INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[Khalsa]

For the foreseeable future the Aussies are good guys.

Agreed and the Kiwis are too.
With their two frigates and a depleting force of Orions .... I don't see them leaning red.

The underlying defence mood is Aus centric.

[Philip]

Geography neccessitates that the IN possesses at least 3 carriers and that is just for the IOR region.The Vikram and IAC-1 are in the 45K t class and IAC-2 has been determined as 65K t.So the debate about size of IN carriers for the next decade at least appears to be academic.What is in the air and open to speculation is the type of flat top chosen for the 4 amphibs.If the JC design is chosen,as one hopes,being the largest and most capable of those reportedly being considered,we will possess 4 flat tops which can operate STOVL aircraft as well as either the Sea Gripen or NLCA if equipped with the ski jump.Though the numbers of such aircraft embarked aboard will be small,as ASW muli-role helos to support amphib ops,etc. will also be needed,these aircraft could provide both air defence and close support for amphib ops.In the pursuance of ASW ops,they will be most useful,with the ability to carry a larger complement of ASW helos.

The USMC too possesses considerable capability with its large number of 50K t amphibs and around 200 Harriers aboard.The JSF will in the future replace the Harriers.Thus,these flat tops will be used in smaller conflict situs and support of the CBGs in a larger crisis.Having a larger number off flat tops spreads the risk considerably of them being attacked and increases the survivability of the carriers with the enemy having to attack multiple targets instead of concentrating his assets against one or two.With the amphibs in service,it would be possible for the IN to send its carriers into farther waters like the Indo-China Sea and Pacific also should the need arise,but they will have to counter the v.large assets of the PLAN.

[venkat_r]

USMC style amphibs are not in IN immediate future. There are probably several more important acquisitions left before these can come in.

Indian carriers would have to be bigger at this point as they would have to be the big ships to face other powers in the region and also power projection that these big carriers would have has to be considerable. Amphibs that IN is acquiring at this point might work in conjunction with these carriers if necessary. Amphibs without aircraft can still work in tandem with the carriers and other flotilla. IN has to give confidence to a lot of south eastern countries about the security and the helping hand it can provide if there is any misadventure in that sphere by anyone. Bigger and meaner the carriers at this point, better it is - doing patrols, joint exercises and friendly visits.

Thanks to NRao's posting of India's Maritime strategy - It seems like Indian Political and diplomacy strength has to catch up with the carrier forces being built in the east.

Amphib carriers might also come in IN's future at some point in time after it deals with the 2 different categories of subs, big carriers, stealth frigates in numbers.

[NRao]

Actually, it all seems rather funny. I started my research on the Naval Doctrine because what I said about the Vikram (sell her) came under fire (and rightfully so).

Then came another facet of this doctrine into our discussions - IN is "not a expeditionary force". That led to:

Oct 4, 2011 :: 'IAF expanding wings beyond Pakistan and China'

(BTW, that is a quote !!!!!)

India is gradually building powerful military capabilities in tune with its expanding geopolitical interests, which are no longer limited to the swathe stretching from the Persian Gulf to Malacca Strait, even as the eastern and western fronts are being strengthened to deter the twin Pakistan-China threat.

After the over Rs 3,00,000 crore plan to build a potent three-dimensional Indian Navy for the future, reported by TOI last month, it was IAF's turn on Monday to assert it was on the path to transform into a true aerospace power with the capability to rapidly deploy and operate around the globe.

Then ................

May, 2012 :: 12th Defence Plan: Focus on Navy’s ‘expeditionary’ ops

___________

There is more out there - plenty more. Like:

JAn 4, 2014 :: Indian Air Force: Is it an Expeditionary Force?

[Philip]

The semantics of the GOI's understanding of "expeditionary" and that of the US needs to be interpreted and understood.For us to wage war like the US anywhere on the globe requires a military capability of at least 50% of that of the US.First of all we would need the equiv. of the USMC,something which I've advocated a few years ago,a gradual build up of at least 3 divs. A few brigades of amphib troops would be vastly insufficient.For example,if we have to once again intervene in SL,our closest hot spot,the SLA has reportedly 100,000+ troops in the NEast of the island alone.This would also require amphib vessels of at least JC capability if not larger like USMC flat tops with their own integral air support for landings.Then comes the aircraft to go with the flat tops ,CBGs,etc. Even the west has had to conduct its expeditionary wars in Iraq,Afghanistan and Libya using the combined forces of its NATO allies,esp. the UK and France with their carrier and amphib capability.

For the IAF ,it require LR strategic bombers which it strangely does not seem to have on its list of priorities.Some of us have been debating the issue for a long time,backfires,SU-34s,etc.,etc. The US is already developing a few supersonic and hypersonic black str. stealth bomber programmes,some of which may already be operational.Even without any expeditionary ambitions,the absence of a LT bomber both for strategic and tactical roles is a glaring deficiency that needs to be plugged.
What has emboldened the IAF to extend its wings has been its series of exercises with other nations,esp. taking part in those in the US/UK where our frontline aircraft like the MKIs and their support crews conducted trans-continental deployment and operations using our LR heavylift IL-76s. With the acquisition of C-17s,larger transcontinental heavy lifters than the IL-76s,this capability has increased.

Nevertheless,the IN has had a long history of "showing the flag" worldwide.It has taken part in numerous reviews of the fleet.I was present at the Trafalgar 200 at Portsmouth in the UK a few years ago,a spectacular show which only the RN is capable of.IN warships and merchantmen also evacuated lakhs of Indians in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait.Tsunami relief and major clearance of wrecked harbours in Lanka were conducted by the IN and the services within 24 hrs. of the catastrophe.A month later when the USN arrived in Galle it found that there was no relief work left for it,as the IN,etc. had completed restoration of the port!
With two new carriers apart from the Vikram sailing home,in the works/plans,and 4 amphibs also in the tender arena,the IN will have by the decade's end 2-3 med. sized carriers (Viraat included) and perhaps 2-3 amphibs also in service.With numerous surface ships and subs planned,it will be able to carry out operations outside in the IOR in pursuit of its maritime interests,support for our smaller allies in particular.In that sense the word/phrase "expeditionary" is plausible,but not in the classic sense of the word in US parlance.

Where we can take a look for charting out a course on the expeditionary road is that of our long experience in UN peacekeeping.Indian troops have fought in the millions from WW1 onwards abroad,particularly in Europe,Africa and the Middle East! If history repeats itself,they will do so in the future also.However,for such long range ops,ultimately someone has to foot the bill . Waging war overseas has beggared even the US! We are in no economic position to do so right now alone and have to first possess forces enough to prevent any attempt at a take away of our island territories and support smaller nations in the IOR like the maldives,Mauritius,etc.,before we can dream of greater pastures to graze upon.

[vivek_ahuja]

Why are we arguing for a USMC style force when we don't even have a fully functional 3-carrier force? The IN has plans in place to make that happen. What say we let them enact those plans before asking for the moon?

The arrival of the Vik has certainly increased the expectation levels here. I would impress the need for us to stay grounded in both the fiscal and military realities of the next decade. This reality (certainly perceived through the GOI lenses) does not need more than what the IN is slowly building up.

Code: Select all

----------- Scenario ------------------------ Projection ----------------------------- Nature -------------------------------------------- Resources (projected from current plans) -----------------
Presence off the Australian coast                Unseen                           Power Projection                                                N/A                                   
Presence in the south China seas                 Unseen                           Power Projection                                                N/A                                  
Boomer subs near the Chinese coastline           Definitive                       Nuclear deterrence                                           Adequate by 2020 
Carrier forces near the Chinese coastline        Unseen                           Strategic offensive                                             N/A
Invasion of Sri Lanka                            Unseen                           Strategic offensive                                             N/A
Blockade of Pakistan / Elimination of PN         Definitive                       Strategic offensive                                          Adequate as of 2014
ASW in the IOR against Chinese Navy              Projected                        Sea denial / Sea Control                                     Adequate as of 2014
Denial of passage of Chinese CBG in IOR          Projected                        Sea denial / Sea Control                                     Adequate as of 2014. Projected to remain adequate as of 2020
Two front offensive against PN and China in IOR  Projected                        Regional domination                                          Barely adequate as of 2014. Barely adequate as of 2020   
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Getting capability for the sake of it without a need or vision for it is beyond our fiscal limits and lower than our stupidity thresholds.

After all, we aren't the Chinese now, are we? We don't just get stuff because the US has it. There has to be a driving need for it, current or projected.

[NRao]

It is very interesting that within a span of (not even) a month that we have come from "India's carriers and the IN do not have such an operational requirement.We have no plans to invade China,or Pak from the sea." (here), to "The semantics of the GOI's interpretation of "expeditionary" ".

That indeed is heartening. And, IMVVHO, a move in the right direction (for aam aadmi).

[Philip]

If you've read my post above with additions,I have put our record of foreign operations in its historical perspective.It all depends upon how one defines "expeditionary".We have already in the Rajiv era intervened in the Maldives and Sri Lanka independently, while under the UN flag our troops have since Independence fought in many global hot spots.Could these be termed "Expeditonary"? Certainly not for us in the classic US understanding of the word.

In US parlance,"expeditionary" equals Korea,Vietnam,Panama,Haiti,GW1 and 2,Afghanistan,overseas ops which lasted for years! It meant invading,classic 3-D warfare to defeat the enemy,holding onto territory,regime change,establishment of "democracy",huge political ends requiing far more than mere military forces and hardware to "kick ass" and massive money on tap. The word thus also has significant neo-colonial and neo-imperialist tones today.Our two most intensive overseas ops were in BDesh in '71,where the war lasted 10 days and Sri Lanka,a "peacekeeping " op which turned sour into a full blooded battle against the LTTE ,to defeat /marginalise them and allow the GOSL to conduct elections in the NEast of the island. The IPKF's sojourn in Lanka taught us bitter and valuable lessons in Clausewitzian terms.

By extension of the Rajiv doctrine,our reach in the IOR has to be greater to support friendly nations like Mauritius,the Maldives from attempted invasions,coups,etc. The emergence of the Chinese into the IOR as they establish bases and outposts in Gwadar and Burma and pit stops in Lanka and elsewhere have to be countered.Our priority should be to build up our capabilities be able to dominate the IOR as an "Indian Lake",conduct long range naval and air ops outside the IOR to protect our energy and maritime trade ,and extend the defensive boundaries from the Indian coastline and airspace in the classic sense,"attack is the best form of defence" tous azimuth. Support of friendly endangered nations in Asia and Africa outside the IOR,esp. those with large PIOs will also depend upon the assistance of other allies.Why closer relations with ASEAN and Far East nations should continue to grow and expand in content as we're doing with Japan.

[NRao]

Muddying the waters as usual. And changing colors too.

[NRao]

It would immensely help the discussion (I am no expert at this) if you can keep "US" out of this picture. It makes no sense to keep on painting this picture with a US brush. Give it a shot. thx.

__________________________________

This from wiki:

Expeditionary Force is a generic name sometimes applied to a military force dispatched to fight in a foreign country. The term was particularly common in World War I and World War II.

I just do not see any "US" mentioned there.

Also:

Indian Expeditionary Force

Again, nothing to do with the US.

_______________________

This whole thing arose when I mentioned that India would need carriers to fight in the SCS. There was no mention of any other nation in ANY respect or form. Nothing to emulate, nothing to follow, nothing to consult, nothing. Simple as that. And, I still maintain:
1) India will need a force to fight in the SCS - when I cannot say, but that time will come. However, call it by any other name, but please provide that capability - it does not have to be used, until it is required. It does not need to be based anywhere in that region, but should be capable of fighting (and wining) in that region
2) IF it can be avoided by some other means, so much the better
3) I see a time coming when India will be forced to fight or at least project that threat/power

[Philip]

Of the word "Expeditionary" is used in warfare,then you have to discuss it in its full context.Which nation has conducted the most "Expeditionary" warfare on the planet since the two WWs? Trying to keep out the US,principal conductor of expeditionary warfare worldwide from the debate is like ignoring the elephant,sorry..... the dinosaur in the room!

In the Indian context,having the capability to strike hard and at long range in other theatres outside the IOR does not amount to "expeditionary warfare". That long range capability most of us on BR have been advocating for well over a decade,as well as a forward force capability in the Indo-China Sea to counter China's ememrgence in the IOR. It is amusing to see apologists and adventurists touting expeditionary warfare for India try to wriggle out of its true meaning and the role of its principal actor the US from it,because in almost every "expedition",Vietnam onwards,the US has ultimately retreated in splendid fashion with its tail firmly tucked between its legs! Technically,the war in Korea is still not over.Has anyone calculated the cost of the US maintaining its forces in Korea and Japan over the last few decades? This is why its latest strategy is to wage "drone warfare" all over the globe as against the enormous cost of waging "expeditionary warfare" with its huge cost in terms of human lives,eqpt.logistics,etc.,cannon fodder on the ground being best left to "native" elements.

Does anyone want India to play the "Gunga Din" role for the US this time as a neo-colonial subedar,doing the dirty work for the white massa? First let the GOI decide upon what its Afghan policy is going to be ,supporting Karzaui after the US withdraws allowing that country to be at the mercy of the Pakis and Talibanis.The GOI has shied from even providing Karzai with modern weaponry which he has pleaded for,if we cannot do even that,and he's not asked for Indian troops on the ground,then Indian "expeditions" will be picnics to Hauz Khas and the farthest limit to Goa,the former Portugese colony now ruled by the Russian and Israeli mafias and African drug peddlars!

[NRao]

Eh?

Do you have a shoe to bang on a podium? Or a chapal will do too.

Anyways, Sir, let me know if you can talk about IN in SCS.

Oh, without bringing the US into teh picture - the last time I read teh document there was never a mention of the US.

[Shrinivasan]

I saw a tracking update that INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22) have met up in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa and the whole fortilla is sailing towards Desh via the Persian Gulf. By 4th of Jan they should reach the Indian shores...

[svinayak]

The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power Robert Kaplan

from 28 min

[Philip]

No, a battery of cannon!

Seriously NR,here is a v. interesting paper,excellent read,from the US Army War Studies Inst. For the first time,the Asia-Pacific region is now being called the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" region.I have been using the phrase "Indo-China Sea" as its abutting landmass is called "Indo-China" ,the correct phraseology for the so-called SC Sea.In fact the whole of ASEAN historically has been most influenced by India in culture and religion and our historic maritime trade has spanned millennia.In the Autumn Parameters 2013 issue,the advocates of continuing presence of US troops on the ground in the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" theatre exemplifies its understanding and conduct of "expeditionary warfare".

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... 7_Deni.pdf

Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
John R Deni

Xcpts:

In the rush to the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater prompted by the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, it has become conventional
wisdom to say the US Army has only a minimal role in the rebal
-
ancing effort underway. Advocates of this perspective assume that the
Pacific theater—with its massive distances—is far more suitable to the
platform-intensive Air Force and Navy, than the soldier-centric Army.
1
They then argue that, since the Army’s primary mission is fighting and
winning the nation’s wars, the Army’s role in the Pacific is largely limited
to the Korean Peninsula.
The Army is not blameless in this respect. According to one promi
-
nent analyst, the Army’s, “organizational culture continues to focus
nearly exclusively on state-on-state war.”
2
Organizational bias has also adversely affected how the institutional Army embraced the importance of promoting interoperability, developing coalition capability, and building partner capacity.
3
And this bias persists despite efforts by General Ray Odierno, the Army’s Chief of Staff, to change that culture
by emphasizing the importance of shaping the international environment and preventing conflict in the first place, including through the development of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) initiative.
4
In fact, the US Army has significant strategic roles to play in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region that cannot be adequately performed by naval or air forces. They fall into three broad categories: bolstering defense of allies and deterring aggression; promoting regional security and stability through security cooperation; and ameliorating the growing United States–China security dilemma. As discussed below, the United States
faces some hurdles in wielding strategic landpower in each of these areas, yet notemploying the Army will make matters worse

Abstract:
The US Army has a major, strategic role to play in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. That role can be broken down into three
broad areas—bolstering defense of allies and deterring aggression,
promoting regional security and stability through security cooperation, and ameliorating the growing US-China security dilemma.
Employing strategic landpower in each of these areas is not without
challenges—especially in the face of sequestration—yet not making
use of the Army will result in fewer policy options

.
26
The challenge facing senior American leaders is how to ensure vital
US interests, such as freedom of the seas, are maintained while also avoiding negative security dilemma outcomes. Such a task is difficult given thedegree to which Beijing views every American action in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region as part of a broad anti-Chinese conspiracy. At a recent conference on American policy toward Asia, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy relayed one anecdote that illustrates the challenge of changing Chinese perceptions.
27
During a meeting with her senior Chinese military counterparts, she presented an historical analysis showing the distribution of US military forces and the security agreements the United States had arrayed against the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. She then showed the same types of information vis-à-vis China, all dramatically less than the United States
used to contain the Soviet Union. In reaction, “their jaws hit the floor in a moment of profound cognitive dissonance.” The Chinese officials said they did not believe the data: it clashed heavily with what has become conventional wisdom in China, even within elite circles.

Conclusion
Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army’s primary role in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater is guarding against a North Korean invasion.
Arguably, the Army itself has promoted this over the last several years,
placing great emphasis on campaign planning on the Korean peninsula.
But such a conceptualization of how landpower is or could be utilized
in the pursuit of American vital interests is unnecessarily limited. The
strategic use of landpower in what is typically seen as a Naval or Air
Force theater offers more benefits to the national security of the United
States and its allies than is commonly acknowledged.
Defense and deterrence are critical roles the US Army plays on the
Korean peninsula, but the aperture needs to widen beyond discussing
potential responses to Pyongyang’s aggression. It is logical to expect the
Army to play a key role in any number of defense and deterrence related
scenarios—assuming sequestration does not force a precipitous drop
in Army end strength. This is especially true regarding ballistic missile
defense throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and well beyond Korea.
At the same time, the Army will continue shaping the international
environment and preventing conflict, even though much of this mission
is fundamentally diplomatic in nature. The other US military services
cannot replicate Army-led security cooperation, especially in terms
of engaging with the armies of critical allies and partners like India,
Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The US Army must overcome
institutional as well as budgetary challenges to fulfill its missions
completely.
Finally, the Army can help the United States resolve the security
dilemma with China. It may take a generation or more to convince the
Chinese that the United States does not seek containment, and that US
mil-to-mil engagement throughout the region actually benefits China. It
is, however, an effort worth making

From the last lines in the conclusion,it can be seen that the US envisages cooperative interoperability between its Army and that of "allies" such as India.In simple language,Indian jawans alongside US grunts,both armies fighting on the same front against a common enemy!

[Singha]

among 1000s of ships passing in international waters through malacca or indonesian straits how exactly does one identify and seize the subset that would be china bound? there are dozens of large ports in that region incl in japan and soko. so I think this talk of blocading china sea lines of communication for oil is far fetched.

the only possible way could be demolish a few ships just about to enter the funnel into chinese ports from a distance, attack shore based port facilities with SLCM/ALCM etc. this automatically means a fleet of submarines able to get into the west pacific, deliver attacks and head home. [phase1]

and carriers and shore based support able to protect these submarines from threats in atleast the area between malaysia-borneo-indonesia.[phase2]

just as in WW2 - leyte gulf, coral sea , guadalcanal we might see the next carrier-vs-carrier battles in that vast chain of islands from borneo to polynesia north of NZ. the pacific-IOR watershed is kind of peculiar that there is next to no opening between the two that is 100s of KM wide its all narrow gaps, with lots of reefs and islands ..... the only clear passage is sail in sub-antarctic region south of australia and NZ.

[Philip]

Here is a report on planned Indo-US naval cooperation in the Indo-China Sea.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti ... artnership

U.S., India Inch Toward Naval Partnership
By Saurav Jha, on 09 Jul 2012, Briefing

Xcpt:

During his recent visit to New Delhi, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta highlighted the evolution of the annual Indo-U.S. naval war game Malabar from a passing exercise for the two navies’ ships into a full-scale engagement across all functional areas of naval warfare. Indeed, the steadily increasing complexity of Indo-U.S. naval force coordination has been a standout feature of an otherwise interest-driven relationship, suggesting Washington increasingly sees India as the western hinge of the U.S. pivot to Asia, with the U.S. Navy backstopping the shift from the Pacific. However, before the Indo-U.S. entente on the seas becomes a full-blown condominium, more dialogue between the two navies will be necessary.

http://www.cassindia.com/inner_page.php ... =diplomacy

Rising tension: India asserts its presence in South China Sea
The revelations about Chinese Navy challenging Indian warship INS Airavat in South China Sea, while returning from a goodwill visit to Vietnam, has once again drawn international attention on the hardening attitude of China on the South China Sea and raised concerns that this will raise tensions in the maritime region.

Though Indian Navy and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) have simultaneously denied any confrontation with the Chinese Navy, Indian MEA spokesman has accepted that the Indian warship Airavat was indeed contacted by an open radio channel by a caller identifying himself as the “Chinese Navy” stating that “you are entering Chinese waters.” No ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat, which proceeded on onward journey as scheduled.

Recent assertions by China on the status of South China Sea and the launching of the first aircraft carrier for sea trial on August 10 has caused deep concern not only among littoral states of the region but countries like India are also worried.

The US has already challenged the Chinese contention and India has also said publicly that the maritime area is an open sea in which any country can roam freely. It is evident from the Indian Navy and MEA statements that the Chinese Navy did challenge Indian naval warship.

Freedom of navigation

This is why Indian government had to assert that India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles on international law. India reminded the Chinese by saying that these principles should be respected by all.

Since the beginning of last decade India has started asserting its presence in South China Sea, as India’s area of concern extends from the North of Arabian Sea to the South China Sea, first publicly enunciated by the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes in April 2000.

Since then India has been expanding the operational capabilities of its navy to the South China Sea and paying increased attention to force projection and sending expeditionary forces in conjunction with the countries having dispute with China over Spratly Islands and also with other major countries in the maritime region.

India’s primary naval activities in the region concerned mainly anti-piracy, bilateral exercises and goodwill naval visits to ports which in fact indirectly asserted its view that South China Sea is international maritime area and every country has the right to safeguard its economic interests though its own naval resources.

Almost 55 per cent of India’s trade transits via Malacca Strait which funnels out in South China Sea for onward move to China, Japan, Korea, US and other major destinations.

Thus, India has a vital stake in peace and stability in the South China Sea, which China claims to be its territorial waters. Ever since China has started asserting this, Indian and other major navies have been contesting and describing this as international waters.

Situation in South China Sea was a subject of special focus in the July 19 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum wherein India for the first time spelt out its policy publicly.

The then Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao later on asserted during a seminar in New Delhi, “the South China Sea is an important shipping route. India supports the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.”

At the recent ARF meeting in Bali, India noted that the parties concerned were engaged in discussions to address the South China Sea issue and welcomed the recently agreed guidelines on the implementation of the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties between China and ASEAN.

A senior defence official said that no major country including India can accept South China Sea as exclusive domain of China in view of its economic and strategic interests.

Hence, India has adopted a conscious strategy to mark its military presence in the South China Sea, through its forays into the maritime waters which China claims to be of its interest.

Indian Navy started sending its big flotilla of warships to the maritime area since early last decade and is now indulging in joint naval exercises with countries who are contesting the Chinese claims over the Spratly Islands.

India now organizes joint exercises with Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia on a regular annual basis.

In fact, Singapore has helped India flex its muscle in South China Sea, which has irritated China and it objected to the gun and missile firing during Singapore-India joint exercises SIMBEX and both the countries later relented and agreed to exercise silently.

In June, Vietnamese Chief of Naval Staff visited New Delhi and held discussions on issues of naval cooperation which will in fact help strengthen the Vietnamese naval prowess vis a vis Chinese Navy.

According to a defence official, “we will not say publicly that we want to checkmate China in the South China Sea but our actions speak louder.” India’s defence engagement with Vietnam has led to drawing of a parallel line with the growing defence cooperation between Vietnam and India to the China-Myanmar naval cooperation.

As Myanmar has extended naval facilities to the Chinese Navy on Coco Islands in Andaman Sea and the Sitwe port, Vietnam has only last month given permission to India to drop anchor at its Nha Trang port in Southern Vietnam.

Naval officials revealed that probably Indian warships are the only one which has been given such facility so near to the Chinese coast. Halong Bay port near Hanoi used to extend such facilities to Indian Navy.

This will facilitate a sustainable presence to Indian Navy in the South China Sea. However, a senior diplomatic source asserts that growing India-Vietnam defence cooperation should not be seen in response to the Sino-Pak cooperation nor to contain China in the South China Sea.

Since early last decade, India has made it an annual ritual to send warships to countries like Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and other South East Asian countries who are contesting the claims over the Spratly Islands with China.

Expanding capabilities

In fact, officials cite, a decade old statement of the then Defence Minister George Fernandes that India’s area of interest extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.

The Indian strategic planners have asked Navy to expand the operational capabilities and to increase attention to force projection and expeditionary forces. India has been deploying its ships in the name of the anti-piracy operations jointly with regional powers.

As India wants its maritime trade routes free of pirate attacks and prevent any possibilities of obstruction by any state or non-state actors in Indian Ocean, India has also been marking its naval presence in the South China Sea and establishing close working defence relationships with countries involved in South China Sea dispute.

From Vietnam to South Korea India has signed defence cooperation agreements, besides with countries like Malaysia and Indonesia.

India is now using the opportunity given to it by the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting plus forum of ten ASEAN and eight non-ASEAN countries as a member.

India views it as an effort to establish open and inclusive security architecture for the region. India’s policy is to encourage and participate in cooperative approaches which would enable all countries in the region to counter traditional and non-traditional security challenges and ensure that the critical sea lanes in the region are kept open, secure and for navigation and trade.

India’s involvement in the ADMM plus and various other ASEAN fora is a part of progressive and multifaceted partnership with the East Asian region. At the same time India is also mindful of evolving dynamics of power rivalries in the region and their impact on the region and on regional interests, according to a defence official.

In this context, the recent Chinese plans to expand the Maritime Surveillance Force is being viewed with concern in India as it would raise the counter deployment from other claimants of the Spratly Islands.

The MSF will be equipped with additional 16 aircraft and 350 vessels by 2015 and enhance the strength of the naval personnel from 9000 to 15,000 by 2020. The strength of patrol vessels will also increase to 520 by 2020. These will be deployed in the contested maritime area of South and East China Sea.

Indian officials believe a minor incident could be a potential trigger for a major war in the region involving many countries. India would want this region free of any conflict like situation so that the maritime trade routes to major developed markets are kept open.

According to top defence officials, a structure of bilateral and regional maritime confidence building measures with China would be helpful in keeping the area free of maritime tensions.

India would also like to have a maritime security dialogue which could be an extension of the defence dialogue architecture already in place which is likely to be resumed after suspension last year due to the staple visa policy for Indian Kashmiris by the end of this year with the visit of the Chinese defence secretary to India.

India thus wants that South China Sea to be free of military rivalries and disputes to be resolved amicably, and therefore keen to engage not only with China but all the regional powers. India also wants to assert through its naval activities that South China Sea is in fact international waters and no country can claim suzerainty over the maritime area.

PS:I think that we need to take this debate further in the IN td. and leave it free for Vikram posts which will increase shortly.

[member_20292]

among 1000s of ships passing in international waters through malacca or indonesian straits how exactly does one identify and seize the subset that would be china bound?

You dont. You threaten and carry out one or two attacks.

Watch as shipping oil to China rates skyrocket and shippers refuse to go there unless covered with heavy insurance rates.

[NRao]

moved discussion to: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1569328

[Philip]

Good point Maha, as Maj.Gen.Cardoso said in Delhi at the book launch meet,in '71,foreign nations asked the IN for permission to enter Paki waters even though we had not enforced any blockade in the aftermath of the Karachi naval attacks!

It would be easy meat for the IN's forces esp. subs,to sink a PRC tanker exiting the Gulf or one trying to enter the Malacca Straits-that would be far more fun, letting the Chinese sweat it out from the Gulf to the A&N islands and then striking them as they begin to celebrate! It is why we need a substantial sub fleet,far more than planned,where our subs could lie in wait outside China's "string of pearls" in the IOR/Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) region,as the US is now describing it,as well as outside Chinese ports,and pick off PRC merchantmen at leisure.The effect would be devastating.

In fact,if I were in charge of perspective planning at NHQ,I would advocate the establishment of a huge sub fleet which would operate in the Indo-China Sea and IAP region just as the German sub fleet did in the Atlantic in WW2. For this we would need a larger fleet of N-subs,SSGNs with large arsenals of missiles,torpedoes and mines too,to mine PRC ports,which could stay on station much longer than conventional AIP subs.Logistic facilities for IN subs in the IAP region with nations like willing ASEAN states,Vietnam,the Phillipines,Taiwan,Japan,and possibly Oz,would enhance the success of IN sub ops in the IAP region.

[Brando]

among 1000s of ships passing in international waters through malacca or indonesian straits how exactly does one identify and seize the subset that would be china bound?

You dont. You threaten and carry out one or two attacks.

Watch as shipping oil to China rates skyrocket and shippers refuse to go there unless covered with heavy insurance rates.

China has a MASSIVE merchant fleet and unlike Iran or some other third world nation a few sunk merchant ships aren't going to deter their government owned "patriotic" merchant fleet one whit. It might instead piss off all of ASEAN, the Japanese etc but the Chinese will continue plying come cruise missile, torpedo or naval bombardment. Plus the Chinese banks will more than happily insure any private tanker operators or private traders in times of war.

The only sure fire way would be to mine the entire length of the straits with a fleet of mine layers backed up by frigates, submarines and shore based long range cruise missile batteries and fighter aircraft. India has no where near the capability to deploy these elements in the required numbers from ANC.

[Viv S]

It would be easy meat for the IN's forces esp. subs,to sink a PRC tanker exiting the Gulf or one trying to enter the Malacca Straits-that would be far more fun, letting the Chinese sweat it out from the Gulf to the A&N islands and then striking them as they begin to celebrate! It is why we need a substantial sub fleet,far more than planned,where our subs could lie in wait outside China's "string of pearls" in the IOR/Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) region,as the US is now describing it,as well as outside Chinese ports,and pick off PRC merchantmen at leisure.The effect would be devastating.

You dont. You threaten and carry out one or two attacks.

Watch as shipping oil to China rates skyrocket and shippers refuse to go there unless covered with heavy insurance rates.

We're not going to start sinking civilian shipping; the consequences of total war will be far graver than any economic hurt delivered. Nor is it feasible to simply block the Malacca or Sunda straits.

Any interdiction of shipping will have to be carried out by physically dominating the routes. That means broadcasting instructions to all shipping in the area and sending (heliborne) boarding parties to force compliance when necessary. The same teams can also be used to check the manifests and verify the destinations through our embassies in East and SE Asia.

There's no way to completely shut off China bound shipping, but you can apply enough pressure such that the shipping companies themselves start segregating it.

[Peregrine]

I saw a tracking update that INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22) have met up in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa and the whole fortilla is sailing towards Desh via the Persian Gulf. By 4th of Jan they should reach the Indian shores...

Shrinivasan Ji :

Why would the INS Vikramaditya proceed from the Red Sea to the Indian Coast - possibly Karwar - via Persian Gulf?

Are they trying to have a "Dekho" of the Land of the Pure and the home of the Terrorists?

Cheers

[Aditya G]

Navantia wins Turkish order for LPD:

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... d-bid.html

The competition with the Mistral, another contemporary design, in the international stage is quite fascinating. My hopes for Juan Carlos to win the IN tender as well!

On hindsight, a fleet of thru deck LPDs should have been acquired much earlier. We needed these ships yesterday. Since the late 80s, there have been multiple instances where such a ship could have been employed:

- Operation Cactus
- Operation Pawan
- Operation Jupiter (Cancelled)
- Operation Sukoon - evac of citizens from Lebanon
- Exfil of Indian Army troops from Somalia (it was a close one)
- Tsunami crisis
- Possible use in Sierra Leone
- Operation Blossom - evac of citizens from Libya

So we have been doing expeditionary operations, albeit in a limited way. With the induction of the C-17 and US-2 this capability is going to be boosted further.

[Anurag]

Navantia wins Turkish order for LPD:

So we have been doing expeditionary operations, albeit in a limited way. With the induction of the C-17 and US-2 this capability is going to be boosted further.

Not sure how the US-2 boosts India's expeditionary capability. It's purely for SAR operations, not sure I'd call it an expeditionary capability gain. The real catch would be to be able to use the aircraft for both civilian/military purpose, but that depends on what comes out of the cooperation they've been talking about.

But yes, those LHD/LPD's were needed yesterday. I also prefer a platform that can carry a fairly potent ground-strike capability (Harrier/Naval-LCH/F-35/etc...whatever) to support the troops.

[John]

hina has a MASSIVE merchant fleet and unlike Iran or some other third world nation a few sunk merchant ships aren't going to deter their government owned "patriotic" merchant fleet one whit. It might instead piss off all of ASEAN, the Japanese etc but the Chinese will continue plying come cruise missile, torpedo or naval bombardment. Plus the Chinese banks will more than happily insure any private tanker operators or private traders in times of war.

There have been reports China-Russia working on missiles that can hidden with shipping containers along with full scale radar systems. Russia has already shown Klub SSM deployed in such manner in brochures.

[NRao]

we had space based assets and now merchant navy based assets?

what next? Threaten the country of origin - "whoever supplies ................ shall be ................."

this game will never end.

[devesh]

in the video above, around 42 mins, Kaplan is talking about "Muslim-Chinese interaction".

significant pointer. and he is also talking about the "rimland" from horn of africa, persian gulf, IOR, Malacca, South China Sea being the "home" of this interaction.

India is also mentioned. but the thrust is "interaction" between Chinese and Arabs/Persian-gulf powers.

the plan for India is to remain a docile second rate power taking orders.

[NRao]

the plan for India is to remain a docile second rate power taking orders.

Where did you get that from? And, orders from whom?

talking about "Muslim-Chinese interaction".

That in context of ages ago the same thing happened. He at one point states that the whole thing is going back to per-european days.

In fact on more than one occasion he mentions that China will not be able to defend any bases in the IOR (because "the way the IAF is constituted").

Also: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 9#p1569328

[Shrinivasan]

I saw a tracking update that INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22) have met up in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa and the whole fortilla is sailing towards Desh via the Persian Gulf. By 4th of Jan they should reach the Indian shores...

Shrinivasan Ji :

Why would the INS Vikramaditya proceed from the Red Sea to the Indian Coast - possibly Karwar - via Persian Gulf?

Are they trying to have a "Dekho" of the Land of the Pure and the home of the Terrorists?

Cheers

I too had the same doubt, why Persian gulf... They could have just steamed straight to Karwar... maybe the whole armada took a route straddling the coast of the Arabian peninsula, into the Persian Gulf and then the land of the pure before entering the EEZ of the desh...

Just a hypothesis...

[Anurag]

Shrinivasan Ji :

Why would the INS Vikramaditya proceed from the Red Sea to the Indian Coast - possibly Karwar - via Persian Gulf?

Are they trying to have a "Dekho" of the Land of the Pure and the home of the Terrorists?

Cheers

I hope the dekho is the middle finger.."kya kar lega salay"..lol

[g.sarkar]

Indian Expeditionary Force
Again, nothing to do with the US.

Perhaps OT, but those who studied Hindi in high school will remember the Indian Expeditionary force in WWI as described in the story "Usne kaha tha". A love story with Punjabi Soldiers fighting the Germans in France.
Gautam

[NRao]

Usne kaha tha .........................



Indian bicycle troops at the Battle of the Somme


Indian cavalry from the Deccan Horse during the Battle of Bazentin Ridge


Indian Army 10 pounder Mountain Gun crew in action, East Africa.

[Aditya G]

Not sure how the US-2 boosts India's expeditionary capability. It's purely for SAR operations, not sure I'd call it an expeditionary capability gain. The real catch would be to be able to use the aircraft for both civilian/military purpose, but that depends on what comes out of the cooperation they've been talking about.

- Ability to perform long range SAR for amphibious troops
- Ability to deploy initial MARCOS teams prior
- Exfiltration of MARCOS
- Delivery of urgent supplies to fleet
- Surveillance

It really depends on the we employ our assets. I doubt we will buy these aircraft purely for SAR and civilian duties. I would ofcourse like it to be armed with weaponry.

[rajsunder]

vikramaditya has arrived (from ajai shukla's blog)

[Singha]

chinooks have long been noted to hover over calm sea with rear door open and SEAL team can ride their inflatable boats direct into the hold for hot extract
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMAr51etn20

a seaplane permits extraction over much longer range and heavier sea state probably...I dont see the chinook being able to this with any significant wave action present.

a US-2 could perhaps fly direct from trivandrum at night , over the open sea to Maldives island, land a team to monitor a jihadi unit training camp, act as comms relay for the main strike unit coming off a FFG later in the night, and recover the scout team before dawn to make a clean exit back to motherland.
it has room for 20 people and radius of around 2300km..so a unit of 12 marcos (4 x 3) is possible with their boats and eqpt. any helicopter would not be able to set down and loiter quietly .... and triv-male distance being 500km, none not even the huge Merlin would make it there and back unrefueled.

it can also land in the sea & fly out emergency medical cases from IN or civilian ships deep in the ocean upto 2300km away from base. well beyond the range of any IN helis.

[Singha]

the Viraat seems to have a sub-optimal hull form perhaps? the other 3 ships have no visible bow wave or turbulence in the first 3rd of the ship...viraat seem to have a more stubby 'merchant ship' type shape and hence visible white water from the bow itself.

[chackojoseph]

2 harriers seen on Viraat. Will they land it on Vikramaditya?

[Khalsa]

Beautiful.....Aditya is here. That shot with the Viraat is exactly what I was hoping for.
Good PR too.

[Philip]

Oh what a beautiful sight! This will bring tears to the eyes of many IN sailors,esp. those who served aboard our carriers.

Yes,they fought for "King and Country",for the British Empire.At Brighton,the magnificent Royal pavilion was used as a r3cuperative hospital for Indian wounded,there is an AV feature showing the king presenting the VC to Indian soldiers,and a memorial chattri in the town,which holds great affection for the Indian soldiers.My old school has commemorated those children who later fought and died in WW1 (IM Indian troops fought and around 75K were killed) and WW2 too.In WW2 so too did 2.5M!

It would be no undisputed fact that if not for these volunteers from India,in both wars,the Brits would be up sh*t street and German would probably be the national lingo of the UK,where in any case German royalty rules!

This is why it is so attractive to western defence planners to rope in the "Injuns" as allies in their order of battle for the future,when there is stiff resistance in their own countries for their kind to fight abroad for Queen and Country and for Uncle Sam.The huge development of unmanned weapon systems is a consequence of this harsh truth,that the west has gone soft after decades of waging war on the planet after WW2 from Korea to Afghanistan and cannot contemplate taking on China with its millions of storm troopers alone.

Please do not confuse the ability to conduct open ocean blue water LR ops in waters outside the IOR with "expeditionary warfare".It is that with tech developments,LR missiles,etc.,the outer defences of maritime states will be based upon their reach and range of their platforms and weaponry.We've come a long way from the 12nm cannonball limit that determines a nation's territorial limits at sea.It is why LRMP aircraft are exceptionally valuable assets in the NCW real time environment of today and the IN keeping on the Bears as long as it can for their enormous unmatched reach and capability.In any future crisis,the primary task of the IN will be to sanitise the IOR so that our energy and merchant fleet can operate without hindrance.This requires bottling up the PN in its harbours as we did in '71 and preventing any mutual support from the PN from the PLAN.In a rapidly mobile situation,domination of the air at sea,sea control by the IN's air assets will be crucial.

The IN is fast becoming a powerful "air force" of its own.The Fleet Air Arm will soon have approx. 300+ aircraft and helos.45 MIG-29Ks,about the same number of NLCAs planned,a few dozen LRMP and med. MP aircraft,3 doz. Dorniers for EW,etc.,around 30 KA-31 EW helos,plus around 100+ med. ASW multi-role helos aboard our surface fleet and flat tops.Another large number of light utility helos,Hawk and other trainers,etc. will be a very potent force operating in the IOR and IAP regions.The Vikram and IAC-1 are approx. the same size operating about the same number and type of aircraft and helos.This should make it easier for the IN and the carrier crews to switch from one ship to the other.Both are also arriving within a few years of each other.Ideally,IAC-2 should also have a similar sister ship before 2030,for operational efficiency and which would bring down costs too with standardisation.We would then have about 150 aircraft and helos operating from 4 carriers,plus those aboard the 4 amphibs.The JC class is becoming the preferred design and hopefully the IN should also pick it,instead of going for the lowest tender,which it cannot be with the smaller Mistral also in the pack.

Once the Vikram arrives,the first task would be to equip her with integral anti-air/missile systems.It would be interesting to see where they would be located .Have these locations been shown on any models,renderings earlier? I don't see many sponsons where they could be accommodated.Yes,the Harriers can certainly operate from the Vikram.,That's the beauty of STOVL aircraft but maintenance facilities for them are limited as the larger CV has been fitted out to operate MIG-29Ks primarily.There was a note on this somewhere.

At the last naval defexpo at Cochin last autumn,the SAAB presentation on the Sea Gripen was supposedly at the IN's request.The presentation showed that the small aircraft,Harrier size could operate even from the Viraat ,Vikram. as well as the larger carriers to come.The IN is also now paying for 25% of the LCA MK-2s development,which will be the basis for the NLCA,but will arrive only after the MK-2 arrives.If this is going to take around 5+ years,by 2020,the IN may perhaps be contemplating a small number of SGs for the Viraat whose Harrier numbers are a handful ,which could possibly be in service until IAC-1 arrives,until 2020.