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The Realist Prism: Russia Sends Trial Balloons on Iran Sanctions Regime
By Nikolas Gvosdev, on 16 Aug 2013, Column
Russia has been sending some confusing signals on Iran in recent weeks. Rumors began to circulate that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be heading to Tehran to meet with newly inaugurated President Hasan Rouhani—with some even predicting that Putin would "drop in" on Iran this week after completing his visit to Azerbaijan to confer with Azeri President Ilham Aliyev. Stories were also released that Russia was reconsidering its unilaterally imposed boycott on selling advanced S-300 air defense systems to Tehran, or at least replacing them with another variant, the Antei-2500 system, as a way to get Iran to drop its legal action at the International Court of Arbitration in Geneva that charges Moscow with breach of contract over the S-300s.
So, was there a method to the madness of these leaks? They appeared to be test balloons—reminders that the unprecedented international sanctions that have exacted a toll on the Iranian economy over the past few years are fragile and that Russia could be prepared to reverse course on Iran. At a time when U.S. policymakers are worried that Iran is close to mastering the technologies needed to fabricate an atomic weapon, it would be a real setback for the Obama administration for Moscow to defect from the U.S.-led sanctions process. And supplying Tehran with sophisticated weapons systems would make a U.S. or Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities much more difficult to carry out. Perhaps the intent was to show a U.S. foreign policy establishment increasingly skeptical of the value of U.S.-Russia relations—and increasingly critical of Putin’s domestic policies—what some of the costs of a rupture might be.
Of course, Putin made no such surprise visit to Tehran or even to any of Iran's Caspian port cities, and Rosoboronexport—the Russian firm that handles arms exports—is as of this writing denying that there are any plans to reactivate the S-300 contract. However, Putin is set to meet Rouhani next month on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. An interesting question to pose is whether Rouhani would journey to Central Asia in an effort to break Iran out of its current isolation—and what he might do in the meantime to change the current dynamic.
Upon taking office in early August, Rouhani announced his intent to engage in "serious and substantive" talks with the international community about Iran's nuclear program. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared, "We absolutely agree with what he said" in terms of the importance of restarting talks, and Russia has since called for the P5+1 talks to resume in mid-September.
What would happen if the Islamic Republic, over the next several weeks, were to qualify those statements with a series of concrete actions, such as temporarily halting enrichment activities and offering an unprecedented degree of transparency and access to Iran's nuclear facilities to international observers? Doing so might bolster Rouhani's claims that Iran is merely seeking to exercise its rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to a "peaceful" atomic program as well as his calls for a temporary relaxation of international sanctions. If sanctions relief were granted, it would strengthen his position at home by validating his more conciliatory approach vis-a-vis the hard-line skeptics within the leadership who see no value to diplomacy.
Would Russia, in turn, be prepared to champion Rouhani's diplomatic engagement? It would certainly change the narrative for the forthcoming G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, which right now is focused on Putin's canceled bilateral meeting with President Barack Obama, and divert attention from Russia's domestic policies, particularly its recent legislation banning pro-gay "propaganda." Instead, Putin could present this opening to his fellow world leaders as an opportunity for a decisive diplomatic breakthrough.
After leaving St. Petersburg, Putin, along with Chinese President Xi Jingping, will travel to the SCO summit, giving them a chance to meet with Rouhani. If they were so inclined, the SCO could provide a stage for both Russia and China to endorse the Iranian call for talks as well as to support the idea of sanctions relief for Tehran. Beijing and Moscow might find it quite attractive to put the United States on the defensive, particularly in the U.N. Security Council, since the unspoken but nevertheless ever-present reality is that the true U.S. preference is for Iran's complete denuclearization, not simply its regulation within certain bounds. Up to this point, Iran's clumsy diplomacy has allowed the U.S. to build an international coalition to pressure Tehran over its unwillingness to concede to meaningful inspections and limits. But Rouhani, along with his new foreign minister, former Iranian U.N. Ambassador Mohammed Javad Zarif, might prove to be more adept than their predecessors.
How likely is this scenario? Iran has shown an impressive ability to shoot itself in the foot in the past when it has come to addressing its nuclear program, with its unwillingness to make serious concessions being used as proof of its insincerity. Moreover, Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei’s receptiveness to such an approach is a critical unknown at this point.
Yet it is something the Obama administration should be prepared for. At a time when Rouhani might be able to win cautious support, not only from Russia and China, but also from Iran's European and Asian trading partners who have cut back their business with Tehran at Washington's behest, Obama faces a U.S. Congress that is all but ready to dispense with diplomacy. At the end of July, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill co-sponsored by Reps. Ed Royce and Eliot Engel that seeks to further cut Iran's oil exports by putting even more pressure on Iran's customers to stop purchasing from Iran, as well as putting more pressure on entities that help finance Iran's foreign trade. The Senate will consider similar legislation after its summer recess concludes in September. If Iran signals its willingness to seriously talk, it may come at a time when the U.S. is deaf to such appeals.
This would create quite an opening for Russia to claim the moral high ground on the Iranian nuclear issue, while simultaneously embarrassing the White House for its lack of control over the U.S. policy process. Combined with Washington’s tepid response to the unfolding crisis in Egypt, it could also have implications for the two sides’ divergence over how to address the war in Syria. If Moscow wants to get the Obama administration to reconsider the value of the bilateral relationship, the Iran card would certainly be a useful one to play.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government. His weekly WPR column, The Realist Prism, appears every Friday.
Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin (photo by the website of the president of the Russian Fe
