Managing Chinese Threat
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
you mean the good old - running dog lackey of the imperialist revisionist clique?
you splittist!
you splittist!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Right now they are acting like Mad-Ill_Kong. They think China is TINA in Asia.Lalmohan wrote:the term "middle kingdom" covers it aptly - invokes an imperialistic memory
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
is that a new Chinese name!
Mad Il Kung?
Mad Il Kung?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
My suggestions:
The Middle Emperors
The Little Emperors
The Middle Ones
The Little Middles
The Middle Emperors
The Little Emperors
The Middle Ones
The Little Middles
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
MFK=Middle Fingered Kungdumb
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Just admit it...everyone is missing Middle Kingdom Bhadrakumar...
Frost in a promising Indian summer
By M K Bhadrakumar
Frost in a promising Indian summer
By M K Bhadrakumar
High drama of a Chinese troop "intrusion" on the disputed border with India seemed to ebb through negotiations as silently as it had begun, with seemingly little damage to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's state visit to New Delhi. Yet Beijing may have weakened the very power centers in India that were working to usher in a brave new world of partnership.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Agnimitra wrote:Just admit it...everyone is missing Middle Kingdom Bhadrakumar...

Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Four Indian warships on Overseas Deployment - ToI
India has dispatched four warships, including a frontline destroyer and a stealth frigate, on a long overseas deployment through the strategic Malacca Strait to Malaysia, Vietnam and Philippines.
The four warships from the country's Eastern Fleet — stealth frigate INS Satpura, guided-missile destroyer INS Ranvijay, missile corvette INS Kirch and fleet tanker INS Shakti - will make port calls at Klang in Malaysia, Da Nang in Vietnam and Manila in Philippines before returning to India towards end-June. Eastern Fleet commander Rear Admiral P Ajit Kumar is leading the flotilla.
"Constructive engagement is our principle weapon during peacetime. The idea is to enhance security and stability in the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR) by engaging with regional and extra-regional maritime powers," said a senior officer.
India, of course, is also building strong maritime security bridges with countries like Japan and Vietnam in a bid to counter China's "string of pearls" maritime construct in the IOR.
Incidentally, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who is currently in Tokyo, said on Tuesday that India shares with Japan a strong strategic interest in expanding cooperation on maritime security and promoting regional stability.
India views Japan as a "natural and indispensable partner" in the quest for stability and peace in Asia. Ensuring sea lanes remain open and free is vital for the region's prosperity, given its dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, he added.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Indian patrols to move closer to China border
With improvement in infrastructure, India is getting ready to be more assertive along its disputed border with China.
Top government sources have told HT that Indian forces may soon patrol deeper into the disputed territory with China, beyond the limits observed before the recent three-week border standoff in Ladakh.
However, they would still not be carrying out surveillance all the way up to India's perceived border because of a self-imposed restriction that has never been made public.
Classified documents accessed by HT have revealed that India currently restricts its surveillance to a self-imposed 'patrolling limit' ranging from 2km to 20km inside New Delhi's perception of the line of actual control (LAC).
The common belief, based on public statements by the government, was that Indian forces patrol right up to the LAC - the undefined border disputed by both sides.
Indian and Chinese armies restarted patrols in eastern Ladakh after the standoff, but Indian forces do not venture beyond the 'patrolling limit', a top army officer confirmed.
He added that the so-called 'patrolling limit' predated the April 15 Chinese incursion, and it may have been imposed in the 1960s after the India-China war.
"The patrolling limit is being reconsidered in some swathes due to improvement in infrastructure on our side," a top government source said, adding that poor infrastructure had so far been a constraint for Indian forces to be able to patrol right up to New Delhi's perceived LAC.
Indian forces carry out patrols up to points referred to as P10, P11, P11A, P12 and P13 that define the 'patrolling limit' in Daulat Beg Oldie sector.
The secret map identifying the patrol points was recently analysed by the China Study Group, which is India's top policy body on China.
Indian patrol parties from Burtse, 10km southeast from the face-off site, march up to patrol point P10, return to Raki Nala and then take up the second leg of the surveillance to P11 the next day.
The surveillance cycle covering all the points takes up to five days, and is carried out at least once a month.
In April, Chinese troops had taken up positions and pitched five tents, 19km into Indian territory, in the bottle-neck area of Raki Nala, preventing Indian troops from patrolling more than 750 sq km of disputed area.
With improvement in infrastructure, India is getting ready to be more assertive along its disputed border with China.
Top government sources have told HT that Indian forces may soon patrol deeper into the disputed territory with China, beyond the limits observed before the recent three-week border standoff in Ladakh.
However, they would still not be carrying out surveillance all the way up to India's perceived border because of a self-imposed restriction that has never been made public.
Classified documents accessed by HT have revealed that India currently restricts its surveillance to a self-imposed 'patrolling limit' ranging from 2km to 20km inside New Delhi's perception of the line of actual control (LAC).
The common belief, based on public statements by the government, was that Indian forces patrol right up to the LAC - the undefined border disputed by both sides.
Indian and Chinese armies restarted patrols in eastern Ladakh after the standoff, but Indian forces do not venture beyond the 'patrolling limit', a top army officer confirmed.
He added that the so-called 'patrolling limit' predated the April 15 Chinese incursion, and it may have been imposed in the 1960s after the India-China war.
"The patrolling limit is being reconsidered in some swathes due to improvement in infrastructure on our side," a top government source said, adding that poor infrastructure had so far been a constraint for Indian forces to be able to patrol right up to New Delhi's perceived LAC.
Indian forces carry out patrols up to points referred to as P10, P11, P11A, P12 and P13 that define the 'patrolling limit' in Daulat Beg Oldie sector.
The secret map identifying the patrol points was recently analysed by the China Study Group, which is India's top policy body on China.
Indian patrol parties from Burtse, 10km southeast from the face-off site, march up to patrol point P10, return to Raki Nala and then take up the second leg of the surveillance to P11 the next day.
The surveillance cycle covering all the points takes up to five days, and is carried out at least once a month.
In April, Chinese troops had taken up positions and pitched five tents, 19km into Indian territory, in the bottle-neck area of Raki Nala, preventing Indian troops from patrolling more than 750 sq km of disputed area.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Have the Raki Nala postions been vacated by the Chinese after the April 2013 standoff?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
And I am going to go right to the fence of my backyard where my neighbour is presently taking a dump.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
On your side or his side?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The Chinese have a demonstrated track record spanning decades of being uncouth in both words and actions. How about the "Barbarian of Asia?"RajeshA wrote:SSridhar garu,SSridhar wrote:It is very clear that the Chinese aggression on the LAC has this important component: Chinese pique at growing Indian relationship with all of China's neighbours with whom China has border disputes.
The Chinese are used to such kind of abusive, invective language referring to international leaders. They used to call Nehru a dog of western imperialism.
I think we should also have choicest words for the Chinese like "The Last Imperial Scum", etc. There are of course others who may also qualify for such epithets but that should not stop us from making a point that they are imperialist, and that their critique of Japan falls flat simply because they themselves are occupying N.E. Ladakh, Tibet, East Turkestan, Inner Mongolia, North Goguryeo (Korea) and are making illegitimate claims on many islands in the East China Sea and Indo-China Sea.
So in the same way we always add "Peace Be Upon Him" to the Prophet, similarly whenever we speak of China, it should always be with "The Last Imperial Scum" added to it, lest one forgets.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Kudos. Completely missed the middling kindom (sic) aspect. Shows how deeply the enemy have penetrated our babudom and media discourse.Agnimitra wrote:Just admit it...everyone is missing Middle Kingdom Bhadrakumar...
Frost in a promising Indian summer
By M K BhadrakumarHigh drama of a Chinese troop "intrusion" on the disputed border with India seemed to ebb through negotiations as silently as it had begun, with seemingly little damage to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's state visit to New Delhi. Yet Beijing may have weakened the very power centers in India that were working to usher in a brave new world of partnership.
MKB is veritably one of the MK's "assassin's maces". A true 'Grima Wormtongue' dripping poison into the aging King's ear.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Indo- Japani friendship will extend from Indian sea To japan Sea Encomapassing Indo Pacific Sea, taller than Himalaya , Stronger than Steel, Wider than Dragon' Dungeon and Deeper than Paki Mush.
How ready is Japan to play its Part as the rightful inheritor of Buddhist legacy and have say in the affairs of present and future Tibet. Soka Gakkai International have been pretty active in India and its leader Daisaku Ikeda have many followers among Dilli Billis.
How ready is Japan to play its Part as the rightful inheritor of Buddhist legacy and have say in the affairs of present and future Tibet. Soka Gakkai International have been pretty active in India and its leader Daisaku Ikeda have many followers among Dilli Billis.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Indian & Chinese officials hold talks to address trade deficit - Economic Times
Top Indian and Chinese commerce officials held talks to take steps to reduce India's ballooning trade deficit with China and discuss follow up actions needed to broaden market access for Indian products here. [Beijing]
Commerce Secretary S R Rao along with Additional Secretaries Rajiv Kher and J S Deepak, who arrived here [Beijing] on May 27 on a five-day visit, discussed bilateral trade issues with their Chinese counterparts in the last two days, officials here told PTI.
Rao and his colleagues held talks with three top officials in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC), the planning body of China and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).
They met Chen Jian, Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce and Yan Xueshan, Vice Chairman of NDRC and Vice Minister of MIIT. The talks are ongoing, the sources said. The talks so far went off well and were reportedly focussed on streamlining procedures for Indian exports, they said.
India also looks to facilitate Chinese offer to invest in industrial zones to step up its investments.
Issues relating to declining bilateral trade, which fell to about USD 66.7 billion last year from around USD 74 billion in 2012, China's plans to step up investments in India as well as the ballooning trade deficit which touched about USD 30 billion last year figured in the talks, officials said.
The two countries set the target of USD 100 billion in bilateral trade by 2015 during Li's visit.
During his recent visit, Li had promised to address New Delhi's concerns in this regard and seriously consider ways to meet India's demand to open up IT and pharmaceutical sectors which offered great potential for Indian products.
Li's promise to open up the sectors and the MOUs signed during his visit were expected to facilitate India's exports of oilmeal, pharmaceuticals, marine products and buffalo meat. Indian officials expect the buffalo meat exports to fetch about one USD billion dollars in the first year itself.
Meanwhile, a Chinese scholar came up with a bizarre argument that China's trade surplus is actually helping Indian economy.
"One could easily make a case that China's long-term surplus with India is supporting the economy of its large Asian neighbour rather than hindering it", Mei Xinyu, an associate researcher with the state-run Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation wrote in commentary in official daily Global Times.
"In India, protectionist policies have long kept outside companies from cementing footholds in its market. Sure, this means that Indian businesses face few foreign rivals within their home turf as they slowly develop - but it also means that local companies have few incentives to improve the quality of their products", the commentary said.
"If anything, opening the door to inexpensive goods from China will inspire healthy competition and push local companies to incrementally step up their games. This will encourage upgrading within India's manufacturing sector, which will translate into higher-quality goods for both local and world markets in the long run", it said.
"We can't forget that most of the imports entering India from China are cheap raw materials rather than finished products. These goods are highly prized in India because they keep operating and manufacturing costs at acceptable levels", Mei said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
China is getting a taste of its own medicine, at last after so much delay and they don't like it. It is very bitter.
Chinese media accuses Japan of attempting to encircle China
Chinese media accuses Japan of attempting to encircle China
Fuming over Japan's efforts to forge maritime security cooperation with India during the just-concluded visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a state-run Chinese daily on Thursday accused Tokyo of attempting to "encircle" China by building strategic alliances in the neighbourhood.
"With Singh on his four-day visit to Japan, both sides have discussed maritime security cooperation. A few days ago, when Shinzo Abe, Singh's counterpart, visited Myanmar, it was seen as Japan's attempt to complete a "puzzle game" in order to "encircle China," state-run Global Times daily said in its editorial today.
"Japan's strategy for China drives its activity around China's neighbours, said an editorial titled 'Diplomatic row due to disoriented Japan'.
"But Japan's wishful thinking of encircling China is just an illusion. Besides sneaking a few bargains from its competition with China, Japan does not have the strength to prevail over China's influence in Asia," it said.
The allegation comes as China's attempts to forge close ties in India's neighbourhood were perceived as Beijing's attempt to encircle India.
China is currently hosting Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa pouring billions of dollars of aid and investment, sparking concerns in India.
Today's editorial is second such comment by Chinese official media over Japan's efforts to forge close ties with India during Singh's visit.
An article in People's Daily two days ago had termed Japanese politicians "petty burglars" for courting India.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
then why this chest-beating aritcle ? why worry just have some shanghai curry."But Japan's wishful thinking of encircling China is just an illusion. Besides sneaking a few bargains from its competition with China, Japan does not have the strength to prevail over China's influence in Asia," it said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/com ... 0801.story
America's China mistake
America's China mistake
This spring, China's navy accepted the Pentagon's invitation to participate in the 2014 Rim of the Pacific — RIMPAC — naval exercise to be held off Hawaii. This will be the first time China takes part in the biennial event.Our allies should signal their intent to withdraw from the exercise if China participates. Failing that, the invitation should be withdrawn. RIMPAC is for allies and friends, not nations planning to eventually wage war on the United States. Russia sent ships in 2012, but while its senior officers may occasionally utter unfriendly words, they are not actively planning to fight the United States. Analyst Robert Sutter was surely correct when he wrote in 2005 that "China is the only large power in the world preparing to shoot Americans."That assessment, unfortunately, remains true today. Beijing is configuring its forces — especially its navy — to fight ours. For instance, China has deployed along its southern coast its DF-21D, a two-stage solid-fuel missile that can be guided by satellite signals. The missile is dubbed the "carrier killer" because it can be configured to explode in midair, raining down sharp metal on a deck crowded with planes, ordinance, fuel and sailors. Its apparent intent is to drive U.S. forces out of East Asia.A pattern of aggressive Chinese tactics also points in that direction. Especially troubling is the harassment in international waters of unarmed U.S. Navy reconnaissance vessels for more than a decade, most notably the blocking of the Impeccable in the South China Sea in 2009. And there was the 2001 downing of a Navy EP-3 and the surfacing of a Song-class attack submarine in the middle of the Kitty Hawk strike group near Okinawa in 2006.
Since then, we have been hearing bold war talk in the Chinese capital, from new leader Xi Jinping to senior officers and colonels who say they relish combat — a "hand-to-hand fight with the U.S.," as one of them put it in 2010.Why do China's officers want to go to war? There is an unfortunate confluence of factors. First, there is a new Chinese confidence bordering on arrogance. Beijing leaders, especially since 2008, have been riding high. They saw economic turmoil around the world and thought the century was theirs to dominate. The U.S. and the rest of the West, they believed, were in terminal decline.The Chinese military also has gained substantial influence in the last year, perhaps becoming the most powerful faction in the Communist Party. Beginning as early as 2003, senior officers of the People's Liberation Army were drawn into civilian power struggles as Hu Jintao, then the new leader, sought their support in his effort to shove aside Jiang Zemin, his wily predecessor who sought to linger in the limelight. Last year, the civilian infighting intensified as the so-called Fifth Generation leadership, under the command of Xi, took over from Hu's Fourth. Like a decade ago, feuding civilians sought the support of the generals and admirals, making them arbiters in the party's increasingly rough game of politics.The result of discord among civilian leaders has been a partial remilitarization of politics and policy. Senior officers are now acting independently of civilian officials, are openly criticizing them and are making pronouncements in areas once considered the exclusive province of diplomats.
The remilitarization has had consequences. As Huang Jing of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy said: "China's military spending is growing so fast that it has overtaken strategy. The young officers are taking control of strategy, and it is like young officers in Japan in the 1930s. They are thinking what they can do, not what they should do."What do China's admirals want? They are supporting their nation's territorial ambitions to close off the South China Sea to others. This brings them into conflict with nations surrounding that critical body of water and pits them against the U.S. If there has been any consistent U.S. foreign policy over the course of two centuries, it has been the defense of freedom of navigation.
According to a white paper it issued in April, China is building a navy capable of operating in the ocean's deep water, and has 235,000 officers and sailors. Its navy last year commissioned its first aircraft carrier, and it is reportedly building two more. China has about a dozen fewer submarines than the U.S., but the U.S. has global responsibilities. The Chinese, therefore, can concentrate their boats in waters close to their shores, giving them tactical and operating advantages.While the Chinese plan to dominate their waters and eventually ours, we are helping them increase their effectiveness with invitations to RIMPAC and other exercises and by including them in joint operations like the one directed against Somali piracy. The U.S. Navy at the same time is continuing to reduce its fleet, currently at 283 deployable ships. As Beijing's behavior has become more troubling, the Pentagon has clung to the hope that military-to-military relations will somehow relieve tensions with the Chinese.Yet as Ronald Reagan taught us, the nature of regimes matter. We are now helping an incurably aggressive state develop its military — to our peril. There is something very wrong at the core of the Obama administration's and the Pentagon's China policies.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
China's Middle East footprint
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/com ... 5641.story
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/com ... 5641.story
Security in the Forbidden City across the street from the Great Hall of the People was tight last month when Li Keqiang was installed as premier of China. But the uniformed guards weren't armed with automatic weapons. Instead, they were equipped with fire extinguishers to prevent would-be protesters from self-immolating.
During a recent trip to China, I spent a week talking with analysts about the Arab Spring and the changing strategic dynamic in the Middle East. In surprisingly candid discussions, Chinese experts on that region — many of whom spoke good Arabic — described an evolving view of Chinese involvement in a troubled part of the world the state has long avoided.China imports nearly 55% of its oil from the Persian Gulf, and it has long benefited from the U.S. security umbrella there. One Chinese analyst went so far as to describe the long-standing U.S. aircraft carrier presence there as a "public good." But these days Beijing is concerned about what the Obama administration's pledge to downsize the U.S. presence in the Middle East means for energy and regional security. Closer to home, the Chinese worry about the impact of rising Islamism on the state's restive Muslim population in the gas-rich western province of Xinjiang.China's think-tankers concede that the People's Liberation Army is not yet capable of playing a security role in the Middle East. Consider that the navy's first deployment outside of Asia — a three-ship anti-piracy escort mission in the Gulf of Aden — occurred less than five years ago, and it was reportedly a stretch for the force. And even if the PLA were able to field troops in the region, Washington wouldn't want to "make room" for China in the gulf, I was told.But the Chinese I spoke with grudgingly recognized that the People's Republic would eventually be compelled to start playing a bigger role in the Middle East. As one scholar noted, "China is a powerful state but doesn't act it."While China will not soon contribute in a meaningful way to security in the region, it has been increasing its presence there, including deploying peacekeepers to U.N. contingents in Sudan and Lebanon. It is also laying the groundwork for a more robust regional military presence, establishing its so-called string of pearls network of naval bases that spans from Asia to the Persian Gulf.Beijing is also raising its profile in the region in other ways. In 2009, Beijing appointed its first special Middle East envoy. And since 2011, China has vetoed three U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning Syria's Bashar Assad regime. Likewise, despite significant investments in Iran's energy sector, China has thus far complied with U.S.-led sanctions against Tehran to dissuade the theocracy from developing a nuclear weapon.Beijing is also projecting soft power in the Middle East, making a concerted effort to increase trade and investment, especially in the energy sector. China and Gulf Cooperation Council states are negotiating a free-trade agreement. State-owned Chinese companies are building joint-venture refineries in Saudi Arabia and have secured contracts to construct mosques — including a $1.5-billion shrine — in oil-rich Algeria.This new activism is not motivated by altruism. Beijing's priority is to secure ongoing access to Middle Eastern energy. At the same time, it doesn't want to see Iran go nuclear. But more important, it wants to avoid a fight with Washington over the sanctions.
The lessons of Libya were also sobering. China was later stung by its 2011 Security Council abstention in a vote that condoned international military action to "protect" the Libyan people but was subsequently exploited to topple Moammar Kadafi. Worse, during that revolt, 40,000 Chinese laborers had to be evacuated, and Beijing's consular and political sections in Tripoli were simply not up to the task. In the aftermath of the Libya debacle, China may bolster its diplomatic representation in the region.It is not likely that China will soon contribute to a more stable region. Instead, what the Middle East needs, according to a March 20 editorial by the official New China News Agency, is "helping hands from a responsible and constructive superpower" like Washington. Regrettably, absent a concerted U.S. effort to cajole Beijing to provide grant assistance to struggling Arab states and to support tough U.N. Security Council measures against Iran, the Middle Kingdom will remain a peripheral actor in a turbulent Middle East.After all, China recognizes that America's commitments to Japan and South Korea — states dependent on gulf energy — will long oblige Washington to underwrite security in the Middle East. So even as the Arab awakening has piqued Chinese concerns about stability, energy security and Islamism, for the time being, I was told, Beijing is content to remain a "free rider."
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
India can get close to Japan at its own peril: Chinese Daily - Economic Times
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's just concluded Japan visit continues to rile China, with a state-run daily warning that India could get close to Tokyo "at its own peril" and ties with it "can only bring trouble" to New Delhi.
After attacking Japan yesterday accusing it of attempting forge alliances with India and other neighbours to "encircle China" the ruling Communist Party-run Global Times today came out with an article titled "India gets close to Japan at its own peril".
Written by a scholar from an official think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Affairs of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, the article with aggressive overtones outlines China's concerns over the close relations between India and Japan.
"Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh concluded his visit to Japan on Wednesday. The visit, coming after Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's recent trip to India, led to speculation in Indian media that it was a balancing tactic against China," it said.
Noting that Singh's visit, coming immediately after Li's visit, was coincidence, it said, "however, adding a day to the visit, initially planned for two days, after the recent China-India border confrontation, prompted speculation about India's concerns over China in the visit to Japan," it said.
"Given the long-lasting Diaoyu Islands dispute (Japan calls the islands Sekakus) and China-India border confrontation, there may be some tacit understanding in strategic cooperation between India and Japan," it said.
"However, India should keep sober over the (Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo) Abe administration's vicious intentions of denying the World Anti-Fascism War as a just war. East Asian countries that were the victims of the World War II won't indulge Japan".
"Overheated strategic cooperation with the Abe administration can only bring trouble to India and threaten its relationships with the relevant East Asian countries," it said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
seems to me that the ruling elite have a lot of khujli about any perceived constraints on their growth plans. i also wonder if external threats are a good diversionary tactic to keep the masses away from democratic thoughts... after all, a rise in prosperity does tend to encourage such radical thinking...?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
SSridhar wrote:India can get close to Japan at its own peril: Chinese Daily - Economic TimesPrime Minister Manmohan Singh's just concluded Japan visit continues to rile China, with a state-run daily warning that India could get close to Tokyo "at its own peril" and ties with it "can only bring trouble" to New Delhi.
"Overheated strategic cooperation with the Abe administration can only bring trouble to India and threaten its relationships with the relevant East Asian countries," it said.[/b]
India and Japan have the opportunity to not only change Asia but the entire world in the coming future
China cannot talk about India's relations with the any nation in the world. India has her own reason to align with any nation in the world. China's action has caused great danger to India in the region. China will have to bear the responsibility.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Chinese efforts have been to marginalize Japan in Asia, as well as to keep the image of Japan as a potential "fascist imperialist" country, today aligned to another "imperialist" country USA in a poodle role.
Indian involvement with Japan changes this carefully crafted narrative! So it does a lot of khujli to China!
Indian involvement with Japan changes this carefully crafted narrative! So it does a lot of khujli to China!
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I must say the Chinese, judging by their crude threats, seem to be a particularly uncouth race.
They have not progressed much from their " running dogs" culture.
They have not progressed much from their " running dogs" culture.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The society has been transformed into socially engineered experiment. This may not have been planned at the beginning but over the decades handlers did lose control over the experiment and the result has been uncouth.sanjaykumar wrote:I must say the Chinese, judging by their crude threats, seem to be a particularly uncouth race.
They have not progressed much from their " running dogs" culture.
There has been no corrective mechanism to bring stability and order.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
dont forget that modern china is the product of a horrific war and just as horrific revolution - with massive social upheaval. much of the old order and civility may have been stamped out by the workers and peasants and their more proletarian culture... not something that is easy for foreign observers to spot perhaps?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I find a curious disconnect between Chinese individuals and Chinese government. I know dozens of Chinese men and women, and I find them to be one of the most polite, soft-spoken, humble, and simple people (especially the wimmens) on earth. On the other hand, Chinese goverment comes out to be a global bully, foul-mouthing others and always eager to get into fist-fights. Why would that happen?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
This is precisely the sort of characterization, which some of us make of others, which is extremely damaging to us Indians. Let us say for the sake of argument that it is even 100% correct, that the Chinese are an uncouth people. So, let us ask some questions surrounding this assertion. Compared to who ? The Indians ? I have heard Indians being characterized as such by others, and I have strongly rebutted this assertions in forums big and small, whenever it has been asserted in my presence. However, I do feel that in relative terms, we Indians open ourselves far more to being labelled "uncouth" than even the "Chinese". Why ? Let us examine that.sanjaykumar wrote:I must say the Chinese, judging by their crude threats, seem to be a particularly uncouth race.
They have not progressed much from their " running dogs" culture.
1) The Chinese never became a full fledged colony of the West, in the same way as Indians did. They resisted the West in its heyday and continue to do so. This is no mean feat, and an uncouth people and culture cannot do that. Because by definition, the uncouth cannot get along with anybody including their fellow man, and therefore cannot organize, while to be able to resist outside forces like China did and does, requires a certain sophistication in organization. Chinese with all their faults, of which there are plenty, including the fact that they are somewhat uncouth, but you cannot accuse them of being too terribly disorganized. They have the ability to organize for a cause, which they have demonstrated time and again.
2) When China and India started off as modern nations in 1947-48, China was arguably worse off than India. Let us say, they started on an equal footing. No one can claim, we are on equal footing in any way today. The one advantage Indians claim to have is that we are "secular" and a "democracy". Well, most people at BRF know are fully aware of whether the Indian brand of "democracy and secularism" are an advantage or a disadvantage. An uncouth people cannot accomplish what the Chinese have accomplished. China in a sense has consistently snatched victory from the jaws of defeat and the Indians have consistently snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
Let us not reveal ourselves as uncouth by calling others that and let us not reveal ourselves as people with Hubris. Let us look at ourselves in the mirror. And let us not place the blame for our own shortcomings at the feet of the Chinese. It is not the Chinese, but we ourselves who are responsible for the state that we are in, including the problem of the "Chinese menace". As far ahead as the Chinese are of the Indians at the moment, they still dont have the power to menace us on their own, unless we Indians willingly help them to do so.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
As far ahead as the Chinese are of the Indians at the moment, they still dont have the power to menace us on their own, unless we Indians willingly help them to do so.
I agree with this. But not the rest
I agree with this. But not the rest
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
This is precisely the sort of characterization, which some of us make of others, which is extremely damaging to us Indians. Let us say for the sake of argument that it is even 100% correct, that the Chinese are an uncouth people. So, let us ask some questions surrounding this assertion. Compared to who ? The Indians ? I.....
Before you embarrass yourself further, please consider that there may be more than one recipient of those remarks.
Before you embarrass yourself further, please consider that there may be more than one recipient of those remarks.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Traditionally after the Mongol conquest of China, the Chinese military has been dominated by Manchu, Mongol and North East Asian types. But the working class are mainly the mandarin, South China types who have qualities of soft-spokenness, humility, simplicity, but it was this mandarin group which was led by the Song dynasty which was defeated by the mongol Kublei and in turn he imposed the bully attributes on his conquered, in the sense only the manchus, Yuezhi, Mongol types were given preference in jobs and military over the soft-spoken, 'non-martial' mandarin types. That legacy has been passed on to emperor's guards and then further to PLA types.Ashok Sarraff wrote:I find a curious disconnect between Chinese individuals and Chinese government. I know dozens of Chinese men and women, and I find them to be one of the most polite, soft-spoken, humble, and simple people (especially the wimmens) on earth. On the other hand, Chinese goverment comes out to be a global bully, foul-mouthing others and always eager to get into fist-fights. Why would that happen?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
What specifically in my post do you not agree with and why ?Acharya wrote:As far ahead as the Chinese are of the Indians at the moment, they still dont have the power to menace us on their own, unless we Indians willingly help them to do so.
I agree with this. But not the rest
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Your definition of uncouth will not be recognised by anyone with even passing familiarity with the English language.rsangram wrote:Because by definition, the uncouth cannot get along with anybody including their fellow man, and therefore cannot organize, while to be able to resist outside forces like China did and does, requires a certain sophistication in organization.
Uncouth simply means "a person with bad manners" or "crude behaviour".
sanjaykumar used the word "uncouth" in relation to the threats emanating from the Chinese government.
The behaviour of the Chinese government in relation to Tibet, Ladakh, South China Sea, Senkaku Islands, etc. without any doubt whatsoever displays a loutish and thuggish mindset, which can quite fairly be characterised with the word "uncouth".
For you to suggest that an "uncouth" person is not capable of being "organised" is not even remotely logical.
Being well mannered and being well organised are two uncorrelated characteristics.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
RSangram-ji,
I doubt the Mongols of the thirteenth century took any lessons in good manners as young men and women, but they did conquer more than half the then known world. They kept up a military organisation and staff system that kept their empire on top, and they routinely beat down opponents richer, better armed and armoured than themselves. I doubt strength has anything to do with good manners. And the Chinese, even today, do not possess the soft power to influence decisions in countries around them, or they would not be resorting to the crude threats we are seeing from them. They have not even become the top dog in Asia in many senses, and already they have set off all their neighbours against them. Let us not defeat ourselves before the enemy even comes to us.
I doubt the Mongols of the thirteenth century took any lessons in good manners as young men and women, but they did conquer more than half the then known world. They kept up a military organisation and staff system that kept their empire on top, and they routinely beat down opponents richer, better armed and armoured than themselves. I doubt strength has anything to do with good manners. And the Chinese, even today, do not possess the soft power to influence decisions in countries around them, or they would not be resorting to the crude threats we are seeing from them. They have not even become the top dog in Asia in many senses, and already they have set off all their neighbours against them. Let us not defeat ourselves before the enemy even comes to us.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
While we are talking about the uncouth, coincidentally, here is a news item reported today.
http://news.yahoo.com/analysis-china-tu ... 16385.html
http://news.yahoo.com/analysis-china-tu ... 16385.html
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
@FinancialTimes: China begins US economic zone patrols http://t.co/1BjDJhhsAn
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I think we are reading too much into interested reconstructions of Mongol history. I am not sure where people got the "ill-mannered" characteristics of The mongols. Before adopting Islam towards the middle of the 13th, they were primarily followers of various branches of Central Asian Buddhism, with a strong component still remaining till today of Tibetan Buddhist influence all the way up to the eastern shores of the Baikal. Are we saying Buddhists taught them to be "uncouth/ill-mannered"?
Some of Mongol narratives of the period are available, for example the so-called chingiz diaries, which show a great deal of sophistication in social interactions, and they had their own "manners", not at all dubbable "uncouth". A lot of Mongol uncouthness that we hear about comes from Persian, Arabic, and Chinese sources - who had an interest in showing the Mongols as uncivilized barbarians.
On the other hand, the myth of organizational superiority and un-defeatability - is a bit of a stretch. The height of Mongol power lasted roughly for 150 years. Even within that the period of "one empire" was only the lifetime of Chingiz. The Mongols broke up into regional principalities immediately after his death, and Kublai's dominance of China ended with hi sdeath. The Mongols were chased out soon after - from China. Kublai failed in his attempts to conquer Japan, the Mongols failed to take Vietnam and were devastatingly crushed there. Mongols came into India - after a long interlud eof Persian mixing, Islamization, and Afghanification. Their remnants - as part of the "Golden horde" - in the khanate of Astrakhan were wiped off by Dmitry.
There were no "Mongol" organization techniques that left any lasting impact on any state formation processes, or society, or the army. The way they failed to take care of successiond isputes should be ample proof that they had not developed any profound "organization" techniques. The innovation of mounted archers did not belong onlee to Mongols, and the use of gunpowder based projectile weapons were also not their innovation - the primary reasons for their apparent success.
Some of Mongol narratives of the period are available, for example the so-called chingiz diaries, which show a great deal of sophistication in social interactions, and they had their own "manners", not at all dubbable "uncouth". A lot of Mongol uncouthness that we hear about comes from Persian, Arabic, and Chinese sources - who had an interest in showing the Mongols as uncivilized barbarians.
On the other hand, the myth of organizational superiority and un-defeatability - is a bit of a stretch. The height of Mongol power lasted roughly for 150 years. Even within that the period of "one empire" was only the lifetime of Chingiz. The Mongols broke up into regional principalities immediately after his death, and Kublai's dominance of China ended with hi sdeath. The Mongols were chased out soon after - from China. Kublai failed in his attempts to conquer Japan, the Mongols failed to take Vietnam and were devastatingly crushed there. Mongols came into India - after a long interlud eof Persian mixing, Islamization, and Afghanification. Their remnants - as part of the "Golden horde" - in the khanate of Astrakhan were wiped off by Dmitry.
There were no "Mongol" organization techniques that left any lasting impact on any state formation processes, or society, or the army. The way they failed to take care of successiond isputes should be ample proof that they had not developed any profound "organization" techniques. The innovation of mounted archers did not belong onlee to Mongols, and the use of gunpowder based projectile weapons were also not their innovation - the primary reasons for their apparent success.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The Chinese "uncouthness" - ["thugginess" is rather inappropriate for this was an invention by the Brits to dub a certain Indian group as criminal, and their methods were not "ill-mannered" - simply deceptively murderous. The Chinese are not deceptive about their murderous tendencies.] is almost surely a specifically communist contribution. The communists deliberately ran campaigns of social alienation from practises and customs of the "ancestors" - and there are documents after documents as to how they went about doing this, including regular intervention by the party and mass-fronts to "correct" "regressive/ancient" behaviour, and incentivizing aggressive audacity and bullying, preferably in solidarity groups in young people. It was a political strategy of wiping out resistance to the new identity sought t be imposed by the party under its control, and therefore reducing chances of traditional Chinese resistance "from below" to central authority.