Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[sanjaykumar]

It does demonstrate that Dalrymple knows little of Pakistan and nothing about India.

Indo Pak rivalry in Afghanistan? What is this? Cricket?


Why would India care about Pakistan? As Shashi Tharoor (the only Indian official to my knowledge) put it on the Paki talking heads show: Pakistan has nothing that India wants. What is it about this that westerners can't understand?

India is only doing a Kashmir in Baluchistan, a purely defensive play. And yes they are there, they would be stupid not to be there.

TTP Pakistan is obviously sponsored by serious a intelligence agency-Afghanistan, Iran, USA, India, again India is not above the old ultra-violence.
Why would Pakis be surprised.Why belly ache now? Did they think they were immune from the blowback from Khalistan and Kashmir? Do Muslims in Pakiland believe their own manufactured narratives?

[abhishek_sharma]

Hard on Obama: Steve Coll

Book Review:

The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat
by Vali Nasr
Doubleday, 300 pp., $28.95

[Shanmukh]

Hard on Obama: Steve Coll

Book Review:

The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat
by Vali Nasr
Doubleday, 300 pp., $28.95

The Vali Nasr book is written to make Bill-Bibi look good. While it has some legitimate criticisms against Obama, the book is all about making Hilary seem like a great statewoman, and fantastic State Department head. In reality, her acumen and record are pretty spotty ...

[abhishek_sharma]

basically Hillary picked and trusted Richard Holbrooke, and Holbrooke hired Vali Nasr.

[SSridhar]

You seem to suggest that the US was party to Pakistan's plan of undermining direct (non-ISI-brokered) contacts between the Taliban and Karzai; and that Baradar was arrested because Saleh had convinced him to enter negotiations directly with Karzai. I don't understand why the US did this... was it to once again "placate" the Pakistani concerns that their "interests" in Afghanistan would be secured after US withdrawal?

RD, thanks.

I see three reasons. I would put them in the descending order of importance (from a US perspective). The US is still interested in ensuring that post-2014, Afghanistan does not turn out to be again a pre-2001 Afghanistan as far as the US is concerned. They want to retain some force in Afghanistan after 2014 to monitor that country, maintain listening posts, keep at bay forces inimical to US interests, have a means to quickly intervene if the situation so demanded etc. This, they have realized, is impractical without Pakistani cooperation, especially when Russia bristles with opposition to this and influences CIS, and a China is working behind the scenes without revealing much about its real intentions. They know that the Pakistani masses totally oppose US presence in Afghanistan, a popular view that all Pakistani governments will support. Unlike during Musharraf's regime when he hunted with the hounds and also ran with the hares, popular governments in Pakistan can no longer resort to such practices easily. It was clear even by c. 2010, that the PPP government would have no chance of returning to power whenever its term ended and that Imran Khan (he was becoming very popular around that time) or NS would assume the throne. In fact, the PPP government's fate has been hanging by a thin thread since c. 2010. Both IK & NS, the possible successors were well-known Taliban supporters. NS is a well known entity to the US and completely mistrusted by them. Though IK was unknown yet he was certainly not a friend of the US.

The US had to weigh its options and hedge and they were left with none other than the PA. The gradual shift towards the PA in the US thinking has been happening since c. 2009 though at times it was acrimonious because each was jockeying up for dominant positions in the final countdown. We will shortly see why c. 2009. The change of hands in Pakistan recently coincided with the US preparations to leave and they wanted to ensure that their twin objectives of a hassle-free evacuation of men and material in the 2013-2014 time frame followed by retaining a level of force in Afghanistan securely could not be achieved through an inimical civilian government that would be ruling Pakistan at that time. Since 2011, the US has sought the support of warlords for evacuation purposes and in one such deal, a warlord was reportedly getting a cool USD 2.5 M per month. There was no way an under-prepared ANA with its suspect loyalty or a Karzai who was disliked by the US Establishment (dislike being mutual) could be expected or even trusted to be of any help. C. 2009 was a bloody year for the US forces in Afghanistan. 54 US soldiers were killed in August that year, another 51 in October and then in an audacious suicide attack, 8 CIA officers inside the Forward Operating Base Chapman at Khost including the chief of the base. That took the American deaths in c. 2009 to 304 from the 151 in the previous year. It was also a miserable year for the entire NATO forces as they lost in c. 2009 alone as many personnel as in the entire period of 2001 to 2006. There were threats of withdrawal from many member countries like Italy, Germany, Canada and New Zealand. There were calls within the UK to withdraw which ultimately led to the January 2010 London Conference. Two well-known protaganists of engaging with the Taliban, Richard Holbrooke of the US and Sherard Cowper-Coles of the UK were in position in Afghanistan as special representatives of their respective governments when the London conference was convened in the background of the huge losses in c. 2009. So, an embattled US had to fall back upon the time-tested PA. Naturally, the PA which was concerned about its 'strategic depth' to avenge India, had to be indulged in. Gen. Kayani's words at Madrid, which I had quoted from in the earlier post, are plain and forceful. That was an inflexion point as far as India was concerned. India was ditched. At the same time, the US-Karzai relationship began to be defrayed too. Thus, it was c. 2010 that set the trajectory for the next five years. I would therefore say that rather than 'placating the PA', it was the necessity of the US that determined whatever has happened. No doubt, several incidents took place after 2010 that took the US-Pakistan relationship to breakpoint. Some of them were jockeying up attempts and others might have been genuine.

The second reason could be the need to contain India. I have believed that the US learnt a solid lesson when it went overboard in the 70s and 80s in its relationship with China. This allowed PRC, among other reasons, to consolidate its position and reach the level that it is in today. India is of a similar size and capacity and the US does not want to repeat that mistake. The India-Pakistan relationship must be maintained at a simmering point, but never boil over. That was why the US linked Afghanistan with the Kashmir issue at the prompting of Pakistan. Viceroy Holbrooke was initially appointed as Special Adviser for Af-Pak-Ind region. Soon upon his take over, he said in Brussels in the NATO meeting that India was a key element in resolving the Afghan problem. Many Indians were elated that at last our role has been recognized but it was a ruse to link Kashmir etc with Afghanistan. When that ploy fell through because India forcefully rejected Holbrooke's position vis-a-vis India and even went to the extent of not receiving him at all in new Delhi, another ploy had to be invented and that was the Indian involvement in Balochistan. The Pentagon spokesperson, Ms. Christine Fair, was tasked with supporting the Pakistani falsehood of Indian consulates in Herat and Jalalabad destabilizing Pakistan through Balochistan. By repeating Pakistani assertions that its Afghan interests are dictated by its 'only existential threat', India, the US has implicitly recognized that Pakistani position and has used it so far to deny effective Indian involvement in Afghanistan and beyond.

The third reason could be the local situation in Afghanistan itself. Karzai is hated by the US. His powerful brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, one of the most powerful individuals in southern Afghanistan, was killed at Kandahar by an assassin, one of his own security bodyguards in July 2011 and eight weeks later, the High Peace Council (HPC) Chairman and a possible contender for a Presidential position in c. 2014, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was also eliminated. In between, other high profile Karzai supporters such as Jan Mohammad Khan, a member of Mr. Karzai's inner circle and a former Governor of the Uruzgan province and the Mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam Haider Hamidi were also killed by the Taliban. Karzai was considerably weakened especially with the loss of his Kandahari brother. The deaths of Wali Ahmed Karzai and Burhanuddin Rabbani were clearly meant by the Taliban and Pakistan to sabotage the peace process, eliminate non-Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, and reduce the involvement of those who may not toe the Pakistani line of thinking in the resolution of the Afghan crisis. These assassinated individuals were playing the role of weaning away the Pashtun from the Taliban, a goal with the January 2010 London conference and Holbrooke. But, by the third quarter, this was all gone. As Afghanistan’s Presidential elections in c. 2014 loomed, the fight for the Presidency is likely to be among Muhammad Umar Daudzai, the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan (Pashtun and a former member of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami), Hanif Atmar, a fomer Interior Minister in Karzai’s cabinet (Pashtun), Abdullah Abdullah, a former Afghan Foreign Minister representing the Northern Alliance of non-Pashtuns, Amarullah Saleh, the former Intelligence Chief in Karzai’s government and Ahmed Zia Masoud, the brother of the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmed Shah Masoud. None of them is to the liking of the US for different reasons. They (US) might have therefore preferred a Taliban instead, as alternatives are not viable and Karzai or his supporters are no longer in the good books of the US after c. 2009.

One thing doesn't seem to make sense on the face of it. First the US gives Pakistani generals $1B as a bribe to get the Taliban talking to Karzai; then the US helps Pakistan to close down an alternate channel whereby the Taliban were already talking to Karzai. Why was it in the US interest to close down that alternate channel, which after all was directed at the same end-result of mediating reconciliation between Taliban (allegedly the "70% of Taliban who were non-fundamentalist") and Karzai?

Was it because the alternate channel of Baradar-Karzai (and subsequent alternate channels like Rabbani-Karzai) were created at the behest of the RIC triangle to bypass Pakistan? Does the US, or at least a section of the US apparatus, believe that it is not in the American interest to have a solution in Afghanistan where Pakistan isn't controlling the mediation?

I do not think that the RIC was influential enough to strike contacts between Karzai and Baradar. Karzai had been willing to talk to those Taliban who shunned extremism, accepted Afghan constitution, and was willing to fight the elections democratically. His group was able to strike deals independently with Baradar et al behind the backs of the ISI. Amarullah Saleh was running an efficient intelligence and counter-intelligence setup.

As to why the US should spend money to get the Taliban to the table and yet close down the Karzai-Baradar dialogue, there can be only one answer. That is that the US decided at some point (during the 2009 - 2010 time frame) that they should not encourage anything that was not to the liking of the Pakistani friends.

2) Also, I remember on May 23rd 2011 a TOLO report that Mullah Omar had been killed while Hamid Gul was escorting him from Quetta to North Waziristan. http://www.dnaindia.com/world/1546514/r ... an-channel

Do we know for sure that Mullah Omar is still alive? It is not unthinkable that certain TTP leaders who were former proteges of Hamid Gul might have attacked and killed Mullah Omar, in much the same way as they killed other former mentors like Colonel Imam. Pakistan might be pretending Mullah Omar is alive as a bargaining chip, but in fact they might have him in custody or might have killed him. Following the Baradar episode, it would make sense for the ISI to get rid of all other contenders with enough heft and authority to negotiate with Kabul or Washington on the Taliban's behalf, except for the 100% Aabpara-approved Siraj Haqqani.

The report of Mullah Omar's death was perhaps a psy-ops by Afghan intelligence. There is absolutely no need for the US to suppress Mullah Omar's death if indeed it had happened. Nor, can we expect the Taliban to remain silent on this for more than two years now. There was no follow-up news after that one, which is a giveaway that no such incident took place. Commanders and foot soldiers of the TTP take a bayat on Mullah Omar. Mullah Omar remains a rallying point for the Taliban and even the Pashtun warlords such as the Haqqanis. Mullah Omar wore Prophet Muhammad's robe in Kandahar on one fateful day in c. 1996 and was thus proclaimed as the Leader of the Believers (Amir ul Momineen) by the ecstatic crowd. He is a far more credible Amir-ul-Momineen even to the Pakistani masses than the wannabes like Zia-ul-Haq or a Nawaz Sharif in 1998. A number of Taliban commanders might be susceptible to blandishments but not so long as Mullah Omar lives. The Haqqanis would have reduced Aabpara and the entire Rawalpindi-Islamabad region to ashes had Mullah Omar been killed. Today, Mullah Omar is the head of Al Qaeda and Allied Movements.

[SSridhar]

SS ji - Only bit I disagree with is the conspiracy with the RIC's. They don't trust TSP. They know anything that TSPA signs up to is not worth its paper. I think they are just seeing what Pak can offer - its worth a shot for them.

shyamd ji, what I meant was this. That RIC which was unanimously strident a year ago now appears split as RC on one side and I on the other. China stands to gain enormously from taking Pakistan's help in getting Taliban's protection for its investments in the copper mines at Aynak or possibly for energy transit routes from CAR through Pakistan into Xinjiang or flood Afghanistan with cheap Chinese products post 2014 or contain the Xinjiang unrest by having a foothold in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Russia may have similar aims as China as far as Islamist jihadis go. Besides, Russia and China are teaming up strategically after the Asian pivot has been announced. Russia may choose to piggyback on China's influence with Pakistan over the Taliban. I do not trust the recent talks that China had with us on the Afghan issue. They may be more to walk us down a wrong altar. India remains as the odd-man out in this scenario. China has been warning India not to ally with countries such as the US or Japan or Vietnam. China would see no particular advantage in allying with India over Afghanistan.

[SSridhar]

Acharya, Virendra, Agnimitra, Thanks.

Ramana, for some reason, after the templates were auto upgraded by Google, I have difficulties in posting on Pak-watch.

[ramana]

So SSridhar the death of OBL had less impact on TSP and expalins why US is not going after Mullah Omar after Abortabad raid.

- It will destabilize TSP like nothing else.

BTW the whole Mullah Omar episode reminds me of John Buchan's spy story of "Green Mantle"
where a British spy dons a Mullah robes and leads the faithfool on a jihad during WWI.

[Prem]

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06 ... ew-office/
US envoy: Administration 'outraged' over Taliban's handling of new office

The U.S. representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan said Monday that the Obama administration was "outraged" over the way the Taliban opened its new office in Qatar last week. The opening of the Doha office was meant as a big first step toward peace talks, and a possible peace deal, in the Afghanistan war. But the Taliban last week angered Afghan President Hamid Karzai by using their flag and calling the office the "Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan." Karzai objected to the wording of its name, saying it was tantamount to the establishment of a rival government office, not a political office. U.S. envoy James Dobbins echoed his concerns on Monday. "We protested and we asked them to take corrective measures and they took them," he said, according to AFP. "We were outraged ourselves because it was inconsistent with the assurances we had been given and the assurances we had given." The Taliban have since removed the offending sign and lowered the flag, though Taliban leaders are also objecting over the stand-off.
"There is an internal discussion right now and much anger about it but we have not yet decided what action to take," Shaheen Suhail, the Taliban's spokesman in Qatar told The Associated Press in a telephone interview. "But I think it weakens the process from the very beginning." A Qatar Foreign Ministry statement said the Taliban had violated an agreement to call the office the "Political Bureau of the Taliban Afghan in Doha." The Obama administration also said the U.S. and Qatar never had agreed to allow the Taliban to use that name on the door.
But Suhail said the incident has frustrated and angered some within the militant movement who said the Taliban have been meeting with representatives of dozens of countries and holding secret one-on-one meetings with members of Karzai's High Peace Council on several occasions, always under the banner of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. "Now the process is being weakened at the beginning and not being given a chance," he said. "This is very bad for the Afghan people, for the international community." In Kabul, a member of the government's negotiation team said it was still prepared to begin talks in Qatar and said the removal of the sign and flag was a positive sign. Meanwhile Dobbins arrived in Doha on Saturday where U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was attending meetings on Syria. His presence suggested that the U.S. remains interested in talking with the Taliban despite the recent flap. Suhail said the Taliban had not been notified of talks with Dobbins on Saturday but he advocated for cooler heads to prevail. "Everyone should save the process. Give a chance to the process. In one day everything cannot be resolved," he said. "This is a very secondary thing and not important. I am also surprised that it should derail the process."

[RSoami]

India is only doing a Kashmir in Baluchistan, a purely defensive play. And yes they are there, they would be stupid not to be there.

[ramana]

...

Why would India care about Pakistan? As Shashi Tharoor (the only Indian official to my knowledge) put it on the Paki talking heads show: Pakistan has nothing that India wants. What is it about this that westerners can't understand?

India is only doing a Kashmir in Baluchistan, a purely defensive play. And yes they are there, they would be stupid not to be there.

TTP Pakistan is obviously sponsored by serious a intelligence agency-Afghanistan, Iran, USA, India, again India is not above the old ultra-violence.

Why would Pakis be surprised.Why belly ache now? Did they think they were immune from the blowback from Khalistan and Kashmir? Do Muslims in Pakiland believe their own manufactured narratives?

sanjaykumar, MMS at Sharm -el-shamless challenged TSP to show Indian involvement in Balochistan and no one took him up. Only Christine Unfair in her less sober moments pushes the line of Indian consulates in Afghanistan supporting Balochistan rebels.
That line is to pretend to support TSP while droning them in Afghanistan.

Who is supporting Balochistan is not my problem so long as they cause pain to TSPA@.


Shashi Tharoor might have been polite in his interaction, India does have very legitimate interests in Afghanistan.

The biggest is the very existence of Afghanistan will cause takleef to TSP meddling.


Same with TTP. They don't need any outside support for its part of Pashtun civli war. The TTP are non-sarkari Pasthuns figthing for self determination under and Islamic flag.


Last point I agree. TSP is reaping the whirlwind for the sowing the Khalistan and Kashmir terrorism. Also called blowback.


The keypoint is Dalrymple and other fellow "reverse watermelons"* are facing the takleef and whining in media.


*reverse watermelons = Liberal/Left on the outside and green inside.


I worte this in Dec 2001 after fall of Taliban

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... amana.html

Indian interests in Afghanistan can be divided into security, political, economic and miscellaneous.
The security interests can be further divided into internal and external. The worsening internal security situation in Jammu and Kashmir has coincided with the rise of the Taliban. The existence of a client regime in Afghanistan had allowed Pakistan to move ISI run terrorist into Afghanistan, outside the range of Indian security forces. Pakistani terrorists were further reinforced by foreign elements that have taken part in the war against the Soviets. Additionally, the Taliban had provided aid and shelter to criminals like the hijackers of the Indian Airlines plane IC 814. Hence the Taliban were closely involved in insurgencies and terrorism directed against the Indian state and its people. Not surprisingly, the closure of terrorist camps across Afghanistan is top priority for India. Furthermore, the narcotics trade originating in Afghanistan is used to fund the ISI's covert operations against India and the cutting-off this source is a key Indian objective. This also reduces the drug supplies to the underworld and has ripple effects in the Indian society. The external security is impacted in an indirect manner. Pakistan was hoping to create 'strategic depth' in Taliban controlled Afghanistan. This was meant to stage their reserves in Afghanistan out of reach of Indian armed forces. In addition it was able to divert troops towards the Indian border taking advantage of a friendly regime in the West. The presence of an assertive regime, which puts Afghan interests first, would relieve the pressure on Indian borders. It would reduce the room for strategic maneuver available to Pakistani forces.

In addition to the security interests there are political interests. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state. It has Sunni Pashtuns in the south and Tajiks, Uzbeks in the North, and Shia Hazaras in the centre. A composite ethnic state can exist only with representative government. If Afghanistan succeeds it will be a model for the Islamic world and should be supported as a global effort. Afghanistan is the gateway to Central Asia. A radical regime in Afghanistan could export its brand of beliefs and destabilize Central Asia and the newly emergent republics of the post Soviet era. This region is the home of the last great energy finds in the world and destabilization here would effect energy prices everywhere and impact economic growth needed for India to take its rightful place. The British drew the Durand Line, between present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan and it was in effect till the last decade when the treaty lapsed. It has not been renegotiated and could be a contentious cause between the two states. At a minimum this issue will preclude their coming together for a common cause against India.

India’s economic interests are no less significant. After the destruction wrought by the Soviet takeover, the civil war for control between Taliban and the Northern Alliance and the US bombing campaign to dislodge the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden, reconstruction is major priority. India can help in this reconstruction and rebuild the infrastructure. Entire segments of the economy have to be rebuilt - communications, transport, education, health care and civil administration and military training. Even if the pipeline does not come through Afghanistan, the presence of a moderate regime in Afghanistan will enhance the flow of oil, which is essential for economic stability. Other interests include cultural and historic ties with the people of Afghanistan, which go back long in time. There is no need to wax romantic about these but they are not insignificant - Tandoori cuisine, Kabuliwala moneylenders immortalized in story by Tagore and Balraj Sahani in film. It is heartening that the songs that the Afghans sang after the liberation of Kabul are those from Bollywood – India’s film industry.

Successive Indian governments have been quite aware of these interests and sought to advance them in spite of the limited scope for such moves. The main thrust was to support the central regime in order to ensure that the country does not split along factional lines. This support was misunderstood by the mujahadeen mistook this to be an endorsement of the Soviet takeover and it kept India at a distance after the Soviet withdrawal. Fortunately India has been more engaged and sensitive to the needs of the Afghan people. It’s unwavering support of the country’s legitimate government since 1992 has gone a long way in persuading the Northern Alliance of its sincerity.

Some fool expert thought I was GOI minion!!!!

[shyamd]

shyamd ji, what I meant was this. That RIC which was unanimously strident a year ago now appears split as RC on one side and I on the other. China stands to gain enormously from taking Pakistan's help in getting Taliban's protection for its investments in the copper mines at Aynak or possibly for energy transit routes from CAR through Pakistan into Xinjiang or flood Afghanistan with cheap Chinese products post 2014 or contain the Xinjiang unrest by having a foothold in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Russia may have similar aims as China as far as Islamist jihadis go. Besides, Russia and China are teaming up strategically after the Asian pivot has been announced. Russia may choose to piggyback on China's influence with Pakistan over the Taliban. I do not trust the recent talks that China had with us on the Afghan issue. They may be more to walk us down a wrong altar. India remains as the odd-man out in this scenario. China has been warning India not to ally with countries such as the US or Japan or Vietnam. China would see no particular advantage in allying with India over Afghanistan.

SS ji, My take is different. I think they'll talk with TSP to see whats on offer but don't think they'll take it up. I'm confident both Rus and PRC view TSP guarantees as worthless and I can't see them agreeing to any deal with TSP. Even if they do - how long will it last? 2 or 3 years? Won't change much in the long run.
As for Chechens - at the moment they are heavily deployed in Syria and growing in numbers. Russia is going to face problems no matter what. Drugs and terror are the biggest threats here for CAS and Russian security. I just can't see any of these groups going away in the long run based on a deal. They are gonna fight no matter what and they'll use bases/networks in Afg to achieve their objectives.

The Russians are trying to set up a CSTO - NATO type force for counter terror. Also SCO are trying to set up a force. India is expected to be contributing to the joint forces (if it materialises). US isn't going anywhere, they are looking to base themselves in Herat in a large way.

Pivot - I know publicly they have announced Rus-PRC alliance - lot of articles coming out in the Russian press denying that they are forming an alliance with PRC. US will be in that region as long as Azeri's stay on the US side (which they are eager to be on -just today I heard they are trying to sell themselves to the Hill as a key ally against Iran). Azeri's are the cork of the (oil) champagne. Others can't sell much to west without Azeri support. I don't think we have reached a state of pushing Rus & PRC together yet in a serious level.

India will be able to influence afghan affairs (particularly Northern Alliance side who aer rearming) as long as Iran and Rus is on side.

[ramana]

All an old BRM article by Laxman Bahroo,MD on Taliban circa 2002

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... ahroo.html

We had a lot of good hakims.

[ramana]

Pioneer
LINK

Beginning of the endgame

Friday, 28 June 2013 | Jyotsna Bakshi | in Oped


Is there any chance that the Taliban will change heart and work towards peace? Will their mentors agree?

The Afghan endgame prior to the scheduled withdrawal of the US-Nato troops in 2014 has begun to unfold. On June 18, the leading responsibility for maintaining the security of Afghanistan was formally handed over to the Afghan troops. The foreign troops present in the country will hereafter play only a supporting role.

The US and other Nato countries are keen to cut their losses and exit Afghanistan. The shortest and least expensive transport route to and from Afghanistan is through Pakistan. The northern route, called the Northern Distribution Network, passing through Russia and several Central Asian states, is longer and more expensive. The NDN was made functional by the US to reduce its total dependence on Pakistan. The fact remains that the US-led Western countries need Pakistan's support to ensure the smooth and safe withdrawal of nearly 1,00,000 troops, support staff and vast amount of equipment from Afghanistan. Pakistan is cashing on this to clinch a deal with the US.

The Taliban leadership under Mullah Omar, called the ‘Quetta Shura’ is well ensconced in Pakistan's Quetta city under the protection of Pakistan's military and Inter-Services Intelligence. Pakistan, therefore, is in the best position to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.

For more than a decade, Pakistan has perfected the art of hunting with the hounds by joining the US-led war against terror in Afghanistan as its non-Nato ally, and running with the hare by supporting the Taliban insurgency. As a result of Pakistan's support, the Taliban have not only survived, but have also grown in strength. Militant groups that are fighting in Afghanistan and are involved in cross-border terror acts in Jammu & Kashmir are regarded by Pakistan's military establishment as “strategic assets” for furthering Pakistan's interests at the expense of its two neighbours. Pakistan has persistently sought “strategic depth” in Afghanistan in a bid to counter India from a position of relative strength.

However, the terror groups nurtured by the Pakistani establishment have become so powerful that they threaten the very survival of Pakistan's socio-political order. The spectre of Pakistan's Talibanisation looms large. Large areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are beyond the control of the Pakistani military and the civil administration. The Taliban have destroyed girls' schools and killed women teachers in these areas.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a loose alliance of militant groups known as the ‘Pakistani Taliban’, is pitted against the Pakistani security forces, with the aim of establishing a hardline Islamic system in the country. Pakistani rulers are following a dual policy of supporting the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network responsible for insurgency in Afghanistan, while fighting the Pakistani Taliban which challenges their authority within the country. No doubt, Pakistan's military-political elite would not like the extremist groups to establish dominance in their own country.

Reports have come of late that the Government of Punjab Province ruled by Mr Shahbaz Sharif, brother of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has given a grant-in-aid of Rs61 million to Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the parent organisation of the dreaded terrorist outfit, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, headed by Hafiz Sayeed, the Mumbai 2008 carnage mastermind. Pakistan's provincial Government has also allocated a sum of Rs350 million to Jamaat's Markaz-e-Tayyeba to set up a knowledge park there.

Apparently, Pakistan is trying to buy peace with terror groups within the country. At the same time, it is working overtime to ensure that the energy and ambition of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network aligned with the latter are directed towards wresting control of Kabul. The Taliban are hardline Sunni extremist groups, whose support base is limited to the Pashtu-majority communities of southern and eastern Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a heterogeneous and multi-ethnic country. The Taliban are well-entrenched among the Pushtun communities in the south and east. Despite their mutual rivalries, the ethnic groups living in northern Afghanistan formed the Northern Alliance in the past to fight the Taliban. The Northern Alliance may be resurrected if the Taliban imposes itself by force on the whole of Afghanistan. The present Constitution of Afghanistan, based on an inclusive representative democratic system, provides for the diverse people to live together and build on these foundations as a united country. In fact, President Hamid Karzai has even urged Mullah Omar to contest elections and come to power through democratic means. Any political dispensation that can keep the country united and bring peace to the war-ravaged nation should be based on tolerance and recognition of minority rights, respect for human rights and gender equality.

The million dollar question is: Will the Taliban tiger change its stripes for attaining greater acceptability within Afghanistan and the international community? Are the mentors of the Taliban within the Pakistani establishment willing to exert their influence or do they think that it is still possible to buy peace at home and export terror to neighbouring countries?

(The writer is ICSSR Senior Fellow and a former India Chair Professor at Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

[shyamd]

Ramana ji and SS ji - you'll enjoy this article

Brig Qadir on Mulla Baradar’s role today http://t.co/qeTwVXtfiT via @etribune #Afghanistan

[ramana]

Confirms a few things:

Baradar is Durrani sub-tribe of Poplazai
Omar is a Ghilzai.

From what I know Omar is a Ghilzai like Lodi etc.
He is not any cousin of Poplazai Karzai.
I too have my Afghan contacts.

Kabul area is brefit of Pasthuns.
What is this guy smoking?
Isn't he the Bofors high angle fire in Kargil guy?

Even the Tajik/Uzbek/Hajara Afghans all will accept only Popalzai Pashtuns as rulers.


For reference sake please post the full text and the comments if you can.

[SSridhar]

Kurshid on talks with the Taliban - Business Line

US-Taliban talks

On the fallout of the US withdrawal next year from Afghanistan on India, Khurshid said Washington has assured that the talks with Taliban will stay within the “red lines” drawn for the purpose.

“When (US Secretary of State) John Kerry was here, he told us that as far as our reservations are concerned, no step will be taken that will harm our interests. Red lines have been drawn and we agree with them. Those (Taliban) who come to talk will believe in the constitution, they will down their arms and snap ties with al Qaeda, if they have any.

“If they remain within these lines – the US has time and again said they will – we think the talks can progress.

The basic thing which we have all agreed upon is that the talks should remain in control of Afghanistan as it is their internal matter,” he added.

Khurshid said the government has had detailed discussion with the US and Afghan President Hamid Karzai on the issue of talks with Taliban.

“We have had a detailed discussion with the US on the issue. We also talked about it with Karzai when he was here.

We have spoken to other countries as well, like Saudi Arabia and the UK.

“Right now, nobody knows whether the talks (between the US and Taliban) will succeed. Even the US has not expressed confidence that these talks will move forward. It is an attempt,” he said.

Khurshid said some things happened during the inaugurating of the Taliban office in Qatar, which were not liked by some people.

“We are (now) told these have been rectified,” he said.

[SSridhar]

US Diplomat's Afghanistan Peace Theory Baffles New Delhi - Devirupa Mitra, New Indian Express

There is a feeling of deja-vu in the South Block corridors as visiting US special representative on Af-Pak James Dobbins brought back a frequent narrative among American officials that the mess in Afghanistan is a consequence of Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

“Any improvement in Indo-Pak ties will almost automatically improve the Afghanistan situation,” Dobbins told reporters here on Thursday.

He arrived in New Delhi on Wednesday and had separate meetings with PM’s special envoy S K Lambah and Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai.

Dobbins’ remarks would have given led to flashbacks for Indian observers. This is a pet theory in influential circles in Washington and is peddled out at regular intervals -- if only India was willing to go an extra mile by agreeing to resolve the Kashmir imbroglio, Pakistan would not be interested in meddling in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

The statement by Dobbins comes in the wake of an essay published by the Washington-based think tank Brookings Institution. “The hostility between India and Pakistan lies at the heart of the current war in Afghanistan,” wrote popular historian William Dalrymple, who has recently published a book on the first Anglo-Afghan war.

The advocacy of this theory is significant as it comes at a time when the US is trying to reach a political settlement with Taliban, before foreign troops start leaving the war-ravaged country from next year.

Those efforts are temporarily stalled due to the Taliban office in Doha displaying the flag and plaque of ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ - that led to Kabul quickly pulling the plug on negotiations for a security pact. Washington, of course, feels that Islamabad is key to pushing the Taliban and its various factions to the table.

During his visit earlier this week, US Secretary of State John Kerry was quick to soothe Indian concerns on the role of Taliban, the Haqqani network and by default, Pakistan in the reconciliation talks.

These views were reiterated by Dobbins, who asserted that Taliban needs to adhere to the redlines before the talks resumed.

“In an agreement, they (Taliban) need to improve on cessation of hostilities, respectfully attend the Constitution and go about severing its ties with al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organisations,” Dobbins said.

Despite allegations by Pakistan that Indian consulates foment terror across the border, the image of India in Afghanistan, so far, is that of a “generous donor”, with a bilateral assistance program of over $2 billion.

In fact, Afghan Education Minister Ghulam Farooq Wardak is currently on a visit to India, as New Delhi is one of the largest providers of education scholarships to Afghan citizens under various programmes.

[ramana]

So Dalrymple article was in concert wtih US State Dept initiatives to tar and feather India for Afghan mess.

Even when India was no where in 1990s the TSP created Taliban and that led to 9/11. Looks like the US SD has diplomutts running their embassies.

[SSridhar]

Ramana ji and SS ji - you'll enjoy this article

Brig Qadir on Mulla Baradar’s role today http://t.co/qeTwVXtfiT via @etribune #Afghanistan

shyamd, tks.

[SSridhar]

Britain's Cameron in Afghanistan to push for peace talks - ToI

British Prime Minister David Cameron flew into Afghanistan on Saturday to try to reinvigorate stalled peace talks with the Taliban and reassure Afghans that foreign troops will not cut and run next year.

Cameron's visit to British military bases in southern Afghanistan came four days after the Taliban attacked buildings near the presidential palace in Kabul and the Afghan headquarters of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), setting back already shaky attempts to end 12 years of war.

That attack came a week after US and Taliban representatives had attempted to meet in the Qatari capital of Doha, a session that was cancelled amid objections from the Afghan government.

British officials said Cameron was keen to boost political stability ahead of a presidential election next year which Western diplomats hope will result in the first peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan since 1901.

Britain, whose troops currently number 7,900, is in the process of reducing its forces and removing equipment ahead of the end of the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission next year.

"We want a political solution as well as making sure we have a security solution," Cameron told reporters.

"What we have done in Afghanistan is we came here to stop it being used as a base for terrorist activities. That has been and is successful.

"What we (now) need to do is build up the Afghan armed forces and at the same time make sure that the politics of Afghanistan enable everyone in Afghanistan to play a role in the future of their country. We are making some progress there."

The Taliban's statement that they no longer wanted Afghanistan to pose a threat to other countries or to be a haven for terrorism was encouraging, he added.

Separately, a senior military source said Western troops would need to remain in the country as part of a "follow-on mission" up until 2020.

Cameron's visit comes 11 days after a ceremony marking the start of the final phase of the handover of nationwide security responsibility to Afghan forces.

Dubbed "milestone 2013" by Nato, the event will lead to the departure of all Nato troops serving in Afghanistan at the end of next year.

Nato and its partners are racing against the clock to train Afghanistan's 350,000-strong security forces before then, though questions remain over how well the Afghans will be able to tackle the insurgency in the face of high casualty numbers.

The source said Western troops would need to undertake a mission after 2014 that would last "three to five years", while a senior diplomatic source conceded that some of the gains the West has notched up since 2001 were "reversible".

[svinayak]

So Dalrymple article was in concert wtih US State Dept initiatives to tar and feather India for Afghan mess.

Even when India was no where in 1990s the TSP created Taliban and that led to 9/11. Looks like the US SD has diplomutts running their embassies.

This fictional historian and his article is being promoted by Pak/ISI and their supporters DC.
This is a geo political plan to change the region for along term objectives.

The period 1975-1990 is the anti soviet strategy which brought in Iran revolution, Afghan war and Pak radicalization. These are directly related to policies of the western govt including US under Reagan and Bush. This was also the trigger of the SUnni rival against the Shia with radical Islam as an answer to bring political power to the regimes. From North Africa to Pakistan all military govt are supported as part of the global containment of the Soviet Union

From 1990 to 2001 is the policy of appeasement of Pak terror and Al Quaida terror in the entire region. Pak becomes the terror capital of the world and US pretends ignorance and surprise on 911.

From 2001 to 2011 Bin Laden capture and killing is the period of US military operation which increases the region Jihad temperatures. This is being fought as Muslim Christian war with US mili losing its war objectives and unable to bring stability to Af Pak. Pak is now increasingly becoming uncooperative with US and the west.

Now the policymakers are the peddling the fiction that India is connected to all the problems

[member_20292]

This is what winning looks like.


They could have won. They could have won in Vietnam. They could have won in Somalia. They could have won in Lebanon. They could have won in Afghanistan.

America knows how to fight wars.


Anyhoos, India has no core interest in Afghanistan. Best for the Pakis and Afghans to continue to slaughter each other for another ten years only without American interface-mano a mano. That should crystalise the Afghan objective of reclaiming the lands up to Attock. Currently the Pathans are ambivalent about Afghanistan-they may have contempt for the Panjabi Muslim but they know Afghanistan is even more hard-scrabble and primitive than Pakistan.

Amreeka and Parat need to encourage the love of Pathans for their fellow Pashtuns. A busy Pakistan will be no threat to anyone but itself.

Boss; not agreeing or disagreeing with you, simply stating my views here:

1. Victory in a war means meeting the objectives. America got Osama (their version of Badal) got many other jihadis and their goats, threw out the Taliban, cut the Pak Army and ISI down to size, so much so that naPak was able to have democratic elections for the first time in its history,

2. Kiyani now says that the main threat to Pak is internal, not external.

3. All said and done, more peace in India.

Therefore, US got many of its objectives, and helped India (without taking much money from us) gain many of it.

More power to the US, I say, if it helps India achieve so much peace. I mean, Pak Army is going to have its hands full to the brim for the foreseeable future; Pakistan Taliban and the ANA as well as the remainder of the American army, the drones, will see to that.
If Pak has its hands full on its western border, India is cool with it then. Good for us.

[abhishek_sharma]

Afghan Lessons: Culture, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency

[brihaspati]

Boss; not agreeing or disagreeing with you, simply stating my views here:

1. Victory in a war means meeting the objectives. America got Osama (their version of Badal) got many other jihadis and their goats, threw out the Taliban, cut the Pak Army and ISI down to size, so much so that naPak was able to have democratic elections for the first time in its history,

2. Kiyani now says that the main threat to Pak is internal, not external.

3. All said and done, more peace in India.

Therefore, US got many of its objectives, and helped India (without taking much money from us) gain many of it.

More power to the US, I say, if it helps India achieve so much peace. I mean, Pak Army is going to have its hands full to the brim for the foreseeable future; Pakistan Taliban and the ANA as well as the remainder of the American army, the drones, will see to that.
If Pak has its hands full on its western border, India is cool with it then. Good for us.

Kayani said the following a couple of months ago : later than the "internal>external" thingie.

“The Pakistani Army is fully committed to the cause and as always standing with the nation. I assure you that we will succeed if we remain committed to the basis for creation of Pakistan and remain steadfast as a nation.”

“Let me remind you that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and Islam can never ever be taken out of Pakistan,” he said.

However, General Kayani said Islam should always remain a unifying force. He assured that regardless of odds, Pakistan Army will keep on doing its best towards common dream for a truly Islamic Republic of Pakistan envisioned by the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal.

Speaking about peace in the region he said: “Pakistan is a peace loving country. Our quest for peace is essentially based on a genuine desire to improve our lot and that of our future generations. Let no one see it as a weakness.

I am not sure BR will like giving a link to the source. But you can find it if you want. You still want to claim things have changed? As for war and victory or defeat :issues are much more complicated. No country or society is defeated until it acknowledges defeat. The Talebs have not. Moreover the US intervention has simply basically destroyed the non-Taleb forces and strengthened the hand of Pak in AFG. Talebs and Pindi based generalissimos are not really that detached to think of a "hands full" problem. The problems came from the non-Taleb AFG enthusiasts - and with Taleb dominance now facilitated by the Gulf islamist regimes and USA - the non-Taleb opposition to Paki control will be tackled.

Talebs were created jointly by the Saudi alliance, USA and Pak. No essential deviation from that relationship.

[member_20292]

Talebs were created jointly by the Saudi alliance, USA and Pak. No essential deviation from that relationship.

haan haan, theek hai.

Now if they want to menage a troika amongst themselves, more power to them. Keep us (India) out of it, I say!

[brihaspati]

Talebs were created jointly by the Saudi alliance, USA and Pak. No essential deviation from that relationship.

haan haan, theek hai.

Now if they want to menage a troika amongst themselves, more power to them. Keep us (India) out of it, I say!

Sweet dreams. Who is the common convenient whipping boy for all three? India. USA+KSA both think they cannot do without Pak. India is not a threat to the extent that PRc can become - because of Indian rashtryia weakness for the theology, and internal fear of the dynasty based regimes about the "majority" - and anything that India does to growl can be neutralized by leaning over more to China.

Talebs have a very clear idea of their prophetic role towards a Caliphate. To the north and west lies Iran and Russia - Talebs need them, or at least not have them against. To the East, they have China - they need China and cannot antagonize them. To the South and South-east they have India - the softest target of them all. Forever in trepidation and paralysis over the love-hate relation with Islam, manipulable easily by leftist or "liberal" jargon, this is one country that can be played like a harp by any transnationally supported islamist movement, who will be able to pull far above their weight.

[member_20292]

^^
Not. As long as we are there

[CRamS]

Therefore, US got many of its objectives, and helped India (without taking much money from us) gain many of it.

mahadevbhu, I'd like to smoke whatever it is that you are. Haven't you been reading all the articles posted here? The crux of US end game in AfPak, confirmed by all the statements both direct and indirect coming out of DC is that TSP's so called "anguish" visa vi India must be quenched, and all of the problems in AfPak are because of so called "India TSP rivalry". If you call this helping India, I don't know what hurting means. Basically, US is going to get an "honorable" withdrawal, and then US can play their India TSP equal equal (which in reality means TSP++) games. That is the end game we seeing set in motion.

[brihaspati]

^^
Not. As long as we are there

"we" where? which "we"? that "we" as in India? or in the US?

[ramana]

I would advise folks not to troll.

Thanks,

ramana

[vivek_ahuja]

Pakistan angers Afghans by suggesting Taliban share power - minister

KABUL (Reuters) - Pakistan has floated the concept of an Afghan power-sharing arrangement between Kabul and the Taliban as part of a peace talks "end game", Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Ershad Ahmadi said on Monday, a suggestion met with outrage in Kabul.

The idea was raised in a Friday meeting between Pakistani national security adviser Sartaj Aziz and Afghan ambassador Umer Daudzai, Ahmadi told Reuters. It involved a form of federalism and ceding power in some Afghan provinces to the Taliban.

The suggestion dashed hopes of a reset in the relationship between the South Asian neighbors following the election of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif last month.

It also suggests a visit by British Prime David Cameron to the region at the weekend to promote the Afghan-Pakistan relationship as well as peace talks with the Taliban had failed before he had even arrived.

"We believe this federalism is a means for the Pakistanis to achieve what they could not achieve through their proxy (the Taliban) on the battlefield," Ahmadi said.

In Islamabad, Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman Aizaz Chaudry denied any suggestion of ceding territory had been made during the meeting.

"It was a courtesy call during which the adviser and ambassador also discussed bilateral relations. No reference was made to ceding of provinces to Taliban," Chaudhry told Reuters.

Pakistan has a considerable influence over the Afghan Taliban leadership, based in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta.

It is seen as crucial to U.S. and Afghan efforts to promote peace in Afghanistan, a task that is gaining urgency as NATO troops prepare to withdraw from the country by the end of 2014.

Afghanistan has long accused Pakistan of playing a double game regarding the 12-year-old war, saying its neighbor, facing a Taliban insurgency of its own, makes public pronouncements about peace, but allows elements of its military to play a spoiling role.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai also voiced his concern about Pakistan's motive in the peace process during a Saturday news conference with Cameron, saying that "delivering a province or two to the Taliban" would be perceived as an invasion by the Afghan people.

Pakistan was not immediately able to comment on what was said by Aziz or its view of Ahmadi's assertions.

Ahmadi also said the ceremonial opening of the Taliban office in the Gulf state of Qatar's capital, Doha, which raised angry protests in Kabul that the office had the appearance of a government-in-exile, was part of a Pakistani plan designed to increase the insurgents' international prestige.

"There are elements within the Pakistani government who have a grand design of using the peace process as a means to undermine the Afghan state and establish little fiefdoms around the country in which the Taliban - its most important strategic asset in Afghanistan - play an influential role," he said.

Before Afghanistan suspended talks in Doha, U.S. officials had said they would have stuck to an insistence that the Taliban break ties with al Qaeda, end violence and accept the Afghan constitution, including protection for women and minorities.

During their 1996-2001 reign, the Taliban banned women from education, voting and most work, and they were not allowed to leave their homes without permission and a male escort.

Ahmadi said despite hopes the new Sharif administration may curb meddling in Afghan affairs, Kabul now felt the civilian administration was aiding the double game played by the military and the country's powerful intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

"While we believe there are elements of the military and the ISI who endeavor to weaken the Afghan state, their narrative seems to be getting some kind of buy-in from other state institutions and that's a major concern," he said.

In particular, the ISI had played a significant role in the events in Doha, Ahmadi said. Part of the reason Kabul was so outraged by the opening of the Taliban office was the use of symbols, including the Taliban flag, that had not been approved as part of the peace deal.

Soon after that flag was taken down, some or all of the Taliban delegates held a meeting with ISI officers in Doha, Ahmadi said.

"We do monitor these things and we know there have been regular interactions," Ahmadi said

[ramana]

The report is downplaying the UK role. From the timing and sequence its UK plan that the TSP is pushing. Its a modification of the Blackwill Plan B which wanted to cede defacto control of Southern Afghanistan to the Taliban. The UK plan is to give forma ie dejure cession of Southern Afghanistan (a minimum of 2 provinces based on Karzai statement) to the Taliban.


BTW Sartaj Aziz is the takla FM of Badmash in Kargil. Cant expect much better from him.

[Philip]

"Fak-Ap" in Af-Pak! Britain to blame?

A cock-up by British diplomutts is supposedly responsible for the latest "Fak-Ap" in the Afghan imbroglio.RElations between the Afghanis and the Pakis are steadily going downhill and India has to act fast to shore up the weakening Afghan regime with arms which it wants.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/ju ... mid-karzai

Afghan-Pakistani ties in a tailspin, with botched British diplomacy blamed
Pakistan points finger at Hamid Karzai, but many analysts believe diplomatic impasse stems from summit at Chequers

"It was clear it had not been a success," said one diplomat from a third country that was briefed by the entourage of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, soon after Chequers. "The [Foreign Office] gave a very different readout in London and elsewhere. They thought they had discerned a strategic shift in the Pakistani attitude to Afghanistan. But the Afghans were using words like 'zero result'."

With the return of the prime minister to the fraught subject this weekend during a whistle-stop regional tour taking in Kabul and Islamabad, the February summit at Chequers offers lessons about the limits of Britain's powers of persuasion when it comes to the complex realities of what foreign policy wonks like to call "Af-Pak".

With hindsight, the official joint statement produced at the end of the summit now seems ludicrously ambitious. It committed all sides to take steps to "achieve the goal of a peace settlement [in Afghanistan] over the next six months".

But since then, Pakistan has shelled positions on the Afghan side of the disputed border and Pakistani newspapers are full of articles disparaging Karzai. The Afghan president was particularly incensed when a senior Pakistani official was quoted in the international media in March as saying Karzai was the "biggest impediment to the peace process" and that he was "taking Afghanistan straight to hell".

Kabul has responded with its own war of words. In May, hundreds of people in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar staged protests, complete with chants of "Death to Pakistan". Bismillah Khan, the Afghan army chief, is said to have despaired at Karzai's emotional outbursts. One diplomat reported that he has complained his president appears to want "a war with Pakistan".

These cross-border hatreds are a major stumbling block for hopes of a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan is believed to have a veto over any such deal in effect because of the strong influence it has over the Afghan Taliban, whose headquarters are in Pakistani territory.

In an attempt to piece together what went wrong at Chequers, the Guardian talked to senior officials from both sides. Some blame the lack of normal diplomatic niceties for causing friction. Karzai is said to have taken umbrage at one discussion where he found himself sitting opposite Hina Rabbani Khar, then Pakistan's foreign minister, and not his opposite number, President Asif Ali Zardari.

A number of diplomats involved in Afghan and Pakistani affairs say they thought it extraordinary that neither Adam Thomson, the British high commissioner to Pakistan, nor Richard Stagg, the ambassador to Afghanistan, were present. The seasoned diplomats may have been able to smooth ruffled feathers.

But it was a politician, David Cameron, who led the discussion. The brainchild of the prime minister, the trilateral summit was launched amid sky-high hopes that it might start a process that could fix all the outstanding problems between the two countries. But his chairing of the meeting angered the Afghans, who thought Cameron often took the side of Pakistan in discussions.

Honest broker

"We have many in Kabul who think that London has an inherent pro-Pakistani bias, in the same way the US is not seen as an honest broker in the Middle East because of its pro-Israel bias," said Davood Moradian, an analyst in Kabul and confidant of Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Karzai's national security adviser.

"The reason Karzai accepted Cameron's invitation was that he thought the prime minister would attempt to exert some control over their errant child, Pakistan."

The difficulties went deeper than protocol, however. The Afghans left the meeting angry with what they believed were unacceptable demands by Pakistan, which Kabul fears still clings to its old policy of trying to dominate Afghanistan to prevent it making claims on its territory, or giving a perch for India to threaten Pakistan.

One of Afghanistan's senior policymakers told the Guardian that the Afghan side was taken aback by the frankness of the Pakistani team. "For the first time real clarity emerged," the government adviser said. "Some politicians, when they see clarity, they cannot digest it. Some senior politicians are still struggling with that reality."

According to him, that new reality was expressed by Zardari, who articulated his country's concern at the "unproportional increase of the Indian footprint in Afghanistan," he said. They also reportedly pushed for Afghanistan to recognise the Durand Line, the border drawn up the British Raj at the end of the 19th century, which deprived Afghanistan of swaths of territory. Accepting its status would be political suicide for any Afghan leader – even the Taliban regime of the 1990s refused to accept the demands of Pakistan, then its closest ally.

Khar, the Pakistan foreign minister, said such claims were "classic examples" of how Afghanistan "misinterprets everything we say". "I don't think we even used the words 'Durand Line'," she said. "What we do want to talk about is better border management because you cannot afford to have 50,000 people cross every day, unsupervised, unwatched and creating havoc in both countries."

Khar, who said she was "exasperated and discouraged" by the failure of the Chequers summit, said Afghanistan's leaders had been guilty of "playing to the public gallery" and not showing "seriousness of purpose and approach".

But the Afghans see it differently. "We thought we had an understanding with Pakistan that their contribution to the peace process will be non-conditional," the Afghan official said. "In Chequers we found that was not the case."

Pakistani officials respond with their own list of complaints about Kabul. Foremost is the Afghans' habit of blaming Pakistan for almost every big attack launched by the Taliban: many Afghans believe they are directed by Pakistan's military intelligence service. Pakistan has responded with counter-claims that Afghanistan supports and harbours groups attacking Pakistan.

At Chequers, Pakistan demanded an end to "safe havens" they believe the Pakistani Taliban enjoy inside Afghan territory and the extradition of a senior Pakistani Taliban commander held by the Afghans.

Pakistani intelligence officers even claim to have intercepted phone calls "from Kandahar" ordering an attack on 15 June claimed by separatists in Baluchistan province on one of Pakistan's most revered national monuments – a colonial-era house where the country's founder spent much of the last few week of his life.

Pakistan makes no secret of its anxiety to match the influence of India, which in October 2011 signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan. Kabul is dragging its feet on a similar deal with Pakistan, demanding progress on its areas of concern first.

Pakistan is also determined to become involved in training the Afghan security forces, but Kabul has consistently turned down offers of places for its officers at Pakistani military academies.

Greatly adding to Islamabad's fury, in March a senior Afghan official was quoted claiming that any Afghans who received training in Pakistan would be regarded as spies and traitors when they returned home. At the same time Afghan officials are disillusioned by what they claim are broken promises made in 2011 to help facilitate a dialogue with the Taliban.

These promises included the release of Taliban prisoners held by Pakistan, support for a conference of senior Afghan and Pakistani clerics in Kabul that it was hoped would have issued a religious fatwa condemning the Taliban tactics of suicide bombing. Although some prisoners were released, they were minor players of whom few people had heard. Afghan officials have questioned whether some of them were insurgents at all.

Pakistan has also held on to Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of Karzai's fellow tribesman who was arrested in Karachi in 2010 after he attempted to start a secret dialogue with Kabul.

The conference of clerics was torpedoed by Tahir Ashrafi, a senior Pakistani mullah, who declared the Afghan Taliban were waging a legitimate jihad against foreign occupation.

And Afghan officials claim Pakistan did nothing to facilitate dialogue, although Pakistani officials deny this. "We had high hopes from this process," the Afghan official said. "But it was a total failure."

Afghan suspicions that Pakistan is not committed to helping the Kabul government talk directly to the Taliban is a key factor poisoning the relationship, a western diplomat said. The Taliban has long refused to negotiate with Karzai, whom it claims heads an illegitimate "puppet" regime.

Last week, Pakistan's official statement welcoming the opening of the Taliban office in Doha merely said it welcomed "the start of direct talks between the US and the Taliban", making no mention of any role for the Afghan government.

Khar said she has been "very, very disappointed" by events since Chequers because her government had worked hard to patch up differences after the open contempt the former president Pervez Musharraf used to show Karzai.

Poisonous roadblock

Recently, however, Pakistan's newspapers have carried prominent stories quoting unnamed foreign ministry and military officials savaging Karzai, who was described as a "poisonous roadblock" to peace. One Pakistani military official was quoted as saying that the US now had no choice but to "accept Taliban as a legitimate power in Afghanistan, talk to them, [and] accommodate their main demands even it meant abandoning assets like Karzai."

A former Pakistani diplomat said the country's army had reasserted full control over Afghan policy by taking advantage of a weak Pakistani foreign ministry during the two-month tenure of a non-political caretaker government before elections on 11 May.

During that time, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief, represented Pakistan at an important meeting with John Kerry, the US secretary of state, and Karzai in Brussels.

Pakistan's new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, has not appointed a foreign minister and appears far more interested in India than Afghanistan. "Sharif has allowed this issue to be run by the military but they just don't have the patience required to deal with a man like Karzai," the former diplomat said. "Karzai is the head of state, not a colonel in the Pakistani army who can just be given orders."

Pakistan's army is impatient for the US to negotiate directly and quickly with the Taliban because the military are desperate to split the Afghan Taliban from the Pakistani Taliban, said Syed Talat Hussain, a journalist who wrote one of the recent articles reflecting Pakistan's new priorities.

"No nation or leader in the world would accept the kind of dictation [Pakistan] is giving Afghanistan," he said. "But the current Afghan leadership is not a real sample of the sentiment of Afghanistan."

Given the vexed history of a complex dispute and the deep distrust between the two sides, the Kabul analyst Moradian said he had been astonished by the "British naivety in expecting a resolution to an entrenched conflict in just six months".

"Chequers was a British version of a south Asian social institution: the forced marriage," he said. "It was an attempt to force Pakistan and Afghanistan together. But like many forced marriages, it was never likely to last long."

[abhishek_sharma]

The Doha portent: Bruce Riedel

[SSridhar]

From the above,

The Pakistani generals believe time is on their side in Afghanistan, that America has already lost the war and that their clients will prevail.

[SSridhar]

Nightwatch Comment:

Afghanistan: For the record. The head of the Afghan army, General Sher Mohammad Karimi said that fighting in Afghanistan could be stopped 'in weeks' if Pakistan told the Taliban to end the insurgency. He told a reporter, "The Taliban are under Pakistan's control - the leadership is in Pakistan." Comment: Blaming Pakistan is not new, but the general's point has merit. He did not say that Afghanistan's Western allies have tolerated this condition since November 2001, apparently in return for using Pakistani infrastructure for resupplying forces in Afghanistan. No drone strikes or other attacks have targeted Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura, which could have decapitated the Taliban leadership, disrupted Taliban finances and their explosives supply chain and demoralized the fighting groups inside Afghanistan.

{If the latest drone strike is the last or one of the last few strikes, that means that the Haqqanis have been also preserved.}

[a_bharat]

Can someone explain what is behind India's change in stance regarding talks with Taliban? Is it
- resigning to the inevitable
- FM shooting off his mouth, or extending his chamchagiri to US

Does India have any options to influence the course, or have to just accept whatever comes out from others' machinations?

[SSridhar]

a_bharat, if you recall, SM Krishna himself said the same thing after the London Conference from which India was excluded. This is not the first time.

[a_bharat]

You are right; googling for India's position in SM Krishna's time, it appears that the stance is nearly the same: the talks must be afghan-led (not pakistan-brokered), no external interference. In practice though, India is accepting these talks even though they don't seem to be afghan-led and are driven by external forces.