![Image](https://fbcdn-sphotos-b-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/253308_10151620459667139_1046008509_n.jpg)
-Vivek
:
:
Let's begin with the omissions. Notably, American defence expert James Acton has pointed out that the WP lacks a specific reference to China's policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, a promise that China would only use nuclear weapons if others used them against China first, and heretofore considered a central element of China's nuclear strategy. The significance of this omission is still being debated among experts, with some saying it might indicate a major change to Chinese nuclear doctrine, and others saying nothing has changed. The fact that there is now some ambiguity about this is itself damaging and potentially destabilising, and recent news suggests China has reinforced its no-first-use stance in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations in Geneva. It is to be hoped that a clarifying statement will come from a more senior source within the Chinese leadership also.
:
:
:
· For those who like to know these things, the entire East Ladakh Line of Actual Control with China is under 3 Infantry Division at Leh. The division was hastily raised in 1962, and took over two brigades. One brigade, 114, was raised in 1959 when the East Ladakh crisis first erupted, with two battalions of locally raised troops, the Jammu & Kashmir Militia. Later, two regular army battalions were inducted. 70 Brigade arrived as a reinforcement after the war began. Later, 163 Brigade was pulled from the Pakistan border and given to 3 Division as division reserve. Still later, 121 (Independent ) Infantry Brigade was raised at Kargil, and put under the division’s command. At some point after 1963, the East Ladakh LAC was bifurcated between 22 Sector north of the Changchemo River, with 114 Brigade at Chushul and 70 Brigade at the southern end of the line at Demchok. 22 Sector has at least two subsectors, with Sub Sector North being responsible for DBO possibly down to the Galwan River.
· Strictly speaking, our intrepid South Asia correspondent Mandeep Bajwa should be telling you all this, as he knows much more about the independent Indian Army’s history that the Editor. The above is to Editor’s best recollection, but likely he’s made errors as he was always more concerned with orbats than history. Still is. But Mandeep is mad at Editor for some reason (he won’t explain why) and refuses to answer emails and chat requests. Please twitter him @MandeepBajwa and tell him to get with the program.
· Okay. In 1971 163 Brigade was withdrawn to Foxtrot Sector in the Punjab for the forthcoming Pakistan War, and it was not replaced because it was appraised there was no longer a China threat. In 1984, 102 (Independent) Brigade was raised at Thoise for the Siachin sector facing Pakistan, and 121 Brigade went under the newly raised 28 Division at Nimu. 102 Brigade was put under 3 Division.
· In 1999, on account of the Kargil War, 70 Brigade went to 8 Division, a formation brought in for the Kashmir Counter Insurgency from Eastern Command and stationed in Kashmir. 28 Division, minus 121 Brigade, went to Kupwara in the Kashmir Valley for the CI. So when the Kargil thing blew up, for operational reasons it was decided not to shift 28 Division back; instead 8 Division took over. Editor believes that 114 Brigade was also withdrawn for a time, leaving the China front denuded of regular troops. Anyway, 114 Brigade came back, and now, 14 years after leaving Demchok, 70 Brigade has come up. So you can see how seriously India was taking Chinese incursions. I.e., not at all seriously.
· To show how urgently India reacted to the threats in the decade 2001-2010, after opening DBO airfield not a single An-32 flight took place. Sub Sector North continued to be protected by outposts of the Indo Tibet Border Police, a high-altitude mountain warfare force raised after 1962 for patrolling the China border with Ladakh, Himachal, and Utter Pradesh. After the 1962 War, a new locally recruited force was raised, the Ladakh Scouts. These used to operate in companies, but after their steller performance in 1999 Kargil, they were given the status of a regular regiment and have, Editor thinks, six battalions. Sub Sector North is protected by 5 Ladakh Scouts, but till the other day this was not forward deployed. The rest of 22 Sector consists, as far as we know, by an infantry battalion, a Ladakh Scouts battalion, and a heavy mortar battery (12 x 120mm mortars), now for some peculiar reason called a heavy mortar regiment.
· After the Operation Trident fuss in 1986-87, India stationed a tank regiment and a mechanized battalion at Leh, under 3 Division; these became part of Corps troops when XIV Corps (Leh) was raised after the Kargil War. After the 2000s Chinese intrusions, India decided to sanction an armored brigade for Ladakh, which is now being raised, slowly. A T-90 tank regiment has gone to Leh and presumably it, plus the mechanized battalion, will form the nucleus of the new independent armored brigade, which will be under HQ XIV Corps as far as we know. India also okayed the raising of an infantry independent brigade group for the middle part of the Ladakh LAC with China. Something is happening, but we don’t know what since Mandeep is unavailable. Our assumption is that this will be based around Changchemo.
India is probably slowly building up to a new division HQ for North Ladakh, leaving 3 Division for South Ladakh. With these new raisings you cannot have a single division HQ controlling the entire 440-km or so Ladakh frontier. Is a third brigade being provided to bring 3 Division to strength? Don’t know – Mandeep will know, but he may not be free to speak, as the information is not released to the public. Sub Sector North also needs to become a separate sector, and the rest of 22 Sector put under a new brigade HQ with a third battalion added. Then 102 Brigade, DBO subsector, the new brigade in lieu of 22 Sector, and the new independent brigade could become part of a new division. But what the Indian Army needs and the bureaucrats agree to are two different things.
· Last Friday we detailed Indian deployments in Ladakh, current and planned. On China’s side the situation is quite simple. The Lanzhou Military Region has two army corps, one of which has been reduced to three independent brigades. The Xinjiang Military District has an unusually large number of independent formations, giving the MR 1 armored, 3 motorized or mechanized, and 1 infantry division, plus seven infantry, mechanized or motorized, and armored brigades.
· There is no particular reason why today these seven division equivalents cannot be deployed against India in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Personally, we have doubts about the efficiency of these troops, who have spent decades in (relatively) comfortable garrisons, have no experience in mountain warfare, and except a few senior generals have never heard a shot fired in battle. But none of this matters, because China does not intend to fight India in the high mountains as in 1962.
· Primarily it counts on Indian political cowardice to forestall any aggressive action on India’s part. But should that fail, the Chinese plan to let India comes down from their mountains to the plains of the plateau, and crush them there using light and medium armor. Not a bad strategy given they lose very little if they lose their high altitude outposts, because their mountain positions are shallow.
· To reiterate, in Ladakh we had postulated that soon there will be the equivalent of two infantry divisions and an armored brigade. It may appear on the surface of it that India is outnumbered three-to-one and in a very bad situation. At least the political types and Ministry of External Affairs, who are always holding out olive branches to the Chinese, would like Indians to believe that. Impressing on the nation its weakness reduces domestic pressure to take a hard line, and lets people believe “well, we have no choice but to compromise”. Naturally, Indians who cannot remember what happened yesterday and have zero interest in tomorrow, don’t ask why after 50-years and after the creation of the world’s largest mountain warfare force this should be so. No one who operates in a western frame of logic can explain anything India and Indians do.
· In reality there is no 3-1 superiority for China because if we are talking of the Xinjiang theater, India can, without difficulty, reinforce Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarkhand with additional divisions to quickly bring itself up to parity in the theatre.
· To problem is, what then? China is not about to launch a full-scale attack on India. The Chinese are arrogant and run their mouths like sewing machines, but they are not fools. They will get nowhere with an attack because their troops will have to dismount and slog it out in the mountains, where they will be at tremendous disadvantage. India is not about to attack China because of the lack of political will.
· But, readers will object, aren’t you forgetting the highly unfavorable Indian logistical situation. So we can push additional divisions into the Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarakhand sectors, but how are we going to support an offensive? The days are gone when an Indian mountain division needed just 200-tons of supplies a day. Back in those days a Chinese division got by with 50 or less because their divisions had little artillery (in the mountains) and few vehicles. Ah yes, simpler times – Editor gets quite nostalgic. Now the division artillery alone would need 200-tons/day in the attack. Moreover, how is India going to get artillery and vehicles to the mountain passes and across down to the Tibet plateau when roads are lacking?
· And what about an even greater problem: India has almost no east-west interconnectivity because of the mountains. Every sector has deployments like the open fingers of a hand, each finger proceeding up a steep, narrow valley, but the fingers cannot switch forces between them. For the Chinese that is no problem because they are on the plateau and have an excellent east-west main trunk road, plus other roads.
Well, we are not saying that this is not a problem. But where there is a will there is a way. India can still mount major offensives in the northwest and northeast. It would, however, have to carefully plan and carefully prepare. Since there is no will, there is no way. If India has done little in fifty years to prepare, what is the chance it will mend its bad ways and prepare for an all-out war in a year? Zero. But it can be done should in some alternative universe India decide to move. This we will discuss tomorrow.
Rajat Pandit, TNN | May 5, 2013, 11.02 PM IST
NEW DELHI: It seems there was some sort of "a quid pro quo" behind the mutual withdrawal of Indian and Chinese troops from the 16,300-feet face-off site in the Depsang Bulge area of northern Ladakh on Sunday evening.
With India furiously working the diplomatic channels ahead of foreign minister Salman Khurshid's visit to Beijing on May 9, in preparation for Chinese premier Li Keqiang's trip to India on May 20, two back-to-back flag meetings were held between local commanders at Spanggur Gap area between Daulat Beg Oldi and Chushul sectors on Saturday and Sunday afternoons.
By 7.30pm on Sunday, the two forces - with 30 to 40 troops each - had begun to withdraw from the 20-day-old standoff site along the Raki Nala, which India perceives to be 19-km inside Indian territory, after a handshake between the two local commanders at the fifth flag meeting held earlier in the day.
Though there was no immediate official word on what were the exact terms of disengagement but sources said "there was some give-and-take" to resolve the face-off. "There had to be some face-saver for the Chinese," said a source. ( and none for India since we dont have face anyway)
China, since the very beginning and through the first three flag meetings on April 18, 23 and 30, had remained adamant that India should dismantle its forward observation post at Chumar in eastern Ladakh since it overlooks Chinese highways and can detect any troop movement there.
India, in turn, was demanding that the over 32 Chinese troops, who had pitched tents at the face-off site and were getting their supplies through regular vehicular support, should return to their pre-April 15 positions. India was worried about the deep Chinese intrusion in the Depsang Bulge area, a table-top plateau, since it threatened to cut its access to around 750 sqkm area in the region.
The face-off site was just about 40-km south of the strategic Karakoram Pass, which is at the tri-junction of China-Pakistan-India borders, and overlooks the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge to the west and the Indian observation post in the Chumar sector to the east. ( If you sell off Siachen-Saltoro Ridge to Pakistan the necessity to have Chumar post will cease to exist . Some of us inlcuding most in UPeeA have advocated it as track-II diplomacy. The mistake of such an idea should be obvious to us though. Karakorum pass is important for us as it would need to be cut off during war.)
Though already angry with India's re-activation of advanced landing grounds at Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyoma and building of other infrastructure along the LAC over the last four-five years, China had made the dismantling of the Chumar post as a pre-condition for de-escalation.
The Chinese, in fact, had earlier even tried to "immobilize" the surveillance cameras positioned at the Chumar post by cutting wires there. In June last year, Indian troops had intercepted two Chinese personnel on mules across the Chumar post. Though they were subsequently let off, with language being a barrier, China got hugely irritated about the incident. Holding that the two Chinese were from its revenue department, Beijing since then has been pressing hard for the Chumar post to be dismantled.
it also looks like unkil always gets benefited by all this drama in south china sea,senkaku islands or ladakhAfter Chinese pullout, India to increase Army presence along LAC
After the pullout by Chinese troops from Daulat beg Oldi area of Ladakh, infrastructure development programme along the line of actual control is expected to be stepped up besides beefing up of the presence of Army there.
Frenquency of patrolling along the LAC is also expected to be enhanced as per the new measures being contemplated by the government, sources said here on Monday.
The government is also planning to give final clearance to a Rs 84,000 crore Army proposal for raising the Mountain Strike Corps along the northeastern borders which will include deployment of IAF assets as per Army's plans, they said.
Very good point. There is a lot missing here.gauravsh wrote:What are the 'modalities' as indicated by the news report. What were the Chinese aiming for all through this time and what did we ended giving up ?
Can't believe they withdraw without getting anything in return. Something is missing here
By weapons sales sir. though unkil is not the only beneficiary in this case but in case of japan, soko, it is .Marten wrote: How exactly is "Unkil" benefited in this case?
There's civil war in Syria now involving Israel, a major war buildup on the Korean peninsula, internal and cross-border war in Sudan/South-Sudan, escalating violence in the DRC, war in Northern Mali, US operations in the Maghreb and against the AQAP and more than a dozen lower grade conflicts across the world. And that's in addition to a worldwide recession and a tottering Europe. We shouldn't be surprised that the global media isn't all that interested in a few dozen Indian and Chinese soldiers pitching tents in the middle of nowhere and waving signs at each other.Samay wrote:By weapons sales sir. though unkil is not the only beneficiary in this case but in case of japan, soko, it is .
The lack of coverage in western media on ladakh should be noted.
New Delhi: Defence minister AK Antony on Tuesday remained non-committal whether India had agreed to withdraw its troops from a key post in Chumar area in Ladkah as was being demanded by China.
“I will just say that the two sides have agreed to have status quo ante,” he said when asked if the Army has agreed to withdraw troops from bunkers built in Chumar area.
Reports on Tuesday suggested that though the government has asserted that no concessions were offered to the Chinese to end the face-off in east Ladakh, the Army seemed to have agreed to removal of bunkers built by it in Chumar close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to facilitate an agreement.
The reports said the 21-day eyeball-to-eyeball situation in Ladakh’s Depsang valley ended only after the Army agreed to demolish bunkers it had built in the region.
During the flag meetings on the issue during the stand-off between the two sides, the Chinese side had been demanding that India dismantle its bunkers in Chumar before talking about withdrawal of its troops from the Depsang valley.
The People's Liberation Army Daily called the report a "gross interference in China's internal affairs".
"Promoting the 'China military threat theory' can sow discord between China and other countries, especially its relationship with its neighbouring countries, to contain China and profit from it," the newspaper said in a commentary that was carried on China's Defence Ministry's website.
The United States is "trumpeting China's military threat to promote its domestic interests groups and arms dealers", the newspaper said, adding that it expects "U.S. arms manufacturers are gearing up to start counting their money".
Yes, it was well calculated move...but I don't think it paid well, it just came after army chief called China border calm...Lalmohan wrote:manum - i dont think this was a random move by china, it was a well calibrated probe. just as they have done on their borders with japan, and in the SE Asian Sea, and by proxy in NoKo - all over the last few months
its a muscle flexing exercise by the new leadership
there is a public warning to the US today on cyberwarfare as well
How many flights were they doing on yearly basis? There was only one source that, i have seen, which talked about lack of flights but by no means that is a confirmation of neglect. Did i miss something else?Singha wrote:I think we tried to get away on the cheap opening these ALGs for fixed wing but not spending the $$ to make them properly up and running for daily ops. afterall, a single C130J or AN32 sortie can surely supply more materials than a Mi17 struggling all the way over the hills.
our bluff has been called. if we want to keep these places we need a solid setup and regular aeroplane flights to supply the larger garrison.
India Prepares For Another Chinese Victory
May 7, 2013: The recent (April 15th) Chinese incursion inside Indian Kashmir has reminded Indian military leaders that despite over five years of brave talk and bold plans, not much has actually been accomplished to rectify the shortage of access to the Indian side of the border. It was this lack of access that played a key role in the last border war with China (in 1962) which saw better prepared and supplied Chinese forces wearing down their brave but ill-supplied Indian opponents. Indians are waking up to the fact that a repeat of their 1962 defeat is in the making.
Over the last five years India has ordered roads built so that troops can reach the Chinese border in sufficient strength to stop a Chinese invasion. The roads have, for the most part, not been built. The problem is the Indian bureaucracy and its inability to get anything done quickly or even on time. The military procurement bureaucracy is the best, or worst, example of this. The military procurement bureaucracy takes decades to develop and produce locally made gear and often never delivers. Buying foreign equipment is almost as bad, with corruption and indecisiveness delaying and sometimes halting selection and purchase of needed items.
Despite the bureaucracy, some progress has been made. Three years ago India quietly built and put into service an airfield for transports in the north (Uttarakhand), near their border with China. While the airfield can also be used to bring in urgently needed supplies for local civilians during those months when snow blocks the few roads, it is mainly there for military purposes, in case China invades again. Uttarakhand is near Kashmir and a 38,000 square kilometer chunk of land that China seized after a brief war with India in 1962. This airfield and several similar projects along the Chinese border are all about growing fears of continued Chinese claims on Indian territory. India is alarmed at increasing strident Chinese insistence that it owns northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This has led to an increased movement of Indian military forces to that remote area.
India has discovered that a buildup in these remote areas is easier said than done. Without new roads nothing else really makes much difference. Airfields require fuel and other supplies to be more than just another place where an aircraft can land (and not take off if it needs refueling). Moreover, the Indians found that they were far behind Chinese efforts. When they took a closer look three years ago, Indian staff officers discovered that China had improved its road network along most of their 4,000 kilometer common border. Indian military planners calculated that, as a result of this network, Chinese military units could move 400 kilometers a day on hard surfaced roads, while Indian units could only move half as fast, while suffering more vehicle damage because of the many unpaved roads. Moreover, China had more roads right up to the border. Building more roads on the Indian side will take years, once the bureaucratic problems are overcome (which often takes a decade). The roads are essential to support Indian plans to build more airfields near the border and stationing modern fighters there. Military planners found, once the terrain was surveyed and calculations completed, that it would take a lot more time because of the need to build maintenance facilities, roads to move in fuel and supplies, and housing for military families.
All these border disputes have been around for centuries but became more immediate when India and China fought a short war, up in these mountains, in 1962. The Indians lost and are determined not to lose a rematch. But so far, the Indians have been falling farther behind China. This situation developed because India, decades ago, decided that one way to deal with a Chinese invasion was to make it difficult for them to move forward. Thus, for decades, the Indians built few roads on their side of the border. But that also made it more difficult for Indian forces to get into the disputed areas. This strategy suited the Indian inability to actually build roads in these sparsely inhabited areas.
The source of the current border tension goes back a century and heated up when China resumed its control over Tibet in the 1950s. From the end of the Chinese empire in 1912 up until 1949 Tibet had been independent. But when the communists took over China in 1949, they sought to reassert control over their "lost province" of Tibet. This began slowly, but once all of Tibet was under Chinese control in 1959, China once again had a border with India and there was immediately a disagreement about exactly where the border should be. That’s because, in 1914, the newly independent government of Tibet worked out a border (the McMahon line) with the British (who controlled India). China considers this border agreement illegal and wants 90,000 square kilometers back. India refused, especially since this would mean losing much of the state of Arunachal Pradesh in northeastern India and some bits elsewhere in the area.
Putting more roads into places like Arunachal Pradesh (83,000 square kilometers and only a million people) and Uttarakhand (53,566 square kilometers and ten million people) will improve the economy, as well as military capabilities. This will be true of most of the border area. For decades local civilians along these borders have been asking for more roads and economic development but were turned down because of the now discredited Indian strategy.
All the roads won't change the fact that most of the border is mountains, the highest mountains (the Himalayas) in the world. So no matter how much you prepare for war, no one is going very far, very fast, when you have to deal with these mountains. As the Indians discovered, the Chinese persevered anyway and built roads and railroads anyway and now India has to quickly respond in kind or face a repeat of their 1962 defeat.
Despite the lack of roads, India has moved several infantry divisions, several squadrons of Su-30 fighters, and six of the first eight squadrons of its new Akash air defense missile systems as close to the Chinese border as their existing road network will allow. Most of these initially went into Assam, just south of Arunachal Pradesh, until the road network is built up sufficiently to allow bases to be maintained closer to the border. It may be a decade or more before those roads are built, meaning China can seize Arunachal Pradesh anytime it wants and there’s not much India can do to stop it.
Undeterred by that the Indian Army has asked for $3.5 billion in order to create three more brigades (two infantry and one armored) to defend the Chinese border. Actually, this new force is in addition to the new mountain corps (of 80,000 troops) nearing approval (at a cost of $11.5 billion). The mountain corps is to be complete in four years. The three proposed brigades would be ready in 4-5 years. By the end of the decade India will have spent nearly five billion dollars on new roads, rail lines, and air fields near the 4,057 kilometer long Chinese border. Spending the money is not the same as actually getting the roads and railroads actually built.
All this is another example of the old saying that amateurs (and politicians) talk tactics, while professionals talk logistics. China realized this first and has built 58,000 kilometers of roads to the Indian border, along with five airbases and several rail lines. Thus, China can move thirty divisions to the border, which is three times more than India can get to its side of the frontier.
During Safed Sagar the Mig 29s were operating from Avantipur, as well as Mirages. It can handle transports as well, definetly An 32s and I am not sure, but I think it can support Il 76 as well.Paul wrote:RohitVats ji, Is Avantipur airfield in Srinagar a useful base to base AN 32 aircraft and provide fighter cover to DBO and Leh? Why is this fighter base not a yseful option for defending eastern and Northern Ladakh.
Flt lt. Sekhon had flown out of this airfield in his Gnat IIRC.