Managing Chinese Threat

[SSridhar]

In other developments, Japanese Prime Minister Abe, during his talks with the Philippines counterpart President Benigo Aquino on July 27 in Manila, offered to provide the Southeast Asian state with ten patrol ships. These ships are to boost the coast guard capabilities of the Philippines. While extending Japan’s economic as well as maritime support to the Philippines, Abe also expressed support towards the latter’s decision to apply for mediation by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea over a territorial dispute with China.

Yomiuri Shimbun

[SSridhar]

The Japanese Defence Ministry Considering 'Attack' Capabilities - Yomiuri Shimbun

The Defense Ministry indicated Friday that it was willing to consider having the capability to attack enemy bases, possibly including missile facilities in North Korea.

Japan needs to strengthen its comprehensive capability to respond to ballistic missile attacks, the ministry said in an interim report on a new basic defense program.

“Striking power is one thing that will be considered,” a ministry official said, elaborating on what “comprehensive capability” means.

The report was submitted to Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera.

The ministry is working to draw up the new program by the end of this year.

The administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided in January to review the current program, which was adopted by a previous administration in 2010.

In the interim report, the ministry also noted the need to be better prepared to protect important facilities in the country, including nuclear power plants and bases of the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military.

The possibility of Japan facing guerrilla and special-forces attacks simultaneously with missile attacks cannot be ruled out, the report pointed out.

On the defense of remote islands, including the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, which are also claimed by China, the ministry said it plans to improve the SDF’s amphibious capabilities, develop supply bases and use private-sector logistics networks.

The report underlined the necessity of high-altitude drone operations for detecting unusual situations in wider areas surrounding Japan at an early stage. The ministry’s budget for fiscal 2013, ending in March next year, includes funds to study the introduction of the U.S. military’s Global Hawk drone.

[SSridhar]

Kerry's Pak Visit Worries China - Saibal Dasgupta, ToI

US secretary of state John Kerry's Pak visit caused anxiety in Beijing which wants Islamabad to reduce its dependence on Washington. During a recent visit of prime minister Nawaz Sharif, China offered assistance in various fields including development of an economic corridor running through Pakistan.

The state-controlled Global Times ran a commentary that said: "Washington is quickening its steps to implement its 'pivot to Asia' and 'return to South Asia' strategies."

Calling Pakistan a strategic partner, it said," The future development of US-Pak ties is worthy of our close attention."

A government expert recently said China's plan to build the economic corridor in Pakistan was meant to offset a similar programme unveiled by the US.

"This basic idea, to a certain degree, coincides with that of the 'New Silk Road' that the US is promoting in Central Asia. The two plans may face competition in the future," Wu Zhaoli, an expert with the state-run National Institute of International Strategy, said in an article.

The economic corridor plan is being challenged in Pakistan by certain sections which feel that it will almost entirely bypass the backward and sensitive border regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and bring benefits to the Punjab and Sind provinces.

[Victor]

what prevents paki subs shooting indian shippin passing in arabian seas??

Common sense, with P8Is on the prowl from Hormuz to Malacca. But pakis being pakis, maybe not.

[manjgu]

Ssridhar... The point i am making is that in a india china shooting match in the mountains, what happens at sea will be of marginal consequence to the outcome. I am not starting with a assumption that pakistan, china are awesome. I am only saying with current and projected force levels neither India or china will be able to protect its shipping ( for varying reasons) or totally disrupt the other sides SLOC. and that pakistan will be actively assisting the chinese in targetting indian shipping. and in the fog of war u cant rule out pakis making hay, though technically we will not be at war with the pakis. Do we have the werewithal to tackle such a threat is the moot point.

[SSridhar]

. . . and that pakistan will be actively assisting the chinese in targetting indian shipping. and in the fog of war u cant rule out pakis making hay, though technically we will not be at war with the pakis. Do we have the werewithal to tackle such a threat is the moot point.

I have answered already about our ability to track Pakistani assistance and take care of them. If the Pakistanis think foolishly that they will provide assistance to the Chinese while 'not being technically at war' with India, thereby not expecting Indian retaliation, they will pay a big price. It will not be too difficult for IN to expose that perfidy. The Indian political leadership may pretend not to understand the Pakistani perfidy but the armed forces do not. I want to draw an analogy here. the 2003 version of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine stated the 'no guarantee' to NNWS who align with NWS (thereby partially withdrawing the Negative Security Assurance to NNWS).

As for the wherewithal, there is no moot point, at least in my mind.

[rajrang]

Thanks Sridhar and others for the illuminating discussions.

Clearly the giant Indian peninsula dominates the Northern Indian Ocean (especially the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea). This is what the Americans had in mind last year when referring repeatedly to India as a net provider of security for the shipping lanes that traverse this region. All of this was camouflaged as a fight against "piracy" but the decision makers in China know the hidden agenda. Indian aircraft both naval (aircraft carriers) and air force (shore based) can in theory inflict serious punishment on the Chinese navy. In principle, large numbers (i.e. a hundred or more) of shore based aircraft can sink any Chinese carrier task force daring to enter the northern Indian Ocean in the event of an India-China conflict. Total air superiority of the Northern Indian Ocean is possible. The basing of Su 30s at Thanjavur, upgrading air assets in the A & N islands as well as the new carriers are steps in this direction. India's air force should also have a potent and NUMEROUS (i.e. several hundred aircraft) Southern Command. In addition if the US and India can enter into a defense arrangement, then, combined with the US bases at Diego Garcia and Bahrain and possible sale of US naval assets (aircraft carriers?) to India, the Chinese navy can forget entering the Indian Ocean with hostile intentions for a long time to come.

Just as China has declared that Taiwan, S China Sea and Tibet are its core interests, India should likewise declare the northern Indian Ocean as its core interest, but this should be done in political coordination with the US and its friends. The latter would warmly welcome this. But such a declaration should be accompanied with teeth by continuing re-arming.

As far as Pakistan entering the fray, the threat of a naval blockade should suffice. Besides the US can be expected to lean on them and keep them quiet.

One impediment to the above scenarios will be any Chinese military advantages vis-à-vis India in the Himalayas. Even a possibility of a Chinese military victory and loss of territory and face in the Himalayas will prevent India from playing a strong hand in the Indian Ocean. This scenario is precisely why China has rapidly developed its infrastructure in Tibet. This is also precisely why China wants to preserve this infrastructure advantage by freezing Indian infrastructure enhancements through a new border agreement. Logically one would expect China to be more concerned about the Indian Ocean than Tibet. Thus it is equally paramount for India to maintain powerful mountain forces. The new mountain divisions, MSC etc. are steps in this direction.


The other impediment will be the Indian Government's strategic timidity and inability (unwillingness?) to develop a more potent defense relationship with the US and its friends (Japan, Australia et al.).

[member_20317]

The Chinese vulnerability on the high seas is going to grow even as its economy grows ,as both raw material,fuel supplies,etc. and finished products all have to use the sea lanes ,esp. the IOR and Pacific.The new Arctic route will ease matters a bit,but not substantiallly.Pipelines are extremely vulnerable,especially when located through inhospitable mountain terrain.The German navy in WW2 conducted a huge campaign against merchantmen right off the US coast.It is why the sub crisis in the IN should be accorded the highest priority and urgent acquisitiions of extra subs made asap.The IN should plan for a sustainable sub campaign against the PLAN and China's merchant fleet in the Indo-China Sea ,taking the fight to the enemy's waterfront! As it is,the PLAN has some stormy weather ahead in its maritime relations with Japan,judging from this Chinese report.

<sniped>

Most interesting to note that Japan intends to "occupy" the disputed islands.It is doing at sea what India should be doing in Tibet.

Also all this presumes that the economic traffic will be the way it is 10-40 years from today.

India and China are like to big bullies sitting on a table in a casino.

Nuke Subs are the cheapest possible solution to giving a global strategic riposte. But these will require much more investments. So the fight between India and China I feel will have two distinct aspects to it. One is aspect that they are good at. Long drawn out scheming. We Indians are only moderately good at countering this. Western universalism and the burgeoning population of ambivalent people, will gradually sap away this advantage. The natural instinct to stand ground will gradually find itself running against the 'pragmatic and principled stand' calling for economic cooperation. This can hurt us but this can also be used as a double edged sword with the business edge towards them. Thus the second aspect of the long term economic dominance is another matter that can be evolved, practiced and eventually managed well by Indians. We have to make sure that in the short term we keep the differential at a manageable ~10-15 years gap. This method will also have willing cooperation of the ambivalent part of our population. The caveat is this will require an on the job learning. And this will also give us the requisite money for the nuke subs based strategy. These subs can also carry modified K-15s that are designed for killing flotillas. The need for this kind of management is perceived by the ambivalents also.

Out into the future. 25-50 year plan perhaps.

[Samudragupta]

The problem that we are failing to see here is how to respond to a Chinese military move....be it in land...air..sea..or cyber space....and there is no problem for me to admit that India has no plan to respond to this Chinese provocation or in case of more serious polico-military move in either through land -air- sea-aerospace-cyberspace domain.....the whole paradigm of looking at the problem through army vs Navy debate is practically flawed....Rajan has just brought the airforce in to the debate...in as much Indian Navy's own future perspective plan till 2027 does not see itself as the most dominating force in the Indian ocean....its to be noted that the Chinese see Indian ocean of the future as a hotly contested strategic space between the different powers with no single power dominating the scene....

[svinayak]

PRC has one weakness which India has to exploit
PRC wants to be no# 1 in Asia and also in the world.

All India has to do is to deny them no# 1 position in Asia.

[member_23692]

PRC has one weakness which India has to exploit
PRC wants to be no# 1 in Asia and also in the world.

All India has to do is to deny them no# 1 position in Asia.

Thats right. India does not have that weakness because India has NO aspirations. It is better to have NO ASPIRATIONS.

[svinayak]

Denying some one else is also an aspiration.

[SSridhar]

China sends ships to disputed Senkaku territories - Business Line

China on Friday sent four coastguard vessels into waters near a group of islands also claimed by Japan, the state-owned Xinhua news agency reported.

The Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands are also claimed by China and Taiwan, which call them Diaoyu and Tiaoyutai respectively.

The move is the latest in a long-running dispute over the territory, which encompasses busy shipping lanes and is thought to be rich in fish stocks and mineral resources.

Japan’s purchase of three of the islets in September sparked protests in dozens of Chinese cities and led to a boycott of Japanese products in the world’s second-largest economy.

[Philip]

Ravi,last year alone,"22" PLAN sub contacts were experienced in the waters off SL and our coastline from official reports.You are right to say that the issue cannot be viewed as an IN vs IA fight for funds,etc. Our response should be holistic,using the best available means/service assets to win the skirmish or battle.The PLAN is still scratching its ghoolies as to how it can overcome the "Malacca dilemma" ,and sadly-for them,geography is on our side.Apart from the 3 planned carriers,we have the unsinkable "INS India",our dagger-like landmass which juts into the IOR-plus our island territories,from which LRMP aircraft,strategic bombers and long-legged air-dominance fighters can sanitise our backyard.Our strategy should go a step further and take the fight into the enemy's own perceived "pond",the Indo-China Sea,lordship of its energy wealth is already hotly disputed by the littoral nations also inimical to China.Just as China has upped the ante by seizing Gwadar,so too should India take up the earlier Vietnamese offer of a base in Vietnam.As Chairman Mao said,a 'loud fart" is better than along speech."Farting" in China's backyard is the best message to the Zhongnanhai clique to retreat from its current policy of aggro against India.With Japan resisting,the Chinese are certainly going to live in "interesting times".

[rajrang]

Our strategy should go a step further and take the fight into the enemy's own perceived "pond",the Indo-China Sea,lordship of its energy wealth is already hotly disputed by the littoral nations also inimical to China.Just as China has upped the ante by seizing Gwadar,so too should India take up the earlier Vietnamese offer of a base in Vietnam.

The Kennedy administration had the doctrine that if they do not fight and stop the communists (i.e. former SU and China) in Vietnam, then, they will be fighting them in California. Similarly, if India does not stop the Chinese in the Indo-China Sea (in coordination with other countries), then, the next generation of Indians will be trying to stop them in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Then it will become an existential threat to India. This is somewhat similar to having missed the boat in Tibet (i.e. keeping the Chinese out of Tibet) or Afghanistan (i.e. stopping the earlier invasions in Afghanistan). Key regions to the security of the Indian subcontinent, in retrospect, will appear to be Afghanistan, Tibet and the Indo-China Sea. The first two were lost. Perhaps the battle of the Indo-China sea will not be lost, more so because other big countries are involved (US, Japan).

[rajrang]

PRC has one weakness which India has to exploit
PRC wants to be no# 1 in Asia and also in the world.

All India has to do is to deny them no# 1 position in Asia.

If only India can deny them no 1 position south of the Himalayas.
Together India, US and Australia can deny them no 1 in the entire Indian Ocean.
The US, Japan, India and ASEAN can deny them no 1 in the Indo-China Sea.
Lastly, the US and Japan can deny them no 1 in the Western Pacific.

China can be no 1 within China (minus Taiwan and with some luck minus Tibet).

[Philip]

It is slowly dawning upon the Chinese that as they expand their interests dramatically around the world,in the search for energy and mineral wealth,their logistic chain becomes very vulnerable.Establishing strings of pearls along the way also requires a very powerful navy to be able to support its merchantment.It is on a learning curve,with its anti-piracy ops in the Arabian Sea/IOR,where PLAN warships are deployed now on a permanent basis.This is where we should also deploy some of our warships and subs (if we have enough of them!) in the Indo-China Sea,using Vietnamese ports for logistic purposes.

We must also remember that the Chinese think far,far ahead into the future.50 years is nothing for the PRC.Already its navy is receiving the max. increase in funding from the budget .While we may smirk at the situ today,where the "Malacca dilemma" is an unresolved issue,what about two decades from now? By then the PLAN will have at least 3 large carriers in service,learnt the ropes of carrier aviation,field stealth aircraft perhaps on them too,and will have 80+ new subs including at least a dozen nuclear attack subs. The US is already downsizing its military.VAYU in a recent issue had a piece about the effect it was having upon US mil. aviation. Sri Lanka today says that the Chinese will not be allowed military use of its facilities,but,the Chinese have been given a 99 yr. lease to a whole new "Port City" to be reclaimed off Colombo Port,already expanded by the PRC.SL is heavily in eco and pol. debt to the Chinese and one fine day when we wake up and find that the PLAN is squatting in Trinco,what will we do? Invade?! The strangulation of India is taking place slowly,just like the Chinese water torture,one drop/squeeze at a time. Unlesswe take aggressive measures at the political,diplomatic and military level in sync.,as Raj has said,we will be fighting them in Kerala! Return of the Chinese fishing nets what?

[Christopher Sidor]

The problem is that like a frog in a well, we are too much accustomed to acting within the four walled confines of the well. We are still dreaming of using malacca straits, when the need of the hour is to build a navy which can go into the western pacific. We need a army which has the logistics strength to go right upto the inner-Mongolia border, ie the border between inner-Mongolia and Mongolia. As of today PRC's troops can come inside our territory, violating the macmohan line in trucks, camp for weeks, but our troops have to trek to the same position. What effectiveness will an average soldier have when he is asked to trek and then fight vs a soldier who rides to the battlefield and the fights?

[Philip]

Chris,that is a v. good Q.Unlike the Chinese,whose avowed goal is to replace the US as the globe's most powerful eco. and mil. power,hopefully by 20250,India seems to drift on regardless of the fast changing strategic scenario.Hover,more than modest plans are afoot,knee-jerk though may have been,but at least with Seabid/Kadamba,a dream of the late CNS Adm.Dawson decades ago,in its second phase and a similarly ambitious base on the east coast south of Vizag at Rambili coming up,the IB has shown that it is alive to the threats of the future and these bases when finished will be a good launching pad for future out-of-IOR ops as you've envisioned.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... ing-navys/

High-Tech Naval Base to counter Chinese Expanding Navy
By Col (Dr) P K Vasudeva
Issue Net Edition | Date : 03 Apr , 2013

he strategic ambitions of China in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea have received a giant boost with its assuming charge of the Gwadar Port from Pakistan after taking charge of port operations from Port of Singapore Authority, which has been managing operations for the last five years. The port is strategically located at the mouth of the Gulf of Hormuz and just 90 km from the Iranian border.

The Indian Navy is developing a new top-secret naval base for its nuclear submarines, code-named Project Varsha located within a radius of approximately 200 kilometers (124.27 statute miles) from Visakhapatnam.

It is a matter of grave concern for India as China´s presence in the Indian Ocean poses a serious threat to Indian maritime operations. Defence Minister A K Antony also expressed his concerns while inaugurating aero show in Bangalore recently.

It is a matter of great satisfaction that slowly but steadily, India’s new futuristic naval base is beginning to take concrete shape on the eastern seaboard. The strategic base, with an eye firmly on China, will eventually even have underground pens or bunkers to protect nuclear submarines both from spy satellites and enemy air attacks.

Sources said a flurry of discussions, presentations and meetings have been held in the PMO and Ministry of Defence (MoD) over the last couple of months to firm up “expansion plans” for a base located near Rambilli called “Project Varsha” on the Andhra coast — just about 50 km from the Eastern Naval Command headquarters at Visakhapatnam — over the coming decade.

The Indian Navy is developing a new top-secret naval base for its nuclear submarines, code-named Project Varsha located within a radius of approximately 200 kilometers (124.27 statute miles) from Visakhapatnam. Previous news reports suggested that Gangavaram had been the initial site for the new base.1

The new base is designed to support all 8-12 Arihant -class submarines to be built for the Indian Navy, and it will include state-of-the-art nuclear engineering support facilities and extensive crew accommodation. The Indian Navy is seeking foreign technical assistance pertaining to nuclear safety features for the base. While designed principally as a nuclear submarine support facility, the new base can accommodate other naval vessels because of the Indian Navy’s expansion. This facility has been compared to the top-secret Hainan nuclear submarine base for the Chinese PLA Navy. This east coast base expansion program by the Indian Navy is in direct response to Chinese naval expansion into the region.

In addition to Project Varsha, in late 2009, the Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL), located at Visakhapatnam, was transferred from the Ministry of Shipping to the Ministry of Defence in order to support the Arihant -class nuclear submarine construction program.

Project Varsha’s ambitious scale in the years ahead will rival the expansive “Project Seabird” under which the Karwar naval base has come up in coastal Karnataka to give India both strategic depth and operational flexibility on the western seaboard against Pakistan. While Karwar will decongest the over-crowded Mumbai port, the new base will do the same for Vizag on the east.

India’s highest decision making body on defence matters, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), has cleared the Indian Navy’s plans to embark on a $2-billion major expansion of the strategic Karwar naval base in the southern state of Karnataka where a host of warships, submarines and the refurbished carrier INS Vikramaditya will be berthed.

Naval assets to protect India’s long coastline and keep watch over the crucial trade corridors in the Indian Ocean are essential to Indian interests.

At its meeting held here under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the plans got the necessary nod, senior Indian Navy officers said here.

The expansion of Karwar naval base will be carried out under Project Seabird Phase 2A, which will entail construction of facilities to berth India’s key aircraft carriers including the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier and its follow-on.

The proposal for the expansion strategic naval base at Karwar involves construction of a wide range of new facilities and augmentation of certain existing facilities. Under Project Seabird Phase 2, the Karwar naval station will get an airbase, armament depot, dockyard complex and missile silos, apart from additional jetties, berthing and anchorage facilities.

The Indian Navy indicated that after the completion of Project Seabird Phase 2A by 2017-18, around 30 major warships will be based at Karwar. To begin with, Indian Navy will deploy the refurbished Admiral Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya), Scorpene submarines and a number of surface ships at the base. In addition, a Naval Air Station will be established there for deploying fixed and rotary wing ship-based military aircraft. The eventual aim is to base 50 major warships at Karwar after Phase-2B is completed.

The Project Seabird has been a victim of various delays and cost-overruns since it was conceived in 1985. The first Phase of the expansion was completed at a cost of roughly $584.25 million in 2005-06 enabling the Navy to base more than 15 warships at Karwar. Despite a slow start, India has managed to pull the project through with the main intention of decongesting naval dockyards at Mumbai.

The Karwar naval base is India’s third major naval base after Mumbai and Visakhapatnam on the east coast. Unlike Mumbai or Vizag base, Karwar is the only naval base in India exclusively available to Indian Navy. The expansion of the naval base will turn Karwar into the largest Defence zone, not only in India, but also in Asia. Considered as India’s third largest naval base, the Karwar Naval Base has also been considered the perfect place to initiate submarine operations due to its depth of water.

The Navy plans to operate at least three SSBNs and six SSNs in the long run for effective nuclear deterrence.

The Karwar base will aid the navy’s blue-water operations in the Indian Ocean region and provide Indian Navy with the much-needed operational flexibility and strategic advantage. Besides, the naval base will protect the country’s Arabian Sea maritime routes. The base is also valuable for its location and its ability to move beyond the fundamental capacity and security limitations of India’s other two naval base.

Karwar can currently base 11 major warships and 10 yard-craft after completion of its Phase-I at a cost of Rs 2,629 crore. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had last year approved Rs 13,000 crore for its expansion under Phase-IIA to ensure it can berth 32 major warships and submarines by 2018-19.2

Karwar will be the home base for aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the 44,570-tonne Admiral Gorshkov being refitted in Russia for $2.33 billion, as well as the six French Scorpene submarines being built at Mazagon Docks for Rs 23,562 crore.

Though it is still very early for Project Varsha to come up, some bill it as an answer to China’s massive underground nuclear submarine base at Yalong on the southernmost tip of Hainan Island, which houses its new Shang-class SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) and the Jin-class SSBNs (nuclear- powered submarines with long-range nuclear missiles).

Although land acquisitions and incremental development work on the base under the secretive project kicked off a few years ago, it is set to take off in a major way with the construction of tunnels, jetties, depots, workshops and accommodation. “Further land acquisitions for the sprawling base to be spread over 20 sq km are now underway, with long-term budget allocations also being planned,” said a defence source.3

With the completion of these projects in the next three to five years India will have an edge over the Chinese Navy…

The endeavour dovetails into the overall policy to bolster force-levels on the eastern seaboard, with new warships, aircraft and spy drones as well as forward-operating (FOP) and operational turnaround (OTR) bases, to counter China’s expanding footprint in the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Naval assets to protect India’s long coastline and keep watch over the crucial trade corridors in the Indian Ocean are essential to Indian interests. The strategic value of force projection beyond the Andaman Islands is seen in terms of deterrence as well given the aggressive military Chinese expansion.

India’s own SSBN programme is also poised to turn the corner soon with sea trials of the 6,000-tonne INS Arihant slated to begin off Visakhapatnam. INS Arihant and its three “follow-on” SSBNs, which will complete India’s elusive nuclear weapon triad since they will be armed with the `K’ series of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as other frontline warships will be housed at the new base.4

The Navy plans to operate at least three SSBNs and six SSNs in the long run for effective nuclear deterrence. Moreover, after inducting the 8,140-tonne INS Chakra submarine on a 10-year lease from Russia last year, India is now negotiating the lease of another such nuclear-powered Akula-II class submarine, as was reported earlier.

With the completion of these projects in the next three to five years India will have an edge over the Chinese Navy, which is a welcome step.

[SSridhar]

The problem is that like a frog in a well, we are too much accustomed to acting within the four walled confines of the well. We are still dreaming of using malacca straits, when the need of the hour is to build a navy which can go into the western pacific. We need a army which has the logistics strength to go right upto the inner-Mongolia border, ie the border between inner-Mongolia and Mongolia. As of today PRC's troops can come inside our territory, violating the macmohan line in trucks, camp for weeks, but our troops have to trek to the same position. What effectiveness will an average soldier have when he is asked to trek and then fight vs a soldier who rides to the battlefield and the fights?

We are in this sorry state for a couple of reasons, both of our own making.

Reason one is that we even wanted to disband the armed forces around the time we got our Independence. The reasons could be many, our pacifist intention, the fear of an Army takeover, the state of our economy and our priorities etc. They may be irrelevant to this thread, but that fact remains.

Reason two, the civilian oversight of our armed forces has been so tight so far that their inputs were never considered necessary in forming our geo-strategic and geo-political responses to emerging situations or long-term planning. The Prime Ministers usually kept foreign affairs to themselves or employed weak Foreign Ministers so that the PMO could ride rough shod over the place.

With the result, we have to make do with whatever we have today. Forget about a much stronger, larger and more powerful China when we do not even have a vision against Pakistan which has arrested us and stunted us for decades and we have meekly reacted to every situation and only for that situation. Even today we are talking of appeasing Pakistan even as it mounts another deadly attack on our interests in Afghanistan. We are hopeless in strategic planning.

[Austin]

India, China set to ink border pact to prevent face-off

A high-level Indian delegation, with representatives from the foreign and defence ministries, will go to Beijing in September to "fine-tune" the BDCA after India finalised its "second counter-draft" to the "revised draft" submitted by China earlier. "The final BDCA can now be settled across the table," said a source.

The BDCA goes "further" than earlier pacts like the 2005 joint protocol on the "modalities for implementation of military CBMs along the LAC" in charting out "more de-escalatory mechanisms" and military-to-military interactions to ensure local issues are settled locally between "local commanders on the ground".

The two sides, for instance, have agreed to additional BPM (border personnel meeting) set-ups in all the three sectors — western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal) - to add to the existing ones at Chushul, Nathu La and Bum La.

While both sides have agreed to Kibuthu in Arunachal Pradesh, the BPM points in the western and middle sectors are yet to be pinpointed. "The Mana Pass-Lipulekh area in the middle sector has, however, not worked out so far. The aim is that the BPM mechanism should effectively kick in whenever there is a situation on the border," a source said.

India wants "greater predictability and stability in how incidents are handled" after the 21-day "unusual" face-off in April-May, during which the two rival armies pitched tents and carried out banner drills after PLA troops intruded 19 km into Depsang valley in the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector in Ladakh.

India has also proposed a DGMO-level hotline between the two armies, on the lines of the one New Delhi has with Islamabad. Conversely, there could be a hotline between the Eastern Army Command chief based in Kolkata and the commander of the Chinese Chengdu Military Area Command, which is responsible for Tibet and almost the entire LAC.

The first Chinese draft for the proposed BDCA submitted in March had raised the hackles of the defence ministry and Army because it suggested both sides should freeze existing troop and infrastructure levels along the LAC.

That came even as the government was getting ready to approve the overall Rs 90,000 crore proposal to raise a new mountain strike corps along with two "independent" infantry brigades and two "independent" armoured brigades (a total of over 80,000 soldiers) over the next eight years to plug operational gaps as well as acquire "some ground offensive capabilities" against China. India, after all, has lagged far behind China's massive build-up of military infrastructure along the LAC.

China later agreed to drop the clauses concerned in the BDCA draft. Then, on July 17, the Cabinet Committee on Security cleared raising of the new mountain corps and brigades.

[SSridhar]

Chinese Troops Stop IA from Patrolling in Indian Territory - ToI

Amid a spate of incursions by China in Ladakh, its troops are also resorting to tactics like preventing Indian Army from patrolling posts in this sector along the border which was well within India's territory.

In what is being described as an aggressive approach by China, the tactics have come to the fore in the wake of yet another incident last week when Indian troops launched its patrol "Tiranga" from Trade Junction area in north of Ladakh for two posts located 14 km up in the higher reaches along the line of actual control (LAC).

The Indian Army personnel were stopped by Chinese troops who came mounted on heavy and light vehicles, official sources said on Sunday.

The patrol party was shown a banner that it was Chinese territory and that they cannot proceed to the posts, they said.

The sources said the Chinese troops were aggressive in their approach while stopping the Indian patrol who were at their posts.

These posts are well inside Indian territory, the sources said, adding that from April this year, the patrol for these forward bases were launched 21 times and only twice it could complete its mission.

Chinese have erected an observation post which kept a vigil on movement of Indian troops and as soon as an Indian patrol party is ready to leave, they are intercepted midway and sent back, the sources said, adding the matter would be taken up during the next Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) at Chushul.

In the same sector in Ladakh, there were instances when Chinese military vehicles were spotted in Depsang Bulge and Daulat Beg Oldi(DBO) sector where the two armies had seen a 21-day stand-off from April 15 this year.

Indian troops comprising mainly Indo-Tibetan Border Police(ITBP) immediately swung into action and prevented the "free-run" of Chinese military vehicles in the Indian territory.

In the last BPM meeting held on July 27, India also raised objections to a tower being constructed in the Chinese side on the LAC in Demchok-Fukhche sector.

During the meeting with the Chinese side which was led by Colonel Wang Jun Xian, the Indian side said the construction was in violation of peace and tranquality agreement signed between the two countries in 1993.

According to the agreement, no construction work has to be undertaken at the LAC by either country.

The Chinese side claimed that the tower was actually a weather station for the benefit of the people of the area and instead informed the Indian delegation that its Army was engaged in military activities in Fukhche.

The Indian side led by Brigadier Sanjeev Rai told the Chinese team that PLA troops were regularly entering into the Indian area, sources said.

It gave instances like on July 16 and 19 when the Chinese troops entered 1.2km deep into Indian territory, on July 17 (2.5km), on July 20 (aggressive patrol entered 200 metres) and intervening night of July 25-26 (3.5km).

These incursions mainly happened in Chumar and Demchok areas, located 300km from Leh.

The sources said that the "assertive posturing" by the Chinese troops was a worrying trend which had been seen lately after the April 15 faceoff at the DBO sector.

Chumar is the last town after which Himachal Pradesh starts. This area also has the distinction of having a defined international border with China. This area is not accessible from the Chinese side whereas the Indian side has a road almost to the last point on which the army can carry a load upto nine tonnes. {We keep saying this advantage ad nauseum and yet it is the Chinese who seem to be enjoying the advantage}

All Indian units located along the LAC have been asked to maintain a tight vigil in their area of responsibilities (AOR) and launch frequent patrols to the higher reaches, the sources said.

[Philip]

The Chinese will keep on "scinching" into Indian territory claiming that we are intruding.At some point we must bite the bullet.The GOI/armed forces have to prepare for this on a war footing.I predict more dangerous and provocative incidents just before the elections and even if we sign an agreement with the dragon,it will simply ignore it in practice.What effect have previous agreements on the LOC had? B*gger all! We will be so preoccupied with election fever,that it will be the opportune time for the Chinese to strike swiftly.Features as in the WEEK mag,telling the Chinese to "p*ss off",lauding our proposed Mountain Strike Corps,are premature,as setting up the same will take a few years at least.In the interests of the country,the GOI should sit with the Oppn. and swiftly clear in principle weaponry and eqpt. reqd. most urgently on a war footing basis.I am sure that there will be cooperation from almost all parties,barring some Sinophiles,for the same.

At the same time we should prepare for a massive counter attack strategy in case of Chinese military aggression.Identifying the key Chinese mil. entities which need to be taken out,esp. the destruction of the Tibetan railway,which is the key lifeline for logistic supplies to Tibet.The IN should also take out the PLAN flotilla in the Arabian Sea on anti-piracy duties as well as intercepting and/or sinking Chinese oil tankers and merchantmen transiting the IOR.The sinking/capture of even a couple of Chinese ships would send a strong signal to the PRC that it is extremely vulnerable on the high seas.The earlier report of a PLAN nuclear sub off the A&N islands indicates that the Chinese are acutely aware of this vulnerability and are trying to find solutions for the same.

[harbans]

At the same time we should prepare for a massive counter attack strategy in case of Chinese military aggression.Identifying the key Chinese mil. entities which need to be taken out,esp. the destruction of the Tibetan railway,which is the key lifeline for logistic supplies to Tibet.The IN should also take out the PLAN flotilla in the Arabian Sea on anti-piracy duties as well as intercepting and/or sinking Chinese oil tankers and merchantmen transiting the IOR.The sinking/capture of even a couple of Chinese ships would send a strong signal to the PRC that it is extremely vulnerable on the high seas.The earlier report of a PLAN nuclear sub off the A&N islands indicates that the Chinese are acutely aware of this vulnerability and are trying to find solutions for the same.

Philip Ji, what is the point of all that if after doing all of that, we acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over KM, Tibet and many signed off areas on the map already. The Chinese are acting provocatively precisely because they are uncertain of the next set up and know this GoI will do everything possible to keep and sweep things under the carpet. More than any military action based on the current premises and understandings of the border and Chinese presence in Tibet, the only option left for us is to de-recognize Chinese presence in Tibet and then plan for all the above. No Indian Govt setup can do all of that above for a few desolate and unihabited square kilometers of land, you and others must realize that very very important underlying theme. Change that and all the above what you wrote becomes doable. Right now it is impossible to do all that. We are withing the confines of our own understood doctrines incapabale of mounting such a challenge. The Chinese know that.

[SSridhar]

India treating Bhutan as a 'protectorate', says Chinese Commentary - Ananth Krishnan, The Hindu

A commentary published on Monday by a Chinese tabloid known for its hard-line views has hit out at India for “interfering” in Bhutan’s recent elections and attempting to prevent the recently developing ties between Thimphu and Beijing.

The article, penned by Liu Zongyi, a scholar of strategic affairs at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), a well-known think-tank, suggested that New Delhi may have sought to influence the outcome in the recent election on account of its anxiety over China’s recent overtures to Bhutan.

Last year, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said, in his first ever meeting with his Bhutanese counterpart, that China was ready to open diplomatic ties with Bhutan and solve their border disputes.

Following Mr. Wen’s meeting in 2012 with the former Prime Minister Jigme Thinley, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying travelled to Thimphu last August. The two meetings - marking the highest-level diplomatic engagement seen between the two countries - appeared aimed at accelerating steps to establish diplomatic ties.

Monday’s commentary, however, argued that “India won’t allow Bhutan to freely engage in diplomacy with China and solve the border issue”. The article was published by the Communist Party-run tabloid the Global Times, which is known for its nationalistic views and does not, according to Chinese officials, {the Chinese are very opaque and others have to scrounge for bits and pieces of information from various sources generally. It then becomes easy for the Chinese to use the media to leak information with 'plausible deniability', the hallmark of Chinese and Pakistani perfidy} reflect government policy, Mr. Liu, the author of the commentary, suggested that India had pressured Bhutan to not engage with China, even claiming that “former
Indian ambassador to Bhutan Pavan K. Varma was forced to resign due to his failure to prevent Bhutan developing relations with China”.

“New ambassador V.P. Haran, who used to be the acting ambassador to Nepal and was keen on practicing a carrot-and-stick policy, has played a big role in the PDP’s latest victory in Bhutan," he claimed. "The withdrawal of subsidies before Bhutan’s elections reflected that India never gives up its power politics where it doesn’t need to,” Mr. Liu added, describing “Indian influence on Bhutan’s elections” as “a tragedy for Thimphu”.

Mr. Liu noted that Bhutan had been looking to diversify its diplomatic engagement and reduce its reliance on India. He said it had also recently “made significant progress in border negotiations with China through active diplomacy”.

“As its largest trade partner, assistance provider and creditor, India controls the whole oil consumption of Bhutan and nearly 90 percent of the country's hydropower development,” he said. “Bhutan’s leadership was worried about this abnormal relationship, and was afraid that Bhutan would be annexed by India some day. In 2005, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck announced he would drop the ruling element of the monarchy when the country realised democratic elections in 2008, hoping to gain greater legitimacy”.

“Bhutan is still firmly under Indian control,” Mr. Liu concluded. “In the 21st century, when concepts like ‘protectorates’ and ‘client states’ are outdated, the India-Bhutan relationship seems to be rather unique”.

China has been clearly trying to drive a wedge between India and Bhutan, the last of the nations in the immediate Indian neighbourhood where Indian influence had not diminished. China has been trying to gate-crash into those nations under the Indian sphere of influence (and succeeded to a large extent too) by using various methods, through largesse, through military assistance, through support in international fora, and through exploiting minor problems between India and these nations. The idea is to keep India constantly off-balance, keeping it confined to diplomatic issues in South Asia, and diminishing the importance of India overall. In the process, China is able to increase its foot-print around India and into the Indian Ocean, something that China is deeply interested in. The nation with a real interest in warm waters of the Indian Ocean is China (unlike a fake theory circulated about the Russian ambitions during the days of the Great Game Part I).

Thus we see that China is using every weapon against India in its holistic war with us and we are struggling to cope up with the Chinese assault because we are always reacting to the emerging situation rather than act.

This commentary on Bhutan, coming immediately after the defeat of a Bhutanese government which tried to get closer to China, indicates that China has added one more armour in its relentless attack on India, Bhutan.

[SSridhar]

MPs raise Issue of Chinese Incursions - The Hindu

The issue of recent spate of incursions by the Chinese was raised in the Lok Sabha with 29 MPs, cutting across party lines, querying the Government which sought to downplay the issue.

Answering questions on the incursions, Defence Minister A.K. Antony said in the last three years since January 2010, there have been a total of 28 violations of Indian airspace by other countries which are taken up with them.

“There is no commonly delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. There are areas along the border where India and China have different perceptions of the LAC and both sides undertake patrols up to their respective positions there,” he said in reply to queries whether the Chinese troops had intruded and destroyed Indian bunkers in Ladakh.

“On account of differences in perception of LAC, certain transgression incidents do take place on ground. Government regularly takes up any transgression with the Chinese side through established mechanisms,” the Defence Minister said.

To a query on whether Chinese have blocked developmental work in Indian territory, Mr. Antony said, “Government takes adequate measures to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of India by reviewing the threat perception from time to time and takes appropriate steps to meet the threats.”

“Developmental work in border areas is carried out through close coordination between security forces and local administration,” he said.

The 29 MPs who raised the questions include Saugata Roy (TMC), Anurag Thakur (BJP), Neeraj Shekhar (SP) and Arjun Meghwal (BJP).

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^^
Notice how it is the LAC and not McMohan Line. We have obviously given up on getting what is ours.

[Cosmo_R]

^^^^
Notice how it is the LAC and not McMohan Line. We have obviously given up on getting what is ours.

Are you referring to the McMahon line in the north or the McMohan line which is west of Mumbai?

[Prem]

^^^^
Notice how it is the LAC and not McMohan Line. We have obviously given up on getting what is ours.

Are you referring to the McMahon line in the north or the McMohan line which is west of Mumbai?

Secret Border settlement as per Man Mohan Line written in water ?

[Cosmo_R]

Secret Border settlement as per Man Mohan Line written in water ?

Jhujar, thank you for being the straight guy and setting it up: the McMohan line is in the Arabian Sea because Mickey does not like to draw lines in the sand.

[Christopher Sidor]

Artur Chilingarov: What’s China got to do with the Arctic? -- The World Today

Ignore the title, there is nothing directly in the article about PRC, it is all about Russia and its claims in the arctic region. However there is this piece of info in the article.

It’s more the transport opportunities on the Northern Sea Route. This route shortens the distance (between East Asia and Europe) and cuts two weeks off the voyage. Already there have been experimental voyages by large tankers;

The distance mentioned and time savings figures given over here is in comparison to the traditional route between North-East Asia and Europe via Indian Ocean. The northern route mentioned above and the route via Central Asia and Russia to Europe are shorter as compared to the traditional route of sea-borne trade. And if we factor in Georgia and Azerbaijan into the equation than Russia can be omitted completely. i.e. PRC will have a direct route to the black sea and from there to Eastern Europe which will not be dependent on Russia at all. And if one wants a land based route then Iran can be roped in by PRC thus eliminating the Caspian Sea blockage all together. This leads one to question the utility of Malacca straits in the coming decade and after that in strangling of PRC's trade.

[Philip]

The "Man Mohan Line" is almost exactly as extensive as that of the late Mughal emperor Shah Alam,whose empire it was derisively said stretched from "Dilli to Palam"!

[Prem]

The Asia-Pacific Region is the New Middle East
http://www.policymic.com/articles/58265 ... iddle-east

The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics,” said then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an article published in 2011. She goes on to say that the region “is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.”From its outset, the Obama administration has been “rebalancing towards Asia,” recognizing the region's importance to the future of America’s security and economic growth.
Prior to a recent trip to India, Vice President Biden spoke on the importance of a growing mutually beneficial relationship with countries in the region, and ahead of his trip, included India in the economic and political coalition of Asia-Pacific countries the United States is striving to be partners with.The reason the Obama administration is making the Asia-Pacific a priority lies in the strong possibility that the United States, and many other countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region, feel threatened by China’s growing political and economic power. China’s recent tactics towards the United States famously include “currency manipulation,” a phrase that was frequently brought up in the 2012 elections, which essentially means the Chinese yuan is fixed to be competitive against the dollar. Although in recent months there has been an increase in the value of the yuan, President Obama is discussed these concerns over currency manipulation with President Xi during a visit last June.
For Japan and many East Asian countries, China’s rise has resulted in not only economic insecurity, but also political insecurity. One prime example is the strip of islands known as Senkaku, a source of territorial disputes that have lately been rekindled. Analysts say that “China is trying to wear down Japan’s resolve in the dispute, and possibly even trying to chip away at Japan’s claim of having effective control over the uninhabited islands established in part by its own maritime patrols.” America’s expanding partnership with East Asia is also a result of our attempt to normalize the trade balance and reduce the trade deficit. As stated by former Secretary Clinton, “Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.” Efforts to form partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region go back before the Obama administration, too. In 2005, the Bush administration liberalized the economies of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP).

In his speech before going to India, Vice President Biden said, “We are focused on the risks of disruption of commerce, proliferation, humanitarian disasters, conflict between nations, and the persistent threat caused by North Korea." Calling for trade fairness and a level playing field, Biden explained, “That means no intimidation, no coercion, no aggression and a commitment from all parties to reduce the risk of mistakes and miscalculation.”Clinton and Biden alike argue that the hostility between the U.S. and China must stop, with both countries benefiting from a positive relationship. China will benefit from American innovation and technology, and the U.S. will benefit from a fairer legal apparatus that protects such rights as intellectual property so that people’s inventions and businesses are not recreated abroad unfairly. In this area, the Obama administration has matched its rhetoric with money. Obama created the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC) to address unfair practices and barriers, and his most recent budget allocated $22 million to the cause. Overall the president has requested in his latest budget $1.2 billion for allocations in the Asia-Pacific region.The Obama administration's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific highlights continued strides to repair and encourage new relationships across the globe. With the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, this administration will undoubtedly switch its focus from Europe and the Middle East to the region that is sure to provide the largest challenges of the 21st century.

[Philip]

The viewpoint by R.Adm.Raja Menon,that China can be deterred by the IN is contested in this piece by a PhD student at King's College London,who says that "Mahanian" doctrine is "obsolete" in today's world of a new "Mil-tech environment" .US analysts however keep on modifying Mahan's doctrine to tech. change,which still remains the foundation for establishing maritime supremacy.Raja Menon in his rebuttal,echoes what I've pointed out that the Chinese expanding global search for energy and mineral resources,and its reverse direction flow of manufactured goods being exported by sea, will make its maritime fleet very difficult to protect and its vulnerability will be its Achilles heel in any future conflict with a powerful maritime power,esp. the US.India which dominates the IOR and which has a navy in deep expansion and modernisation mode,thus has an excellent asset with which to outflank the PRC in any future spat.The sight of burning Chinese tankers and merchantmen in the Gulf,Malacca Straits or Indo-China Sea ,within the first 24 hrs. of warfare will have a profound effect on Chinese maritime trade and rattle the leadership in Zhongnanhai,forcing an early conflict resolution/ceasefire brokered by the two superpowers who will do their best to resolve the spat asap.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/c ... 996362.ece

China deterrence cannot come from Navy

The government of India’s decision to approve an expensive mountain strike corps has drawn mixed reactions. Rear Admiral Raja Menon makes a compelling argument against an Army-led, manpower-intensive approach to India’s Himalayan defence problem, in his article in The Hindu (editorial page, “A mountain strike corps is not the only option,” July 29, 2013).

Yet, the Mahanian prescription is also open to criticism.

A Mahanian solution to the China challenge is that India can compensate for its continental disadvantages by posing a nuisance to China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) on the high seas.

Complicated

While conceptually intuitive, the linkage requires equivalence: Beijing must value the integrity of its SLOCs enough to change its calculus on the mountains. Naval blockades are also complicated operations. The time horizon for success to the point that China would find its resource security threatened would be significantly longer than a swift and limited, continental operation whether pursued for punitive reasons or to change the Line of Actual Control. China’s growing, strategic petroleum reserve, though intended to offset market disruptions, will also be an asset in such a scenario. Further, China’s pursuit of new Eurasian lines of communication, both with growing energy linkages with Russia and connectivity through Central Asia, indicate a potential, declining dependence on Indian Ocean SLOCs at least for some strategic resources. Plainly put, a core interest cannot be secured by peripheral, horizontal escalation.

A competition for resources between the Army and Navy also reflects a deeper contest over the direction of India’s geostrategy. Should India’s priority be continental China or maritime China?

China’s lines of communication to South Asia emanate from its mainland. The corridor to Central Asia, trans-Karakoram linkages through Pakistan, or the corridor through Myanmar are all consistent with a continental geostrategy by China to secure and integrate its periphery. Arguably, the extension and further potential of these lines of communication into the northern Indian Ocean — the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea — cannot be tapped without Indian strategic acquiescence and cooperation.

Near sea lanes

Contrary to some observations, the maritime realm is not a zero-sum theatre where Indian and Chinese core interests clash. The geopolitical reality is that China’s SLOCs traverse near Indian naval deployments with more than 85 per cent of Chinese oil imports flowing through Indian Ocean sea lanes. Similarly, more than 50 per cent of India’s trade now goes through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Rather than a source of conflict, this could form the basis of a maritime accommodation.

An interdependent world economy makes the idea of unilateral security over SLOCs illogical. The “Indo-Pacific” commons fell under the sway of the United States under unique historical conditions that are not likely to prevail indefinitely. While the “Indo-Pacific” maritime system remains in flux, its management cannot but be a collective endeavour where no single major power can be excluded. Within that logic, it is probable that different regional powers will assume greater burdens in their regions.

Furthermore, the evolution of military technology underscores that Mahanian ideas are nearly obsolete. The historical Mahanian logic of offensive sea control — “defined as the ability to use the seas in defiance of the will of others” — via large surface fleets is passé. U.S. historian Alfred Mahan’s ideas were derived from a specific, historical context that no longer prevails given the evolution of the military-technological environment.

Continental-based extended-range missile forces, fourth and fifth generation aerospace capabilities, undersea capabilities like attack submarines, land, air and space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capabilities, anti-satellite weapons, and, cyber capabilities make the idea of sea-control a deeply contested concept. The maritime force structure of tomorrow is likely to trend towards disaggregated and less vulnerable platforms rather than concentrated firepower in large carrier-based fleets. Therefore, sea-denial along with limited power-projection capabilities is perhaps the most that contemporary rising powers can realistically aspire to.

Indeed, China’s strategy reflects an “anti-naval,” regional, sea-denial approach than a quest for global maritime power. Land-based systems play an integral part in shaping China’s maritime strategy that is not emulating the large surface fleets in the Anglo-American tradition. As one western assessment notes, “the Chinese navy’s main purpose is still to protect China from U.S. sea-based strike power.” Another authoritative U.S. study finds, “China’s new navy relies more on unmanned cruise and ballistic missiles than on manned aircraft, and more on submarines than surface vessels.”

Main objective

Curiously, some analysts invoke the Mahanian image of China’s lone aircraft carrier as a guide for China’s maritime future. But blue water projection beyond regional seas is of secondary priority for Beijing. The core objective of Chinese strategy for the foreseeable future is on sea-denial focused on the Western Pacific and the U.S. Navy.

There is no doubt that India needs to address the China challenge asymmetrically, and, by relying on a holistic and inter-service approach to deterrence. Opening a new theatre of contention on the high seas, however, cannot be in either India’s or China’s interest.

(Zorawar Daulet Singh is a PhD candidate at the India Institute, King’s College London.)

Raja Menon responds

Zorawar Daulet Singh is right that in the inner recesses of the Chinese Central Military Commission, the Mackinder versus Mahan debate must be in progress.

But eventually this debate will be overtaken by China’s hurtling pace of growth, that will force Beijing to rely almost exclusively on its SLOCs to support the garnering of resources from Africa and South America. So Mahan will eventually prevail — not his theory of the big battle; but that of protecting extended lines of commerce by an active maritime policy. That is when flag will follow trade and China’s challenge to the U.S. as a world power will take on distinctly naval overtones. The strongest arguments or hint that their weakness in the Indian Ocean is creating paranoia comes from Beijing’s own strategic commentators. This is the only weakness that India can exploit.

As for the mountain strike corps. the argument fails on its own demerits. A mountain strike corps is an oxymoron in that mountains funnel troops into valleys, and funnelling and strike manoeuvring are contradictory. A strike must create surprise at the point of impact and the few known axis of movement preclude surprise. One solution is high altitude lateral deployment of acclimatised troops, but that precisely is where the Army Aviation Corps backwardness hurts the overall strategy. In Tibet, the Chinese can always counter move faster than the Indian Army.

(Raja Menon retired as Rear Admiral in the Indian Navy.)

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423622
Here is an assessment of the USN's current naval doctrine of Sea Power 21

EVOLUTION OF MARITIME STRATEGY...IS SEA POWER 21 THE ANSWER

INTRODUCTION:
Alfred Thayer Mahan is credited with convincing the United States government that the
key to achieving its strategic goals is through the influence of “Sea Power.” Mahan’s definition
of “Sea Power” involved six broad strategic elements including: “Geographical Position, Physical
Conformation, Extent of Territory, Number of Population, National Character, and Character of
the Government.”
1
The basic principles of Mahan’s maritime strategy were instrumental in the
evolution of the United States Navy and shaped its operations across two World Wars, the Cold
War, and violent peace of the Twentieth Century. Having achieved dominance at sea, the
United States Navy is now focused upon expanding its role in directly affecting events ashore as
a component of a joint warfare force.
The terms maritime strategy and naval strategy have been variously defined throughout
modern history. Sir Julian Corbett, writing in 1911, defined maritime strategy as “the principles
which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it
which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part
the fleet must play in relation to the action of land forces.”
2
In 1986, Admiral James D. Watkins,
USN, stated: “The goal of the overall maritime strategy is to use maritime power, in conjunction
with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination on
favorable terms.”
3
For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on a more basic, but timeless,
definition of naval strategy proved by Mahan, which states: “...in war the common sense of
some, and the genius of others, sees and properly applies means to ends; and naval strategy,
like naval tactics, when boiled down, is simply the proper use of means to attain ends.”

4
Following the Cold War, the basis for the development of United States naval strategy
shifted from focusing on a specific potential threat to maintaining the capabilities to deal with a
specified range of contingencies. This changed focus in strategy provides additional challenges
in defining the resources necessary to support the desired effects. This paper will highlight the
effects of this shift in focus on modern maritime strategies, with an emphasis on “Sea Power
21.”

MAHAN’S INFLUENCE ON STRATEGY
Mahan influenced the way America viewed maritime strategy by highlighting the
importance of a powerful navy in international strategy. Mahan contended that “the key to naval
supremacy lay with the ship of the line, and mastery of the sea would fall to the nation whose
battlefleet could defeat its opposite numbers.”
5
He maintained that becoming a world power
2
required mastery of the seas, which would equate to hegemony in an island nation. According
to Sullivan, Mahan “educated both the Navy and the American people on the use of diplomacy,
military force and warfare on a global scale when isolationism still ruled the foreign policy
formulated along the Potomac.”
6
Given the historic success achieved by Great Britain, primarily through a powerful navy,
Mahan postulated that the United States could do the same thing. His basic premise that naval
power can be applied to achieve national strategic goals or to gain national preeminence has
survived the test of time. Mahan contended that national influence can be projected through
dominant naval forces to provide for power projection (primarily against enemy fleets), afford the
security of harbors, and to maintain sea lines of communication. National influence and power
were best achieved through control of the seas by friendly forces, and denial of the seas to the
enemy.
In considering issues for the development of a maritime strategy, Mahan employed the
following questions: “The proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the
establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between
these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or
secondary operation of the war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most
efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital center
through which commercial shipping must pass.”
7
Mahan’s questions relate directly to ends,
ways, and means. Ends are defined as “what military (or other political and social) conditions
must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal.”
8
Ways are defined as
“what sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition.”
9
And means are “how
resources should be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions.”
10
Risks must also be
evaluated to determine the likely results of the actions. These terms will be used to evaluate the
efficacy of modern maritime strategies employed by the United

14
CONCLUSION
The methodology provided by Alfred Thayer Mahan over 100 years ago remains an
effective way to develop an effective maritime strategy. The best recent example of a maritime
strategy that fully developed the ends, ways, means, and risks was the Cold War “Maritime
Strategy.” Evaluation of “Sea Power 21” by Mahan’s standards suggests that the strategy is
biased toward providing justification for future
warfighting systems procurement and deficient in
developing the concept of operations to the extent necessary for determining required force
structure. The force structure outlined in “Sea Power 21” relies on high cost ships, operating in
dispersed formations, which may fall short in providing adequate defense in depth. Additionally,
force structure has no moderate cost, multi mission ships available to accomplish the many
other required operations.
The deficiencies noted in “Sea Power 21” may be attributed to the shift from a threat-
based approach to a capabilities-based study, because a threat based strategy is more
conducive to evaluating the required means by matching friendly forces directly against the
forces of the probable enemy. Despite this inherent difficulty the means could be more fully
developed in a capabilities based strategy by developing a hypothetical concept of operations to
describe the employment of the Navy in the joint war fighting strategy. Another approach is to
develop combined military strategy with separate but interdependent land, maritime, and air
strategies that would better reflect the joint concept of operations to support the vision for future
warfighting operations.
“Sea Power 21” provides a visionary framework for naval operations, but more analysis
should be conducted to determine the adequacy of force structure to ensure the Navy can
adequately respond to littoral, blue water, and joint operational requirements.

The PLAN's "paranoia" about the "Malacca Dilemma" exemplifies their most vulnerable area of defence.They are trying to redress the vulnerability by sending into the IOR and Indian EEZ waters both nuclear and conventional subs.This is also the area of greatest vulnerability of the IN,whose sub fleet is "sinking" rapidly due to obsolescence.A dithering MOD and DM have sat on the second line of subs for aeons and unless an immediate acquisition of more subs like Kilos or BMos equipped Amurs which can be built quickly in Russia ,numbers will fall to such low levels that dealing even with Pak's fleet of modern Agosta AIPs will be a task.

However,Even a dozen PLAN subs operating in the IOR cannot protect their surface fleet and merchantmen and tankers,who will be exceptionally vulnerable to Indian carrier and surface forces and LRMP aircraft launched from India's "unsinkable carrier,INS India".A couple of Indian subs operating in the Indo-China Sea can also cause mayhem with just a few "kills",forcing the PLAN to protect its bases and key assets in home waters.I have given in another thd. the new PLAN patrol regimen in the Indo-China Sea,where the world's biggest theft of territory is being attempted by the Chinese.

We lost the '62 war because the IAF was not used.Even if the IAF is used in any immediate conflict with China,the Chinese too have a strong air froce and can attack oru air bases with ballistic and cruise missiles to complicate the IAF's task.Let us not in the future ask the same Q (with a difference) as to why the IN was not also used !

[SSridhar]

From the above post, Zorawar Singh's (he carries the name of a great Sikh warrior) following question caught my attention: Should India’s priority be continental China or maritime China?

India's priority may be neither or may be both or may be one or the other. That is besides the point and immaterial too. India's priority is 'India's interest'. India's interest against China is to preserve Indian integrity, sovereignty, checkmate Chinese aggression and resolve the border dispute as much closer to the Indian position as possible. I am not considering economic or diplomatic or other interests here since the debate is confined to militaristic terms.

The India-China equation is in some aspects similar to the Pakistan-India equation. Pakistan faces a large neighbour with whom it has an irredentistic issue (let us forget whether Pakistan is right or wrong). Pakistan cannot do much against that neighbour alone. So, what did Pakistan do ? It sought the help of other far more powerful parties. Pakistan decided to use asymmetric warfare.

The same is the case with us against China. We are also seeking allainces against the Chinese juggernaut. We have to hit China hard at its weakness if and when war breaks out. We need the MSC to take the fight into TAR. We also need the two armoured brigades in Siliguri to face approaches from Sikkim and in Chushul in eastern Ladakh to face Tibet. We need all the ALGs and so on. These are all places where the Chinese PLA is also strong. But, where China will feel the pain is when its SLOCs are attacked. We therefore need the Navy for that purpose. This is similar to Pakistan using terrorism against us except that we are using a legitimate war tactic and that too only during the war unlike Pakistan's employment of terrorism against us all the time.

We should not be too bothered about theories and comparisons between Mahan and Mackinder. They may give us knowledge and provoke us into thinking but our intelligence is in picking, or omitting or fusing whatever parts of these theories that will be useful to us vis-a-vis China (and Pakistan) and in formulating our own theories.

[Christopher Sidor]

I do not believe that India-PRC equation is parallel to India-Pakistan equation. Far from it, we have the ability to challenge PRC one-on-one. In all aspects like numbers, quality, etc. It is just that we have not done so this far. If we spend more than 2 Lakh Crore rupees in interest payment out of our yearly budget we can easily set aside some 50 thousand crore rupees for building a world class infra on our North-Western frontier and North-Eastern Frontiers. What we have lacked is the will to do so or shall we say our priorities are all messed up.

[sanjaykumar]

I believe Zorawar Singh was a Dogra.

[ramana]

SSridhar, Good articulation. A true disciple of KS garu.
Once you frame the issue like that then obvious solutions get patent from the various options.
As PRC is land based entity without a maritime experience suffering looses at sea will not make dent. Recall the Battle of Lepanto where the ottomon fleet was decimateds and that led tot eh Western dominace of the oceans for next four hundred years.

The turkish sultan, again a landward thinking didnt feel the sting at all.

I disagree with Menon garu on the MSC. It does strike a stake of fear in the PRC for it allows offensive opeartions in Tibet which is something that could unravel the PRC hold on Tibet. Now technology(acclimitised troops with integral helicopter assets) is allowing a repeat of Gen. Zorawar Singh's conquset of Ladakh in the modern age.

BTW, in late 1989s the PRC had many seminars on the Indian Army adoption of helicopters and light armed mountain troops for Kashmir theatre. Unfortunately the financial mismanagement that led to the FE crisis in the 1990s put these plans in abeyance.

So this MSC is not a "Johnny come lately" idea of the Indian military. They have been working on it to identify appropriate/ideal weapons and transportation assets. Those unreasonable demands on the Krasnopol shells are part of the requirements!

Look at distance of Pindi from Srinagar.

[svinayak]

Look at distance of Pindi from Srinagar.

Smerch can handle Pindi from Inside India border

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

BTW, in late 1989s the PRC had many seminars on the Indian Army adoption of helicopters and light armed mountain troops for Kashmir theatre. Unfortunately the financial mismanagement that led to the FE crisis in the 1990s put these plans in abeyance.

So this MSC is not a "Johnny come lately" idea of the Indian military. They have been working on it to identify appropriate/ideal weapons and transportation assets. Those unreasonable demands on the Krasnopol shells are part of the requirements!

<SNIP>

As I said earlier, Indian Army and Tambrahms have some sort of love affair. And a strong one at that.

MSC as a concept was conceived in mid-80s at the time of, you guessed it right, General Sundarji. So I'm told. They say, there was a even a concept for re-organizing mountain divisions for more offensive tasks on the lines of a RAPID - another brainchild of Sundarji.

2006-07 is when this MSC plan was dusted and evolved into a full fledged proposal and submitted for internal approvals - and finally saw the light of the day in 2013.

Raja Menon's article is like driving forward by looking into rear-view mirror.

Being in the position that he is - he could have done a simple exercise to find out why raising MSC+2 (I) Armored Bdes is costing 65,000 crores? Which is more than USD 10 billion. Assuming a T-90 costs USD 5 million, IA could raise a full fledged armored division in USD 2 billion. So, what could be high value components of the MSC to allow it to fulfill its role?

Secondly, he whines about lack of tanks and mechanized infantry in IA and how the ratios of mechanized assets to infantry is very low and all that. Question is - How does that bloody well matters in case of China and PLA? God knows I have cribbed out lack of mechanized assets in IA but if for some reason, IA is OK with certain force structure and strength against Pakistan Army, so be it.

As for Army Aviation Corps (AAC) lacking assets to allow for full exploitation of MSC, mountains eating troops and lack of mobility and all that, well, has it occurred to the good admiral that may be, USD 10 billion price tag is exactly because IA intends to correct the lack of vertical envelopment angle? And induct more such assets to aid in helicopter borne movement in mountains?

And why is he assuming that Indians will deploy MSC in valleys which funnel troops and negate the meaning of a strike force - for all we know, IA intends to fight the offensive part of the war on the Tibetan Plateau over relatively larger open areas?