Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 26 May 2013 12:40

Honestly is the nsg of today comparable in the most difficult missions to gsg9 and gign the two well known hrt and ct forces under home ministry control? Lets include the fbi hrt as well thats their domestic high end force.

None of them do vip security duty. Ok one might say the srg part of nsg does that. That leaves the sag..is the sag comparably selected, trained and equipped? What is the current number in the sag....? Do we need that number if c130 at hindon and a couple helicopters at maneswar are kept on a rotational alert?

in any human activity if you pick 300 and 3000 from the same pool, the 300 are on avg going to be far superior. The outliers who are 5x to 10x superior to the median are going to be in this 300..to use a poor example the top150 or so in jee have a huge gap with the median ranker.

What do we want and need...csn we manage with 300 or 3000 ?

More than fancy tools or guns its the quality of people that counts in a anything...

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 26 May 2013 19:15

If we go by benchmarking, then lets benchmark everything, right from rectruitment, selection, training, tactics, equipment, weapons etc. Granted that 26/11 was a first timer, but what we lacked clearly impacted what we should have done. All tactics employed atleast those visible were based on a siege op and not a clearance op.

Again based on what benchmark? Now you find a reason to not compare SWAT\HRT\ATF\State troopers. But you blithely rubbish the whole NSG activity as a siege mentality. Well NSG is not monolithic - there is the force (51 and 52) meant for attacking and then the rest which are meant for support activity. In the meanwhile till they got here the command structure was so confused it threw in the nearest army platoons, Marcos etc.

What the units did inside the Taj and Trident as they tackled the enormous task is not going to be known to most of us.

So sitting back and calling it a RR like siege mentality is nonsense.

As for Sayeret Matkal, they have been known for their spectacular up as well as downs.

I can claim so is NSG - BT 2 was success and 26\11 was a moderate success

How quick you are to jump to Sayeret matkals defense? - they need less than half an hour to traverse most of the their important cities. they already live in highly profiled environment.

But there is a world of difference in location someone across a vast geographical area and locating people in a given building.

Really?? am glad you want to give them the benefit. well there is a sea of difference to dealing with a nice uniform, clean, well laid first world environment then dealing with a congested, haphazard, highly populated , over crowded, concrete mess
News flash for you - Foreign counter Terror experts have no answer to sitiuation's in our crowded cities. I cannot tell you examples, but they all threw up their hands and said good luck - god save you.

Now again - can they improve to the levels MP Chowdhury and others had set in terms of response standards, practice, prep - back when it was formed - yes
but for that we have to get rid of the IPS from it. Counter terror is beyond the IPS type leadership.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 26 May 2013 21:38

Lets see, one picture of a NSG man, firing a MP5 single handed at the Chabad House op, when it was pretty well known thanks to signal intercepts that the terrorists had killed the people inside, and the NSG team was focused on just neutralizing the terrorists....is an example of blithering stupidity or similar brash verbiage?

If so, I would like the specifics of what exactly the NSG trooper did wrong, and why his method is not considered a valid method of suppressing fire. He is not exposing himself, aiming with one hand & firing. How is that stupidity?

How does the poster who called this mans actions stupid, certain that these actions were stupid? Is he, or any of the posters here, aware of the tasking for this trooper - and whether what he was doing, was right or wrong?

On the other hand, a NSG trooper taking a SLR and firing with that gun is considered tactical acumen? Again, is there first hand information regarding that particular incident? Is there a NSG man or anyone else who observed that event telling us that was because the Sig Sauer did not penetrate, as versus the gun being jammed etc.

Sorry, but this sort of quarterbacking, by folks who (do correct us if wrong) have not gone through the NSG training or served in the combat arms of any similar organization, do not come across as well deserved or thought provoking.

In fact, I would state, that it is these very posts which serve to degrade the quality of the forum and the discussions therein. This since they are using random pictures to make sweeping categorical generalizations, which are not necessarily supported by those pictures.

Having this pointed out is neither an ad hominem attack, or reflective of BR seeking to silence dissenting opinions or the like. If you wish to convince people, make a convincing well argued case. Not accuse the forum itself of being intolerant because the argument is not convincing and this is pointed out!

Then there is this other aspect of "elite units" being only a few hundred men strong. Which brings us to the question of what exactly is elite!! Its always easier to create a smaller unit, and over or adequately resource it, as versus creating a larger unit and training them to the same standard. But by itself, that is not a defining argument.

Motivation, resources and proper leadership all play a significant role. In many recorded conflicts, large units, regiments, brigades, divisions and much more have consistently excelled at being better than their smaller ostensibly more "elite" peers, which shows that the drivers for performance can be many and not easily drilled down to 1-2 parameters.

In extended conflicts, the darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest, so to speak, has made many large units, under resourced & poorly supported, still deliver a brutal battlefield performance, because they were staffed by battle hardened soldiers. In the Indian case, many people who come to NSG are ex SF, with significant tours and combat experience already. In turn, many who come to the SF come with experience in COIN & have seen combat already or firefights.

I point this out, because this is an issue which is often overlooked when looking at Indian soldiers & even the Indian military services, when they are compared to their "western" or other peers, who often have very detailed modules and impressive equipment, but suffer from other constraints. In recent years, US SOF/British SOF have been involved in extended combat ops thanks to their interventions, but India has been in a quasi-hot-cold war situation & extended internal conflicts for a long time as well, and hence has a very large group of men who have seen combat & bring that savvy to bear when engaged in conflict.

In many exercises & benchmarking events of the sort these competitive events entail, Indian units have come across as equal or better than their peers worldwide, because of certain factors unique to Indian conditions & also in house modules.

However, my point is straightforward, those who saw the NSG first hand & have actual domain experience to benchmark them, can provide data to show where the flaws are, and how they may be resolved, when it comes to combat tactics. Such random pics are not evidence.

Some of the other issues are organizational and structural and can be gathered from media/open source reports -e.g. the under resourcing etc and analyzed by civilians who have not gone through the grind of combat training. For instance, (say) even a software engineer who deals with project deadlines and commutes daily can talk of the logistical bottlenecks in getting a group of men from A to B, if he has lived in that city and seen the challenges first hand. Again, some of the details may be off, but at least that can have some credibility.

Other clear issues which came out were the delays in response time, the issues in procedural methods - e.g. IPS vs Army behaviour etc. But again, the details we have to go on are based on media reports, so some of the details may differ.

But to pick on two random pictures and claim that they represent bad or good tactics respectively, is to be honest, not credible. Especially when the argument is not supported by actual information and hands on experience with regards to that sort of activity. Both need to be available to make this sort of sweeping generalization.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 26 May 2013 22:00

Raja Bose wrote:On top of that incompetence the guy is wearing a borrowed scooter helmet and totally lacks basic fitness - look at his chubby cheeks! I think NSG should invite trainers from local US police SWAT teams such as LAPD and Boston. In Boston they called off the search and cleverly lulled the hiding terrorist into a false sense of security before taking him down. NSG has much to learn from them.

Another interesting point in the recent Boston event, one of the so called injuries from the "firefight" between the second terrorist and the law enforcement, turned out to be blue on blue. He apparently lost ALL his blood per media reports but was still treated & survived. Turns out that fire fight was basically both/multiple groups of cops all firing at each other!

If anything, it reflects well on NSG professionalism (in the 26/11 event) to further light, because we did not have any such incidents reported of passers by, of other soldiers etc getting harmed by such panicked reactions.

If there is anything that as somebody who is not a NSG insider, that I can glean from the NSG ops, is that they need better equipment. I base this partly on NSGs own evaluations of their battle performance. One of the soldiers lost an eye because of splinters (this could have been reportedly addressed by better eyewear), Sandeep Unnikrishnan & team did not have enough radios of the latest kind amongst the team which became a problem when he was separated from his team (though this could have been a procedural issue too in part, because it was reportedly a conscious decision to only have the team leaders have radios, and the team communicate amongst themselves in sign language), not enough of the best in class body armor/equipment for the numbers of people thrown into the ops, lack of the latest see through wall imagers etc, Unmanned systems etc..

But as far as combat tactics go or even a detailed evaluation of which equipment failed, I think the NSG is the best judge of that, and I only hope the MHA helps them to get it fast.

rajithn · Post by **rajithn** » 26 May 2013 23:05

Karan M wrote:Lets see, one picture of a NSG man, firing a MP5 single handed at the Chabad House op, when it was pretty well known thanks to signal intercepts that the terrorists had killed the people inside, and the NSG team was focused on just neutralizing the terrorists....is an example of blithering stupidity or <SNIP>But to pick on two random pictures and claim that they represent bad or good tactics respectively, is to be honest, not credible. Especially when the argument is not supported by actual information and hands on experience with regards to that sort of activity. Both need to be available to make this sort of sweeping generalization.

+1

Our service arms are perhaps one of the most battle hardened operators in the world. Especially so when it comes to urban battle. The lack and/or shortage of cutting edge equipment made these operators improvise with what they have. Now, the lack or shortage of equipment is not their fault.

In almost all instances from BT2, Akshardham, Parliament or 26/11.. these people performed a wondrous task. And as in any AAR, there would of course be instances where tactics or equipment could have been used better or differently but then like we know, hind sight is 20/20.

Just taking in 26/11 as an example, I am not sure if any SpecOp or HRT team could have done a better job of clearing 1000+ guest rooms, associated corridors, service areas, kitchens, hotel management offices etc etc in the time they did it and in the way they did it.

Would there have been specific instances within those days where things a could have been done better? Of course. And I am sure, as we argue here sitting comfortably and safely in our homes or offices, the guys are at Manesar or Mhow going through the very lessons they learnt and understanding how to exploit those specific situations better. And while they may also have this desire to have some of the best equipment they can get their hands on, I for one am certain they are also looking at how to get the job done even in the absence of this equipment. Not for a moment is any of them cursing the situation they are in - brave, honorable men and women going about their jobs very pragmatically with what they have in making sure they can save all and as many lives even at the cost of their own.

Now, we can make this another whining thread about how the state doesn't give them what they need and attribute it to all the bezillion reasons we know or invent. Go ahead and second guess the guys who are getting the job done but perhaps spare them the disservice of calling them incompetent.

Last word: some of the foreign services that we have hailed here don't necessarily come out tops in many instances. Be it killing the wrong people, letting the 'unsubs' slip through badly managed cordon and search ops, getting caught in the act in covert ops, leaving their own people behind and disowning them etc etc.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 26 May 2013 23:23

RajitO wrote:

But Western SF units are much better dressed and that intimidates the terrorists immediately. Just look at this NSG operator - his socks are showing! And they don't match his black dress - they are grey. That is very unprofessional and does not project a good image. I think NSG should first equip its soldiers with proper socks before addressing their inherent deficiencies in quality, skills and training vis a vis Western SF units.

rajithn · Post by **rajithn** » 26 May 2013 23:35

We tend to forget one aspect - a critical aspect.

When these guys are deployed, they are going in unsure of whether they are going to come back alive. Whether their families are going to see them every again.
They know they don't have the best equipment.
They know they are not respected by the very community they serve
They know they are not supported by the very Government they serve under
They know if they lose their lives securing this country, their families may not get the support from the Government or the community.

Does that make them stop and ponder? Does that make them not give their best?

And we want to vilify them for the tactics they employ when we don't know the circumstances they are employing them in, the reasons they are employing them for and whether they achieved the objective they were aiming for with that particular tactic.

There is an old saying: "You may not be any great help, if at all, but at least don't be a nuisance"

P.S: if being better dressed, better equipped and western tactics were the only ingredients to success...Afghanistan and Iraq and Vietnam and Rhodesia and numerous others should have TRULY been 'Mission Accomplished'

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 27 May 2013 00:06

Exactly. To be honest I was surprised to see such "pictorial claims" to make pretty abusive generalisations- that soldier who was firing single handed is stupid? On what grounds. I would sure like to see the exact specifics of why that was stupid in that particular scenario, and clearly since no such info has been presented, I am left to conclude it was just opinion, and poorly supported opinion at that. Plus the claims that to not buy into such opinion is reflective of the forum being intolerant, abusive etc seem equally unsupported.

As a matter of fact, it's not that hard to occasionally speak to members of the NSG at public events and get say, interesting but non classified info - stuff which they can share with the public. Suffice to say that they do train with or benchmark themselves against their worldwide peers, and so far their experience has been that the combat group is quite competent and well drilled. It's a different issue that India,s problems are huge and hence the NSG may have to do far more to compensate for deficiencies or challenges elsewhere like poor local intel, crowded urban areas, etc. so it's not a call for complacency but nor do I think that their actions so far are anywhere as bad as they have been made out to be by certain posters.

negi · Post by **negi** » 27 May 2013 02:03

Well the challenge in all such discussions is comparisons are unavoidable and performance of a unit will be judged by what it has achieved or failed to achieve in past. NSG's biggest problem is that they have been by and large mis used to provide VVIP and other jokers security so basically they have been just reduced to glorified guards quality of their training notwithstanding. As Austin pointed out the fact that they are headed by an IPS cadre chap again reeks of babudom and bureaucracy (I think this plays into the hands of politicians who can then exert a better control over NSG as to how it is deployed because a 3 star and above General level officer from the IA is less likely to be intimidated by two bit CMs and other jokers).

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 27 May 2013 04:28

negi wrote:Well the challenge in all such discussions is comparisons are unavoidable and performance of a unit will be judged by what it has achieved or failed to achieve in past. NSG's biggest problem is that they have been by and large mis used to provide VVIP and other jokers security so basically they have been just reduced to glorified guards quality of their training notwithstanding. As Austin pointed out the fact that they are headed by an IPS cadre chap again reeks of babudom and bureaucracy (I think this plays into the hands of politicians who can then exert a better control over NSG as to how it is deployed because a 3 star and above General level officer from the IA is less likely to be intimidated by two bit CMs and other jokers).

Perhaps if NSG has better uniform they will feel less intimidated.

Anand K · Post by **Anand K** » 27 May 2013 12:49

Where is Shiv when you need him? Remember that picture of "beefy stern marine" against "grinning thin Indian with blue scooter helmet" in that Naval Joint Exercises thread.

Man, there was some serious piskology in that thread.

Aaryan · Post by **Aaryan** » 27 May 2013 13:29

We need to follow 2 principles

1) Principle of specialization
2) Principle of accountability

a) At present we have NSG units at about 4 regional centers. But placing unites in different city will be use less unless provided with proper transportation facility. Ideally each unit should have one plane and one chopper at its disposal. NYPD (New york police department) has more the 5 choppers at its disposal. Also there is a NSG hub at Hyderabad, but then also a unit of NSG was rushed from Delhi for collecting forensic evidence. So what is the Hyd unit doing???

b) Increase the annual budget of NSG.

c) Increase the deputation period in NSG and also create a permanent NSG cadre for research and analysis. This cadre will be responsible for imparting latest training to the cadre and researching and analyzing the latest tactics used by the terrorist. We need to be innovative, at present we look at the last incident and prepare our self on basis of that whereas the terrorist keep innovating and out smarting us. We need to start thinking like those fanatic Jihadis.. We need to create intelligent scenarios and models – based on attacks from the past, latest intelligence and what’s happening at different parts of world- anticipating and out running the terrorist in their own game.

D) Relieve NSG personals from the duty of providing security cover to VIP’s , it’s an irony it is that 200 NSG men were sent at first to clean up terrorist from Mumbai, and about 140 NSG commandos provide security cover to a lady chief minister. Releasing from duty of so called VIP’s would strengthen the NSG by at lest 1700 commandos for performing the task they should be performing.

rajithn · Post by **rajithn** » 27 May 2013 13:46

Goodness gracious!!!!

I don't post often because I come to BRF to learn. There are some brilliant people here and I specifically look for what they have to say.

I always knew there would be atmospherics and clutter - part of any forum, online or otherwise.But the level of tripe that is peddled here and the presumptuous and sanctimonious drivel by some others is getting a bit tiresome.

member_20453 · Post by **member_20453** » 27 May 2013 14:23

Karan M wrote:Exactly. To be honest I was surprised to see such "pictorial claims" to make pretty abusive generalisations- that soldier who was firing single handed is stupid? On what grounds.

I totally concur, they even claim the guy is fat and unfit because his cheeks look chubby

C'mon guys, the quality of their training is top notch. I agree that, using these highly trained men to protect silly people like Mayaweight

etc is just grave misuse of resources. Most of these politicians don't even deserve lathi totting havaldars.

I would propose a massive change with SAG members being drawn from the Army, IN and IAF SF units, SAG should be the primary medium of providing Marcos, Para-SF, SFF and Garuds battle hardening experiences. SAG should be working along side RR with a few deputational Platoons rotating every year from all the SF units in the country.

SRG should have its members drawn from BSF, ITBP, SSB, RPF, CRPF and should be the commando force protectiong the nation's critical assets such as Airbases, Naval bases, WMD assets, Army bases.

BSF, ITBP, SSB should be merged to form one united BSF force with a much large footprint protecting all our borders. CISF should stick to its mandate of protecting our Industrial infra. such as civilian nuke plants airports, large inductrial installtions such as refineries, etc

CRPF should be the primary domestic anti maoist /anti terror force with COBRA units being used to combat terrorists and red corridor militants etc.

Anand K · Post by **Anand K** » 27 May 2013 14:44

Since it's open season;

The "chubby" NSG (Fallujah grade IED, RB man

) seems gingerly leaning to his left side (out of cover from the building in front of him) and providing suppressive fire right? Probably this was the best cover he had from the piglets coverage zone. Height looks like a problem though and apparently he's doing his best to stabilize himself to avoid hitting a fellow soldier/Bai cowering in another floor/building or something. Methinks it's a straining grimace effect coupled with the leaning (and angle of the camera shot) and not a chubby cheek.

There! BF3 rocks!

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 27 May 2013 15:02

Septimus P. wrote:

SRG should have its members drawn from BSF, ITBP, SSB, RPF, CRPF and should be the commando force protectiong the nation's critical assets such as Airbases, Naval bases, WMD assets, Army bases.

How many commandos would be needed for such a responsibility? There is already a Defence Security Corps with 30,000 men that does this job.

jayaaren · Post by **jayaaren** » 27 May 2013 15:32

Surya wrote:
If we go by benchmarking, then lets benchmark everything, right from rectruitment, selection, training, tactics, equipment, weapons etc. Granted that 26/11 was a first timer, but what we lacked clearly impacted what we should have done. All tactics employed atleast those visible were based on a siege op and not a clearance op.
Again based on what benchmark? Now you find a reason to not compare SWAT\HRT\ATF\State troopers. But you blithely rubbish the whole NSG activity as a siege mentality. Well NSG is not monolithic - there is the force (51 and 52) meant for attacking and then the rest which are meant for support activity. In the meanwhile till they got here the command structure was so confused it threw in the nearest army platoons, Marcos etc.

why don't we take recruitment - going by pure CT usage - FBI HRT while going by CT & DA usage - SAS, 1st SFOD-D, Seal Team 6. Can you tell me if they are the same
why don't we take selection - whether HRT, SAS, 1st SFOD-D, Seal Team 6. Can you tell me if they are the same
training - there is a difference between the facilities at Quantico, Hereford, Dam Neck and what has been provided to our men. we have billions being taken as loot in scams and scandals yet we don't have money to provide the required level of training. Recent case in point is the no copter for NSG for training post
tactics - guessing that since we can't give our men access to a chopper or dedicated lift assets, unlikely that our tactics have been updated in exchange programs which cost more
equipment - if there were NVGs or TIs which were sorely needed, Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Gajendra Singh would still be among us killing the those cross border loonies. To midly quote Gen. Patton "the aim is not to die for your country but to make the other guy die for his." Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Gajendra Singh were brave and died fighting but they had a lot more fight in them. These gallant guys are irreplacable but Kasab and his horde are not. Precisely what Pakistan wants.
weapons - every one knows the 5.56mm round is not upto the job. So why is God's name are we using it. I have seen upfront what a 5.56mm round does and what a 7.62 mm round can do. In 26/11 situations, you shoot the guy to kill or incapacitate. 5.56mm wounds but does little else.
If the SRG was there for Support Activity, what were they doing - Recon, SIGINT, ECM, Debriefing.

What the units did inside the Taj and Trident as they tackled the enormous task is not going to be known to most of us.

So sitting back and calling it a RR like siege mentality is nonsense.

We were handicapped going in, for the reasons as said earlier and we lost people - both in uniform and out of it. It practically was a siege not because we wanted it to be but we were forced to again lack of intel

As for Sayeret Matkal, they have been known for their spectacular up as well as downs.
I can claim so is NSG - BT 2 was success and 26\11 was a moderate success

How quick you are to jump to Sayeret matkals defense? - they need less than half an hour to traverse most of the their important cities. they already live in highly profiled environment.

But there is a world of difference in location someone across a vast geographical area and locating people in a given building.
Am not jumping to their defense. Point is Tactical Units need to learn from both the mistakes and successes of others. Case in point the HRT and FBI-SWAT have changed tactics since 26/11, Columbine, Virginia Tech. Did we?

Really?? am glad you want to give them the benefit. well there is a sea of difference to dealing with a nice uniform, clean, well laid first world environment then dealing with a congested, haphazard, highly populated , over crowded, concrete mess
News flash for you - Foreign counter Terror experts have no answer to sitiuation's in our crowded cities. I cannot tell you examples, but they all threw up their hands and said good luck - god save you.

Third World or First. Laid out or Congested, Haphazard, Highly Populated, Over crowded Concrete Mess - it did not happen in a day. We were not prepared and paid a heavy price. Point is we cannot hold that as an excuse to not move forward

Now again - can they improve to the levels MP Chowdhury and others had set in terms of response standards, practice, prep - back when it was formed - yes
but for that we have to get rid of the IPS from it. Counter terror is beyond the IPS type leadership.

On the dot on the - get rid of the IPS from it. Probably a first timer anywhere where a CT unit is headed by a guy who is not a former member of the unit. How can he plan, lead and execute an op if he has not trained for it. Heck, the guy puts on the same uniform as the unit. Sacrilege. Would have thought he had some sense of self respect. Guess these guys never heard of Ulrich Wegener, Charles Beckwith, Danny Coulson, Yonathan Netanyahu

member_20453 · Post by **member_20453** » 27 May 2013 16:35

How many commandos would be needed for such a responsibility? There is already a Defence Security Corps with 30,000 men that does this job.[/quote]

Indeed, but a platoon sized group of SRG men at these sights would further enhance the security. Keeping in mind the decent size of the force, should be possible to arrange for this.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 27 May 2013 19:36

In general the IPS types think that once they have gone through a weapong, drill etc they know everything

repeated drills , practice etc - concept does not exist.

Now there are some who are good but they are unable to bring the initiative against the larger group which is more interested in punching tickets

Why is Force 1 not getting some practice in the Naxal areas of maharashtra?? sure its not urban counter terror - but the ruthlessness required in CT ops will surely be learnt dealing with the Naxals.

But no IPS fat cat would even bother about it

Easier to visit LA on a junket to learn from the SWAT teams there

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 27 May 2013 20:16

My 2 cents to the discussion:

> "NSG is too large - hence not possible to retain quality"

AFAIK current strength of NSG post the founding years has not changed much. I don't think either of the SAGs is new raising. If the NSG was good earlier, how can you blame size for decline? And anyways the SRG was supposed to be the larger more police like force while the penetration is responsibility of the SAG.

Viz-a-viz size, 26/11 clearly showed that size is important given the scale of jehadi attacks .... as true as it was during Black Thunder ops in the 80s.

> "NSG should be more Army and less Police"

Well lets not forget the origins of the NSG lie in Bluestar - where the Army was the "face" of the ops. It had severe repurcussions for the image of the Army in India. It makes sense for a police force to bear the "burden" ... while in reality it has the skill and experience of hardened Army experience in the ranks.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 27 May 2013 23:36

The whole change post 26/11 was that the SRG was supposed to become more like the SAG in terms of taking up direct action roles or directly support the SAG to a greater extent.. Don't know whether that has occurred ...the expansion in strength was a second issue driven by the great PC.. That part has reportedly been less than stellar since the army has justifiably felt it silly to bleed itself for the sake of the NSG. Other steps taken were to have IA/IN/IAF special units in the respective cities where they have a presence to act as first responders. For Bangalore, for instance, IA SF should be available. I think it would be unwise to presume that post 26/11 no improvements have been made while it is clear that the NSG plans have not really come through... So it's a mixed bag and the blame as such does not lie on the token IPS head of the NSG but the MHA and the GOI which tend to focus most of the time in chasing down the opposition and allies via the state apparatus instead of making the state focused on external threats of the kind we saw on 26/11. ULtimately, no matter how many rounds a NSG man can put through a target or how many one hand push-ups he can do, it's all secondary to the muddled thinking at the central level. There really is no excuse for stuff like subpar living facilities extended to the NSG and delays in getting them their asked for arms.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 27 May 2013 23:40

Vaibhav and Aditya both make good points regarding the size of the NSG and why quantity has a quality of its own. Little point in having a handful of supermen who cannot respond to multiple attacks or a large event like 26/11. It's not that hard to remember that even in 26/11 the initial force was overwhelmed by the responsibility of clearing those large hotels and more men had to be airlifted in.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 27 May 2013 23:48

negi wrote:Well the challenge in all such discussions is comparisons are unavoidable and performance of a unit will be judged by what it has achieved or failed to achieve in past. NSG's biggest problem is that they have been by and large mis used to provide VVIP and other jokers security so basically they have been just reduced to glorified guards quality of their training notwithstanding. As Austin pointed out the fact that they are headed by an IPS cadre chap again reeks of babudom and bureaucracy (I think this plays into the hands of politicians who can then exert a better control over NSG as to how it is deployed because a 3 star and above General level officer from the IA is less likely to be intimidated by two bit CMs and other jokers).

True but those are the SRG and that policy has been finally rescinded. So even the SRG should now be available to support or complement the SAG.
IPS cadre I think had as much to do with politics of the time- army could not be seen to take direct part in contentious internal ops like Blue Star, after what happened..plus many western forces whom NSG was modelled on - GSG9, GIGN etc were ostensibly under para military and not direct military control. Another argument was that NSG would be a force with HRT responsibilities and not just combat. The basic issue is not that an IPS man heads NSG -IMO-it's that the MHA like most other GOI bureaucracies headed by political movers and shaker has no accountability in setting fixed goals and delivering on them. It's more of a place to use for power politics. Just take a look at the overhyped disaster that were the anti Maoist ops headed by the self promoter Shri PC...what was the result of all that? It is that is the problem. In the current setup, put any IA guy as head of the NSG but the basic problems will remain..

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 30 May 2013 16:40

A new book released on Indian SF by Lt Gen PC Katoch & Saikat Datta

India's Special Forces: History and Future of Indian Special Forces

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 30 May 2013 22:04

Karan M wrote:Lets see, one picture of a NSG man, firing a MP5 single handed at the Chabad House op, when it was pretty well known thanks to signal intercepts that the terrorists had killed the people inside, and the NSG team was focused on just neutralizing the terrorists....is an example of blithering stupidity or similar brash verbiage?

If so, I would like the specifics of what exactly the NSG trooper did wrong, and why his method is not considered a valid method of suppressing fire. He is not exposing himself, aiming with one hand & firing. How is that stupidity?

While I would not want to attach such an epithet to serviceman, I'd still like to point out that it goes against the NSG's own (albeit borrowed) motto - 'One shot, one kill'. And while suppressing fire on a target as a distraction to a direct assault would have been justified, the huge and persistent volume of fire running throughout the night on Nariman House, a target that should by default have been presumed to contain live hostages, was quite astounding. From what I understand, the objective was to mentally exhaust the hostiles before the assault began, something you'd expect in a COIN operation, but not with an elite CT unit involved.

Sorry, but this sort of quarterbacking, by folks who (do correct us if wrong) have not gone through the NSG training or served in the combat arms of any similar organization, do not come across as well deserved or thought provoking.

Well... the fact that none of us has ever served in an armoured unit (?), has never deterred similar (rude) criticism with regard to the uniformed officers involved in making decisions wrt to the Arjun and T-90. Relatively few of those posts are singled out for their content, while criticism of the NSG almost always gets tagged with 'what are your credentials'.

In fact, I would state, that it is these very posts which serve to degrade the quality of the forum and the discussions therein. This since they are using random pictures to make sweeping categorical generalizations, which are not necessarily supported by those pictures.

Fair enough. Though Col MP Chaudhary's scathing comment describing the NSG as operating 'like untrained infantry' was probably based on his interpretation of images streamed by the media.

Then there is this other aspect of "elite units" being only a few hundred men strong. Which brings us to the question of what exactly is elite!! Its always easier to create a smaller unit, and over or adequately resource it, as versus creating a larger unit and training them to the same standard. But by itself, that is not a defining argument.

Motivation, resources and proper leadership all play a significant role. In many recorded conflicts, large units, regiments, brigades, divisions and much more have consistently excelled at being better than their smaller ostensibly more "elite" peers, which shows that the drivers for performance can be many and not easily drilled down to 1-2 parameters.

Motivation, resources and leadership are a different set of unrelated characteristics. Increasing the selectivity at induction doesn't not negatively impinge upon those factors.

In extended conflicts, the darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest, so to speak, has made many large units, under resourced & poorly supported, still deliver a brutal battlefield performance, because they were staffed by battle hardened soldiers. In the Indian case, many people who come to NSG are ex SF, with significant tours and combat experience already. In turn, many who come to the SF come with experience in COIN & have seen combat already or firefights.

Lets not bring COIN into this. And having 'many' SF troopers in the NSG is not good enough; the average NSG operator is very much an infantarian. And his colleague from the SF is almost always a better candidate for the kind of specialized tasks that the NSG was raised for.

I point this out, because this is an issue which is often overlooked when looking at Indian soldiers & even the Indian military services, when they are compared to their "western" or other peers, who often have very detailed modules and impressive equipment, but suffer from other constraints. In recent years, US SOF/British SOF have been involved in extended combat ops thanks to their interventions, but India has been in a quasi-hot-cold war situation & extended internal conflicts for a long time as well, and hence has a very large group of men who have seen combat & bring that savvy to bear when engaged in conflict.

?? I'm not sure what you're getting at - yes the Indian military like their western counterparts has a large of pool of battle-hardened men to pick from (though the latter has a lot of combat of late whereas the IA's experience peaked during the late 80s and 90s). How does that change the philosophy of recruitment for the special forces (of which the NSG claims to be a part of)?

In many exercises & benchmarking events of the sort these competitive events entail, Indian units have come across as equal or better than their peers worldwide, because of certain factors unique to Indian conditions & also in house modules.

Indian forces have never trained with US Tier I units, and I'd be very surprised if an average cross-section of NSG would have come across as equal or better than its peers in the GSG-9 or GIGN.

Point is, given that the expansion of the IA's SF has come in for sustained criticism for supposed dilution of standards, its surprising that the NSG despite its gargantuan size, is expected to be at par with world-class units that have exceptionally selective recruitment processes.

But to pick on two random pictures and claim that they represent bad or good tactics respectively, is to be honest, not credible. Especially when the argument is not supported by actual information and hands on experience with regards to that sort of activity. Both need to be available to make this sort of sweeping generalization.

Agreed. But just out of curiosity, if you were being perfectly honest, would say that the general response on the forum would have been just as reticent, if the pictures in question belonged to a foreign country's CT unit (or dare I say... the SSG's)?

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 30 May 2013 22:14

Karan M wrote:Vaibhav and Aditya both make good points regarding the size of the NSG and why quantity has a quality of its own. Little point in having a handful of supermen who cannot respond to multiple attacks or a large event like 26/11. It's not that hard to remember that even in 26/11 the initial force was overwhelmed by the responsibility of clearing those large hotels and more men had to be airlifted in.

'Handful' is a relative term. I'd say 250 men were more than enough to handle the events at Mumbai had a SWAT-type local unit been acting in support (besides being the first line of defence).

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 31 May 2013 03:47

Viv S wrote:
Karan M wrote:Vaibhav and Aditya both make good points regarding the size of the NSG and why quantity has a quality of its own. Little point in having a handful of supermen who cannot respond to multiple attacks or a large event like 26/11. It's not that hard to remember that even in 26/11 the initial force was overwhelmed by the responsibility of clearing those large hotels and more men had to be airlifted in.
'Handful' is a relative term. I'd say 250 men were more than enough to handle the events at Mumbai had a SWAT-type local unit been acting in support (besides being the first line of defence).

And what is your experience with handling events like Mumbai, pray tell? Please tell us the amount of time it would take you, with your hands on experience to clear the hundreds of rooms mentioned previously, and also conduct combat ops simultaneously.
This is what is so amusing - you'd say 250 men were enough, which number is picked from where exactly?
This sort of presumptuous commentary on a topic, on which you have no direct experience of, classifies as idle chatter. Not serious analysis. What exactly is a SWAT type local unit, how would it have differed from the NSG? What would its strength be? Training/combat experience etc....none of which factors into your analysis. Suffice to say, you need to read what Vaibhav has said. And his words don't come lightly..

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 31 May 2013 04:35

Viv S wrote:While I would not want to attach such an epithet to serviceman, I'd still like to point out that it goes against the NSG's own (albeit borrowed) motto - 'One shot, one kill'. And while suppressing fire on a target as a distraction to a direct assault would have been justified, the huge and persistent volume of fire running throughout the night on Nariman House, a target that should by default have been presumed to contain live hostages, was quite astounding. From what I understand, the objective was to mentally exhaust the hostiles before the assault began, something you'd expect in a COIN operation, but not with an elite CT unit involved.

Then clearly you dont understand. One shot one kill -or ek goli ek dushman is nothing unique to the NSG. It has been the motto of the Indian Army from time immemorial and has been used ever since the days of the Enfields to the SLRs and then the INSAS. At the same time, the Army employs Brens and more for support fire. The NSG has slogans saying "every man an emperor, a breed apart", same as the Paras, then the SF. So you think the NSG struts around behaving like emperors? Think, instead of speaking for speakings sake.
The NSG started the Nariman ops in full earnest after learning the hostages were dead. This is revealed in the Channel 4 documentary which mentions the Indian intel agencies were running intercepts.
The NSG did all it could to protect its most critical assets - its operators - which means suppressing fire. The fact that you dont even understand what suppressing fire means, and think that it means a "distraction to the main assault", just shows your idea of infantry tactics is something out of a movie, where the NSG has sharpshooters only trying to take out their targets with single aimed shots. The NSG are infantry. COIN or no COIN, infantry tactics remain infantry tactics. Suppress/support, cover - the other group moves to engage. In many cases, it is the suppressing fire which ends up winning the fight, because of which it is vital that the correct weapons be provided. One big reason, the AKs are so favoured in COIN in India because of their high rate of fire!
Before you make such statements about what an elite CT unit is supposed to be, kindly understand the topic to begin with.

Well... the fact that none of us has ever served in an armoured unit (?), has never deterred similar (rude) criticism with regard to the uniformed officers involved in making decisions wrt to the Arjun and T-90. Relatively few of those posts are singled out for their content, while criticism of the NSG almost always gets tagged with 'what are your credentials'.

Again irrelevant! The Arjun T-90 debate benefits from the vast amount of documented data on the lack of proper organizational decision making from the Army side, supported by parliamentary audit records, supported by reams of technical literature about the items in question & also assessments of the equipment by insiders like Niranjan Malik, VCOAS who led the Arjun program.
Nobody here is sitting and cribbing about how worthless IA armoured tactics here, how their formations cannot work with each other, how they as an organization lack the ability to tactically use the T-90s.

Your statements lack merit because you are comparing apples to oranges.
The issue is not whether the Army or NSG is/are perfect.

The issue is whether the evidence presented so far justified the kind of asinine comments made.
A) NSG trooper is firing from one hand - thats idiotic. Zilch evidence provided of why its idiotic

NSG trooper uses SLR and ditches SIG- thats tactical acumen. Zilch evidence provided of why its acumen,

If this is the sort of evidence that floats your boat, you are welcome to it. Dont expect the rest of us to buy it.

In fact, I would state, that it is these very posts which serve to degrade the quality of the forum and the discussions therein. This since they are using random pictures to make sweeping categorical generalizations, which are not necessarily supported by those pictures.

Fair enough. Though Col MP Chaudhary's scathing comment describing the NSG as operating 'like untrained infantry' was probably based on his interpretation of images streamed by the media.

MP Chaudhary is an ex commander of the NSG, and wants IPS control of the NSG rescinded. Suffice to say, that his views are not based on the media & are based on what he feels could be done and also have an organizational aspect to them. His comments on time to response are worthwhile.

Having said that, did he ever lead the NSG into a situation of this sort? No.
Did he face an event of this magnitude? No.
Who were the tactical leaders of the NSG during this event?
People like Sandeep Unnikrishan at the squad level (seconded from the Army), people like Col Sunil Sheoran of the SF at the command level, reporting to Sitapathy.
If MP Chaudhary thinks Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Sheoran are "untrained infantry", then its not a view likely to be shared by those people who fought that day.

Then there is this other aspect of "elite units" being only a few hundred men strong. Which brings us to the question of what exactly is elite!! Its always easier to create a smaller unit, and over or adequately resource it, as versus creating a larger unit and training them to the same standard. But by itself, that is not a defining argument.

Motivation, resources and proper leadership all play a significant role. In many recorded conflicts, large units, regiments, brigades, divisions and much more have consistently excelled at being better than their smaller ostensibly more "elite" peers, which shows that the drivers for performance can be many and not easily drilled down to 1-2 parameters.

Motivation, resources and leadership are a different set of unrelated characteristics. Increasing the selectivity at induction doesn't not negatively impinge upon those factors.

What the??? They are all related! A proper unit has a winning combination of all three. Creating selectivity at induction does not guarantee that the remaining three aspects - motivation, resources and leadership - are available to make raw talent into a battle winning force!!

The point that was made, which you deliberately chose to ignore, was that merely harping on selection, does not ensure combat performance!!
The best units on paper, in the Indian & international context, have flopped when the other aspects did not click!!

In extended conflicts, the darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest, so to speak, has made many large units, under resourced & poorly supported, still deliver a brutal battlefield performance, because they were staffed by battle hardened soldiers. In the Indian case, many people who come to NSG are ex SF, with significant tours and combat experience already. In turn, many who come to the SF come with experience in COIN & have seen combat already or firefights.

Lets not bring COIN into this.

Why? Because you feel so? Because it contradicts your belief system?
Combat experience is critical.

Period.

A ViVS saying otherwise does not make the reality any different.
I have spoken to multiple soldiers, who all reiterate that the one big difference they have versus others is that they ahve seen combat & it makes ALL teh difference to them not freezing up in combat!

Indian soldiers in COIN end up fighting in crowded urban areas, with conditions very similar to CQB!

And having 'many' SF troopers in the NSG is not good enough; the average NSG operator is very much an infantarian. And his colleague from the SF is almost always a better candidate for the kind of specialized tasks that the NSG was raised for.

Again, more gyaan! Whether SF or infantry, combat experience is critical. It cannot be denied! India or for that matter, the world do not have enough supermen from the SF to depute/fill up every other organization!!
The SF trooper comes with more training & a better pedigree for the NSG, but there is no evidence to suggest that a highly motivated infantry man cannot do what is needed of him for the NSG.

I point this out, because this is an issue which is often overlooked when looking at Indian soldiers & even the Indian military services, when they are compared to their "western" or other peers, who often have very detailed modules and impressive equipment, but suffer from other constraints. In recent years, US SOF/British SOF have been involved in extended combat ops thanks to their interventions, but India has been in a quasi-hot-cold war situation & extended internal conflicts for a long time as well, and hence has a very large group of men who have seen combat & bring that savvy to bear when engaged in conflict.

?? I'm not sure what you're getting at - yes the Indian military like their western counterparts has a large of pool of battle-hardened men to pick from (though the latter has a lot of combat of late whereas the IA's experience peaked during the late 80s and 90s). How does that change the philosophy of recruitment for the special forces (of which the NSG claims to be a part of)?

What I am getting at, was very obvious to those who read my post. If you did not get what I meant, read it again. What it means is simply this, battle hardened troopers perform better than callow troopers who may pass the grind on paper but do not have the experience! Nobody so far when harping on how the NSG standards had to be blah blah, mentioned this very aspect, that battle hardened troopers who go to the NSG bring a vast body of knowledge and ability with them - most important being they think on their feet!! They dont have to be SF supermen but perform even so!

Many Indian RR/Infantry commanders confidently state that they have troops/sections that can equal the SF operators overall, because of the pure experience they have across a variety of roles/combat. As elite infantry, they can match the SF. Where the SF excels is in their ability to undertake non conventional infantry roles - intel/strat reccon/beyond the TBA - ironically, also the very roles, Indian SF often dont have the political mandate to pursue.

In many exercises & benchmarking events of the sort these competitive events entail, Indian units have come across as equal or better than their peers worldwide, because of certain factors unique to Indian conditions & also in house modules.

[quote[Indian forces have never trained with US Tier I units, and I'd be very surprised if an average cross-section of NSG would have come across as equal or better than its peers in the GSG-9 or GIGN.[/quote]

How do you know whom Indian forces have trained with or not? Have you been part of the Army? If not, your surprise is worth little. Heck, in previous Army SF level exercises, they have publicly trained with US SF operators from the Green Berets and others. And spare me the semantic nitpicking of who is Tier 1 or otherwise.
Besides which, the above statement proves is that you have zero idea of the kind of exposure the Indian forces have. And yes, for your kind information, the average cross section in the SAG of the NSG would probably match (and they actually note they'd outperform) their peers in the GSG-9 or GIGN, based purely on their mix of combat experience, intensive physical ragad & ability to take real time decisions without caring about the political impact of casualties.

Point is, given that the expansion of the IA's SF has come in for sustained criticism for supposed dilution of standards, its surprising that the NSG despite its gargantuan size, is expected to be at par with world-class units that have exceptionally selective recruitment processes.

IA's SF standards have come for criticism because they are diluted versus own internal prior standards. They have little to do with international standards which vary country by country & are often apples to oranges. Russian airborne troopers in the past have shown higher upper body strength when compared to wiry IA SF troops, which the IA noted & changed its training. Put those same guys in the tropics over several days, and their effectiveness rapidly dropped. Same as IA observed when training with "certain" western SF who even expected mineral water to be made available during training ops. Lord alone would testify to their effectiveness when the logistical chain was broken or during ops like Kargil when IA infantrymen subsisted on gur and ice!!

NSG's garguantan size stems more from its large SRG contingent than its SAG, which too benefits from leaching/poaching off of already experienced/trained IA infantrymen. That again, is a privilege few organizations worldwide enjoy and which is exactly why the IA is upset about acting as a feeder organization to another MHA operated unit, which causes issues for the IA. But it also means the NSG enjoys an advantage, that it directly employes Army men ostensibly under a paramil desig!!

But to pick on two random pictures and claim that they represent bad or good tactics respectively, is to be honest, not credible. Especially when the argument is not supported by actual information and hands on experience with regards to that sort of activity. Both need to be available to make this sort of sweeping generalization.

Agreed. But just out of curiosity, if you were being perfectly honest, would say that the general response on the forum would have been just as reticent, if the pictures in question belonged to a foreign country's CT unit (or dare I say... the SSG's)?

Who cares about the SSG and why are you bringing in them to the discussion? This is a perfect example of an irrelevant side track. You have some mental concept that the "western SF" are superior and Indian NSG are inferior based on some arbitrary KPIs you have employed, size etc, without even understanding the other side of the equation, that numbers matter and that to this date, propaganda apart, the average Indian infantry man goes through a gruelling regimen that would have most western troopers and their advocates up in arms. You might want to know what a certain Marine colonel remarked to his wider unit after exercising with Indian troops - they have an incredibly taxing physical regimen..
This is merely an adjunct of both our larger population base & also our lower technology base. We have our soldiers harder because we will not invest or cannot, in aspects western armies take for granted! In Parakram, Indian armoured corps tankers deployed in vintage T-55s within which the ambient temperature was 40 deg celsius plus. Troops had heatstrokes, but the units persevered. Compare & contrast to whether the US Army would have ever deployed in such circumstances.

What you consider as "world class" is misleading!! Indian, and even Pakistani SF can give the US/west a run for their money. What we lack in are two things: General political awareness of the strategic nature of SF (versus elite infantry) and second, technology!! As a Canadian soldier once told me, look your guys can get x km to a target, I'll just call in an airstrike!! And that is fundamentally, the biggest force multiplier for western SF. Not that their snake eaters are better than our snake eaters - they actually aren't.

nits · Post by **nits** » 31 May 2013 11:32

Great post Karan... Very balanced and practical view...

member_20292 · Post by **member_20292** » 31 May 2013 15:25

Karan M wrote:
Russian airborne troopers in the past have shown higher upper body strength when compared to wiry IA SF troops, which the IA noted & changed its training. Put those same guys in the tropics over several days, and their effectiveness rapidly dropped. Same as IA observed when training with "certain" western SF who even expected mineral water to be made available during training ops. Lord alone would testify to their effectiveness when the logistical chain was broken or during ops like Kargil when IA infantrymen subsisted on gur and ice!!

Hardiness. Does it make for a better infantryman? Is equipment to be factored into the equation at all, when comparing units across armies. I would think so. And thus I would think that some western SFs with their superior equipment and their being used to that equipment, would outfight Indian SF in general.

Who cares about the SSG and why are you bringing in them to the discussion? This is a perfect example of an irrelevant side track. You have some mental concept that the "western SF" are superior and Indian NSG are inferior based on some arbitrary KPIs you have employed, size etc, without even understanding the other side of the equation, that numbers matter and that to this date, propaganda apart, the average Indian infantry man goes through a gruelling regimen that would have most western troopers and their advocates up in arms. You might want to know what a certain Marine colonel remarked to his wider unit after exercising with Indian troops - they have an incredibly taxing physical regimen..

This is merely an adjunct of both our larger population base & also our lower technology base. We have our soldiers harder because we will not invest or cannot, in aspects western armies take for granted! In Parakram, Indian armoured corps tankers deployed in vintage T-55s within which the ambient temperature was 40 deg celsius plus. Troops had heatstrokes, but the units persevered. Compare & contrast to whether the US Army would have ever deployed in such circumstances.

What you consider as "world class" is misleading!! Indian, and even Pakistani SF can give the US/west a run for their money. What we lack in are two things: General political awareness of the strategic nature of SF (versus elite infantry) and second, technology!! As a Canadian soldier once told me, look your guys can get x km to a target, I'll just call in an airstrike!! And that is fundamentally, the biggest force multiplier for western SF. Not that their snake eaters are better than our snake eaters - they actually aren't.

Mano a Mano, sure, I agree that you would say that an Indian SF would be tougher than the average western SF operative.

But, I would also think that that would be true when you compare an jihadi or an LeT operative high on hashish, ready to go to jannat vs the Indian army.

It IS absolutely the combination of the equipment AND the training that is the difference between a war winning and a war losing combination.

So comparing men to men is probably not the fairest comparison (or is it?)

I would compare western SF vs. a specific situation and how they dealt with it, with the Indian SF, in a similar situation and how they dealt with it.

And in comparing the ultimate outcomes, I would venture to say, that the westerners may come out on top.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 31 May 2013 17:34

MP Chaudhary is an ex commander of the NSG, and wants IPS control of the NSG rescinded. Suffice to say, that his views are not based on the media & are based on what he feels could be done and also have an organizational aspect to them. His comments on time to response are worthwhile.

Having said that, did he ever lead the NSG into a situation of this sort? No.
Did he face an event of this magnitude? No.
Who were the tactical leaders of the NSG during this event?
People like Sandeep Unnikrishan at the squad level (seconded from the Army), people like Col Sunil Sheoran of the SF at the command level, reporting to Sitapathy.
If MP Chaudhary thinks Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Sheoran are "untrained infantry", then its not a view likely to be shared by those people who fought that day.

Karan

you are misunderstanding MP here. MP does not mince words and while it was jarring to hear it - he has earned the right.

he based it on parameters which were set up in his time and were not being met more recently.
it does not touch the men like Sheoran etc. I know sometimes words get mixed up and it sounds like that but he is not beating up on the main SAG element if interpret him correctly

I cannot go into details but during his times him and a certain other senior officer who developed all this in certain context had set high parameters and those were nowhere being met.

Indian forces have never trained with US Tier I units, and I'd be very surprised if an average cross-section of NSG would have come across as equal or better than its peers in the GSG-9 or GIGN

First of all we are falling for the well honed message that XYZ are tier 1.
Many special forces have different level of expertise and the professionals always try to learn. Of course the western media will never ackowledge the Uzbek or some other nations SF unit as a Tier1. but there are guys in these units who have tremendous expertise in certain areas. which is logical considering they inherited Spetsnaz elements when they came on their own.

I could also say that GSG 9 and GIGN never have operated in Indian environments - concrete structures, iron grills, big blocks for doors, grills etc.

nice pretty entry in US\Europeans houses will come up a cropper in the indian environment.
Thats why the Israelis have not had much success in rescuing hostages as they have similar iron\grill structure giving time for those inside to shoot the hostage.

PS: The western units are very cunning - they try to send their guys to learn from others but rarely allow the other way.
eg. the SAS

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 01 Jun 2013 09:52

Good debate, I would say. Things get fleshed out better and we get actually Surya to write bigger posts...

My two cents - (a) The regional hub business has screwed lot of things. More than anything, the political diktat to implement it post-haste has meant that there is mixing and matching of men-power.

(b) From what I understand, no more Army SF guys on deputation to NSG. Older SF fellas who did their stint in earlier years might come back to take up command positions but otherwise, no more IA SF for NSG.

(c) 26/11 was a wake-up call; finally, new equipment was sanctioned and has been procured.

(d) The Col MP Chowdhary comments - actually, his comments bring out the tragedy of SF in India. The unit as envisaged by him initially was to be Indian SAS with CT/HRT being one of the roles. You see, the Para Commando Units were considered as elite infantry and were considered good enough for only small time cross border raids and such stuff. IA did try and develop 1 Para Commando as some sort of super-battalion with same structure as SAS and it became Army HQ reserve. But it wasn't a very fruitful experiment. This is where MP Chowdhary comes in - NSG has evolved into something which is not as per the original blue-print that was created for a elite SF Unit.

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 01 Jun 2013 12:26

Surya wrote: PS: The western units are very cunning - they try to send their guys to learn from others but rarely allow the other way.
eg. the SAS

I think that is why the IA never exercises (or very rarely does) with the SAS.

jayaaren · Post by **jayaaren** » 01 Jun 2013 12:50

rohitvats wrote:Good debate, I would say. Things get fleshed out better and we get actually Surya to write bigger posts...

My two cents - (a) The regional hub business has screwed lot of things. More than anything, the political diktat to implement it post-haste has meant that there is mixing and matching of men-power.

(b) From what I understand, no more Army SF guys on deputation to NSG. Older SF fellas who did their stint in earlier years might come back to take up command positions but otherwise, no more IA SF for NSG.

(c) 26/11 was a wake-up call; finally, new equipment was sanctioned and has been procured.

(d) The Col MP Chowdhary comments - actually, his comments bring out the tragedy of SF in India. The unit as envisaged by him initially was to be Indian SAS with CT/HRT being one of the roles. You see, the Para Commando Units were considered as elite infantry and were considered good enough for only small time cross border raids and such stuff. IA did try and develop 1 Para Commando as some sort of super-battalion with same structure as SAS and it became Army HQ reserve. But it wasn't a very fruitful experiment. This is where MP Chowdhary comes in - NSG has evolved into something which is not as per the original blue-print that was created for a elite SF Unit.

I have some queries on the whole MP Chowdhary thing:

our planners probably got it muddled when they set up the NSG in the first place. They culled men to form a unit based on the SAS, GSCG9 and GIGN but failed to realise that there is a world of difference between what the SAS was being use for and what the GIGN/GSG9 were being used for. These planners then set up the ParaCommmando Bns as SF now meaning that NSG and Para (SF) began doing much the same things. They also added MARCOS to the muddle. Now you had 3 units all doing the same thing. Now what is AOR of the NSG, Para(SF) and MARCOS. Are they still stepping on each other's toes

If the SAS, GIGN & GSG9 were the model, why was all this deputing done. To the best of my knowledge, the SAS retains their file while the ranks are temporary, meaning the NCOs & JCOs remain till they quit while the Officers can only return after a "tour" if they are asked. As for the GIGN & GSG9 once they are in, they remain. The same is the case in the FBI's HRT. So now you have a highly experienced group of operators.

This regional hub business is as correctly pointed out a knee-jerk reaction. If we cannot get a unit to the incident scene pronto, then no amount of hubs are going to make a difference. Dedicated Lift Assets are what is required. Case in point, FBI-HRT has access to a dedicated C-17 for cross country transport. The same with the SAS's CT unit alhtough i suspect this is by a C-130. This means that manpower, equipment, weapons, ammo, clothing, vehicles and copters get to the incident spot at the same. Responding to a CT incident is time critical. We cannot affford the luxury of a staggered mobilization. Once you get behind the time cycle you are done for. Terrorists understand this better. I'll get into details of this later.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 01 Jun 2013 15:04

in my limited understanding - sas's primary mission is behind the lines recon and targetting, not hostage rescue - they have dedicated squads for that

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 01 Jun 2013 16:18

jayaaren wrote:I have some queries on the whole MP Chowdhary thing:

our planners probably got it muddled when they set up the NSG in the first place. They culled men to form a unit based on the SAS, GSCG9 and GIGN but failed to realise that there is a world of difference between what the SAS was being use for and what the GIGN/GSG9 were being used for. These planners then set up the ParaCommmando Bns as SF now meaning that NSG and Para (SF) began doing much the same things. They also added MARCOS to the muddle. Now you had 3 units all doing the same thing. Now what is AOR of the NSG, Para(SF) and MARCOS. Are they still stepping on each other's toes

If the SAS, GIGN & GSG9 were the model, why was all this deputing done. To the best of my knowledge, the SAS retains their file while the ranks are temporary, meaning the NCOs & JCOs remain till they quit while the Officers can only return after a "tour" if they are asked. As for the GIGN & GSG9 once they are in, they remain. The same is the case in the FBI's HRT. So now you have a highly experienced group of operators.

This regional hub business is as correctly pointed out a knee-jerk reaction. If we cannot get a unit to the incident scene pronto, then no amount of hubs are going to make a difference. Dedicated Lift Assets are what is required. Case in point, FBI-HRT has access to a dedicated C-17 for cross country transport. The same with the SAS's CT unit alhtough i suspect this is by a C-130. This means that manpower, equipment, weapons, ammo, clothing, vehicles and copters get to the incident spot at the same. Responding to a CT incident is time critical. We cannot affford the luxury of a staggered mobilization. Once you get behind the time cycle you are done for. Terrorists understand this better. I'll get into details of this later.

You need to read-up a bit before doing such critical analysis and trying to prove how we got this wrong. And western countries got all things right.

First things first - The Para-Commandos predate NSG by a wide margin. The first battalion (9 Para Commando) came about after 1965 war and then came 10 and 1 Para Commando. 21 Para Commando came about in mid 90s. These are the original 04 Para Commando Battalions. As I said before, there was an experiment to convert 1 Para Commando into SF on lines of SAS with organization centered around Squadrons and stuff.

From what I understand, the unit to be set-up in early 80s was to be our main Special Force which was to be deployed for strategic requirement. Indian SAS, if you will. For whatever reason, Para Commando Battalions existing at that time (1/9/10) were not considered for scaling up for this requirement. They were primarily geared for cross-border raids and other tasks more in line with larger war-like conflicts.

There is a reason Commando was dropped and Para (SF) was used - the word Commando was by some strange logic considered as symptomatic of more direct-action raids and blowing up stuff. IMO, the word Commando is more cool and PARA (Commando) reads just right.

Then 1984 happened - the spearhead of the assault was a team from 1 Para Cdo along with troops from SFF. Led by a gentleman by the name of Major PC Katoch (and who retired as Lt. General PC Katoch - the author of the book on SF listed on this thread earlier). Post 1984, NSG came into being and from what one can discern, the plan and blueprint prepared by Colonel MP Chowdhary morphed into NSG.

So, while India gained a dedicated CT/HRT formation, it lost out of a dedicated SF which could be used in line with Delta or ST6 or SAS.

And BTW - the true counter part of SAS in France and Germany are SF units of the armies of these countries. German law explicitly prohibits use of German Army for internal duties and hence, GSG9 was created from Border Police; German Army personnel desirous of joining GSG9 have to resign their commission in German Army. GIGN is part of the armed police and not the French Army.

Our Para (SF) are true counterparts of SAS/Green Berets/French SAS. It is just that unlike other countries, SAS also undertakes CT/HRT operations and maintains a squadron for such eventualities.

The Para (SF) battalions continued to evolve to respond to changing requirements - from IPKF in 1987 to North-East to Kashmir. MARCOS came about because you need dedicated SF to operate in maritime environment and in support of maritime interest(s). Every country worth its salt has SF dedicated for maritime operations. From SEAL in US Navy to SBS in UK to Shayetet 13 in Israel - they have a specific role in maritime environment. The fact that most of their operations are land based does not take away from their raison d'etre.

And please stop comparing with western countries and their special forces. The size and number of special forces required is contingent on the threat scenarios faced by the nation. And forces and responses are tailored for this threat requirement. A nation like India needs SF of varying types and number to meet the threat scenarios.

As for the size of SF of NSG type - India is a vast country which faces unique threats. When was the last time an SF unit came up against 1984 or 26/11? GIGN has grand total of ~500 operatives; good luck trying to tackle 26/11 situation with such manpower w/o calling in the SF from Army and even the regular infantry.

IA is million strong and much larger pool to draw men from - heck, jawans belonging to NCR/Western UP/Haryana/Rajasthan opt for NSG for a simple reason that it gives them a chance to be close to their homes. And SAG - the sword arm of NSG - would be around 2500 strong. Men serve time in the unit and go back - this creates a larger pool in the army of trained operators and helps to disseminate knowledge to a wider base.

Coming to lament of Colonel Chowdhary - he raises question on much wider, and serious, problem. That is - the use of SF in our strategic decision making. I wrote earlier in this post that India gained NSG but lost on a strategic SF. Something SAS does for Britain or Delta and SEAL Team 6 for US- fighting dirty wars within and without the country silently and then fading into black.

US follows a two-tier SF model - Green Beret and Rangers Regiment are prime US Army AF units while SEALS are US Navy SF. Men are selected from Army SF units and other infantry regiments to form part of Delta Force and from SEALS Teams to form SEAL TEAM 6 in case of Navy. So, these forces actually have men who are elite of the elite. From what I can deduce, Colonel Chowdhary wanted such a force for India which could undertake CT/HRT also. Men could be drawn from Para Commando Battalions and other infantry regiments.

We do have the Special Group AKA 22 SF which draws men from Para (SF) and other infantry units but not much is known in public domain about it.....(hides for cover)

Long story short - the heart is in the right place but the fvcking mind is not when it comes to raising/maintaining/utilizing an elite formation like NSG.

jayaaren · Post by **jayaaren** » 01 Jun 2013 16:24

Lalmohan wrote:in my limited understanding - sas's primary mission is behind the lines recon and targetting, not hostage rescue - they have dedicated squads for that

SAS was created for a DA role in the North African deserts, then went on to perform assistance & training for partisans & marquis. They then went on to conduct counter-insurgent ops and then CT. CP, SR, ISTAR, TD all came later. They do not have dedicated squads for CT but a dedicated Special Projects Team functioning under the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Wing which develops tactics, tests equipment and imparts training. Each squadron in the 22 SAS (A, B & D) rotates through CRW at fixed periods so that Green capability as well as Black capability is maintained throughout.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 01 Jun 2013 16:55

We do have the Special Group AKA 22 SF which draws men from Para (SF) and other infantry units but not much is known in public domain about it.....(hides for cover)

grr

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 01 Jun 2013 16:58

I think that is why the IA never exercises (or very rarely does) with the SAS.

we return BS with BS

they try to send in some altu faltu marine or infantry guys to play with our SF

we send them to play with some infantry battalion

in general part of the plan of maintaining elite units is also cultivating a careful image of ultra successful super duper forces.

Their media is all part of this plan

PArt of the aim being as soon as some terrorist thinks this unit is coming he is (hopefully) partly lost faith in his mission

Our media on the other .....

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 01 Jun 2013 18:01

SAG should merge into the new JSOC that is being mooted with the few para SF batallions, marcos, SFF and other units they need like aviation
SRG should be farmed between the state police commandoes where they came from and also fed into a hugely expanded SPG that will take over VVIP security not just protecting The Family and the PM!!

both the problems could get solved with this , but first the JSOC needs to get formed with strong PMO and Defmin support plus a constitutional guarantee that politicians will not play with it should a inder gujral type character ever occupy PMO in future...afterall if they inflict pain on the enemy, the Pakis will whine and complain to unkil and what better than to punish JSOC as a CBM