Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 03 Apr 2013 08:04

Pratyush wrote:^^^
You just made a mortal enemy on this thread
who will kill you with his experience.

Still wouldn't want to be in a Tin-can ...

--Ashish

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 03 Apr 2013 09:32

^Sometimes I get the feeling that some generals in the Army are living in their own cocoon. If an average armchair warrior can figure out the utter vulnerability of the tin cans, why cant these old men do the same? Are they all just corrupt?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 12:14

Misraji wrote:^^^
Just saw the episode of "Battle of 73 Easting" of the series "Greatest Tank Battles".
When you have a 70-ton behemoth running rings around you and slicing you up with one shot while your shots bounce of its armor,
one realizes how futile it is to be in a Tin-can against a western heavy MBT.

We have completely shot ourselves in the foot by using that piece of outdated technology (and its successors) for this long.

--Ashish

This is typical problem of knowing one small part of the puzzle -- the real tank battles that have been seen are WWII, and both the WW II tank and later tank scenarios were quite extensively discussed here on this thead and else where, and while the German heavies had all the shock and awe -- in the end, they were just to put it mildly, irrelevant on the battlefield --the real success through tanks came with Pz Mk IVs, T-34s, Churchills and Shermans while the American tanks were even lighter, and despite their grim nicknames, were exceedingly effective.

This is the real record of the tiger

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I

While the Tiger I was feared by many of its opponents, it was over-engineered, used expensive and labour intensive materials and production methods, and was time-consuming to produce. Only 1,347 were built between August 1942 and August 1944. The Tiger was prone to certain types of track failures and immobilizations, and limited in range by its huge fuel consumption. It was, however, generally mechanically reliable but expensive to maintain. It was also complicated to transport, and vulnerable to immobilization when mud, ice and snow froze between its overlapping and interleaved road wheels in winter weather conditions, often jamming them solid. In 1944, production was phased out in favour of the Tiger II.

Many early models proved to be mechanically unreliable; in this first action many broke down. Others were knocked out by dug-in Soviet anti-tank guns. One tank was captured largely intact, which allowed the Soviets to study it and prepare a response

In the North African theater, the Tiger first saw action in late 1942 near Robaa Tunisia. In the ensuing battle, a battery belonging to the 72nd Anti-tank Regiment of the British Army equipped with six-pounders knocked out three Tigers.[21]

The tank's extreme weight limited which bridges it could cross and made drive-throughs of buildings, which might have had basements, risky. Another weakness was the slow traverse of the hydraulically-operated turret. The turret could also be traversed manually, but this option was rarely used, except for very small adjustments.

So while "dekho kitna bada hai" (look it is so big) type of approach may be fine for fan bois and such comparisons (unfortunately many mil planners alsot come in this variety) -- in REAL WORLD of military operations, D*** length comparisons are actually secondary to things like
1) Cost -- production, logistics
2) Maintainability
3) Mobility

Here is one more pointer

Some Tiger units exceeded the 10:1 kill ratio, including 13. Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland (16.67:1), schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 103 (12.82:1) and schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 (13.08:1). Against the Soviet and Western Allied production numbers, even a 10:1 kill ratio would not have been sufficient. These numbers must be set against the opportunity cost of the expensive Tiger. Every Tiger cost as much as four Sturmgeschütz III assault guns to build.

As expected many actually fighting the war did not go gaga over these

The US Army did little to prepare for combat against the Tiger despite their assessment that the newly-encountered German tank was superior to their own. This conclusion was partly based on the correct estimate that the Tiger would be encountered in relatively small numbers.[26] Later in the war, the Tiger could be penetrated at short range by tanks and tank destroyers equipped with the 76 mm gun M1 when firing HVAP rounds,[27] and at long range with the M2/M3 90mm AA/AT gun firing HVAP, and the M36 tank destroyer and M26 Pershing by the end of the war.[20]

The British did react, but not to make Tiger clones, but make more efficient guns

n contrast, the more experienced British had observed the gradual increase in German AFV armour and firepower since 1940 and had anticipated the need for more powerful anti-tank guns. Work on the Ordnance QF 17 pounder had begun in late 1940 and in 1942 100 early-production guns were rushed to North Africa to help counter the new Tiger threat. So great was the haste that they were sent before proper carriages had been developed, and the guns had to be mounted in the carriages of 25-pounder howitzers.

The great benefits of the heavy tanks needed IDEAL conditions to work, but in real life conditions they were just turned redundant

The bush country of Normandy made sure that their guns could not engage the enemy at effective outgunning ranges, by the time Tiger saw a enemy, it was already close and it was too late. Tigers could not work effectively in built up areas.

Over open country, in their role as Assault weapons, Tigers were checked by tank killers, like AT guns and such.

Net net, if the money spent on the Tigers were instead spent on the Panzer Mk IVs, and instead of "golden bullets" -- Germany had relied more on the doctrine as it did in 1930s -- they would have fared far better.

The heavies of WW II were exactly like the love affair with F 22.

Excellent and wonderful pieces of engineering -- but impractical and pointless for any meaningful impact in combat in the time frames they are supposed to work in.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 12:32

The battle of Eastings was fought between the following belligerents

US with Air artillery, ground artillery, 1990s vintage tanks, viz M1. The latest tank of US army and complete air superiority. US had laser range finders, night sight devices, MLRS etc etc

The Iraqi side had
1950s T 55/62. 1970s T 72. No night sights, few laser range finders, and automated target acquisition and tracking, ZERO air support, no air cavalry, no artillery support.

The forces were hopeless outmatched. The Iraqi's erred significantly in allowing the Americans to play to their strengths and not used asymmetric war fare techniques.

Yes the M1 tanks did well, but so did the light IFVs with only a few destroyed, if the myth of heavy armor superiority is true, in the same battles the light armors should have seen the impact shouldn't it have?

The battle has the following important points
1) Technological superiority adds a edge not given by brute strength, weight is secondary to electronics.
2) Combined forces operations are much superior to single force operations.
3) Air cover and air superiority can single highhandedly change the face of the battle.

One needs to learn the right lessons, and not by the propaganda that TV peddles. When the Mil planners start buying their own propaganda too much, the result is the Tiger and F 22 program.

amit · Post by **amit** » 03 Apr 2013 12:34

^^^^^

So, to cut through the chase (and copy paste), a simple question:

If we have a Arjun MK1 (forget MK2) vs T-90 engagement scenario, which one would come out tops?

I think that's the only relevant metrics for us to consider. And we don't need to go all the way back to WWII or even the Gulf War. I do believe such a comparison exercise was done, na? Any idea what the result was?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 12:39

amit wrote:^^^^^

So, to cut through the chase (and copy paste), a simple question:

If we have a Arjun MK1 (forget MK2) vs T-90 engagement scenario, which one would come out tops?

I think that's the only relevant metrics for us to consider. And we don't need to go all the way back to WWII or even the Gulf War. I do believe such a comparison exercise was done, na? Any idea what the result was?

Today T 90 would. Its barrel fired missile would take out the Arjun before Arjun can engage. One to one. As of now.

However its a completely irrelevant metric. Because the entire history of tank warfare shows, that one tank vs one tank is story telling for children.

All the gyan about area of engagement, production rates, doctrines, mixed forces uses and everything and you ask this question? Pretty sad.

amit · Post by **amit** » 03 Apr 2013 12:55

When you talk about production rates, doctrines etc, you are putting the cart before the horse. First you have to choose the tank on which you want base your forces on and then you develop doctrines. And production rates (and doctrines for the matter) are a function of the number of tanks that are ordered. For example DRDO has pointed out that a 500 order tank would break even the project and speed up production. Besides production rate increase is a relatively simple thing to do, as opposed to designing a world class tank from ground up.

Unfortunately as long as the Army treats the Arjun like an unwanted child which happened due to a wild night out and something that exists only to embarrass it, then no doctrine would be developed, or production rates problems be addressed.

Regarding the T90 firing missiles to destroy Arjun, I hope they can get the damn missile fired before the sun goes down. And yes I hope they do that in the winter and not during summer in the desert of Rajasthan.

What is really sad is that India has developed a worldclass MBT from ground up. Yet, instead of nurturing it and allowing it to develop to its real potential a section of the Army and apologists for this section like you, keep treating it like an unwanted child.

Sometimes it's useful not miss the wood for the trees.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 03 Apr 2013 13:23

Misraji wrote: Still wouldn't want to be in a Tin-can ...

--Ashish

Now I get to tell you, I told you so.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 03 Apr 2013 13:42

^The T-90 Invar missiles were found to be defective and not to work at all. Forget firing the missile, the thing would explode INSIDE the T-90 saving the world the trouble of destroying that piece of junk.

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 037_1.html

for those asking for proof

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 03 Apr 2013 13:45

I guess we can save every one a lot of aggravation by scraping the Arjun while buying the next generation Russian Tank. When it enters service in bu 2020.

Seriously why bother with the Mk2 when the T 90 upgrade is here.

vic · Post by **vic** » 03 Apr 2013 14:00

How come the super duper T-90 don't have thermal imagers?

BEL has been asking financial support of Rs. 1000 crores for setting up thermal imager sensor manufacturing line for long time, but MoD wants to buy fish not the fishing Rod.

pankajs wrote:AKA approves Rs 2,800 cr night-vision devices' proposal
The Defence Ministry today approved a Rs 2,820 crore proposal to provide night-vision devices to the Army to enable its tanks and infantry combat vehicles to have capability to fight in both day and night conditions.
Under the plans to do away with the night blindness of Army's mechanised fleet including the Russian-origin T-90 and T-72 tanks and the BMP Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV), around 5,000 thermal imaging sights would be procured from defence PSU Bharat Electronics limited, they said.

For the T-72, which are the main stay of the Indian Army, 2,000 pieces of TI sights would be procured for Rs 1,000 crore while 1,200 pieces would be bought for the T-90 Main Battle Tanks for Rs 960 crore.

1,780 pieces of TI sights would be inducted for the BMP Infantry Combat Vehicles for Rs 860 crore, they said.

The Army has been worried over night-fighting capabilities of its armoured columns and reports had earlier suggested that only 50 per cent of the tank fleet of the forces had this ability.

Meanwhile, the ministry also cleared a proposal to upgrade the existing inventory of M-46 130mm artillery guns to 155mm guns through the Ordnance Factory Board.

The OFB has plans of modernising its facilities under a Rs 15,000 crore plan in the ongoing 12th Defence Plan.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 14:14

Arun Menon wrote:^The T-90 Invar missiles were found to be defective and not to work at all. Forget firing the missile, the thing would explode INSIDE the T-90 saving the world the trouble of destroying that piece of junk.

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 037_1.html

for those asking for proof

Bollocks. Do you even read what you post? The link says

A simultaneous crisis developed around the T-90S’s Invar missile, earlier cited as a clinching reason for buying the tank. But the Invar missiles that came were unusable and they were quietly returned to Russia. On March 2, 2006, Antony told Parliament, “The Invar missile on T-90 tank is not a failure. However, the completely knocked down kits received for assembly have been found to be defective.”

The Invar missile assembled in BDL were defective and replaced by direct russian imports, the issue was found to be at BDL later.

I would advise you to read before you post.

This is also in 2006 -- As of now invars are deployed on T 90s and are being ordered in large numbers

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cabi ... 25318.html

Union Cabinet clears Rs.8,000 crore missile purchase for armed forces

Proposals worth over Rs.8,000 crore for procuring around 10,000 'Invar' missiles from Russia for the Army's T-90 tanks and over 200 air-launched versions of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles for the IAF were cleared on Thursday by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

IGNORANCE is NOT a POV, nor is it a valid argument.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 14:26

vic wrote:How come the super duper T-90 don't have thermal imagers?

They always had since induction. Thales Catharine TI. The Indians were first to integrate it on T 90 in favor of the Russian TI, and then Russia followed suite.

BEL has been asking financial support of Rs. 1000 crores for setting up thermal imager sensor manufacturing line for long time, but MoD wants to buy fish not the fishing Rod.

BEL now makes TIs in India, what exactly are you talking about here ?

http://www.indiainfoline.com/Markets/Co ... Ltd/500049

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 14:32

amit wrote:When you talk about production rates, doctrines etc, you are putting the cart before the horse.

I would say you have no clue of what you talk. Typically the world over including India, the equipment is created as a part of doctrine, taking into account real production capabilities and such like. You can read the basics of any tank development article, including Arjun.

In any case you have again shifted the topic, which was, the heavy tanks performance in WW II was net net poor, and the Iraq war again showed very different lessons.

The above statement like rest of your post is full of simple JUNK which are blatant untruths and have been shown so many times. But you persist is flagging false hoods.

One example of such a behavior is here --

amit making a known untrue statement in the hope that snideness substitutes for real data wrote:Regarding the T90 firing missiles to destroy Arjun, I hope they can get the damn missile fired before the sun goes down. And yes I hope they do that in the winter and not during summer in the desert of Rajasthan.

amit · Post by **amit** » 03 Apr 2013 17:19

Venting it's not going to get you anywhere Sanku.

So equipment are made according to doctrines? Tell me what was the Army's "doctrine" when it framed the requirement for Arjun?

And why isn't that doctrine valid today? Is it because the bridges in Punjab were more stronger in the seventies than they are today?

And what doctrine promoted a weight increase in MK2 when the principal complaint against MK1 was weight?

Your raving and ranting is good entertainment but hardly adds to the discussion.

The fact remains that even piddly Pakistan makes do with its own MBT while we look to Russia for our needs despite developing a worldclass product.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 03 Apr 2013 17:20

Sanku wrote:
A simultaneous crisis developed around the T-90S’s Invar missile, earlier cited as a clinching reason for buying the tank. But the Invar missiles that came were unusable and they were quietly returned to Russia. On March 2, 2006, Antony told Parliament, “The Invar missile on T-90 tank is not a failure. However, the completely knocked down kits received for assembly have been found to be defective.”

Ah, but we have double standards for here. When if the Invar is found to be defective it is not a failure, but even when Arjun works better than the tincan it is still a failure and cannot be bought in more than token numbers. One standard for foreign/corrupt/Russian stuff, another completely different for indigenous/non-corrupt stuff. The missile was said to be the clinching reason to buy the tincan, but when it comes down to it, it does not work at all. It still has not been demonstrated to work in Indian T-90s to my knowledge, certainly not ones made by BDL, which will be where most of them will be made.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Apr 2013 18:04

“The Invar missile on T-90 tank is not a failure. However, the completely knocked down kits received for assembly have been found to be defective.”

The kit came from Russia? Russia is actually capable of sending defective items to India? Did not know that. Thx.

amit · Post by **amit** » 03 Apr 2013 19:46

Hush Rao ji you are hurting the sentiments of some folks here.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 20:06

--- self delete ---

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 20:15

Arun Menon wrote:
Sanku wrote:
A simultaneous crisis developed around the T-90S’s Invar missile, earlier cited as a clinching reason for buying the tank. But the Invar missiles that came were unusable and they were quietly returned to Russia. On March 2, 2006, Antony told Parliament, “The Invar missile on T-90 tank is not a failure. However, the completely knocked down kits received for assembly have been found to be defective.”
Ah, but we have double standards for here. When if the Invar is found to be defective it is not a failure, but even when Arjun works better than the tincan it is still a failure and cannot be bought in more than token numbers. .

Please dont join the Aam means Aamrud club.

INVAR is not defective. The assembly of INVAR at BDL was defective. For a batch. The problem has been addressed.

Arjun's defect were not related assembly issues. Arjun's failure were related to design/manufacturing issues (part of new equipment bring up)

Double standards here are well expected, since two wildly different scenarios are discussed.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 20:25

NRao wrote:
“The Invar missile on T-90 tank is not a failure. However, the completely knocked down kits received for assembly have been found to be defective.”
The kit came from Russia? Russia is actually capable of sending defective items to India? Did not know that. Thx.

NRao, you shouldnt try your hand at sarcasm, it comes out as comedy. Yeah, defective equipment does get supplies by manufacturers -- UK, France, Russia, everyone, you name it it has it -- and everyone remotely associated with BRF knows that -- and everyone knows that everyone knows. So clearly the fact that all real world items have issues is well known.

BTW, it was speculated that the issue with INVARs were that BDL goofed up during assembly. This problem has since been resolved.

The interesting thing is that this is 2006 news. The irony is clearly lost on some.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 20:29

amit wrote:Venting it's not going to get you anywhere Sanku.

But where do I want to go? For the moment I have quite successfully exposed yet another attempt of some folks to push their anti IA agenda. So I am happy.

Meanwhile---

amit wrote:
The fact remains that even piddly Pakistan makes do with its own MBT .

Some one should save this gem for posterity.

=====================================================================

What would we do without the very knowledgeable and very distinguished Amit ji on this forum educating us with brand new unheard of news everyday, which before being penned by him on BRF, had never even existed in the world.

manum · Post by **manum** » 03 Apr 2013 20:50

sankuji have u undergone some training at chinese academy of troll...

it has become dificult ignoring your post even....with increasing number of smileys and lol's...

and obviously hail mother Russia...

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 20:54

manum wrote:sankuji have u undergone some training at chinese academy of troll...

it has become dificult ignoring your post even....with increasing number of smileys and lol's...

and obviously hail mother Russia...

Sir-ji, terribly sorry for the pain. Could not find better words to express my emotions at the spectacular data points being posted.

I have edited the posts to not cause offense to sensitive souls.

Meanwhile -- I really wish people would stop cracking jokes, like the above highlighted parts. Breaking out in total laughter becomes hard.

manum · Post by **manum** » 03 Apr 2013 21:05

thank you for the courtesy...

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Apr 2013 21:42

2010 wrote: "It is for these reasons that I have consistently argued for supporting the Indian Arjun tank," says General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, former army chief and himself a tankman. "Another country can hold India hostage in many ways. We need to place an order for several hundred Arjun tanks so that economies of scale can kick in and we can bring down the price even further."

And, Arjun did out perform the T-90.

Invar included.

Just saying.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Apr 2013 22:24

NRao wrote: And, Arjun did out perform the T-90.

Invar included.

Just saying.

#theek hai

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 04 Apr 2013 00:18

The opening rounds of Battle of 73 Easting were pure armored forces clash.
The initial combat saw 2ACR (which was supposed to not engage the enemy decisively and leave the
heavy combat to the heavy armored divisions of VII Corps) pitted against the Iraqi defenses it ran into.

The 3 Troops of 2 ACR, consisting of 12 Abrams each, completely wiped out scores of T-72.
No MRLS support, no Artillery support, no Air Force support.
The Bradleys were safely tucked behind the Abrams in these engagements.

This was a head-on clash with superior number of Iraqi forces.
No need for "asymmetric" warfare. And they still got wiped out.

The battles that followed this opening round, with US Armored divisions (as opposed to 2nd ACR Regiment) engaging, just reinforced the armor superiority.

BTW, sweet buzzword "asymmetric". One whose significance depends entirely on who used the word.
Usually it means diddly squat, another way of saying, I don't know how to do it, just that what was done has to be wrong because it resulted in failure.

--Ashish.

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 04 Apr 2013 00:52

Actually there is more to that battle than just the equipment matchup. The planning on the American side was way better. The Iraqis basically had no plans.

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 04 Apr 2013 00:55

indranilroy wrote:Actually there is more to that battle than just the equipment matchup. The planning on the American side was way better. The Iraqis basically had no plans.

Curious. That planning would be what exactly?

WRT the battle of troops of 2ACR, the Abrams cut through because of superior equipment, inspite of inferior numbers
This was a battle in which the US troops "stumbled" on heavily defended positions.

And the Iraqis did have a plan. One of their divisions (50th Division??) covered the others before the battle began.
They had deployed in patterns that helped the defender, employing on reverse slope, dug-in positions, formations protecting their command center.
They did not back down. They fought and lost.

--Ashish

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 04 Apr 2013 00:57

Look,Arjun and the T-90 belong to two diff. philosophies.The T-90 of classic Russian design,small tank,small crew,low weight ,low silhouette,heavy firepower. The IA can use it in any terrain in the Indian sub-continental context. The Arjun is based upon classic western design ,larger tank,larger crew,heavier weight,heavy firepower.It cannot be used successfully in all terrain in the Indian context,because of bridge limitations in certain sectors and mountainous terrain where the lighter,smaller T-90 is easier to operate.In the desert sector with very high temps,the comparison between Arjun and the T-90 would be interesting-which is the more comfortable tank for the crew,AC,etc.The later versions of the T-90 have a separate ammo stowage zone,unlike earlier versions of the T-72 series.From one report in BR itself,even the Catherine TI set is being replaced by an improved one.Improvements in both the T-90 and Arjun are being carried out,and Arj.MK-2 is supposed to have considerable improvements.

To my mind,both tanks would be complementary.No harm in ordering more Arjuns instead of totally upgrading all the T-72s in service.As one option considered was to use the T-72 chassis for specialised tank/armoured variants.The IA for the better part of the last two decades has been equipped mostly with the T-series and therefore the majority view in the IA appears to have preferred sticking to the well-known philosophy.tactics that it possesses. There was one post some time ago about Soviet tactics and why they developed two diff. tanks-the T-72 series and the T-64(?)/T-80s.heavier armoured tanks for the initial breakthrough NATO defences and the faster ,lighter T-72s for rapid penetration to seize objectives.Even our Vijayanta was the "Vickers Light Tank" and not a heavy Chieftain/Challenger. The design philosophy behind the Arjun shows a clear attempt to build an Indian version of the Leopard tank.Even the Arjun's engine is an MTU one! I am sure that a rational procurement strategy can be worked out that benefits our indigenous efforts (Arjuns),as well as keeping our numbers and firepower happy (T-90s) at reasonable cost too.

Any feedback/comments reg. the '65 war details posted earlier? Since there is still talk of an FMBT design fort eh future,what should be the philosophy behind an FMBT,if we want to have just one design? The IA's supposed "want" has already been described some time ago.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 04 Apr 2013 01:24

Sanku wrote: INVAR is not defective. The assembly of INVAR at BDL was defective. For a batch. The problem has been addressed.

Any source for this besides your imagination? Also, the article is from 2011 not 2006, perhaps you should read that before jumping to conclusions.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 04 Apr 2013 01:42

Misraji wrote:The opening rounds of Battle of 73 Easting were pure armored forces clash.
.

Says who?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting

The main U.S. unit in the battle was the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR), a 4,500 man reconnaissance and security element assigned to VII Corps. It consisted of three ground squadrons (1st, 2nd and 3rd), an aviation (attack helicopter) squadron (4th), and a support squadron.

So no, not really a TANK unit alone

The aviation squadron led by Lt Colonel Don Olson established a screen along the 50 Easting by 7 a.m. and by 8 a.m. the armored cavalry squadrons had moved into their new zones.

The air cavalry was a integrated part of the 2Armor Cavalry regiment, which in addition included

Each ground squadron was made up of three cavalry troops, a tank company, a self-propelled howitzer battery, and a headquarters troop

So pure tank battle? Not really!!

And this does not count the pre battle Air AND artillary bombardment -- and covering fire DURING the initial movement

The following passage is about the movements during the first phase of battle, although it is does express surprise that Iraqi's managed to put their heads up somewhat even after being pummeled.

Despite extensive aerial and artillery bombardment by U.S. forces, most Iraqi units defending along the 70 Easting remained effective. The Regiment employed artillery fire from the supporting 210th Field Artillery Brigade, air strikes, and attack helicopters (both Apaches of 2-1 Aviation and Cobras of Fourth Squadron) against the Republican Guard units as the armored cavalry squadrons moved east through the security zone. Sandstorms slowed this movement throughout the day, restricting visibility to as little as 400 metres (1,300 ft).

So sorry, all this Tank battle is TOTAL myth making. The american forces were superior in every way, by far.

Also even if it was pure Tank game, comparing a 1970s second class Soviet tank (soviets did not give their best pieces) to 1990s best in class US tank and claiming that one is better is trivial. Of course the M1s were better. They were 20 years better.

You still chose to ignore one question though. If the armor thickness was the superior factor as you think -- why did the Bradley's survive? It would be expected that at least the Bradleys (which entered the fray ALONG with M1s) should have fared poorly?

If you are interested in serious analysis, rather than Rah rah television fan boism. Read these two articles

I post relevant quotes...
http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j ... 7112,d.bmk

The war began with a massive six-week air campaign. This quickly crippled the Iraqi air defense system and destroyed key elements of the Iraqi command and control network. There followed more than a month of effectively uncontested, round-the-clock pounding of ground targets across Iraq and over the entire depth of the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO).

Nice no? Only tank battles, after you have pounded the enemy for over a month, and rendered him blind and crippled.

CONCLUSIONS

Soon after the 1st Armored Division's attack started at 8 PM on 26 February, the 3rd Armored Division launched an attack just to the south of the 1st Division. One hour later, the 1st Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and captured all of Objective Norfolk. Franks had wanted to slam into the Republican Guards with a "three division fist."67 That is exactly what he did. Franks defeated the Tawakalna Division by massing six brigades and an armored cavalry regiment against it, and flanking it to the north and south with two more brigades. Attack helicopters and long range artillery systems had bombed the Tawakalna beforehand.

The Tawakalna division commander, who probably perished in the battle, never had an opportunity to maneuver, use reserves, or even use his artillery with any effect. His spirited defense, however, confirmed Frank's concern that the Republican Guard did not enter the battle already defeated. They did not run away, and fought with extreme bravery. American battle reports cite the bravery of the determined Tawakalna defenders. This division had good equipment. Unfortunately, they did not know how to use it fully. For example, they did not know how to employ their equipment to ensure that they had local security, allowing the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment to gain contact with them without discovery. The Tawakalna division was unable, regularly, to hit the targets at which they aimed with their tanks and anti-tank guided missiles. Seldom did the Tawakalna division effectively use their artillery or air defense artillery.68

More important than problems in using equipment, The Tawakalna division was simply, overwhelmed. It was the application of the US Army's Airland Battle doctrine,69 executed by well-trained, equipped and motivated soldiers, that defeated the Iraqi forces. By dawn on 27 February 1991, the Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division had ceased to exist.

With the destruction of the Tawakalna Division, Franks was able to focus the combat power of the 7th Corps towards the other heavy divisions of the Republican Guard Forces Command. Although part of the Medina Division would stand and fight against the 1st US Armored Division, the Iraqi high command ordered the Hammurabi Division to start moving north, across the Euphrates River and away from the American attack in the west. The Tawakalna Division's defense gave the remainder of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait the time it needed to evacuate most of its mechanized forces to Basra.

So while TV type of learning is fine for average US grunt being motivated to be cannon fodder for next Afganistan, the real world says something else.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 04 Apr 2013 01:46

Arun Menon wrote:
Sanku wrote: INVAR is not defective. The assembly of INVAR at BDL was defective. For a batch. The problem has been addressed.
Any source for this besides your imagination? Also, the article is from 2011 not 2006, perhaps you should read that before jumping to conclusions.

Source for what? This is from the same article you linked. Read AK Antonys statement.

Article could be from anytime, Shukla is still repeating the same lies he was repeating in 2006, so the time of the article is irrelevant. The time of the INVAR defect is from 2006 time frame. For a batch of knocked down missiles.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 04 Apr 2013 01:56

Philip wrote:.No harm in ordering more Arjuns instead of totally upgrading all the T-72s in service

The question is how will it be done. Avadi is making a mess of both T 72 upgd program as well as Arjun manufacture.

Apart from the T 90 assembly, we are in deep dodo. According to one report Avadi has managed only 150 T 90 tanks (indian manufacture) since 2008 to 2011 (they are supposed to make 100-140 per year) -- If not for the Russian direct imports + kits, IA would still have 1970s tanks while everyone discussed this or that.

I dont know how will we ever have a tank fleet if the problems at Avadi are not fixed. Of course the Pvt sector is completely out of its depth here and banking on the same (even for the sake of argument is hopeless) -- the ONLY option is to make Avadi work.

Unfortunately, no one seems to be really interested in making sure the Avadi produces. Its no ones baby. We are in deep dodo.

All we have from Indian MIC are excuses, IA didnt do this, Russia didnt do that, x didnt do this y didnt do that.

What do the MoD do? What do the civvies do?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 04 Apr 2013 02:10

Whose fault is that 30 years after Arjun was conceived, we dont remotely have a suitable engine.

Not even a blue print?

What excuse would be offered for this? For the the gear box? Is a 139033254258425452534452242425 tank order needed before MoD/DRDO can figure out that making a working prototype does not need a order from IA but only funding from MoD?

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 04 Apr 2013 02:24

Read Again. This is the wiki part that is relevant because it refers to 2ACR.
THAT is Battle of 73 Easting. The rest that has been quoted from Wiki with MRLS+Artillery support IS NOT Battle of 73 Easting.

The Regiment moved from the 60 Easting with eight of its nine cavalry troops generally abreast of each other. (Lt Colonel Kobbe had pulled his Troop F out of the Second Squadron’s leading echelon when his zone narrowed.) The operation escalated into a full-out battle as E Troop (call sign “Eagle”) maneuvered to the 70 Easting around 3:45 p.m. Heavy combat then spread to the south as I Troop of the Third Squadron closed the gap between the two squadrons and joined the fight. G Troop’s attack to the north of Captain HR McMaster’s E Troop made contact with defending units farther east and combat there became intense around 4:45 p.m. Fighting continued into darkness as the Iraqi division commander reinforced the 18th Brigade with his 9th Armored Brigade in the G Troop zone.
At 4:10 p.m. Eagle Troop received fire from an Iraqi infantry position in a cluster of buildings at UTM PU 6801.[10][11] The troop returned fire with its Abramses and Bradleys, silenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners, and continued east with the two tank platoons leading. The 12 M1A1 tanks of Eagle Troop destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, 16 personnel carriers and 30 trucks in 23 minutes with no American losses.[12]
At about 4:20 Eagle crested a low rise and surprised an Iraqi tank company set up in a reverse slope defense on the 70 Easting. Captain McMaster, leading the attack, immediately engaged that position, destroying the first of the eight enemy tanks to his front. His two tank platoons finished the rest.
Three kilometers to the east McMaster could see T-72s in prepared positions. Continuing his attack past the 70 limit of advance, he fought his way through an infantry defensive position and on to high ground along the 74 Easting. There he encountered and destroyed another enemy tank unit of eighteen T-72s. In that action the Iraqis stood their ground and attempted to maneuver against the troop. This was the first determined defense the Regiment had encountered in its three days of operations. Still, the Iraqi troops had been surprised because of the inclement weather and were quickly destroyed by the better trained and better equipped American troops.
After defeating that force, McMaster sent a scout platoon of two Bradleys north to regain contact with Troop G. In doing that the scout platoon encountered another Iraqi tank position of thirteen T-72s which they destroyed with TOW missiles.[13]
Other 2nd ACR Troops I (call sign “Iron”), K (“Killer”), and G (“Ghost”) joined the fight minutes later. Iron Troop of Third Squadron had halted around the 67 Easting to control the limit of advance with its tank cannons. As the troop moved north to secure its northern boundary around 4:45, it came under fire from the same group of buildings E Troop had fought through an hour earlier.
Captain Dan Miller, commanding I Troop, silenced the resistance with return fire then attacked to the 70 Easting. There, he confronted T-72s in defensive positions south of those E Troop had just obliterated. With initial support from Captain Mac Haszard’s K Troop, Miller’s tanks destroyed sixteen enemy tanks on that position and then attacked through it. Just beyond the defenses I Troop observed another formation of enemy tanks moving in its direction and attacked it with tank and TOW fires. During that engagement, TOW missile fire from a K Troop Bradley struck and destroyed an I Troop Bradley wounding all three crewmen.[14] Before returning to positions along the 70 Easting, I Troop located the defending battalion’s command post and destroyed its command bunker and security forces.[15]
By 4:40, Captain Joe Sartiano’s G Troop had gained a position on a ridge overlooking a wadi at and parallel to the 73 Easting, north of E Troop. As the Regiment’s northernmost unit, G Troop secured an open flank until the 3rd Armored Division’s cavalry squadron arrived to occupy its own positions along the 70 Easting.

Battle of Easting 73 DID NOT have any aviation support.
While 2ACR had an aviation squadron, it was grounded because of desert conditions.
While they had howitzers, they were not used.

The 2nd ACR Troops sliced through full force of Iraqi armor on basis of Abrams ALONE.
That is why Battle of 73 Easting is considered the Zenith of American Armored combat.

Battle of 73 Easting in Detail

The winter of 1990/91 was one of the wettest on record in the Persian Gulf, and had been a major problem during the preceding six weeks of the Desert Storm air campaign. Now the wind was howling, causing a sandstorm that was grounding the Army’s aviation assets and limiting visibility to as little as a thousand meters. Air reconnaissance was limited mostly to signals intelligence data, which meant that finding where the IRG divisions were located would be up to the 2nd ACR. Like the prairie horse soldiers of 150 years earlier, the troopers of the regiments would grope forward until they physically ran into the enemy, in this case the IRG Tawakalna Division. Generally known to be the best and most aggressive of the various IRG formations, Tawakalna was the unit that would bear the brunt of the coming battle with VII Corps.]

--Ashish

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 04 Apr 2013 02:41

Misraji wrote:Read Again. This is the wiki part that is relevant because it refers to 2ACR.
THAT is Battle of 73 Easting. The rest that has been quoted from Wiki with MRLS+Artillery support IS NOT Battle of 73 Easting.

Oh please, you take one hour snapshot in a battle and claim that since that one hour snapshot had only tanks your battle has only tanks?

However even here you are just wrong. I have shown how the integrated air assets were deployed at the very beginning of the battle. The air assets were back by NOON as well.

Lets not be childish here. A battle does not happen in isolation, like set piece battle game put on board by children. A battle has precursor moves, a theater, and overall environment. All this impacts the battle. The Iraqi's were already scattered, had NO intel since they could not put their heads up and see. When 2ACR first made contact, the Iraqi's were not even in their tanks. It was a turkey shoot.

Later the remaining units just got into the tanks are mounted a brute force counter attack without any command and control (because they were already taken out)

All this and more is listed in depth in the articles posted. The tv serial that you are basing your view on was probably one of US;s usual PR exercises.

So net net, no your definition of what the battle of 73 easting is incomplete, incorrect and somewhat concocted.

------------------------------------------

BTW you are still not talking about Bradleys, is it your case that Bradelys are also superior to T 72s (actually in that battle they were. significantly) but if they were then you will have to worry about how your armor thickness theory holds up.

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 04 Apr 2013 02:47

T-72 was introduced into production in 1973.

An "economy" tank with the old design V-46 powerplant was developed from 1967 at the Uralvagonzavod Factory located in Nizhny Tagil. Chief engineer Leonid Kartsev created "Object 172", the initial design, but the prototype, marked "Object 172M", was refined and finished by Valeri Venediktov. Field trials lasted from 1971 to 1973 and upon acceptance the Chelyabinsk Tank factory immediately ceased T-55 and T-62 production to retool for the new T-72 tank.

M1 Abrams was introduced into production in 1980.

A total of 3,273 M1 Abrams were produced 1979–85 and first entered U.S. Army service in 1980.

Thats a 7-year difference.
The same technology constraints had applied to development of both the tanks.
There was no generation gap between the two.
If anything, given the Soviet's better metallurgy as compared to the west (as evidenced by their submarine building skills) ,
I would have expected their armor to be better, hence their tank to win.

The T-72 sucked because its design was outdated right from the start.
And they have continued with that flawed design even after having their a$$e$ handed out to them in so many wars.

--Ashish

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 04 Apr 2013 02:48

I have NOT defined what Battle of 73 Easting means.
It has been defined by historians who studied GW1.

Read the detailed link. That is the Battle of 73 Easting.
There are multiple other links which specifically state the same.
In the entire action that wiped out Iraqi Blocking force, that specific action by 2nd ACR is called Battle of 73 Easting.

You want to have your own definition of the Battle, then we are not talking about the same thing.
And during that battle, M2 Bradleys were behind the Abrams in the formation.

I have not even started reading other battles like Battle of Medina Ridge etc.
Wonder how many one-sided kill-ratios those are gonna throw up.

--Ashish