Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 10 Oct 2013 23:48

viv, US also has other airborne formations in addition to the rangers. the 82nd airborne div and 2 airborne BCT's.

the rangers are a quick reaction team.

the closest Indian equivalent to SFOD-D would be SG. but I guess they also shoulder some of the role GB and CIA SAD are supposed to.

if there's another IC-814 type crisis, NSG would be involved if it's in India. but if it's outside India, I am not quite sure who would be called.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Oct 2013 00:52

Rahul M wrote:the rangers are a quick reaction team.

Being a QRT is just one role, perimeter security/force protection/airfield take downs are others.

Viv S wrote: Note the 'Green Berets' i.e. US Army Special Forces are fairly large as well - 20 battalions (recently scaled up from 15 battalions), each around 300 strong. They deploy in strength and while they specialize like RajitO mentioned, in Foreign Internal Defense, they've spent most of the last decade on the counter-insurgency circuit , again not unlike our Para-SF units.

Before 9/11, the holy grail of Green Beret operation was to operate at an ODA - Operational Detachment Alpha-level, a 12-person team, led by a Captain and rest highly experienced NCOs. Since post 9/11 Afghanistan was an SF-led fight, 2-3 ODAs started to get deployed together on an op, reporting to their respective Special Forces Group HQ, which was also in the field, a departure from prior ops.

nachiket wrote:
Viv S wrote:... There's the SF unit rotating through the Para Brigade, but next time we have an IC814 type crisis, it'll be a toss-up between the Paras and NSG, both being sub-optimal solutions.
Why? Isn't that exactly the kind of thing the NSG was raised for in the first place? I don't understand why the Paras would even be considered for it.

IC814 on a controlled Indian airport might be NSG, but IC814 in Kandahar is beyond the current capability and training of any Indian SF unit. Honestly, IC814 in Kandahar would have been a nightmare for JSOC as well.

There is no shortage of alphabet soup units in India - SG, SFF....TSD seemed to be like our ISA/Gray Fox equivalent. Point is, you need a doctrine, which has to be developed and pushed by champions, which gets political approval, and then flows money, organization, training, equipment...and finally capability.

Edited: Hit Submit instead of preview.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Oct 2013 01:13

IMHO, IC814 in kandahar would have been impossible for any SF unit for the simple reason of the amount of risk to the hostages. they would have had to fight off the talliban to even reach the aircraft, alerting the terrorists of their presence.

only the russians would have been crazy enough to attempt it.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 11 Oct 2013 01:22

An HR op in an IC814 type situation anywhere outside India, would be contingent upon whether the country in question allows our forces in to do it. If they do, it has to be the NSG who does it. If they don't, it is impossible for any force, like Rahul said.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 11 Oct 2013 01:42

nachiket wrote:Why? Isn't that exactly the kind of thing the NSG was raised for in the first place? I don't understand why the Paras would even be considered for it.

If you want to carry out a hostage rescue in a location controlled by hostile forces in a landlocked country, at the very least the first wave of recon/pathfinders will need to be airdropped, most probably under the cover of darkness. The perimeter will need to be taken and held by force while the aircraft/building is assaulted, possibly requiring the employment of heavy weapons (against light armored vehicles, technicals, jeeps, fixed defences and so on). While the NSG is manned by servicemen, the heavier the battle, the better the Paras (incl SF element) are suited for the task.

Its worthwhile to note that the NSG was mobilised for the Maldives intervention as well, but it was eventually entrusted to the Para Brigade.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 11 Oct 2013 01:56

nachiket wrote:An HR op in an IC814 type situation anywhere outside India, would be contingent upon whether the country in question allows our forces in to do it.

Not necessarily. Afghanistan at time, like Somalia, didn't exist as a nation-state. The operation would be contingent on whether Iran granted overflight and refueling rights. It would still be complex and risky (case in point: Eagle Claw) but not impossible.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Oct 2013 02:08

it's not about getting permission from a nation state. without co-operation from the force on ground, in this case the taliban, you would have no element of surprise. almost certainly ISI would have instructed the jehadis to eliminate all hostages in such a situation, without caring for whether they themselves lived after that. those people are one step away from a suicide attack anyway.

the only way we could have carried out such a rescue was with at least passive co-operation from the talibs.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 11 Oct 2013 02:23

Viv S wrote:
nachiket wrote:Why? Isn't that exactly the kind of thing the NSG was raised for in the first place? I don't understand why the Paras would even be considered for it.
If you want to carry out a hostage rescue in a location controlled by hostile forces in a landlocked country, at the very least the first wave of recon/pathfinders will need to be airdropped, most probably under the cover of darkness. The perimeter will need to be taken and held by force while the aircraft/building is assaulted, possibly requiring the employment of heavy weapons (against light armored vehicles, technicals, jeeps, fixed defences and so on). While the NSG is manned by servicemen, the heavier the battle, the better the Paras (incl SF element) are suited for the task.

Its worthwhile to note that the NSG was mobilised for the Maldives intervention as well, but it was eventually entrusted to the Para Brigade.

Exactly the situation in this book. The author is a Vietnam veteran as memory serves and put in a significant amount of research into his book..

http://www.amazon.com/Fire-Arrow-Frankl ... 0804104212

Seals go in and secure the hostages after a HALO assault. Thats the easy part.
Marines or Airborne, forget which provide outer cover and overwatch. And then have to face off against determined counterattacks. Both SEALs and paras get bloodied.
USAF does a SEAD/DEAD attack against all Libyan AAA - but still loses aircraft to hidden ZSUs etc when the transporters come in with paras and light tanks.
USAF LAPES in M551 Sheridans to provide support (and these get in a huge firefight with Libyan owned, Russian staffed T-72s) and barely make it out. One survives if i remember..
USMC Cobras provide support - author correctly notes how vulnerable they are to MANPADS
...
After all this - the assault force barely survives, and only because the Russians let them.
They suffer heavy casualties.

Of course, Afghan did not have all the opposing assets as mentioned in the book above, but it lays out the complexity of such an operation in brutal detail. IMHO, Entebbe was an outlier.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 11 Oct 2013 02:28

RajitO wrote:IC814 on a controlled Indian airport might be NSG, but IC814 in Kandahar is beyond the current capability and training of any Indian SF unit. Honestly, IC814 in Kandahar would have been a nightmare for JSOC as well.

Rahul M wrote:IMHO, IC814 in kandahar would have been impossible for any SF unit for the simple reason of the amount of risk to the hostages. they would have had to fight off the talliban to even reach the aircraft, alerting the terrorists of their presence.

Op Entebbe. Opposition was much lighter but the premise was similar as was the time-frame. Unfortunately we don't have an equivalent to the Sayaret Matkal or for that matter a command mechanism to effectively employ such a unit. There's the SG yes, but given the general lack of interaction with the rest of the military, I'm not sure how well they'd mesh into a joint operation involving the IAF and IA (even the IN to an extent). That said, IIRC they were some suggestions about the SG being on standby during the IC814 hijacking.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 11 Oct 2013 02:31

Entebbe really was an outlier - and quite frankly, the Israelis were very very lucky with that op. They managed to retain surprise through most of that op. In contrast, with technicals (MMG/RPG armed jeeps on the flightline), all it would take is one of them to survive and open up on the aircraft, and it would have been a bloodbath (hostages not even in a building).

SG meshing with IAF/IA is not an issue - heck, India has pulled off last moment coordination on its own, eg Maldives ops. Get it done mentality of armed forces is a given.

The problem is the entire premise itself - how do you get to Afghanistan, sanitize the ground and then exfil?

johneeG · Post by **johneeG** » 11 Oct 2013 02:33

Why do a hostage rescue operation, if its so difficult?
Why not take hostage of some high-profile enemy leader and then do the swap?

The target could be anyone from talibs to bakis to sheikhs to... etc Anyone who is valuable to the enemies...

Alternatively, the deterrence model can be applied. One could issue subtle or not so subtle threats that if the hostages are not released, there would be retaliation and the retaliation would be assassination and/or destruction of property of those who participated in the kidnapping directly or indirectly. And then have the capability and willingness to carry out the threat...

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 11 Oct 2013 02:34

Lateral thinking..! Not bad!

BUT... what do you do if the bluff is called?

This is an ISI run op. And if the ISI judges the embarassment to India > than loss of a few of its foot soldiers... then it would have gone ahead and then what do we do?

We are fighting a state in the guise of all these proxies.

johneeG · Post by **johneeG** » 11 Oct 2013 02:45

Karan M wrote:Lateral thinking..! Not bad!

BUT... what do you do if the bluff is called?

This is an ISI run op. And if the ISI judges the embarassment to India > than loss of a few of its foot soldiers... then it would have gone ahead and then what do we do?

We are fighting a state in the guise of all these proxies.

Actually, I imagined the target would be some important personality of ISI or baki army or some sheikh who funds the fundoos... I was not thinking of talib foot soldiers unless it is some important talib guy.

My thinking is simple: it is easier to hurt/kill/nab than to protect/rescue. So, offense is the best form of defense and there needs to be a deterrent to stop the enemies. The only deterrent is promise of retaliation(i.e. pain).

I think in such situations, political and economic patrons of enemies should also be seen as fair game. The idea is, "we will not fight a limited war but escalate it to zones where you may not want a fight."

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Oct 2013 03:00

viv, ISI was well aware of entebbe and took enough precautions to prevent another one. the taliban technicals carefully surrounding the plane were there for a reason. I dpnt know if it was SG but SF were there on board JS' aircraft.

johnee, israel had in fact carried out something like that, detain/hijack a syrian aircraft to get their soldiers back, way back in 50's . it was hugely condemned by all and sundry and they have never tried anything similar. nowadays, israeli ultimatum to syria for similar situations usually resulted in blacking out damascus with a few well targeted PGM's at their power grid.
a nation state can't afford to use techniques that are perceived to be immoral. that advantage lies with terrorists and their nation-state backers.

=============
we are digressing. let's get back on track.

I would like to throw out a hypothetical question, what would we need to pull off a geronimo type operation ? assume taking out dawood ibrahim from a neutral country with no conventional strength to interfere with our movement, say country A.

since it is a what-if question let's put diplomatic and conventional military factors (ingress routes, air cover, air defence) off the discussion table. that's someone else's headache. only the SF and transport part is your headache.
intel tells you DI is in country A, so and so location with a small group of well-trained bodyguards.

if one were to take up such an operation from "existing" Indian forces/resources,
> whom would you choose.
> how and for how long would you train them (of course I am not talking about nitty gritties)
> any other details

fire away and play armchair general !

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 11 Oct 2013 03:35

Karan M wrote:Entebbe really was an outlier - and quite frankly, the Israelis were very very lucky with that op. They managed to retain surprise through most of that op. In contrast, with technicals (MMG/RPG armed jeeps on the flightline), all it would take is one of them to survive and open up on the aircraft, and it would have been a bloodbath (hostages not even in a building).

They had first rate detailed intelligence about the situation on ground and the odds were in their favour.

SG meshing with IAF/IA is not an issue - heck, India has pulled off last moment coordination on its own, eg Maldives ops. Get it done mentality of armed forces is a given.

That's there. Then again Murphy's Law kicks in when one least expects it.

The problem is the entire premise itself - how do you get to Afghanistan, sanitize the ground and then exfil?

Iranian support would be a prerequisite. Given that they have little love lost for the Taliban, I don't believe that would have been a stretch.

Spit-balling here. First you'd need to thoroughly survey the area and identify potential dropzones. Induct a pair of UAVs to monitor and control the situation in real-time. Insert at least two teams, preferably on a moonless night, while a heliborne taskforce is dispatched from Iranian soil . One team holds the perimeter with heavy weapons and covers the assault team when they go loud. Hold on long enough for the cavalry to arrive. Exfiltration would depend on the number of hostages, condition of airliner and condition of the runway. Worst case, induct a STOL transport.

The most important element as in most cases will be intelligence. 20 years back such an operation would bound to get screwed up, today with vastly improved reconnaissance and command & control systems, you could arguably adapt such plan to the situation. Hostage rescue in a location populated by hostiles isn't an altogether unforeseeable circumstance, and I'd imagine most folks in the HR/CT business would have some type of contingency plan.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 11 Oct 2013 04:58

Viv S wrote:
The problem is the entire premise itself - how do you get to Afghanistan, sanitize the ground and then exfil?
Iranian support would be a prerequisite. Given that they have little love lost for the Taliban, I don't believe that would have been a stretch.

Spit-balling here. First you'd need to thoroughly survey the area and identify potential dropzones. Induct a pair of UAVs to monitor and control the situation in real-time. Insert at least two teams, preferably on a moonless night, while a heliborne taskforce is dispatched from Iranian soil . One team holds the perimeter with heavy weapons and covers the assault team when they go loud. Hold on long enough for the cavalry to arrive. Exfiltration would depend on the number of hostages, condition of airliner and condition of the runway. Worst case, induct a STOL transport.

Kandahar seems to be about 370 km from the Iranian border as the crow flies. Which helo are you going to use? Wiki tells me the Mi-17 has a range of only 465 km. The Taliban would also have had AA guns near Kandahar. Plus, what perimiter are you talking about here? The Taliban technicals were right on the tarmac beside the aircraft. The moment they are engaged in a firefight, the hostages are dead. There are no good defensive positions around the aircraft. No cover. The Taliban can bring in more forces almost instantly. The team engaging them (along with the one assaulting the airctraft) is surrounded on all sides by superior numbers. How do you get the aircraft in the air for exfil unless it has a clear runway? What if it's not fueled?

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 11 Oct 2013 05:27

Rahul M wrote:viv, ISI was well aware of entebbe and took enough precautions to prevent another one. the taliban technicals carefully surrounding the plane were there for a reason. I dpnt know if it was SG but SF were there on board JS' aircraft.

Those were NSG men, not SG.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 08:43

Raja Bose wrote:Those were NSG men, not SG.

Lt. General Katoch's book says that SG was present on the aircraft.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 11 Oct 2013 08:51

The Regt has had multiple Colonels of the Regt from SF too, infact from 2006 till 2010 Lidder, Katoch and PC Bhardwaj were all from the SF units. There was no movement even then, thing is no one wants to either rock the boat when they are in it or are not able to.

Rohit,

My info is a bit dated, Is 12 Para slated for becoming an SF unit? 'what i heard was 1 SF and 2 regular battalions like a good year back.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Oct 2013 08:53

Rahul M wrote:=============
we are digressing. let's get back on track.

I would like to throw out a hypothetical question, what would we need to pull off a geronimo type operation ? assume taking out dawood ibrahim from a neutral country with no conventional strength to interfere with our movement, say country A.

since it is a what-if question let's put diplomatic and conventional military factors (ingress routes, air cover, air defence) off the discussion table. that's someone else's headache. only the SF and transport part is your headache.
intel tells you DI is in country A, so and so location with a small group of well-trained bodyguards.

if one were to take up such an operation from "existing" Indian forces/resources,
> whom would you choose.
> how and for how long would you train them (of course I am not talking about nitty gritties)
> any other details

fire away and play armchair general !

Hmmm...every poster is going to invoke his inner Tom Clancy and go ballistic on it.

For the record Neptune Spear was not an op in a neutral country, a lot of planning went into avoiding discovery and if compromised how to fight their way out.

What you are positing requires a capability similar to an Israeli kidon/neviot team combo, or US -ISA/Gray Fox capability, or UK 14 Int./Det capability. These units are unique because SF "door kickers" are extensively retrained in tactical intelligence operations. backed by some really nifty technical intelligence stuff.

So, like India has done in the past, with varying degrees of success, we will hand off the job of bumping D-bhai to a rival criminal enterprise, not just because it's deniable, ironically they have the best tactical intel on his movements.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 11 Oct 2013 10:48

rohitvats wrote:
Raja Bose wrote:Those were NSG men, not SG.
Lt. General Katoch's book says that SG was present on the aircraft.

hmm.....he obviously will have more accurate sources. But when has SG trained for aircraft storming?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Oct 2013 16:43

imo the only way it would work is if some close friends and relatives of mulla omar could have been kidnapped & airlifted out and then exchanged for the hostages.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 11 Oct 2013 17:38

the khujli to get into SG conversation never seems to abate

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 17:41

Surya wrote:the khujli to get into SG conversation never seems to abate

Chief - the cat is out of the bag.

Everything mentioned on last page is from open source - the one about cross border mandate is from a discussion on SF role and structure in India which was chaired by Lt. General Oberoi and printed as a book. A very good book, I must say. Second good book on the subject is the one by Katoch.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 18:27

RajitO wrote:<SNIP> As elite infantry and rapid reaction forces, a non-SF para force is always useful, just maybe not as important a cog as it used to be

On the contrary, the requirement and usefulness of parachute infantry and support arms has increased tremendously.

Ability of India to launch a full fledged Parachute Bde over a meaningful distance is a capacity we need to develop - Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal wrote about requirement of expeditionary capability on the lines of 1 x Amphibious Bde + 1 x Air Mobile Bde + 1 x Parachute Bde - to take care of 'Out-of-Area' contingencies.

I think people will remember reports about India keeping the 50 (I) Para Bde in readiness status when the BDR mutiny erupted in Bangladesh couple of years back. This is the only true Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) we have - but we still lack the ability to airlift the entire Bde in one go.

The 'meaningful' distance can be defined as our CORE area of interest - something like Indian Ocean Rim countries. At a minimum, we should be able to intervene in Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar.

The Americans, with the most advanced doctrinal and capable SF-structure in the world also throw in a few headscratchers. The 75th Ranger Regiment is actually a Tier-1 component as part of JSOC, even though it is nowhere near DEVGRU, 1 SFOD-D (Delta), and 160 SOAR in selection, training, and gear. Because it provides extra muscle in certain ops like Mogadishu, it's fit in somehow.
<SNIP>

US structures it Special Forces as per their requirement - the building blocks however, remain the same.

So, to deal with Operation Eagle Claw like situations, they take highly trained manpower from Green Berets and Ranger Regiment and refine them further for (then) lesser, shorter duration but strategically more important roles. They wanted a proverbial tip of the spear to deal with high value operations and that is how Delta Force was borne.

They did not convert the entire US Army Special Forces into Delta Force nor did the entire SEAL establishment graduate into ST6. That is what is called clarity of purpose. Of course, one can argue what with Cold War gone and counter-terrorism on global scale being order of the day, the difference in mandate between Green Berets and Delta has blurred.

We have no such clarity of thought or purpose - ironically, the COMMANDO designation attached with Para Cdo Units was dropped because COMMANDO word was considered to be associated with Direct Action kind of missions reminiscent of WW2. Special Forces was adopted to give out an impression that Para SF units are trained for more strategic roles.

Tragically, only the name has changed - not the role(s).

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 11 Oct 2013 18:54

johneeG wrote:Why do a hostage rescue operation, if its so difficult?
Why not take hostage of some high-profile enemy leader and then do the swap?

The target could be anyone from talibs to bakis to sheikhs to... etc Anyone who is valuable to the enemies...

Alternatively, the deterrence model can be applied. One could issue subtle or not so subtle threats that if the hostages are not released, there would be retaliation and the retaliation would be assassination and/or destruction of property of those who participated in the kidnapping directly or indirectly. And then have the capability and willingness to carry out the threat...

Thats how russians do. But it needs political guts. Here by deterrence model, you trying to win by proving who is more ruthless, either you(Gov) or terrorists.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 11 Oct 2013 18:57

Chief - the cat is out of the bag.

Everything mentioned on last page is from open source - the one about cross border mandate is from a discussion on SF role and structure in India which was chaired by Lt. General Oberoi and printed as a book. A very good book, I must say. Second good book on the subject is the one by Katoch.

problem is not open source info

problem is someone gets excited as a discussion proceeds to let slip something which is gray area

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 19:01

Viv S wrote: Actually with the increasing number of SF battalions, the parallels with US SOF organisation has increased if anything. Note the 'Green Berets' i.e. US Army Special Forces are fairly large as well - 20 battalions (recently scaled up from 15 battalions), each around 300 strong. They deploy in strength and while they specialize like RajitO mentioned, in Foreign Internal Defense, they've spent most of the last decade on the counter-insurgency circuit , again not unlike our Para-SF units.

First things first - US Special Forces are structured as per their requirement and commitments. Further, you're trying to compare what exists in US Orbat for operational and historical reasons with our structure - does not work that way. Unless, we're raised our forces to mirror US establishment.

So, a direct comparison is moot and irrelevant.

Having said that, it is not the absolute numbers which only count - what also matters is the amount of time taken to reach a particular level of manpower. And to ensure that selection standards are not diluted. And this increment was done as per long term plan given the global commitments of the US Army in the GWOT.

Given the global deployment requirement, Green Beret or US Special Forces are specialized for various tasks in their AOR - I'm yet to see anything resembling this in our case.

Then you have the rapid deployment force; 3 battalions, 75th Ranger Regt. Broadly, analogous to the IA's three Para battalions. Elite airborne infantry.

75th Ranger Regiment is more than line Parachute Infantry Regiment - they have their own Parachute Infantry which forms part of 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions. And are counter part to our Parachute Regiment.

But where the Rangers mesh with the Delta Force, we clearly lack a Tier I unit. There's the SF unit rotating through the Para Brigade, but next time we have an IC814 type crisis, it'll be a toss-up between the Paras and NSG, both being sub-optimal solutions.

From what I know, SF unit rotating with Para-Bde is because of lack Parachute Infantry Battalions - the 3 x Para Battalions need to be rotated to different sectors and regions and cannot remain static in Agra.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 19:37

vaibhav.n wrote:The Regt has had multiple Colonels of the Regt from SF too, infact from 2006 till 2010 Lidder, Katoch and PC Bhardwaj were all from the SF units. There was no movement even then, thing is no one wants to either rock the boat when they are in it or are not able to.

There is a very strong mind-set against having a separate SF Regiment or establishment, if you will. Colonel of the Regiment can do only so much - when there have been multiple committees on the subject recommending the same thing.

Rohit, My info is a bit dated, Is 12 Para slated for becoming an SF unit? 'what i heard was 1 SF and 2 regular battalions like a good year back.

From what I know, 12th battalion was to be line Parachute infantry but is now a SF battalion.

11 Para SF was raised for NE -

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... al-strikes

GUWAHATI: The army is raising a new Special Forces' battalion primarily for conducting counter-insurgency operations in the northeast. The new unit of the Parachute Regiment 11 Para (SF) will be first deployed in the NE sector, a source in the army said.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 19:38

Funny thing is this - Parachute Infantry Regiments now carry the title of - Special Forces Airborne.

God know's what that means and who came up with such slapstick nonsense.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Oct 2013 19:51

If we are going to bring in US Special Operations in a discussion, we might as well be on the same page.

1. In US Army usage, Green Berets/Special Forces refers to the same organization. Delta, Rangers, 160 SOAR are other examples of Special "Operations" Forces (SOF). So SF is not equal to SOF in a US perspective.

2. The 75th Ranger Regiment is part of JSOC. Not 82nd Airborne or 101st Airborne etc. Would be happy to be corrected by a credible source.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Oct 2013 20:01

RajitO wrote:If we are going to bring in US Special Operations in a discussion, we might as well be on the same page.

1. In US Army usage, Green Berets/Special Forces refers to the same organization. Delta, Rangers, 160 SOAR are other examples of Special "Operations" Forces (SOF). So SF is not equal to SOF in a US perspective.

2. The 75th Ranger Regiment is part of JSOC. Not 82nd Airborne or 101st Airborne etc. Would be happy to be corrected by a credible source.

Where have I contradicted you? The above is correct and I'm aware of the same.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Oct 2013 21:24

Fair enough

At a macro level, the first issue is separating rapid reaction forces and special forces in the Indian context.

Whether we choose to go the Tier-1/Tier-2 stratification in special forces and a joint organization would be a further issue to address. The US offers a good template and some good principles to emulate but ultimately it has to be a uniquely desi evolution, best suited for our needs.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 12 Oct 2013 12:02

rohitvats wrote:First things first - US Special Forces are structured as per their requirement and commitments. Further, you're trying to compare what exists in US Orbat for operational and historical reasons with our structure - does not work that way. Unless, we're raised our forces to mirror US establishment.

Certainly. Not saying they're modeled on or mirror US organisation. Merely that there exist parallels.

Having said that, it is not the absolute numbers which only count - what also matters is the amount of time taken to reach a particular level of manpower. And to ensure that selection standards are not diluted. And this increment was done as per long term plan given the global commitments of the US Army in the GWOT.

Given the global deployment requirement, Green Beret or US Special Forces are specialized for various tasks in their AOR - I'm yet to see anything resembling this in our case.

The foreign language proficiency and specialization in FID is absent. And the technical skill-base is relatively smaller (mirroring that of their respective parent organisations). But as far as UW and COIN goes, the Para-SF will be performing same the roles as the US SF did in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, and would have done in war against the Warpac.

75th Ranger Regiment is more than line Parachute Infantry Regiment - they have their own Parachute Infantry which forms part of 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions. And are counter part to our Parachute Regiment.

The specialization for the 82nd and 101st is limited to graduation from Jump School; 3 weeks parachute training, also open to women. There's no equivalent to the Para probation. A closer analogue is in fact the British Army's Parachute Regiment, which is generally considered an elite infantry organisation at par with the US Rangers and RM Cdos.

From what I know, SF unit rotating with Para-Bde is because of lack Parachute Infantry Battalions - the 3 x Para Battalions need to be rotated to different sectors and regions and cannot remain static in Agra.

?? I was under the impression the brigade had an attached Para Cdo det when the majority of btns in the regt were still regular Para.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 12 Oct 2013 13:38

nachiket wrote:Kandahar seems to be about 370 km from the Iranian border as the crow flies. Which helo are you going to use? Wiki tells me the Mi-17 has a range of only 465 km. The Taliban would also have had AA guns near Kandahar.

On internal fuel. You do a round trip with additional tanks. AAA can be identified and neutralized.

Plus, what perimiter are you talking about here? The Taliban technicals were right on the tarmac beside the aircraft. The moment they are engaged in a firefight, the hostages are dead. There are no good defensive positions around the aircraft. No cover. The Taliban can bring in more forces almost instantly. The team engaging them (along with the one assaulting the airctraft) is surrounded on all sides by superior numbers. How do you get the aircraft in the air for exfil unless it has a clear runway? What if it's not fueled?

Hostages are rarely killed at the opening of the firefight. The first instinct for the hostage takers is always to fight off the intrusion. The objective for the CT force is to eliminate the threat before desperation sinks in. Also, we're talking about an operation in blackout conditions. No perimeter lighting of the sort that's standard on most airports. The lack of cover and tighter cordon will work in favour of an infiltrating force equipped with NVGs, flash-suppression as well as heavy standoff weaponry.

Superior numbers are not an insurmountable problem as one might think, especially for a crack force facing a hardened but still non-professional militia. Exfiltration can be heliborne or by military transport, in the event that the aircraft is out of commission for whatever reason. The real challenge with an such an operation is command & control; getting the timing right, coordinating forces and ensuring the redundancies built into the plan don't fail when the chips are down.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 15 Oct 2013 20:55

http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2013/10/dh ... hours.html

Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv achieved a new milestone by completing flying a total of one lakh hours today. The land mark has been achieved in the early hours today with the flying of helicopter IA 3104 of 301 Army Aviation Sqn (Spl Ops).
“One lakh hours flown by the machine is an awesome feat to achieve. It is a dream machine for any pilot," an HAL release said, quoting Lt Col Kapil Agarwal who completed the landmark flying hours.
ALH is being operated by Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Coast Guard, BSF and state governments since 2002. Currently, more than 132 Dhruv helicopters are serving the Indian Defence Forces. HAL has also built 12 civil variant Dhruv helicopters and they are being used by its customers. The Ecuador Air Force (FAE) operates six Dhruv helicopters with their President choosing to fly in them.

first time I am hearing that designation.

member_27862 · Post by **member_27862** » 16 Oct 2013 00:20

It is the Indian Army's effort to evolve into specialized Helo Ops. The tangible result of the same is to have a SPECOP infil/ exfil capability which is independent of the IAF support (which the army keeps cribbing of) and this also helps in its claim to having a clear understanding and operationalisation of all envisaged roles of Heptr ops to build up its case for an independent Heptr fleet with varied roles.

This unit was probably designated when the tussle for control of the AH64Ds was on its max swing and the army threw all its aces at the MOD.......

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 16 Oct 2013 04:06

Surya wrote:
Chief - the cat is out of the bag.

Everything mentioned on last page is from open source - the one about cross border mandate is from a discussion on SF role and structure in India which was chaired by Lt. General Oberoi and printed as a book. A very good book, I must say. Second good book on the subject is the one by Katoch.
problem is not open source info

problem is someone gets excited as a discussion proceeds to let slip something which is gray area

Saar, one would presume that if someone is privy to non-public info (whether it is about SG or any other unit), they typically will have the sense not to reveal that. Why assume others are naive children whereas you are not?

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 16 Oct 2013 07:14

because it has happened in past

somewhere in archives you might see the hollering

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 16 Oct 2013 08:28

Then report those posts to admins, whats the point in hollering and drawing more attention if it is really secret?

Otherwise it will become like what has happened to Delta in massa....all the so-called 'secrecy' just garners more publicity.