Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

[Victor]

This blaming of IAF for the crappy performance or non-performance of HAL stretches credulity.

"IAF officers are corrupt": IAF officers must report their financial dealings, even inheritances IIRC. They cannot socialize with foreigners and must report any such interaction if it happens inadvertantly. There's more but importantly, they will be held in contempt by brother officers many of whom may lose their lives because of corruption. Finally, in order for there to be corruption, it has to be institutionalized-a single officer or even a few, no matter at what level, cannot swing it because all such decisions are taken by committee, NEVER by a single officer. If we conclude that corruption is institutionalized in the IAF, it will be safer to hand over our air defense to Nepal. Compare this with the closed-door shenanigans of our politicians and babus.

"The IAF is a spoiled kid": while the IAF may provide input on a preferred aircraft, it is not the IAF's decision to actually buy it. That rests with MoD babus and politicians, ie. "the parents". Who is to blame for a spoiled kid?

Things make infinitely more sense if we pin the long record of mediocrity, substandard products and waste on the fact that HAL is an unaccountable political- bureaucratic cesspool driven by seniority over merit focused on gathering to itself every paisa it can of taxpayer money and jealously guarding this gravy train. This fits far more easily the picture of corruption that is oozing out of every political and bureaucratic orifice possible.

[Victor]

India can not produce world class products till the venerable IITs IISc et al come down from high horse producing good IIM candidates or publishing papers and do some hands on kind ITI work to test their education...

Sorry, this canard doesn't fly because these same kids are tearing it up in Indian and foreign high-tech companies worldwide. Boeing and Lockmart are filled with them and held in very high esteem.


The problem is the PSU model which we cling to but which has been rejected by everyone else.

[Philip]

Absolutely Vic! Just read again what I've posted how above,HAL sold genuine MIG-21 spares to foreign nations and used sub-std. spares from dubious sources for our own pilots! If that isn't being anti-national in the extreme, I don't know what is.

[member_27444]

Why could we not copy the Iskara of Polish origin?

For the crores of RS to be spent not a single Dada of private sector thought of coming up with propeller driven aircraft after 60 plus years of seth walchand Hirachand started HAL.....
In the pre Independence era there used to visionaries and patriots now only parasites.

A nation that boast largest number of engineers cant design engines or airframes....

It is simply illogical to think a nation of billion people are so casual about armed forces.....

build simulators and be done with it and send the boys on Su-27 MiG29 etc etc

some examples please of tearing up Matinis, marts (not data marts) goeings etc

[Victor]

some examples please of tearing up Matinis, marts (not data marts) goeings etc

This is a surprising question coming from an Indian. Where have you been the last 30 years?
I'm not into spoon feeding lazy people but here goes just this once: Link

Over the last few years, IISc has emerged as one of only two places outside of the United States to be designated as Boeing Company research centres — the other being the Cambridge University...strategic tie-up that currently puts IISc alongside the likes of Caltech, Stanford, Carnegie Mellon, the Illinois Institute of Technology, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for Boeing research.

The tie-up has now produced over two dozen papers from faculty in various departments at IISc covering "nanotechnologies, structural alloys, composites, smart materials and structures, process modelling and simulation, manufacturing technologies, substructure fabrication and testing".

[member_27444]

crucible and crucible does not make a product....
POwer point is not product

did wright brothers publish paper before making the product? I wonder

The tie-up has now produced over two dozen papers from faculty in various departments at IISc covering "nanotechnologies, structural alloys, composites, smart materials and structures, process modelling and simulation, manufacturing technologies, substructure fabrication and testing".

we need technologists who make products then write papers

anyway you have your opinion so do others

[Victor]

My suspicion is that the Ajeet trainer was an unstable aircraft and the IAF rejected it because of that. All sources say that it had a lengthened fuselage but used the same wings. The T1 in comparison had a 40% larger wing area to handle the additional pilot load and provide a somewhat more docile training envelope. In a tiny plane like the Gnat, one extra pilot makes a much bigger impact than in say a Hunter or MiG-21.

[nachiket]

My suspicion is that the Ajeet trainer was an unstable aircraft and the IAF rejected it because of that. All sources say that it had a lengthened fuselage but used the same wings. The T1 in comparison had a 40% larger wing area to handle the additional pilot load and provide a somewhat more docile training envelope. In a tiny plane like the Gnat, one extra pilot makes a much bigger impact than in say a Hunter or MiG-21.

IIRC, the extra pilot in the lengthened cockpit replaced fuel tanks that used to take up that space. The weight increase would have been limited. The Ajeet trainer could have never been as good as a Hawk or Alpha Jet which were designed much later. But it would still have been a hundred times better than to send new pilots up in the Mig-21U which is what the IAF ended up doing eventually.

[Victor]

crucible and crucible does not make a product....
POwer point is not product
we need technologists who make products then write papers

Products don't come out of someone's musharraf. They need R&D and IISc is a Boeing R&D center in the same standing as the top universities in the west. Regardless, many of IISs students (and even staff) end up in the private sector and the US making products that people use everyday all over the world. Same for dozens of other institutions and dozens of companies--GE, GM, Ford etc. And for many young DPSU scientists who are disillusioned by the sycophancy and lack of excellence that they naively expected.

[member_20292]

we need technologists who make products then write papers

anyway you have your opinion so do others

I have done both.

Guess which one is more sustainable, less prone to risk, does not require stupid finicky customers to mollycoddle , and dollars to cajole out of his pocket via sales while your kids and wife , who will eat off of those sales dollars, starve at home?

[Indranil]

My suspicion is that the Ajeet trainer was an unstable aircraft and the IAF rejected it because of that. All sources say that it had a lengthened fuselage but used the same wings. The T1 in comparison had a 40% larger wing area to handle the additional pilot load and provide a somewhat more docile training envelope. In a tiny plane like the Gnat, one extra pilot makes a much bigger impact than in say a Hunter or MiG-21.

That makes no sense at all. Lengthened fuselage with same wings does not make a plane more unstable. Adding a plug and managing CG, CP etc. are elementary to designing a plane. Certainly HAL/ADA has the expertise to do it.

Also, there is lacuna among the IAF towards taking up ownership of products. And I agree with Ajai Shukla, that in many respects they are a "spoilt child" who absolutely get whatever they want. IAF should have looked at HAL as its manufacturing unit.

1. When it comes to what IAF has to do today with regards to trainers is understandable.
2. But when it comes to the question of what it could have done to not get into this position, it is very difficult to defend them.

[NRao]

should have looked at HAL as its manufacturing unit

ALL should have ........... looked at each other to make things happen.

They still can. There is plenty of time to do so, even now.

[vishvak]

How about 2, 3 or more squadrons of LCA Tejas mk1 for all its benefits. It is stable platform already as also as a trainer it can have as much indegenous component sets as possible, plus added benefit of optional upgrades when needed.

[Victor]

Lengthened fuselage with same wings does not make a plane more unstable.

Lengthened fuselage=increased weight
increased weight+same wing area=higher wing loading
higher wing loading=less stability

Plus, the increased length of contol cable would make for more difficult control.

Even if slight, the fact remains that the Ajeet trainer was almost certainly more difficult to handle than the stock Ajeet. There is a very good reason why Folland increased the wing area along with the fuselage length in the dedicated T1 trainer variant. I would have paid close attention to what they did and why but we did not.

CG, CP etc. are elementary to designing a plane. Certainly HAL/ADA has the expertise to do it.

Where was this elementary knowledge when they designed a basic trainer that was unable to glide properly and killed so many trainees?

Let me tell you what really makes no sense and is IMO downright criminal--We should be furious at HAL instead of looking for dubious, serpentine excuses to exonerate their horrible track record and deflect the blame onto the aggrieved party insead.

[Karan M]

Perhaps like the IN, the IAF should've been given the primary design/integration role as well by taking it away from HAL and made them a pure manufacturing house. THen we could've made apple-to-apple comparisons on how each of these branches did with their PSU counterparts... but that is not how it happened.

Should have been given.. come on who gave the IN anything? The IN took it, made it happen, often against entrenched opposition at the highest bureaucratic level. Furthermore, they persisted with it, giving people in that wing (the entire design/development/manufacturing group) pretty decent job opportunities.
In contrast, the IAF has shown little to no interest in doing anything about getting seriously involved in the aircraft design & manufacturing process. Even the process by which the likes of MSD Wollen, the late Mr Suresh and other talented IAF folk went to HAL and improved things - the IAF discontinued that as well.

Neither the AF or the Army has a serious process or program office in place to involve themselves or monitor such programs. They are run on a program by program basis, with individual teams or reporting chains at the senior level (and that too only in recent years). People appointed to such programs from the services end are often allowed to languish thereafter (the service really doesn't care or know what to do with them). Some go back to their parent units, to their older responsibility (which means whatever skills they picked up as working with developers go to waste). As of yet, there are only two IAF program offices with limited responsibility when it comes to managing or involvement in any serious programs - one is the Software Development Institute (which has a very limited mandate as the name suggests), and then there is ASTE (which too is neither staffed nor does it have a mandate to undertake any work like that is required).

Bottomline, the IAF has long been accustomed to playing the role of a mere customer - a handful of programs where it deputes a few people to develop or lead critical tasks - really don't count for much over the long run.
If it merely remains the customer, and technology gets more and more unaffordable, and at the same time software dependent or dependent on foreign built "black boxes", then the shift towards local items will continue. In which case, by not involving itself fully, the IAF is shooting itself in its own foot.

Merely sitting on the board of some "empowered committees" and "agreeing to reccomendations" is what the IAF sees its role as. But that is no longer sufficient. All these problems it is having with HAL or whatever, will continue to happen with other organizations as well - private or public. Which is the big reason why the IAF's BRD structure has not been able to move beyond making the spares that can be reverse engineered. They are all at sea when it comes to anything significantly complex.

Don't know how long it is since you have been away from India, but this is the current state of affairs. All these programs end up being run independently and the lack of a proper, unified set of organizations on the IAF/IA end, ends up being a huge issue.

For the Army, things are much worse. Unlike the AF, their import list is much bigger, and the geographical areas they test in end up posing another challenge. Add a fragmented engineering & responsibility set up (x unit leads a program y, but y program needs to interface with all the different combat arms) and the result is that trials drag on forever, that is if the requirements ever get written properly. Most of the time, they are a mere restatement of whatever the IA gets from brochures, Janes and even what competing vendors provide.
That laundry list is given to a DPSU in the case of a UOR which means imports and DPSU manufacture, and if there is no TOT, the DPSU, promptly goes to the very vendors with those unique attributes & merely imports them.

We have the bizarre case of the BMS being in development for ages, and people on the IS side of the Army from the unit tasked with IS, cribbing that F-INSAS is not being integrated keeping BMS in mind. There is an ADCR&S which late in the day, it was realized that it had to talk with the IAF equivalent and its yet to be implemented. Multiple trials get broken through fairly ridiculous specs which appear to be a restatement of a vendors product. In some cases, this is merely brochuritis, as versus malafide intent.

The point is the IA & IAF have had many decades to get their act together and move from being mere customers to being codevelopers. The much smaller Navy moved on to that path much earlier & has persevered and continues to do so. A HAL is any day better than a dockyard teeming with far more serious labor union issues (and in some cases, located in states with a history of aggressive activism), yet the Navy "owns" its products, which at the end of the day are purpose built to their needs. This despite being far more dependent on imports than some local aero programs. At least there is no us versus them cribbing. With private yards coming into play, talk is the Navy will work with them as well, and things are slated to get better (the big bane of the shipyards has been their low productivity). But if you see the manner in which the Navy convinced firms which were in all sorts of different businesses (oil manufacture!) etc to get into stuff like making gears for them, consistently deputing people to various groups, labs etc to make things happen, its a huge difference. Their limited budgets and smaller size, plus a much more tech savvy leadership, have meant that they consistently seek unorthodox solutions, and don't sit and merely crib.

There is not such a significant transition on the IA & IAF side. In fact, people who move to head such critical national programs ultimately have to be absorbed by the R&D/DPSU side as there is no org on the IA/IAF side to keep them. In turn, if they shepherd program interests versus say service interests alone, they are accused of being disloyal to the olive green etc. I.e if the service keeps changing specs unreasonably and the program office cites the contract line & verse.

Whats galling in that case, is that the services are far more reasonable when it comes to external vendors. There used to be tons of imported equipment lying around, waiting for the foreign OEM to pick them up or repair them under warranty conditions. In many cases under dispute. Little of that makes the press, though it does give the bean counters occasional ammo in their once in a while review.

Net net, the IAF has to get its act together too when it comes to platforms. Beating up on HAL will only go so far. Its just pointless. HAL will be HAL and MOD will be MOD. Private sector wont be a huge change either. Theres only so much one can write about the shenanigans of what goes on, but its going to be a cartel too. Two-three HALs versus one.

(Bah: multiple grammar/typo edits required in above post, giving up zimbly..)

[nachiket]

Lengthened fuselage with same wings does not make a plane more unstable.

Lengthened fuselage=increased weight
increased weight+same wing area=higher wing loading
higher wing loading=less stability

Next time you fly in an airliner, make sure it isn't a B777-300 or an A340-600 or an A321 etc. etc. They are all lengthened versions of smaller aircraft with the same wings. You wouldn't want to fly in an unstable aircraft now would you?

[Karan M]

How's that going for India, BTW ? Projects stuck in LSP stage, you say ? After multiple generations of license aircraft manufacturing and opportunities for ToT/Learning/Development paid for by taxpayers... is that also IAFs responsibility, then - to take ownership of production/manufacturing techniques for modern aircraft ?

Thats not fully accurate. Some of the delays are because the IAF chose to involve itself so late in the game and issue engineering change orders much later in the process. The LCA MK1 of today bears little relation to the LCA MK1 as planned at the timeframe the TDs started taking off. This is not merely design improvement etc - that stuff comes with the game (i.e. test flying and fixes) but actual redesign of core avionics systems & modules. While at the end of the day, the LCA will be a fine aircraft - with many customer specified features - it would have saved a couple of years, per rough estimates (going by whats been discussed publicly at several seminars/industry interactions) if the IAF had chosen to involve itself much earlier. In fact some of the stuff that's now coming with MK2 could have been on MK1 itself.

[Victor]

Next time you fly in an airliner, make sure it isn't a B777-300 or an A340-600 or an A321 etc. etc. They are all lengthened versions of smaller aircraft with the same wings. You wouldn't want to fly in an unstable aircraft now would you?

Nice try but we're discussing a manually controlled TRAINER that would be flown by total rookies barely out of their teens literally by muscle power, not a digitally controlled jet flown by highly trained veterans with hundreds of hours of multi-engine experience under the belt.

[Karan M]

Absolutely Vic! Just read again what I've posted how above,HAL sold genuine MIG-21 spares to foreign nations and used sub-std. spares from dubious sources for our own pilots! If that isn't being anti-national in the extreme, I don't know what is.

That quote is by Izvestia, read your own article, quoted verbatim by the Tribune, and Izvestia has a vested interest in blaming all the MiG crashes on the IAF/HAL/Indian side then acknowledging Russian culpability.

Lets not believe every bit of hyperbole that comes out of the Russian side. They made much the same claim at a public event (Aero India) only to have a BRD official savage their claims in front of the press, later on. Its another matter that the imbeciles in the Indian media carried all the Russian claims verbatim on day 1, but never bothered with the IAF officers response thereafter.

[nachiket]

Next time you fly in an airliner, make sure it isn't a B777-300 or an A340-600 or an A321 etc. etc. They are all lengthened versions of smaller aircraft with the same wings. You wouldn't want to fly in an unstable aircraft now would you?

Nice try but we're discussing a manually controlled TRAINER that would be flown by total rookies barely out of their teens literally by muscle power, not a digitally controlled jet flown by highly trained veterans with hundreds of hours of multi-engine experience under the belt.

That doesn't change the fact that what you said about higher wing loading decreasing stability is completely wrong. Wing loading affects performance. The climb rate and sustained turn rate for example may reduce because of a higher wing loading. It does not have an adverse effect on stability. The only concern for rookie pilots may be a higher landing speed. You are also ignoring the fact that the weight increase would be limited since the extra cockpit area got rid of the fuel tanks that used to be there. That is also the reason why the T1's wing area was increased BTW. To accommodate more fuel.

[Philip]

The fundamental reason for our messy indigenous aircraft development is the lack of trust that exists between manufacturer,HAL and end-user the IAF. HAL takes the stance that since we are Indian,the IAF must "buy Indian",regardless of the quality of the product.In many posts,including mine,the issue of quality of the product has been a major issue which has led to crashes,esp. of MIG-21s.Using sub-std. spares ,while selling the genuine ones,is a case in point and the state of brand new aircraft delivered .Read again the full interview with AM.MM Singh (he is not Izvestia or a Russian national!).Add to quality issues,huge delays,lack of accountability of our DPSUs,cost-overruns-there is one fact that manufacturing an SU-30 here costs us 80 crores more than importing it from Russia,does not improve confidence whatsoever in the minds of the end-user.

We now have the MMRCA Rafale "stall",where Dassault is questioning the capability of HAL to absorb such high-tech offsets,how quality control is to be maintained and who is ultimately responsible for the quality of the product.With the LCA we are told that only now HAL has realised that "establishing a production line is a technology in itself". The definitive LCA meant for series production even for sub-performance MK-1 has yet to arrive. The trainer issue is another pathetic story,the IJT delay adds salt to the wound.I am posting a piece about the MIG-21 crisis,where the IAF has had to keep the aircraft flying decades beyond its planned lifespan thanks to govt. indifference.

The IAF too must also share some responsibility for its allowance of the politico-babu nexus to ride rough shod over its interests.One often wonders why service chiefs have not taken stronger stands on issues of obsolete eqpt.,but who is willing to fall on his sword like Adm.Bhagwat? The MOD as one wit described it is "not a professional organisation",and the communication gap between the services and political masters and decision-makers has been deliberately engineered by babudom to protect their ultimate power over the services in all matters.The Parliament Standing Committee on Defence has time and time again cried out for swift action on many issues,but its voice is akin to a prophet crying out in the wilderness.Ultimately,it is the political leadership-govt. of the day who should be sensitive to this most important of all issues-the security of the nation.The callous manner in which the Pakis can use our gallant troops as cannon-fodder ,for target practice while we shamelessly a*se lick them in return,talking,talking,talking about peace,a peace that never arrives from their side,illustrates where the major fault lies.

http://freepressjournal.in/mig-21-iafs-mid-air-crisis/

The history of MiG-21 accidents only serves to add to the negative image of the IAF in public perception. The Inspector-General, flight safety, is not hopeful of reducing the number of fatal accidents. In the late ’70s, when the number of accidents touched 40, the IAF set up the La Fontaine Committee (headed by Air Marshal D La Fontaine, who later became Air Force Chief) to go into the problem. This committee, along with many recommendations, has emphasised the stipulated life cycle of the aircraft and has not recommended technical extension of its life.
The MiG-21 was inducted in 1963 and was supposed to be phased out by 1978. But in the absence of government funds, the ministry of defence pressurised the IAF to extend its use. Thus, the MiG-21 got its first extension in 1979, for 10 years. But, once again, a financial crunch ensured that it was not phased out in 1989 either. It received a further lease of life until 1999. In 1999, under the pretext that MiG-21s constituted a major chunk of IAF’s combat fleet and so could not be declared obsolete, it was retained, as its substitute, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA- Teja) was not operationally ready. In 2000, it got its third extension, this time of five years, a fourth extension of another five years in 2005 and a fifth extension of five years in 2010.
Mikoyan and Guryovich, who were the designers of the MiG, were not aware that India would use its aircraft for half-a-century, instead of 15 years they had in mind and that ultimately, their creation would face a legal battle in the Indian court, rather than an actual battle in airspace.
Apart from the ageing aircraft, an ad hoc purchase policy over the years too has contributed to this disaster. Often, the government has gone in for interim purchases (like the MiG-23), which later leads to the problem of spare parts. In fact, accidents due to technical defects are a serious problem, and this issue has not been addressed properly. Often, human error is glossed over in the courts of inquiry. The concerned authorities, either from the IAF, or from its related higher defence organisation, are not worried about the fact that the La Fontaine Committee Report was never implemented in letter and spirit.
This mid-air crisis has not crossed the optimum, but the maximum angle of incidence and accidents. It will be recalled that Mrs Kavita Gadgil, mother of the late Flight Lieutenant Abhijit Gadgil (a fighter pilot who died in September 2001 in an MiG-21 crash near the Suratgarh air base in Rajasthan) formed the Abhijit Air Safety Foundation in Mumbai, in her son’s memory and to unite victims of MiG-21s and raised serious questions about the crashes. It may be noted that Mrs Gadgil was the only person who took strong objection to the then Defence Minister George Fernandes flying in an MiG-21 trainer aircraft at the Ambala air base on August 2, 2003. Her protest was justified, as it was a mere joyride in answer to the challenge hurled at him in Parliament and by the media, to fly in an MiG-21. The accompanying pilot was instructed not to cross the sound barrier and an altitude of 5,000 metres, for that would have posed a serious problem and Fernandes would have paid a high price.
While he tried to make political capital and gain media mileage out of the incident, he did not sit up and take action to replace the MiG-21, for he had not given it an air worthiness certificate either. This crisis had by then reached the President of India, with Mrs Gadgil submitting two petitions; one a general petition and the other against the allegation made by the court of inquiry against her son. And now, the fate of the MiG-21 and its pilots are petitioned in the court of law. In fact, a public interest litigation (PIL) was already in the offing in 2001, by a lawyer who was also a family friend of Mrs Gadgil, but she refused. One can only pity the IAF, seeing how our decision-makers have it suspended in mid-air.
The MiG-21 was designed as a very fast, high–altitude, day interceptor. Doctrinal and tactical flying techniques changed drastically in low altitude management, both for interception and penetration of hostile air space, after design work. Without putting too much emphasis on it, the MiG-21s have been operating in sub-tropical conditions, mostly in the low altitude regime. Dynamically induced drag, environmentally degradation and structural fatigue in the airframe, engine and other flight controls and systems have affected its air-worthiness. Also, in most cases, it could not pull out from the low altitude regime and hardly gave time for even first class pilots to go into emergency vital action at low levels. Given these circumstances, a major question hangs on the issue of the MiG-21 extensions and related technical updates.
It has been argued that it is not an easy aircraft to fly. If the aircraft demands such exacting standards, then facilities for such exacting standards should have been provided without further delay. No price can be too high to preserve the lives of our pilots and the morale of the IAF. Over the past 25 years, successive governments have played with the lives of our pilots by dilly-dallying on the decision to procure a replacement for the MiG-21. How such a vital decision could hang in balance for over two decades, with the knowledge that MiG-21 crashes are not a departmental problem of the IAF, but a national problem. It is a reflection on the quality of decision-making by the political leadership, which has shown shocking insensitivity to the issue. It is not the MiG-21 fleet that needs to be grounded, but our political leaders,who have been shirking their responsibilities, that must be taken to task.
Aviation may have its inherent complexities, but advance aids and certain automations have overridden these. Dead aircrew tell no tales. The enquiry committee cannot ascertain accident situations exactly. Investigators can only depend on tell-tale indications of different hues from the wreckage, survivors, eye-witnesses, the system executives-cum-manipulators, knowledge, experience and expertise. But vested interests and lobbies, organisational loyalties and national interests are also governing the course of investigation and to substantiate my argument, I will quote Mrsa Gadgil, who did not agree with the findings of the inquiry report on the death of her son, the late Flight Lieutenant Abhijit Gadgil.
In the unrecorded history of the IAF’s major disasters such as mid-air collisions, explosions, collisions on the ground, crashes due to technical or structural failure, design defects and navigational / piloting errors have not been researched, analysed and publicized, to prevent their recurrence. The IAF often cries after the blood is spilt, but hates to pay heed to history and its lessons. It often falls back on its lack of decisiveness, bureaucratic hassles, the red tape and official delays. But as a professional organisation, shouldn’t it have a detailed ‘flight plan’ and know exactly where it is headed? It must ensure at all times that its performance is beyond reproach and that the confidence of the nation in its air force is fully justified. It should not plead before its political masters to grant consecutive extensions to outdated aircrafts at the cost of our brave pilots. Before the petition is admitted in Delhi High Court, the IAF should declare its MiG-21 obsolete.

Dr. J A Khan is Head, Dept. of Defence & Strategic Studies,
Bhonsala Military College, Nasik and was awarded his Ph. D.
on Air Power In India’s National Security.

[Mihir]

Next time you fly in an airliner, make sure it isn't a B777-300 or an A340-600 or an A321 etc. etc. They are all lengthened versions of smaller aircraft with the same wings. You wouldn't want to fly in an unstable aircraft now would you?

Nice try but we're discussing a manually controlled TRAINER that would be flown by total rookies barely out of their teens literally by muscle power, not a digitally controlled jet flown by highly trained veterans with hundreds of hours of multi-engine experience under the belt.

So what you are saying is:

• The stability of an aircraft is essentially a function of wing loading. I suppose the relative location of the centre of gravity and centre of pressure doesn't matter at all. Also, someone please tell the Jaguar pilots that their aircraft are very unstable because of the high wing loading and they really shouldn't be engaging in NoE flying in those.
• The Gnat was controlled "literally by muscle power". The hydraulics were just there for show.

One learns new things every day, I suppose.

[Victor]

That doesn't change the fact that what you said about higher wing loading decreasing stability is completely wrong.

Agreed. The word I should have used is maneuverability.

[ramana]

Philip, Have they done root cause on the Su-30 that got hit by its own bomb (fratricide) due to the fuze? Who designed the fuze, where was the fuze made and why did it go off so soon after release? And was the plane in the safe release height?

[Victor]

[*] The Gnat was controlled "literally by muscle power". The hydraulics were just there for show.[/list].

Compared to digital. Hydraulics may make it easier but it does not eliminate muscle power.

[Philip]

Here are some excerpts from a piece last yr. by a former pilot showing the root cause of the malaise,of which the crashes and problems faced by the services is the "symptom of the disease".

http://ibnlive.in.com/blogs/wingcommand ... dness.html

Military aviation in particular is driven by technology. Technologies are getting outdated faster than the full utilization of aircraft. Therefore fleet replacements and technological updates are not only a constant necessity but also has long gestation period, hence need to be anticipated in time so that preparedness level is not compromised. Thanks to the lack of foresight, today we are saddled with aircraft, technology and assorted inventory that is more than four decades old and its effectiveness in present day war theatre is suspect.

None less than Defence Minister A.K. Antony lamented India's slow pace of defence indigenisation whereby we continue to import 70% of our equipment,inspite of spending huge sums on these PSUs. With private sector not allowed to participate in defence R&D or production, the defence production and research industry has been more of a gravy train for those controlling it. Thousands of Crore Rupees have been spent and we are yet to receive helicopters, ships, submarines and even basic weaponry that DRDO and others were mandated to provide to replenish depleted force levels. In spite of the delays, the armed forces continued to pay the agencies huge amount of money under government directives -money that could have otherwise been used for procurement of equipment to retain war preparedness.

Complicated acquisition procedures put in place for defence procurement by successive governments has also played their part in slowing down the acquisition process. As per AK Anthony, last year more than Rs 7000 crs were returned by armed forces as unspent. Procedural delays and lack of clarity to deal with market forces are main reason. Bofors scandal has forced our top leadership to adopt a pessimistic approach to procurement. A new system for procurement that has been put in place is fraught with in built lacuna of paying more to be seen to be honest!!! According to this system, known as Foreign Military Sales, the government of country manufacturing weapon system negotiates the price for us with the manufacturer. Now onwards another country will decide what is good for Indian defence needs and what is the price that India must pay for it !! This itself proves the lack of understanding of Defence matters by those who have been responsible for it. As they say, Defence Minister's fetish for a clean image is costing India 125 percent more for buying half the equipment. This system has already started failing. The Howitzer guns shortlisted for purchase under FMS programme from USA failed 12 out of 18 essential QRs of the Indian Army but the government is still keen to acquire them because it makes the deal look clean in public perception! Incidentally the much-tainted Bofors won us Kargil because it was a weapon system, which emerged meritorious because it followed a selection process, which laid down stringent technical QRs.

India's war preparedness must always be a matter of concern to all of us, as our nation has displayed tendencies to slip into complacency as soon as a war is over. Was there anything wrong with our defence preparedness 12 years ago when we fought Kargil War?. The root cause of Pakistan's military adventurism in Kargil arose from Pakistan's assessment of perceived weakness in our war preparedness at that time. Having lost more than 500 of our brave soldiers, there was intense debate on the tactics adopted by India to reclaim the heights from the Pak paramilitary forces and Kashmiri insurgents in the sector. Orders were to climb the heights head-on as India could not adopt the tactic of blocking off the supplies to enemy positions without crossing the line of control (LoC). Given this situation, the soldiers had to climb the steep hillocks at night with the enemy firing at them from a height and making them easy targets. Reports suggested that many soldiers bore bullet marks up the neck and above as the enemy picked off their ill-equipped targets. Defence experts were outraged that the soldiers weren't even wearing enough protective equipment before taking up such a dangerous mission. The callous manner in which the investigations were carried out into this where charges and counter-charges flew thick and fast and the issue was politicized, only shows that quality of defence equipment is not on anyone's minds.

For far too long, our defence has been left at the mercy of those who have no idea about it in the name of civilian supremacy. The people of our country are kept happy with ceremonial displays such as Air Force day parade and fly past, The Navy Day celebrations and Navy ball, The RD Parade and Beating The Retreat. On these occasions, nation see proud soldier ready to lay down his life for the country and an impressive display of military hardware -enough to lead them into a false sense of security and complacency. One wonder how much India has already compromised and how much further it is going to compromise as regard to its sovereignty. Future wars would be at short notice and therefore would have to be fought with readiness of forces at the start of a conflict. What it signifies is that unlike in the past when long lead times were available for mobilization and preparation for war, the same luxury would not be available in future wars. The crucial deciding factor would be a vigilant state of defence preparedness both by up-gradation of military equipment and modernization, especially Air Force and Navy. In fact the initial defence and offense in today's war scenario will have to come from the Air Force therefore the nation can not afford any depletion in war waging capabilities of the IAF at any cost. The high tech weapon systems that an Air Force needs to induct ,must be anticipated well in time so that adequate time is available to our personnel to be trained and fully acquainted on these machines. Success in war in future would not necessarily go to nations larger in size, population resources and potential, but to the one prepared militarily at the outbreak of hostilities. India must therefore shed its illusions that in every war in future its size and military strength will prevail. War preparedness in its most comprehensive form would be the deciding factor.

With this state of defence preparedness, are we ready to meet the threats?? Do our politicians and bureaucrats really understand how the defence of our nation is to be handled? Most importantly, how long can we leave the sovereignty of our country in the hands of people who have no knowledge of how to protect it ?? Have we really learnt anything from the past and are we prepared for the future challenges?

Its time our country has an autonomous Armed Forces Commission, which is kept, insulated from political and bureaucratic interferences, on the lines of CAG or Election Commission.

It is an undeniable fact that India is today what it is, because the Indian Armed Forces have never flinched in sacrificing lives for defending the Indian Republic from both external and internal threats. The Indian soldier fights with what he has and not what he wants. But how long can we continue denying him the equipment that he deserves ??

The poignant words inscribed on the Kohima War Memorial fittingly embody this sentiment. It is inscribed:

"When you go home, Tell them of us

And say.

For theirs Tomorrow, We gave our Today."

We need to ensure that this spirit is not allowed to die at any cost. Even Sri Lanka has acknowledged the contribution of our soldiers in defending that country against terrorists and they have built a memorial for the fallen hero's of IPKF. Why are we in India forgetting our soldier at this critical time ?

Jai Hind.

[nachiket]

[*] The Gnat was controlled "literally by muscle power". The hydraulics were just there for show.[/list].

Compared to digital. Hydraulics may make it easier but it does not eliminate muscle power.

Uh, no. AFAIK, except in partially boosted hydraulic systems, there is no tactile feedback, so muscle power is irrelevant. In fact some aircraft incorporated artificial feel systems using springs, etc. to provide a sense of resistance in the stick which would otherwise feel completely loose.

[ramana]

As per AK Anthony, last year more than Rs 7000 crs were returned by armed forces as unspent. Procedural delays and lack of clarity to deal with market forces are main reason. Bofors scandal has forced our top leadership to adopt a pessimistic approach to procurement. A new system for procurement that has been put in place is fraught with in built lacuna of paying more to be seen to be honest!!! According to this system, known as Foreign Military Sales, the government of country manufacturing weapon system negotiates the price for us with the manufacturer. Now onwards another country will decide what is good for Indian defence needs and what is the price that India must pay for it !! This itself proves the lack of understanding of Defence matters by those who have been responsible for it. As they say, Defence Minister's fetish for a clean image is costing India 125 percent more for buying half the equipment. This system has already started failing. The Howitzer guns shortlisted for purchase under FMS programme from USA failed 12 out of 18 essential QRs of the Indian Army but the government is still keen to acquire them because it makes the deal look clean in public perception! Incidentally the much-tainted Bofors won us Kargil because it was a weapon system, which emerged meritorious because it followed a selection process, which laid down stringent technical QRs.

India's war preparedness must always be a matter of concern to all of us, as our nation has displayed tendencies to slip into complacency as soon as a war is over. Was there anything wrong with our defence preparedness 12 years ago when we fought Kargil War?. The root cause of Pakistan's military adventurism in Kargil arose from Pakistan's assessment of perceived weakness in our war preparedness at that time.

As an academic exercise can some one figure out how much money was returne unspent during the UP tenure from 2004 onwards?

so we have triple whammy:
- First the funds allocated in the defence budget get slashed constantly
- Second the unspent funds get returned
- THird by FMS they pay more for less hardware where there is no recourse for deficient hardware.

if this is not a unilateral disarmament program of the UPA govt then what is it?

In Bofors scam the Congress party leader Rajiv Gandhi took bribe money and successive Congress govts ensured that the bribe takers and dealers die peaceful death. Nehru had many scandals which willing fall guys took the discredit for: jeep scam, Mundhra scam, Jayanti Shipping scam and so on.....

So where is the problem of foreign company bribes if there is no urge to steal by the political class? The proper remedy is to enforce anti-corruption laws and not prevert justice as was done in the Bofors case.

And the current govt out Boforsed Bofors in the magnitude of corruption.

Mr clean Anthony allowed the Italian company to bribe its way in the helicopter purchase. So what if he is clean whne he enables the others to get the bribes.

Recall wikileaks disclosed that he was the replacement for Pranab Mukherjee as Raksha Mantri, for he would not allow the party to steal!!!

[Indranil]

[*] The Gnat was controlled "literally by muscle power". The hydraulics were just there for show.[/list].

Compared to digital. Hydraulics may make it easier but it does not eliminate muscle power.

Victor sahab,

It is elementary physics. Let us take the best case scenario. The plane is flying as light as it can (at empty weight) and making a 1 G turn. The pilot will have to generate 2,175 kg of force to turn the plane. Humanly possible?

[srai]

...
Should have been given.. come on who gave the IN anything? The IN took it, made it happen, often against entrenched opposition at the highest bureaucratic level. Furthermore, they persisted with it, giving people in that wing (the entire design/development/manufacturing group) pretty decent job opportunities.
In contrast, the IAF has shown little to no interest in doing anything about getting seriously involved in the aircraft design & manufacturing process. Even the process by which the likes of MSD Wollen, the late Mr Suresh and other talented IAF folk went to HAL and improved things - the IAF discontinued that as well.

Neither the AF or the Army has a serious process or program office in place to involve themselves or monitor such programs. They are run on a program by program basis, with individual teams or reporting chains at the senior level (and that too only in recent years). People appointed to such programs from the services end are often allowed to languish thereafter (the service really doesn't care or know what to do with them). Some go back to their parent units, to their older responsibility (which means whatever skills they picked up as working with developers go to waste). As of yet, there are only two IAF program offices with limited responsibility when it comes to managing or involvement in any serious programs - one is the Software Development Institute (which has a very limited mandate as the name suggests), and then there is ASTE (which too is neither staffed nor does it have a mandate to undertake any work like that is required).

Bottomline, the IAF has long been accustomed to playing the role of a mere customer - a handful of programs where it deputes a few people to develop or lead critical tasks - really don't count for much over the long run.
If it merely remains the customer, and technology gets more and more unaffordable, and at the same time software dependent or dependent on foreign built "black boxes", then the shift towards local items will continue. In which case, by not involving itself fully, the IAF is shooting itself in its own foot.

Merely sitting on the board of some "empowered committees" and "agreeing to reccomendations" is what the IAF sees its role as. But that is no longer sufficient. All these problems it is having with HAL or whatever, will continue to happen with other organizations as well - private or public. Which is the big reason why the IAF's BRD structure has not been able to move beyond making the spares that can be reverse engineered. They are all at sea when it comes to anything significantly complex.

Don't know how long it is since you have been away from India, but this is the current state of affairs. All these programs end up being run independently and the lack of a proper, unified set of organizations on the IAF/IA end, ends up being a huge issue.

For the Army, things are much worse. Unlike the AF, their import list is much bigger, and the geographical areas they test in end up posing another challenge. Add a fragmented engineering & responsibility set up (x unit leads a program y, but y program needs to interface with all the different combat arms) and the result is that trials drag on forever, that is if the requirements ever get written properly. Most of the time, they are a mere restatement of whatever the IA gets from brochures, Janes and even what competing vendors provide.
That laundry list is given to a DPSU in the case of a UOR which means imports and DPSU manufacture, and if there is no TOT, the DPSU, promptly goes to the very vendors with those unique attributes & merely imports them.

We have the bizarre case of the BMS being in development for ages, and people on the IS side of the Army from the unit tasked with IS, cribbing that F-INSAS is not being integrated keeping BMS in mind. There is an ADCR&S which late in the day, it was realized that it had to talk with the IAF equivalent and its yet to be implemented. Multiple trials get broken through fairly ridiculous specs which appear to be a restatement of a vendors product. In some cases, this is merely brochuritis, as versus malafide intent.

The point is the IA & IAF have had many decades to get their act together and move from being mere customers to being codevelopers. The much smaller Navy moved on to that path much earlier & has persevered and continues to do so. A HAL is any day better than a dockyard teeming with far more serious labor union issues (and in some cases, located in states with a history of aggressive activism), yet the Navy "owns" its products, which at the end of the day are purpose built to their needs. This despite being far more dependent on imports than some local aero programs. At least there is no us versus them cribbing. With private yards coming into play, talk is the Navy will work with them as well, and things are slated to get better (the big bane of the shipyards has been their low productivity). But if you see the manner in which the Navy convinced firms which were in all sorts of different businesses (oil manufacture!) etc to get into stuff like making gears for them, consistently deputing people to various groups, labs etc to make things happen, its a huge difference. Their limited budgets and smaller size, plus a much more tech savvy leadership, have meant that they consistently seek unorthodox solutions, and don't sit and merely crib.

There is not such a significant transition on the IA & IAF side. In fact, people who move to head such critical national programs ultimately have to be absorbed by the R&D/DPSU side as there is no org on the IA/IAF side to keep them. In turn, if they shepherd program interests versus say service interests alone, they are accused of being disloyal to the olive green etc. I.e if the service keeps changing specs unreasonably and the program office cites the contract line & verse.

Whats galling in that case, is that the services are far more reasonable when it comes to external vendors. There used to be tons of imported equipment lying around, waiting for the foreign OEM to pick them up or repair them under warranty conditions. In many cases under dispute. Little of that makes the press, though it does give the bean counters occasional ammo in their once in a while review.

Net net, the IAF has to get its act together too when it comes to platforms. Beating up on HAL will only go so far. Its just pointless. HAL will be HAL and MOD will be MOD. Private sector wont be a huge change either. Theres only so much one can write about the shenanigans of what goes on, but its going to be a cartel too. Two-three HALs versus one.

...

True words. Indigenisation is a lot harder if the primary end-users are just mere customers. Apart from being involved as co-owners and co-developers, a system of "patronage" is lacking when compared with the West, Russia and China. There is a strategic failure to understand that their support in developing indigenous capabilities will lead to a much stronger nation in the long run.

[NRao]

[*] The Gnat was controlled "literally by muscle power". The hydraulics were just there for show.[/list].

Compared to digital. Hydraulics may make it easier but it does not eliminate muscle power.

"Hydraulics" is meant to make it easier. It should eliminate muscle power.

Just like a car's power steering.

[Victor]

I simply don't understand this line of argument or what the motives are. I would love to understand it.

...the IAF has shown little to no interest in doing anything about getting seriously involved in the aircraft design & manufacturing process

The point is the IA & IAF have had many decades to get their act together and move from being mere customers to being codevelopers.

In 2011 there was a plea by the IAF to place AVM Matheswaran as head of HAL in order for the IAF to take over the responsibility for the production of its own aircraft. The AVM was reportedly one of the best organizational and aeronautical brains in the IAF but the idea was shot down and a PSU bureaucrat with zero aeronautical knowledge was named to head HAL. What could possibly be the reason for this?

What exactly do you mean by "codevelopers"? Who would have final authority in technical matters during a "codevelopment" of say the LCA Mk2? Does the IAF have such a mandate or a budget to staff a full fledged aeronautical engineering department in order to get involved in a meaningful "codevelopment"? AM Harjinder Singh's attempt in the 50s at setting up a R&D-cum-manufacturing facility in Kanpur run by the IAF was shot down because HAL threw a tantrum and refused to have anyone else play in its sandbox. Why would things be any different now? Besides what are the mandates of DRDO and HAL if not to be the EXCLUSIVE developers and manufacturers of aircraft and weapons tech in India? Do they need hand-holding? Or do they need a patsy to pin their failures on?

Beating up on HAL will only go so far. Its just pointless.

How do you know how far beating up on HAL will go? Why is it pointless to keep beating up a grossly under performing entity that causes so much waste in a poor country like India and so much danger to our defense preparedness? Can we afford this?

Private sector wont be a huge change either.

How do you know the private sector won't be a huge change? Given the relative performance of the private sector and the DPSUs, who but the most biased of people will believe this?

I also don't understand how the IAF is "merely a customer". It is involved on a daily basis with the current and future products it hopes will come out of HAL for it to use because unlike unaccountable HAL employees, the lives of its own members depend on these products. It has always and still wants to "get its act together" in a way that will make a difference by having the authority to do so and not merely becoming subservient to HAL. That would simply give the bureaucrats a bigger stick to beat the IAF with and further protect their own skins.

This latest dirty hatchet job done by HAL and the babus via Shukla is an indication that they are getting desperate and cannot mask HAL's failures much longer. Somehow I sense that the end is near for these dinosaurs and it can't come soon enough.

[Victor]

"Hydraulics" is meant to make it easier. It should eliminate muscle power.

Just like a car's power steering.

Yes, I got that. I remember reading or hearing somewhere that the Ajeet trainer had control problems that it had inherited from the Gnat. At the time, the IAF and HAL got along quite well. That was before the MiG-21 CKDs changed the game and made HAL a mere product assembler and neta-babu gravy train focused more on volume of money flowing through it.

[vina]

In 2011 there was a plea by the IAF to place AVM Matheswaran as head of HAL in order for the IAF to take over the responsibility for the production of its own aircraft. The AVM was reportedly one of the best organizational and aeronautical brains in the IAF but the idea was shot down and a PSU bureaucrat with zero aeronautical knowledge was named to head HAL. What could possibly be the reason for this?

PERFECTLY GOOD REASON. The HAL is NOT the IAF's backyard for service guys to harrumph and throw their weight around and turn it into their turf. It is FAR more strategic and important that. It should be managed professionally and not become a mai baap /koi hai kind of thing. In fact, is good that they brought in a pure management guy with zero aero experience here. He can atleast see things as they are without a jaundiced eye and do what is right.

This latest dirty hatchet job done by HAL and the babus via Shukla is an indication that they are getting desperate and cannot mask HAL's failures much longer. Somehow I sense that the end is near for these dinosaurs and it can't come soon enough.

Thank goodness for Shukla. NOW we know the game the IAF played with the trainer, and how they diluted the specs to get the Pilatus. You sure as hell didn't get the "technically" best trainer out there by a long shot, settled for an "good enough" one, but wanted HAL to match the Super Tucano, Texan II and sent them on a wild goose chase! Same case with the Hawk, when today, there are supersonic trainers around, you went and got a tired 30 year old subsonic design!

HAL SHOULD develop the HTT-40 and help the Navy, Army and BSF, set up and expand their fixed wing arms and stiff the IAF. When a trainer of the Super Tucano or better class is flying with the Army and BSF and Navy, and their pilots get better basic AND a large part of weapons training that is now becoming common with that kind of trainers the world over and the Army and BSF flies their own close in support missions and show the birdie to the IAF, and the IAF guys get trained on a watered down Pilatus, then it will surely hurt (maybe, one can only hope I suppose).

And to think that you guys grounded the HTT-34 and the Ajeet Trainer and sat on your thumbs for 30 years to get the Hawk and twiddled your thumbs for 35 years until the HPT-32s started falling out of the skies and then went and imported trainers after losing pilots and airframes due to poor training is nothing short of scandalous.

[vina]

So yes, the Ajeet would've been a readily available aircraft, but a good trainer ???

Ah, I see. You wanted the "perfect" (whatever that is), trainer, but refused to use one available readily and shot yourself in the foot and paid with lives and treasure for 30 years ! Great.

Seems like a stretch to make that link - remember that the Gnats were optimized for a role that would've pushed the design away from a nice, docile jet trainer. Nothing significant happened from the conversion: Gnat --> Ajeet to change that aspect of it ; it was a fairly straightforward license production thing.

But Abhibhushan/TKS assures us that for the Brits, it was a mere 1 year and 4 month job to get a "perfect" trainer from the Gnat fighter (see, if the RAF used it, it must be perfect only na ?) , so to do that, even if you wanted to make it into a "docile" trainer, you would need say 3 years (if you allow that the Brits were twice as good as HAL!).

But no, you wanted to import the Hawk paying billions and set up a new line and everything

Sure the IAF wanted the Hawk (and you and I can have an opinion on that), but i can guarantee it was not their choice to wait 30 years for it

Sure, they shot themselves in the foot for 30 years and then at the end of it, imported a tired 30 year old design when the current state of art is supersonic trainers! Touche!

At the end of it, senior ex IAF folks like Abhibushan tell us that the less from the AJT fiasco, hold your breath, iis that the time taken to make a fighter Gnat into a trainer is just 1 yr and 4 months and NOT the idiocy of refusing to use a readily available plane to train rookies in an advanced training course before sending them on to Mig 21s and such.

Talk about missing the trees for the woods.

[Mihir]

Compared to digital. Hydraulics may make it easier but it does not eliminate muscle power.

Uh, no. AFAIK, except in partially boosted hydraulic systems, there is no tactile feedback, so muscle power is irrelevant. In fact some aircraft incorporated artificial feel systems using springs, etc. to provide a sense of resistance in the stick which would otherwise feel completely loose.

Exactly! The MiG-17 is a classic example. Early models of the fighter had hydraulic controls that gave no feedback to the pilots, which led to them making mistakes. The controls had to be heavily modified to introduce some feedback.

[Philip]

Vina,the Hawk was selected in 1985 and "sanctioned" a year later.It was not the IAF who dithered for decades but the two decades+ delay by the MOD/GOI! I have posted the relevant facts in several earlier posts.Please read these.Secondly,the refusal of the GOI/MOD to replace MIG-21s becoming obsolete,on the argument that there was no money,etc. is also another fact.Their life extension has now been done 5 times! In fact Bisons are expected to last out until 2017-2020,never anticipated earlier because of the LCA's delay.

Blaming the IAF for delays in indigenisation,late arrival of aircraft,etc., when it has had little or no control over HAL or any DPSU just does not hold water.The evidence is overwhelming that the DPSUs have been protecting their turf and annual budgets without any accountability whatsoever,and where good management has existed results have occurred,being the exception rather than the norm.which is why the figure of 70% of the cost of defence wares is spent on buying from abroad. APJAJK promised that a decade ago ,in 2003,we would be producing 70% indigenously,but a decade on,the 70% import figure remains!

[pragnya]

Vina,the Hawk was selected in 1985 and "sanctioned" a year later.It was not the IAF who dithered for decades but the two decades+ delay by the MOD/GOI! I have posted the relevant facts in several earlier posts.Please read these.Secondly,the refusal of the GOI/MOD to replace MIG-21s becoming obsolete,on the argument that there was no money,etc. is also another fact.

philp, who was dithering is not the point. it is well known GOI had no money to pay in the 80s till mid 90s till the economy was opened. the point Vina and others are trying to make is when IAF knew they will have to wait for very very long time, why did they sit waiting for the hawk to fructify for decades?? even if Ajeet was not an optimal solution for a trainer, wasn't it a 'better' option to train than mig 21s??

[Philip]

Prag,details show that the Gnats.Ajeets were being completely phased out and that the two trainers were sent to the last operational sqd.The whole line was shut down.The IAF did their job with the AM La Fontaine Committee,made their recommendation which should've been taken up asap! After the IAF gave its choice in '85 for the Hawk,it was sanctioned a year later.When something has been "sanctioned",it is in the MOD's domain not the IAF's. The ball was then in the MOD/GOI's court.How could the IAF then ask for an inferior Gnat trainer not in production, after plumping for the Hawk approved by the MOD?!

It has been shown for decades how much money earmarked for the services is "returned to the kitty" because no decisions were made.This situ exists even today.Red tape delays a decision in a financial year and the money earmarked goes back to the Fin.Min.The argument that we had no money doesn't hold water.There was complete indifference towards the problem from the MOD.Please read the posts with interviews of former senior IAF officers and one will get a holistic picture of the difficulties the services and IAF in particular have experienced with our MOD/DPSUs.

[vina]

Prag,details show that the Gnats.Ajeets were being completely phased out and that the two trainers were sent to the last operational sqd.The whole line was shut down.

The decision to shut down the line was a consequence of choosing the Hawk. The line was shut down around 84/85 I think. It could have easily produced some 45 trainers in 3 years and then shut down and that would have taken care of the "AJT" problem for 3 decades.

The IAF did their job with the AM La Fontaine Committee,made their recommendation which should've been taken up asap! After the IAF gave its choice in '85 for the Hawk,it was sanctioned a year later

. Philip, if ANYONE in an executive position, or in ANY position in a private company says that "I gave my recommendation , but the other guy didn't do it" , guess what, you will be most probably fired for being ineffective , especially if you are the guy in the dock for seeing it through no matter what.

Sorry. The IAF didn't DO their job. Their job was to train the next set of pilots safely and give them the skills to fly their planes. Saying that I made a report and my job was done simply doesn't cut the mustard anywhere.