Indian Naval Discussion

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 19 Apr 2013 22:56

Manish_Sharma wrote:
Ajay Sharma wrote: Chetak Saad, Prem Ahuja was not a Punjabi but a Sindhi...
Ahuja and Taneja are not sindhis but from multan.

Manish Sharmaji... Ahujas, Tanejas, Makhijas, Dhamejas etc are seraiki people and come from multan, bahawalpur and north sindh. In this Prem Ahuja's case, he was from the south side of the punjab-sindh border and during the nanavati case supported by the Sindhi community as one of their own

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Apr 2013 03:46

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... ssion.html

By Tom Phillips, Shanghai

19 Apr 2013

The 990ft Liaoning carrier – which was formally brought into service last September – is now preparing for its first major outing, CCTV reported.

"A big country cannot do without aircraft carriers," said Zhang Zheng, the carrier's captain, whose first encounter with an aircraft carrier came in Portsmouth, in 2002.

The Liaoning is a former Soviet carrier that was reportedly purchased from Ukraine in 1999 before being refitted at a naval base in northeast China.

In March, a Chinese shipping expert, Lan Yun, told state media its first major voyage could take between one and three months and see the Liaoning reach "waters near Japan's Okinawa islands and even Guam".

The high-profile announcement came in a series of reports about the aircraft carrier, timed to coincide with the 64th anniversary of China's navy next Tuesday.
Related Articles

China lays bare its expanding military might
16 Apr 2013

"The navy has to protect the security of the country and its economic interests," the China Daily reported in a front-page article headlined: "China's ocean-going giant."

A J-15 fighter jet on the flight deck of China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (Reuters)

Carriers made "a huge difference to the military capabilities of the countries that had them," the newspaper added, pointing to the Royal Navy's HMS Argus which became the first fully-functional vessel of its type in 1918.

Liu Zhigang, a first officer on the carrier, told the newspaper the carrier could "serve as a guide for the transformation of the Chinese navy, from coastal defence to greater responsibilities in deep oceans."

"The Chinese navy needs to reach every place that other countries can reach to support the country's growth. The navy has to be able to compete with any naval force from any country in any area," he said. "We can refit an aircraft carrier and be fully combat-capable much faster than most experts expected."

Beijing's apparent determination to extend its control over the seas with a "blue-water force" comes at a time of increasingly acrimonious maritime disputes with neighbouring countries such as Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam.

China has also expressed public concern over the United States' "pivot" to Asia, which Beijing views as a direct threat to the country's rise.

On Tuesday, a spokesperson for China's defence ministry said the US' growing presence in the region was "not conducive to the upholding of peace and stability".

Reports suggest China is currently developing at least two "home-grown" aircraft carriers and is now moving ahead with plans to build nuclear-powered carriers. Last year, the country's annual defence budget grew to over £65bn, making it the world's second largest.

China's Liaoning is preparing for its first long voyage ,says this report.It also says that the PLAN plans at least two carriers like the Liaoning and in the future nuclear powered carriers too.This would indicate operations in the IOR,where PLAN subs are already making many forays into Indian EEZ waters and where China has "planted its flag" so to speak in major infrastructural projects in littoral nations like Sri Lanka-Hambantota Port,and Gwadar-handed over to it by Pak,which it could use in times of crisis.

The IN will have to be not just modernised but also enlarged suitably to meet the huge challenge that the PLAN will pose in the next decade.It will seriously have to consider a forward presence using Vietnamese facilities ,esp. for its subs and LRMP aircraft,so that in any crisis it can deal with PLAN assets planning to transit the Malacca Straits.China will try and prevent this handicap by "parking" a sizeable qty. of assets earmarked fro IOR duty at 'safe' bases like Gwadar and perhaps in Burmese ports too,where an oil pipeline is planned to transport ME oil to China avoiding the chokepoint of the Malacca Straits.on a permanent basis.The IN will have to seriously double its force of conventional subs apart from its planned force of nuclear boats both SSBN and SSGN to meet this impending threat.the time for quick decisions is now.

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 20 Apr 2013 04:27

A newbie question...

What is a typical composition of an Indian carrier group and will this change when INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant join?

I was curious to know that whether the requirements change with an increase in the carriers' tonnage and capabilities or this doesnt fundamentally change.... like # of ASW corvettes, frigates/destroyers for AD etc

Eric Leiderman · Post by **Eric Leiderman** » 20 Apr 2013 09:02

Yes the requirements will change for reasons that are not purely technical

As a carrier gets larger and more expensive/more sailors on it, It becomes imperitive to protect it as sinking of a carrier in war will be a huge physiological and psychological blow.

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 20 Apr 2013 09:32

The Indian Navy's ambition of operating multiple Carrier Groups is a somewhat dubious prospect from an Indian perspective IMO. In terms of pure naval tactics and firepower, those billions would have been better spent in advanced submarines. long-range cruise missiles and cruise missiles fired from said submarines. India has neither the forces nor the wherewithal to wage the kind of expeditionary warfare that the US wages and as such the ability to bomb distant targets and control distant airspace is a very remote requirement for the kind of time, money and energy India has spent on that ability.

So while the Chinese parade their Liaoning up and down the sea lanes like a white elephant, the real threat passes unseen and undetected under the sea in the form of 50+ diesel electric submarines and their fleet of SSNs all carrying dozens of cruise missiles.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 20 Apr 2013 10:06

Brando wrote:The Indian Navy's ambition of operating multiple Carrier Groups is a somewhat dubious prospect from an Indian perspective IMO. In terms of pure naval tactics and firepower, those billions would have been better spent in advanced submarines. long-range cruise missiles and cruise missiles fired from said submarines. India has neither the forces nor the wherewithal to wage the kind of expeditionary warfare that the US wages and as such the ability to bomb distant targets and control distant airspace is a very remote requirement for the kind of time, money and energy India has spent on that ability.

On the contrary, while the IN doesn't intend to be globally deployed like the USN, within its area-of-interest viz. Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca, carrier-centric surface fleets are the most efficient way to achieving our strategic goals. India needs to secure its SLOCs, which calls for a surface fleet. In a crisis relating to Pakistan, a naval blockade will result in maximum pressure with minimum violence, and a conventional naval blockade requires a surface fleet. Also, with regard to the PRC, a CBG is still the best tool for intercepting/interdicting China-bound sea traffic at the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca.

Which is not to say that there the scope for an undersea arm is limited - the USN will continue to field the largest most potent submarine fleet in the world for a long time yet. India needs submarines for some degree of influence in the South China Sea (in addition to complementing surface forces). But SE Asia is not the IN's primary AoR.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 20 Apr 2013 10:49

1. The Soviet Union realized rather belatedly that their anti-access capability in the form of bomber regiments and SSNs was not enough as a superpower and they "improvized" their way into carriers and carrier based naval aviation with rather mediocre results.

2. China has realized comparatively early in the day that carriers give a strategic capability like no other, and if they are to deter a carrier-centric USN they better have some of their own, especially if they may one day have to face their version of the Falklands - a scenario where carriers proved invaluable.

3. Ideologically, carrier-based operations have been central to our Navy's DNA from the 60s, and the number of folks who have commanded a carrier and then gone to either head the Western Fleet or become Navy Chief reflects that importance. With more carriers that will only grow. It would be a strategic harakiri to shift focus away from carriers to subs when your primary rival in this century is doing the opposite.

4. Carrier Strike Groups are super-expensive as is the training for carrier operations but they also enable you to fight a Pearl Harbor, Midway, Falklands, Libya that no submarine force can ever do. But the moment we put our hat in the superpower ring we need to cough up the cash to support those aspirations...because China is.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 20 Apr 2013 11:24

IN needs a balanced force of CBG , Subs and Surface ships with other supporting assets ...no point in shifting the equilibrium and preferring one over the other

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 Apr 2013 12:03

If we aspire to a lhd fleet, they need carriers for land ops support thats for sure.

Subs cannot support a land op beyond landing a few marcos and token strike with missiles....

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 20 Apr 2013 13:45

Thanks for the responses, but my original question remains regarding the composition. Perhaps, another way of putting it would be what force structure is required to maintain a carrier force in the sea. For eg:
a) Subs: ?
b) ASW screening corvettes/frigates:
c) Fleet AD frigates/destroyers:
d) Auxillary ships:

As per Uncle wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_battle_group)

Khan Saab

In modern United States Navy carrier air operations, Carrier strike group (CSG) has replaced the traditional term of carrier battle group (CVBG or CARBATGRU). The Navy maintains 11 carrier strike groups, 10 of which are based in the United States and one that is forward deployed in Japan. CSG or CVBG normally consist of 1 Aircraft Carrier, 2 Guided Missile Cruisers, 2 Anti Aircraft Warships, and 1-2 Anti Submarine Destroyers or Frigates.[2] The large number of CSGs used by the United States reflects, in part, a division of roles and missions allotted during the Cold War, in which the United States assumed primary responsibility for blue water operations and for safeguarding supply lines between the United States and Europe, while the NATO allies assumed responsibility for brown and green water operations

The French

The Carrier Battle Group (Groupe Aéronaval, GAN, in French) of the Force d'Action Navale is usually composed, in addition to the aircraft carrier, of :
a carrier air wing (Groupe Aérien Embarqué, GAE, in French), a complement composed of about 60 aircraft : Rafale F3 and Super Étendard (up to 30)
E-2C Hawkeye (2)
SA365 Dauphin (3) for RESCO and EC725 Caracal for CSAR (2)
one Rubis-class submarine
two anti-submarine destroyers (currently Tourville or Georges Leygues class)
one or two anti-air destroyers (Horizon or Cassard class)
one stealth frigate in forward patrol (usually a La Fayette class)
one supply ship

The Italians

The CVS–ASW (Aircraft Carrier with Anti-Submarine Warfare) Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi is Italy's first carrier. The battle group based in Taranto called COMFORAL is formed by the carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, two Durand de la Penne-class destroyers, two support ships Etna and Elettra, and three amphibious/support ships (San Giusto, San Marco and San Giorgio).
After 2010 the Italian battle group will be formed by the new carrier Italian aircraft carrier Cavour, 5-6 new warships (including destroyers Horizon and frigates FREMM), one new support ship, some minehunters and new submarines (the COMFORAL will be a reserve group).[5]

The Spaniards

The Spanish Navy currently operates the Buque de Proyección Estratégica (Strategic Projection Vessel) Spanish ship Juan Carlos I, which can be used as a light aircraft carrier.[6]
The group includes two escort squadrons: the 41st, with ASW Santa María-class frigates, and the 31st, with AEGIS Álvaro de Bazán-class AAW frigates

The Russkies

Of the few sorties the carrier has conducted, most have been solo missions and without a large escort. However, the Kuznetsov has been observed sailing together with a Kirov-class cruiser (CGN), Slava-class cruiser (CG), Sovremenny-class destroyer (ASuW), Udaloy-class destroyer (ASW) and Krivak I/II FFG (ASW). These escorts, especially the heavily armed Kirov-class cruiser, use advanced sensors and carry a variety of weaponry. However, ships like the Kirov would likely be used in offensive operations rather than fleet escort in the event of war. Carrier escort would then be conducted by smaller vessels such as a Slava class accompanied by several Sovremenny, Udaloy and Krivak vessels.
The Admiral Kuznetsov is designed specifically to sail alone and carries greater firepower than its U.S. counterparts. This includes 12x SS-N-19 'Shipwreck' (long range, high speed, sea-skimming) SSMs, 24x VLS units loaded with 192 SA-N-9 'Gauntlet' SAMs, and 8x Kashtan CIWS with dual 30 mm guns, and 8x AK-630 CIWS. Compared to the 4x Phalanx CIWS and 4x Sea Sparrow launchers, each with 6 missiles carried by the Nimitz class, the Kuznetsov is well armed for both air-defence and offensive operations against hostile shipping.

The Brazilians

The São Paulo forms Brazil's only carrier battle group, together with 4 frigates from Type-22/1 class frigates and Vosper Mk.10 class frigates (known as the Niteroi class), 1 or 2 Tupi-class submarines, and one replenishment oiler (Almirante Gastão Motta), with VF-1 "Falcão" Air Wing equipped with 6 to 9 Attack Aircraft AF-1 Skyhawk (A-4Ku), and 3 more Helicopters Squadrons for Attack, ASW and Multi-Mission (between AS332 Super Puma, AS532 Cougar, Super Lynx, Esquilo, EC 725 (16 ordered) SH-3 (being replaced by 6 new SH-60B)) and 2 more Fixed Wings Squadrons for AEW, COD and REVO (C-1A Trader and S-2 Tracker ordered).

... And for IN, it says...

The Indian Navy's CBG usually consists of two destroyers (usually of the Delhi class, previously Kashins were used) and two or more frigates, (usually a combination of Brahmaputra, Talwar or Shivalik classes) and one support ship

This data had the tag "citation needed" and looked odd since submarines seems to be a standard component in most carrier groups

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 20 Apr 2013 14:41

To bring in USN carrier/CSG capability in a discussion with others is

, and one is not talking about the platforms themselves:

1. The USN is the only navy where By Law only a Naval Aviator (Pilot) or Naval Flight Officer may command a carrier. For some reason though the CSG can be commanded by a non-aviator/NFO.

2. All pilots in a USN carrier-borne squadron have to be night qualified, from the Nugget LT. (first time on cruise) to the CAG. Nobody else trains to that standard, not even the French who are today 2nd in overall capability.

3. USN carriers by definition are expeditionary, they have publicly announced regular patrol cycles all across the world, and at least one is always forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan. They can stage out of Manama, Subic Bay, Diego Garcia etc. etc.

4. Apart from CSGs, there are the ARGs - Amphibious Ready Groups also called Expeditionary Strike Groups, some 12 odd with a heavy Marine Expeditionary Unit component to them.

Specific to India, it's not just a question of platforms but developing a doctrine that factors in what it is like to play in someone else's backyard not ours - a totally different ball game.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 Apr 2013 17:27

the CSG commander is usually a ex-DDG commander moving up I think. is there cases of ex-submarine commanders being given DDG or CSG command?
sub commanders esp the SSBN types are supposed to be the A1 elite in terms of psychological evaluation etc .... a necessity as few bold men can kick off WW3 by mutual aggreement

negi · Post by **negi** » 20 Apr 2013 17:53

redundant

negi · Post by **negi** » 20 Apr 2013 17:54

Singha wrote:the CSG commander is usually a ex-DDG commander moving up I think.

Well in IN upto the rank of Commander the promotions are time based and prior to one's promotion the officers specially from the executive class are deployed on ships so in case of a small K class boat even a Lt. Commander can be the Captain in charge similarly an officer of rank of Commander gets to command a missile destroyer/frigate and they wear Captains stripes when on the ship, the ones who go beyond upto and above the rank of a Commodore may get to command our only AC INS Viraat . Even aviators like Admiral RH Tahiliani and Arun Prakash have commanded missile destroyers/frigates and our Aircraft carrier in service during their tenure.

is there cases of ex-submarine commanders being given DDG or CSG command?

I won't be surprised if it happens or has happened in the IN it's just that I don't know anyone who has served on both platforms.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 20 Apr 2013 18:16

If I am not wrong Adm Vishnu Bhagwat had commanded a submarine , destroyer and CBG in his career before he rose to lead.

Snehashis · Post by **Snehashis** » 20 Apr 2013 18:38

Arihant surfaced! Well on a tablo.

Hull diameter and length looks a bit larger than Akula and also looks like it has a twin shaft.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 20 Apr 2013 19:01

Since a CSG/CBG is not a recognized command formation in the Indian Navy, there have never been any official commanders of them. The admiral in charge of whatever is cobbled together at a particular time around the carrier pretty much calls the shots.

Bhagwat was never a submariner IIRC, his son is/was.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 20 Apr 2013 19:53

RajitO wrote:.. It would be a strategic harakiri to shift focus away from carriers to subs when your primary rival in this century is doing the opposite...

The world hasn't seen carrier vs carrier combat since world war 2. In the Falklands war the Argentinian aircraft carrier ran to port with its tail between its legs instead of taking on the Brit task force only because of a nuclear submarine.

negi · Post by **negi** » 20 Apr 2013 21:23

^ Carriers are relevant even today ; i.e. they are very nice platforms to project air power specially in areas which cannot be patrolled and controlled by the IAF for obvious reasons. Also a big enough Carrier fleet can in theory give one an option of opening an another front through the sea route. In case of USN the long term economic interests of US in far flung regions outweigh the apparent prohibitive costs involved in maintaining and operating such a huge number of carriers.

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 21 Apr 2013 02:56

From the LCA thread:

The ships with best seakeeping qualities in IN are from the R class which are basically modified Kashin-II class i.e. about 1970s vintage. GD fwiw the R class have non-retracting fin stabilizers. Iirc Snaik had posted the image of fin stablizers on Talwar class quite some time back (iirc it has one pair of non-retractable fin stabilizers).

Non retracting fins are just welded pieces of steel few inches wide and running several meters below the water line. No great tech. If you imply 'sea handling capability' as the means to reduce roll, then it all depends upon the GM. ON the contrary good 'sea handling' may involve ships that roll a lot as the correcting moment GZ is high. They are uncomfortable maybe, but they are going to survive the worst weather better than a ship that's got a high GM and a longer period of roll. The first characteristic when i design a Ship will be ability in bad weather conditions. It's worst possible GM in those conditions, it's correcting ability in such conditions. I will as a Naval Arch and designer be the most interested in it's righting lever in the worst conditions. For a passenger ship of course all those criteria will change. But never think that a ship that rolls less is more stable than one that rolls like mad at sea. So when i design a fighting ship i am intersted in the righting lever first and foremost. Not the comfort levels of the crew that mans it. That is a primary design consideration. Next comes obviously if there are weapons systems that have limitations to roll, pitch and yaw. It's only in those cases that reducing roll measures are put in place. There are many measures, but these have nothing, zilch to do with sea handling capabilities.

negi · Post by **negi** » 21 Apr 2013 04:12

^ Well I did not mean to imply any such thing for I have no knowledge of ship building I just listed some data based on what I know; however the seakeeping qualities of the R class are well known and it is one of the reasons why they serve with the Eastern Naval Command (Bay of bengal and the Indian ocean are more rougher than the Arabian sea). As for fin stabilizers GD had posted a question on fin stabilizers I merely replied to that.

The R class are also different from most of the other ships in the IN; unlike the Delhi, Talwar and Shivalik class R class's foremost bulkhead does not store any equipment or quarters it is just one solid piece of steel (I am told that in theory it can ram into another ship and break it). Basically it is a perfect ship for jingo giri the amont of analog guages and plumbing and pipes running through the ship are mind boggling , the Volna system needs a dedicated officer to man it and the heli hanger is designed like some alien craft i.e. after the heli lands it is lowered by the elevator and a roof slides shut from top, from outside one cannot tell where the heli is kept. Shivaliks cannot accomodate the Kamovs as latter are taller than what hanger can accomodate.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 21 Apr 2013 04:44

Hindustan Times: Chabahar India’s answer to Gwadar

Ahead of external affairs minister Salman Khurshid’s visit to Iran from May 3-5, the Union cabinet is likely to approve an assistance plan of $100 million (about Rs. 539 crore) to develop the port. “The cabinet approval is expected soon,” said an official.

Gwadar has strategic importance for China as 60% of its crude oil comes from Gulf countries that are close to the port.

Chabahar will not only help New Delhi counter Beijing’s presence but also boost India’s trade and investment ties with landlocked Afghanistan and central Asia by providing it with a transit route to the region (Pakistan does not allow Indian goods to pass through its territory). India, Iran and Afghanistan have already signed an agreement to give Indian goods heading for central Asia and Afghanistan preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar.
:
:
:

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 21 Apr 2013 08:25

abhik wrote:
RajitO wrote:.. It would be a strategic harakiri to shift focus away from carriers to subs when your primary rival in this century is doing the opposite...
The world hasn't seen carrier vs carrier combat since world war 2. In the Falklands war the Argentinian aircraft carrier ran to port with its tail between its legs instead of taking on the Brit task force only because of a nuclear submarine.

The world has never seen an SSBN fire an ICBM in anger - hell they didn't launch even in Crimson Tide or The Hunt for Red October. Should we do away with them? Let's keep away from fallacious arguments where we don't factor in the reasons why a situation X or Y has happened or not.

One of the reasons why that Argentinian carrier ran away with its tail between its legs is that it did not have the protection of a USN like CSG around it. Which is also the reason why we should not be complacent about just acquiring more carriers, we need to figure out the whole CSG thing as well.

I suppose now someone will bring up the whole Chinese sub surfacing close to Kitty Hawk incident as proof that even that does not work. As a response to that I can only point people to relevant internet resources like the USNI blog where serving and retired USN officers have been bemoaning the major erosion in their ASW capability, especially since the carriers stopped operating the S-2 carrier-borne ASW aircraft.

This is not a my submarine can beat your carrier discussion. It is about what tools we need for the job if we want to play the Superpower game.

Bottomline...why are the Chinese spending so much time and effort in building a carrier-based capability when they already have hordes of anti-access capability and could have just focused all energies on improving their still mediocre sub force?

And just like their Olympics Gold programme, by hook or crook, they will get there...

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 21 Apr 2013 08:44

Chah Bahar being "developed" is a 20 yr. old story.The problem with our MEA mandarins is that only when they see that the PRC has stolen a decade over it do they wake up from their slumber! We have also wasted the opportunities offered to us-in Sri Lanka at Hambantota and at Trinco,which at one time was even offered to us to use as a naval base!
Nevertheless,better late than never,but be warned,Uncle Sam will do his utmost to sabotage Indo-Iranian relations because of the so-called threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions.

The Chinese,like soldier ants,have a relentless military programme that marches on and on,never halting or slowing down.It's avowed aim is to replace the US as the most powerful military power on earth.It hopes-as is customary of Chinese military philosophy,Tzun Zsu,blah,blah,to overwhelm enemies without going to war by the sheer size and capability of its armed forces.By 2020 we will see a PLAAN ,which is getting the largest amount of funding from the govt. possessing between 60-80 modern subs,nuclear and AIP,armed with ICBMs and LR cruise missiles,a 4-carrier navy in the making,with some nuclear powered,over a thousand naval aircraft including SU-33s,SU-30s,etc.,plus if reports are true,some of the 36 TU-2M#3 Backfires being acquired from Russia,while the PLAAF will also possess SU-35s in addition to the massive amount of Flankers that it already has.Several classes of DDGs and FFGs are also being built along with large numbers of missile craft many being passed on to client states like Pak.The IN's task is going to be difficult ,as we are already seeing reports of large numbers of sightings of Chinese subs in the immediate waters around the subcontinent.Unless the IN also expands its operations to the Indo-China Sea and secure bases/facilities for the fleet in the IOR littorals,we will be focussing more on sea denial than sea control in our own backyard.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 21 Apr 2013 09:07

I have always wondered, what additional strategic advantage do Hambantota or Trincomalee give to India?
Why develop a port there or a naval base there?
India was considering the Trincomalee tank farms as a strategic oil reserve, but the area was to unstable with the LTTE problem then.
What would India gain from helping build Hambantota for the lankans?

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 21 Apr 2013 09:21

Gagan wrote:I have always wondered, what additional strategic advantage do Hambantota or Trincomalee give to India?
Why develop a port there or a naval base there?
India was considering the Trincomalee tank farms as a strategic oil reserve, but the area was to unstable with the LTTE problem then.
What would India gain from helping build Hambantota for the lankans?

It's about playing "the Great Game". I am pretty sure some MEA mandarin would have concluded that since having a port a few hundred miles away from one's mainland was not that much of a biggie operationally, the same is true strategically. Denying someone a strategic advantage is as good as having created one.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 21 Apr 2013 12:34

RajitO wrote:The world has never seen an SSBN fire an ICBM in anger - hell they didn't launch even in Crimson Tide or The Hunt for Red October. Should we do away with them? Let's keep away from fallacious arguments where we don't factor in the reasons why a situation X or Y has happened or not.

I don't see how this is relevent.

One of the reasons why that Argentinian carrier ran away with its tail between its legs is that it did not have the protection of a USN like CSG around it. Which is also the reason why we should not be complacent about just acquiring more carriers, we need to figure out the whole CSG thing as well.

I suppose now someone will bring up the whole Chinese sub surfacing close to Kitty Hawk incident as proof that even that does not work. As a response to that I can only point people to relevant internet resources like the USNI blog where serving and retired USN officers have been bemoaning the major erosion in their ASW capability, especially since the carriers stopped operating the S-2 carrier-borne ASW aircraft.

There is no silver bullet that will somehow make the submarine threat suddenly disappear, S-2 or any thing else.

This is not a my submarine can beat your carrier discussion. It is about what tools we need for the job if we want to play the Superpower game.

Why do you believe that India wants to play the Superpower game? I have seen no indications of such, at least in the near term(10-20 years).

Bottomline...why are the Chinese spending so much time and effort in building a carrier-based capability when they already have hordes of anti-access capability and could have just focused all energies on improving their still mediocre sub force?

They have one refurbished second-hand aircraft carrier, with no follow ups under construction(at least as far a I know). On the other hand they have 60+ subs and a large sub building program which is rapidly increasing both its quality and quantity.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 21 Apr 2013 15:29

abhik wrote:
RajitO wrote:The world has never seen an SSBN fire an ICBM in anger - hell they didn't launch even in Crimson Tide or The Hunt for Red October. Should we do away with them? Let's keep away from fallacious arguments where we don't factor in the reasons why a situation X or Y has happened or not.
I don't see how this is relevent.

One of the reasons why that Argentinian carrier ran away with its tail between its legs is that it did not have the protection of a USN like CSG around it. Which is also the reason why we should not be complacent about just acquiring more carriers, we need to figure out the whole CSG thing as well.

I suppose now someone will bring up the whole Chinese sub surfacing close to Kitty Hawk incident as proof that even that does not work. As a response to that I can only point people to relevant internet resources like the USNI blog where serving and retired USN officers have been bemoaning the major erosion in their ASW capability, especially since the carriers stopped operating the S-2 carrier-borne ASW aircraft.
There is no silver bullet that will somehow make the submarine threat suddenly disappear, S-2 or any thing else.

This is not a my submarine can beat your carrier discussion. It is about what tools we need for the job if we want to play the Superpower game.
Why do you believe that India wants to play the Superpower game? I have seen no indications of such, at least in the near term(10-20 years).

Bottomline...why are the Chinese spending so much time and effort in building a carrier-based capability when they already have hordes of anti-access capability and could have just focused all energies on improving their still mediocre sub force?
They have one refurbished second-hand aircraft carrier, with no follow ups under construction(at least as far a I know). On the other hand they have 60+ subs and a large sub building program which is rapidly increasing both its quality and quantity.

1. QED...The point of giving an irrelevant example was to show how yours was irrelevant. If you want to analyse it another way, chalk up all post WWII conflicts, figure out in how many of those both sides had carriers, and then let me know how the original conclusion on carrier vs. carrier looks.

2. Agreed. But who said anything about silver bullets? Beefing up your ASW defences is what is being talked about to mitigate not eliminate the sub threat.Take a guess even in the modern era what is the no.1 source of detection of submarines? The answer may surprise you but will help connect some of the dots.

3. So:
a) India going overtly nuclear in the 90s
b) Our ICBM, SLBM, SSBN programs - some with origins in the 70s
c) Formal lobbying for a permanent Security Council seat from the late 80s
d) etc.etc.

don't make you think that we want to play that game. Or were you looking for a formal press release from the PMO or the MEA which would explicitly state that "India would like to formally state it's case to become a Superpower by the year 2030...". You know, I tried to google for similar documents from the US, Soviet Union etc. but could not find one.

4. Would this be the same carrier that was acquired by a Macau based front company to be ostensibly used as a floating casino (What does it tell you about an adversary when it has to resort to such machinations)? As for refurbished second hand carriers...I know, how dare they copy us!

Finally, i am surprised this link is not there in the China Military Watch archive...

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 ... /?page=all

eklavya · Post by **eklavya** » 21 Apr 2013 15:57

RajitO wrote:So:
a) India going overtly nuclear in the 90s
b) Our ICBM, SLBM, SSBN programs - some with origins in the 70s
c) Formal lobbying for a permanent Security Council seat from the late 80s
d) etc.etc.

don't make you think that we want to play that game. Or were you looking for a formal press release from the PMO or the MEA which would explicitly state that "India would like to formally state it's case to become a Superpower by the year 2030...". You know, I tried to google for similar documents from the US, Soviet Union etc. but could not find one.

With a defence budget of $40bn, and the economy slowing down precipitously, India is barely able to defend our own borders against China (look at events at DBO), let alone justify superpower hallucinations.

The nuclear and missile capability is aimed at deterring China from using nuclear blackmail against India, not to project power or coerce another country.

A permanent SC seat does not turn a country into a superpower: UK and France do not have even 10% of the capability it takes to be a superpower.

Aircraft Carriers are an instrument of power projection; in the context of dealing with the threat from China and Pakistan, they are quite useless. What we need is more silent submarines (nuclear and AIP), more P-8I, about 3 Su-30 squadrons with refuelling capability deployed permanently in the Andaman and Car Nicobar Islands, etc.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 21 Apr 2013 21:20

eklavya wrote:Aircraft Carriers are an instrument of power projection; in the context of dealing with the threat from China and Pakistan, they are quite useless. What we need is more silent submarines (nuclear and AIP), more P-8I, about 3 Su-30 squadrons with refuelling capability deployed permanently in the Andaman and Car Nicobar Islands, etc.

Unless you're proposing the IAF or IN start sinking civilian shipping during wartime (a la German U-boats in WWII) there is quite simply no alternative to a CBG if the objective is to enforce a blockade of Karachi or stop China bound shipping from transiting the Malacca Strait. Frankly, within the Indian Ocean its submarines that are of marginal use. For that matter, even in the South China Sea SSN/SSKs operations may not bear sizeable fruit, given the lack of significant ISTAR resources in support.

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 21 Apr 2013 22:45

Philip wrote:Chah Bahar being "developed" is a 20 yr. old story.The problem with our MEA mandarins is that only when they see that the PRC has stolen a decade over it do they wake up from their slumber! We have also wasted the opportunities offered to us-in Sri Lanka at Hambantota and at Trinco,which at one time was even offered to us to use as a naval base!
Nevertheless,better late than never,but be warned,Uncle Sam will do his utmost to sabotage Indo-Iranian relations because of the so-called threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions.

The Chinese,like soldier ants,have a relentless military programme that marches on and on,never halting or slowing down.It's avowed aim is to replace the US as the most powerful military power on earth.It hopes-as is customary of Chinese military philosophy,Tzun Zsu,blah,blah,to overwhelm enemies without going to war by the sheer size and capability of its armed forces.By 2020 we will see a PLAAN ,which is getting the largest amount of funding from the govt. possessing between 60-80 modern subs,nuclear and AIP,armed with ICBMs and LR cruise missiles,a 4-carrier navy in the making,with some nuclear powered,over a thousand naval aircraft including SU-33s,SU-30s,etc.,plus if reports are true,some of the 36 TU-2M#3 Backfires being acquired from Russia,while the PLAAF will also possess SU-35s in addition to the massive amount of Flankers that it already has.Several classes of DDGs and FFGs are also being built along with large numbers of missile craft many being passed on to client states like Pak.The IN's task is going to be difficult ,as we are already seeing reports of large numbers of sightings of Chinese subs in the immediate waters around the subcontinent.Unless the IN also expands its operations to the Indo-China Sea and secure bases/facilities for the fleet in the IOR littorals,we will be focussing more on sea denial than sea control in our own backyard.

Gwadar is a worthless investment hyped up by delusional pakis who believe that their location gives them strategic advantages which can compensate for their monumental shortcomings and incompetence.
No one wants to take over it even for free! Pakis been begging Chines to take it over for over a decade but they kept refusing. Eventually Singapore took it for a while but they soon realized what sucker of a deal it is and threw it back to Bakis. Now China has finally taken it over but it'll remain a marginal, loss making, tactically brilliant investment being sold as game changing strategic answer to all their insecurities.

Chah Bahar and indian involvement in it has nothing to do with Gwadar IMO, it's Indian effort to get access to Afghanistan and central Asia for trade. No one in their right mind would think that an Iranian port can become a major trade port for anything under current sanctions from west.

eklavya · Post by **eklavya** » 21 Apr 2013 23:27

Viv S wrote:
eklavya wrote:Aircraft Carriers are an instrument of power projection; in the context of dealing with the threat from China and Pakistan, they are quite useless. What we need is more silent submarines (nuclear and AIP), more P-8I, about 3 Su-30 squadrons with refuelling capability deployed permanently in the Andaman and Car Nicobar Islands, etc.
Unless you're proposing the IAF or IN start sinking civilian shipping during wartime (a la German U-boats in WWII) there is quite simply no alternative to a CBG if the objective is to enforce a blockade of Karachi or stop China bound shipping from transiting the Malacca Strait. Frankly, within the Indian Ocean its submarines that are of marginal use. For that matter, even in the South China Sea SSN/SSKs operations may not bear sizeable fruit, given the lack of significant ISTAR resources in support.

Why blockade Karachi port when it can be made inoperative with 2-3 dozen IAF sorties. Once the docks are damaged, the loading/unloading equipment is damaged, and the road, rail and electrical infrastructure is damaged, the port becomes quite useless. Lots of targets here:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... etwork.png

To talk about the Indian Navy blockading China today of all days is a bit rich in irony. Government of India lacks the scrotal fortitude to even defend Daulat Beg Oldi effectively, let alone blockade the Malacca Straits for China bound merchant shipping. Let's not kid ourselves too much.

Thought of an Indian Navy aircraft carrier with 16 to 28 MiG-29K facing down the PLAAF over the South China Sea is simply not credible.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 22 Apr 2013 01:24

eklavya wrote:Why blockade Karachi port when it can be made inoperative with 2-3 dozen IAF sorties. Once the docks are damaged, the loading/unloading equipment is damaged, and the road, rail and electrical infrastructure is damaged, the port becomes quite useless. Lots of targets here:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... etwork.png

Well, in the same vein, one could go ahead and say why bother to bomb Karachi when you can simply destroy it with a nuclear strike. A naval blockade is a means of applying economic and strategic pressure without engaging in full scale conflict or as a deterrent to the same. The enemy could at that point declare war or it could buckle down, point is, those options are not available with a submarine centric fleet. If you start out by bombing the port instead, the purpose is defeated.

As a matter of fact, there is good reason to believe that during the Kargil war, rather than tactical losses in the warzone, it was the arrival of 30 Indian Navy ships in Pakistani contiguous waters off Karachi that prompted Nawaz Sharif's beeline to Washington DC and the great climbdown thereafter.

To talk about the Indian Navy blockading China today of all days is a bit rich in irony. Government of India lacks the scrotal fortitude to even defend Daulat Beg Oldi effectively, let alone blockade the Malacca Straits for China bound merchant shipping. Let's not kid ourselves too much.

I'm afraid that too is rhetoric. The government's gumption or lack thereof has little to do with the composition of the Indian Navy's fleet. Governments come and go, naval ships on the other hand, whether surface or sub-surface, have an average lifespan comfortably exceeding 30 years.

Thought of an Indian Navy aircraft carrier with 16 to 28 MiG-29K facing down the PLAAF over the South China Sea is simply not credible.

Which may be why no one has voiced such a proposal. We're talking about carrier deployment south of A&N and submarine operations in the South China Sea.

eklavya · Post by **eklavya** » 22 Apr 2013 02:10

Viv S wrote:Well, in the same vein, one could go ahead and say why bother to bomb Karachi when you can simply destroy it with a nuclear strike. A naval blockade is a means of applying economic and strategic pressure without engaging in full scale conflict or as a deterrent to the same. The enemy could at that point declare war or it could buckle down, point is, those options are not available with a submarine centric fleet. If you start out by bombing the port instead, the purpose is defeated.

What makes you think Pakistan will not attack Indian Navy ships attempting a blockade of its main port. Once you decide to blockade a nation, you are asking for war. Anything deployed by the Indian Navy within range of the PAF F-16 Block 52s armed with Harpoons will be soggy toast.

Anyway, how exactly does a MiG-29 operating off the INS Vikramaditya enforce a blockade? One needs surveillance aircraft (for detection) and surface ships (to conduct inspections, etc), but why an aircraft carrier? Sounds like a huge waste of money for the job to be done.

Viv S wrote: As a matter of fact, there is good reason to believe that during the Kargil war, rather than tactical losses in the warzone, it was the arrival of 30 Indian Navy ships in Pakistani contiguous waters off Karachi that prompted Nawaz Sharif's beeline to Washington DC and the great climbdown thereafter.

There is even better reason to believe that this is a rather fanciful and self-serving theory propagated by people shamelessly trying to take credit for something to which they have contributed not even 0.1%.

Viv S wrote: The government's gumption or lack thereof has little to do with the composition of the Indian Navy's fleet. Governments come and go, naval ships on the other hand, whether surface or sub-surface, have an average lifespan comfortably exceeding 30 years.

The thought of the Indian Navy blockading China-bound merchant shipping with its hugely vulnerable aircraft carriers 30 years from today is not even remotely credible. Submarines are a lot less vulnerable.

Which may be why no one has voiced such a proposal. We're talking about carrier deployment south of A&N and submarine operations in the South China Sea.

It would be far better to base Su-30s in the southern part of A&N. The Indian Navy carriers will be hugely vulnerable to any number of threats.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 22 Apr 2013 02:44

During the Kargil War,Pak had fuel supplies for not more than 7-10 days and the presence of IN warships which were capable of enforcing a naval blockade,which included eastern Fleet assets ,plus the little mentioned but significant role that the IN's EW assets played,would've seen the swift destruction of the Paki fleet had war broken out.I was told after the war that the PN,which had little knowledge of Mushy's gambit,could galvanise only very few of its warships and subs into a warfighting condition.had war broken out,the Paki army would've run out of fuel and one can imagine the consequences of it had India launched a ground offensive .Caught as if in a nutcracker,with the steady capture of the peaks,thanks to the IA and IAF,being strangulated by the IN,and the prospect of certain defeat if war broke out on every front,Pak had to run to the the US to save its butt.

The presence of permanent PLAN warships,subs and maritime patrol aircraft operating out of Gwadar far outweighs any lack of lucrative commercial considerations.For the Chinese ,operating a naval base at Gwadar is afr more important than the commercial chicken feed for it.With such a presence,China could give India and the IN a very tough time safeguarding its tankers exiting the Gulf.The In would be stretched and would need at least two carrier task forces in the Arabian Sea to handle such a threat.The gravest threat would come from Chinese subs.We've already seen their appearance in our backyard,and it is only a matter of time before their permanent presence at Gwadar occurs.

Our waking up to CB may also be in part due to the attitude of the US/West over the arms trade issue,where we strongly objected to the terms being attempted.The pro-Pak entrance of Kerry as Sec. for State does nothing to reassure India that the US will play fair with us over Paki terrorism.The refusal to hand over Headley/Gilani and continuing aid to Pak indicates its pro-Pak swing.

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 22 Apr 2013 02:59

Well I did not mean to imply any such thing for I have no knowledge of ship building I just listed some data based on what I know; however the seakeeping qualities of the R class are well known and it is one of the reasons why they serve with the Eastern Naval Command (Bay of bengal and the Indian ocean are more rougher than the Arabian sea). As for fin stabilizers GD had posted a question on fin stabilizers I merely replied to that.

The R class are also different from most of the other ships in the IN; unlike the Delhi, Talwar and Shivalik class R class's foremost bulkhead does not store any equipment or quarters it is just one solid piece of steel (I am told that in theory it can ram into another ship and break it). Basically it is a perfect ship for jingo giri the amont of analog guages and plumbing and pipes running through the ship are mind boggling

Negi Ji, just wanted to clarify on this aspect of 'Sea-keeping'. Lots of folks think that when a ship doesn't roll much in heavy weather it is 'handling well'. On the contrary when a ship rolls massively it is not 'handling well'. That line of approach is not correct IMO, and keeps getting reiterated by many folks including sailors with little idea about angle of loll. I would be very careful of a vessel which almost is always upright when the weather is rough and swells are abeam. Some classes of ships which 'handle' so well are tested for the period of roll just to ascertain whether they are fit to go out to sea. The discomfort due to high roll is so high that crew possibly don't get a minutes nap even in their free time. However designers don't still work on crew comfort and that is a sad part about the Naval Industry. Heartening part is that many expensive systems work better off if roll is reduced to acceptable levels. This is why stabilizers of different types are in vogue and used. Passenger ships obviously demand comfort levels and hence the best quality stabilizers are in use and companies running them mandate skirting rough weather patches wherever possible or staying confined to quieter waters. That case unfortunately does not apply to fighting ships. So considering the angle of loll, most ships that folks say 'handle well' in rough weather could capsize at a large wave abeam.

I don't understand what you mean by the foremost bulkhead does not store XYZ. A Bulkhead is a partition. The foremost bulkhead, usually a collision bulkhead will run from bottom to upper deck. Solid steel always with stiffeners. It is always designed such that in case of a collision and flooding in the forward compartments the vessel will not sink. Only in Ice class vessels it is significantly strengthened for obvious reasons. Forward of this bulkhead will have to contain the chain locker and hydraulic equipment that help hoist up and down the anchors at the minimum, unless the R class you say has anchors aft of the forward most bulkhead..

As for piping, there are miles of it that run through almost every class of vessel. It's not something specific to R class for sure. On the Gorshkov revamp issue i had put out a post couple of years back identifying why a revamp is always a bigger nuisance than building something anew from scratch. On analogue gauges: They will always be required, as digital readings will always be dependent on some kind of power and in events of emergency can fail. Analogue gauges help in determining critical pressures and temperatures amongst the various systems despite failure of major systems and their backups. Experienced Naval personnel will always insist on local analogue gauges to designers who may not understand the desperation. That is why even in the most modern ships, analogue gauges are provided locally for key systems till date, even though key parameters and responses are checked digitally in normal operations. Anyways JM2PwLI.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 22 Apr 2013 03:05

eklavya wrote:What makes you think Pakistan will not attack Indian Navy ships attempting a blockade of its main port. Once you decide to blockade a nation, you are asking for war. Anything deployed by the Indian Navy within range of the PAF F-16 Block 52s armed with Harpoons will be soggy toast.

The Indian Navy has operated fleets well within F-16 range in past, and were the circumstances to call for it, will do it again. And no, Pakistan is not compelled to initiate lethal action in the event of a blockade. That option, if taken, will be a result of considered deliberation and weighing in of all factors.

Anyway, how exactly does a MiG-29 operating off the INS Vikramaditya enforce a blockade? One needs surveillance aircraft (for detection) and surface ships (to conduct inspections, etc), but why an aircraft carrier? Sounds like a huge waste of money for the job to be done.

Its popular to think of an aircraft carrier as a floating airfield for bombers but fact is, the primary responsibility for the air complement is protection of the naval battle group. Its why the IAC project was originally named Air Defence Ship. A surface fleet without air cover may well end up, in your words, as 'soggy toast'.

There is even better reason to believe that this is a rather fanciful and self-serving theory propagated by people shamelessly trying to take credit for something to which they have contributed not even 0.1%.

Nobody is taking away credit for the recapture of Tiger Hill. But if you think the imminent blockade of the country's only deep port, relied upon for 80% of its fuel, didn't send alarm bells ringing in Islamabad, you've not thought matters through.

The thought of the Indian Navy blockading China-bound merchant shipping with its hugely vulnerable aircraft carriers 30 years from today is not even remotely credible. Submarines are a lot less vulnerable.

'Hugely' vulnerable is an unsubstantiated claim. Submarines are less vulnerable but they're also less utilitarian. They cannot detect or track any enemy fleet at range, have limited situational awareness especially with regard to aerial threats and have a limited potential for survivability when engaged. Just as importantly they can't be employed for sea control, unless the captain wants to risk his command by repeatedly surfacing for VBSS-type operations.

It would be far better to base Su-30s in the southern part of A&N. The Indian Navy carriers will be hugely vulnerable to any number of threats.

You can't police maritime traffic with Su-30s and the PLAN isn't likely to send a surface fleet into the Indian Ocean any more than the IN would send one into the South China Sea.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 22 Apr 2013 08:22

Viv S wrote:Pakistan is not compelled to initiate lethal action in the event of a blockade. That option, if taken, will be a result of considered deliberation and weighing in of all factors.

Blockade against who Pakistan

The last time such a thought went passed like a fast meteor flashes the earth was after 1992 Mumbai blast when PVN govt was contemplating blockade against PN only to be wisely told such a blockade would result in war , since then we have only seen Ships from Pakistan have only visited Mumbai and Ratnagiri with arms .....no blockade

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 22 Apr 2013 08:48

I wonder if crew quarters that are suspended, eg a spherical chamber in a complementary compartment has been used for crew comfort during rough seas.

tushar_m · Post by **tushar_m** » 22 Apr 2013 08:57

Austin wrote:
Viv S wrote:Pakistan is not compelled to initiate lethal action in the event of a blockade. That option, if taken, will be a result of considered deliberation and weighing in of all factors.
Blockade against who Pakistan

The last time such a thought went passed like a fast meteor flashes the earth was after 1992 Mumbai blast when PVN govt was contemplating blockade against PN only to be wisely told such a blockade would result in war , since then we have only seen Ships from Pakistan have only visited Mumbai and Ratnagiri with arms .....no blockade

maybe an unannounced blockade could work .???

we know that 2 akula's were present near US coasts for a month , what does it tell , it tells us that there is a security breach in the territorial waters & this may seem like a small news for us (living in India) but for USN upper brass this was a nightmare scenario .

suppose there is a news of an SSBN with SSN in pak waters will it not informally exert a blockade for precious ships like oil tankers & others.

what i really want to say is that since the scenario is changing in the Asian theater we need our Navy ,Army & IAF to be more aggressive in such a neighborhood.

"Just show that we can do it then you wouldn't need to do any such thing"