Indian Naval Discussion

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Jul 2013 15:01

I agree with Singha.Two 45,000t carriers,Vik and IAC-1,plus the Viraat and when she retires,the amphib warship vessels of approx. 25-30,000t will fill in that gap for amphib and ASW ops. in a "swing" role.From IAC-2,the future carriers should be of 65,000t at least.RN studies showed that this was the optimum size of a carrier,giiven launch and recovery sortie rates for multi-role missions,etc. Even if UCAVs materailise within the next 15-20 years aboard IN flat tops, A larger carrier will be able to accommodate larger aircraft.But the critical decision here is that the launch system depends upon the primary aircraft type to be carried. Even the RN had many doubts about the system and finally decided against Cats,being much too expensive and reversed their decision and have plumped for the STOVL version of the JSF for their new QE class.This is probably why the IN has deferred the design of the IAC-2 until they have operated the MIG-29K for some time and evaluated its capabilities.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 20 Jul 2013 16:41

Mig has tortured IAF too much on issues of service and spare parts too much. Even sukhoi did for su 30 but mig has always been a nightmare. Now by 2025+ or well into 2040 I don't know if mig will exist or even will be able to deliver spare parts for 29Ks.

Rafale beats Mig 29 hands down on range plus AESA and availability after every sorty. Though I hope our indigenous carriers will always have only LCAs and AMCAs with maybe cfts like this version of rafales:

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 20 Jul 2013 23:37

WoW!! Those tripple launchers are awesome! Greatest way of adding hardpoints in sleek small airframes.

What are the issues that are preventing LCA team, even in Mk2 version, from pursuing a dual or tripple missile launcher like in above picture? Every time I see that LCA picture with 2 drop tanks, 2 Bombs and 2 missiles the first thing that comes to my mind is that it's fallen short on all 3 counts in that configuration. 2 missiles (WVR or BYR) 2 bombs for ground attack and 2 tanks for getting legs. Although there are many other configurations which are very useful but for a true-multirole plateform airborne with both AA, AG and extra fuel it needs minimum 4 misslies (2 each of WVR/2BYR), 2large bombs and 2 large tanks.

When action starts drop tanks and get cracking and come back home on internal fuel.

A small plateform like LCA with twin/tripple launchers for AA missiles will be a step change in it's capability IMO. Other option is to add 2 hard points at the afy belly for 2 small AA missiles.

titash · Post by **titash** » 21 Jul 2013 02:03

Might have to do with payload and/or the aerodynamic penalty. The LCA is flying with an older generation engine (F404 v/s M88 or EJ2000) and perhaps it's aerodynamic profile and wing area may be unsuited to carry multiple ejector racks...after all each weapon release & clearance sequence will require wind tunnel testing/CFD modelling/live testing.

Personally the sooner the LCA sees squadron service as a replacement in the Mig-21's current job profile, the better. The fancy stuff can wait a few years before testing.

The LCA's role was envisaged as a cheap point defence fighter/close air support aircraft, and it's current weapons configuration fits the bill perfectly. 2x WVR & 2x BVR is sufficient to intercept F-16/J-10 on a strike mission on our territory. Likewise, 2x LGBs are enough to disrupt enemy tank columns and forward air bases.

And of course, let's not forget that there are still 2 Atlantiques and 5-7 Orions that need to be shot down. Why scramble a Su-30 or a Rafale when the LCA can do that job cheaper?

titash · Post by **titash** » 21 Jul 2013 02:16

Philip wrote:I agree with Singha.Two 45,000t carriers,Vik and IAC-1,plus the Viraat and when she retires,the amphib warship vessels of approx. 25-30,000t will fill in that gap for amphib and ASW ops. in a "swing" role.From IAC-2,the future carriers should be of 65,000t at least.RN studies showed that this was the optimum size of a carrier,giiven launch and recovery sortie rates for multi-role missions,etc. Even if UCAVs materailise within the next 15-20 years aboard IN flat tops, A larger carrier will be able to accommodate larger aircraft.But the critical decision here is that the launch system depends upon the primary aircraft type to be carried. Even the RN had many doubts about the system and finally decided against Cats,being much too expensive and reversed their decision and have plumped for the STOVL version of the JSF for their new QE class.This is probably why the IN has deferred the design of the IAC-2 until they have operated the MIG-29K for some time and evaluated its capabilities.

Good point. We will have 4x LPH's in service in the next decade - these will double up as ASW flat tops. However, with the retirement of the sea harrier, and no other VSTOL aircraft planned for purchase, these will be restricted to the amphibious / ASW / AEW role, and cannot provide any fighter cover.

I like the last statement as to why the IN has deferred the design of the IAC-2...it makes sense to operate and evaluate the STOBAR MIG-29K before taking a call on spending billions.

titash · Post by **titash** » 21 Jul 2013 02:17

AoA...100 posts for me

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 22 Jul 2013 16:46

Will this happen? There are many technical hurdles apart from the desire for India to align itself firmly with the US's list of client states and lose its independence.The author also forgets that India also fought with Japan in WW2 with the forces of Bose and the INA.Until Oz gets off its superiority attitude towards India,esp. on India's nuclear-weapon state status,there will be a point beyond which we will not cross.Both japan and China cannot look at us just for being a military counter to China.There must be much more in the relationship,particularly economic cooperation with India,an all round attitude of being a "special friend" before we can act together militarily,something that Independent India has never done with any nation,even the USSR during the Cold War when we were best pals.

http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplom ... on-at-sea/

Strategic Triangle: A Japan-Australia-India Coalition at Sea?

The Naval Diplomat ventured from sweltering New England to sweltering Washington, DC last Friday to explore Japanese maritime cooperation with fellow Asian seafaring powers. Well, cooperation with powers apart from A Certain Large Asian Power Whose Name May Not Be Spoken, anyway.

Hosted by my pals at the Center for a New American Security, the event took place at the Willard Hotel. This majestic edifice, a stone's throw from the White House, is renowned for its lobby. Indeed, the term lobbyist was coined for various advocates' practice of waiting there to intercept government officials and members of America's native criminal class, and, well, lobby for particular policies, federal largesse, or what-not. How's that for a nifty historical footnote?

But I digress (not for the first time). The CNAS organizers, clearly a reckless lot, asked me, the loose cannon, to act as discussant for a panel on maritime cooperation among Japan, Australia, and India. I jotted down a few thoughts for the panel while stranded in Providence awaiting my flight. Here's the gist of them.

Let's start off by consulting the map — never a bad first step when grappling with a wicked problem. Japan, Australia, and India lie along a vast outer maritime crescent enclosing continental East Asia. That external position, plus the long lines of communication connecting the three countries and the potentially contested terrain lying in between, would make working together a trying prospect in times of strife. A loose consortium in peacetime, and for police functions to which no one objects, fine. In competitive times, watch out.

Another thing leapt off the map while surveying the CNAS agenda, complemented by a cursory reading of history. The second panel reviewed Japanese relations with South Korea and the ASEAN countries. If the outer-crescent powers are liberal seagoing republics, the inner crescent is home to an assemblage of (mostly) continental nations. One shares a land frontier with China, another, South Korea, a border with China's ally North Korea. And, with the exception of Thailand, the interior countries all fell to Imperial Japanese conquest within living memory. That imperial legacy hangs a millstone on contemporary Japan's relations with Koreans and Southeast Asians.

Back to Japan, Australia, and India. Beset by distended sea lanes, convoluted geography, and the myriad other stresses the strategic setting imposes, Tokyo, Canberra, and New Delhi must attach considerable political value to combined naval and military action in order to justify the costs, hardships and political headaches such a coalition would entail. Mutual interests, and in particular mutual threats, are the most dependable adhesives that bind together alliances and coalitions. The more compelling the common interest, or the more deadly the menace, the greater the likelihood that the collaborative impulse will override the differences that work against such joint enterprises as policing the commons or facing down hostile powers.

Let's not forget that maritime cooperation in far-flung oceans constitutes a secondary effort for each one of these countries. It's doubtful that, say, the Bay of Bengal will ever constitute a primary theater for Japan. Likewise for India in the East China Sea. Clausewitz counsels against embroiling yourself in secondary operations unless you stand to gain something "exceptionally rewarding," and unless you enjoy "decisive superiority" in the main sphere of action, and thus can spare the resources for lesser pursuits without undue risk.

Does Japan enjoy decisive superiority in Northeast Asia? Less and less so, which leads us to Clausewitz's dismal verdict on alliances and coalitions. You never attach the same value to someone else's cause that you attach to your own, he advises. Common practice is to back up your partners halfheartedly. You send a middling-sized force to the ally's aid, and look for the exit when the going gets tough.

All of this suggests that the new partnerships now forming up along the Asian periphery may find it easy to do easy things together, but that relations will come under enormous strain when the time comes to do hard and perilous things.

On the bright side, certain social, cultural, and ideological affinities may supply lubricant to smooth out bilateral or tripartite relations among the parties. Japan, Australia, and India are constitutional republics whose governing arrangements would gladden Immanuel Kant's heart.

Australia and India both fought Imperial Japan seventy years ago, but unlike Korea and most of Southeast Asia, neither succumbed to Japanese arms. The reflexive suspicions marring Japanese cooperation with one-time subject nations such as South Korea or Vietnam are muted in dealings among Tokyo, Canberra, and New Delhi.

Far be it from me to counsel despair about maritime coalition-building. The effort is worth undertaking, and Tokyo should pursue it with vigor. Let's work together by all means, but let's not make the mistake of assuming that collaborative arrangements will fall into place of their own accord or manage themselves. "Natural" or "special" alliances are few and far between, and those few tend to come about through traumas like world war — not something coalition managers should wish for.

Managing multinational endeavors takes attentive care and feeding, no matter how like-minded, democratic, or just darned nice the partners may be.

And on that dour note, let the effort begin!

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 22 Jul 2013 17:16

the desire for India to align itself firmly with the US's list of client states and lose its independence

A very, very biased point of view. A typical Russian view. Very shallow thinking.

I had predicted this alignment ages ago (recall I used to call Japan Yapan then - out of irritation with that nation) (and Aussie selling uranium after all that noise is not surprising too).

This should happen - it is in India's interest and that is all there is to it. It has nothing to do with the US or anything else.

The best example of Indian independence I can provide is the Indo-Iranian relationship. Another is the Indian withdrawal from some US-Japan-India naval exercises.

Also, as a BTW, the Russian behavior when NATO or whatever it was that went into Iraq was an eye opener for India too.

India is calibrating her position, that is all that is happening. (In the middle of bad corruption at the political level, "elections", etc.)

member_20317 · Post by **member_20317** » 22 Jul 2013 18:41

chetak wrote:A good read.

At What Cost a Carrier?

Are you supporting a 'carrier is not desirable for IN' position?

A carrier is a weapon to stop the war from starting unlike a ASBM which is meant to take out this very capability and unleash a war. It is essentially a floating air base (and since usually the super powers have only one or two bases per friendly country) the carrier essentially becomes a country available for hire on easy payment lease.

As it is peninsular India+Andaman+Lakshdweep act as three unsinkable aircarft carriers. Add three more to come and you can choke the whole ocean at will.

Here use this to draw circles. Will show how much of a force an MKI is stationed out of land and what a clutch of 500 km range carrier based aircraft will do to anybody who comes into this fish pond.

http://www.freemaptools.com/radius-around-point.htm

IMO a carrier is a cheap solution to keeping the neighbors friendly esp. when the neighbors are demanding sort and can easily find support from far off allies.

The kind of staying power afforded by a peninsular land mass and a few ACs is not something that can be argued against.

ASBM are definitely a great front foot play. lets not have one AC and invest that money in ASBM.

Yogi_G · Post by **Yogi_G** » 22 Jul 2013 18:49

Katare wrote:WoW!! Those tripple launchers are awesome! Greatest way of adding hardpoints in sleek small airframes.

What are the issues that are preventing LCA team, even in Mk2 version, from pursuing a dual or tripple missile launcher like in above picture? Every time I see that LCA picture with 2 drop tanks, 2 Bombs and 2 missiles the first thing that comes to my mind is that it's fallen short on all 3 counts in that configuration. 2 missiles (WVR or BYR) 2 bombs for ground attack and 2 tanks for getting legs. Although there are many other configurations which are very useful but for a true-multirole plateform airborne with both AA, AG and extra fuel it needs minimum 4 misslies (2 each of WVR/2BYR), 2large bombs and 2 large tanks.

When action starts drop tanks and get cracking and come back home on internal fuel.

A small plateform like LCA with twin/tripple launchers for AA missiles will be a step change in it's capability IMO. Other option is to add 2 hard points at the afy belly for 2 small AA missiles.

titash · Post by **titash** » 22 Jul 2013 19:40

Yogi_G, those are for very tiny practice bombs only. Not relevant in any operational scenario.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 22 Jul 2013 20:33

ravi_g wrote:
chetak wrote:A good read.

At What Cost a Carrier?

Are you supporting a 'carrier is not desirable for IN' position?

A carrier is a weapon to stop the war from starting unlike a ASBM which is meant to take out this very capability and unleash a war. It is essentially a floating air base (and since usually the super powers have only one or two bases per friendly country) the carrier essentially becomes a country available for hire on easy payment lease.

As it is peninsular India+Andaman+Lakshdweep act as three unsinkable aircarft carriers. Add three more to come and you can choke the whole ocean at will.

Here use this to draw circles. Will show how much of a force an MKI is stationed out of land and what a clutch of 500 km range carrier based aircraft will do to anybody who comes into this fish pond.

http://www.freemaptools.com/radius-around-point.htm

IMO a carrier is a cheap solution to keeping the neighbors friendly esp. when the neighbors are demanding sort and can easily find support from far off allies.

The kind of staying power afforded by a peninsular land mass and a few ACs is not something that can be argued against.

ASBM are definitely a great front foot play. lets not have one AC and invest that money in ASBM.

Being a carrier proponent is good...unless the thinking is rooted in the current context and capability. Just as one replaces Mig-21/27s with MKIs but simultaneously looks at new scenarios and doctrines that open up given the jump in capability, having STOBAR and CATOBAR carriers (the latter a rumored 60-65k tonnes) to police neighbors in "our fish pond" is not very good value for money.

The new carriers and what gets largely undiscussed on BR, the Carrier Strike Group equivalents, will require IN to develop a whole new concept of operations, doctrine, and training. And none of it is going to be "cheap."

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 22 Jul 2013 21:05

this pic here shows a french M2K with dual pylon for LGB under fuselage. our M2Ks do not have this.
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/files/2011/0 ... 00x332.jpg

none of our a/c have dual let alone triple pylons though thats the fashion worldwide now.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 22 Jul 2013 21:48

Singha wrote: none of our a/c have dual let alone triple pylons though thats the fashion worldwide now.

Does this count?

Oh, and we forgot this one:

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 22 Jul 2013 22:20

titash wrote:If economics are going to dictate the capabilities that we shall have, it makes eminent sense to lay the keels for a couple more INS Vikrant type ships - in their current STOBAR version. We can amortize the design/spares/aircraft costs over a larger number of ships, and provide increased availability and fleet air defence capabilities.

The prime weakness of the STOBAR approach is that the strike capabilities are greatly compromised with the reduction in fuel/payload.

If the IN's strategy is to operate in/dominate the IOR only, then 40,000 ton STOBAR carriers are good enough. They can operate in conjunction with land based AWACS and maritime strike bombers (TU-22 types) to deliver a potent air defence + strike package.

If the IN has extra-regional ambitions, and intends to operate deeper in the Persian Gulf, South China Sea etc., then it needs to actively consider the possibilities of procuring 60,000+ ton CATOBAR carriers with integral AEW/Tanker/Strike aircraft

I dont see Indian Aircraft carriers operation in IOR. Their area of operations will be Western Pacific. And there we really need 70K+ ton aircraft carrier's. Each with an air wing of 50 fighters plus, preferably a naval variant of PAK-FA or F-35.

titash · Post by **titash** » 22 Jul 2013 23:02

Christopher Sidor wrote:I dont see Indian Aircraft carriers operation in IOR. Their area of operations will be Western Pacific. And there we really need 70K+ ton aircraft carrier's. Each with an air wing of 50 fighters plus, preferably a naval variant of PAK-FA or F-35.

What are we going to do in the pacific aside from port calls in Fiji and San Francisco?

In the event of a war with Pakistan, the whole navy will be in the Arabian sea/Persian gulf. In the event of a war with China, the navy will put all its resources into interdicting Chinese oil/trade routes from Oman to Singapore. We aren't getting out of this zone!

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 22 Jul 2013 23:34

A significant amount of PRC's trade is with North America. That is what we have to disrupt. A significant amount of our Oil and Gas comes from the Russian Far East shipped in tankers. That will have to be protected. Further we will have to degrade PLAN and PLAAF's fighting ability before they come into the ocean that bears our name. Rather than wait for them to come over here using submarines and their proposed 5 aircraft carriers we should take the fight to them.

Further our ability to go into Western Pacific will dictate how many of the south-east asian and north-east asian nations tilt in our direction or stay neutral. It is very important for us to prevent these nations from falling into PRC's orbit.

We can interdict as much as oil and gas as we want. PRC is building up a Oil Strategic reserve of upto 30 days. Long enough to stand out any blockade. Its trade with EU can be redirected via Atlantic and Pacific, though it will add some 6-7 days of transit time, but still trade will not be disrupted. Moreover PLA can deploy its DF-21 ASBM in southern PRC near to its border of Burma and Loas thus threatening our IN assets in Andaman Nicobar islands. Many people have said that these islands are unsinkable aircraft carrier. That is not exactly true. You see A&N are very near to the south-east nations. Unless IAF and IN wants to violate the sovereignty of Burma, Thialand, Loas and possibly Vietnam there is no way our air assets can directly attack Southern China. They can serve as forward base for IN for its operations in South china sea and Western Pacific. They can also serve as a base for our blockade of all container traffic from Western Pacific to Indian Ocean and vice versa but they definitely are not an unsinkable carrier.

maz · Post by **maz** » 22 Jul 2013 23:48

Part 1 of multipart series on Indian Naval Aviation

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stor ... ing-at-60/

Enjoy!

titash · Post by **titash** » 23 Jul 2013 01:27

Christopher Sidor wrote:A significant amount of PRC's trade is with North America. That is what we have to disrupt. A significant amount of our Oil and Gas comes from the Russian Far East shipped in tankers. That will have to be protected. Further we will have to degrade PLAN and PLAAF's fighting ability before they come into the ocean that bears our name. Rather than wait for them to come over here using submarines and their proposed 5 aircraft carriers we should take the fight to them.

If you disrupt trade inbound to the USA, you will soon be fighting both the PLAN and the USN

No sir - the only thing we can disrupt is oil/trade from and to the lesser powers or less decisive powers

Also, the PLAN will never be strong enough (even with 5x STOBAR carriers) to engage in a full fledged battle in our backyard with the IN's nuclear subs / missile boats / carrier based aircraft, let alone the IAF. Vice versa, there is no reason for the IN to spend $$$ on larger carriers for the express purpose of taking the fight into their waters - we just can't do it. Would you risk your entire carrier fleet against the PLAN's nuclear subs and the PLAAF's 1000+ strike aircraft? Nope - only the USN can do that...each of their carriers is more capable than most air forces

IMHO, a small force of nuclear submarines will automatically deter the PLAN from moving into the IOR. Thus, our immediate needs are the revitalization of the conventional submarine force and the building of a small SSN force from ground up. The chosen role for our carriers is fleet air defence, convoy protection, and interdiction of small (i.e. Pakistani) naval units.

Christopher Sidor wrote:Further our ability to go into Western Pacific will dictate how many of the south-east asian and north-east asian nations tilt in our direction or stay neutral. It is very important for us to prevent these nations from falling into PRC's orbit.

Agreed - always good to have a big stick. However, that stick needs to be subtle and stealthy; ideally a nirbhay/brahmos equipped SSN.

Christopher Sidor wrote:We can interdict as much as oil and gas as we want. PRC is building up a Oil Strategic reserve of upto 30 days. Long enough to stand out any blockade. Its trade with EU can be redirected via Atlantic and Pacific, though it will add some 6-7 days of transit time, but still trade will not be disrupted. Moreover PLA can deploy its DF-21 ASBM in southern PRC near to its border of Burma and Loas thus threatening our IN assets in Andaman Nicobar islands. Many people have said that these islands are unsinkable aircraft carrier. That is not exactly true. You see A&N are very near to the south-east nations. Unless IAF and IN wants to violate the sovereignty of Burma, Thialand, Loas and possibly Vietnam there is no way our air assets can directly attack Southern China. They can serve as forward base for IN for its operations in South china sea and Western Pacific. They can also serve as a base for our blockade of all container traffic from Western Pacific to Indian Ocean and vice versa but they definitely are not an unsinkable carrier.

Sir - if you believe the ASBM reports, then there is *absolutely no reason* for us to invest in a carrier. We have yet to see any video footage of a real life test...after all they're experts at producing grainy images of J-20, J-31, etc.

Also, if you want to interdict PRC merchant shipping on a global scale, you need an SSN fleet that can operate globally. Far cheaper than building a fleet of supercarriers. Let's not forget that our primary requirements are roads and power plants. Our defence forces are just that - defence forces. Unlike the PRC, India has zilch expansionist designs

raj-ji · Post by **raj-ji** » 23 Jul 2013 01:42

titash wrote:
Christopher Sidor wrote:A significant amount of PRC's trade is with North America. That is what we have to disrupt. A significant amount of our Oil and Gas comes from the Russian Far East shipped in tankers. That will have to be protected. Further we will have to degrade PLAN and PLAAF's fighting ability before they come into the ocean that bears our name. Rather than wait for them to come over here using submarines and their proposed 5 aircraft carriers we should take the fight to them.
If you disrupt trade inbound to the USA, you will soon be fighting both the PLAN and the USN No sir - the only thing we can disrupt is oil/trade from and to the lesser powers or less decisive powers

Also, the PLAN will never be strong enough (even with 5x STOBAR carriers) to engage in a full fledged battle in our backyard with the IN's nuclear subs / missile boats / carrier based aircraft, let alone the IAF. Vice versa, there is no reason for the IN to spend $$$ on larger carriers for the express purpose of taking the fight into their waters - we just can't do it. Would you risk your entire carrier fleet against the PLAN's nuclear subs and the PLAAF's 1000+ strike aircraft? Nope - only the USN can do that...each of their carriers is more capable than most air forces

IMHO, a small force of nuclear submarines will automatically deter the PLAN from moving into the IOR. Thus, our immediate needs are the revitalization of the conventional submarine force and the building of a small SSN force from ground up. The chosen role for our carriers is fleet air defence, convoy protection, and interdiction of small (i.e. Pakistani) naval units.

Christopher Sidor wrote:Further our ability to go into Western Pacific will dictate how many of the south-east asian and north-east asian nations tilt in our direction or stay neutral. It is very important for us to prevent these nations from falling into PRC's orbit.

Agreed - always good to have a big stick. However, that stick needs to be subtle and stealthy; ideally a nirbhay/brahmos equipped SSN.

Christopher Sidor wrote:We can interdict as much as oil and gas as we want. PRC is building up a Oil Strategic reserve of upto 30 days. Long enough to stand out any blockade. Its trade with EU can be redirected via Atlantic and Pacific, though it will add some 6-7 days of transit time, but still trade will not be disrupted. Moreover PLA can deploy its DF-21 ASBM in southern PRC near to its border of Burma and Loas thus threatening our IN assets in Andaman Nicobar islands. Many people have said that these islands are unsinkable aircraft carrier. That is not exactly true. You see A&N are very near to the south-east nations. Unless IAF and IN wants to violate the sovereignty of Burma, Thialand, Loas and possibly Vietnam there is no way our air assets can directly attack Southern China. They can serve as forward base for IN for its operations in South china sea and Western Pacific. They can also serve as a base for our blockade of all container traffic from Western Pacific to Indian Ocean and vice versa but they definitely are not an unsinkable carrier.
Sir - if you believe the ASBM reports, then there is *absolutely no reason* for us to invest in a carrier. We have yet to see any video footage of a real life test...after all they're experts at producing grainy images of J-20, J-31, etc.

Also, if you want to interdict PRC merchant shipping on a global scale, you need an SSN fleet that can operate globally. Far cheaper than building a fleet of supercarriers. Let's not forget that our primary requirements are roads and power plants. Our defence forces are just that - defence forces. Unlike the PRC, India has zilch expansionist designs

^^^^

+1. Very good points.

The Panda's carriers don't stand a chance in the Indian Ocean. Just like our carriers won't manage in their neighborhood. The carriers are a useful tool if used correctly in the correct conditions. They are good for projecting power. And a strong offence is a good defence.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 23 Jul 2013 07:27

imo we need strong ASW capabilities in our carriers. something like that could sanitize large operating areas of enemy subs if suitably equipped. it may not even be a carrier in the true sense but OShumi/Dokdo types with ASW helicopters. these can keep up far higher coverage(16-20 helis) than DDG/FFG with 1-2 units trying to make ends meet. packs of the Klub-ASW missile as well...the JMSDF makes it a point to keep VL-ASROC on every large ship.

and we need more SSNs at highest funding priority. these are the only assets able to wage war globally without the severe opex of CVN TFs.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 23 Jul 2013 07:42

Not based on knowledge, but purely feeling wise I'd feel our navy very powerful if we have 15 to 18000 ton nuclear powered destroyers. Loaded to teeth for both AAW & ASW warfare. 2 of SH-60B Seahawk sized helicopters and 2 LCHs.

Around 50 of these destroyers and 30 nuclear powered Arihants.

Instead of Aircraft craft carriers I like Shankarosky's idea of land based aircrafts like Su 30s accompanied by refueller going out to sea releasing their Nirbhays and Brahmoses, dogfighting and coming back. Better to develop special airports in the vast empty lands one sees while going by train to pune, goa and bangalore from delhi.

In a tv program they were showing last year it was told that INS viraat costs 1 crore per day to operate. Why waste so much diesel and manpower on such platforms?

US has to bully and start wars all over the planet, most of our enemies are near and around us, so why go for these 65000 or 90000 ton giants?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 23 Jul 2013 07:46

I suppose a small complement of around 50 blackjacks armed with a mix of missiles and PGMs can sanitize the IOR against anything the Cheen can send in on the surface. but to secure it underwater atleast 50 P8 are needed too. for to secure the air at long range against large carriers of PLAN (proposed), we would need 50 refuelers to support land based fighters.

if you look at value and complexity of all the above, a few CV equipped with rafale and ASW helis also balances out on cost.

tushar_m · Post by **tushar_m** » 23 Jul 2013 07:47

Night takeoff exercise (or a bad weather ) from vikramaditya

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 23 Jul 2013 07:55

Singha wrote:
if you look at value and complexity of all the above, a few CV equipped with rafale and ASW helis also balances out on cost.

What is CV?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 23 Jul 2013 07:58

conventionally powered carrier. a couple of such carriers would bring 80 JSF or Rafale into the fight, plus 20 NH90 asw helis. unlike a fleet of MKI or backfires it wouldnt need a long arduous tail of repeat tankings to maintain coverage over far parts of the IOR. it can economically sit right there. it will need a few refueling ships to maintain station for extended time.

only the US has the tanker muscle to sustain purely land based air campaigns over trans oceanic distances...on a smallish scale. they had to move a lot of files to get 3 x B1 from wyoming to libya and back.

only the Tu160 has the speed, range to fly fast unescorted into far corners to release missiles but again it cannot provide air cover to anyone and it still needs time to fly out and back. headcount is low.costs are huge.

so a balanced mix of land based strike + onsite CV is best. the hybrid onshore + offshore itvity model.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 23 Jul 2013 09:09

raj-ji wrote:The Panda's carriers don't stand a chance in the Indian Ocean. Just like our carriers won't manage in their neighborhood. The carriers are a useful tool if used correctly in the correct conditions. They are good for projecting power. And a strong offence is a good defence.

Isn't there a contradiction right there? If you are going to project power by definition you have to learn how to do it in the other guy's neighborhood. Acquiring a CATOBAR carrier is one step in that direction. What aircraft you put on it, the CSG you build around it, the support you give it from land-based air assets are all part of the equation.

If the Chinese are not shy of camping miles inside Ladakh, they will not be shy of sending their carriers into the IOR. Fortunately, the IN has a large learning curve advantage over the PLAN in carrier ops, and the benefit of exercising regularly with the USN - the world's leading player in high tempo, full spectrum carrier ops.

On the downside, our acquisition programs are a mess...

Yogi_G · Post by **Yogi_G** » 23 Jul 2013 09:12

titash wrote:Yogi_G, those are for very tiny practice bombs only. Not relevant in any operational scenario.

Titash ji, only the outboard stations can support a single AAM each, IIRC upto 150-200 kg which is what modern AAMs come to.

The inner and center stations can easily support racks. In a typical CAP with a center line fuel tank the inner stations can easily support racks. So there is nothing stopping the employing these racks on the LCA.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 23 Jul 2013 10:18

Doom and gloom again. The sting of the Scorpene returns.Navy By the time they are fully commissioned,they will be "obsolete" says the IN.So what do we do to urgently retore the IN's sub capability?

One option is to order more Kilos to replace old Kilos being retd.The new upgraded 636.3s are being built at rapid pace for Russia,Vietnam,etc. Russia is alsod eveloping a new battery which can obviate a sub needeing an AIP module.When this will arrive is a moot point,expected in the near future. However,the IN/MOD must get down to quickly deciding upon the next sub,as the venerable Scorpene-already in service with France,Spain,Malyasia,etc., is as expensive as a nuclear boat!

Secondly,those at MDL responsible for this fiasco should be axed. MDL's lackadaisical attitude is the main reason why this "Titanic F-up has occured.Add to this is the fact that MDL has torpedoed the chances of L&T and Pipapav to build subs ,effectively keeping them out from the same,despite its incompetence.MDL's track record of delays in building surface warships is also well known.After the Scorpene fiasco,surely the next line of subs should be built elsewhere,best in a pvt. yard,while Vizag can concentrate on building our nuclear boats.

A few decades ago we unwisely pensioned off the German U-boat building because of the HDW controversy,which put paid to acquiring more U-boats of more modern design.Since replacements are urgently required,the IN should examine all options to restore numbers in the interim and decide upon a class of sub that can accommodate BMos,which it wants for the future.With MDL's poor showing,a new indigenous design is a long way away and we should concentrate upon building more N-boats,both SSBNs and SSGNs, as rapidly as possible.Leasing another one or two Akulas would be great but would take at least 4-5 years to arrive if we decide now.

The Navy, however, is livid over the yard’s persistent disregard for deadlines. Top Navy officials rue that by the time the Scorpenes are commissioned, they would be obsolete.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/s ... 942060.ece

Scorpene sub delayed by one more year

It is official. Gloomy days aren’t over for the Scorpene submarine project. Plagued by years of delays and subsequent cost overruns, the project being executed by defence shipyard Mazagon Dock in Mumbai has missed the deadline once again, dealing a body blow to the Navy’s desperate effort to pull its impuissant submarine arm out of the trough.

The French-origin submarines, being built under a transfer of technology (ToT) contract, will not be available for induction into the submarine-starved Navy in 2015, as promised by the yard. The revised target for delivery of the first of the six Scorpenes is September 2016, with the remaining hopefully entering service at the rate of one submarine every 12 months thereon.

“We have set a new target of September 2016 for delivery of the first Scorpene,” confirmed Rear Admiral (retd.) Rahul Kumar Shrawat, Chairman and Managing Director of Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) during an interaction with The Hindu in Kozhikode recently. Rear Admiral Shrawat says orders for the third and final batch of 178 high-value items — outfitting equipment that gained an unsavoury reputation as MDL-Procured Material (MPM) after the yard’s cumbersome and hazy procurement procedures held up the project for over two years — was placed on DCNS, the original manufacturer of the Scorpenes, in November last year.

The orders were placed on a single contractor to save the yard from the burden of having to deal with a large number of foreign vendors. The process inter alia ensured transparency and ease of procurement, Rear Admiral Shrawat said explaining the delay.

The Navy, however, is livid over the yard’s persistent disregard for deadlines. Top Navy officials rue that by the time the Scorpenes are commissioned, they would be obsolete. The first three Scorpenes will not even have air independent propulsion (AIP), a technology that enhances underwater endurance of submarines several times over, they point out. Without AIP, submarines are forced to surface once in a few days to recharge their batteries, a process when they are most susceptible to detection.

The contract for construction of the Scorpenes was inked in 2005, with the first originally slated for delivery in 2012. MDL’s long-drawn procurement processes and sluggishness in technology absorption gave the projects hiccups at the start itself. Meanwhile, the project cost grew exponentially from the original Rs.18,798 crore to Rs. 23,562 crore in 2010 with a renewed timeline.
Another roadblock

DCNS’ takeover of Armaris, the company with which the contract was signed, contributed to the complexities in sourcing of stipulated equipment. The project faced another roadblock with the yard failing to renew its technology assistance contract with the Spanish Navantia, co-developer of the Scorpenes, early this year.

While the country head of DCNS, in an interview with The Hindu in April, gave an assurance of “technical assistance [to the project] beyond contractual obligations,” it is believed that any further hold-up would result in the company making a plea for extra fee.

Keywords: Scorpene submarine project, DCNS-India

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 23 Jul 2013 12:11

yogi-g, those are practice bombs - especially designed to have the same flight characteristics of normal bombs, but multiple are carried for practice flights - so that pilots can train repeatedly during the same sortie. they are unguided - which means that given their small warheads, their war fighting utility is close to nil

Yogi_G · Post by **Yogi_G** » 23 Jul 2013 12:34

Lalmohan wrote:yogi-g, those are practice bombs - especially designed to have the same flight characteristics of normal bombs, but multiple are carried for practice flights - so that pilots can train repeatedly during the same sortie. they are unguided - which means that given their small warheads, their war fighting utility is close to nil

you are right in them being practice bombs Lal mullah ji. But there is no reason that the LCA cannot be equipped with racks of AAMs or bombs as they can carry the weight except the outermost one which can at best carry a AAM.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 23 Jul 2013 15:07

agreed, but there is a drag penalty and for small bombs to be useful -they have to be guided

srin · Post by **srin** » 23 Jul 2013 16:50

The delay in P75I doesn't count ? That has nothing to do with MDL. Hate this finger pointing.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 23 Jul 2013 18:16

Delay in P75I does count.The indigenous line was conceived of as far back as the Adm.Bhagwat era.Why the MOD,IN too if at fault,have sat on this matter for so long without any decision needs to be examined.As far as one knows,the IN has been screaming for subs for several years now.

Here is another report ,perhaps posted earlier on the delay in heavyweight torpedoes and the follow on Delhi class DDGs,experiencing a two-year+ delay.

Navy's ongoing hunt for heavy torpedoes leads to delay in modernisation process
Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indi ... 79309.html

A fresh hunt for heavy torpedoes for its new line of warships and a setback in the delivery of new destroyers has the Indian navy reeling under pressure of delay in major modernisation programmes.

The process to acquire new torpedoes was set rolling recently after the first attempt to purchase the weapon got embroiled in controversies.

With Finmeccanica's conduct in the VVIP helicopter deal for the Indian Air Force coming under scanner, questions have been raised on the company's participation in other contracts though no punitive action has been taken against it by the government so far.

Acquisition

The acquisition of torpedoes was held back because the front runner, Black Shark torpedo, was being made by a Finmeccanica subsidiary called WASS.

Even though the ongoing $300 million project to procure 98 torpedoes has not been cancelled officially, the navy has issued Request for Information (RFI), re-launching the process to procure the weapons. An evaluation committee had given an "all clear", but despite that the project had not moved further.

The German rival Atlas Elektronik had also raised questions about Black Shark's selection.

Sources said a fresh process of induction was initiated so that the torpedoes could be made available for all the warships and submarines in the pipeline - including Project 75 (Scorpene), 15A (Kolkata class destroyers), 15B (follow on of Kolkata class destroyers).

At the moment, navy warships are equipped with old Russian heavy torpedoes. The new torpedoes were also to be integrated with the French Scorpene submarines under construction.

Even as the torpedo issue was being sorted out, the navy was hit by the delay in project 15A for the construction of three Kolkata class destroyers

The first ship of the class, being constructed at Muzgaon Dock Limited (MDL) in Mumbai, was scheduled to be delivered in July. But technical problems were detected during the sea trials of the destroyers - the largest warships to be constructed and designed at MDL.

It is estimated that the project has been delayed by at least six months as the new destroyer would now be made available only by early 2014.

Project 15A, under which three destroyers have to be built, is already running two years behind schedule. The revised deadline for the delivery of first ship was mid-2013. The project was going on track keeping up with the revised deadline but the snag was detected during the sea trials of the ship.

kmc_chacko · Post by **kmc_chacko** » 23 Jul 2013 19:45

Why don't MoD go for faster induction process with additional lines of production

John · Post by **John** » 23 Jul 2013 19:52

Back when the deal was signed it was puzzling why MOD didn't decide to procure at least 2 Scorpene built abroad, have 1 assembled here and rest built here. Especially knowing all the problem DCN had earlier with Agosta90b.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2013 20:10

John wrote:Back when the deal was signed it was puzzling why MOD didn't decide to procure at least 2 Scorpene built abroad, have 1 assembled here and rest built here. Especially knowing all the problem DCN had earlier with Agosta90b.

This animal has no head !!!!

No planners, no project managers, it seems.

A MS Project would help them. Dates and dependencies.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 23 Jul 2013 21:21

It has to do with obliging the PSU and MDL promising to deliver without realising the complexity involved .....So MDL says I can build all 6 subs at our yard and it will be cheaper and we will deliver on time them MOD says ok done ! The hold of PSU on MOD is so strong that they wont let Pvt Indian player like L&T to play any role least their absolute dominance will get threatened.

Once the deal gets signed the super efficiency of MDL and IST of working takes over.

Same goes for P-75I deal where 2 subs will be build abroad , 3 by MDL and 1 by HSL !

No one gets pulled up for delays or are ever fired from PSU so there is no incentive for doing work on or ahead of time or penalty when delayed , the GOI simply revises the schedule in case of delays and sanctions the revised amount and cost gets doubled or even tripled for revised scheduled.

In the end IN end up being on the receiving end as it has to deal with dwindling force and has to do make shift arrangement by either reducing the time its asset spend at sea or go for upgrades of older system ...with submarine fleet there is not much choice and problem is more acute as they would have to manage with lower combat strength as the intake of new subs will be slower then what is available compared to what gest decommissioned this decade

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jul 2013 21:33

It can happen once, ................... ok, twice, ............................ three times................ But, it has been happening for ever.

And EVERYONE talks about it and then accepts it. IST is a great example.

Like I said, this animal has no head.

raj-ji · Post by **raj-ji** » 23 Jul 2013 21:44

RajitO wrote:
raj-ji wrote:The Panda's carriers don't stand a chance in the Indian Ocean. Just like our carriers won't manage in their neighborhood. The carriers are a useful tool if used correctly in the correct conditions. They are good for projecting power. And a strong offence is a good defence.
Isn't there a contradiction right there? If you are going to project power by definition you have to learn how to do it in the other guy's neighborhood. Acquiring a CATOBAR carrier is one step in that direction. What aircraft you put on it, the CSG you build around it, the support you give it from land-based air assets are all part of the equation.

If the Chinese are not shy of camping miles inside Ladakh, they will not be shy of sending their carriers into the IOR. Fortunately, the IN has a large learning curve advantage over the PLAN in carrier ops, and the benefit of exercising regularly with the USN - the world's leading player in high tempo, full spectrum carrier ops.

On the downside, our acquisition programs are a mess...

See your point. But the contradiction only comes with trying to project power in certain neighborhoods. You see this with the US, and their formidable carrier groups as well. They can take them anywhere in the world. But you don't see them taking their carriers too close to Russia & China. These countries can ward off carrier groups in many different ways.

So IMO the carriers are a handy tool, but will not be as affective against the Panda. Given this and the fact that we don't have expansionist aspirations like other countries, the CATOBAR may be overkill. More smaller sized carriers may fit our needs better.

If the Panda tries to park a carrier close to us, it won't take much to rattle their cages to the point they leave. MKIs flying low level from multiple directions will make sure their carriers will be very very busy. Not to mention our ships and subs hovering around. They would be sitting ducks. IMO the Pandas are more likely to use their carriers around Vietnam, the Phillipines and other smaller countries to intimidate them. Won't be the same result in the Indian Ocean. They won't even be able to use them against Japan or Taiwan.