Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

rnikhil · Post by **rnikhil** » 28 Jun 2013 13:11

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/jk-terrorist ... 3-245.html

Srinagar: Terrorists carried out a grenade attack on a CRPF bunker in Sopore in Kashmir on Friday. The attack comes just two days after terrorists targetted an Army convoy in Bemina in Kashmir, killing eight soldiers.
The grenade missed the intended target and exploded on the road, an official said. Official sources said the explosion caused panic among the passersby who ran for their safety.
The area has been cordoned off and a hunt has been launched to nab the terrorists, they said. No terrorists outfit has so far claimed responsibility for the attack.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 29 Jun 2013 16:51

Opportunity for Indian defence planners to buy US equipment too cheap

The massive disposal effort, which U.S. military officials call unprecedented, has unfolded largely out of sight amid an ongoing debate inside the Pentagon about what to do with the heaps of equipment that won’t be returning home. Military planners have determined that they will not ship back more than $7 billion worth of equipment — about 20 percent of what the U.S. military has in Afghanistan — because it is no longer needed or would be too costly to ship back home.

We can buy $28 bn worth of military equipment at scrap rate or a little more. an opportunity ,expected as not to be told to the Indian taxpayer.
I will be a surprise if Indian media shows it to the public.

member_26965 · Post by **member_26965** » 29 Jun 2013 21:10

MRAP can be used in internal policing duties.

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 02 Jul 2013 12:46

http://www.rediff.com/news/report/top-a ... 130702.htm

On Monday, more than half the Indian Army’s top commanders were shifted around in what many top generals and analysts consider a motivated and unnecessary reshuffle. The crucial Northern, Western and Central Commands now have new commanders, as do the Integrated Defence Staff and the army’s training command.

Officers at army headquarters say the Army Chief, General Bikram Singh, has personally initiated this reshuffle to push through a promotion policy in which quotas, not merit, would govern the selection of brigadiers and generals.

The Indian Army, like professional Western armies, has traditionally selected its senior officers based on their career records alone. Until recently, that is, when vacancies in the rank of Brigadier started being distributed between arms (infantry, artillery, armoured corps, etc) on a “pro rata” basis, ie, in proportion to the number of officers in each arm. Now, Gen Singh wants to extend this to the next rank, ie, Major General.

Officers who want meritocracy at senior ranks call this “Mandalisation” of a professional army. The official term for it is “pro rata” promotion.

Senior most among those shifted out is a resolute opponent of “pro rata”, former Central Army Commander, Lt Gen Anil Chait. At the Army Commanders’ Conference, the army’s only consultative check on the chief’s otherwise arbitrary power, Chait had pushed for the rollback of “pro rata” for brigadier vacancies, and blocked its extension to Major General rank. But Chait had been sidelined with his posting as chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. He is no longer an army commander.

The “pro rata” policy has been propagated by an unbroken series of army chiefs from the infantry and artillery, which benefit most from “pro rata” -- Gen N C Vij (infantry); Gen S Padmanabhan (artillery); Gen J J Singh (infantry); Gen Deepak Kapoor (artillery); Gen V K Singh (infantry); and Gen Bikram Singh (infantry).

The infantry has the largest number of officers, and already benefits from “pro rata”: a corresponding number become Brigadiers, regardless of merit. Extending “pro-rata” to Major General rank would extend reservations up the promotion ladder. Benefiting similarly is the artillery, the second-largest arm.

The big loser is the armoured corps -- the army’s key strike arm -- that has traditionally produced more Brigadiers and Generals than its small officer strength might suggest. Another loser would be the mechanised infantry, whose high-calibre Brigadiers would be denied promotion because of its small quota of major general vacancies.

Replacing Chait in Lucknow is the newly promoted Lt Gen Rajan Bakshi, who was in command of the Leh-based 14 Corps, where he successfully handled the recent Chinese intrusion in Daulat Beg Oldi. Bakshi, an armoured corps officer, was well placed to take over command of the Udhampur-based Northern Army, on Lt Gen K T Parnaik’s retirement on Sunday. But that would have meant two armoured corps army commanders -- Chait and Bakshi -- would have opposed “pro rata”. Replacing Chait with Bakshi, and posting Chait as CISC, has defanged that opposition.

Apparently, Singh cited Bakshi’s armoured corps background to block him from commanding the Northern Army, involved primarily in infantry operations. This, after Bakshi successfully commanded the infantry-predominant 14 Corps, including handling the Daulat Beg Oldi intrusion.

The army said it was not considering the extension of “pro rata” to Major General rank. It said Lt Gen Anil Chait’s posting as CISC “has been in the organisational interest.”

During his eventful last days in Lucknow, Chait had earned plaudits for his handling of the recent Uttarakhand natural disaster. But ministry of defence officials said the army chief had told Defence Minister Antony that Chait was close to Mulayam Singh Yadav and, therefore, must be shifted from Lucknow.

Farsighted infantry and artillery generals like former Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen (Retd) Rostum Nanavatty, believed that “pro rata” would drag the army into mediocrity. “I opposed this proposal at every forum. How are we going to get the best commanders if we are allocating quotas at the highest rank? Every step we take in this direction will be a mistake,” said Nanavatty.

To command the Northern Army, another well-settled Army Commander, Lt Gen Sanjiv Chhachra, who has commanded the Western Army for almost a year, has been shifted to Udhampur. Chhachra is an infantryman, as are the Eastern Army Commander, Lt Gen Dalbir Singh; and Lt Gen Gyan Bhushan, who heads the South-western Command.

Even after sidelining Chait, the “pro rata” policy might still encounter resistance if army commanders from the mechanised infantry dig in their heels. These are Lt Gen Philip Campose, who has taken over the Western Army at Chandimandir; Lt Gen Sanjiv Madhok at the Army Training Command at Shimla; and Lt Gen Ashok Singh, who heads the Southern Army in Pune.

The MoD has the final word on changes to promotion policy. However, it has not questioned or blocked the “pro rata” policy at Brigadier rank.

Wouldnt have happened without GoI consent

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 02 Jul 2013 15:44

abhishek_sharma wrote:Coomi Kapoor's Column

Conciliatory chief

Unlike his predecessor General V K Singh, Army Chief General Bikram Singh has few points of disagreement with the Ministry of Defence. Some circles link this to his desire to become the first person to hold the post of permanent chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee, proposed by the Naresh Chandra panel. Singh is due to retire in May 2014. The Chief of Staff Committee post would have a two-year tenure.

Does this mean that Gen BS will get an extension of 2 more years if this happens?

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 02 Jul 2013 15:45

He is aiming for this -> permanent chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee

Rampy · Post by **Rampy** » 02 Jul 2013 15:54

krishnan wrote:He is aiming for this -> permanent chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee

Modi should make a statement reading our defense corruption and Army in particular.. and may be also throw a statement on making gen V K Singh a MoS. That would stall many stupid changes now

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 02 Jul 2013 19:15

Someone writes unsubstantiated bull-sh1t and we have people going apesh1t...sigh!

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 02 Jul 2013 20:24

Rampy wrote:
krishnan wrote:He is aiming for this -> permanent chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee
Modi should make a statement reading our defense corruption and Army in particular.. and may be also throw a statement on making gen V K Singh a MoS. That would stall many stupid changes now

Gen V K Singh as MoS , now that is an out of the Box idea. It will stump many.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 02 Jul 2013 20:50

This GOI has done all it can to constantly drag even the few finer institutions remaining with it, into mediocrity.

>>>The MoD has the final word on changes to promotion policy. However, it has not questioned or blocked the “pro rata” policy at Brigadier rank.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 02 Jul 2013 22:07

--Divide and Rule--

when those who rule fear more of being despatched, they divide more..
its not hard to find out why upa fears the army when there is huge rise in politician's corruption..
we can hope and we can try,so that army within all its ranks remains united and the best force in the world..

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 02 Jul 2013 22:20

That ReDiff article is unadulterated nonsense. It is putting a political spin on matters that are not.
Besides CIDS needs a forceful person anyway.

If all this leads to CDS like posts more power to them.

Also keep the politics away from the thread.

jamwal · Post by **jamwal** » 03 Jul 2013 08:06

Found this very interesting blog

http://majorgauravarya.blogspot.in/

EK FAUJI KI DIARY

What is it about the olive green uniform that makes it so special? What is so different about this piece of cloth that we associate strength, honour, faith, courage and integrity with it? Maybe because you cannot just buy and wear it. You have to earn it with blood, sweat and perhaps a few tears of humiliation. And when you are man enough to wear it, they don’t just hand it over to you. It comes with the blessings of a billion Indians. And stories to tell your grandson on cold, winter evenings.

The Wolf Pack

Disclaimer: "The Wolf Pack" is a work of fiction. The incidents mentioned in this particular story never happened. But most of the people mentioned in this story are real and are still serving in the Indian Army. I have deliberately written about them because it is important for the young people of India to have heroes to emulate. Heroes, mind you. Not the rabble you see on television reality shows. I am talking about real heroes. I do not claim to represent or even have knowledge of the entire Indian Army. I am just writing about my heroes....the officers & men of 17th Battalion, The Kumaon Regiment.

Chapter – I: Run Rabbit, Run

Day & Date: 23 June, 1996
Location: Tibri Cantt, Gurdaspur (Punjab)

The bile in my stomach started to rise and this time, it would not stay down. It came up rushing from my gut as I ran towards the toilet and came gushing out of my mouth. Whiskey and other sins lay splattered on the floor. Another heave followed by a few more and I was retching on an empty stomach. My head hurt like a goblin had crawled up on me gently without a sound and hit me three millimetres above my temple with the hammer of Thor.

I staggered to my bunk and sat down, reaching for a glass of water. I drank a sip, unwilling to drink more and felt a gentle hand on my shoulder.

“Drink up, Sir” said Capt. Varun Batra, my company 2-i-C (second in command).

“Yes mother” I croaked, taking two more sips.

“Feeling better, Sir?” Varun was all concern.

“Shut up, Varun. My head is breaking into pieces” I countered irritably.

Varun walked to the medicine cabinet and took out two Disprins, poured a glass of water and let the tablets dissolve. He handed the glass to me and waited.

I took a long look at the glass and slowly downed the foul liquid.

“Fifteen minutes, Sir. In fifteen minutes you will be rocking” said Varun. In Varun’s scheme of things, everything which was fine was rocking. If you got a 9 pointer ACR, you were rocking. If you almost got a nine pointer, you were almost rocking. If you were dead, you stopped rocking. The world was divided into those who rocked and those who did not.

We sat in silence and soon the tablets were working their magic. Varun stepped outside and walked across the narrow dirt road to the officer’s mess.

“Mess” he howled.

“Koi hai?” he added in a fake British accent, his take on how a young British officer would have sounded in the early twentieth century.

“Ji sahib” was the immediate response. Out rushed Mess Havaldar Dharam Singh, all of five feet nothing and a middle which would have done a halwai proud.

May be the following belongs in CI ops thread. Surya, Rohitvats; what do you think of it ?

Our tents were pitched at the bottom of a small hill, no more than an undulation in the ground. Covered with grass, it was the ideal place for Anuj and the ‘cancer’ brotherhood to grab a last smoke before sleeping. Suddenly, we heard voices and about a dozen figures started walking down the hill, taking a small track to our right. I got up from my bed in shock and ran to where Anuj and Maj. GC Gaur were sitting. The figures came closer. All were dressed in black dungarees and all were armed. Each person carried an assault rifle and a side arm. I could not recognise the regiment these men belonged to and their weaponry looked strange.

“Are these Rashtriya Rifles guys, Sir?” I asked Maj. Gaur. I had heard about RR people wearing black.

“51 Special Action Group of the NSG. These guys are trained for anti-terrorist operations. The main weapon they are carrying is a Heckler & Koch MP 5 and the pistol is a Glock 9 mm. The sniper rile is a PSG 1. I trained with them at Manesar”, he said.

“But what is the NSG doing in this place, Sir?” I wanted to know.

“That’s beyond your pay grade, son. Now let’s catch some sleep” Maj. Gaur smiled.

We walked back to our tents and prepared to sleep. I could not stop thinking about the dozen black clad soldiers walking down the hill, silently. What was the NSG doing here?

I knew that the NSG was the nation’s premier anti-terror force. It was divided into various operational units. 51 Special Action Group was the anti-terrorist wing. 52 Special Action Group were the anti-hijack people. Both these were drawn from the army. The Special Rangers Group was drawn from the police and the para-military forces and was responsible for VIP security of half the undesirables who comprised of our parliament and state assemblies.

For the superstitious, there are things which are symbols of what may happen, good or bad. A guest at home in the morning is a good omen. A crow crowing at night is the harbinger of bad news. What did a dozen black cats walking down a hill mean?

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 03 Jul 2013 08:31

jamwal

all i can say - not surprised

this is the difference between an IPS led unit and an Army unit

Army based units look to get into the action in some manner to get exposure, experience etc

IPS\police do the training and then follow rules and regulations and waste away

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Jul 2013 09:49

jamwal wrote:Found this very interesting blog

http://majorgauravarya.blogspot.in/

EK FAUJI KI DIARY

This really rocking man, thanks for sharing.

jamwal · Post by **jamwal** » 04 Jul 2013 00:10

Another officer involved in CI operations in J&K wrote a much more detailed blog. His code name was Khalid. You should read that if you haven't done so already.

There is very minor error in this blog. He was stationed in Punch in Jammu division, but repeatedly referred it as Kashmir. Muslim dominated areas of Punch & Rajauri like Mendhar were worst affected by terrorism. Proximity to LoC didn't help either. Traffic on the highway was shutdown after 5 pm or sunset.

Sunderbani which he talks about earlier in his story, is actually a picturesque little place, or at least used to be.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 04 Jul 2013 00:18

jamwal, do you have the url. I couldn't find it.

jamwal · Post by **jamwal** » 04 Jul 2013 01:02

I think I read it on Blogspot too, but here is the Rediff link

http://blogs.rediff.com/kashmirdiary/2006/09/

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 04 Jul 2013 01:52

Aaryan · Post by **Aaryan** » 04 Jul 2013 13:01

jamwal wrote:Another officer involved in CI operations in J&K wrote a much more detailed blog. His code name was Khalid. You should read that if you haven't done so already.

May be you are talking about this.
http://blogs.rediff.com/kashmirdiary/

Murugan · Post by **Murugan** » 04 Jul 2013 13:59

from kashmir diary bomber khan II

In K

The idea when operating covert is to look like civilians to security forces and like militants to the civilians.

Tough job

(The whole diary has been discussed many many moons ago in BRF)

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 04 Jul 2013 18:08

interestingly both blogs went silent as they became realistic

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 04 Jul 2013 18:45

A lot of the topics and frank opinions voiced on some of the actions of COs/brass were clearly too realistic, and may have caused issues for the juniors still in the service. E.g. the career hungry CO who leaves his 25 year old junior to fend for himself in the case of the "killing the priest" story.
They also show a very revealing light into how the IA continues to be structured, patterned on the British pattern, with attendant pros and cons.

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 09 Jul 2013 15:20

X-posting from the LCH and other Helicopters Discussion Thread ... this has potential of adding a new dimension to Army's Orbat and it's offensive/defensive capability.

maitya wrote:The juicy bits in the ToI report Army to get Rudra choppers, armed with missiles and rockets in Aug are:

Induction of Rudras marks a significant boost to Army's endeavour to build its own "mini'' air force. The raising of "aviation brigades'' for each of the 1.13-million strong Army's three "strike'' and 10 "pivot'' corps (each has around 75,000 soldiers) has already kicked off.

The force wants one attack helicopter squadron each for its three "strike'' formations - 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal) — in keeping with their primary offensive role. Moreover, it has plans to induct 114 Rudras for the remaining 10 'pivot' corps.

The force's long-term plans include a squadron each of attack/armed, reconnaissance/observation and tactical battle-support helicopters for all the 13 corps.
So the plan is to have Sqdns at the corps level - while I's thinking maybe it needs to go down to equipping at the division level.
Maybe later when LCHs comes thru, further augmentation will happen - and maybe this aviation brigade/corp formulation in future, incorporates a sqn each of LCH and Rudras for the Strike Corps and 2 Sqns of Rudras/Pivot Corps.

But whatever it is, it's a step in the right direction no doubt.

Plus, the below is also a step in the right direction (though a sqn/Regional or Operational Commands woul have been better):
In addition, the force wants each of its six regional or operational commands to get "a flight'' of five fixed-wing aircraft for tactical airlift of troops and equipment.
But this will generate another round of tug-of-war and turf-war between IAF and Army.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 10 Jul 2013 20:24

^^^Well, this should not come as a surprise.

I had discussed this earlier as well - that each Corps will have a Aviation Bde on the lines mentioned above. Also, one needs to keep in mind that the plan calls for developing capability for air-assault as well; the same is planned as such:

1. Corps - ability to airlift a Company of Infantry
2. Command HQ - A battalion level capability
3. Army HQ - A brigade worth of troops.

So, an Aviation Bde with 1 x Rudra + 1 x LUH + 1 x ALH for each Pivot Corps will meet this capability.

And as I said before, we've not seen the last of Apaches in Indian service. IA will go for 3 x Squadrons to cover the Strike Corps. So, expect another 35-40 Apaches ordered by India.

However, missing in this entire matrix so far is LCH. I expect them to reinforce the Aviation Bde in the IA as they come in.

As per some reports, first Aviaton Bde has been formed in Leh based 14 Corps.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Jul 2013 11:05

Picture from IA FB Page:

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid= ... =1&theater

Check the formation flag behind the officer sitting along with his civilian counterpart - seems to me the formation sign of 56 Mountain Division raised over last couple of years. There have been posting of pics of similar formation sign on BRF from travel forums - I guess this settles the question. Next to it is the formation sign of 3 Corps.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 12 Jul 2013 05:49

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=20263

Hopefully, they have already engaged DRDO with this, and given out enough specs, and participating as a stake holder right from the beginning. I sincerely hope there is no firang involvement here., especially massan components

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 15 Jul 2013 06:09

rohitvats wrote:Picture from IA FB Page:

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid= ... =1&theater

Check the formation flag behind the officer sitting along with his civilian counterpart - seems to me the formation sign of 56 Mountain Division raised over last couple of years. There have been posting of pics of similar formation sign on BRF from travel forums - I guess this settles the question. Next to it is the formation sign of 3 Corps.

Rohit the comment below in the FB page mentions it as "56th Infantry Div"...

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 17 Jul 2013 10:00

Received by email

Nation needs to understand Ethos of Forces: Uttarakhand Disaster- A Test Case

Brig CS Thapa (Retd)

The devastation in Uttarakhand because of cloudbursts that occurred on 15th /16th June and heavy rainfall thereafter is unprecedented. Until June 27, rainfall was nearly 3.9 times more than the average monthly rainfall of 328 mm for June, leaving a heavy trail of death, destruction and devastation in its wake. While official sources give figures of under one thousand dead and around two thousand five hundred missing, the toll, as per conservative estimates, is likely to exceed five thousand. The devastation saw 154 bridges and 1520 km of road destroyed and upwards of 2232 houses wrecked. Over one hundred thousand pilgrims found themselves trapped as the Army moved in to rescue the stranded.

The Army’s Area Headquarter, located at Bareilly reacted before even being asked to do so. Commanded by a three star General Officer, it mobilized on 17th June and relocated to Dehradun from where it started functioning early next day. Simultaneously, it passed orders to its units to relocate immediately for rescue missions. The units responded with typical military precision and alacrity, underlying in the process the true nature of military leadership, which leads from the front. As an example, on the 17th itself, after an aerial reconnaissance, a unit was ordered to move to Kedarnath, establish its command post there and report readiness to the Area Commander. This occurred at a time when the civil administration was not even fully aware of the scale of devastation. The commanding officer moved forthwith, reaching Kedarnath with his unit and reported readiness by the 18th complete with command and control elements to the Area Commander. The
Commanding Officer was the first to reach Kedarnath. Paradoxically, at this time, his counterparts in the civil administration were being evacuated!

The message from military commanders was clear. At a critical time, four flag officers were available at dangerous places in the mountains of Garhwal where civil administration had ceased to exist. This helped greatly in the subsequent rescue missions with decision makers available on the spot. The Commander-in-Chief of the Central Army also provided a sterling example of front-line leadership, when on 26 June he walked with the stranded passengers, leading them to safety. How many leaders walk their talk?

The Army’s reaction was quick and efficient. While exact figures are not available due to security reasons, estimates suggest initial deployment of 5000 or more troops. Thereafter, based on requirement the strength went up to around 8000 to 8500 troops. With more assistance sought in the form of support for engineering tasks, such as, construction of bridges and repair to roads the strength will only go up. The Air Force and Army Aviation contributed nearly 40 helicopters, civil aviation nearly a dozen or fewer helicopters. The ITBP initially contributed a battalion, building this up later to two battalions. This may further increase by another battalion for force strength of over two thousand personnel. The NDMA contributed around 300 personnel in the initial days of the rescue and now its strength stands further increased. The tragedy has shown up the top-heavy nature of the NDMA, overstaffed with high-ranking officials sitting in Delhi, but woefully
short of functional elements at the ground level. That the Army moved in as first respondents instead of the NDMA tells its own tale.

The Indian state deploys the Forces whenever the chips are down. The forces too deliver, but whereas, the forces understand the concept of civilian supremacy the Indian state has paid scant attention to understanding the ethos of the Forces. This ethos - of Service before Self, leadership from the front, mission accomplishment at all costs, and transparency in all its dealings have been under acute national media scrutiny. Continuous live media coverage by the print and visual media has brought home to the Indian public both the unfolding tragedy and the role the Armed Forces are playing in its mitigation. Not a blemish has come on the Forces, which speaks volumes of their ethos. This factor is little understood, as the Services shy away from presenting their achievements. For them, mission accomplishment remains the single greatest aim and not its publication. This has led to a wide gap and the soldiers’ ethos of a three hundred old organization is
brushed under the carpet of babudom. In 2012, a large number of us retired veterans took part in a seminar organized by Uttarakhand Sub Area Head Quarters on the role of the Army in the floods of 2011. It seems the civil administration learned no lessons. It slept over the findings of the seminar and today relies solely on the Army and the Central Police Forces such as ITBP for disaster management as that is the ground reality so visible today.

A weakness of the Armed Forces lies in its recording of the events. Each unit will dutifully record the role it played in disaster mitigation in its war diaries and subsequently a consolidated list of lessons learned will emerge. The ethos of the Forces will treat this as merely a part of duty and the collective history of this great achievement is unlikely to be recorded. The Forces need to record in full, the collective effort of commanders and troops at all levels so that the nation remembers and knows what took place at such a tragic time in our history. Till 27June, the relief effort was 1820 sorties, 15, 311 evacuated by air and nearly 1, 05, 000 evacuated by air and land. Its time Dehradun Sub Area records this collectively for posterity and not lessons learned alone. The forces need to let the nation know how they surmount almost impossible odds in service of the country as this will inspire our youth to join the Forces. The Service ethos of
Service before Self leads the military to maintain a stoic silence and treat all its actions as mere rendition of duty. But we need to record the great work done so that the nation knows, and holds up such example to the rest of the country.

The forces have a commitment to the task, the fierce single-minded obsession to accomplish the mission even at the peril of one’s life. The details that the Army goes into are painstaking, with an obsessive eye for detail. Every contingency is planned for, troops briefed, events rehearsed and special troops earmarked. In this case, people were stranded at inaccessible places and special troops were sent. As an organization the Army mitigated the risks to ensure that those rescued were not put at risk. Self-containment is another requirement for the forces. Each time there is a flood or a disaster, when all else are coming out the soldier is going in. Who looks after his sustenance? Evidently, he has to look after himself, and the military leadership, with its eye for detail, ensures that the soldier is self-contained for the mission. This gives the soldier the freedom to devote all his energies to the task. In addition, the soldiers are briefed of the
need to be patient with the people they are assisting as these people are at the end of their tether. This makes for better understanding and compassion.

Locating people stranded at various places remained a challenge. In addition to locating the stranded by helicopters, the Army sent many young officers on foot patrol to locate pilgrims. It built bases up ahead to ensure that the choppers spend more time on doing the job at hand and less on commuting up and down. It is running hospitals and with the border roads is ensuring that the road axis clears up earliest. The forces are deployed in large number and assisting the civil administration in command and control functions which remains a vexed problem for the latter. The poor state of infrastructure has been pointed out by the Army, but perhaps the time has come to be more forceful in talking about such issues lest we be caught wrong footed again.

The ability to multitask without affecting the main missions shows the solid foundation of the Army organization. Today, a web site assists in finding missing people, Army doctors provide medical aid, its units double up as bases sheltering pilgrims, its light helicopters assist in dropping supplies and the Army seamlessly goes about the main task of rescuing stranded pilgrims in a viable period. This sends a clear strategic message to those having nefarious designs because of the poor infrastructure on our border areas that the collective will of its citizens will prevail and the situation stabilized.

The nation however needs to understand the ethos of the soldier to get the best out of him. It must trust the Army’s deep commitment to democratic values and its secular mind set. Most of us veterans have managed troops and presume all is hunky dory. This is not really so as prolonged deployment brings its own sets of problems. The media will highlight just one bad incident, as that is its rightful role. However, the nation needs to understand between the working ethos of the forces and an odd event. A few stray cases cannot be taken as an erosion of the ethos of the Forces, which remains as strong as ever as shown so convincingly in the assistance being provided at Uttarakhand.

Brig Chander Thapa (Retd) is a renowned defense analyst

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Jul 2013 15:45

^^^From what I could gather, the army component came from 9 (I) Mountain Bde at Joshimath and mountain bde of 6 Mountain Division based in Uttarakhand. The Area HQ being mentioned in the article above is UP Area HQ based in Bareilly.

Avarachan · Post by **Avarachan** » 17 Jul 2013 20:28

chetak wrote:Received by email

Nation needs to understand Ethos of Forces: Uttarakhand Disaster- A Test Case

Brig Chander Thapa (Retd) is a renowned defense analyst

The article is posted here: http://www.claws.in/Nation-needs-to-und ... -Retd.html

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 18 Jul 2013 00:24

rohitvats wrote:^^^From what I could gather, the army component came from 9 (I) Mountain Bde at Joshimath and mountain bde of 6 Mountain Division based in Uttarakhand. The Area HQ being mentioned in the article above is UP Area HQ based in Bareilly.

Rohit,

Quick Question, Is 9 Bde Independent? AFAIK, 6 Div has 99 Bde on the Chaubatia-Almora Axis another 69 Bde at the Pithoragarh-Dharchula and also at Uttarkashi-Harsil corridor. That sites the Independent brigade bang in the middle across a very wide frontage for 6 Div.

Vipul · Post by **Vipul** » 18 Jul 2013 00:55

India to deploy 50,000 additional troops along China border.

Boosting Army's war fighting capabilities along the line of actual control (LAC), the government on Wednesday has given the go ahead to the creation of a corps including deployment of 50,000 additional troops along the China border at a cost of around Rs 65,000 crore.

The Cabinet committee on security headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cleared the proposal in its meeting, sources told PTI.

As part of the plans, the around 1.3 million-strong Army is expected to raise the new corps' headquarters at Panagarh in West Bengal along with two divisions in Bihar and Assam and other units from Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh.

Army chief Gen Bikram Singh and IAF chief Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne were also present at the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) for providing any possible clarifications, if any, sought by the CCS members including defence minister AK Antony, external affairs minister Salman Khurshid and finance minister P Chidambaram.

As per the plans, the IAF will also deploy its force multiplier assets such as six each mid-air refuelling tankers and C-130J Super Hercules special operations aircraft at Panagarh.

The Army had sent the proposal in this regard in 2010 but it was returned by the government asking the three services to work together on plans to strengthen their capabilities in that region.

The Army will also get a number of new armoured and artillery divisions along with it to be deployed along the northeast region.

The existing strike corps in the force include the 1, 2 and 21 Corps are all based close to the Pakistan border and are mainly armed to fight a land battle unlike the new corps which will mainly focus on mountain warfare.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Jul 2013 04:57

Rohitvats, So Pangarh as new MSC headquarters along with IAF tankers and QRT aircraft sanctioned. Now we know plans are moving.

Ankit Desai · Post by **Ankit Desai** » 18 Jul 2013 06:56

New armoured and artillery divisions along with it too !

-Ankit

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 18 Jul 2013 07:09

I wonder why Panghar was chosen as the home for MSC, it is far away from AP and with poor infrastructure how will they move the troops! unless the plan is to air lift the troops most of the time

Ankit Desai · Post by **Ankit Desai** » 18 Jul 2013 08:13

VinodTK wrote:I wonder why Panghar was chosen as the home for MSC, it is far away from AP and with poor infrastructure how will they move the troops! unless the plan is to air lift the troops most of the time

People having exact idea can give proper answer but I had similar question in my mind but after looking existed three strike corps's I,II and XI HQ which are aim for Pakistan, other than II corp rest have HQs far away from Pakistan. If we check divisions/brigades HQs and their deployment than we will see that they are deployed relatively close to boarder and at strategic locations that they can move close to border.

Correct me if I am wrong, I think Corps HQ contains only reserves and/or a brigade level strength troops. So, during strike troops won't move from HQ to particular location but they will move from division/brigade's deployment area.

-Ankit

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 18 Jul 2013 09:43

vaibhav.n wrote: Rohit,Quick Question, Is 9 Bde Independent? AFAIK, 6 Div has 99 Bde on the Chaubatia-Almora Axis another 69 Bde at the Pithoragarh-Dharchula and also at Uttarkashi-Harsil corridor. That sites the Independent brigade bang in the middle across a very wide frontage for 6 Div.

Spoken like a true orbat junkie!!!

Yes, 9 Bde is an independent formation. In addition to 2 x Scouts Battalion in the area (Kumaon and Gharwal), has additional infantry battalions. Including an Animal Transport Battalion.

Coming to 6 MD, of the three bdes, two as you've mentioned are in UK. Third bde, IIRC is in Saharanpur with Division HQ in Bareilly. It is Army HQ reserve and tasked for central sector in UK to Kashmir Sector, as the case may be. In 1999, it was initially supposed to lead the effort instead of 8 MD; it was located south of Zojila Pass in Sonamarg area.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 18 Jul 2013 09:54

ramana wrote:Rohitvats, So Pangarh as new MSC headquarters along with IAF tankers and QRT aircraft sanctioned. Now we know plans are moving.

Well, so it is ordained.

No wonder, the PLA generals are squealing like swine...they know the emperor is naked and someone just called their bluff.

What would be interesting to see is the placement of divisions of the Corps and other assets like artillery division and reserve troops. The reports says that the divisions will be in Bihar and Assam.

Placing a division and support assets in Bihar would mean that Sikkim (read Chumbi Valley and Tibetan Plateau) is likely to to be AOR and location in Assam would allow deployment across eastern and Central AP.

However, there is a possibility of a very interesting development taking place - 23 infantry division is based in Ranchi. If the new division of MSC comes up in Ranchi, 23 ID may well move west and be forward deployed in Rajasthan as part of 1 Strike Corps or 21 Strike Corps. And give more teeth to CSD.

Please remember, IA has traditionally being using the cantonment which were left over by the British - and were sited to allow British to exercise control on India. However, something like Panagarh would have been chosen from strategic and tactical mobility perspective.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 18 Jul 2013 09:56

Ankit Desai wrote:New armoured and artillery divisions along with it too !

-Ankit

2 x (I) Armored Bdes have been authorized; one each for Ladakh and Sikkim. No mention of an Armored Division.

Artillery Division for Eastern Command was authorized earlier and I think this is the final approval. In addition, an (I) Infantry Bde each was to be authorized for Uttarakhand and Ladakh sectors - need to keep a look out for news byte for these elements as well.