INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Dec 2013 08:33

While folks are free to mine the depths of the Internet in support of their pro and anti-carrier arguments, here's a parallel from modern warfare to reflect about.

The advent of the SAM in Vietnam and the ATGM in the Yom Kippur War came as a big shock to those doing the attacking with aircraft and tanks respectively.

Tactics were adjusted, counter-measures were developed. The best weapon system to shoot down an aircraft remains another aircraft (See Bekaa Valley), ditto for tanks (For every Kornet vs. M1 Abrams thread, there is a Battle of 73rd Easting).

Folks who see aircraft carriers as the ship and basically big floating targets are mostly folks who have never used a carrier in battle. The Arun Prakash's of this world, who have been both naval aviators and carrier COs "know" different.

As long as the IN knows what its doing, and is ready to take its game to the next step with a US trained and influenced cadre of naval aviators and Carrier COs, we can keep theorizing on this forum in a vacuum.

venkat_r · Post by **venkat_r** » 11 Dec 2013 11:46

Well, Here is an article from diplomat on the carrier debate

Carrier debate
Also please look at this video on the origin of the aircraft carriers and their growth

Aircraft carriers have to travel far from the shores to really do their work. and yes they do require lot more ships and submarines to compliment and protect them. This is what India should work towards in the near future.

On the other hand, does anyone think that China will stop making carriers as India has anti ship missiles. Why?

TSJones · Post by **TSJones** » 11 Dec 2013 12:22

I've seen videos of US dive bomber planes as they were attacking the Japanese fleet. As the planes dived bombed the Sons of Nippon made their ships scatter like a covey of quail! Those ships moved like a live bacteria specimen under a light in a microscope. You wouldn't think they could make huge ships move like that. And in fact most of the US dive bombers missed their target. Of course that wouldn't happen now days with laser targeting. But now days no plane could gt close to a fleet either.

It seems like most people think of a ballistic missile attack against US fleet like video's you see when the Japs made suicide dive bomb attacks against the US fleet during the battle of Okinawa. The US stayed right where they were because they had over 20,000 troops ashore fighting so they stayed put. Unlike the earlier battle of Guadalcanal when the US Navy bugged out and lost the trust of the Marines. My step dad was a career US Navy engineman on an LST off shore during the battle of Okinawa. They had over 100 air raids in one day and it was all hands on deck with everything they had against those planes. He didn't like to talk about it much. The US suffered 17,000 dead on land and sea at Okinawa, IIRC.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Dec 2013 12:41

The Marines will never stop reminding the rest about the "betrayal" at Guadalcanal...eh

Folks who are fascinated by "wonder weapons" like DF-21 are ironically not very different from those predicting the death of the battleship after the advent of naval air power. Yet, there they were slinging Tomahawks and shells in GWI, under the protective umbrella of US CBGs.

The real discussion needs to move to how India and China will match up on the CBG learning curve, and what kind of platforms are we going to be inducting to make them capable. e.g. SSNs and Aegis/Kirov type SAM-wagons.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Dec 2013 13:18

I am still quite skeptical about how the DF-21 would go about targeting.

at those speeds both in flight communications or seeker heads would be difficult to use due to plasma formation. technologically speaking, has this problem been solved yet ?

sudhan · Post by **sudhan** » 11 Dec 2013 15:57

^^ I have read about a workaround to reduce the comm blackout during Shuttle re-entries. I could not locate the original material I remember reading from, but here is another source..

http://www.spaceacademy.net.au/spacelink/blackout.htm

There are however, ways in which communication is possible during this critical reentry time. The sheath temperatures on the top surface of the Shuttle are much less than those on the bottom which, at a descent angle of about 22 degrees, is where the shock is formed. Communications from the topside via a satellite relay in the GHz range may be possible. Other options which have been tried are water injection into the plasma, and also the use of very narrow width pulsed signals, both with some success.

Communication was possible by placing an antenna near the tail of the shuttle in such a way it exploits a gap in the plasma field around re-entering craft..

I believe placing an active seeker on the re-entering warhead would be quite tricky.. So it must be somehow guided passively, through positioning info fed to the onboard nav systems, potentially through the above mentioned workaround..

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 11 Dec 2013 16:35

The big Q is not whether we should have carriers or not but what kind of carrier. The IN needs at least 3 carriers,two to operate on each seaboard and one in the yard for maintenance/repairs ,etc. The size,propulsion,aircraft and launch systems need to be carefully evaluated and thrashed out in the holistic context of the IN's maritime sphere of operations instead of aping a particular superpower model.

The debate started when nuclear power was contemplated for an IN CV.There are pros and cons,taking into consideration experience from long-term carrier navies like the US,UK,France,Russia,etc.Except for the US and France,the rest have preferred non-nuclear propulsion for economic reasons.Large N-powered supercarriers costing $12-15B each,plus an accompanying escort of other warships costs $7.5M to operate each day is simply unaffordable for the IN which requires a balanced fleet and a strong sub fleet with at least 12 SSBNs and SSGNs. For the price of just one US nuclear powered supercarrier,we would be able to acquire at least 10+ Akula-2 SSGNs. Putting all one's eggs into a few highly expensive carrier "baskets" in the light of advanced cruise and now terminal homing DF-21 BMs of the Chinese have heightened the risk of the carrier sailing into "harm's way".The top brass of the USN now acknowledge that they cannot any longer sail close to Chinese shores ,the "first island chain" unlike in the past because of the enhanced missile threats.Some proponents in the US advocate smaller carriers of about 45,000t,similar to the US's America class amphib vessels which will also operate the STOVL version of the JSF and UCAVs.This will spread the risk of having just a few CBGs which are tempting targets and against which the enemy/Chinese can throw the bulk of their strike forces against in massed missile attacks tous azimuth.

This is why one has ben advocating for aeons that all IN surface vessels above 10,000t are flat topped,so that they can also operate STOVL aircraft like the JSF and UCAVs,apart from a considerable arsenal of vert. launched missiles.The IN would then apart from the 3 carriers,3-4 amphib flat tops,also have another 6+ flat tops,making 10-12 flexible flat tops from which aircraft and helo ops can perform multiple tasks as the situ demands and spread the risk .In the intl. naval td. I've posted a report on the USN's new DDX,Zumwalt class DDG which resembles a sub more than a surface warship,with a tumblehome not seen on a warship for a century.Together with the tri-maran LCS FFG and the advent of carrier borne UCAVs,sub launched drones ,rail guns and lasers,we are on the cusp of a revolution in naval warfare .The traditional 20th century modes of warfare based around supercarrier CBGs have to be modified .

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Dec 2013 18:52

I am still quite skeptical about how the DF-21 would go about targeting.

at those speeds both in flight communications or seeker heads would be difficult to use due to plasma formation. technologically speaking, has this problem been solved yet ?

Not sure.

However, the DF-21D is a BM to start with. The flight profile turns to "maneuvering" only at the tail end of the flight (although some call it a MARV - which I do not think it is). And, the missile head is supposed to have both an optical and radar sensor set - used during the terminal phase.

The Indian missiles all (???) seem to be CMs (air breathing), have a maneuvering capability for the entire flight envelop and I think can perform rather complex maneuvers during the terminal phase (like S and U turns - so they do not have to attack the subject from the direction in which they arrive at the scene. ???). I suspect all Indian missiles have some sensor package to detect the target in "final approach". I could be wrong, but, the slowest Indian missile seems to be around Mach 3 and is able to "look" and "guide" itself somehow - ability to overcome a plasma (if there is one).

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Dec 2013 19:17

Very interesting.

We should not emulate expensive US supercarriers BUT we must emulate their ESGs and Marine Corps, which capability is available at throwaway prices...NOT.

We should step away from 20th century CBG doctrine BUT rely on STOVL-based aircraft as a centerpiece, which was a 20th century construct and largely found sub-optimal except by one operator which needed to justify it for its very reason for existence.

We should pin our hopes on the F-35 B version BUT not have any plan B

(since no one else is making STOVL jets) in case that version gets cancelled due to continuing issues/raging debate currently in the US military questioning the very feasibility of ESGs/MAGTFs fighting high intensity, non-permissive battles against a near peer enemy.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Dec 2013 19:52

we must emulate their ESGs and Marine Corps

Sir, did you take the time and trouble to find out where the USMC got those ideas from? IF you follow BR closely you will soon realize that such idea sets are not US based at all.

____________

Vicky cost IN $2.25 billion - I think Russia could have build India a brand new ship for that price - OK, perhaps for $3 billion.

Vikrant started out at an estimated price of Rs. 1400 crores, currently estimated at Rs. 1800 crore, that is $3 billion (IF I have the math right)

Vishal - have no clue what is the estimated cost

What did get to me is Vicky, Vikrant and Vishal - total will carry around a 100 fixed wing air crafts. ???? IF only two are expected to be on patrol that would mean a total of some 70 air crafts at any given point in time. Dunno, seems to me that IN, at times, may need to be bailed out from mainland.

On flattops with STOVL - IMHO bad idea. I think IN will need cats - to launch much heavier planes (tankers, AEW, etc) - not to speak of *real* planes too.

I also think IN needs a complete aircraft carrier: including the ability to repair and test engines, handle Greyhound type of an aircraft, etc. And each one be able to handle at least 60-75 aircrafts.

????

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 11 Dec 2013 20:01

India had to hide cost of Arihant Project including Russian component without arousing suspicion.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Dec 2013 20:05

I would think the cost of any strategic asset would be hidden. But then there was a similar argument made about France too, related to the M2K upgrade.

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 11 Dec 2013 20:32

STOVL component in one basket- that too USA - is weakest point. Unless India/Russia get to develop alternative. Are we missing that aspect here completely ? ?

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 11 Dec 2013 22:42

NRao wrote:
Sir, did you take the time and trouble to find out where the USMC got those ideas from? IF you follow BR closely you will soon realize that such idea sets are not US based at all.

Happy to be educated...following BR closely and what to take seriously can have its challenges due to high signal/noise ratios at times.

So if there is a specific point to be made in the context of USN CBGs being considered expensive and ESGs and the Marine Corps for some strange reason, are not, am happy to discuss.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 11 Dec 2013 23:10

Rahul M wrote:I am still quite skeptical about how the DF-21 would go about targeting. at those speeds both in flight communications or seeker heads would be difficult to use due to plasma formation. technologically speaking, has this problem been solved yet ?

The Chinese think asymmetrically. Instead of a full kill, even a mission kill will suffice for them.

The Chinese will use their satellites, UAV & MPA to detect threats. Once a carrier group is detected, the ballistic missile will be launched with INS programmed with target coordinates. Since flight time will be in minutes, the carrier group wont be able to travel far. Once the RV is deployed, it can use pre-decided GPS signals for minor course correction.

Now, a BM doesnt need to precisely hit the carrier.

Salvoes of BM can deploy a wide spread of submunitions like Prithvi runway penetrators.
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_zUe7sq7m3h0/T ... arhead.jpg
http://jjamwal.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/cimg2599.jpg

A bunch of these will significantly damage a Paki airfield or a carrier deck or AEGIS radar. While not outrightly sinking any ship, they can cause a mission kill. The carrier group will be weakened enough for other forces to take it on.

nirav · Post by **nirav** » 12 Dec 2013 00:55

NRao wrote:
Vicky cost IN $2.25 billion - I think Russia could have build India a brand new ship for that price - OK, perhaps for $3 billion.

Vikrant started out at an estimated price of Rs. 1400 crores, currently estimated at Rs. 1800 crore, that is $3 billion (IF I have the math right)

1 Billion USD = 6,200 Crores. @ 62 Rs a Dollar.

The estimated figure for the Vikrant is about 14,000 to 18,000 crores and not 1,800 crores.
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india ... yed-294997

Translates to about 2.25 - 3 Billion USD.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 12 Dec 2013 01:27

Rahul M wrote:I am still quite skeptical about how the DF-21 would go about targeting.

at those speeds both in flight communications or seeker heads would be difficult to use due to plasma formation. technologically speaking, has this problem been solved yet ?

Agreed. I still haven't figured out how they do it. Especially the terminal maneuvering within the lower atmosphere. To be quite honest, I always assumed it would be pre-programmed maneuvers. That part is doable because you aren't looking to attach sensors up in the nose to "look" for targets. Even active commands given to such warheads from an external source (i.e. command links) seems very iffy.

I presume the Chinese plan to have live satellite coverage of the Amrikhan CBGs and provide mid-course corrections, leaving the final in-atmosphere flight profile as whatever the initial point for it will allow. And as NRao saar says, perhaps the idea is simply to scatter dozens of smaller sensor-fused bomblets over the target area (the target, BTW, would have moved about a few hundred meters from the initial point on the terminal profile, so should be within scatter range for a high altitude bomblet release).

All of this is educated speculation, of course. Nobody really knows what the Chinese plan to do. Fact of the matter is that for all we know, this all just a elaborate ruse to instill the "fear" within the Amrikhan commanders. It certainly fits the bill:

a) Take a run-of-the-mill BM and attach a new alphabet to its version
b) Spread internet rumors and grainy pics of what its "designed" to do
c) Wait and twiddle thumbs as the internet forums catch fire and the tweets reach the Pentagon
d) Keep releasing enigmatic (read cryptic) press releases with catchy phrases like "Anti-Satellite" missile or "Carrier Killer BM" etc.
e) Deploy some repainted launchers close to the coast and let them be "seen" by enemy satellites

And if push comes to shove in wartime:
f) Launch a few approximately guided missiles towards the general direction of a enemy CBG and hope for the best
g) Hope that the enemy falls for the "bark is nastier than the bite" and backs off

If the above is not true and the Chinese have truly mastered this area of technology, then kudos to them. But given their track record, I will believe it when I see it.

For now, my money is on the bluff part. They may very well be working on some ideas and concepts, but I have yet to see something akin to a realistic test. The one they did in the desert under controlled conditions does not count. I could very well launch a vanilla DF-21 towards a ground target and say it was all a very secretive test of new technologies.

My two cents onlee, of course. Perhaps I have really fallen behind the curve on all this missile stuff and the world has moved on.

-Vivek

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Dec 2013 02:05

Nirav,

Thanks. Not a good idea to drop a 0, it too has a value!!!

TSarkar/VA,

India wants Russian JV BrahMos missile warship deployment

Finally, the Russian cannot incorporate JV lessons from the BrahMos because everything for the missile is out-sourced from Russia. The missile's target acquisition software, guidance, navigation and fire control systems are all Indian contributions to the JV, along with the firing mechanisms.

That is no coincidence. This missile, at Mach 3, has the capability to ferret out THE target. Not an easy capability in all that clutter - and I mean all kinds of things that the opponent would throw at this missile. And, again, at Mach 3.

I do not know, but it seem to imply they could even have a library, to match, within the missile - just like a CM flying over land would match the landscape. (Interestingly, was watching a UT on a US CM. States that during the Gulf war the US sent their CMs along the hills/mountains of Eastern Iraq and then into Baghdad because they were not too sure that the missiles could handle the bland terrain of the deserts).

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Dec 2013 02:25

Dec 10, 2013 :: INS Vikramaditya and the Aircraft Carrier Debate

A new carrier like India’s does more than just denote blue-water capability.

The Indian Navy has been energized by the commissioning of its new aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya. Coming two months after another significant achievement – the nuclear reactor of the Arihant, India’s first indigenous nuclear powered submarine, going critical – the Vikramaditya is being seen as a game changer, with the potential to transform the Indian Navy’s profile in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond.

The ship’s proportions and capabilities are indeed significant. At 45,400 tons, the Vikamaditya is considerably larger than any ship the Indian Navy has ever had. Its primary aviation assets, the Kamov-31 helicopters and MiG 29K multirole fighter aircraft – the mainstay of its integral combat capability – are among the most advanced in the world. In addition, the naval version of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) may also be positioned onboard, making the Vikramaditya the first Indian aircraft carrier to operate two aircraft of the Short Take off but Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) variety.

Interestingly, Vikramaditya’s commissioning seems to have re-ignited an old debate among maritime analysts: of the relevance of aircraft carriers in a maritime contemporary context. Proponents of aircraft carriers argue it constitutes the core of maritime strategy and must play a central part in a blue-water navy’s operational plans. Opponents posit that the aircraft carrier’s high vulnerability (to new disruptive weapons and technologies), and inadequate logistical sustainability render it an irrelevant asset. Not only is it a financially expensive proposition, they point out, it is also incapable of projecting significant offensive power. The fact that it is virtually defenseless against underwater attacks, long-range strategic airpower and ballistic missiles makes it a near liability in war.

As compelling as the criticism appears, there is a more nuanced rationale for retaining the giant ships. Modern day maritime discourse requires such ships to be located in a new conceptual framework. Ocean-going navies today need three types of conventional assets. The first category comprises “hard-power” assets: fighting platforms like destroyers, frigates, missile boats and attack submarines meant for the real combat operations in a naval battle. These are used in both offensive and defensive operations, and are meant to influence the tempo and outcome of a maritime conflict. The second lot is of “soft-power” assets like hospital ships, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) platforms, survey vessels, etc. These provide a valuable regional (and global) service and are crucial for a navy’s soft-power outreach. Finally, and most significantly, a navy needs assets for “power projection” – a critical component of a nation’s maritime strategy. Power projection assets are an embodiment of a nation’s strategic capability and political intent. Navies strive to accrete power and project it far beyond the home country as a metric of national influence and their own regional relevance. Aircraft carriers fall into this category.

This is not to suggest that aircraft carriers no longer have an important combat role to play. It is just that they do not necessarily have to be involved in high intensity combat operations against adversaries and must be seen as fungible assets, in terms of their utility in advancing national interests. There is certainly prestige involved in possessing an aircraft carrier. But prestige is increasingly coming to be recognized as equaling national influence. As aircraft carrier supporters point out, the arrival of an aircraft carrier at a regional port of call imparts a diplomatic impact that cannot be matched by a submarine or a destroyer. Therefore, even while acknowledging the flexible demands of future maritime missions on maritime forces that would necessitate a shift towards multi-purpose warships (such as amphibious assault vessels), the likelihood that aircraft carriers would continue to be relevant in their present form and configuration, remains high.

If this gives some perspective to the aircraft carrier debate, it still doesn’t settle the supposed contest between sea control and sea denial. Inducting an aircraft carrier, it has been suggested, signifies the triumph of the concept of sea control over the more practical and much less expensive notion of sea denial. The analysis tries to draw a false equivalence between two fundamental concepts intrinsic to national maritime strategy. While the former is a prerequisite in dictating the terms of a naval engagement, the latter (as a subset of the former) has limited application and is meant to deny a stronger adversary the use of maritime space. Both play a vital role in a nation’s larger maritime strategy, but none supplants the other.

There is one significant difference though. Since sea-denial is useful in defending a nation’s maritime territory against an aggressive adversary, it is primarily a war-time concept. Sea control, on the other hand, allows for both battle-space domination in war and the expansion of naval sphere of operations in peacetime (a critical component of grand national strategy). Its utility as a metaphorical enabler in naval strategy is, therefore, far greater.

For the Indian Navy, operating two full-fledged carrier battle groups (CBGs) – one each for the Eastern and Western seaboards – is not just a long-standing ambition, but also a key component of its operational strategy. With the INS Viraat nearing the end of its operational life, the Indian Navy has been under pressure to position a suitable replacement. The INS Vikramaditya brings it one step closer to achieving a desirable end-state. As things stand, by the end of 2018 the navy will induct the 40,000-tonne INS Vikrant being built at the Cochin Shipyard. The Vikramaditya, in the words of India’s Naval Chief, Admiral D K Joshi, is intended to “bridge the gap between the INS Viraat’s decommissioning, and the entry of the INS Vikrant.”

An aircraft carrier, however, doesn’t by-itself guarantee an expanded sphere of naval influence. With a limited integral defensive capability and even lesser maneuverability, a carrier needs an armada of armed escort ships and aircraft to protect it from external threats. In this, the Vikramaditya has an inherent disadvantage as it lacks an on-board close-in-weapon-system (CIWS) and long-range surface-to-air missiles (LR-SAMS). Its near total dependence on layered in-depth defense provided by its screening ships and aircraft is a challenge that the Indian Navy will need to address in due course.

The Indian Navy will also be mindful of the maritime ambitions of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) and the role that its new aircraft carrier – the Liaoning – is likely to play in China’s Indian Ocean expansion. China’s new aircraft carrier might be used both for the PLA-N’s power projection, as well as an instrument for its soft-power diplomacy – a key component of the “far-seas” naval strategy. That apart, the PLA-N is also said to be considering using aircraft carrier in a hard-power role for the expansion of its island barrier defenses, also known as the inner and outer island chains. In fact, analysts agree that China is most likely to pursue the construction of additional aircraft carriers in the future – which only indicates the PLA-N’s belief in the worthiness of its aircraft carrier program.

Ultimately, possessing an aircraft carrier does not just indicate blue-water capability, but it is also representative of a navy’s essential vision. If a maritime force can conceive of an aircraft carrier’s role as a versatile and flexible asset – one that can switch easily between soft power diplomacy, power projection and combat operations – it can be a game changer, for both national foreign policy and naval strategy.

If used intelligently, the Vikamaditya could prove to be critical in shaping the Indian Ocean’s strategic environment.

Abhijit Singh is a research scholar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and looks at Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean. He is co-author of the book Indian Ocean Challenges – A Quest for Cooperative Solutions.

Leo.Davidson · Post by **Leo.Davidson** » 12 Dec 2013 05:40

India wants Russian JV BrahMos missile warship deployment

Russia is not interested in the Brahmos, will never be when they already have a missile with same characteristics and double the range. Although some the innards are Indian contributions; the specifications were Yakhont, so they already have the same components (but Russian) in their version of the missile.

Brahmos 2 might interest the Russian. The Mini-Brahmos will not.

Eric Leiderman · Post by **Eric Leiderman** » 12 Dec 2013 06:04

The Vikramaditya being a blue water vessel is still up for discussion. It will depend on the operating budget. The ratio she is in the dock to out on patrol.
Lets wait a few years a much better picture will emerge by then.
The Uk went for diesel electric after a lot of discussion. A rough estimate of the ratio of tied up/sailing could show up as 80/20 (This is an educated guess) so Nuke propulsion would be expensive. The khans have the ratio skewed the other way, so it makes sense. Where will we be in this ratio? Time will tell.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 12 Dec 2013 06:16

Leo.Davidson wrote:India wants Russian JV BrahMos missile warship deployment

Russia is not interested in the Brahmos, will never be when they already have a missile with same characteristics and double the range. Although some the innards are Indian contributions; the specifications were Yakhont, so they already have the same components (but Russian) in their version of the missile.

Brahmos 2 might interest the Russian. The Mini-Brahmos will not.

mini-brahmos might find favor with RusAF and Navy.. they have Su-30/35s.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Dec 2013 06:43

EL,

Big Data on the Nimitz class:

NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS

All you wanted to know and more.

BTW, where did you get educated to make that guess? That ratio is horrendous. I mean converting it into a casino, for that duration, would make perfect sense.

member_27811 · Post by **member_27811** » 12 Dec 2013 07:05

Why is R33 registered Bhutan or is it temporary?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 12 Dec 2013 07:09

bomblets released from 5km up seem to be a viable plan. lots of soft targets like comms gear , planes to hit on any ship.
assuming each is 3kg, that packs a considerable wallop with filled with ball bearings in outer layer.
a DF21 might be able to carry some 300 of these. a salvo of 5 DF21 aimed at the same CBG might be able to release 1500 of these in a killbox

a 30knot ship (55kmph) would be able to move max 5km in 10 mins....but not so much in rear quadrant as it will take more time in making a 180' turn co-ordinated with its escorts. so we are looking at a semicircle only mostly of radius 5km. less than 50 sq km area. so 1500 bomblets distributed evenly means 30 per sq km.....enough to snag a hit or two on the carrier me thinks and bring flight ops to a halt for a while... radio altimeter fuze all of them to explode 10m above the sea surface in hopes of hitting something and not wasting anything.

for better effect these bomblets need to have IIR/MMW and be something like the CBU105 to home in on targets by limited lateral flight using cold gas thrusters maybe or hot gas vanes.

the idea of a Shourya scoring a hit with unburned fuel + 1ton warhead sounds more like a carrier killa than these light duty bee attacks.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 12 Dec 2013 07:13

what i'd do is see if there was a russian weapon like this, languishing for lack of funds. if so, chances are that is what china has, combined with its own tech. thats what they do whenever they can get something disruptive but which is not grade A stuff (from russia POV)

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 12 Dec 2013 07:20

USN will likely deploy a single laser weapon near the top of its ships to zap plunging submunitions quickly in a cone if the laser can fire quickly and repeatedly.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Dec 2013 07:22

Singha wrote:bomblets released from 5km up seem to be a viable plan. lots of soft targets like comms gear , planes to hit on any ship.
assuming each is 3kg, that packs a considerable wallop with filled with ball bearings in outer layer.
a DF21 might be able to carry some 300 of these. a salvo of 5 DF21 aimed at the same CBG might be able to release 1500 of these in a killbox

a 30knot ship (55kmph) would be able to move max 5km in 10 mins....but not so much in rear quadrant as it will take more time in making a 180' turn co-ordinated with its escorts. so we are looking at a semicircle only mostly of radius 5km. less than 50 sq km area. so 1500 bomblets distributed evenly means 30 per sq km.....enough to snag a hit or two on the carrier me thinks and bring flight ops to a halt for a while... radio altimeter fuze all of them to explode 10m above the sea surface in hopes of hitting something and not wasting anything.

for better effect these bomblets need to have IIR/MMW and be something like the CBU105 to home in on targets by limited lateral flight using cold gas thrusters maybe or hot gas vanes.

the idea of a Shourya scoring a hit with unburned fuel + 1ton warhead sounds more like a carrier killa than these light duty bee attacks.

Errr......

They did a dry run test:

They sank a Nimitz class ship ............................ in the desert. Which is what allowed them to declare IOC.

That BTW is a direct hit.

Two of them, to be sure.

Vicky making a U-Turn:

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 12 Dec 2013 07:29

http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/ ... jings.html

During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, as U.S. aircraft carriers ranged Soviet targets with nuclear weapons, Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau (SKB-385) was developing the R-27 (4K18)/SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Moscow formally approved development of an ASBM variant, the R-27K/SS-NX-13, that year. Visually identical to its simpler progenitor, the 900 km-range R-27K’s second stage had a liquid propellant KB-2 engine designed by the Aleksei Mihailovich Isayev design bureau. It obtained targeting data pre-launch from the Legendaocean reconnaissance satellite system (RORSATs) and Uspekh-U radars on the Tu-20 Bear-D aircraft [7]. Its 0.65 MT nuclear warhead could home in on targets within a 27 NM (50 km) “footprint” with 370 m accuracy [8]. Soviet aerospace engineer Boris Chertok credits the R-27K with “a homing system for striking pinpoint targets on the shore and surface ships” [9]. Beginning in December 1970, system tests yielded only four failures in 20 launches. December 1972 saw the first submarine-launched test from the Project 605/Golf K-102 submarines outfitted with the Record-2 fire-control system and Kasatka B-605 satellite-tracking target acquisition system, yielding 10 of 11 launches succeeded [10].

On August 15, 1975, therefore, the R-27K and its K-102 trial submarine “were accepted for operational service.” Yet, “because the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements of the 1970s would count every SLBM tube as a strategic missile regardless of whether it held a land-attack or anti-ship (tactical) missile,” according to Norman Polmar, “the R-27K missile did not become operational” [11]. Moreover, Soviet satellite targeting was not ready to support precise terminal homing, and the program was competing with more mature solutions to specific problems (e.g. the Skhval torpedo) [12]. Instead, the program was terminated in December 1975 [13]. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently stated that the SS-NX-13 ASBM “has not been tested since November 1973 and is not operational. However, the advanced technology displayed by the weapon is significant and the project could be resurrected” [14].

Russia and the United States undoubtedly would have developed their own ASBMs before China had they not signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This 1987 agreement prohibits them from possessing 500–5,500 km-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 12 Dec 2013 07:30

The SS-NX-13 submarine-launched ballistic missile is a short-range, two-stage, storable liquid-propellant missile apparently designed for an anti-ship role. It is capable of delivering a reentry vehicle in the 2500-lb class, containing a warhead with a yield of 2.0 to 3.5 MT, to a minimum operational range of 80 nm or a maximum operational range of 360 nm. The missile flies a lofted trajectory, and is unique in that it has an impact-point correction capability of up to 30 nm through use of a restartable second-stage. The missile uses an inertial guidance system aided by an onboard passive ELINT target sensor. In a pure ballistic mode the SS-NX-13 is capable of a CEP of about 0.3 nm, and against cooperative targets, i.e., a target emanating radio-frequency transmissions, the SS-NX-13 is capable of a CEP of 0.1 to 0.2 nm.

Eric Leiderman · Post by **Eric Leiderman** » 12 Dec 2013 07:47

I stand by my educated or by your assumption un-educated guess.
Except for khan no navy including Russia is at sea for ratios in excess of 30 percent,(surface fleet / large vessels 10K tonnes and above.) It just costs too much, The figures you are banding on the Nimitz class vessels are not indicative of what it costs to maintain a Carrier battle group at sea including supporting vessels, air wing , shore support add that all up and the figure will be more realistic.
The UK with cost cutting and fat trimming would be the ideal Navy to showcase this assumption for her larger vessels. Hence the 20%.
The Indian navy would be not much better , I say this with confidence because I have a maratime background and have observed Indian Naval vessels in naval dockyard and at anchorage (Mumbai) over the period 1980-2000, As I have travelled up and down the waterway in question during that period. Let some ex-service personnel in the said service rebut what I am assuming, I will retract my assumption, However your argument is based on conjucture (as could be argued is mine)

There was never any hint of the US navy being in underutilised, Lets see the figures for the UK surface fleet or the Indian Surface fleet. (Nuke subs are a different animal)

I wish what i am assuming were different, However till we need to project our power on a more permenant basis and are willing to pay for the said projection, the ratios will remain skewed towards the Casino.

John · Post by **John** » 12 Dec 2013 08:14

Karan M wrote:what i'd do is see if there was a russian weapon like this, languishing for lack of funds. if so, chances are that is what china has, combined with its own tech. thats what they do whenever they can get something disruptive but which is not grade A stuff (from russia POV)

^ It is indicated in WikiLeaks as per info from wires that amount of money china has given Russians for arms tech far far exceeds what was reported. Might explain how Putin has no problem bankrolling 50 billion Winter Olympic event.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 12 Dec 2013 08:19

In the quest for debating Carrier doctrine let's not get all revisionist about "current" Indian capability. To suggest that Indian Navy is not blue water capable because it does not meet x/y/z US benchmark is disingenuous.

One can keep going back and forth with numbers but sometimes anecdotal evidence helps like the IN making it a point to rub in the fact to folks transiting through it AOR, with its traditional and rather infamous hailing message...No?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 12 Dec 2013 08:32

singha ji, great digging. i'd take that as a serious idea of what china may have, a simplified version perhaps or even with some additional input in terms of current tech to compensate for lack of long range targeting info (since they lack targeting sats)

that cm-400 AKG they are touting for jf-17, surprise, surprise, very "similar" to a mothballed russian design too.

john ji, agree with your assessment, because all said and done, in the space of 15 odd years, china went from jh-7 class to j-10 class induction, after struggling for a long time before that with much simpler designs (they couldnt even do a J7 upgrade on their own) and the progress was without even the cautious approach we followed with LCA in terms of flight testing. basically israeli design backed by russian re-engineering/design improvements for production.

JF-17 is basically repackaged mig-33 proposal. SAMS, radars, tanks - across the board soviet input is there.

for h&d reasons, they will never acknowledge russian help. but its basically mass transfer of industrial knowledge based on huge funds transfer from china. russian industry needed the money to survive, and even retain their talent, so they took the deal.

as matter of fact, given the recent j-20s similarity in planform - wouldnt be surprised if mig shared prjct 1.44 data with them for remaking into a stealth version. their latest attack chopper turned out to be a direct kamov job.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 12 Dec 2013 10:27

Vikramaditya stamp - should be a collector's item!

Though I thought stamps were reserved for commemorative events.

venkat_r · Post by **venkat_r** » 12 Dec 2013 22:08

Though a couple of years old, still a good report on the future of aircraft carriers mostly for US fleet, but has some info on the school of thought for smaller carrier concepts.

Future of Aircraft Carriers

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Dec 2013 23:01

Unrelated to IN, however, based on a report that the French N had deployed their carrier in the IOR found the following:

The entire air wing on the deck!!

The Charles de Gaulle air wing for this deployment includes:
- 10 Rafale M
- 10 Super Etendards Modernisés
- 2 E-2C Hawkeye
- 2 Dolphin Helicopters
- 1 Alouette III Helicopters
- 2 Caracal C-SAR Helicopters

The picture above has more than this list.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 12 Dec 2013 23:21

RajitO wrote: One can keep going back and forth with numbers but sometimes anecdotal evidence helps like the IN making it a point to rub in the fact to folks transiting through it AOR, with its traditional and rather infamous hailing message...No?

could you elaborate a bit ?

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 13 Dec 2013 01:10

If you look at say USA AC, that costs x million $ per day, how much of it comes from foreigners? - depending upon fuel etc. Please remember USA prints its dollars totally independent of foreigners. To say that Russia spends y 'dollars' per day for its AC won't be correct, will it? It may be totally free for Russian state for its power projection.

member_23455 · Post by **member_23455** » 13 Dec 2013 08:08

Rahul M wrote:
RajitO wrote: One can keep going back and forth with numbers but sometimes anecdotal evidence helps like the IN making it a point to rub in the fact to folks transiting through it AOR, with its traditional and rather infamous hailing message...No?
could you elaborate a bit ?

From earlier in this very thread...

RajitO wrote:
Minor OT...but if Pranay has operated in the Indian Ocean AOR, I bet he has a "Welcome to our Ocean" story....most USN personnel do .

Which is why I keep asking Mods to reach and out and invite the BTDT crowd to have their own thread...