraged to really scare an adversary and make sure there is no first strike at all rather than making blind guesses about X bombs of Y megatons.
What we need to look for goes well beyond the idea of second strike. It is preventing a first strike from occurring. Being ready for second strike is no guarantee that first strike will not occur. Being ready for a second strike only encourages the other party to make his first strike more effective so he causes to you, in his first strike, the pain that you think you will cause him in a second strike. In this scenario both parties feel pain. Surely a better idea is not to feel that pain at all. That is the meaning of deterrence. Second strike is part of deterrence but happens to be a reaction to failed deterrence. Planning for second strike is merely planning for failed deterrence.
Re: Deterrence
Perhaps off-topic.
But the best Deterrence against Pakistan would be by ensuring that Pakistanis have everything to lose. Everything is when all eggs are in one single basket. Right now as the Pakistani Elite has spread out into the world, where Paki generals can send their children abroad, where Pakis can safeguard their money abroad, then the trigger-happiness of the Pakis would be highest. It has to do with how the resources are distributed, and the higher the chance that these resources and family escape second strike, the easier it is to go for a nuclear strike.
Indians need to enter world media, change the perceptions of Pakistanis in all countries and get them deported back to Pakistan. When all the Pakistani Elite becomes vulnerable, then the deterrence would be highest.
It's only when there are sufficient escape pods that anybody would be willing to activate the self-destruction sequence.
But the best Deterrence against Pakistan would be by ensuring that Pakistanis have everything to lose. Everything is when all eggs are in one single basket. Right now as the Pakistani Elite has spread out into the world, where Paki generals can send their children abroad, where Pakis can safeguard their money abroad, then the trigger-happiness of the Pakis would be highest. It has to do with how the resources are distributed, and the higher the chance that these resources and family escape second strike, the easier it is to go for a nuclear strike.
Indians need to enter world media, change the perceptions of Pakistanis in all countries and get them deported back to Pakistan. When all the Pakistani Elite becomes vulnerable, then the deterrence would be highest.
It's only when there are sufficient escape pods that anybody would be willing to activate the self-destruction sequence.
Re: Deterrence
May I point out one more example of the power of psy ops? This is no way seeks to blunt or degrade the points made by Rudradev which I accept are correct except his comment on psychology.
On a hunch I pasted the image onto a graphics program and found the green 20kt circle to have a diameter of 50 pixels and the large pink circle to have a diameter of 220 pixels. If the large circle is 55 sq km, the small one is 2.75 sq km and not 4. If the green circle is 4 sq km, the pink one is 77 sq km. This translates to roughly 10 kt versus 1 MT or 20 kt versus 2 MT
But the effect the map has on observers is dramatic despite what appears to be a minor error. Again psychology trumps science.
On a hunch I pasted the image onto a graphics program and found the green 20kt circle to have a diameter of 50 pixels and the large pink circle to have a diameter of 220 pixels. If the large circle is 55 sq km, the small one is 2.75 sq km and not 4. If the green circle is 4 sq km, the pink one is 77 sq km. This translates to roughly 10 kt versus 1 MT or 20 kt versus 2 MT
But the effect the map has on observers is dramatic despite what appears to be a minor error. Again psychology trumps science.
Re: Deterrence
A long time ago I had generated this image of the damage that can be caused by multiple 25 kt blasts versus one single one MT blast over Beijing.
The logic there was that multiple blasts in different parts of a large city would cause worse chaos and disruption as people fleeing from one nuked area would bump bang into people fleeing from another area - each set of thousands of fleeing people thinking that they would get safety and relief in another area. More delay. More suffering. More death. More pain for survivors. More difficulty for rescuers and relief workers. Overload of misery. After all that is what nuclear war is meant to achieve and every plan must maximize that.
The logic there was that multiple blasts in different parts of a large city would cause worse chaos and disruption as people fleeing from one nuked area would bump bang into people fleeing from another area - each set of thousands of fleeing people thinking that they would get safety and relief in another area. More delay. More suffering. More death. More pain for survivors. More difficulty for rescuers and relief workers. Overload of misery. After all that is what nuclear war is meant to achieve and every plan must maximize that.
Re: Deterrence
It is well known a grid of smaller hits will kill more people but then what luxury do we have in terms of mirv payloads? Bald fact is we have zwro mirv capability at present and only when a6 and k4 enter ioc in say 7 yrs we will start on having it. How long before we have good number of such kit to carry such smart and small payload..maybe 15 yrs for sure.
Until then unitary payload is all you have on a3 and a5....very small numbers of missiles again.
The kind of pattern play you laid out is the luxury in hands of usa and russia only with 100s of proven icbm and good fraction with mirvs.
Before 2025 we are not in a position to play with small just enough payload warheads.
Until then unitary payload is all you have on a3 and a5....very small numbers of missiles again.
The kind of pattern play you laid out is the luxury in hands of usa and russia only with 100s of proven icbm and good fraction with mirvs.
Before 2025 we are not in a position to play with small just enough payload warheads.
Re: Deterrence
Singha it comes back to what i wrote earlier.Singha wrote:It is well known a grid of smaller hits will kill more people but then what luxury do we have in terms of mirv payloads? Bald fact is we have zwro mirv capability at present and only when a6 and k4 enter ioc in say 7 yrs we will start on having it. How long before we have good number of such kit to carry such smart and small payload..maybe 15 yrs for sure.
Until then unitary payload is all you have on a3 and a5....very small numbers of missiles again.
The kind of pattern play you laid out is the luxury in hands of usa and russia only with 100s of proven icbm and good fraction with mirvs.
Before 2025 we are not in a position to play with small just enough payload warheads.
1. How much fissile material do we have for warheads? Very little info on that.
2. Better to launch 6 missiles for one target than 1 if you don't have MIRVs
The overall point I want to make is that nukes are so dangerous and destructive that one can be innovative and tailor what one has to inflict pain on the other guy. But you need the nuclear material for that. The Prolotullahs are not morons. FMCT recognizes just this fact
Re: Deterrence
THis is a very good post. This is a media created images which is taken as truth over decades.shiv wrote:The "nuclear arms race" was invented by the USA and all talk about nuclear weapon usage has been generated from US think tanks. The issue has not got as much public attention in India and we absorb US attitudes and values by reading the only available material which is from the US.
The US for example presents itself as a humane nation that will not tolerate even one small nuclear blast on its territory. On the other hand it says its adversaries are inhumane and will need to be wiped out (and will be wiped out) by overwhelming force.
This Pakistan deterrence is also lot of hot air. India is not a enforcer in the sense of a Super power. So there is no question of India trying to do a coercive sanction against Pak. Hence there is no reality of deterrence situation. India has to avoid a border war and threat of terrorist attack. These dont need a nuke deterrence. India has to avoid contact with Pakistan and its people for 30 years and we will see results.
India is deterred by Pakistan and the US is deterred from using its nukes by NoKo.
But is Pakistan deterred from using nukes against India? In my opinion Pakistan uses irrationality as a game. When Pakistan readies its nukes irrationally for use on India, there is no way of saying whether Pakistan is really going to use a nuke or simply pretending. That is why Pakistan needs to be assured that it will be destroyed.
Re: Deterrence
Shiv ji, you seem to think that failed deterrence is the only concern and that second-strike capability is of little significance because the damage has been done and therefore it matters not if I have KT weapons or MT weapons. This, in my opinion, is simply wrong because MT weapons might not improve deterrence but MT weapons are necessary for second-strike and I make the [obvious] case for it later. You have also said that multiple KT weapons can create more of a psychological impact during war with KT bombs raining left and right, a bit like IAF using rockets, not bombs, to scare Pakistani forces in East Pakistan in 1971. I say that matters not because we'd be responding to a first strike and the psychological impact would've already become the Indian's burden. From that point on, the psychological need for retaliation is less important and the real need to inflict large-scale damage of long-term impact to the detriment of the attacker's industry and economy takes centre stage. Schadenfreude is only a byproduct, not the goal.
That the US cares about THAAD means even they are aware that their overwhelming deterrence can fail. With your NoKo argument you have also said that NoKo has proved that the US is a NFU country. None of it has a bearing on the relevance of MT weapons. Deterrence may have failed but the need for MT weapons does not diminish.
Stronger weapons with precise delivery are better at blowing open protected blast doors and bunkers. They are better at destroying infrastructure to the point where recovery takes months or years, not weeks. They can be used to obliterate industry and power supply to the point where recovery becomes exponentially complicated.
As an example, even if you have all the iron ore and coal you need, without your steel mill and without electricity you can't make the steel you need to recover. Without your railway lines you can't haul the steel in. Without the steel you can't repair the railway lines.
MT weapons are about the logistics and economy of recovery, not the size of my tool in my pants. I have already understood that the attacker didn't care about the loss of life in India, that the attacker is assured of a second strike from India and that the attacker has also chosen to not care about the loss of life on their side.
Please stop portraying the need for MT weapons as a pisko issue. Deterrence might be all about psychology but the logistics of rebuilding and the economics of recovery are not about psychology, they're very real and objectively prove the need for MT weapons. My "attitude" or some supposed inferiority complex has nothing to do with the need for MT weapons. If the attacker has set the fertility of my land, the health of my people and the size of my economy back by 50 years, I must do them a disproportionate disservice by returning the favour. With both economies set back, we can restart with parity or, preferably, an advantage. What is psychological about this? Absolutely nothing. It is about influencing one's position in the competitive space post-war.
That the US cares about THAAD means even they are aware that their overwhelming deterrence can fail. With your NoKo argument you have also said that NoKo has proved that the US is a NFU country. None of it has a bearing on the relevance of MT weapons. Deterrence may have failed but the need for MT weapons does not diminish.
Stronger weapons with precise delivery are better at blowing open protected blast doors and bunkers. They are better at destroying infrastructure to the point where recovery takes months or years, not weeks. They can be used to obliterate industry and power supply to the point where recovery becomes exponentially complicated.
As an example, even if you have all the iron ore and coal you need, without your steel mill and without electricity you can't make the steel you need to recover. Without your railway lines you can't haul the steel in. Without the steel you can't repair the railway lines.
MT weapons are about the logistics and economy of recovery, not the size of my tool in my pants. I have already understood that the attacker didn't care about the loss of life in India, that the attacker is assured of a second strike from India and that the attacker has also chosen to not care about the loss of life on their side.
Please stop portraying the need for MT weapons as a pisko issue. Deterrence might be all about psychology but the logistics of rebuilding and the economics of recovery are not about psychology, they're very real and objectively prove the need for MT weapons. My "attitude" or some supposed inferiority complex has nothing to do with the need for MT weapons. If the attacker has set the fertility of my land, the health of my people and the size of my economy back by 50 years, I must do them a disproportionate disservice by returning the favour. With both economies set back, we can restart with parity or, preferably, an advantage. What is psychological about this? Absolutely nothing. It is about influencing one's position in the competitive space post-war.
Re: Deterrence
This is what you have imagined after reading my posts. It shows ho difficult it is to communicate an issue that has a strong emotional component. I have not said anything of the sort,PratikDas wrote:Shiv ji, you seem to think that failed deterrence is the only concern and that second-strike capability is of little significance
I never demanded that megaton bombs are not needed. All I have said is that the required amount of damage can be done with kiloton bombs. I think you are underestimating kiloton bombs and overestimating megaton bombs You cannot take out a large city with one megaton bomb. To take out Shanghai you will have to rain several megaton bombs like Indians firing rockets on East Pakistan. But you can take it out of reckoning by a few well placed kiloton bombs. If you think what I am saying is guesswork, the opposing viewpoint is also guesswork.You have also said that multiple KT weapons can create more of a psychological impact during war with KT bombs raining left and right, a bit like IAF using rockets, not bombs, to scare Pakistani forces in East Pakistan in 1971.
In other words we are responding to deterrence which failed. How about trying to find out what will prevent deterrence from failing in the first place?I say that matters not because we'd be responding to a first strike
Agreed. This is a good argument against US type arsenals.That the US cares about THAAD means even they are aware that their overwhelming deterrence can fail.
With your NoKo argument you have also said that NoKo has proved that the US is a NFU country. None of it has a bearing on the relevance of MT weapons.
Wrong. NoKo's kiloton weapons are deterring the US That is what is so funny
Boss what is the matter? Are you talking about counter force as a reaction to first strike? That makes no sense - getting nuked first and then taking out bunkersStronger weapons with precise delivery are better at blowing open protected blast doors and bunkers. They are better at destroying infrastructure to the point where recovery takes months or years, not weeks. They can be used to obliterate industry and power supply to the point where recovery becomes exponentially complicated.
A pure assumption with no real data to say why they will be better than multiple kiloton weapons. NoKo deters the US. Pakistan deters India. Who has the megaton weapons?MT weapons are about the logistics and economy of recovery, not the size of my tool in my pants.
You mean I should stop saying what I think and start saying what YOU think? Do you claim that this request from you is not psychological?Please stop portraying the need for MT weapons as a pisko issue.
Re: Deterrence
Let me quote some of your points:shiv wrote:This is what you have imagined after reading my posts. It shows ho difficult it is to communicate an issue that has a strong emotional component. I have not said anything of the sort,PratikDas wrote:Shiv ji, you seem to think that failed deterrence is the only concern and that second-strike capability is of little significance
- There is, in my view, a "deterrence point" that will scare anyone and make him think twice about using nukes against you.
- How about trying to find out what will prevent deterrence from failing in the first place?
- [Regarding vulnerability of THAAD] Agreed. This is a good argument against US type arsenals.
I agree that this is all guesswork. I am not underestimating but devaluing the power of KT weapons to deteriorate industrial recovery. When you talk about taking a city out of reckoning you are only talking about the duration of the war because you mentioned taking it out of the "war economy". What about taking the city out of reckoning for much longer than that, out of the post-war recovery economy as well? Doesn't a MT weapon support better than a few KT weapons considering critical infrastructure tends to be spaced apart? We can't target every major power plant with a KT warhead, but targetting the point in between 2 power plants with a MT weapon could take both out.shiv wrote:I never demanded that megaton bombs are not needed. All I have said is that the required amount of damage can be done with kiloton bombs. I think you are underestimating nuclear bombs You cannot take out a large city with one megaton bomb. To take out Shanghai you will have to rain several megaton bombs like Indians firing rockets on East Pakistan. But you can take it out of reckoning by a few well placed kiloton bombs. If you think what I am saying is guesswork, the opposing viewpoint is also guesswork.You have also said that multiple KT weapons can create more of a psychological impact during war with KT bombs raining left and right, a bit like IAF using rockets, not bombs, to scare Pakistani forces in East Pakistan in 1971.
Deterrence might work against China because they care about their economy. Deterrence may not work against Pakistan because they care less about their economy, there isn't much of one anyway, and they gamble on the predisposition of the Indian leadership to err on the side of caution. This isn't to say that a future Indian leadership will be vulnerable to the same predisposition. The MT weapons are needed in the arsenal for what they achieve, which is certainly more than what KT weapons can achieve, even if they're only ever required once in the future.shiv wrote:In other words we are responding to deterrence which failed. How about trying to find out what will prevent deterrence from failing in the first place?I say that matters not because we'd be responding to a first strike
It works to prove the point that no amount of precise delivery capability and MT yield is bulletproof, but you don't see any nation giving up its MT weapons because the same counter-force effect can be had with KT weapons.shiv wrote:Agreed. This is a good argument against US type arsenals.That the US cares about THAAD means even they are aware that their overwhelming deterrence can fail.
The threat by NoKo is hyped up beyond belief. I don't care much for US H&D but I really don't think the US is "deterred". The situation only proves that the US doesn't have a hair trigger. Noko simply isn't a threat. They're only a bargaining chip.shiv wrote:With your NoKo argument you have also said that NoKo has proved that the US is a NFU country. None of it has a bearing on the relevance of MT weapons.
Wrong. NoKo's kiloton weapons are deterring the US That is what is so funny
Sir, people will die on the surface too, if it makes the idea of taking out bunkers in the meanwhile more rational. Sorry, Shiv ji, but India can get nuked despite any BMD capability and any level of deterrence. Can we take the argument to the next step? Won't a MT counter-strike kill more as well even as it goes about doing greater long-term damage to infrastructure?shiv wrote:Boss what is the matter? Are you talking about counter force as a reaction to first strike? That makes no sense - getting nuked first and then taking out bunkersStronger weapons with precise delivery are better at blowing open protected blast doors and bunkers. They are better at destroying infrastructure to the point where recovery takes months or years, not weeks. They can be used to obliterate industry and power supply to the point where recovery becomes exponentially complicated.
I really don't believe Noko deters the US. I do believe you have proven that the US is a NFU country and Iran is an example to the same effect. Yes, Pakistan deters India. Yes, India doesn't have MT weapons. India needs MT weapons for second strike because it causes more damage and delays and complicates recovery. I don't have deterrence in mind and I don't have Pakistan in mind as I write this.shiv wrote:A pure assumption with no real data to say why they will be better than multiple kiloton weapons. NoKo deters the US. Pakistan deters India. Who has the megaton weapons?MT weapons are about the logistics and economy of recovery, not the size of my tool in my pants.
It is not at all psychological. You have arguably the best logical mind in the forum and I can't believe you keep withdrawing to the deterrence argument when clearly any level of deterrence can fail and there is a need to do a lot not if but when that happens. Let me quote you:shiv wrote:You mean I should stop saying what I think and start saying what YOU think? Do you claim that this request from you is not psychological?Please stop portraying the need for MT weapons as a pisko issue.
Am I not right is deciphering that you are saying stronger weapons are only necessary for scaring the other party, i.e. for pisko purposes? Whether you believe in counter-force or counter-value and whether current or future Indian administrations have a predisposition for one or none of the above, a MT weapon does more for all that.shiv wrote:It seems to me that everyone simply applies his own personal attitudes about what should scare the other party
Re: Deterrence
Pratik Das I will answer only three points in this post. I will probably take up a couple more in a subsequent post
The US is deterred by all nuclear arsenals to the extent that they will not use their much hyped up oompah-ed policy of first strike.
Megaton weapons are not required for deterrence. They can be cited as necessary for second strike after deterrence has failed, but I have argued that they may not be necessary even for second strike. One need not hinge one's policy and attitudes based on the absence of megaton weapons. If one has them - no need to get rid of them. If one does not have them, no need to imagine that the world will end and deterrence or second strike cannot work in their absence.We should agree that even a US type arsenal doesn't deter. We should also agree that India will not reach a US type arsenal any time soon. So how are we ever to achieve the deterrence point that will scare anyone when even the US has not achieved that capability? To summarize, deterrence can always fail and it doesn't undermine the need for a strong second strike
Pratik Das. Is this or is this not a statement that a psychological attitude has been created about NoKo nukes which you believe amounts to "hype"? I have reasons to believe that it is not hype but it requires explanation. The particular explanation I have in mind is difficult for me to express without getting to many people indignant about my views. I have said it before and will do so again in de course, But let it be for now.The threat by NoKo is hyped up beyond belief.
It does, for reasons I will state. The US is not stupid and knows that the game of domination to be played against nuclear armed adversaries is different from the easier game of domination against non nuclear adversaries.I really don't believe Noko deters the US.
The US is deterred by all nuclear arsenals to the extent that they will not use their much hyped up oompah-ed policy of first strike.
Re: Deterrence
Thank you for responding.
Megatons may not be needed for deterrence when even Gigatons won't deter Pakistan because Pakistan has gambled that India won't use even the sub-KT in response to Pakistani provocation. So you say Pakistan's nukes deter India. I say Pakistan's nukes deter this Indian administration. The conclusion doesn't hold indefinitely.
Once we have an administration that crosses the threshold by using a tactical sub-KT for the first time then both Pakistan and China might start wondering if India will go as far as using a KT or a MT weapon next time - all psychological, but all in the context of deterrence. I'm more concerned about post-first strike because I don't believe in any definitive deterrence.
Megatons may not be needed for deterrence when even Gigatons won't deter Pakistan because Pakistan has gambled that India won't use even the sub-KT in response to Pakistani provocation. So you say Pakistan's nukes deter India. I say Pakistan's nukes deter this Indian administration. The conclusion doesn't hold indefinitely.
Once we have an administration that crosses the threshold by using a tactical sub-KT for the first time then both Pakistan and China might start wondering if India will go as far as using a KT or a MT weapon next time - all psychological, but all in the context of deterrence. I'm more concerned about post-first strike because I don't believe in any definitive deterrence.
Re: Deterrence
Pratik - don't get me wrong here. Nothing personal. I have used the psychology argument as a taunt for the following reason. I want someone to do a good analysis and comparison of what will happen to a city like Shanghai in two different scenariosPratik Das wrote: When you talk about taking a city out of reckoning you are only talking about the duration of the war because you mentioned taking it out of the "war economy". What about taking the city out of reckoning for much longer than that, out of the post-war recovery economy as well? Doesn't a MT weapon support better than a few KT weapons considering critical infrastructure tends to be spaced apart?
1. Single one megaton bomb
2. Two 20 kiloton bombs
The choice of where the bombs are placed is left to the analyst but the damage caused in terms of death and disruption need to be realistic. It is quite OK if the analyst sets out to prove that one is better. But his analysis will have to be credible and homework put in will be appreciated as well as gyan imparted to others on the issue.
After this analysis is done I would like to see why Shanghai would recover more slowly from the megaton bomb rather than the two 20 kt blasts. In the absence of a detailed analysis it will remain guesswork.
My analysis of the situation is that the damage with two 20 kt bombs is itself so bad that the city will not be able to cope, let alone coping with megaton level damage.
But in both cases the city will recover. I do not see recovery in less than one year in either case and in both cases I think disruption for one month is certain. But one will have to go into further detail like where the bomb was dropped and damage to piers, water supply, drainage etc.
But the absence of such an analysis makes it pure guesswork akin to Vatican saying heavy weight falls faster than light weight.
This can be analysed logically. Of course the damage would be greater. But how much of a difference would there be between "great damage" and "greater damage" in terms of how people react to an attack on their city.Can we take the argument to the next step? Won't a MT counter-strike kill more as well even as it goes about doing greater long-term damage to infrastructure?
A simple analysis of what people do in times of disaster would be a pointer. I am trying to force people to think along these lines for several reasons. One is simply to learn. The second is that even as evil minds we may be able to figure out exactly what can cause maximum disruption to a city. After all we are discussing nuclear deterrence and people who read this must know what will come if deterrence fails.
For example if there is a port city whose economy is dependent on the harbour, a nuke far away from the harbour may lead to faster recovery than one aimed at disrupting the life blood of the city. A city in a high region with one or two main highways leading to the city may be given its most cruel treatment by aiming to disrupt the parts of the city from which external aid will come. Mega cities are so big that a single megaton bomb cannot destroy a whole city. It can only disrupt. If we are looking at disruption then one can look at what sort of disruption is best to cause he greatest misery.
Re: Deterrence
Let me ask questions that I have thought about on and off. I have my own answers but I am interested in what others think
1. If there is nuclear war between India and Pakistan would the risk of a nuclear exchange between Noko and someone else or Israel and someone else increase or remain the same?
2. If the US nukes NoKo would the risk of nuclear war between someone else increase?
3. If the US and/or Israel attack Iranian nuclear sites would the risk of future nuclear war between India and Pakistan increase or decrease?
4. If anyone uses a nuke against anyone else would the overall risk of further nuclear conflict increase or decrease?
1. If there is nuclear war between India and Pakistan would the risk of a nuclear exchange between Noko and someone else or Israel and someone else increase or remain the same?
2. If the US nukes NoKo would the risk of nuclear war between someone else increase?
3. If the US and/or Israel attack Iranian nuclear sites would the risk of future nuclear war between India and Pakistan increase or decrease?
4. If anyone uses a nuke against anyone else would the overall risk of further nuclear conflict increase or decrease?
Re: Deterrence
Shiv ji: This matter of what in general will deter has been beaten to death. Your approach cannot be proven by anyone as necessarily wrong simply because not enough data to predict all scenarios exist. What you do well though is provide alternative thought structures to think about the issue.
We need to be able to discuss deterrence shedding the US based literature and view points and compiling more information on our likely adversaries in terms of their intents, capabilities and doctrine, their institutions, people and situations. These IMO will provide far better understanding of what it takes to deter our likely opponents.
The challenge is to arrest our own emotions, while dissecting the enemies views on deterrence to get to realistic scenarios and possibilities. There has to be an "agreed" basic set of assumptions to start with to conduct a meaningful discussion, such as Pakistanis are not mad and are not out there to lob nuclear bombs at us out of the blue one day. Pakistani arsenal is secure enough that Jihadis shall not be able to get access to a usable device. If there is no basic agreement on such then dissecting higher level deterrence equations become difficult.
At least I wish to discuss these but fear that no such basic agreement exists and many are unable to check their emotions and hence higher level understanding of what it takes to accomplish deterrence varies wildly. This is not to say that we all turn to "Mr. Spock" like behaviors and deny that these emotions do not exist.
Just one of variables such as the person at the helm can change things significantly but not everything. A Mao thinks differently on the issue than a Deng Xiaoping. A JFK thinks differently than say Nixon. They have different approaches and risk profiles some institutionalized some not. Similary, a Musharraf thinks differently than a Kayani.
Also, another issue that deviates discussions on this topic is a misunderstanding of the purpose of nuclear deterrence. India's nuclear arsenal against Pakistan is not meant to deter sub conventional or even conventional attack. This basic fact has to be accepted. Similarly, Pakistan's deterrence objectives are to deter a conventional attack but of what kind and with what objectives is to be understood. Many such "on topic" questions in terms of nuclear deterrence in our region have yet to be fully explored. My desire here is to more fully understand and explore deterrence as it applies to India, from an Indian lens with Indian biases and assumptions and objectives.
OT: BTW, read that Sajjad Haider book you had recommend.
We need to be able to discuss deterrence shedding the US based literature and view points and compiling more information on our likely adversaries in terms of their intents, capabilities and doctrine, their institutions, people and situations. These IMO will provide far better understanding of what it takes to deter our likely opponents.
The challenge is to arrest our own emotions, while dissecting the enemies views on deterrence to get to realistic scenarios and possibilities. There has to be an "agreed" basic set of assumptions to start with to conduct a meaningful discussion, such as Pakistanis are not mad and are not out there to lob nuclear bombs at us out of the blue one day. Pakistani arsenal is secure enough that Jihadis shall not be able to get access to a usable device. If there is no basic agreement on such then dissecting higher level deterrence equations become difficult.
At least I wish to discuss these but fear that no such basic agreement exists and many are unable to check their emotions and hence higher level understanding of what it takes to accomplish deterrence varies wildly. This is not to say that we all turn to "Mr. Spock" like behaviors and deny that these emotions do not exist.
Just one of variables such as the person at the helm can change things significantly but not everything. A Mao thinks differently on the issue than a Deng Xiaoping. A JFK thinks differently than say Nixon. They have different approaches and risk profiles some institutionalized some not. Similary, a Musharraf thinks differently than a Kayani.
Also, another issue that deviates discussions on this topic is a misunderstanding of the purpose of nuclear deterrence. India's nuclear arsenal against Pakistan is not meant to deter sub conventional or even conventional attack. This basic fact has to be accepted. Similarly, Pakistan's deterrence objectives are to deter a conventional attack but of what kind and with what objectives is to be understood. Many such "on topic" questions in terms of nuclear deterrence in our region have yet to be fully explored. My desire here is to more fully understand and explore deterrence as it applies to India, from an Indian lens with Indian biases and assumptions and objectives.
OT: BTW, read that Sajjad Haider book you had recommend.
Re: Deterrence
Decrease. Mankind would have to be deranged to appreciate nuclear weapons use. I do not think mankind is that depraved to loose its collective conscious, even if there are lapses.shiv wrote: 4. If anyone uses a nuke against anyone else would the overall risk of further nuclear conflict increase or decrease?
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Re: Deterrence
Sorry! This is a very benign world view.ShauryaT wrote:Decrease. Mankind would have to be deranged to appreciate nuclear weapons use. I do not think mankind is that depraved to loose its collective conscious, even if there are lapses.shiv wrote: 4. If anyone uses a nuke against anyone else would the overall risk of further nuclear conflict increase or decrease?
http://www.timelines.info/history/confl ... d_war_two/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wa ... %80%931989
Re: Deterrence
On BRF this is the single most common factor that confuses any discussion. The question of "Deterrence" in the nuclear context was always deterrence of nuclear attack. Not conventional attack. Or terrorism.ShauryaT wrote:
Also, another issue that deviates discussions on this topic is a misunderstanding of the purpose of nuclear deterrence. India's nuclear arsenal against Pakistan is not meant to deter sub conventional or even conventional attack.
But the confusion did not start with BRF. It started with western media and think tanks who said that nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR actually prevented direct conventional war between the two and therefore nuclear weapons will deter conventional war. This was a mistaken premise in the first place.
In fact it is entirely possible that Paki generals bought the theory and though India would not respond to a Kargil like provocation because of nuclear weapons. That was wrong. However they went one notch below military ops to covert ops/terrorism and were right in gambling that India would not mount a conventional response, let alone a nuclear response.
So Pakistan has discovered the threshold for hitting India, but I digress.