Thanks GD.Singha wrote:
thats it, no need to fire a shot immediately.
Managing Chinese Threat
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Last edited by RamaY on 24 Apr 2013 07:22, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
hope the media escalates and clearly shows on a map how serious a threat this is to the DBG garrison...words like "Kargil 2" are best used.
shame the govt into action.
judge,jury,executioner channels like TimesNow can do their bit!
this is classical chinese strategy
step 1 - squat in your backyard
step2 - demand concessions on another part of your backyard in return for vacating your own backyard
step 3 - if concessions granted, go to step 1 after a delay
step 4 - if kicked on the backside, howl in pain and retreat, sulk for a while and then go to step1 to try again
idea is to tire out the adversary via relentless series of small aggressive moves.
shame the govt into action.
judge,jury,executioner channels like TimesNow can do their bit!
this is classical chinese strategy
step 1 - squat in your backyard
step2 - demand concessions on another part of your backyard in return for vacating your own backyard
step 3 - if concessions granted, go to step 1 after a delay
step 4 - if kicked on the backside, howl in pain and retreat, sulk for a while and then go to step1 to try again
idea is to tire out the adversary via relentless series of small aggressive moves.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Also install a generator to power broad spectrum wireless communication jammers. The unwelcome tourists will have to wonder what to do next in radio silence.Singha wrote:install a small AA unit, block their land route and let them cordially know that
- any attempt at aerial incursion will attract MANPADS now
- any attempt to escape by land will be intercepted and they will be arrested, disarmed, flown to delhi and handed over to red cross for repatriation after media interview and parade (loss of face) - install a mobile armour and infantry unit 500m from them to block any escape route.
- they are welcome to sit there and starve if they want.
- install some loudspeakers and bombard their camp with bappi lahiri music 24x7 (cruel I know, against geneva convention, but what to do we are cruel yindoo onlee)
- periodically bring in sanitation trucks and dump the human waste and rotting kitchen garbage in heaps upwind from their camp - let them smell the fragrant jasmines of yindoostan , catch 100s of live rats and release them next to the camp to sit there and run riot
thats it, no need to fire a shot immediately.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
they have tried this squatting thing in east asia also. pic here
panganiban reef http://resources0.news.com.au/images/20 ... na-sea.jpg
subi reef https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/imag ... OpayEqgg0Q
mischief reef https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/imag ... JCwpe_XcvA
none of these are likely to survive a good cyclone. its amazing the amt of expertise they have developed to setup these "oil rig" type things at drop of a hat. some kind of inherent genius in sneaking around and squatting on others property.
philipines and japan not demolishing these structures after arresting the occupants has only emboldened them, as has indian inaction on the land front.
panganiban reef http://resources0.news.com.au/images/20 ... na-sea.jpg
subi reef https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/imag ... OpayEqgg0Q
mischief reef https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/imag ... JCwpe_XcvA
none of these are likely to survive a good cyclone. its amazing the amt of expertise they have developed to setup these "oil rig" type things at drop of a hat. some kind of inherent genius in sneaking around and squatting on others property.
philipines and japan not demolishing these structures after arresting the occupants has only emboldened them, as has indian inaction on the land front.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Did the BRICS summit in SA make them sense MMS' weakness?SSridhar wrote:Times Now channel reporting that China is unwilling to accept that its troops are on Indian territory. So, it is now very clear that from the very beginning, they had planned this incursion. There can therefore be no more pretension of 'differing perception' or 'not sharply defined border' etc. excuses from our side. Military retaliation is the only alternative.
It is now clear that the Chinese planned this incident just ahead of the Chinese PM's visit and after homilies by President Xi Jinping kindled a sense of expectation in Indian leaders and bureaucracy. Their thinking is that this would put the Indian leaders in a dilemma and they would decide not to react in the interests of relationship.
The strongest political signal India can send right now is publicly ask Chinese to cancel or postpone the visit of Jinping. It will tell them that India can do without Chinese "friendship". This is exactly like 62 when Chau made the visit to see Bakhra dam. In this test of will and lets pray there is still little steel left among Nakhid Netas and Babbus of Bharat. India need to start toying with China, irritating them and set up for loss of face on every possible international occasion.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Will post some links and try to come up with a suitable explanation in the gdf thread.Carl wrote:Would be useful if you and other gurus could list some signs and evidence of this nexus at work - which manufactures an emergency everytime India's MIC wants to gear up for next level, and thereby spurs a buying spree to upgrade rather than investing in our own MIC...
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
From The Hindu
If it is to be solved through 'peaceful negotiations', then why did the PLA intrude 11 Kms ? The Chinese are setting up a circular argument here by claiming that they have not intruded and they are only on their side. The only way to call their bluff is to act militarily elsewhere if not in the same sector. Let us call for 'peaceful negotiations to solve the issue left over from history' after we cross 22 Kms into territories held by PLA.In Beijing, Mr. Akbaruddin’s (Indian MEA Spokesperson) counterpart, Hua Chunying, sought to play down the tensions amid a shift in tone compared to the previous day when she had strongly rejected Indian claims of an incursion as “speculation” and stressed that the Chinese troops were on “their side of the border.’’
On Tuesday, she declined to comment on the on-ground situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and instead emphasised the good momentum in India-China ties and sound interactions and cooperation on the border issue.
“The two sides should work together to properly solve this issue left over from history through peaceful negotiations, so as to create good conditions for sound development of bilateral relations,’’ she said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
No other nation on Earth would have allowed such an incursion. What a sad state of affairs...
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
KKP is far closer and they are already there.SSridhar wrote:In fact, this Chinese intrusion well beyond DBO and almost to the nape of Siachen must open the eyes of those who were arguing for turning Siachen into a peace park and India withdrawing its soldiers. They are forgetting that TSPA and PLA are together in their nefarious activities.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
SSridhar wrote: In Beijing, Mr. Akbaruddin’s (Indian MEA Spokesperson) counterpart, Hua Chunying, sought to play down the tensions amid a shift in tone compared to the previous day when she had strongly rejected Indian claims of an incursion as “speculation” and stressed that the Chinese troops were on “their side of the border.’’
On Tuesday, she declined to comment on the on-ground situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and instead emphasised the good momentum in India-China ties and sound interactions and cooperation on the border issue.
“The two sides should work together to properly solve this issue left over from history through peaceful negotiations, so as to create good conditions for sound development of bilateral relations,’’ she said.
This could be triggered by Uncle and Uncle sponsered news report and news media
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Of course, ShauryaT. But, that is north of Siachen and this is south of it. A good pincer.ShauryaT wrote:KKP is far closer and they are already there.SSridhar wrote:In fact, this Chinese intrusion well beyond DBO and almost to the nape of Siachen must open the eyes of those who were arguing for turning Siachen into a peace park and India withdrawing its soldiers. They are forgetting that TSPA and PLA are together in their nefarious activities.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
One can legitimately make a case that PRC threatens up to Zoji La. Their capacity to do so is questioned by our Army. A demilitarization is based on strength not weakness. It will be our weakness that will open space for PRC not our strength. The fact that there are incursions and the entire LAC is not demarcated is well known. An MSC and additional mountain divisions is our best guarantee against any such designs. I can only hope that the recent doctrinal change from a pure defensive posture against PLA to a more aggressive one on paper is backed by additional funding and capabilities. We shall of course continue to differ on SiachenSSridhar wrote: Of course, ShauryaT. But, that is north of Siachen and this is south of it. A good pincer.

Re: Managing Chinese Threat
A non-governmental public demonstration of outrage would be a helpful "diplomatic" signal. Even selective boycott of goods and swadeshi pride would go a long way. But the defeatism doesn't seem to be limited to GoI. Trending on twitter:


Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Nowadays, Most BR threads are filled with gossips and less facts. Many members are unnecessarily commenting useless things and just doing time pass only.
When I open a thread, I want to read facts but instead I have to scroll through an entire page full of comments to locate one or two useful comment
When I open a thread, I want to read facts but instead I have to scroll through an entire page full of comments to locate one or two useful comment
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Summary compilation of comments on situ by Lt. Gen H.S. Panag (R)
Sino Indian Competitive Conflict
Last 4 comments are interesting. Says he is not calling for war, but for a very strong mobilization to evict intruders.
Says if we do not, then it will set us back by a decade in our efforts to decide IB.
Sino Indian Competitive Conflict
Last 4 comments are interesting. Says he is not calling for war, but for a very strong mobilization to evict intruders.
Says if we do not, then it will set us back by a decade in our efforts to decide IB.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
What momentum the MEA is seeking to preserve. The PLA advances and the IA sit back??
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Has this been posted?
When were these "fortifications" built by India, and how are they located with respect to the two sides' perception of the LOC?
China refuses to pull back troops from Ladakh, wants India to dismantle posts: Reports
New Delhi/Srinagar: Even as the "face-off" continued between Indian and Chinese Army troops at Depsang in Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector in Ladakh, reports claimed on Wednesday that Beijing has asked New Delhi to dismantle several fortified positions in the so-called disputed territory.
At the second flag meeting held on Tuesday following the April 15 incident when a platoon of troops from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) intruded 10 kilometres inside the Indian territory in DBO sector and set up a tented post there, no resolution could be reached between the two sides.
As per reports, the Indian side refused to accept the Chinese demand and that led to an impasse.
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/ch ... 44319.html
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
This is looking more and more like 1962 mistakes all over again. Why is the international media highlighting the Chinese Japanese dispute but not these. Since, we have seen over the last 10 years, BBC, CNN and whole lot is nothing but Govt mouthpieces, some plan is there to put a lid on Chinese incursions.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
And that is why they want to control the KK Pass.Jhujar wrote:Tweet form a Fauji
Lt Gen H S Panag(R) @rwac48 2h
19.#Standoff:China feels most vulnerable from SSN due proximity to Aksai Chin-Xingiang Highway.Pre/in 62 ops commenced from SSN.
As I wrote earlier, the Chinese claim line in Ladakh was designed with the express intent of controlling all the west-east passes; this ensured the safety of their Xinjiang-Tibet highway. For some reason, they left out the KK Pass from this claim line. KK Pass gives an opportunity for breakout towards the highway.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I am posting the full range of tweets by Lt. General Panag (R) for reference. He articulates the right way forward on the topic at hand.
1. #Standoff:India&PRC are both striving for stability,economic prosperity,great power status&position of preeminence in comity of nations.
2. #Standoff:PRC's 2 maj vulnerabilities-Tibet&sea lanes of communications which r geo-strategically&politically linked with India.
3. #Standoff:Dalai Lama,Tibetan Govt&sizeable population in India.PRC sees India as principle supporter/instigator of free Tibet.
4. #Standoff:To counter threat to sea lanes,string of pearls policy with pol,economic&mil investment in geo strategic areas/neighbours.
5. #Standoff:Unsettled borders is part of strategy 4 competitive conflict in general&to ward off perceived direct/indirect threat to Tibet.
6. #Standoff:Himalayas between India&Tibet a frontier region.PRC strategically preempted&seized Aksai Chin&all else it required by mid 50s.
7. #Standoff:PRC ready 4 converting frontier/border to IB in 50s.Unrest in Tibet,Dalai L asylum&Don Quixotic fwd policy led to 62 debacle.
8. #Standoff:PRC supremacy established&Frontier converted to Border/LAC which has been kept tense via Mutt&Jeff tactics as part of strategy.
9. #Standoff:To safeguard Tibet&as part of competitive conflict,LAC will be kept tense to exercise leverage&humiliate weaker India.
10. #Standoff:India has an ambiguous functional strategy,ambitious in vision&weak in application,vis China.Tibet card kept close to chest.
11. #Standoff:In application,strat is barely tactical with realpolitiks,infrastructure&mil prowess not matching the ambiguous strat vision.
12. #Standoff:Mismatch between strat vision,&capacity 4 led to 62.Gap has reduced but capacity only 4 dissuasion¬ retribution.
13. #Standoff:9 mutually accepted areas of differing perceptions of LAC.Both sides patrol up to perceived LAC.No confrontation since 86.
14.#Standoff:Night 15Apr PLA patrol of a platoon intruded 2 km beyond their own perceived LAC ie 10 km from our perceived LAC.
15.#Standoff:Temporary Camp set up.8 days not moved back.Overall area known as Sub Sector North(SSN) with Daulet Begh Oldie(DBO) in centre.
16. #Standoff:SSN 17000ft+ plateau lies 50 km due East of Siachen glacier.Karakoram Pass is in its North.See map. http://pic.twitter.com/xPIsJRIUDp
17.#Standoff:Until recently reached from Sasoma in Nubra or along Shyok River after 3 day march.A road has now been constructed along Shyok.
18.#Standoff:DBO located in Centre of SSN with activated airfield.Intrusion 40 km SE of DBO at Burtse in Depsang Valley.(Please refer to my map earlier for this location. They are basically sitting on the access route to DBO Airfield
19.#Standoff:China feels most vulnerable from SSN due proximity to Aksai Chin-Xingiang Highway.Pre/in 62 ops commenced from SSN.
20.#Standoff:Earlier own infrastructure poor now due airfield&road it is much improved.So greater perceived threat by PLA.
21.#Standoff:Intrusion due strat of Mutt&Jeff,our improved infrastructure to preempt build up,humiliate ,quid pro quo(?),PM visit(?).Combo!
22.#Standoff:Our strat should be a firm response-a combo of diplomacy,quid pro quo to our perceived LAC&be prep 4 escalation.
23.#Standoff:We must not accept status quo.It will be a strat defeat wo war with international humiliation.National morale will sink.
24.#Standoff:Escalation contingencies must incl move of a Brigade&Mech Forces Combat Gp to SSN,an addl Div and Armd Brigade to Ladakh.
25.#Standoff:Demonstration flts by IAF.Be prep for full mobilisation in all sectors.We must replicate the Sumdrong Valley Strategy of 86/87.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
our national media has not even managed to show a detail map of the sector as posted above! all we see is a view from the moon of india, with ladakh marked.
http://www.nationalturk.com/en/chinas-b ... tier-36908
According to an English daily, Indian Army has rushed more troops to the region to prevent Chinese army incursions.
“An infantry regiment of the Army specialising in mountain warfare has been sent to Daulat Beg Oldi sector in Ladakh,” the newspaper quoted sources as saying.
According to the reports, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which is deployed on India-China border, has also erected a tent post near the one set up by the Chinese troops.
http://www.nationalturk.com/en/chinas-b ... tier-36908
According to an English daily, Indian Army has rushed more troops to the region to prevent Chinese army incursions.
“An infantry regiment of the Army specialising in mountain warfare has been sent to Daulat Beg Oldi sector in Ladakh,” the newspaper quoted sources as saying.
According to the reports, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which is deployed on India-China border, has also erected a tent post near the one set up by the Chinese troops.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
In an unrelated news
Unrest in China's Xinjiang kills 21 people
BEIJING — Twenty-one people, including police officers and social workers, were killed in violent clashes in China's ethnically-divided western region of Xinjiang, a local official said Wednesday.
"Twenty-one persons were killed in all... including social workers and policemen," an official surnamed Cao from the provincial government's news office said of the incident, which, he added, occurred on Tuesday.
Gun fights broke out in Bachu county, in the west of the province, after police went to search the home of locals suspected of possessing guns, a report on Tianshan Net, a government-run news website, said.
The report described the fighting as a "violent terror incident".
It said 15 of those killed were either police or social workers, with 11 of them being members of China's Uighur ethnic minority, who live mainly in Xinjiang.
A further six "gang members" were shot dead in the violence, the report said, without giving their identities.
Cao confirmed the contents of the report, but said he did not know how many police were among the dead.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
All the preparations are already underway. Last night defence establishment held a very long meeting stretching late into the night.
GoI is talking and preparing at the same time. No one is going to allow the PLA to stay there for long. Khurshid and co are just trying to resolve this without losing lives of our soldiers. The next response in the coming days/weeks will likely be military.
GoI is talking and preparing at the same time. No one is going to allow the PLA to stay there for long. Khurshid and co are just trying to resolve this without losing lives of our soldiers. The next response in the coming days/weeks will likely be military.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
From the TimesNow channel photographs, I see regular constructions and also what looked like a commnication tower. Are these Indian structures that the PLA has occupied ?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Unless the Chinese have started to believe own propaganda like PA in Kargil, the current move by PLA is a very deliberate exercise where the PLA would have factored in the escalation in ground situation.
PLA would have kept a Regiment level of force ready to deal with any escalation in this sector. Please be advised that in PLA, Regiment is equivalent to an Indian Army Bde. Even if the troops on standby to directly support the ones which have camped at Burtse are not large in number, PLA could use any use of force in this case (by India) as an excuse to mount limited and swift offensive in some other place of their choosing. 1962 war shows that PLA tends to use 3:1 superiority while mounting offensive(s) and I’d not be surprised if certain pockets where we are at strategic disadvantage, such ratios have been catered for.
They could mount a swift ‘punishment’ type of raid on couple of posts/areas.
As has become known over last couple of days, the entire DBO sector is held lightly – and here again it is ITBP which is manning the forward areas. PLA lines of communication in east-west direction are very good and they can quickly bring forward and concentrate troops and heavy weapons. I would not be surprised to find out that PLA troops in other sectors like Chang-Chenmo, Chushul, and Demchok are also on standby (even if reinforcements have not come from outside). MI and IB would (should?) have picked up heightened activity on the eastern side of LAC.
We will also have to be ready for graded escalation.
We need to dish out the same treatment to PLA as they did to isolated Indian Army posts in 1962. Basically, surround them and cut-off lines of communication and bombard them with incessant broadcasts over loudspeakers. Any reinforcement coming to beef-up these fellows should be interdicted and asked to return.
At the same time, move more forces into Ladakh for both actual use (if required) as well as mark of strength and show. As it is, IMO 14 Corps is lacking by way of reserves. We need to demonstrate the stick and size of the stick while we talk softly. Lt. General Panag (R) has already outlined the force required. Army can move the 6 Mountain Division (AHQ Reserve) into the sector along with a regiment worth of tanks. More forces can be moved from the valley by road (passes have recently opened up on NH-1A)
PLA would have kept a Regiment level of force ready to deal with any escalation in this sector. Please be advised that in PLA, Regiment is equivalent to an Indian Army Bde. Even if the troops on standby to directly support the ones which have camped at Burtse are not large in number, PLA could use any use of force in this case (by India) as an excuse to mount limited and swift offensive in some other place of their choosing. 1962 war shows that PLA tends to use 3:1 superiority while mounting offensive(s) and I’d not be surprised if certain pockets where we are at strategic disadvantage, such ratios have been catered for.
They could mount a swift ‘punishment’ type of raid on couple of posts/areas.
As has become known over last couple of days, the entire DBO sector is held lightly – and here again it is ITBP which is manning the forward areas. PLA lines of communication in east-west direction are very good and they can quickly bring forward and concentrate troops and heavy weapons. I would not be surprised to find out that PLA troops in other sectors like Chang-Chenmo, Chushul, and Demchok are also on standby (even if reinforcements have not come from outside). MI and IB would (should?) have picked up heightened activity on the eastern side of LAC.
We will also have to be ready for graded escalation.
We need to dish out the same treatment to PLA as they did to isolated Indian Army posts in 1962. Basically, surround them and cut-off lines of communication and bombard them with incessant broadcasts over loudspeakers. Any reinforcement coming to beef-up these fellows should be interdicted and asked to return.
At the same time, move more forces into Ladakh for both actual use (if required) as well as mark of strength and show. As it is, IMO 14 Corps is lacking by way of reserves. We need to demonstrate the stick and size of the stick while we talk softly. Lt. General Panag (R) has already outlined the force required. Army can move the 6 Mountain Division (AHQ Reserve) into the sector along with a regiment worth of tanks. More forces can be moved from the valley by road (passes have recently opened up on NH-1A)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
well reports said the PLA team had moved into unoccupied huts built by indians earlier. so you are right.
the comms tower may be theirs if its heli portable...all their oil rig reef squatting kit has radar dome and comms tower.
the comms tower may be theirs if its heli portable...all their oil rig reef squatting kit has radar dome and comms tower.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
also quoting that som bunkers were destroyed by PLA.SSridhar wrote:From the TimesNow channel photographs, I see regular constructions and also what looked like a commnication tower. Are these Indian structures that the PLA has occupied ?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
one really wonders if their formation is just a platoon 40 people to be doing so much...a busy set of boys....I wonder if constant helicopter borne sorties are being flown to reinforce and resupply them as we have made no public statement that any airspace violators will be shot at and reinforced that message by deploying a SAM battery a mile from their hangout.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Is it another Kargil-like operation ? We vacated and they occupied ?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
yes SS, somewhat I presume... The ITBP had vacated that area and the posts which were promptly occupied and some destroyed, most probably the ITBP has some surveillance lapses and IA was cautioning other vulnerable areas of the same tactics. They shouldn't have got through without meeting any resistance in the first place.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The Chinese are using delaying tactics to reinforce their positions. It is increasingly clear that the undue hurry which Li Keqing showed in coming to India even making MEA squeeze in his visit in early May fits in well with the strategy in DBO sector. India's delays in sending a clear and tough military message is foolish.Singha wrote:. . .we have made no public statement that any airspace violators will be shot at and reinforced that message by deploying a SAM battery a mile from their hangout.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
We have also to see if this is not some sort of diversion for a larger and more sustained thrust in some other sector in NE/ Sikkim side. I hope satellites/ drones are being put to good use for that too. I think it is high time India dropped the bombshell ending recognition of Chinese aggression of Tibet. Nothing to lose, much to gain by doing so. Tell the Hanbarians where they really belong: East coast of China Sea and not the plateaus of Tibet.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Singha - there is one report which talks about ITBP personnel witnessing helicopter sorties into the area.Singha wrote:one really wonders if their formation is just a platoon 40 people to be doing so much...a busy set of boys....I wonder if constant helicopter borne sorties are being flown to reinforce and resupply them as we have made no public statement that any airspace violators will be shot at and reinforced that message by deploying a SAM battery a mile from their hangout.
Also, the terrain is such that these troops cannot come easily from east-west direction. IMO, they crossed some place north and then came in south-south-east direction.
Here is the location of Indian Camp at Burtse - which is important staging ground for movement to DBO.
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.10 ... 0&z=18&m=b
Indian Camp at Murgo - another staging point prior to Burtse:
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.04 ... 1&z=18&m=b
You can see how close the LAC runs to east of Burtse...however, the terrain is mountainous which will make large scale east-west movement difficult. Also, if the troops are sitting anywhere close to Burtse, they are sitting in a narrow valley with high ridge-line on all sides. The access route is only north to Depsang Plains where roads from Tibet side can be seen to terminate close to LAC.
Check this: http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.28 ... 4&z=16&m=h
So, these troops are being maintained partly by helicopters.
CT Alert - My spider sense tells me that PLA could have deliberately placed these forces in such a spot so as to give Indians easy target to jump the gun. This could have served as caucus-belli for PLA to attack on force in another area.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
so there is no motorable road going through burtse right?
that also precludes moving any heavy wheeled or artillery/radar assets to the location.
I think they are setting it up as a tripwire to attack through the depsang plains using motorized and heliborne units and take over DBG incl the airbase...its stuck out in middle of nowhere without a means to reinforce easily.
so we will need to reinforce that place first if we want to up the game right there or find some other spot where their location is weak.
that also precludes moving any heavy wheeled or artillery/radar assets to the location.
I think they are setting it up as a tripwire to attack through the depsang plains using motorized and heliborne units and take over DBG incl the airbase...its stuck out in middle of nowhere without a means to reinforce easily.
so we will need to reinforce that place first if we want to up the game right there or find some other spot where their location is weak.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
All doubts are being cleared now that a well planned Chinesmilitary & political operation is on its way and we are caught unawares yet again.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/thu ... rusion.jpg
pic from newpaper showing the camp. its backed by a high ridge.
pic from newpaper showing the camp. its backed by a high ridge.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
You've summed up that just right. But a little correction is in order.Singha wrote:so there is no motorable road going through burtse right?
that also precludes moving any heavy wheeled or artillery/radar assets to the location.
I think they are setting it up as a tripwire to attack through the depsang plains using motorized and heliborne units and take over DBG incl the airbase...its stuck out in middle of nowhere without a means to reinforce easily.
so we will need to reinforce that place first if we want to up the game right there or find some other spot where their location is weak.
As per tweet from Lt.General Panag (R), we've now made a road to DBO. I've heard that it was under development but this is the first time I've heard that it is ready. This will allow us to send large body of troops by road from Nubra Valley itself. And then, we can land troops using helicopters and AN-32/C-130 in DBO itself.
Coming to radars, we have a Low Level Light Weight 2D radar 'Bharani' for deployment in such areas. Check this:
From here: http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/labs/LRDE/Engli ... chieve.jspLow level Light Weight 2D Radar - BHARANI: Low level Light Weight L-Band 2D Radar is a light weight, battery powered and compact sensor which provides 2D surveillance solution to alert Army Air Defence Weapon Systems mainly in mountainous terrain against hostile aerial targets like UAVs, RPVs, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft flying at low and medium altitudes. The radar can be transported by vehicles, animal transport or group of men or as helislung loads. It can be dismantled into packages to facilitate quick installation and re-location in mountainous terrain. It will act as an early warner to air defence weapon systems employed to provide protection to vulnerable areas or vulnerable points.
The system consists of radar, Commander Display Unit (CDU) and messaging unit Target Designation Unit (TDU) and Target Data Receivers (TDR). One radar can service upto 10 TDRs using existing combat radio resources/ network. The CDU can be located upto 750m from the radar. The radar with modular architecture, advanced ECCM features, ruggedness as per Mil standards can be operated in varied conditions including extreme climatic and geographical conditions and in battle field situations, especially offensive EW environment. The radar detects and tracks short range air-to-ground threats with a high probability of detection. The radar has an integrated IFF that can detect, confirm, classify and attain IFF status on every target in the battle space under surveillance.
PLA east-west connectivity from their Xinjiang-Tibet highway towards DBO is very good. And they can concentrate more forces to overwhelm the defenses there. In 1962, they used a Regiment level formation to overwhelm a single Indian infantry battalion which was spread across the entire area in penny-packets as per Forward Policy.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I remember reading a few years ago that the PRC made 33 attempts to take DBO airfield incl. during Kargil war.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
This confirms that the PLA is sitting in the narrow funnel going from Burtse to Depsang Plain.Singha wrote:http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/thu ... rusion.jpg
pic from newpaper showing the camp. its backed by a high ridge.
If I were PLA commander, I would have planned the operation (in case things escalate) as follows:
- Dominate the ridge line towards east of the narrow funnel leading from Burtse to Depsang Plains. This way I can dominate the entire area along with the Burtse camp itself.
- Concentrate the forces in the funnel itself at some choke point and thereby cut off the land connectivity to DBO completely. Further north of Burtse, after a camping ground called Qazil Langar, lies the Depsang La. I would control this and hence, the access to Depsang Plains/DBO from South.
- Hold the Indian forces in the funnel while launch an all out-attack on the DBO sector wiping off any opposition here (and in Depsanf Plains area) and take the KK Pass.
- I would extend the LAC right up to where Chip-Chap river meets Shyok River at Gapsham.
(http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.30 ... 1&z=12&m=b)
- From here, I can actually threaten the northern reaches of Siachen Glacier. As it is, Indian trekkers have gone from DBO to Siachen by passing through this very route. They crossed over Col Italia over to Siachen.
Col Italia - http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.46 ... 7&z=11&m=b
Whether PLA does that or not is not important - but it raises the threat levels for us. And China is then permanently lodged in the Kashmir Dispute.