INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[NRao]

The IN would be best served with a NLCA based upon the LCA MK-2 variant,not the underpowered NLCA-1 given its limited operational effectiveness

In fact the logic should be because of NLCA, therefore LCA MK2.

The Air Force tagged on to a Navy's request for a LCA with a more powerful engine.

VAYU!!!!! A built-in bias.

[Philip]

"Shoot the messenger time at the BR carnival"! Poor VAYU,where is its bias? It has only reported the thinking about the NLCA at the moment,echoing similar facts what Kartik has said.From the report,the NLCA will arrive only by 2020 or thereabouts.The point I'm making is that by then,IAC-2 will be under construction,hopefully to arrive before 2025,where the aircraft required to be aboard it should be superior to the MIG-29K.The single engined lightweight NLCA ,which has yet to fly-even the IAF;s MK-2 upon which it is supposed to be based upon,by any stretch of the imagination is inferior to the MIG-29K.There is enough of stats available for the interested.The long term plan is to acquire 80 say some sources.

ET

15 Nov, 2013
The MiG 29-Ks would provide a significant boost to Indian Navy with their range of over 700 nautical miles, extendable to over 1,900 n.m. with mid-air refuelling, and an array of weapons like anti-ship missiles, beyond visual range air-to- air missiles and guided bombs and rockets.

Wik

Modifications made for Indian Navy requirement featured Zhuk-ME radar, RD-33MK engine, combat payload up to 5,500 kg, 13 hardpoints (inclusive of the multi-lock bomb carriers), additional fuel tanks situated in dorsal spine fairing and wing LERXs, increased total fuel capacity by 50% comparing to first variant of MiG-29 and an updated 4-channel digital fly-by-wire flight control system. With special coatings, the MiG-29K radar reflecting surface is 4–5 times smaller than of basic MiG-29. Cockpit displays consist of wide HUDs, 3 colour LCD MFDs (7 on the MiG-29KUB), a French Sigma-95 satellite GPS module and Topsight E helmet-mounted targeting system compatible with the full range of weapons carried by the MiG-29M and MiG-29SMT.[28]

Let's take a look at the current and future threats to the IN's carriers.The principal threat is going to be from the PLAN's subs and CBGs.The sub threat and the critical need for the IN to vastly upgrade and enlarge both N-subs and AIP subs has been debated earlier.In the IOR we will face mainly the sub threat.The Saudis are planning to acquire 24 German U-boats,the BDeshis 2 Ming SS boats and the Pakis will build more Agostas or acquire a Chinese design.Given the close relationship that the Saudis have with the Pakis,it is definitely on the cards that the Pakis will train the Saudis in sub warfare and perhaps even acquire a few from the Saudis on lease,whatever.The number that the Saudis plan to acquire is highly suspicious,far beyond their needs.

However,the PLAN plan to build several carriers-some say 4-6,and are aping US super carriers.They have the money and the commitment to build them at home and at speed.For decades they've been acquiring carriers for scrap and carrier tech from every source available.These carriers will operate heavy naval aircraft from the SU-33 to perhaps a naval version of their two stealth birds under development.Our NLCA ,with its limitations in range,endurance and payload-as the variant will be heavier with reinforced undercarriage,a tailhook,etc.,and less capable than the Mk2,will not be capable of dealing with these threats from more advanced aircraft.Had the LCA's development been faster ,perhaps a naval variant of the proposed stealth AMCA could've been an option.The best option for the IN to maintain a qualitative edge over the PLAN would be to acquire a naval variant of the FGFA,reportedly being planned for Russia's future carriers.Other options could be an upgraded version of the MIG-29 ,with AESA radar,more stealth components and newer weaponry,since no follow-on version of the Flanker is being contemplated,the 29K having been found more suitable.The ability to carry the air-launched version of BMos should be essential.The STOVL JSF is also a prospect,how it performs on the QE class will be closely watched.Here is a previous report on BMos:

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2012/03/ ... r-mig.html

BrahMos Corp. is looking to develop a new anti-ship missile with a smaller diameter and lighter weight than the present BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. The proposal, tentatively called BrahMos-3, is aimed at putting together a potent anti-ship/anti-surface missile for the Indian Navy's MiG-29K and IAF MMRCA.

Revealing plans for the BrahMos-3 today at Defexpo, BrahMos CEO Dr A. Sivathanu Pillai said the first test-firing of a BrahMos from a modified Su-30MKI (modifications by HAL) would take place by early next year.

The BrahMos-2, a concept scramjet-based hypersonic version of the missile has begun development, and the programme aims at a first test in five years, Dr Pillai says. The long-awaited underwater-launched version of the BrahMos is expected to undergo its first test within 2012, and is understood to be ready in all respects.

The BrahMos recently conducted two successful tests of the army land attack variant of the missile, in which it performed supersonic steep dives in both tests.

[NRao]

Ved Vyas ji did not write so much!!!

Whatever.

____________________________

Came across an article (if one can call it that) that the chinese have "EMALS" equivalent. !!!!!! States that a 100 mt prototype was built sometime in 2008. Sounds suspicious, but, it is out there.

[Philip]

Having reportedly stolen the "crown jewels" of the US's nuclear warhead designs and tech by US sources,it is entirely plausible that they've stolen EMALS tech too.It is ironic that Cold War doctrine that the Soviets used against the US is becoming relevant once more,but this time against the PLAN.One Oscar class SSGN for every US carrier.This was the recommendation by a Russian analyst some time ago for India,that Russia should lease out Oscar class SSGNs for India to be able to defeat the PLAN's future CBGs and surface fleet.If we build asap an SSGN variant of the ATV,with a large payload/assortment of anti-ship and land attack missiles,about 6 subs,they could be tasked for the same purpose.to destroy PLAN CBGs and would be able to conduct a 70-90 day patrol .

[Khalsa]

IN Doctrine no matter how small has never been about Sea Denial..... but Sea Control.

[Shalav]

+1

[Singha]

Imo more realistic as out footprint expands is sea control in bob and arabia sea and sea denial in east asia and middle of the io.

[Aditya G]

Hoping for some good vikram pics from Malta ...

[Viv S]

Might not be a misconception. The plan seems to have been to spend $43 billion in building three ships. Considering $4 billion as development costs you still end up paying $39 billion for 3 ships which makes it approximately $13 billion a ship.

Viv, Ganesh

$13 billion is the construction cost for Gerald R Ford. It does NOT include $4.7 billion worth of R&D costs (applicable for the entire class and other spin-offs). The 13 billion itself includes a cost overrun. Any delay (due to budget difficulties/sequestration, or due to technical challenges with maturation of EMALS/othyer technologies) will cause further increases.

The quoted cost is the cost inclusive of non-recurring expenditure (I've skimmed through the CBO report from which you got those figures).



Most recently, reports of cost overruns on the first ship of the class have brought increased scrutiny from both Congress and the media. The questions are well founded, and the Navy shares those concerns. The current cost of the ship is estimated to be about $12.9 billion. This has been attributed to three primary factors.

First, that $12.9 billion total pricetag includes $3.7 billion of non-recurring engineering necessary for the design of the entire Ford class. For ships, this one-time design charge is accounted for in the cost of the first ship of the class, while the benefits accrue over the entire 94-year life of the class.

Second, a 2002 decision to move from a three-ship evolutionary strategy to a single leap forward resulted in the concurrent design and build of many new technologies that were originally planned for later ships. This has resulted in unplanned increases in both equipment and construction costs. However, while that decision increased the cost of the first ship of the class, it brought increased capability to the warfighter sooner and avoided “one-of-a-kind” carriers that would have ultimately resulted in costly sustainment challenges throughout their life cycles.

Finally, we’ve experienced cost growth above initial estimates in several of the new government-furnished technologies such as the electromagnetic aircraft launching system (EMALS) and the new dual-band radar (DBR), as well as cost growth in the contractor-furnished material and contractor construction performance.

US Naval Institute



However the figure varies from $12.8 billion alll the way to $14 billion, putting the cost of construction at between $9.2 billion and $10 billion. In either case, it still remains a better option that a new Nimitz class carrier.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^^
Scope creep at work. The biggest cause of project failures and cost escalations. The Americans have a tendency to go for revolutionary developments rather than step by step evolutionary developments. Due to this they manage to be a step ahead of their adversaries and the rest are left catching up. In simpler words they do not change the rules of the game, rather they change the game itself.

[member_25400]

Guys ., whats the take on the large carrier / small carrier argument

1. USN studies prove that a larger carrier is more cost-effective than smaller ones. i.e You get more bang for your buck with large supercarriers.
2. OTOH, large carriers and indeed the carrier group, represent a *substantial* cost investment. Which is putting your eggs into one basket, especially for an ICBM/DF21-D type (somewhat less so for a lucky shot/submarine/air attack).
3. Also, the thumb rule is ~3 carriers (1 in refit, 1 working up) for every one in operational use. So having one or two large supercarriers suffers from that availability aspect.
4. Smaller carriers have far less capable air wings; compromising on range/usuable payload and indeed coming down to either helicopter carriers or STOVL aircraft at some point. The only modern STOVL aircraft is the F-35, where India is clearly on the outside. (politically & economically).
Larger carriers allow for more effective AEW/ASW wings, and even fixed wing AWACS at some point.
At the lower end, one can even talk of "post carrier" amphibious assault ships, with part time helicopter/STOVL air wings.

--
The gripping hand (critical point) is to figure out what purpose the carriers are meant to serve. The USN has an answer, which doesn't necessarily apply to India. Sea control/power projection etc are part of it., but the USN is clearly heavily influenced by principles espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan.

To confuse the issue, power projection and sustenance in a blue water/expeditionary scenario is very different from a near-shore/littoral scenario, and the risks and potential capabilities don't completely translate from one to the other.

I like this article (http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/86e3 ... ea-Control) which talks about the purposes of an aircraft carrier as "eyes of the fleet", cavalry/ raid/hit and run/disruption, capital ship, nuclear strike and floating air platform, gepolitical chess piece and potentially mothership for assault.

The problem is that aircraft carriers are long term investments, and India has no clear doctrine. Plus since India's economic capabilities, political and military situation is also changing rapidly, (and technical capability a little less rapidly) it is difficult for India to come out with a clear doctrine and plan our fleet around it. (eg http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_Aircraf ... _GSKhurana)

Instead, we try to fudge/hedge our bets. Unfortunately, we have challenges in both long term thinking and in opportunistic purchase, due to limitations of our procurement process.

Clearly, aligning with the US can have substantial naval air benefits ranging from more effective large aircraft carriers (EMALS, possibly in large nuclear powered carrier), to small (F-35 base assault ships/small carriers); aligning with other western powers may help (UK, Italy, France-Mistral etc) or Russia (nuclear power,
shipbuilding).

The Indian Navy is well advised to keep its options open and create/build upon traditions and capabilities that we possess.

[An example of trade-offs, Large supercarriers are very vulnerable in green water near-shore (eg Karachi) scenarios to Pakistan's AIP/conventional submarines, but can be pitched somewhat against pakistan's land based air force), their presence in the Gulf or South China sea risks political imbroilement, of a sort we haven't had to decide so far.]

Ultimately, we are still growing and have not figured out who we are as a nation. The IN expression of that identity and it's translation in form of the number and size/capability of our aircraft carriers reflects that.

[Singha]

>> Also, the thumb rule is ~3 carriers (1 in refit, 1 working up) for every one in operational use

I believe that is very conservative side. mostly it would be 50% available..khan bahadur with 12 carriers needed atleast 4 for north atlantic and 4 for north pacific to make impact in WW3. out of the available 50%, half might be in active deployment but the other half could cut short their training cycle and join on patrol as needed - provided the crew and air wing were trained up to readiness / extra pilots available to replace the trainees with.

with just 2 carriers for a while until IAC2 enters service probably around 2025, we will have to find creative ways to pack in more a/c and aircrew for war deployment and practice it seriously in peacetime.

[Aditya G]

Excellent post, Barath.

Our aircraft carrier choices are further complicated due to the confusion regarding choice of aircraft, which is a major contributor to design finalization.

At present, the objective decision for IN to make is viz INS Vishal. Following are the choices:

1. 40,000 Ton class:
a. Build another INS Vikrant class carrier. Acquire LCA Navy and more MiG-29K.

2. 65,000+ Ton class. Aside from LCA and MiG-29K, the Rafale-M is a viable option.
a. New indigenous design.
b. Buy PA2 design from France. Build in India with suitable modifications
c. Off the shelf purchase from UK or France of QE2/PA2 class (unlikely)

3. 80,000+ Tons.

IMHO - My ideal case is Option 2b. It will minimize design risks and we wont be testing any new ground with Rafale-M. Since this size of vessel can support fixed wing AEW aircraft it overcomes the basic shortcoming of Vikram and Vikrant. Building anything bigger is just indulgence. This mid size carrier may be supported by through deck amphibs operating a large fleet of helicopters and VSTOL JSFs if need be.

Option #3 throws up too many questions and options at the same time viz Propulsion, Catapult technology, aircraft selection, Cost, risks and like. I don't think we are getting answers to these questions till 2020 - and hence is something I want IN to avoid.

[member_23455]

Hmmm...more convoluted spirals discussing options that are largely moot.

1. Nothing is "revolutionary" about US carrier development - Post-WWII they stepped through "light carriers", re-designated them with mods etc., evolved three (four if you include the JFK one-off) conventional carrier classes, made one "proof of concept build" - Enterprise, and then settled on the Nimitz class, which also had distinct "versions." Gerald Ford is to Nimitz what broadly the Super Hornet is to the Hornet. It is not an F-35 (for better or worse) to the Hornet.

2. To draw a parallel, for the IN the IAC-1 is "proof of concept" + capability. If that leads to stabilizing on the 65K IAC-2 as a class, that's good enough rather than embark on "keeping up with the Joneses" - supercarriers, n-propulsion etc., Chinese propaganda - for the sake of it. There is a lot else that goes into creation of combat power than simplistic size-based assumptions.

3. It will take the IN at least 8-10 years to fine tune a "USN-lite" CBG doctrine, hampered as it will be with missing pieces of the puzzle purely in hardware terms - Kolkata class, SSNs etc., so while ambition is good, "crawl, walk, run" is a time-tested military principle. Let's not lose sight that we are in crawl mode right now.

[member_23455]

The gripping hand (critical point) is to figure out what purpose the carriers are meant to serve. The USN has an answer, which doesn't necessarily apply to India. Sea control/power projection etc are part of it., but the USN is clearly heavily influenced by principles espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan.

To confuse the issue, power projection and sustenance in a blue water/expeditionary scenario is very different from a near-shore/littoral scenario, and the risks and potential capabilities don't completely translate from one to the other.

Largely bang on and great to see posters talk about doctrine on this thread. Only thing is not to mix Blue-water -- which the IN is today -- with expeditionary in the US context -- which also leads to wrong conclusions.

The problem is that aircraft carriers are long term investments, and India has no clear doctrine. Plus since India's economic capabilities, political and military situation is also changing rapidly, (and technical capability a little less rapidly) it is difficult for India to come out with a clear doctrine and plan our fleet around it. (eg http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_Aircraf ... _GSKhurana)

Disagree, we had a clear doctrine for the old days and practiced it. India's carrier doctrine currently is in transition, as posted before, somewhere in the 90s we made a change from British to US doctrine - reinforced by the IN sending the cream of its carrier COs and naval aviators to USN establishments both at strategic and operational/tactical level.

Now that the IN has the central piece of hardware essential to practically developing a new doctrine, let's see if operational plans and tactics reflect that in the years to come. Khurana is a Navy guy but a "skimmer." There are some other chaps around who do this carrier-based warfare for a living, and thankfully they are mostly in the right place to influence things.

[TSJones]

Current US Naval strategy and tactics were born in WWII from Pearl Harbor to the Guadalcanal bug out and not wanting to repeat those mistakes. India's experiences will undoubtedly be different.

[srin]

In this case our doctrine should be shaped by reality: our ship-building rate is very slow - something of INS Vikrant would take around 10 years.

There are two choices to go forward:
a) Have INS Vikrant as a TD, and go for bigger, "better" (EMALS, CATOBAR etc) INS Vishal; OR
b) Start making xerox copies of INS Vikrant.

(a) is fine if we can stabilize the design. If we already have the money sanctioned, if we already have EMALS deal worked out with the US, that's fine.

Until then, IN shouldn't dither and just start ordering more (b). Because while you may not get the latest and greatest, you will have something that is good enough. And you have a shipyard that has activity and you haven't lost skillset when the INS Vikrant designers retire out.
That means the doctrine would be to have a squadron each in say, three ACs and then pack much more than that at combat time. And a single fleet would have multiple ACs that can be made into different task-forces or all unified to add more punch.

[member_23455]

Current US Naval strategy and tactics were born in WWII from Pearl Harbor to the Guadalcanal bug out and not wanting to repeat those mistakes. India's experiences will undoubtedly be different.

Why just WWII? Mahan's classical principles predate WWII while the visionary US Code Title 10, 5492, amendments on Aviation command eligibility were enacted well after WWII.

[Singha]

whether (a) or (b) we have no option but to double down on investing in Kochi and make it capable of building/refitting 3 carriers at various stages. this means atleast 2 drydocks whether static or floating. and one area where a floating hull can be fitted up in final stages or smaller repairs done inside without hull cutting. karwar also needs money for medium work on carriers. being in the middle of nowhere it will be hard to have 100s of subcontracting cos come in and do stuff that easily feasible in mumbai or kolkata.

even with a stable number of 3 carriers, 1 will be nearing retirement always, 1 will be nearing MLU/heavy upkeep ... so we need be building 1.5 new carriers always to reach a stable number of 5 or 6 active carriers someday.

we need land (not sure if it exists in kochi shipyard) and we need atleast $1b to scale up the machine shops and supply chain and we need to order *2 carriers* at the same time...perhaps 1 will be xerox of IAC-1 and 1 will be the PA2ski. there is no other way to cut the gordian knot.

the alternative is invest heavily in P75I and SSNs .... Khan would love to see funding diverted from SSN/SSBN progs into carriers and offer chocolates like emals and hawkeye to make it attractive..........but really its no alternative at all - both sea control and sea denial assets are useful in various theaters - sea denial is a must for south and east china sea ops.

[Prasad]

SSNs are inherently tied into the production of our carriers aren't they? So we should ideally be producing an ssn along with a carrier to fit into a future cbg, along with other elements.
Doesn't massa have ssn's in a cbg?

[Rahul M]

yup, although they are called CSG's nowadins.

[NRao]

By what we face today or how we understand it, the Indian Naval doctrine is rather tame.

However:

Aug 2009 :: Indian Maritime Doctrine release

Which really did not add much to teh original one released in 2004.

2010 :: India's Maritime Military Strategy

[NRao]

2010 :: The Indian Navy's New 'Expeditionary' Outlook

[Singha]

Ability to strike hard and consistently on Chinese shipping, naval bases and coastal targets in a high threat env is the goal we need for 2025. Ssn or aip ssk armed with nirbhay klubs and hwt supported by lrmp are the lynchpin.
they will play offense.
carriers and other units like big asw ships can hunt enemy subs and engage any surface units from further out. Beyond a point its too risky for all but subs unless one can mass together four cvn for a kola peninsula type all out attack with full readiness for a nuclear exchange to erupt within hours.
we r far from that and subs to press the attack.

[Philip]

Our doctrine according to Adm.Arun Prakash (retd) is not Mahanian but Corbettian,in that maritime power is to be sued to influence matters on land.India has greater danger from land-grabbing by China and Pak traditionally and have no US style expeditionary warfare doctrine neccessitating super-carriers.

However,our maritime responsibilities are expanding as our global role increases.For China,it is the top priority,to force the USN to back off wherever its interests are threatened,esp. in the Asia-Pacific region.We have new threats emerging though in the IOR,saudi sub a,mbitions with 24 German U-boats on order,some may find their way to Pak,as the Pakis will surely be involved in training the Saudis in sub warfare.Secondly,the BDeshis are also buying 2 Chinese Ming class subs.If they also gain a foothold in the Bay of Bengal like Gwadar,and the chances of that happening is strong,esp.if the anti-India BNP supported by the US comes to power in the Jan elections.The principal threat in the IOR will be from enemy subs and China last year showed increased patrols close to the Indian coastline and in the A&N Sea.Our ASW warfare capabilities will have to increase and extra flat tops with heavy SSW/muti-role helos like Merlins,etc. will prove most useful.The IN's sub inventory has to be attended to on a war footing regardless of the carrier/amphib requirement.What is most welcome is the signing off for the 16 coastal ASW craft,below 1000t.

India too with our training of the Vietnamese navy in Kilo sub ops will need to have a permanent presence in the Indo-China Sea just as the RN has its "ARMILLA patrol" in the Gulf and Arabian Sea.Our recent exercises with Japan are also meant to expand our presence in the Asia-Pacific.However,the assets that we send into harm's way ,out of the IOR where our unsinkable carrier,"INS India",allows us to operate long-legged LRMP aircraft and the IAF too,need to be carefully chosen.The US with huge budget cuts barely has 4+ CBGs operational,and many carrier air wings have also been axed.The IN operating 3 med. sized carriers will also find it hard going financially.Here is where our planned 4 smaller sized amphibs ,approx.Viraat's tonnage,could serve us well in tackling with lesser tasks.It would also increase the number of flat tops in the fleet to 6/7.

An interesting offer came from SAAB at the Cochin naval defexpo,where the Sea Gripen,much upgraded from the std. version, was offered for use on the Viraat as well as the new carriers.Given the fact that the NLCA will only arrive after the IAF's MK-2 is produced,sometime 2020+,this is an intriguing proposal.About the size of the Sea Harrier,it can use the same lifts.How much more life is left in the carrier is a moot point,but the Chinese have shown how an aging rust bucket,the Varyag has been completely rebuilt into a new carrier.It may be poss. to extend the life of the Viraat with one more refit until IAC-2 arrives by 20205.Sea Gripen on the Viraat for around another 7-10 years would be giving the IN a quantum leap in capability and also bridge the time period before IAC-1 -the new Vikrant also arrives.The aircraft could also be used on the amphib flat tops which will start ar,iving by 2020,giving them integral close support assets apart from a degree of multi-role capability that this single-engined aircraft can perform,far more than the few Harriers left.The NLCA development can go along without any hindrance,as in the future,as many have pointed out we will need more flat tops and aircraft with them.The larger carriers will principally operate the MIG-29K and any other similar twin-engined types in the future.

[Klaus]

even with a stable number of 3 carriers, 1 will be nearing retirement always, 1 will be nearing MLU/heavy upkeep ... so we need be building 1.5 new carriers always to reach a stable number of 5 or 6 active carriers someday.

we need land (not sure if it exists in kochi shipyard) and we need atleast $1b to scale up the machine shops and supply chain and we need to order *2 carriers* at the same time...perhaps 1 will be xerox of IAC-1 and 1 will be the PA2ski. there is no other way to cut the gordian knot.

Cochin Outer Harbour Project.

There will be close to 3300 acres of reclaimed land available for a outer harbour and a second petrochemical (possibly oil refinery too) in Kochi. Proper planning and relocation of existing assets can give room for Kochi Shipyard to construct a second drydock, 5-10 kms away from the first one.

Alternatively, there is a proposed transhipment port project at Vizhinjam (Link), to which modifications can be made to include a shipyard facility with 2 drydocks.

[svinayak]

Which really did not add much to teh original one released in 2004.

2010 :: India's Maritime Military Strategy

[Manish_Sharma]

http://postimg.org/image/qd4gweiet/

Why we don't need a big carrier force:

a.) Orange painted part is where our navy will be fighting. Mostly hunting chinese and porki subs and taking out chinese merchant and naval platforms.

b.) Green brush is where our carrier force or our air attack platforms won't need to go for next 40 years at least.

c.) Blue brush path is where neither our nor cheeni a/c carriers are going through to attack each other. Too busy and risky to stay hidden.

d.) Thin white brush part shows Shankarosky's idea of Tanker assisted Fighter-Strike A/cs going to attack. So instead of wasting money on 45000 ton, 65000 ton or 90000 tons heavy ships. Use that money to buy big A-330 tankers and a separate force of PAK FAs, Tejases and Rambhas to do that work.

[TSJones]

That string of islands just abpve the equator, the Maldives? What's their story? Are they cooperative or are they a pain in the you know what?

[NRao]

If one reads the latest and greatest those "choke points" are very slowly vanishing. China has moved or is moving most of her energy needs to Central Asia and Russia. The only thing India can choke is ore (and anything else) from Africa, which China has built up reserves to last hew a few months (right now).

Which is why IN will have to take the fight into the SCS.

The carriers that IN has currently plans for are more than sufficient to take on anything (bad guys) in the IOR. But is not designed to take on China if she were send her fleet into IOR. Recall China's original plan - which she proposed to the US - was to rule IOR (and have US rule the Pacific). Bet this is still on.

IN needs to be an offensive task force. Now, be it with N number of carriers, each at X tons, with Y in the air wing. Or dozens of subs. But it needs to be a viable, perceived threat to China and her minions around the rim. IN will have to discard her "IOR" vision and migrate to a "rim" - an arc that starts at the Suez and culminates north of Japan.

Call it what you want - Deputy, etc. All is fine. Just built up and make sure that China feels threatened.

[Singha]

>> Recall China's original plan - which she proposed to the US - was to rule IOR (and have US rule the Pacific).

I think their proposal was china-west pacific upto the blue water and US gets to rule the empty blue water/polynesia and micronesia fair n balanced foxnews style deal.
not sure if IOR was in that folder but bill clinton regime had signed off on making cheen the chowkidar of asia. the bush neocons put an end to that.

[NRao]

You are partially right: China wanted West of Hawaii + IOR and US to keep East of Hawaii.

China proposed division of Pacific, Indian Ocean regions, we declined: US Admiral

However, there were two items that had caught my attention in that episode:

1) China wanted to rule the IOR, and
2) Air craft carriers.

As far as Indian Naval doctrine is concerned this is all that matters.

On choke points, some other thoughts:

Aug, 2013 :: Can India Blockade China?

The Economist suggested a few months ago that "India’s naval advantage might allow it, for example, to impede oil traffic heading for China through the Malacca Strait." David Scott's recent article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, argues that: "In the case of the Malacca Strait … India [has] the ability to block (China’s so-called ‘Malacca Dilemma’) easy Chinese access to the Indian Ocean." Ajai Shukla, a well-informed defense journalist, writes that "analysts agree that the Indian Navy … can shut down the Indian Ocean shipping lanes whenever it chooses," and quotes a retired fleet commander as saying that "a couple of submarines and a fighter squadron at Car Nicobar could easily enforce a declared blockade." India's first official naval doctrine, in 2004, itself boasted that "control of the choke points could be used as a bargaining chip in the international power game."

and, then:

Dec, 2012 :: Ready to protect Indian interests in South China Sea: Navy Chief

So, the thinking is there already. the doctrine document is not as emphatic (I guess since it originated in 2004).

[Philip]

Remember "Fortress Singapore"? What happened? Churchill's darkest moment."Fortress A &N" islands and its facilities will be first in the firing line from massed missile attack.The survivability of the airstrips.etc. must be assured.The subs should be already in the Indo-China Sea and preferably N-subs.Otherwise conventional subs will require more advanced facilities in the A & N, or use Vietnamese bases, possible since we are to train the Viets in sub ops.

[Victor]

..those "choke points" are very slowly vanishing. China has moved or is moving most of her energy needs to Central Asia and Russia. The only thing India can choke is ore (and anything else) from Africa..

Per China Daily, they got only 12% of their oil from Russia and Central Asia in 2011 and that is not going to change drastically anytime soon. Gwadar pipeline thru PoK will also remain a mirage. So with the exception of another 5% or so from South America, about 80% of their crude will need to sail through our choke point at Malacca for the foreseeable future. They are trying to avoid Malacca by going thru Myanmar but they still need to make it through Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. But even if they do, the pipelines are within range of Assam-based missiles.

[NRao]

..those "choke points" are very slowly vanishing. China has moved or is moving most of her energy needs to Central Asia and Russia. The only thing India can choke is ore (and anything else) from Africa..

Per China Daily, they got only 12% of their oil from Russia and Central Asia in 2011 and that is not going to change drastically anytime soon. Gwadar pipeline thru PoK will also remain a mirage. So with the exception of another 5% or so from South America, about 80% of their crude will need to sail through our choke point at Malacca for the foreseeable future. They are trying to avoid Malacca by going thru Myanmar but they still need to make it through Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. But even if they do, the pipelines are within range of Assam-based missiles.

It is a longer term outlook.

Also, china is not stopping at obtaining her energy resources from Central Asia, she is actually replacing Russia (and Western companies) in being the go-to entity for distribution of energy resources. Which is even more dangerous.

India has been eying CAR for energy (via Iran), but IF China gets to be the kingpin for distribution too, then the others will have to depend on China. even locals (as they depend on russia and western companies right now).

Also, there are tales of China looking into getting energy from Iraq/Iran (and other resources in A'stan) via CAR.

But, all this will take a few decades. By then China could pile up defense assets too.

check out the thinking out there - it is very, very interesting (even Indian reaction).

[g.sarkar]

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 795_1.html
"Chinese daily lauds launch of INS Vikrant
Report lauded steps taken by the Indian govt for localising arms production
In a rare praise, a leading state-run Chinese daily has lauded the launch of India's first indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, saying it marks a 'firm stride' towards domestic production of hi-tech arms. The launch of India's home-built aircraft carrier is indeed worth celebrating, because it marks a firm stride toward the indigenisation of arms,' an article on the state-run Global Times' website said. The launch also shows that the Indian government has had preliminary success in localising arms production,' the report said, noting that India has invested billions of dollars in the construction, research and development of domestic shipbuilding. The article also said that together with the inauguration of domestically built nuclear submarine INS Arihant, the chances of ruling Congress Party in next year's election will be boosted. However, the article, published yesterday, noted that the launch of INS Vikrant and Japan's helicopter carrier should serve as a warning for China. Some Chinese scholars emphasise that India has yet to grasp the key technologies of the carrier and that it will rely on other countries to maintain and upgrade the carrier......."
Gautam

[kit]

..those "choke points" are very slowly vanishing. China has moved or is moving most of her energy needs to Central Asia and Russia. The only thing India can choke is ore (and anything else) from Africa..

Per China Daily, they got only 12% of their oil from Russia and Central Asia in 2011 and that is not going to change drastically anytime soon. Gwadar pipeline thru PoK will also remain a mirage. So with the exception of another 5% or so from South America, about 80% of their crude will need to sail through our choke point at Malacca for the foreseeable future. They are trying to avoid Malacca by going thru Myanmar but they still need to make it through Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. But even if they do, the pipelines are within range of Assam-based missiles.

It is a longer term outlook.

Also, china is not stopping at obtaining her energy resources from Central Asia, she is actually replacing Russia (and Western companies) in being the go-to entity for distribution of energy resources. Which is even more dangerous.

India has been eying CAR for energy (via Iran), but IF China gets to be the kingpin for distribution too, then the others will have to depend on China. even locals (as they depend on russia and western companies right now).

Also, there are tales of China looking into getting energy from Iraq/Iran (and other resources in A'stan) via CAR.

But, all this will take a few decades. By then China could pile up defense assets too.

check out the thinking out there - it is very, very interesting (even Indian reaction).[/quote]

As a rule geopolitical situations are never static., to generalize . India does have some percieved advantages even then by virtue of its position in Asia , as well as some relationships with other nations nervous of china s reach ., cultivating and developing military and economic relationships with Iran,Japan and South Korea as well putting its economy in order can better deter China than a full blown arms race.

[Christopher Sidor]

PRC will not remain dependent on Middle East for oil much longer. By the end of decade at the most. By that time two things would have happened,
1) EU's dependence on Russia and CAR Oil+gas would decline due to push towards renewables and American shale revolution. This would force Russia and CAR to supply more quantities of Oil+Gas to PRC and other North East Asia countries.
2) PRC would have its own shale gas and possibly hydrate revolution.

Added to this the northern passage via arctic would become passable for at least 9 months. Thus PRC whose biggest market is still EU would not depend that much on IOR. On the other hand our dependence on Pacific Ocean would increase.

So to expect us to sit pretty in the Indian Ocean and dictate terms would not work. We would have to take the fight to Western Pacific.

Now consider what we would have by 2020 in terms of naval assets. 3 aircraft carriers. 5 nuclear bombers. This is being optimistic. While IAC-II's propulsion is not finalised, even if it is nuclear it will not make a difference. Firstly it's escort ships will not be nuclear driven. Secondly there is no plan to get a 5th generational fighter or a UAV for our IN. We will not have any nuclear attack submarines. I have deliberately omitted Chakra-I and the rumoured Chakra-II as they are on lease submarines. We need our own home grown nuclear attack submarines. So our navy is going to be under equipped to handle any crisis in SCS, we can forget Western Pacific. INS vikramaditya may be helpfull in the Arabian Sea but beyond that it will be of little use.

[NRao]

As a rule geopolitical situations are never static., to generalize . India does have some percieved advantages even then by virtue of its position in Asia ,

No problems.

But, what are they? And more appropriately does China recognize them as such and respect them?

as well as some relationships with other nations nervous of china s reach .,

That aspect has been going up in gears - actually to Indian's advantage.

But, again, does China care for it? At least does the literature out there show that?

cultivating and developing military and economic relationships with Iran,Japan and South Korea

India has an treaty/agreement with Iran (do not know when it expires) to use Iranian territory in the event of a war with pakiLand.

Japan, as we can all see things have turned a corner. So too with SK.

But, again, for the third time, does China care?

as well putting its economy in order can better deter China than a full blown arms race.

LSE thinking? This PM even suggested converting the Siachen into a "Peace Mountain", did not want to raise a Strike Corp along Chinese border.

Yet. ........................

Nothing that is proposed here is new, India has tried everything and is still trying a few more. BUT, the trend is that - in pretty much every case - India has been experiencing a giggle from the Chinese (as one can see even the article on supposedly congratulating India on the Vikrant effort). From what I am reading China really does not care. She is about to take on the Japan, the US and anyone else who stands in her way. India - as I see it - is rather low on her list. My read is she feels if she can take care of the US that the rest will fall in line - that (to me) means that India will very slowly relent on AP and other border areas - without a fight. This may take 50 years but that is OK with China.

__________________

That is one angle. The other is that India HAS invested a ton (addressing "arms race") in Siachen AND a Strike Corps AND has in the past 5 or so years addresses the North Eastern concerns (very slowly and reluctantly granted). Those investments better be considered a part of any "arms race".

Secondly, IN is being rather heavily funded. So, what I am suggesting is not any quantum leap in cost. All I have suggested increasing the air wing from some 75-80 to about 150 and perhaps reconfiguring the carrier capacities. Carriers are expensive, so I fully understand that doubling the size is expensive, but by 100%.

View that cost in terms of Siachen and a Strike Corps.

___________________

There is a LOT going on on the IN front, much hidden because Indian politicians - for whatever silly reasons - want to be perceived as some clean non-violent set of leaders.

IN is no such mood.

___________________

IF there is an "arms race", it has started.

However, I do not see it as a "race". And, I think it is necessary, else India will get gobbled.

___________________

There is another alternative - as I have always said - get rid of Pakistan as we know it. India need to recognize Baluchistan as an independent nation or better still give her Indian statehood (BTW, thsi is an old topic). Sindh, etc should follow.

___________________

China has been given a 50 year lease in PoK and we seem to have been anesthetized about that situation. Heck that is Indian land.

[SaiK]

walkaround on mig29k and well explained by commander khv singh. was this posted here earlier?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NhN7_L3R6uU