LCH and other Helicopters Discussion Thread

[member_22539]

^Hurray! More scope for ruski maal. Screw Indian maal. We need to buy ruski LUH before the SDRE HAL wallahs make a local one. Hurry Hurry!! (also imagine all sorts of reasonable sounding arguments in favor of ruski maal, mixed in with some appeals for loyalty towards our taller than mountain, deeper than ocean weapons supplier).

[Philip]

Thank you Arun.You have just insulted the IAF and its chief for asking the govt. to hurry up and decide after a 7 year wait.I am only the postman.Shoot me by all means, but please continue to defend the indefensible ,the utter incompetence and conspiratorial nexus of the MOD babus and their political bosses,who after 7 years and after the French helo was chosen as the winner a few years ago,still offer no explanation why a decision has not been made.

Contrast this with the amazing hypersonic speed with which the cabinet decided on the Jet Airways-Etihad deal,in just a few months! What gives?

[Kartik]

No need to let this competition go through at all. Cancel it, if required, buy more Dhruvs or Mi-17V5s and eventually get the HAL LUH. Neither the Fennec nor the Sergei offer game changing capabilities that a domestic LUH cannot offer. And in this matter, I'm actually happy to see the MoD dragging its feet on the issue. Chetaks and Cheetahs aren't falling out of the sky either.

[Philip]

Well,tell that to the CoAS! If the LUH was already in flight testing,I would agree with you,but the timeframe for its eventual arrival in series production is an unknown. However,if the issue drags on,there is no harm in buying more Dhruvs to fill part of the gap,but the IN do need a new helo to replace the Chetaks.

By the same argument,why do we need just 24 Apaches when the our own attack helo has been developed and is flying and about 60+ on order for the IA alone? We also have heavily armed versions of the MI-17,while certainly not an attack helo,which can fit part of the bill.If a heavier Dhruv is considered adequate as stop-gap for the LUH,why not the reverse with the LCH?

[John]

This is AJT all over again lets wait till LUH is in trials before jumping on bandwagon, remember all the Hawk bashing and Sitara has yet to see light of day. Nothing short of miracle will get IJT service any time before 2020 and HJT-39 is more or less dead.

in case of LUH the two biggest problems - engine + gearbox and cockpit+avioics is proven and sourced from Dhruv which is already in service so I forsee less risk or chance of delays of HAL devotes the proper cycles on this. and they have data bank from flight test pgms of Dhruv , Rudra and LCH to steal from and predict / optimize things.

imo its a no brainer and we should go for it , the only thing which scares me is there was a report that French (turbomeca) were demanding a arm and leg for single engine mods to Ardigen and "HAL was looking at other engine options" - DONT DO IT ! pay 15% extra but use the proven drivetrain instead of tortuous process of selecting another maker, another engine, another set of problems....

IMO LUH is not as simple as made out to be you can make the case for LCH but not for this, we will see when the test flights happen I would be very surprised if clears for production before 2020.

My solution as i said earlier would be to get our private companies to cut deals with foreign companies and start manufacturing helicopters for civilian and eventually military purpose.

[Sagar G]

Philip your personal "chat sessions" with AM,VCoAS or for anyone for that matter are of no value unless and until you can back up your data with suitable documents and being a high rung officer doesn't necessarily mean that the person must be in complete knowledge about the programme. I have quoted the NFTC chief who is more involved in LCA than even the present IAF chief so if you can provide backing of your "claims" with suitable documents from reliable sources then you are welcome other wise be ready to face music from time to time from someone over your "claims" so deal with it, and please stop dropping names you are not the only one here with "sources".

I am simply amazed by your ability to continuously BS even about stuff which are public knowledge otherwise. As soon as I pointed out CAG when you raised "performance" issue of DRDO you have now changed your stance to "comprehensive audit specifically of the entire working of the institution,successes and failures of the DRDO and remedial measures to be taken is badly needed if we are to hasten indigenisation". Now would be a good time for you to search for Ramam Rao committee and while you are at it also search for what the present DRDO chief said about decentralisation and where did you quote the 27% figure from ??? Which parliament statement are you referring too ??? Multiple articles have been posted here where the new figures of % of indigenous defence content was given by none other than ex DRDO chief Dr. Saraswat, again do me a favour and search for it. What the HAL lesson teaches us is that screw driver tech doesn't build either capacity or capability but alas this simple conclusion seems way too complicated for you to comprehend.

IN is successful in it's quest for indigenization because not only it sincerely believes in it but also invests men and money into it. Funny thing about IN is that not only it is an example of the fact that the current system is good enough if you are eager for indigenization and hence punches hole in the IA/IAF lip service of "having interest in indigenization but the system can't deliver" theory but also it provides a good example as to why another theory which a lot of people here love to believe in that if someone from the armed forces is at the helm of affairs then all things will become sundry-sundry, mushy-mushy, happy-happy and our defence related problems will disappear in an instant. It's very nice that you brought up the defence PSU's let me just put a bit of info in here regarding the naval PSU yards,

1. GRSE - Rear Admiral Anil Kumar Verma, VSM, IN (Retd.) Chairman & Managing Director
2. GSL - R Adm (Retd) Vineet Bakhshi, VSM Chairman & Managing Director
3. CSL - Commodore K Subramaniam Chairman & Managing Director
4. MDL - Rear Admiral (Retd) R K SHRAWAT, AVSM Chairman & Managing Director
5. HSL - Rear Admiral NK Mishra NM,IN (Retd.) Chairman & Managing Director

I had researched about this a few months back maybe a "non naval guy" has been made the MD of one of these naval yards if so please correct me. What did you say about the PSU's again Philip ???

[member_22539]

^Oh, thats got to hurt, but then again some people have thick hides and selective amnesia. The Armor thread has taught me a lot of things.

[Philip]

Who is denying the fact that retd. or serving naval officers have been heads of shipyards? It's been a fact for decades.That is why the IN has had better success at indigenisation than the other two services.But what is their ability to act decisively and reorganise the yards which need modernisation,extra space in the case of MDL or change laborious procurement protocol drawn up by babudom? If they can't deliver and one finds that the delays are due to mismanagement by the shipyard heads by all means change them. The hard fact is that the yards are DPSUs run by the MOD and not the IN,which has been asking for more control over them for a long time.I would seriously look at the entire Scorpene fiasco and at least rectify the bottlenecks,issues, which have led to the inordinate delay and cost-overrune,since we have been repeatedly being given news that further delays are in the offing.

As for the AM,he was repeatedly chosen to head the LCA project,time and time again,with "hire and fire" powers,repeatedly sabotaged by babudom even after the post was signed on by the PM! The DRDO did not want an IAF officer to head the project and show up its flaws.As I said before,at just one joint mtg.,when APJAK was lied to by the GTRE that Kaveri would arrive in 3 months,he told him the truth and asked him whether the GOI was really serious about the project.APJAK then later made his famous statement about "200 LCAs to be made between 2003 and 2010"! There is enough on file regarding the matter.As for "documents",please tell me how many classified documents have been revealed on BR since existence? Perhaps it may be poss. to get him to speak at a BR get-together to clear the air in the future.

I posted an official report in the media months ago about the % of def, indigenisation.Here is a quite from a paper by Maj. Gen. (Retired) P K Chakravorty, VSM on "Indigenisation of Defence Technology".

India's imports increased by 38 percent between 2007 to 2011. The primary weapon systems included 120 Su-30 and 16 Mig-29 k, both from Russia. The reason for such imports is to obtain state of the art equipment by the services to ensure effective performance leading to victory in operations. Accordingly indigenous products which would be effective on the battlefield will be acceptable to the user. Indigenisation involves the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO), Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) private sector, the services and the political leaders. There is a need to find a way by which our indigenisation increases and imports reduce. Currently about 70 percent of our equipment is imported and there is a need to reduce the percentage of foreign equipment in our inventory.

Here's a more recent piece in Bus.Std. Even AKA is on record wanting to "reverse the 70:30 ratio".

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 057_1.html

Ajai Shukla: Indigenising defence - the 70:30 fallacy

In practice, indigenisation has been, with apologies to Greta Garbo, an illusion, wrapped in a fallacy, cloaked in deception

Defence indigenisation has long been more a Ministry of Defence (MoD) slogan than reality. Defence Minister A K Antony pays regular lip service to reversing the 70:30 ratio: reducing the foreign component of Indian defence from 70 per cent to 30 per cent. In practice, indigenisation has been, with apologies to Greta Garbo, an illusion, wrapped in a fallacy, cloaked in deception.

The empirical reality of “indigenisation” is evident in the Indian Navy, the only service that pursues indigenisation systematically (the Indian Air Force and the Army talk the talk but oppose indigenisation in practice, demanding aircraft, tanks and guns now, not ten years down the line). The navy takes justifiable pride in building most of its warships in Indian shipyards, but a closer examination reveals that indigenisation is only skin-deep. Defence shipyards have developed the crucial skills needed for designing and constructing sophisticated warships, and for harmonising myriad sensors and weapons into an integrated battle management system. But there is little headway in indigenising the multiplicity of components and systems that are the vital innards of a battleship.

Consequently, India’s four defence shipyards – the flagship Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL); Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE); Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL); and the newly acquired Hindustan Shipyard Ltd, Visakhapatnam (HSL) – must necessarily look overseas for the engines, gas turbines, propulsion systems, gearboxes, generators, hydraulic systems, air-conditioning and countless other systems, which add up to the bulk of the cost of modern warships.

These are all lost opportunities for India’s private sector companies, which could be building these systems as their route into the lucrative business of defence production. Examine the figures. From the navy’s budget of Rs 21,000 crore this year (all figures rounded off), almost 60 per cent, or Rs 12,000 crore, is earmarked for capital expenditure. Of this, Rs 4,000 crore will be disbursed directly to foreign shipyards that are constructing Indian warships, while Rs 8,000 crore will be paid to Indian shipyards. On the face of it, that would appear like a healthy 66 per cent indigenisation rate, close to Mr Antony’s target.

Unfortunately, only a small share of this goes to the Indian shipbuilder. MDL retains just 25 per cent of the cost of each warship it produces, with 75 per cent being paid to foreign suppliers for the systems mentioned above. GRSE pays out 65 per cent and GSL remits 55 per cent abroad, not because they are better at indigenising but because their vessels use lower-end technology that is available in India.

The shocking statistic is that India has a 100 per cent indigenisation rate in jungle boots, blankets and similar low-tech equipment. But in critical technologies, we import 85 per cent of our needs. And in warship-grade and aerospace-grade components, we have indigenised just 5 per cent of our requirement; 95 per cent still comes from abroad. An example is Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd’s Dhruv helicopter, designed and integrated in India, but 90 per cent foreign in physical content.

This regrettable situation exists largely because the MoD, particularly its Department of Defence Production (DDP), has failed to coordinate and sponsor the development of indigenous capability. Warship builders still import even warship- grade steel, the toughened alloy that comprises the basic structure of a modern battleship. This is not because the technology is beyond us. Years ago, India’s public sector metallurgical establishments – the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory; Mishra Dhatu Nigam; and Steel Authority of India Ltd – developed and manufactured warship-grade steel (termed D 40S), which has been used in the navy’s reputed Shivalik class frigates. But cross-ministerial coordination is needed to produce the relatively small volumes required for warship programmes while remaining profitable for both steel makers and shipyards. Essar Steel had offered to produce warship steel, subject to some conditions. But the MoD has preferred to continue reliance on import.

In 2003 the navy addressed the lack of depth in indigenisation with a “15 Year Indigenisation Plan”, which was subsequently revised up to 2022. This forecasts the warship programme’s requirement of equipment and systems, hoping for import substitution by bringing in the private sector. A similar initiative last year, broadened to all three services, was the DRDO’s “Technology Perspective & Capability Roadmap”, which details the technologies that the military requires and urges the private sector “to offer firm commitments in partnering the MoD in developing contemporary and future technologies as well as productionalising [sic] equipment required by the Armed Forces”.

But these useful baseline documents are only a starting point for an indigenisation thrust. Private sector corporations that are interested in defence production would still require handholding and funding for their initially non-productive R&D. The funding is available – each year the MoD has been earmarking some Rs 2,000 crore for “Make” procedure projects, without a single rupee having ever been paid out – but nobody in the MoD has taken clear ownership of such an initiative.

It is time for the defence ministry to step up to the plate. They have already identified 61 critical technologies – especially materials and components that can be used across a broad range of sub-systems and systems – that India badly needs for developing higher technological capabilities. A nationally synergised effort is needed, which must also explore obtaining specific technologies through the offset route.

We have learnt how to swim at the deep end of the pool, developing the complex abilities needed to design and integrate warships, aircraft and tanks, without developing the broader research and industrial ecosystem that sustains a defence industrial base. It is time to deepen and broaden indigenisation, by developing the materials, components and sub-systems that will not only substitute defence imports, but also provide technological “trickle down” to energise the national industrial base.

PS:I don't hold a brief for the piece about "90% of Dhruv" being firang.It surprises me.Can this be critically examined?

Here's another piece about the "IN at Sea".

Indian Navy: At Sea
http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside- ... vy-at-sea/

Hold the line and build naval capacities is the common refrain that one hears on the Raisina Hill when it comes to the Indian counter to Chinese assertions over the tedious land border dispute and its muscle flexing on the high seas. It is actually quite a pragmatic solution to deal with China except there is a huge and widening gap between the Indian intent and the reality on ground. The Indian border infrastructure along the 3,488 kilometer Line of Actual Control (LAC) is work in progress with connecting roads being slowly built due to lack of funds, equipment, land acquisition problems, political impediments or in the name of environmental concerns. This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese side, where metallic black top highways exist from the zero line and are connected to far away Beijing. And on top of that there is Finance Ministry which wants the Defence Ministry to give it the state of Chinese threat to India if it wants the government to fund the force accretion in the Indian Army. Much has been written about the tardiness of Indian border infrastructure and there is much hope in Navy’s capability to match any Chinese adventure along the LAC or in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Let us confine ourselves to the Indian Navy’s capability and its capacity to vacate a Chinese threat if it ever were to be called upon by the government of the day. The fact is that Indian Navy always had a big vision but over the years the strength of its combatants has not been able to match its ambitions. While the Navy Headquarters may dream up expeditionary forces like US Navy fleets in future, the present force levels are not anywhere near the requirements. This is partly due to the delays in indigenous warship production as well declining capacities of Russian shipyards, which have been the mainstay of Indian Navy in the past. So while we talk about being the major naval player in the Indian Ocean, we have only a 50 year old aircraft carrier Viraat to rely on if it comes to expeditionary forces. Despite much delays and wrangling over money, the Russians have still to deliver Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and our own indigenous air defence ship is still in the basic stages of development. It is not that the Chinese Navy is very superior, only that India is losing the edge and fast. The state of indigenous ship construction is hostage to PSU shipyards,which are unable to meet the production schedules and critical projects are getting delayed. With Indian bureaucracy designed to deal with PSUs, there is inherent mistrust towards private players in the sector despite their proven capacities. The fact is that even though India plans to increase its force levels to 150-160 ships by 2022, the PSU shipyards cannot keep up with the pace of construction due to very high existing workloads and low production capacities. The matter is compounded due to cumbersome procurement procedures and outdated machinery. Consider this:

# Production of three Shivalik class frigates was commenced during 2000-2003 with contracted delivery dates in 2008-2009. Two of them were delivered after a decade and the last one still to be handed over. In the meantime, the cost of each ship shot from Rs 2250 crore in January, 1998 to the present Rs 9,000 crore.

# Production of three destroyers of proven Delhi class began in 2003-2005 with deliveries in 2009-2012. The first will be delivered at the end of this year and the remaining two to be handed over to Navy in the coming years. The original cost of each destroyer escalated from Rs 3580 crore in May 2001 to present Rs 11,876 crore.

# Production contract for six Scorpene submarines was awarded in 2005 end. They were to be delivered from 2010 to 2014. The likely deliveries are now going to take place from 2016 to 2021 after a delay of ten years.

# The first Brahmputra class of frigate (project P-16A) was delivered after twelve years of building period. Sister ship INS Betwa was delivered after 16 years of commencement of production and the third ship INS Beas was delivered after 17 years of commencement of production.

There are many other instances that reveal that all is not well with Indian naval prowess with Navy lacking the teeth to strike. While the Indian Navy is going to be a proud owner of Russian built Akula class nuclear submarine soon, it is still to acquire long legs needed to become a deterrent to the growing PLA Navy. With the PLA shifting its focus from land to naval forces, it is time that the Indian Navy got its act together. The government needs to be open to warship building in private sector and shed the PSU protection attitude as the latter just do not have the capacities. Given that India’s stated area of influence is from Gulf of Aden to the narrow Malacca Straits, New Delhi simply needs more surface combats. Otherwise, the Chinese are coming and in a big way.

[Philip]

And for dessert,just read this!
So much for the statements being out out by AKA and the MOD.

Budget puts indigenisation in defence sector on the back burner

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/b ... 466342.ece

Budget puts indigenisation in defence sector on the back burner

For all the talk about indigenisation of defence equipment for self-reliance in the long run, the Union budget has cold-shouldered the private sector, which has been seeking a larger role in defence production.

The budget has earmarked a token Rs. 1 crore for facilitating the Indian industry to fashion high-end defence systems. While Rs. 89.22 crore was apportioned last year to assist the industry in developing prototypes under the ‘Make’ category of defence procurement, the allocation was cancelled by the Finance Ministry when it cut back Rs. 14,904 crore from the defence outlay.

The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) stipulates that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) bear 80 per cent of the development cost of such prototypes. But projects under way in this category, like the future infantry combat vehicle (FICV) and the tactical communication system (TCS) are on a slow track thanks to the MoD’s historic mistrust of the domestic industry, rue industry insiders.

Without a level-playing field, projects undertaken to give a fillip to indigenisation have all been stalled for a long time, laments Geethanjali Nataraj, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Ficci) director in-charge of defence.

“Cosmetic hike”

Ms. Nataraj terms ‘cosmetic’ the (8 per cent) hike in capital expenditure in the sector, saying the Defence Ministry has got a raw deal.

“Given the rate of inflation and the depreciation of rupee, there’s hardly anything for enhancing indigenisation with the participation of private sector,” she says.

The industry does have the capability to execute projects like FICV and the TCS, besides those in the pipeline like the battlefield management system (BMS), operational data link (ODL) and the net-centric operations system (NCOS), but the government looks the other way, she says.

In contrast, Gurpal Singh, Confederation of Indian Industry’s principal adviser (Defence), welcomes the defence outlay of Rs. 2,03,672 crore, an increase of nearly 14 per cent over the revised estimates last year in the backdrop of the “slow economic growth and the pressing needs of military modernisation”.

Mr. Singh is optimistic about Finance Minister P. Chidambaram’s assurance that more funds would be ploughed in for enhancing security preparedness in case of need.

He feels that benefits such as zero customs duty for plant and machinery extended to the industry under the National Electronics Policy should also include the defence sector.

Chief Executive Officer of Tata Power Strategic Electronics Division Rahul Chaudhry feels ‘disheartened’ at the cut in the allocation for prototype development expenditure.

“For decades, the Defence Ministry has been talking about building a defence industrial base in the country and advocating domestic research ad development. The budget has once again ignored the issue of extending 80-IA benefits for investments in defence manufacturing infrastructure and has not announced any schemes to give impetus to indigenous R&D. I sincerely hope that this is not an indication of the government’s true priority on indigenisation and a correction will be effected before the budget is approved,” he told The Hindu.

The former Vice-Chief of the Navy, Vice-Admiral (retd.), Raman P. Suthan, however, thinks that money has never been a constraint on hardware acquisition for the forces.

“The problem lies with the procurement process which takes several years for completion. The DPP is a failsafe mechanism offering little scope for departure, but people are scared to take decisions. While everyone gets wiser post-facto, you can’t wait for all the 100 factors to be in place to take decisions on such key issues,” he says.

He is confident that the government would make available funds for big ticket purchases, but likens the process to a game of snake and ladder, with the government getting into a scrap-all mode at a faint hint of corruption.

“You must delink corruption from capability- building. The purchase of the Barak missile defence system, for instance, was mired in controversies, but its induction has made the forces more confident as it is a pretty good weapon,” he says.

And here is the latest June 2013 ASSOCHAM/PWC tome on the "Holy Grail" of indigenisation.

http://www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/ ... sation.pdf

Just a few highlights,which you will see runs counter to current political policy.

FDI in defence: An imaginary bogey
The role of FDI in building a domestic industry and creating an
enabling environment for transfer of technology from foreign
OEMs cannot be over emphasised. The 26% cap has completely
failed as the total inflows of FDI in the last 10 years in this sector
have been a meagre five million USD and a handful of joint
ventures, compared to over 280 billion USD that the country
has received during the same period. Based on the experience in
sectors such as automobiles, IT and other manufacturing sectors,
there is an urgent need to allow 100% FDI in this sector and
address security concerns separately as in most countries

DPP 2013 also lays down the method for computation of
indigenous content. It broadly prescribes the cost of the
equipment to be reduced by the cost of imported materials,
cost of services received from non-Indian entities at all tiers.
The definition of indigenous content in spirit is commendable
and seeks to scan through the indigenous content in the
entire supply-chain. However, ensuring compliance with the
requirement at all the tiers is going to be extremely cumbersome
for the entire industry. The indigenous content as it is currently
worded may also be open to varied interpretation, example,
the meaning of non-Indian entities, direct and indirect costs
of services etc. Further, the Indian companies, even if they
are indigenously manufacturing the core equipment, may get
disqualified on a strict application of the definition of indigenous
content. This may lead to re-categorisation of the procurements
under ‘buy and make with ToT’or ‘buy global programmes and
eventually defeat the objectives of the changes.
The affirmation of indigenous content at the trial stage is
impractical and requires re-consideration. It is acknowledged
that India does not have the current know-how and the
infrastructure to manufacture high-end defence equipments and
therefore, expecting the requirement to be fulfilled at the time of
trials is unreasonable and impractical

[VinodTK]

From DefenseNews: Source: India Considers Buying More Boeing Apaches

NEW DELHI — Boeing could snare yet another big order from India as the Indian Army has asked the Defence Ministry to acquire an unspecified number of AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, according to an MoD source.

Last year, the Indian Air Force purchased 22 Apaches for US $1.3 billion. Beyond the Indian Army request, a third order of helicopters could be in the offing for India’s planned Mountain Corps.

Boeing executives in New Delhi were unavailable for comment.

US companies have already won contracts worth more than $8 billion over the past four years, and most of the weapons and equipment supplied to India have come through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. India has bought 10 Boeing C-17 aircraft, 12 Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft and six Lockheed Martin C-130J transport planes.

The Indian Army wants its Apaches to be exclusive to the service and not associated with the Air Force’s 22 helicopters.

The MoD source added that, instead of inviting fresh bids, the MoD is considering a repeat order, which he said could be finalized by the end of the year. The size of the order is not known.

Meanwhile, an Indian Army official said the newly sanctioned Mountain Corps of roughly 30,000 troops, which could be deployed along the China border, would also be equipped with yet another purchase of attack helicopters.

The Cabinet Committee on Security, the highest decision-making body on weapon purchases and security, approved the additional troops this month.

The attack helicopters for the Mountain Corps would be in addition to the order being considered by the MoD for the Army. The Indian Army, however, must still decide when and how to procure the additional unspecified numbers of attack helicopters for the Mountain Corps, which is expected to be in operation in about 10 years, the Indian Army official said.

India has, meanwhile, developed an indigenous light combat helicopter. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited will build 60 Rudra helicopters for the Army and Air Force.

The Rudra is powered by a new Shakti engine, jointly developed by Hindustan Aeronautics and French engine manufacturer Turbomeca. The new engine will allow the Rudra to fly above 20,000 feet.

[Philip]

The IA needs to have its own dedicated air assets especially with regard to close support integrated with ground troops.In fact the ones meant for the IAF-all attack helicopters should be transferred to the IA.The Apache has performed well in recent spats including Afghanistan.Since the LCH is also flying and on order,production of our desi attach helo should be speeded up so that we can evaluate the same in the field and see how it performs in comparison with the Apache.Costing a lot less,greater numbers of LCHs would be possible too,apart from it being indigenous to an extent.

[member_26535]

is any other AF around the world which operates 3 types of attack choppers ?...Can anyone comment pl

[Singha]

chacha operates ah64, ah1supercobra(marines) and kiowa warrior(armed scout).but their dal-roti is the apache.
I dont think anyone else operates even 2 types, let alone 3.

[NRao]

is any other AF around the world which operates 3 types of attack choppers ?...Can anyone comment pl

Unless it is a generic question, it is at best an incomplete question.

One cannot compare apples and oranges. There are plenty of influencing factors when it comes to such matters, including finance, politics (within AFs, MoDs, and nations), needs, and therefore technology needs.

[nits]

From DefenseNews: Source: India Considers Buying More Boeing Apaches

NEW DELHI — Boeing could snare yet another big order from India as the Indian Army has asked the Defence Ministry to acquire an unspecified number of AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, according to an MoD source.

Last year, the Indian Air Force purchased 22 Apaches for US $1.3 billion. Beyond the Indian Army request, a third order of helicopters could be in the offing for India’s planned Mountain Corps.

Boeing executives in New Delhi were unavailable for comment.

US companies have already won contracts worth more than $8 billion over the past four years, and most of the weapons and equipment supplied to India have come through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. India has bought 10 Boeing C-17 aircraft, 12 Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft and six Lockheed Martin C-130J transport planes.

The Indian Army wants its Apaches to be exclusive to the service and not associated with the Air Force’s 22 helicopters.

The MoD source added that, instead of inviting fresh bids, the MoD is considering a repeat order, which he said could be finalized by the end of the year. The size of the order is not known.

Meanwhile, an Indian Army official said the newly sanctioned Mountain Corps of roughly 30,000 troops, which could be deployed along the China border, would also be equipped with yet another purchase of attack helicopters.

The Cabinet Committee on Security, the highest decision-making body on weapon purchases and security, approved the additional troops this month.

The attack helicopters for the Mountain Corps would be in addition to the order being considered by the MoD for the Army. The Indian Army, however, must still decide when and how to procure the additional unspecified numbers of attack helicopters for the Mountain Corps, which is expected to be in operation in about 10 years, the Indian Army official said.

India has, meanwhile, developed an indigenous light combat helicopter. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited will build 60 Rudra helicopters for the Army and Air Force.

The Rudra is powered by a new Shakti engine, jointly developed by Hindustan Aeronautics and French engine manufacturer Turbomeca. The new engine will allow the Rudra to fly above 20,000 feet.

1) How many Apache Helicopters will be needed for Mountain Corps
2) Can we use LCH instead of Apache

[Singha]

having their own apaches and chinooks has become a prestige issue. so no logical argument will suffice.
if your brother has got a cool bmw5 wouldnt you want to upg from the camry if you could get father to write the cheque?

[NRao]

Was this posted? A July 9, 2013 article.

Army to get Rudra choppers, armed with missiles and rockets in Aug

NEW DELHI: After fighting a messy turf war with the IAF over getting its own ``attack'' helicopters, the Army will take a major step forward in getting airborne firepower by raising its first-ever dedicated squadron of "armed'' choppers next month.

The first squadron of ``Rudra'' helicopters, the weaponised version of ``Dhruv'' advanced light helicopters (ALH) manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), will be raised in Bangalore and later deployed in the western sector facing Pakistan, said sources.

While not in the class of heavy-duty ``attack'' helicopters, which have greater combat capabilities and armour protection, each Rudra will be armed with a chin-mounted 12.7mm canon, 70mm rockets, Magic Matra air-to-air missiles and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) to form a ``deadly package'' against enemy forces.

"The difference between attack and armed helicopters is blurring. The Rudras will constitute the third dimensional maneuver arm to provide ground commanders with a lethal edge,'' said a source.

"The ALHs did excellent rescue work in Uttarakhand recently. With combat firepower, speed and mobility, they will prove their worth in military operations too. While a Dhruv costs Rs 47 crore, each Rudra comes for Rs 71 crore,'' he added.

The Army will initially induct six squadrons (10 helicopters each) of the Rudras, named after the Rigvedic god of the tempest. The first two squadrons will have imported ATGMs but the next four will have the indigenously-developed Nag-Helina ATGMs with a four-km strike range.

While the Army's Aviation Corps (AAC) currently operates around 190 ageing Cheetah/Chetak helicopters as well as 70 Dhruv ALHs, attack and medium-lift helicopters were so far the IAF's preserve only.

The Army for long had been demanding ``full command and control'' over ``tactical air assets'' for rapid deployment, holding that IAF can retain its ``larger strategic role''. Finally, in a bid to resolve the long-standing battles, the defence ministry last year decided ``future'' procurements of attack helicopters will be for Army. IAF, however, will get the 22 AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters to be acquired from the US for over $1.4 billion.

Induction of Rudras marks a significant boost to Army's endeavour to build its own ``mini'' air force. The raising of ``aviation brigades'' for each of the 1.13-million strong Army's three ``strike'' and 10 ``pivot'' corps (each has around 75,000 soldiers) has already kicked off.

The force wants one attack helicopter squadron each for its three ``strike'' formations - 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal) — in keeping with their primary offensive role. Moreover, it has plans to induct 114 Rudras for the remaining 10 `pivot' corps.

The force's long-term plans include a squadron each of attack/armed, reconnaissance/observation and tactical battle-support helicopters for all the 13 corps. In addition, the force wants each of its six regional or operational commands to get ``a flight'' of five fixed-wing aircraft for tactical airlift of troops and equipment.

[member_26622]

is any other AF around the world which operates 3 types of attack choppers ?...Can anyone comment pl

IAF is truly a global and diversified force - with airframes from Britain, Russia, USA, France, Switzerland, Italy, Brazil, and Germany (soon Japan and Korea will be in this list) with Zero Indian frontline planes. LCH, LCA and other Desi designed stuff just cannot make it for a million reasons ranging from technology, bureaucracy to corruption.

By the way, it is also the 4th largest air force in the world. Sarcastically, I don't know whether it is really 'Indian' Air Force or 'Foreign' Air Force in India.

I will fully back the Indian Army's mini air-force plan. Only requirement is that the Army's 'air' force should be 100% Indian designed airframes. Willing to consider all ways and means to get rid off this debilitating foreign addiction.

[member_26622]

The IA needs to have its own dedicated air assets especially with regard to close support integrated with ground troops.In fact the ones meant for the IAF-all attack helicopters should be transferred to the IA.The Apache has performed well in recent spats including Afghanistan.Since the LCH is also flying and on order,production of our desi attach helo should be speeded up so that we can evaluate the same in the field and see how it performs in comparison with the Apache.Costing a lot less,greater numbers of LCHs would be possible too,apart from it being indigenous to an extent.

My two cents:

Apaches are good but relying on their performance in Afghanistan is not going to work. The Chinese army is much better equipped with air defense equipment versus the Paki taliban in Afghanistan. A better comparison would be tactics adopted by europeans to stave off perceived soviet armor threat. A-10 Warthog was their choice as it was a fast and survivable platform capable of taking heavy punishment.

Helicopters have never been robust enough platforms for deployment in high saturation zones. They have awesome utility though.

[rohitvats]

is any other AF around the world which operates 3 types of attack choppers ?...Can anyone comment pl

Unless you're Uncle Sam and have money to spread around like birdseed and use a hammer to squash a fly OR you're a European country like France/Germany/UK with small land force and very high per soldier investment, you'll need more varied solution for your needs. Stop looking at things from prism of what others have done or are doing.

Case in point - the attack helicopter in IA.

Let us look at the requirement: IA has 13 Corps with a 14th having being sanctioned recently. It operates in terrain ranging from deserts and plains in west to high mountain country in north/central/north-east to dense jungles in east.

Now, I'd ideally like to equip all my Corps in western sector with something like an Aviation Bde with at least 1 x attack helicopter squadron. Ideal scenario and deep pockets would mean that each Corps gets an Apache Unit. But that would require 7-8 squadrons of Apaches - but we don't have that much money. Simple.

So, what do we do?

We equip the Strike Corps with 1 x Apache Squadron each and others with a mix of 1 x Rudra (armed ALH) + 1 x LCH. And manage my cost while ensuring that I provide the required firepower to the formations. So, IA has already committed for some 114 LCH and a high number of Rudra helicopters (first lot is for 60 such units equivalent to ~6 Squadrons).

Similarly, I equip my mountain formations with LCH Squadrons because I feel Apaches are no up to the task in this sector.

So, while no one else may have 3 different types of attack helicopters (well, actually 2 x attack helicopters + 1 x Armed helicopter), India has pretty unique requirements and tailor made solutions.

[ramana]

From N Rao's post....

While not in the class of heavy-duty ``attack'' helicopters, which have greater combat capabilities and armour protection, each Rudra will be armed with a chin-mounted 12.7mm canon, 70mm rockets, Magic Matra air-to-air missiles and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) to form a ``deadly package'' against enemy forces.

"The difference between attack and armed helicopters is blurring. The Rudras will constitute the third dimensional maneuver arm to provide ground commanders with a lethal edge,'' said a source.

"The ALHs did excellent rescue work in Uttarakhand recently. With combat firepower, speed and mobility, they will prove their worth in military operations too. While a Dhruv costs Rs 47 crore, each Rudra comes for Rs 71 crore,'' he added.

The Army will initially induct six squadrons (10 helicopters each) of the Rudras, named after the Rigvedic god of the tempest. The first two squadrons will have imported ATGMs but the next four will have the indigenously-developed Nag-Helina ATGMs with a four-km strike range.

...
Induction of Rudras marks a significant boost to Army's endeavour to build its own ``mini'' air force. The raising of ``aviation brigades'' for each of the 1.13-million strong Army's three ``strike'' and 10 ``pivot'' corps (each has around 75,000 soldiers) has already kicked off.

The force wants one attack helicopter squadron each for its three ``strike'' formations - 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal) — in keeping with their primary offensive role. Moreover, it has plans to induct 114 Rudras for the remaining 10 `pivot' corps.

The force's long-term plans include a squadron each of attack/armed, reconnaissance/observation and tactical battle-support helicopters for all the 13 corps. In addition, the force wants each of its six regional or operational commands to get ``a flight'' of five fixed-wing aircraft for tactical airlift of troops and equipment.

Which ATGMs for the initial 2 Squadrons?

[Surya]

so what role would the AF apache do compared to the army apache

[Singha]

AF ones will star in firepower demos @ pokhran onlee.
army ones attempting to sneak in will be intercepted by standing CAP of Mig29s and chased off the premises

[Philip]

Enjoyed that! So do we need to send in the Presidential Bodygauard-61st Cavalry,to stop the Chinese horsemen what?

The AAC should also include as said earlier COIN aircraft which air forces round the world are finding very cost-effective.larger aircraft like A-10s or Frogfoots should be operated by the IAF though as they would require far more sophisticated support.

[KrishnaK]

Surya,
I remember reading, that the AF intends to use their Apaches for DEAD. That's why they were against the Army getting their own apaches, cause that would amount to a duplication of equipment.

[Sid]

Surya,
I remember reading, that the AF intends to use their Apaches for DEAD. That's why they were against the Army getting their own apaches, cause that would amount to a duplication of equipment.

I hope you meant SEAD not "DEAD".

[rohitvats]

so what role would the AF apache do compared to the army apache

That remains to be seen.

Presently, the 2 x Mi-35 Squadrons work closely with IA Corps and IMO, are each tasked for anti-armor role. The one in Suratgarh works with 2 Strike Corps while the other one in Pathankot would be employed in Gurdaspur-Pathankot-Sambha Corridor. Now, this was the hunting ground of 1 Strike Corps earlier but with it being under SW Command, one does not know.

So, if Apaches are 1-to-1 replacement for Mi-35 (in the long run) and will continue to perform same role as earlier, then IA's purchase of Apaches for western sector can be allotted to other Corps. And IA can count on 2+X number of Apache Squadrons for Western Sector at least.

Let wait and watch if IAF raises new Squadrons for Apaches and the location(s) thereof.

[Kartik]

is any other AF around the world which operates 3 types of attack choppers ?...Can anyone comment pl

the Mi-35s are on the last legs. Once the Apaches enter service, the Mi-35s will be retired. That'll leave the IAF and IA with 2 attack helis, the Apache and the LCH. the Rudra isn't a gunship like the former two, but rather an armed helicopter that could theoretically be tasked with more roles such as CSR and even as armed scouts.

[abhik]

Surya,
I remember reading, that the AF intends to use their Apaches for DEAD. That's why they were against the Army getting their own apaches, cause that would amount to a duplication of equipment.

How is that going to work out with both our adversaries having AWACS ?

[KrishnaK]

Surya,
I remember reading, that the AF intends to use their Apaches for DEAD. That's why they were against the Army getting their own apaches, cause that would amount to a duplication of equipment.

How is that going to work out with both our adversaries having AWACS ?

I don't know. I'm far from an expert at such things. Do both the countries have enough AWACS that they can constantly monitor all of the airspace at our borders 24x7 to completely preclude the chances of a sneak attack ?

[NRao]

Surya,
I remember reading, that the AF intends to use their Apaches for DEAD. That's why they were against the Army getting their own apaches, cause that would amount to a duplication of equipment.

How is that going to work out with both our adversaries having AWACS ?

Somewhere in that equation they perhaps have the following:

Israel Unveils Loitering Anti-Missile Drone

[vivek_ahuja]

How is that going to work out with both our adversaries having AWACS ?

I don't know. I'm far from an expert at such things. Do both the countries have enough AWACS that they can constantly monitor all of the airspace at our borders 24x7 to completely preclude the chances of a sneak attack ?

No.

And under realistic conditions (not the flat desert terrain of Iraq but the urban, vegetated and rolling terrains of the subcontinent), the effective range of detection of terrain hugging helicopters is extremely limited even for high flying AWACS, brochure numbers notwithstanding. Which means that to find such incoming helicopters, the AWACS has to be practically above them! Unless those helicopter pilots are really unlucky, the chances for this happening are very low. Especially given the fact that the radar emissions of any neighboring AWACS will be seen far and wide far before the return signature of their potential targets does, allows effective evasions.

Bottom line is that long range SEAD missions undertaken by heavily armed helicopters remains a very valid idea for the IAF/IA and its nice to see them on the ball for it.

[nachiket]

^^Can we expect a few such missions in your next scenario?

[vivek_ahuja]

^^Can we expect a few such missions in your next scenario?

Fenix will meet your needs when I am done with it.

The reason I posted above is because that was what some simulations I did for Fenix showed. I am putting together a whitepaper on the data I collected called "Deep Penetration Rotary Strikes in a High Radar Threat Environment for the Indian Subcontinent". If only I can get the time to finish it though.

-Vivek

[Surya]

vivek

one concern I have of the subcontinent urban haphzard environments is the clutterof wires and other obstacles -

maybe Radars will be sited in open places for LOS reasons but ingress and egress for helos are going to get uglier as the populations explode

[abhik]

And under realistic conditions (not the flat desert terrain of Iraq but the urban, vegetated and rolling terrains of the subcontinent), the effective range of detection of terrain hugging helicopters is extremely limited even for high flying AWACS, brochure numbers notwithstanding. Which means that to find such incoming helicopters, the AWACS has to be practically above them! Unless those helicopter pilots are really unlucky, the chances for this happening are very low.

Sources? What you are basically implying that airborne radars are useless.

Especially given the fact that the radar emissions of any neighboring AWACS will be seen far and wide far before the return signature of their potential targets does, allows effective evasions.

Helicopters are slow(relatively) moving and it may not be possible for them to act in such a dynamic manner.

Bottom line is that long range SEAD missions undertaken by heavily armed helicopters remains a very valid idea for the IAF/IA and its nice to see them on the ball for it.

Are there any examples of the armed helicopters taking on long range SEAD missions apart from that one incident at the start of GW1? Fast jets armed with anti-radiation missiles, bombs etc + jamming seem like a more common occurrence.

[abhik]

...
Somewhere in that equation they perhaps have the following:

Israel Unveils Loitering Anti-Missile Drone

Also this
DRDO to develop anti-radiation missile

[vivek_ahuja]

Sources? What you are basically implying that airborne radars are useless.

That's quite a leap you have taken from what I was saying. AWACS have their uses and are very effective. But against very specific type of threats: higher speeds, higher altitude and longer range threats. But like any weapon system, they have their limitations, least of which is against slow-moving, very low altitude rotary systems. Expecting AWACS to be an almighty solution to all your airspace defense problems is like expecting cotton to plug every wound from scratches to an artery break.

Sources: None whatsoever in print or open media. So I cannot solidify what I said above in stone. All I have is simulations data based on best projected performances and anecdotal snippets from chai-wallas. But these are, as always, at odds with brochure numbers out on the web.

Helicopters are slow(relatively) moving and it may not be possible for them to act in such a dynamic manner.

Hiding behind terrain and urban clutter does not require too much effort on the part of helicopters. All they need to know is the direction from which they are being looked at and that tells them how to use the terrain around them to keep obstacles between themselves and their would-be predators.

Are there any examples of the armed helicopters taking on long range SEAD missions apart from that one incident at the start of GW1? Fast jets armed with anti-radiation missiles, bombs etc + jamming seem like a more common occurrence.

There are of course a lot of changes since GW1 to allow for SEAD tactics, least of which is the Jaguars of the IAF, which have evolved dramatically for the role since the late 1980s to now. So far, no opponent in the world has fought a war where both sides are armed with potent airborne radar systems. I think the IAF is simply trying to be ahead of the curve on this one.

JMT, of course.

-Vivek

[vivek_ahuja]

vivek

one concern I have of the subcontinent urban haphzard environments is the clutterof wires and other obstacles -

maybe Radars will be sited in open places for LOS reasons but ingress and egress for helos are going to get uglier as the populations explode

Surya,

I agree.

This was already in play even during Operation Iraqi Freedom with Apache pilots running into a lot of trouble with urban environments during ingress and egress to target areas. For the subcontinent it gets a lot worse and forces chopper pilots to fly higher and higher to evade obstacles, thus making them more likely to be detected by airborne radars.

Its an utterly complex mess with no simple solution for every case, but in theory, the idea of using choppers for SEAD is sound. Whether it can be effectively employed in the Indian context is case-dependent.

-Vivek

[KrishnaK]

Adding to what vivek_ahuja just mentioned - having the capability allows for the IAF to employ such tactics if and when it makes sense. If you they don't induct such platforms and train for specific scenarios, they won't have the option at all.

Vivek, what constraints would lead the IAF to choose the apaches as the platform of choice for SEAD, over say the Jaguars ? Clearly the USAF thought along those lines when they employed the apaches in that role in GW1.