Indus Water Treaty

[SSridhar]

I am just going through the interim order of the CoA. What struck me immediately was the openness of India and the secrecy of Pakistan wrt the proceedings of the Court. India wanted the proceedings to be even broadcast and all documents made public whereas Pakistan wanted everything to be cloak-and-dagger and only Press Releases issued by the CoA whenever needed. Also, the frivolous objections, as usual, raised by Pakistan at various stages of the proceedings go to indicate the mindset of the Islamic Republic. We have seen this type of behaviour (compulsive obstructive obsessive neurotic) since c. 1906 when a group of Mussalman met the Viceroy Minto at Shimla to stake a claim.

[SSridhar]

Whatever we do, the sediment *must* be flushed downstream of Kishenganga and must reach Muzzafarabad. This alluvial gift from India would help the Islamic Terrorist Republic of Pakistan.

[Pranav]

I think there are two points that could be made -

(1) The CoA has suggested that there are adequate sediment management methods which do not require "draw down". If, even after using the said methods the sediment is not adequately controlled, then it would constitute an "unforseen circumstance" under which India has every right for a full draw down.

(2) India is not under any obligation to recognize any gratuitous views of the CoA on matters that were not placed before it in the first place. The matter that was placed before it was only related to the Kishenganga project, not any future projects.

[Pranav]

How about siphoning out sediment with water from near the reservoir bed? Put a barge on the surface, with a pipe being suspended from it, with its opening being held say half a meter off the bed. The other end of the pipe goes downstream of the dam.

Move the barge around and you would be able to "vacuum clean" the reservoir bed with only minimum power consumption.

Maybe you can design a special wheeled "anchor" to hold the pipe opening at the right distance from the reservoir bed. This "anchor" could move around on the bed with the barge stationary on the surface. Then move the barge and anchor to cover another area. Maybe the anchor could even have some kind of underwater "drill" to agitate the sediment so it can get sucked out by the siphon.

Part of the piping could be fixed but a segment from the barge to the dam wall would need to be flexible to allow the barge to move around.

Added later: It may not be easy to raise the sediment particles with the flowing water. It depends upon the density of the sediment particles, and how easily they can be suspended in the water. If that becomes an issue then you should not lift the sediment up from the wheeled anchor to a barge on the surface ... the tube should go horizontally from the anchor along the reservoir bed and then through the dam wall.

It is interesting that some of these ideas have actually been tried out - see

Sediment removal efficiency of siphon dredging with wedge-type suction head and float tank - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ar ... 7910600340

Also case studies from China in the book Reservoir Sediment Management By Şahnaz Tiğrek, Tuçe Aras - http://books.google.co.in/books?id=kafE ... al&f=false

[sanjaykumar]

http://www.hydrocoop.org/publications/C ... oblems.pdf

Thus, India should have a number of options. But it might be best to renegotiate IWT, from a much stronger economic and political position than he 1950s. India should dictate terms, at the least demand a fairer share of water resources.

[Theo_Fidel]

The most unfortunate thing is that the Salal dam has desilting sluice gates at the bottom of the dam. India can not use those sluices to desilt because of commitment given.

[Pranav]

The most unfortunate thing is that the Salal dam has desilting sluice gates at the bottom of the dam. India can not use those sluices to desilt because of commitment given.

As per my understanding low level gates can be used, but the problem is that the reservoir cannot be drawn down below dead level, making such use less effective.

So alternatives which don't require draw down must be found. I wonder whether siphon-dredging, or building of an upstream mini-dam, have been considered for Salal.

Furthermore, siltation at Salal can be considered to be an unforeseen circumstance, since it was not foreseen at the time of construction. The Treaty explicitly allows draw-down in unforeseen circumstances.

[chaanakya]

The Kishanganga Dam does not have much gradient near the place of its cinstruction. The Dam height is merely to ensure that adequate water is stored for ROR Power plant which would be placed on a different location altogether. The Head being utilised for power generation due to geography. The area after the dam immediately goes beyond LOC.

Now the prolem is once can not construct a bypass channel with sufficient head pressure to ensure sediment flushing. The viable option would be drawdown flushing. Clearly Our Expert was ill informed. But There could be other solution such as constructing auxiliary channel to let sediment flow beyond Power station through the same tunnel where Headrace would be located.

Other types could be there but one has to see few factors: such as how much energy is being used for sediment flushing when not using natural and passive features. How much of mechanical stress would be on any such active devices. What would be other operational difficulties. If sediment is not flushed regularly, then upper layer of water body would contain increasing amount of sediments due to gradual filling of the dam bed and that would result in more sediment flowing through headrace tunnel damaging turbine blades. That could be potentially fatal situation.

But technically viable solutions , other than drawdown flushing, must be examined and found. Notwithstanding this minor hiccup basic principles have been reiterated and decided in Indias favour. There would be some extra cost for this and each new dam that we would construct in future but we can jolly well go ahead and construct dams using full quota.

[James B]

Pakis are claiming the victory. The made the issue of draw down mechanism as their main point and diversion of water as secondary

[SSridhar]

Whatever we may say, the denial of draw-down flushing in this and *all* future project has deep implications for India. The CoA claims that this method violates the IWT. One does not see how. India must ask for clarification and re-interpretation. There cannot be an omnibus removal of a valid engineering option for India for all times to come. This is violative of principles of natural justice.

[chaanakya]

Pakis can talk about draw down till they drop dead.

There was one news item in Pakistan which claimed that India was permitted minimum use of water for KHEP so as to not affect the flow in Kishanganga beyond dam.
Here is what Press release outlines the decision in this regard.

The Court therefore found that Pakistan retains the right to receive a minimum flow of water from India in the Kishenganga/Neelum riverbed at all times. The Court noted that this right also stems from customary international environmental law, and that it considered that the Treaty must be applied in light of contemporary international environmental law principles.

In this context, the Court recalled the commitment made by India’s Agent in the course of the hearing that India would ensure a minimum environmental flow downstream of the KHEP at all times.

So it is not the Powerhouse of KHEP but Pakistan , downstream the river , would receive minimum flow environmentally needed. India had already assured pakis on this yet they wanted COA. As earlier pointed out in this thread, impounding of water in KHEP is not going to impact the flow by more than 11%.

Pakis should remember what was the first and foremost dispute for which they went to the town and as outlined by COA

As stated in Pakistan’s Request for Arbitration, the dispute between the Parties as to:

Whether India’s proposed diversion of the river Kishenganga (Neelum) into another Tributary, i.e. the Bonar-Madmati Nallah, being one central element of the Kishenganga Project, breaches India’s legal obligations owed to Pakistan under the Treaty, as interpreted and applied in accordance with international law, including India’s obligations under Article III(2) (let flow all the waters of the Western rivers and not permit any interference with those waters) and Article IV(6) (maintenance of natural channels)

And COA says

In essence,
the Parties disagree as to whether the planned diversion of water and other technical design features of the KHEP are in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.

The Court is unconvinced by Pakistan’s argument that this water must first be released back into the Kishenganga/Neelum below the dam before it may permissibly be delivered into another tributary of the Jhelum. The additional restriction would make no operational sense. Paragraph 15(iii), moreover, refers to water “released below the Plant,” not to water “released below the dam.” In the Court’s understanding of the term “Plant,” water released from the KHEP tail-race into the Bonar Nallah is undoubtedly released below the Plant. It is simply the case that here, there is not one watercourse but two flowing below (or downstream of) the Plant into which water may be released. Similarly, the Court cannot accept that the phrase “into another Tributary” was intended to mean anything other than another tributary of the Jhelum. There is no textual basis for concluding that the second use of the term “Tributary” in
Paragraph 15(iii) differs from the first and refers exclusively, as Pakistan suggests, to tributaries of the Kishenganga/Neelum itself.

In the present case, however, the Court concludes, on the basis of its understanding of the KHEP and its appreciation of the Gurez site, that diversion from that site is, in fact, “necessary” for India to generate significant power

Thus, on the one hand, the Treaty establishes that Pakistan enjoys unrestricted use of those waters of the Western Rivers which it is entitled to receive. On the other hand, the Treaty’s specifications in respect of India’s hydro-electric uses on the Western Rivers are inconsistent with denying to India the capacity to generate electricity from power plants built in conformity with the Treaty. Any interpretation of Paragraph 15 the logical result of which would be to allow Pakistan unilaterally to curtail the ability of such Indian Plants to operate would subvert an important element of the object and purpose of the Treaty.

[chaanakya]

COA decision on Second dispute

(1) Except in the case of an unforeseen emergency, the Treaty does not permit reduction below Dead Storage Level of the water level in the reservoirs of Run-of-River Plants on the Western Rivers.

(2) The accumulation of sediment in the reservoir of a Run-of-River Plant on the Western Rivers does not constitute an unforeseen emergency that would permit the depletion of the reservoir below Dead Storage Level for drawdown flushing purposes.

(3) Accordingly, India may not employ drawdown flushing at the reservoir of the Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Plant to an extent that would entail depletion of the reservoir below Dead Storage Level.

(4) Paragraphs B(1) and B(2) above do not apply to Run-of-River Plants that are in operation on the date of issuance of this Partial Award. Likewise, Paragraphs B(1) and B(2) do not apply to Run-of-River Plants already under construction on the date of issuance of this Partial Award, the design of which, having been duly communicated by India under the provisions of Annexure D, had not been objected to by Pakistan as provided for in Annexure D.

C. This Partial Award imposes no further restrictions on the construction and operation of the Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Plant, which remain subject to the provisions of the Treaty as interpreted in this Partial Award.

In carrying out this evaluation, the Court emphasizes that it is not considering whether the development of hydro-electric power without recourse to drawdown flushing is preferable for India. It is not for the Court to apply “best practices” in resolving this dispute. India has quite understandably argued in these proceedings for a right to the optimal design and operation of its hydro-electric installations on the upstream stretches of the Western Rivers. However, any exercise of design involves consideration of a variety of factors—not all of them technical. Hydrologic, geologic, social, economic, environmental and regulatory considerations are all directly relevant, While acknowledging that the potential impact of sediment must be evaluated and modelled in relation to each particular site and dam design, the Court presently sees no reason why the factors favouring the feasibility of a sluicing mode of operation at the KHEP site would not apply equally to other sites on the Western Rivers at which India would be likely to construct Run-of-River Plants. 738 and the Court considers the Treaty restraints on the construction and operation by India of reservoirs to be such a regulatory factor.
739
* * *
For the Court, the optimal design and operation of a hydro-electric plant is that which can practically be achieved within
the constraints imposed by the Treaty.

Award of Court of Arbitration can not get extended to Next or any future dam. It is evident that COA , by itself , does not consider the argument as final one. It places only on restriction as to depletion of water below dead storage level. is not permitted by the Treaty except in unforeseen circumstances. In its opinion Sedimentation does not constitute such eventuality. however if there is no proper Gate below the dead storage level for flushing in the even of some unforeseen eventuality (excepting sedimentation) how India would exercise that option. So there would not be any restriction as to making low level gates but there would be restriction on its use for drawdown flushing unless no other method technically superior and efficient is available. Of course that would give scope to Pakis to keep on disputing. That they would do in any case.

On the whole , this partial award represents a comprehensive loss to Pakis abd by their own estimates their plant at NJHEP would be reduced by 14-30% in power generation. Would it be viable even after that is a question lending agencies should seriously contemplate. Cost of generated power would be so damn costly for beggars in pakistan that they would rather rob it than to legitimately use it by paying prohibitively high cost. I wonder what could be the life of NJHEP after this and if they are using Drawdown flushing or sluicing. I also wonder if NJHEP would be able to bear the heavy sediment release from KHEP and sustain the operation of Chinese turbines through erosive flow.

[chaanakya]

Whatever we may say, the denial of draw-down flushing in this and *all* future project has deep implications for India. The CoA claims that this method violates the IWT. One does not see how. India must ask for clarification and re-interpretation. There cannot be an omnibus removal of a valid engineering option for India for all times to come. This is violative of principles of natural justice.

I agree with you and I am sure this is not yet a settled principle. Such unsolicited observation might not apply to future dams and needs to be challenged as such, even for KHEP, while going ahead with construction with , may be , cosmetic changes.

[Theo_Fidel]

If draw down is not allowed the only realistic solution is a fore dam that diverts silt around the main dam structure. This too will cause energy losses as water is diverted away from the pump house. Maybe the minimum environmental flows can carry this. Still a redesign will be required.

[sanjaykumar]

Apparently a reservoir can be dug out upstream that will serve as a catchment basin for the silt.

[Prem]

Apparently a reservoir (S) can be dug out upstream that will serve as a catchment basin for the silt.

Indian might need many many many of them to filter and separate the water from silt while maintaining the minimum environmental flow toward the people low and below us . It is well known fact that Chinese made Turbines are very sensitive toward silt and like silt free clean water .

[Vipul]

RAPE/Track II Analysis.

Draw down flushing not allowed, India cant control water flow and hence pakistani victory.

[Theo_Fidel]

^^^
The fellow is wrong. Mixing up dead storage with live storage is such a wrong headed mistake.

nd here it is the finding of the ICA on allowable manipulable storage which is the key issue. The Baglihar decision would appear to have provided India with a green light to build these projects with as much live storage as they chose (as long as they classified it as "for sediment flushing"). What is enormously important is that the ICA has, according to early press accounts, addressed this issue head-on and, de facto, concluded that the Baglihar finding in this regard undercut the central compromise of the Indus Waters Treaty, was wrong and should not be applied to future projects. The ICA has, apparently, specifically ruled that the design and operation of Indian hydropower projects on the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum cannot include more live storage than allowed under the IWT, even if the justification for such storage is silt management.

What can one say about this nonsense. The rivers are shared. The problem is one side thinks all the western rivers belong to it....

This should be one in which there is a search for joint benefits (such as hydropower plants built in the best possible sites, with power sold both ways, and with operating rules which benefit both parties built into the project).

[dada]

Total Storage = Live Storage ( Power Generation + Silt Management + ?? ) + Dead Storage

[SSridhar]

Jubilation at Indus win is Premature - Ramaswami R Iyer, The Hindu

In his article in The Hindu , John Briscoe makes some valid points about the Kishenganga Award (editorial page, “Winning the battle, but losing the war,” February 22, 2013) but we need to note certain complexities, and a central dilemma arising from the Treaty. Yes, India wins on point (1) [Whether India’s proposed diversion of the Kishenganga (Neelum) into the Bonar Madmati Nallah, being one central element of the Kishenganga Project, breaches India’s legal obligations owed to Pakistan under the Treaty, as interpreted and applied in accordance with international law, including India’s obligations under Article III (2) and Article IV (6)? — the “First Dispute”], as was to be expected, and yes, Pakistan has won on point (2) [Whether under the Treaty, India may deplete or bring the reservoir level of a run-of-river Plant below Dead Storage Level in any circumstances except in the case of an unforeseen emergency? — the “Second Dispute”], but this needs to be gone into further.

At the outset it must be mentioned that the Award is an interim or partial one; the final award will come later. Jubilation at having won on the issue of diversion of waters is premature. We have to wait and see what stipulations the final award makes, and what implications they may have for the extent of diversion and the capacity of the power plant. However, the decision that there is no violation of the Treaty and that the project may proceed is certainly a matter for satisfaction to India.

Pakistan must have known that with a specific provision in the Treaty envisaging inter-tributary transfers on the Jhelum, their contention that Kishenganga was a violation of the Treaty was unlikely to be upheld. Why then did they take this project to arbitration? The answer is that the second issue, i.e., drawdown flushing (arising from the Baglihar case), was much more important to them. They were dismayed by the Neutral Expert’s (NE) recommendation on this matter, but the Treaty provided for no appeal against the NE’s findings, and they could not ask for a Court of Arbitration (CoA) on that issue in the Baglihar case; they therefore used the Kishenganga case to mount an indirect appeal against the idea of drawdown flushing. They have succeeded.

Drawdown flushing

Let us now get to the complexities. First, a purely technical point: the arbitration in each case is sui generis . The finding or award in one case applies only to the difference or dispute in that case. However, as it would be absurd to adopt divergent principles in different cases, the decision in one case will tend to become a precedent for others. At the same time, while the Kishenganga decision on drawdown flushing will need to be kept in mind in all future cases, does it retrospectively nullify the NE’s finding in the Baglihar case, though the Treaty does not provide for an appeal against that finding? Strictly speaking, it cannot, but it seems a bit odd to adopt a certain practice in Baglihar and refrain from it in future cases. I leave the conundrum to legal experts.

What are the implications of ruling out drawdown flushing? To answer this, we must go back to the Salal Project. That case did not go to arbitration but was settled by mutual agreement between the two governments. The condition stipulated by Pakistan for agreeing to the project was that the low-level sluices should be permanently blocked. India accepted this, and this has meant the trapping of the silt in the reservoir, leading to severe turbine maintenance problems, and a reduction of generation capacity and of project life. India was therefore happy that the NE in the Baglihar case recognised the importance of proper maintenance of the project, including the flushing of the reservoir to get rid of sediment. This seemed to go against the Treaty provision that forbids outlets below the dead storage level, but the NE observed that while the dead storage could not be used for operational purposes, it could be used for maintenance purposes. This caused dismay in Pakistan and they referred the issue to the CoA. Now the CoA has given a ruling which means that the problems that crippled Salal will cripple all future projects, unless alternative methods of sediment-removal are found. This is what the CoA has said, and Indian engineers will have to find answers. One hopes that there are indeed answers.

It is difficult to believe that the Treaty envisaged that a project would be constructed at great cost and then allowed to silt up rapidly and suffer a drastic reduction in project life. It must be noted that the Treaty makes its prescription of “no outlets below the dead storage level” subject to the proviso “unless sediment control or other technical considerations necessitate this.” One wonders whether the CoA gave due weight to that proviso. I referred to a dilemma arising from the Treaty. It is the following. While allowing India limited use of the waters of the western rivers, including the construction of run-of-the river hydroelectric projects, the Treaty imposes stringent engineering and operational conditions on such use for the purpose of protecting Pakistan from possible harm. Each such condition and restriction in the Treaty is accompanied by the proviso “consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation.” That kind of balancing act is easy enough to write into a Treaty but problematic in practice. This leads to a permanent tug of war in the Indus Commission, with India stressing the permissive provisions and the proviso mentioned above, and Pakistan taking its stand on the restrictive provisions and ignoring that proviso.

Here then is the dilemma. If the proviso is read too liberally, then the protection to Pakistan might get compromised; if the stringent provisions are insisted upon in an absolute manner, ignoring the proviso, then the permission given to India to build hydroelectric projects gets virtually nullified. If we say “go ahead and build projects but don’t flush the reservoir; accept the possibility of unsatisfactory operation” we are virtually saying “Don’t build projects,” which is a departure from the Treaty.

Briscoe’s suggestion of joint and collaborative undertakings is welcome, but given the state of relations between the two countries, they seem highly improbable. If that sort of cooperation is possible, what prevents the existing Treaty itself from being operated in a constructive, harmonious spirit? I have myself been making more modest proposals of joint studies to take care of certain concerns of Pakistan, but I wonder whether they will happen. We must of course keep trying.

(Ramaswamy R. Iyer is a former Secretary, Water Resources, Government of India.)

[manjgu]

as per the video in this thread a) silt is not a major problem/issue in the kishenganga project given the topography/geography of the area. Absence of draw down flushing will not be a major issue wrt to the power plant. b) diversion is allowed but the final quantum of water that is NOT to be diverted is still to be fixed depending on data provided by both india and pakistan. This quantum will impact the electiricty generation potential of both the Indian dam and paki dam on the river.

MR Iyers article really IMHO hits the nail on the head. Depending on which side of the border u r looking at it, u can see it differently.

Drawdown flushing does gives India ability to control the flow of water into pakistan. However, given the fact that the treaty has generally been followed in both letter/spirit for so many years the provisios should be viewed liberally.

question for Ssridhar...

a) how often is drawdown flushing done in a year say in case of Baglihar??

b) how long does it take to fill the pond once draw down has been done?? ( baglihar)??

[pankajs]

Diamer Bhasha Dam: World Bank, not ADB, presses for seeking Indian NOC

ISLAMABAD: A move by the Asian Development Bank to bring World Bank on board for co-financing Diamer Bhasha Dam backfired when the World Bank instead asked the ADB to first seek a no-objection certificate from India – a condition that has derailed the project.

What is going on between the two international lenders does not absolve the government of its responsibilities. Officials said the government could have fought back against the Indian lobby by approaching the Americans who have expressed interest in financing the dam.

Really! So India now controls IMF/WB?

[Pranav]

Jubilation at Indus win is Premature - Ramaswami R Iyer, The Hindu

Now the CoA has given a ruling which means that the problems that crippled Salal will cripple all future projects, unless alternative methods of sediment-removal are found. This is what the CoA has said, and Indian engineers will have to find answers. One hopes that there are indeed answers.

Certainly there are answers. Siphon dredging, and construction of a small upstream dam for sediment diversion, have been discussed on this thread.

But are the Central Water Commission engineers seized of the matter? It was not good to see the Indian representative go to the Court of Arbitration and confess that he was quite ignorant of these issues.

[vic]

How come these solutions were not employed at Salal?

[chaanakya]

First of all he agrees that each arbitration case is sui generis and not applied to next case. Then he goes on to say that however it would be absurd to apply divergent principles in different cases.

When NE delivered its award in Baglihar case it laid down a solid argument for low level gates and use of draw down flushing. Now it was absurd of COA not to study those aspects and interpret the Treaty in a totally divergent way . COA pointed out that India has not raised this issue before NE in case of KHEP and therefore nothing prevents COA from taking it up. It did not consider NE award in case of Baglihar as applicable to KHEP.

Now I am going to apply the same logic and not accept the argument of COA for future dams , each award being sui generis.

If need be the issue could easily be raised before another NE/COA in anothee dam where Pakistan is most certainly to raise this and host of other issues.

Hence , what Pakistan has essentially demonstrated that there is no finality of the case under IWT and each dam would be contested. So be it.

As regards low level gates there are some provisions in IWT which are relevant for this.
Ann E

19. The Dead Storage shall not be depleted except in an unforeseen emergency. If so depleted, it will be refilled in accordance with the conditions of its initial filling

11. The design of any Storage Work (other than a Storage Work falling under Paragraph 3) shall conform to the following criteria :

(a) The Storage Work shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the reservoir higher than the designed Full Reservoir Level except to the extent necessary for Flood Storage, if any, specified in the design.

(b) The design of the works shall take due account of the requirements of Surcharge Storage.

(c) The volume between the Full Reservoir Level and the Dead Storage Level of any reservoir shall not exceed the Conservation Storage Capacity specified in the design.

(d) With respect to the Flood Storage mentioned in Paragraph 9, the design of the works on the Jhelum Main shall be such that no water can spill from the Jhelum Main into the off-channel storage except when the water level in the Jhelum Main rises above the low flood stage.

(e) Outlets or other works of sufficient capacity shall be provided to deliver into the river downstream the flow of the river received upstream of the Storage Work, except during freshets or floods. These outlets or works shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and with satisfactory operation of the Storage Work.

(f) Any outlets below the Dead Storage Level necessary for sediment control or any other technical purpose shall be of the minimum size, and located at the highest level, consistent with sound and economical design and with satisfactory operation of the Storage Work.

(g) If a power plant is incorporated in the Storage Work, the intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the plant and with customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the plant’s operation.

The paragraphs highlighted indicates that it is permissible to design gates below dead storage level which should be minimum required for satisfactory operation and sound and economical design and at the highest level consistent with above factors. In fact , if one recalls Baglihar award, NE had changed the height of outlet below dead storage level.

I am not sure what made Mr Rangrajan to accept that he is not aware of the best possible means for sediment control from the point of view of ease of operation, economic and technical feasibility, less use of energy anf most efficient method for sediment control. Other methods suggested above are costly, operationally complicated and technically complex. India could have flown experts to depose before the COA or at least brief Mr Rangrajan.

However that is besides the point. The issue is that Low level out let is permitted and reservoir emptying is permitted is situation so warrants and for that provision has to be made consistent with treaty obligation. The most COA should have done is to impose certain technical restrictions. Instead it talked about future dams and India would not give a damn about it.


While talking about the same IWT in 2010 he was quite emphatic in his assertions and never once ventured the idea of Joint studies.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/what- ... -/594319/0

The fact that needs to be stated clearly and categorically is that there is no water issue between India and Pakistan. Water-sharing on the Indus stands settled by the Indus Treaty 1960, and the sharing is so simple (three rivers to India, three rivers to Pakistan) that no misunderstandings or misinterpretations are possible. (There is indeed some dissatisfaction in both countries with the water-sharing under the treaty, but they have to live with it as it was the agreed outcome of prolonged negotiations approved at the highest level in both countries.) For monitoring the operation, there is a joint Indus Commission mandated by the treaty. The differences that can arise and have arisen under the treaty relate not to water-sharing but to questions of conformity of Indian projects on the western rivers (permitted by the treaty) to the technical and engineering stipulations laid down in the treaty. There are provisions and procedures for dealing with such "differences" or "disputes".

I wonder what made his write like that

It must be noted that the Treaty makes its prescription of “no outlets below the dead storage level” subject to the proviso “unless sediment control or other technical considerations necessitate this.” One wonders whether the CoA gave due weight to that proviso.

There is no such prescription in the treaty. Treaty says Any outlets below the Dead Storage Level necessary for sediment control or any other technical purpose shall be of the minimum size, and located at the highest level, consistent with sound and economical design and with satisfactory operation of the Storage Work

The paki formulation of issue has crept in our discourse on IWT and even civil servants ( not engineers ) have fallen pray to it. The impact of Track-II is seeped into mainstream.

Therefore he concludes for a joint studies of the basis.

I have myself been making more modest proposals of joint studies to take care of certain concerns of Pakistan, but I wonder whether they will happen.


To answer vic

1. During Flood season Reservoir flushing can be carried out. The reservoir is almost emptied for sediment flushing.The outlet must be at certain height above the dam bed so as not to get itself clogged by sediments and make it difficult to operate the gates.
It has to be done before the filling dates which is 21st June to 31st August and at the prescribed rates.

It coincides with main flooding season.

2. It could be done once in a year but frequency depends on sediment load and type of sediments. coarse sediments would settle down fast while fine sediments would remain suspended and gets out in normals course.

Siphon dredging could be a good alternative though little costly and operationally complex.

[chaanakya]

[Prem]

http://dawn.com/2013/03/04/beyond-the-iwt/
Beyond the IWT

THE partial award by the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) in the Indus Waters Kishenganga arbitration case, permitting India to proceed with the construction of the Kishenganga hydroelectric project, has shocked many who believed that the court would rule against it.
This expectation was unreal in the legal context of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).In April 2010, I had written an op-ed in Dawn underlining that if Pakistan effectively wanted to challenge the exact number of dams or hydroelectric projects that India might construct or undertake upstream on the Western rivers, it needed to step outside the framework of the IWT and raise the issue with India at a bilateral level. Later that year in July, at a talk at the Royal United Services Institute London, I reiterated the IWT’s restricted scope in addressing all water-related issues between Pakistan and India, and stressed the IWT’s essentially technical nature.The Indian government’s decision to construct a dam or a hydroelectric project upstream on any of the Western rivers is taken outside the IWT regime and is based wholly on India’s assessment of its energy needs and strategic interests.India does not submit to Pakistan the reasons behind any such decision through its Indus Waters commissioner. It merely submits a blueprint of the dam or project as stipulated by the IWT and technical details as mentioned in the annexure to the IWT. Crucially, within the treaty’s framework, Pakistan may only object to the technical specifications of the submitted blueprint, not question the political decision. Thus, as long as India’s blueprints conform to the IWT’s technical specifications, it can potentially undertake any number of projects.Simply put, the ICA concedes that as long as India’s blueprint conforms to the IWT, it cannot disallow the construction of a dam or a project. This is so because of the lack of any provision in the IWT authorising India specifically to build a certain number of dams or undertake a certain number of projects.
In Annexure D for instance there is a list of plants that India will construct or complete but no provision regarding the number of future projects undertaken by India. In the absence of any IWT provision authorising or limiting the number of dams, the ICA had no choice but to permit India to go ahead with the Kishenganga project subject to the treaty’s technical requirements.f Pakistan wants to effectively challenge India over the sheer number of upstream dams or projects being constructed as opposed to their technical design, it must not invoke the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism but rather bilaterally take up the matter with India or with any other international forum.The ICA’s partial award affirms this legal position as of now unless it adopts a different view when passing the final award later in the year.In any case, given that arbitration is ongoing, the Pakistan team should take advantage of the four months time granted by the ICA and provide the necessary data and information to maximise its gains from the existing proceedings.

[chaanakya]

VIEW : Indus waters:let’s bury the hatchet — Sara Ali

Netherlands is one of the advanced countries of Europe that has developed its niche on water diplomacy; it possesses specific knowledge that is in demand, has made long-term investments in water arena and has developed a broad network in the field of water management. Pakistan must look in to the possibility of addressing issues pertaining to the Indus Basin by establishing a ‘Tripartite Water Forum’ including both the basin and the Netherlands. One of the benefits of this tripartite water forum will be to resolve water issue without spawning politics between the two rival states i.e. India and Pakistan.

Since the dispute over Indus Waters Treaty mostly hinges upon the issue of dams and most conflicts arise due to clashes over the construction of dams, therefore, measures need to be undertaken to put an end to this practice. Conflicts of such nature can be resolved by initiating cooperative programmes for optimum utilisation of river system. Article seven of the Indus Water Treaty discusses “Future cooperation” and point to the “common interest in the optimum development of the rivers” and urges both India and Pakistan to cooperate fully when carrying out engineering works on the rivers.

Furthermore, to mitigate discrepancies, Pakistan and India must explore new areas of cooperation within and outside the scope of the treaty. They can jointly commission studies that entail and discusses in detail issues arising as a result of the reduced water flows.

It is time to act more prudently, let us forget our old animosities and come to terms to the fact that water is important for both the nations. A right attitude is required to deal with such a sensitive matter and it is time to inculcate that attitude in ourselves.

Sounds familiar. One of our own expert used similar ideas. These balloons are floated from Pakiland and we assimilate into our discourse.

[chaanakya]

http://tribune.com.pk/story/513594/repo ... %20experts

By Our Correspondent
Published: February 28, 2013
ISLAMABAD:

India and Pakistan need to revisit the Indus Water Treaty to address water needs, stated experts at a report launch on Wednesday.

The report “Indus Basin Roadmap for Cross-border Water Research, Data Sharing, and Policy Coordination” stresses cross-border dissemination of hydrological data, investment on regular maintenance of canal infrastructure, drip irrigation systems and identifying alternative crops better suited for growth in the basin’s arid climate..

Shafqat Kakakhel, former ambassador, said the 1960 Indus Water Treaty has no response mechanism for variations in water flow due to climate change. But that is just one of the treaty’s shortcomings. “The agreement does not contain effectively binding provisions to address water quality or pollution.” Similarly, while the two countries share trans-boundary aquifers, there are no provisions for managing groundwater supplies,” he added

Water scarcity is a common challenge and a joint approach should be adopted to address it, Kakakhel stated.David Michael, director of environmental security at the Stimson Centre, shared the report’s recommendations. Effective management of the basin’s water resources, based on scientific data and confidence-building measures, can promote a sustainable future for India and Pakistan

The report also recommends developing a digitised online model of the Indus Basin and increasing knowledge on monsoon variability trends. Experts at the report launch called for rainwater harvesting and water storage to deal with reduced availability.

The report was produced by the Indus Working Group, an outcome of a Pakistan-India Track II project. Sustainable Development Policy Institute had partnered with the Stimson Center for the project.

Track-II ideas. It works on the basis that India is not following the IWT in letter and spirit and is in essence violating the treaty. All by implication rather than by concrete proof. Paki propaganda coopted by track-II snakes.

[chaanakya]

Beyond the IWT

Although Pakistan engaged the services of lawyers of international repute such as James Crawford QC who along with other members of the legal team tried hard to couch the request for relief in the context of legality of the project itself, they ultimately failed to persuade the ICA because the IWT contains no provision forbidding India from constructing a dam or undertaking a project on the basis of Pakistan’s objections on strategic grounds.

Although Pakistan was able to obtain certain technical advantages from the present partial award, in the public’s perception the essential relief — banning the project — could not materialise.

It is time for Pakistan to realise that the IWT does not provide any framework that caters to its strategic concerns that proliferation in the construction of dams or projects upstream on Western rivers might be used against it by India as strategic assets in times of conflict.

Of course, Pakistan should persist with the IWT. I do not subscribe to the idea of scrapping the treaty as it has been an enduring confidence-building measure and has even withstood wars. However, Pakistan’s policymakers must place and interpret the IWT within its proper legal context. As said earlier, the treaty was never intended to scrutinise the Indian government’s political decision of undertaking projects on the Western rivers. Hence, the treaty does not list the precise number of upstream dams or projects that the two countries might have agreed upon in any of its otherwise detailed annexes. It neither identifies any possible sites for upstream dams or projects nor provides any timeline for undertaking their construction.

Clearly therefore, the issue of the exact number of upstream dams or projects that India could or should construct falls outside the scope of the IWT and ought to be addressed outside its framework.

Thus, if Pakistan wants to effectively challenge India over the sheer number of upstream dams or projects being constructed as opposed to their technical design, it must not invoke the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism but rather bilaterally take up the matter with India or with any other international forum.

The ICA’s partial award affirms this legal position as of now unless it adopts a different view when passing the final award later in the year.

[chaanakya]

India, Pakistan urged to revisit Indus Water Treaty: SDPI report on the Indus Basin

Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, Senior Research Associate, SDPI, started the proceedings and said that report was produced by Indus Working Group, which was the outcome of Pakistan-India Track-II project for which SDPI had partnered with the Stimson Centre, Washington DC. He briefed that working group was comprised 25 experts that joined hands to build mutual understanding between Indian and Pakistani decisions-makers on risks and opportunities arising out of Indus river basin.

Sharing the recommendation of the report, David Michel, Director Environmental Security, Stimson Centre, US said that effective management of the basin's water resources - built on sound scientific data, guided by an integrated knowledge base, and anchored by capacity building and confidence building measures - can promote a sustainable future for both India and Pakistan in the Indus Basin. He said the report stressed on cross-border dissemination of hydrological data; promotion of laser land levelling technology and drip irrigation systems; establishing best practices for increased water storage; and identifying alternative crops better suited for growth in the basin's arid climate. It also prioritises investment in regular maintenance of canal infrastructure to minimise agricultural water losses.

Citing recommendation on energy and economic development, he focused on initiating a professional exchange programme for experts between both the countries to educate people on how climate change and shifting precipitation patterns were influencing water availability.

It also recommends developing a digitised online model of the Indus Basin and increase the knowledge base on monsoon variability trends to improve outcomes for rainfall dependent agriculture. Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel (Retd), former UN assistant secretary general and Member Board of Governors, SDPI, was of the view that Indus Water Treaty that survived three wars and governed the water issues for the last five decades needed to be preserved and further refined to address the gaps, issues and challenges confronting both the nations.

He said that existing treaty had no provisions on how to respond to variations in water flow that climate change could engender. "Nor does the agreement contain effectively binding provisions to address water quality or pollution. Similarly, while the two countries share trans-boundary aquifers, there are no provisions for managing groundwater supplies," he added.

He concluded by saying that the water scarcity was common challenge that posed existential threat to India and Pakistan and it was essential that both countries adopt a joint approach to address the issue. Dr Iqrar Ahmad Khan, Vice Chancellor, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad lamented the inefficient use of water and said that efficiency of only 40 percent in agriculture water usage was a crime that could not be tolerated. He talked about comprehensive water distribution arrangements between the upper riparian region and lower riparian regions not only between India and Pakistan, but also between the provinces.

Dr Iqrar said Pakistan had one of the world's lowest ratios for water storage and suggested introducing rainwater harvesting and watershed management in Indus river basin. Simi Kamal emphasised on educating people on sustainable water usage and said unless the water prices in the country were not increased there would be continuous wastage of water in agriculture, industry and in domestic use. "Pakistan has the lowest productivity as per capita water and land usage and this must be changed. We have to educate people to take responsibility in efficient water use and management," she added. She also asked civil society, young researchers, and academicians to initiate research initiatives on water issues and facilitate government in taking correct policy decisions.

Syed Iqbal Hussain, an expert from India presented deliberation on glacial dimensions of Indus water basin. He was of the view that 80 percent of water in Indus River came from snow and glacial melt and keeping in view the rapid melting of glaciers especially in Tibetan plateau from where Indus originated, it was possible that there might be substantial decrease in water flow in Indus in coming future. He also showed his concerns over coal fired power plants in India, producing 70 percent of electricity, and were source of black carbon that was responsible for fast melting of glaciers in the region.

[chaanakya]

India opts for imperialistic tone

Monday, March 04, 2013 - IN an atmosphere where unfortunately trust deficit is increasing between India and Pakistan, New Delhi is trying to show its muscles in an imperialistic tone. According to reports in the media, India has asked Pakistan to get no objection certificates (NoCs) from it for building all the hydropower projects in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir involving funding of international donor agencies.


This demand is funny and smacks foul on further polluting relations between the two countries in spite of Pakistan’s keenness to improve relations. Because of Indian attitude the gulf is widening and the letter sent by the Indians to the water and power ministry would create more distrust to the already somewhat charged atmosphere. Gilgit-Baltistan is an integral part of Pakistan and Kashmir is a disputed territory and its final decision is to be made by the people through a plebiscite as mandated by the UN. India in violation of the Indus Water Treaty is building water storages in occupied Kashmir and diverting water of Pakistani share. Being a riparian country, Pakistan has the right to object over the construction of storages by India and India has no legal right to oppose hydropower projects of ours. It appears that the whole purpose of the Indian letter is to dissuade the international financial institutions from investing in these projects. Already the World Bank under Indian influence has refused the funding for the major strategic project of Diamer-Bhasha dam. We would advise India to desist from imperialistic temptations, as that would further vitiate the atmosphere in the region.

A taste of their own medicine??

[chaanakya]

Indian spin: Pakistan has not lost water case, says minister

Pakistan has not lost its water case in the International Court of Arbitration as the short order of the court ensures a minimum flow under the Indus Water Treaty, the Upper House was told on Tuesday.

“The judgment is not against Pakistan, rather it is in our favour,” State Minister for Water and Power Tasneem Ahmad Qureshi said allaying reservations expressed by Senator Muhammad Mohsin Khan Leghari and the Leader of Opposition in the Senate Ishaq Dar.

Qureshi said the Indian media wrongly presented the case and the real situation was completely the opposite. Pakistan’s reservations have been considered in the short order and a final judgment would be announced in December this year.

Senator Farhatullah Babar said the court has given its verdict to one out of two questions. According to the decision, a minimum flow that has been granted under the Indus Water Treaty will be ensured and that is a victory for Pakistan.

The issue was taken up in the Upper House through a calling attention notice moved by Leghari and Dar. Dar said the government always took water lightly, which is why it lost the case in international arbitration.

[chaanakya]

Diamer Bhasha Dam: World Bank, not ADB, presses for seeking Indian NOC


By Shahbaz Rana / Creative: Faizan Dawood
Published: March 1, 2013

Pakistan asks for $2.5 billion each from the two lenders.
ISLAMABAD:

A move by the Asian Development Bank to bring World Bank on board for co-financing Diamer Bhasha Dam backfired when the World Bank instead asked the ADB to first seek a no-objection certificate from India – a condition that has derailed the project.

The ADB has so far faced criticism for asking for Indian NOC at the eleventh hour when Pakistan has already met agreed prerequisites. Background discussions with officials of multilateral lenders and Pakistani officials concerned revealed that it was actually the World Bank that set the condition of NOC and also asked the ADB to press for the same.

The plan was to seek $2.5 billion each from the ADB, Pakistan’s largest creditor, and the World Bank, the second largest creditor.

“The ADB will never itself impose a condition that is tantamount to undermining sovereignty of the country and seems stupid,” said an official requesting anonymity. He said the ADB was trying to manage the situation and resisting World Bank pressure.

Compared to initial estimates of $11.2 billion, the revised cost of Diamer Bhasha Dam is touching $14 billion with construction work yet to start. Lately, Japan has come forward with a $4 billion package for procurement of machinery, but still the lead financier is missing.

At a time when the ADB was taking up the matter with the World Bank, Pakistan and India had already locked horns over Delhi’s move to divert water to generate electricity. Pakistan invoked an arbitration clause of the Indus Waters Treaty after both the countries failed to resolve disputes over Baglihar and Kishanganga hydropower projects.

Last week, Pakistan lost Kishanganga case in the court of arbitration. The Indus Waters Treaty, inked between India and Pakistan, provides for appointment of a neutral expert by the World Bank as a last option to resolve water disputes between the two countries.

According to another official, the Indian lobby in the World Bank actually prevailed over the management that placed the NOC condition. The bank took the position that since it was an arbitrator between India and Pakistan, financing for Diamer Bhasha Dam would compromise its position.

The ADB has managed to get its board of directors approve a couple of projects in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and insists that it can do the same when the need arises. Yet, it does not solve the equation.

The other day, the ADB’s Director of Energy Division of the Central and West Asia Department, Rune Stroem, stated that right now Pakistan does not have the needed fiscal space to finance mega projects like Diamer Bhasha Dam. Furthermore, the energy sector over the last few years has rotten away and financing of such projects should be seen in broader macroeconomic perspectives.

The way the government has handled the construction of Neelum Jhelum hydropower project, which is far smaller compared to Diamer Bhasha, has further made the ADB wary.

Owing to delays and kickbacks in award of contracts for procurements, the cost of the project has ballooned from Rs84.5 billion to a staggering Rs274.8 billion. ADB officials said the bank did not want to finance a project which remains incomplete after years.

What is going on between the two international lenders does not absolve the government of its responsibilities. Officials said the government could have fought back against the Indian lobby by approaching the Americans who have expressed interest in financing the dam.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 1st, 2013.

[arun]

India, Pakistan urged to revisit Indus Water Treaty: SDPI report on the Indus Basin ........{Snipped} ...............

The cited report titled “Connecting The Drops ; An Indus Basin Roadmap for Cross-Border Water Research, Data Sharing, and Policy Coordination” produced by the Observer Research Foundation (Indian), Stimson Center (American) and SDPI (Pakistani):

Connecting The Drops

The Indian participants are as below:

››Dr. Mahendra Bhutiyani – Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (India)
››Amb. Salman Haidar – Former Foreign Secretary (India)
››Prof. Mahendra P. Lama – Central University of Sikkim (India)
››Dr. Chandan Mahanta – Indian Institute of Technology (India)
››Samir Mehta – International Rivers (India)
››Sonali Mittra – Observer Research Foundation (India)
››Lydia Powell – Observer Research Foundation (India)
››Akhilesh Sati – Observer Research Foundation (India)
››Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Krishnaswamy Srinivasan – Centre for Security Analysis (India)
››B.G. Verghese – Centre for Policy Research (India)
››Dr. Masudul Haq Wani – S.K. University of Agriculture and Technology (India)

[rohitvats]

This Daimer-Basha dam seems to be another scam in works by RAPES to siphon off money.

They'll take money in the name of mango-abdul and fill their coffers. Does TSP even have the engineering and PM wherewithal to manage a USD 14 Bn project? Some RAPES are going to buy villas on French Riviera in near future...

[SSridhar]

A slew of articles from Pakistanis on re-writing or re-approaching IWT. If Indus Basin is to be considered in its entirety, then the fair question to ask is why did Pakistan separate if it depended so much on the rest of India for agriculture, economy, religion etc? Having gone away, there is no need to have any business as though we are one country now, just for the purpose of water especially when Pakistan's stated aim is to fragment and destroy us, a project which all sections of Pakistan are pursuing with vigour and without exception to this day.

Not even Pakistani Punjab and the Sind provinces are willing to treat the Indus Basin as one unit and willing to make water adjustments. Why do they want it with mortal enemy India ? In c. 1935, the British government made 'water' a provincial subject. Immediately, the Sind province objected to Punjab's need for more and more water. This went to the Indus Commission headed by the reputed engineer B.N. Rau. The Commission called for an integrated development of the Indus Basin, but its report was unacceptable to both Sind and the Punjab.

[Pranav]

Something similar to the siphon dredging method has already been implemented by several companies. The equipment is called "Cutter Suction Dredger" in the dredging industry.

I would highly recommend seeing this short video clip on a Cutter Suction Dredger made by Van Oord Corporation of the Netherlands - http://vimeo.com/44648876# . It shows how efficiently sediment can be removed from the reservoir bed.

The company webpage is at http://www.vanoord.com/activities/cutte ... on-dredger .

The concept I described previously has the advantage the suction would be powered by water pressure. The tube from the cutter-suction head would go horizontally on the reservoir bed, through the dam wall, and down on the downstream side. Only power for turning the cutter would be required. The Van Oord equipment uses pumps to create suction.

[arun]

Op-Ed in The Hindu by B.G. Verghese:

Don’t muddy the Kishenganga verdict’

Rejoinder by John Briscoe to the above B.G. Verghese article and the earlier article by Ramaswamy Iyer posted here on BRF by S. Sridhar (Clicky) :

Kishenganga Judgement: John Briscoe responds

[Virupaksha]

So John Briscoe is basically arguing that by making the gates below the Dead storage level manipulatable, even for specific uses like flushing - India cant be using them as dead storage level, instead they would be counted as actual storage.