INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[NRao]

walkaround on mig29k and well explained by commander khv singh. was this posted here earlier?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NhN7_L3R6uU

Yes. Some time back.

It has some very good points to keep in mind for good discussions.

[RKumar]

Vicky is coming home ... it is already in Persian Gulf.

[member_25400]

1. N Rao: Very much obliged to you for the 2010 doctrine link and the position paper on expeditionary outlook.
1a. IMHO, these should be archived/stickied somewhere . Can a MOD help ?
1b. As you said, these strategies are tame, but even more so, they are generic/anodyne. To me they look more like pro-forma/re-active papers rather than pro-active/shaping documents. (completely apart from how aggressive or not the navy's role should be, or the force structure of the navy). i.e the true discussion is happening (or not) elsewhere.
1c. It is encouraging in one sense to see theses and position papers referenced (showing some active discussion). In another sense, it is extremely discouraging in that we don't have formal institutions to do this job.

2. rajat/O
2a: Blue-water vs expeditionary
Perhaps I should have inserted an or instead of a / to make it more explicit. As N. Rao's excellent link (ORF paper) talks about, IN is slowly moving into expeditionary areas, and had earlier simply been calling it something more neutral. With the acquisition of Jalashwa and the forthcoming plans for an LPD/LPH/LCU etc, IN is clearly moving in this direction. While expeditionary force brings in the ability to sustain operations (whether releif or offensive) in a blue water context, the true principle IMHO is jointness. i.e. bringing in combined arms thinking. Unfortunately, history dictates the IN working predominantly in isolation in our conflicts. Even worse, the proposal for Joint Chief by the Naresh Chandra task force (http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Chairma ... ngh_070812) has not found political favour and would require, at the minimum, change in government to be envisaged.

Without this joint thinking, budgets and role for navy should be constrained, akin to Dhananjay's link.

OTOH, we can do without US style adventurism., which I think is your point.

2b. disagreement on doctrine.
I don't think we are in disagreement on IN historic doctrine; and the future is TBD (IMHO). So we may perhaps be in sync.
If you meant IN hardware driving doctrine, then perhaps not.

4. Singha:
re: no other option except to invest in Kochi to have capability for working on 3 carriers at the same time and 5-6 carriers overall.
I do not mean to insult or denigrate, but I think these are more like pipe dreams/jingoistic wishes rather than rationalized thoughts/justified plans or even realistic thoughts.

Even the royal navy with it's glorious tradition has been envisaging a 2 task force navy (1 with aircraft carrier and 1 based on ambhibious assault ship). (ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_b ... tle_groups) This may be somewhat closer to a realistic option for India, especially when our economic strength has not been built up yet.

Remember, it was 5 star general eisenhower who said : " Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children." Eisenhower oversaw the largest fleet of ships assembled for an expedition (D-day) and was C in C besides.

There must be balance. Given our political realities, there will always be demands on the public purse for non-defence outlays. Having planned, strategy informed, professional and agile procurement is the best way to get most bang for our buck.

5. Dhananjay:
i) re: orange painted part: That is a coherent and quite feasible/realistic concept, but not inevitable. Lets see if it becomes our reality
ii) re: Shankarovsky's idea of tanker + flanker. (A330 extending range of Rambhas, Tejas, Pak fa etc). No doubt we have to invest into this. But there are significant limitations. For one, tankers are big fat, easy targets and would have to stay outside contested/stand-off airspace. For another, buddy refueling gets us some of the same capabilities without having to wait for an invest in tankers (i.e. it is already here). For a third, tankers in A330 class etc have to fly from (indian*) land anyway, Vickaditya and Vikrant aren't CATOBAR (which allows for heavier load take-off) and are on smaller side for large tankers [*India's basing agreements with foreign countries for supporting a wartime strike - perhaps none of our agrreements would support this ? Would welcome updates]. But perhaps most important is sortie rate. Tanker supported long distance strike does not lend itself to high sortie rate. It's one thing if we needed a long distance stealth golden bullet. (pak fa?)

But for power projection (if thats the goal), it can't exactly replace having an nearby aircraft carrier or assault ship.


6. re: Choke points :
I think couple of posters have made good points on Choke points and China. Perhaps 2 points to be added :
a. India does not have free hand in middle east or malaccan choke points. The existing powers including especially the US will also have their say. Less so, japan, malaysia etc.
b. Indian diplomacy has not grown to extent required. We have not invested in the institutions to develop diplomatic postures and even more so, tangibly, have not invested in manpower for actual men on ground (our diplomatic presence/IFS is quite low). Further, politically we have vested interests and are quite susceptible to political brouhaha for reactions based on publicity rather than diplomatic reasons.

How then to create substantial strength of alliances and invitations that is a pre-requisite to using/leveraging any naval strength we acquire ?
(this is also perhaps response to N.rao on india's perceived advantages). How do we avoid taking a stance that would tick off some potential partners ? A

Some of our strengths are precisely because we have avoided taking certain stances. That is a luxury we would not afford/be able to rely on, if we have a rim minded outlook in an arms race.

Basically a long winded way of saying I agree with N rao on the better way to deter China being not arms race but military and economic relationships.

China's overweening pre-occupation is with taiwan first and south china sea area second, and energy/trade third.

7. N.Rao on division of IOR and Pacific.
I don't read as much into it, as it is clearly tongue in cheek jest. Just imagine the ridiculous scenario if someone had agreed to that.

8. TS Jones. :
Maldives is in Indian sphere of influence. (ref operation cactus). However, much like some of India's other neighbours (nepal, srilanka, bangla), there an indian origin vs native political element in it and overt moves can create an counter-reaction. Similar to what is happening now, there.

Also, I think everyone has missed citing Diego Garcia. India has always claimed the whole of Indian Ocean region as our sphere of influence on the flimsy grounds that the name is "indian" ocean. The US has rejected this. Diego Garcia is a substantial base for US power projection in the indian ocean. just south of the equator. Technically, it is british, but de facto US (US has basing rights as part of an agreement, if i remember correctly including WW2 lend-lease paybacks - though I can't find a reference to support this right now).

9. rajit O, Philip, (N rao) and Dhananjay : on doctrine
Good posts & I enjoyed reading them. Probly missed out a couple more

10. Singha : On thumb rule 1 in 3 aircraft carriers vs 50 % available.
You may very well be closer to correct going forward. It depends on the number of years between refit (age of existing ship) and distance between base and operational theaters. We can probably assume 15 years to major refit in near future after Vikramaditya/Vikrant are worked up.

11. Prasad : "SSNs are inherently tied into the production of our carriers aren't they? So we should ideally be producing an ssn along with a carrier to fit into a future cbg, along with other elements. Doesn't massa have ssn's in a cbg?"

US uses nuclear powered attack submarines as part of CBG group for ASW and picket duties. France relies more on destroyer based ASW (though aso having nuclear powered sub in the CBG/CSG group. UK and Russia not so much (IIRC) (can someone confirm the plan for QE2? CBG). Submarine accompanying a CBG needs to have long range and high speeds => nuclear subs de-facto IMHO. (Ausie Collins class is a unique, though close to obsolete long range diesel sub; it is not an option for india)
US has simply not developed dedicated/focused ASW vessels as they have plethora of nuclear attack subs.

Given our limited production capabilities and overweening needs for strategic deterrence, we would be better off with ASW on one of the Talwar class accompaniments, rather than diverting Arihant class production. Talwar class has ASW equipment IIRC. For near shore exercise, one of our rather few conventional subs can lurk in the area.

12. Idle thoughts.
1. The US invested substantial amount in SOSUS (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOSUS) and IUSS. I would love for India to leverage its hydrographic strengths by investing in something similar and developing strong acoustic library. Not sure if the undersea 'landscape' is conducive in any area.

2. Doctrine:

2a. 5 years down the line, if we find a way to have a nuke capable aircraft land on an Indian aircraft carrier, we may find we have backed into a significant change in doctrine. I think IN/IAF may be able to make necessary adaptations in a pinch. especially after an LCA naval.

2b. US supercarriers are a 'floating red line'. i.e They are backed by ICBM/cruise missiles. Sink one and you have just invited the same, perhaps even nuclear. Another reason why the US can invest in such large egg baskets. A hypothetical indian supercarrier would have no such credible threat/backing at this time. We may need to evolve our nuclear doctrine and other delivery systems also. Another example of interconnectedness

Admittedly, time to construct such a supercarrier is much higher than time to change doctrine. But how about the above example ?

[member_23455]

2. rajat/O
2a: Blue-water vs expeditionary
Perhaps I should have inserted an or instead of a / to make it more explicit. As N. Rao's excellent link (ORF paper) talks about, IN is slowly moving into expeditionary areas, and had earlier simply been calling it something more neutral. With the acquisition of Jalashwa and the forthcoming plans for an LPD/LPH/LCU etc, IN is clearly moving in this direction. While expeditionary force brings in the ability to sustain operations (whether releif or offensive) in a blue water context, the true principle IMHO is jointness. i.e. bringing in combined arms thinking. Unfortunately, history dictates the IN working predominantly in isolation in our conflicts. Even worse, the proposal for Joint Chief by the Naresh Chandra task force (http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Chairma ... ngh_070812) has not found political favour and would require, at the minimum, change in government to be envisaged.

Without this joint thinking, budgets and role for navy should be constrained, akin to Dhananjay's link.

OTOH, we can do without US style adventurism., which I think is your point.

Not really. Just trying to focus on the more recent and relevant aspects of Indian carrier doctrine. At the risk of repetition, heavily influenced of late by the USN, and finally getting the hardware to start putting a few theories in practice.

A lot of the other points may be better addressed in other threads.

2b. disagreement on doctrine.
I don't think we are in disagreement on IN historic doctrine; and the future is TBD (IMHO). So we may perhaps be in sync.
If you meant IN hardware driving doctrine, then perhaps not.

We agree that it is TBD. Hardware should never drive doctrine, it's the other way around. In this case not just the carrier but other important elements of the CBG are important to get onstream ASAP because for a warfighter all doctrine needs practical validation. Which is why the next few years will be seminal in the IN's evolution.

[TSJones]

Practically every US destroyer carries two helicopters. Those copters aren't just for hauling supplies and conducting sight seeing tours for the visiting press, they also hunt submarines. There is a sonar room in each destroyer and they constantly conduct exercises with the 'copters. the choppers carry sonar buyoies and drop them near unusual descrepancies that the sonar room has detected. The chopper can also drop ant-submarine weapons. It' a game of cat and mouse. The destroyer also is a radar picket with anti aircraft missiles. So the destroyer is vital in all aspects.

An attack on US carriers may not be answered with Nukes. It may be answered with extensive loss of assets of the attacking nation, incuding space assets. There is nothing we can do about satellites in peace time. We all know that if you can see the target (US carrier) then you can hit it. We are naked in that regard. However, that would be a first strike occurance only.

[Singha]

is the SM3 now IOCed onto american ships now?
it apparently can target sats in LEO if they chose to exercise that option


An SM-3 launched to destroy an errant satellite
On February 14, 2008, U.S. officials announced plans to use a modified SM-3 missile launched from a group of three ships in the North Pacific to destroy the failed American satellite USA 193 at an altitude of 130 nautical miles (240 kilometers) shortly before atmospheric reentry, stating that the intention was to "reduce the danger to human beings" due to the release of toxic hydrazine fuel carried on board.[32][33] A spokesperson stated that software associated with the SM-3 had been modified to enhance the chances of the missile's sensors recognizing that the satellite was its target, since the missile was not designed for ASAT operations.
On February 21, 2008 at 3:26 am (UTC) the USS Lake Erie, a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser, fired a single SM-3 missile, hit and successfully destroyed the satellite, with a closing velocity of about 22,783 mph (36,667 km/h) while the satellite was 247 kilometers (133 nautical miles) above the Pacific Ocean.[34][35] USS Decatur, USS Russell as well as other land, air, sea and space-based sensors were involved in the operation.[36][37]

---
However the bad boys operate much farther up and are well out of reach of this kind of weapon like arrow, sm3 or thaad. to get to these you would really need to launch a killer sat into orbit that manouvers close to them and targets them in some fashion.
Yaogan SAR sats - 600-1000km
NOSS elint/targeting sats - 1000km
Beidou navigation - 21000-36000km
all the above the eyes and ears of the big dragon sit well out of reach.

[NRao]

1c. It is encouraging in one sense to see theses and position papers referenced (showing some active discussion). In another sense, it is extremely discouraging in that we don't have formal institutions to do this job.

Well....................... The doctrine is tame, but the response to the ground situation is not as tame. Granted the IN still has to answer to the zombies in ND, so from that PoV they too are tame (Kargil is my favorite example - where (political) tameness and (military) brilliance existed at the very same time. Not easy to fight with both hands tied behind the back). (And, this PM wants to disarm them too!!!!)

2a: Blue-water vs expeditionary
Perhaps I should have inserted an or instead of a / to make it more explicit. As N. Rao's excellent link (ORF paper) talks about, IN is slowly moving into expeditionary areas, and had earlier simply been calling it something more neutral.

IMHO, that is the understatement of the year (2013). Having said that the IN position is being disguised very well. But, it is well under way, in its infancy, yet. Thankfully.

There must be balance. Given our political realities, there will always be demands on the public purse for non-defence outlays. Having planned, strategy informed, professional and agile procurement is the best way to get most bang for our buck.

The political reality is that the political base is as corrupt as it gets and is taking advantage of the situation. Pathetic.

i) re: orange painted part: That is a coherent and quite feasible/realistic concept, but not inevitable.

I agree, IF (huge if, font size=200) India wants to be a player, her *presence* has to be felt everywhere. Does not mean physical presence, just that aam janta needs to know that In can arrive at will.

6. re: Choke points :

Valid, but old thinking. I feel IN needs to move to a threat perception mode. The idea has to be:
* We can and will show up anywhere we please and force our will - that perception needs to exist, and
* I really do not like the idea of BDies buying ding-dong things. IMVVHO, India needs to reverse the physical presence of China in the immediate area. That has to happen. No BD/SL/Burma/etc buy *anything* from China - nothing. No pipelines, no industrial equipment, nothing, no toilet paper too. Period. We will take it from there. Lock-down.

Indians need to install responsible leadership.

7. on division of IOR and Pacific.
I don't read as much into it, as it is clearly tongue in cheek jest. Just imagine the ridiculous scenario if someone had agreed to that.

China IS implementing this already.

China operates in one mode: she proposes a plan and irrespective of what others think she goes about to implement the plan.

I would not take this lightly - which is why I would like IN to be able to operate in SCS and beyond.

Maldives is in Indian sphere of influence. (ref operation cactus). However, much like some of India's other neighbours (nepal, srilanka, bangla), there an indian origin vs native political element in it and overt moves can create an counter-reaction. Similar to what is happening now, there.

What Indian politicians have given up IN seems to have worked very, very hard to recover. Or are on their way to recover - may nto have completed the job.

____________________

* I am not sure what teh mix needs to be (between surface and submarine assets), but no matter what China is prepared to take care of all Indian assets. So, I for one, do not see any advantage of building one over the other. I think it is a matter of risk and the risk may be slightly greater with surface assets. But if India were to invest in submarine assets China will also invest a bigger chunk in opposing that and the risks will increase there too.
* The naval doctrine (as published in one of the Naval documents) is clearly based on political thinking - as it should be. However, given the sorry state of Indian political affairs, THAT seems to have reflected on the doctrine itself. That needs to be corrected, else it will place a huge pressure on the Services in general and on the IN in particular. Totally unnecessary and avoidable.
* -expeditionary- is a very good word
* China has to feel the presence of the IN all over China. It can be done
* Chinese 'pat-on-the-back' are actually a shot across the bow. It is a warning not to take that path

[SaiK]

carrier capable c-130s is something we need to look at... multiple roles, transportation and refueller role for deep strike from carrier.

of course, we have to also think about assisted (emals /nuke powerd) takeoffs and landing.

[Singha]

Its way too big an a/c even for the nimitz class except for emergency psyops DoLittle type raids. it cannot remotely be accomodated in the elevators and cannot be moved around inside the hanger below. I am sure khan has tried some experiments on takeoff...landing would be super dicey...below the entire deck had been cleared of the usual mass of parked planes due to the big wingspan
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x69f02 ... -carr_tech

even C27 would be too large. the E2/C2 is about the realistic limit.

the US navy depends on a fleet of land based tankers to provide their F-18 and hawkeyes fuel. if you look at aleutian islands, japan, guam, south korea, bahrain, qatar, diego garcia, europe, israel, egypt, alaska, canada they have big bases everywhere the US navy might operate in a attack role . buddy refueling simply does not scale, is wasteful of scarce sortie launch rates and is more of a emergency measure than a real solution for sustained use. I dont set great store by our flight refueling MKI centerline pods and upaz pods on mig29.

thats the only realistic option for us too . which implies we need big fleet of refuelers and bases in peninsular indian, nicobar, andamans and preferably in mauritius, yemen(socotra - my dream lives on! ) and madagascar. completely unsexy and low key asset, but the prime enabler for SUSTAINED area dominance patrols/warfighting ops along with AWACS. these two are like two legs of a 3-legged table with the other leg being attack assets. a 1-legged or 2-legged dog is not exactly the most lethal or mobile.

any punk can throw a couple of punches. TSP will hit us with all they have in the first 72 hrs for sure. its the big bears who can stick around and pound the enemy into defeat after absorbing any surprise heavy initial blows. staying power is everything in the ring.

[TSJones]

is the SM3 now IOCed onto american ships now?
it apparently can target sats in LEO if they chose to exercise that option


An SM-3 launched to destroy an errant satellite
On February 14, 2008, U.S. officials announced plans to use a modified SM-3 missile launched from a group of three ships in the North Pacific to destroy the failed American satellite USA 193 at an altitude of 130 nautical miles (240 kilometers) shortly before atmospheric reentry, stating that the intention was to "reduce the danger to human beings" due to the release of toxic hydrazine fuel carried on board.[32][33] A spokesperson stated that software associated with the SM-3 had been modified to enhance the chances of the missile's sensors recognizing that the satellite was its target, since the missile was not designed for ASAT operations.
On February 21, 2008 at 3:26 am (UTC) the USS Lake Erie, a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser, fired a single SM-3 missile, hit and successfully destroyed the satellite, with a closing velocity of about 22,783 mph (36,667 km/h) while the satellite was 247 kilometers (133 nautical miles) above the Pacific Ocean.[34][35] USS Decatur, USS Russell as well as other land, air, sea and space-based sensors were involved in the operation.[36][37]

---
However the bad boys operate much farther up and are well out of reach of this kind of weapon like arrow, sm3 or thaad. to get to these you would really need to launch a killer sat into orbit that manouvers close to them and targets them in some fashion.
Yaogan SAR sats - 600-1000km
NOSS elint/targeting sats - 1000km
Beidou navigation - 21000-36000km
all the above the eyes and ears of the big dragon sit well out of reach.

I don't really want to go into details that I do not have fine knowledge of, but suffice it to say that I have reasons to believe that the US has some capabilities to deal with enemy satellites on a short term notice. It sounds like a cop out doesn't it? But that's all I will say.

[member_23455]

carrier capable c-130s is something we need to look at... multiple roles, transportation and refueller role for deep strike from carrier.

What else would you like to add to your wishlist? How about this?

http://defensetech.org/2011/12/06/video ... rrier-ops/

Where's a "Fantasy Admiral" thread when you really need one?

[NRao]

With a better positioned island, we could perhaps do anything on this carrier ...........

http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/ima ... 7-2011.jpg

May be double that.

[SaiK]

not laughable at all.. with nuke powered carriers, it is possible.

[member_23455]

not laughable at all.. with nuke powered carriers, it is possible.

Would you like to, instead of one-liner drive by posts, have a serious discussion on C-130s off a carrier? Please do some research, so that there is some clarity:

1. The C130s managed to show carrier take and landing capability off the USS Forrestal which was not nuclear powered.

2. The C130 was not supposed to be "carrier-borne" in the true sense of the word. It was filling in the COD slot. It lost out to a smaller, more logistically manageable and less riskier aircraft.

At a time when there are major gaps in doctrine, numbers, and CBG components, the fact that you would want to focus on esoteric stuff is not laughable. Just mildly amusing.

[Shrinivasan]

anybody tracking the progress of the INS Vikramaditya Battlegroup? it is making Significant progress and has crossed the Suez Canal. INS Viraat and couple of DDGs are raving across the Arabian Sea to receive Vikd!!!

[Singha]

afaik the whole C2 thing came about to move people longer distances from shore to carrier than afforded by helicopters and delivery/takeaway of engines for the hornets and tomcats. the C2 is just about enough for that job and not much more . similar the E2 looks like a tight fit narrow fuselage, lord knows only the khan can squeeze in a powerful awacs into such a small shoe. a look at E2D interior reveals about 50% of the interior is filled solid with eqpt(one side) and other side has a few seats and consoles. there is no room even for a aisle behind the seats for someone to use the galley/toilet or stand behind in E3 style
http://derf.smugmug.com/photos/416601856_oUC6N-L-1.jpg
http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/i ... NGC_lg.jpg

I dont know if any other carrier navy has the ability to fly engines in and out and engine testbeds onboard. this is another necessity for the 9-month long x-world deployments of the cvn I suppose.

[Christopher Sidor]

However the bad boys operate much farther up and are well out of reach of this kind of weapon like arrow, sm3 or thaad. to get to these you would really need to launch a killer sat into orbit that manouvers close to them and targets them in some fashion.
Yaogan SAR sats - 600-1000km
NOSS elint/targeting sats - 1000km
Beidou navigation - 21000-36000km
all the above the eyes and ears of the big dragon sit well out of reach.

In May-2013 reports started filtering out that PRC had allegedly carried out a missile test which had managed to reach an altitude of 9600 kms or even higher. It is speculated that this ASAT was carried out under the guise of a sounding rocket test with the aim to target satellites in geostationary orbit. If this is true than it means INSAT series of satellites along with US GPS systems (on which we are shamefully still dependent) along with other GPS systems are now within the sights of PRC.
This becomes instructive as there are rumours floating around the cyberspace that if US were to loose a aircraft carrier somewhere in the Western Pacific due to hostile actions it would take down all the space assets of the target nation. These space assets will be crucial for any Anti-Ship Ballistic missiles. The aim being even if one aircraft carrier were to be lost, the other aircraft carrier's should not be lost to the same type of weapon systems. But I digress.

Now our Theater BMD that we are building is sufficient for low earth orbit targets, but will not be able to touch the PRC navigation systems positioned above this. And if we cannot target those we will not be able to degrade the working of a PRC's ASBM. PRC's ASBM is a threat to our aircraft carriers operating too. And if deployed in Pakistan/Burma or shared with Pakistan it would degrade significantly IN's ship borne capacity.

[Aditya_V]

Someone in DRDO has mentioned A-5 as anti SAT weapon. Hope somebody is alive to developments.

[Singha]

they were playing around with weapons designated as KT-1, KT-2, KT-3 based on DF21 or DF25 probably. but their HEO test was a new weapon dubbed DN-2. this one can reach the high fliers like GPS sats.

the oceanic hunter sats operate around 1000km orbit. so as a first step we need ASAT capability upto that height. maybe a modded Agni-1 with a suitable second stage KV might be enough to take the KV stage to that region. will be interesting to see what our AD-1 and AD-2 BMD missiles look like.

[Christopher Sidor]

IN should start to think on the following
1) On how to neutralize the threat that PRC's ASBM poses to IN aircraft carriers?
2) Is PRC thinking of putting its ASBM onto ships or submarines or create a Air-Launched ASBM?

[Philip]

First problem for the PLAN is targeting.Even a large AC in the middle of the huge oceans can fool a sophisticated navy.Remember how the RN's small carriers remained undetected by the USN in Gulf war games some years ago? After targeting is accurate real-time info. if the carrier is mobile.The PLAN's strategy is to ensure that USN carriers remain a goodly distance from China's outer defence line,the "1st island chain" and prevent a hostile takeaway of Taiwan.This also reveals China's mindset,to strike first like Japan in WW2 at Pearl Harbour,where the carriers may be in port,and win the first major battle.Both require assets like sats,LRMPs,ELINT aircraft,plus clandestine shadowing by PLAN subs.

The latter factor answers one of NRs points as to the PLAN's large sub fleet,shadowing the USN,Japanese navy,etc.
He stated that if the IN built up its sub fleet,China would increase its accordingly,but to my mind,the primary reason is countering the USN.This was also the Soviet's strategy.It illustrates the fact that the sub is the most difficult naval asset to locate and destroy,why SSBNs are the platform of choice for any nation's strategic defence.China has already put into place its sub extension programme,where German sub engines and other western sub tech (much provided by the Pakis) will power its navy.Having reached its figure of around 60+ subs,with ambitions for upto 80,the IN cannot but double its sub fleet with the "extras" being acquired by Pak,Saudi,etc..We need at least 36 subs,24 AIP subs and 12 SSBNs/SSGNs.The DCNS in Vayu said that there was a further delay with the Scorpenes and that the first would arrive "late year end 2016".Read that as 2017.So even if the follow on RFI is handed out in 2014,it is only well into 2025 at the earliest that the first of the second line will makes its way to India.The inescapable fact is that if we are to augment our dwindling fleet,numbers critical as of now,there is no other way but to import.

This is one reason why I've been advocating more flat tops for the IN,in the form of amphibs and cruiser class vessels to have flat tops which can operate a multitude of aircraft and helos and spread the risk of a carrier or amphib taking a hit.

[NRao]

NRs points

IS:

* It really does not matter what the Chinese do. They will have assets to track and destroy and so will their opponentS.
* So ................ it really does not matter if there are carriers, carriers as cruisers or carriers with STOVL. Each carries a risk - I suspect somewhat equal no matter what is deployed
* Because: India would also target them in some fashion to increase the risk for china

The ding dong (DF-21D) is a threat, but not one to worry about too much, for the simple reason, unless this zombie PM is still on the throne, India should retaliate and the cost of that should be equal to the loss of a carrier.

The only point I would like to reiterate is that these 15-24 fixed wing air wings - IMVVHO - will be too small to be deployed an win a fight against a sizeable opponent. IMHO, IN should be provided a better stick.

Also, I still maintain that the Vicky is not the best solution that was on the table. Welcome her with open hands, that is fine. But, I am fairly confident she would have to be replaced much before her life span.

I find the Vikrant to be too small for the ground realities, which I feel have changed dramatically since the past 10 years.

[Christopher Sidor]

The falklands war experience does not apply any more for the following reasons
1) Argentina did not have the space based satellites, targeting and navigation, which PRC is building and will have by 2020. This is the period in which we will have 3 aircraft carriers.
2) ASBM/Air-Launched ASCM have made progress and will continue making progress. Again baring, exocet missiles which were denied to Argentine forces, Argentina had a very few options.

To reach Western Pacific or SCS our submarines would have to traverse the Mallaca strait, which is shallow sea and has choke points, namely near Singapore and other between Indonesia and Malaysia where a submarine can be detected and neutralized. The other way is to go between the islands of Indonesia where also the submarines can be detected if not by PLAN/PLAAF then by Indonesian forces and other forces. Basically it is not easy to travel between Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean without being detected as there are access points which can be monitored and neutralizing steps taken accordingly.

While our Fleet and our aircraft carriers will be able to deal with any future PLAN/PLAAF forces in the ocean that bears our name, our forces are simply not that deep to take on PLAN/PLAAF in the SCS and Western Pacific.

At the end of the day the aircraft carrier won the day over the battleship as it was able to deliver a bomb much further than a battle ship could, while remaining relatively safe. In case of a battle ship like the behemoths Yamato class built by IJN the maximum range was about 30-40kms. In case of dive bomber or fighter taking off from a aircraft carrier the range was higher than that. So a aircraft carrier could engage a battleship while a battleship could not engage the aircraft carrier. Today the situation is slowly changing. Missiles, Ballistic or cruise, have the range to engage a aircraft carrier without the aircraft carrier being able to engage the ships or platforms launching these missiles. The threat of these missiles may make the aircraft carrier stay away from the areas where fighting is going on. Once that happens these ships become paperweights.

[NRao]

Then, how do the Chinese subs pose a threat in IOR? India should have similar assets to detect Chinese assets when the Chinese attempt to get into the IOR.

[member_23455]

I find the Vikrant to be too small for the ground realities, which I feel have changed dramatically since the past 10 years.

What a surprise then that the IN thinks the same too, hence the different specs for IAC-2.But maybe even that is small for people on this thread.

Despite having 90k tonnes plus carriers the US still relies on bases in the Pacific, FDNF in Japan, plus its allies to keep China in check.

Are we going to be sailing up the Taiwan Straits tomorrow? These ground realities need to be defined in more layered and complex terms of the prevailing realpolitik than the Tom Clancy-ish scenarios that keep surfacing on this thread.

At the end of the day the aircraft carrier won the day over the battleship as it was able to deliver a bomb much further than a battle ship could, while remaining relatively safe. In case of a battle ship like the behemoths Yamato class built by IJN the maximum range was about 30-40kms. In case of dive bomber or fighter taking off from a aircraft carrier the range was higher than that. So a aircraft carrier could engage a battleship while a battleship could not engage the aircraft carrier. Today the situation is slowly changing. Missiles, Ballistic or cruise, have the range to engage a aircraft carrier without the aircraft carrier being able to engage the ships or platforms launching these missiles. The threat of these missiles may make the aircraft carrier stay away from the areas where fighting is going on. Once that happens these ships become paperweights.

Yes, thank you for the 1000th post on the Internets about the "carriers are dead" argument. If you would care to scroll a few pages back in this thread your concern trolling has been addressed, not in the simplistic X platform > Y platform but in fundamental principles of warfare - something that seems to escape folks driven by narrow agendas.

[Philip]

It was reported that last yr. there were 20+ PLAN sub contacts in Indian and Lankan coastal waters and A&N islands.Even with a SOSUS equiv. in the A&N,continuing a contact in the littoral waters of the IOR remains a problem.Despite intense CW patrolling of the GIUK gap,Russian subs very often escaped detection after exiting into the Atlantic even with the intense multi-asset ASW The IOR itself is huge.One would require a huge ASW force to keep track of subs operating patrols by NATO forces.I was talking last week with a veteran sub officer,who started his career on Foxtrots.A good sub skipper with his team even in ancient boats have evaded detection by skillful tactics.IN N-subs in particular in future can operate in the Indo-China Sea and Pacific waters on 80-90 day patrols.

As for the size of our future carriers,does anyone seriously think that we and the USN will face of as in '71 and need to emulate acquiring super-carriers? Land based LRMP and supersonic bombers can defend our shores at a considerable distance,apart from land based LR anti-ship missiles.Our carriers though are clearly meant for power projection ,more for sea control than sea denial.A carrier of size 65,000t (as found by the UK after extensive research) is ideal for non-superpower major navies,and with 40-50 aircraft aboard is surely a better bet than a 45,000t carrier with 25-30.As in many earlier posts,the size does not add that much to the cost being mainly steel costs,but the propulsion,cats/EMALS if a CATOBAR carrier ,sensors,weaponry for defence and the cost of the aircraft,helos and now UCAVs aboard that will considerably affect the bill. The IN however seems to have fixed the size of IAC-2 at around 65,000t which will therefore carry more "stick" as wished for! Along with the Vikram and Vik-2,these 3 carriers of the IN ,along more amphib flat tops and with a strong sub fleet will definitely be a considerable force to reckon with for the PLAN.

What is worrying the PLAN is facing a two-front maritime war with the USN in the Pacific on the one hand ,and the IN in the IOR on the other,allied with the Japanese navy too.The increasing number of subs in its inventory and growing contacts could mean that the PLAN may use their subs in the IOR in a forward front ,just as the Germans did in WW2 in the Atlantic,raiders of convoys,merchantmen,etc., apart from attacks on IN assets.These subs could use facilities/bases from Gwadar to Burma using pit stops in Lanka,the maldives or BDesh too

[NRao]

But maybe even that is small for people on this thread.

"people" is only me!!!! I do not think I have company on this matter.

Yes, one/single 90K is not enough.

Despite having 90k tonnes plus carriers the US still relies on bases in the Pacific, FDNF in Japan, plus its allies to keep China in check.

Hmmm............. I am sure if push comes to shove they will all cobble up a decent plan, till then they will all bicker. Just read that the "pivot" is not making the USMC happy with the US-A invasion.

I would not be surprised if TSJ had some nice stories over a drink or two. After all bugging out is his famous line.

[Christopher Sidor]

It was reported that last yr. there were 20+ PLAN sub contacts in Indian and Lankan coastal waters and A&N islands.Even with a SOSUS equiv. in the A&N,continuing a contact in the littoral waters of the IOR remains a problem.Despite intense CW patrolling of the GIUK gap,Russian subs very often escaped detection after exiting into the Atlantic even with the intense multi-asset ASW The IOR itself is huge.One would require a huge ASW force to keep track of subs operating patrols by NATO forces.I was talking last week with a veteran sub officer,who started his career on Foxtrots.A good sub skipper with his team even in ancient boats have evaded detection by skillful tactics.IN N-subs in particular in future can operate in the Indo-China Sea and Pacific waters on 80-90 day patrols.

Between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean the following are the ingress and egress points
1) Mallaca Strait
2) Lombok Strait
3) Sape Strait
4) Ombai Strait
5) Timor Sea
6) Tasman Sea and under Australia.

The last two are biggest in terms of area to be covered and also are the most distant. The Timor Sea is the most irksome to get to for PLAN/PLAAF. Right now IN and IAF cannot patrol these two without raising a few eyebrows in Australia and New Zealand.

So we will need electronic sensors near these points. Now the speed of a submarine can go to about 20-30 knots. We can develop high-endurance UCAV having inflight-refueling capability to keep an eye on any subs coming through these points. UCAVs can be coupled with ASW ships and planes in helping us to neutralize these submarines if the need arises. So we need not follow USN and RN steps to counter the threat of submarines. The problem is that we might not be able to differentiate between hostile and non-hostile submarines. So we will have to track all of these submarines entering India's Ocean and continue tracking them till they exit India's Ocean. The problem will start to occur when PLAN submarines start to enter territorial waters of friendly nations like Pakistan in order to avoid our UCAV.

As for the size of our future carriers,does anyone seriously think that we and the USN will face of as in '71 and need to emulate acquiring super-carriers?

Future is uncertain. That is the only certainty in the world. We need to keep safe from all potential threats.

I agree with you on the rest of the points that you make.

[venkat_r]

This is one reason why I've been advocating more flat tops for the IN,in the form of amphibs and cruiser class vessels to have flat tops which can operate a multitude of aircraft and helos and spread the risk of a carrier or amphib taking a hit.

I see that you have brought this up several times on this thread - Not sure if it is a viable solution in the present scenario, might be something that works in the future.

1. Firstly, if the carrier is only being seen in pounding Karachi or some shore based asset of China, then it is a misnomer.
2. The more the flat tops we have deployed, the more the chance of an enemy sneaking through a shot at these. that is it is easier to protect the one big and important ship than protecting the 10 semi-important ships.
3. If one or two subs + couple of surface ships are required to defend a carrier, then the subs + surface ships required to support the flat tops would be quite a bit more. ASW for these flat tops would be pretty high as they cannot go alone.
4. If there is going to be any chance of aircraft landing on the flat tops, there are certain min requirements to be followed like the length of the deck and duplication of the personnel/equipment
5. If we try to make them heli carriers, with aircraft & missiles to be self sufficient, (kind of multi-role if you will) then they are going to be pretty bloated ship unsure of the role it is going to play. We might have to think of some use cases in which such ships can be used.
6. None of the navies in the world follow this, navies with better experience and looking to cut corners still prefer big carriers.

Protecting few high valued assets would be easier than trying to protect everything, which would mean not enough protection for anything.

Having said that this concept will work better, with UCAVs - when there is a lot of commonality and the logistics are simplified quite a bit. If some ships can be modified to have a flat top, with the ability to store and launch few UCAVs, small in size (added bonus if with Vertical Takeoff and Landing) then this might be the way to go. ASW is still going to be a threat and will continue to be in the future. Any threat, subs or missiles to the big carrier would be more of a threat to the smaller carriers and same restrictions on the deployments near to the enemy's shore would still apply to these smaller carriers too.

An assumption seems to be that there is protection in the fact that enemy cannot attack every ship if we have more smaller ships or that some ships would survive in case of an attack. With the cost of the missiles being negligible compared to the ships, enemy might be happy to serve a volley in the general vicinity of the deployment.

Please show in which cases the smaller carriers or the flat tops carrying helos and aircraft might be more efficient.

[Singha]

a high flying UCAV or anything cannot track submerged submarines transiting through these straits and entering the huge deep area that lies south of the indonesian islands.
only SOSUS arrays / patrolling subs with passive sensors and LRMP a/c using sonobuoys could hope to detect and pursue these contacts.

Indonesia is a huge chain of islands stretching to irian jaya that lies just north of australia. unless we have 2-3 strong bases in indonesia itself or a fleet of 5 LHDs strung out in a line, I dont see any of the above as realistic.

[Khalsa]

Enough is enough
where are they now and whats the size of the flotilla grown to ?

[Nikhil T]

Updated location on Marine Traffic

Saw this picture
INS Vikramaditya accompanied by HMS Monmouth through English Channel, December 12, 2013


From UK MoD

The 4,900 tonne frigate met up with the newest Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya – weighing in at a massive 45,000 tonnes and helped her safely through the busy English Channel.

Originally built for the Russian Navy as a modified Kiev class aircraft carrier, called Baku in 1987, India procured her in 2004 and she was accepted by the Indian Navy in a commissioning ceremony in November 2013.

Following successful sea trials in July 2013 and aviation trials in September 2013 the carrier began her long journey to her new home of India escorted by auxiliary INS Deepak and Talwar class frigate INS Trikand.

HMS Monmouth’s Operations Officer, Lt Cdr Chris Hollingworth, said:

“I was impressed at the scale the Vikramaditya, which displaces twice as much as HMS Illustrious.

“As the 65,000 tonne Queen Elizabeth Carriers are half as big again we will have quite formidable ships to operate in the near future.”

With HMS Illustrious due to visit India over Christmas the interaction with the Indian’s newest ship could not have been more timely. INS Vikranaditya also paid a visit to Portsmouth Naval base during the summer.

Celebrating her 20th year in commission, the escorting duty is HMS Monmouth’s last commitment before return home to Plymouth to prepare for a major refit throughout 2014.

[sanjaykumar]

HMS Monmouth looks a little third worldish.

[NRao]

HMS Monmouth looks a little third worldish.

IIRC, she is used just for that purpose: escort other ships through the busy waterways.

[Khalsa]

Updated location on Marine Traffic

Saw this picture
INS Vikramaditya accompanied by HMS Monmouth through English Channel, December 12, 2013


From UK MoD

The 4,900 tonne frigate met up with the newest Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya – weighing in at a massive 45,000 tonnes and helped her safely through the busy English Channel.

Originally built for the Russian Navy as a modified Kiev class aircraft carrier, called Baku in 1987, India procured her in 2004 and she was accepted by the Indian Navy in a commissioning ceremony in November 2013.

Following successful sea trials in July 2013 and aviation trials in September 2013 the carrier began her long journey to her new home of India escorted by auxiliary INS Deepak and Talwar class frigate INS Trikand.

HMS Monmouth’s Operations Officer, Lt Cdr Chris Hollingworth, said:

“I was impressed at the scale the Vikramaditya, which displaces twice as much as HMS Illustrious.

“As the 65,000 tonne Queen Elizabeth Carriers are half as big again we will have quite formidable ships to operate in the near future.”

With HMS Illustrious due to visit India over Christmas the interaction with the Indian’s newest ship could not have been more timely. INS Vikranaditya also paid a visit to Portsmouth Naval base during the summer.

Celebrating her 20th year in commission, the escorting duty is HMS Monmouth’s last commitment before return home to Plymouth to prepare for a major refit throughout 2014.

Thanks Nikhil
I thought they were already past the Suez. The link shows them in the Med.

[prahaar]

Celebrating her 20th year in commission, the escorting duty is HMS Monmouth’s last commitment before return home to Plymouth to prepare for a major refit throughout 2014.

Thanks Nikhil
I thought they were already past the Suez. The link shows them in the Med.

The links says info received on 23-12-2013.

[NRao]

Yes, that is ancient news.



Happy new year!! To one and all. The al-55i team too.

[Klaus]

Indonesia is a huge chain of islands stretching to irian jaya that lies just north of australia. unless we have 2-3 strong bases in indonesia itself or a fleet of 5 LHDs strung out in a line, I dont see any of the above as realistic.

Anything related to having presence in Indonesia will mean that Indian hardware will routinely come under scanner of Australian Over the Horizon radar systems. Unless India has a prior agreement with Australia in place, this is bound to cause friction with the ANZUS.

There are locations in Eastern Borneo which are outside this radar coverage and hence ideal for basing Indian assets, besides it is a huge island with a lot of dense forest and foliage, it should be easy to conceal a lot of stuff from satellites.

[Christopher Sidor]

Looking at the pictures of viki dada one is stuck that the hangar deck is not open. Now compare this to the aircraft carriers of IJN like IJN Shinano or other aircraft carriers of USN. IJN Shinano would not be a good example as it was a retro-fitted carrier. Wonder why the Soviets did not go down the path of having open hangars. Closed hangars can create smoke and fire hazard.

[NRao]

For the foreseeable future the Aussies are good guys.