Of course, it is. Besides what you said above, the presence of US troops in Afghanistan is always to stop India from taking any decisive military action {even on those rare occasions} against TSP and thus allow TSP to go on with its terrorism against us.ramana wrote:Even this was an US CBM to TSP to leave a weak ANA in Kabul for strategic depth anytime they felt like.
Looking at events as they are unfolding, are you confident presidential elections will be held in 2014, and how confident are you they will be fair?
The concerns are there; they are real. The first priority is that elections be held on time, in the early months of 2014. There is no doubt they will be very different elections. The security situation, of course, is one obvious concern. Then, there is the fact that large parts of the country will still be in the grip of winter when elections are held. Finally, the kinds of electoral reforms we had hoped for have not occurred. We hope, though, that the electoral bodies, and the Electoral Complaints Commission, understand how enormous their responsibilities are. This is not just an election to choose a President, but to build a democratic Afghanistan.
The pre-election situation will obviously become more complicated if the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States is not signed soon. There are even fears that the International Security Assistance Force may then pull out before the elections, and that western aid might be cut sharply.
Whatever President Karzai’s reasons are for not signing the BSA — and I think they are not the stated reasons, but personal ones, which I do not want to go into — I do not feel what he is doing is in the interests of the country. Let us face it: there is no ideal agreement that will satisfy all the desires of the Afghan people, and there will not be an ideal agreement tomorrow. To say, as President Karzai is saying, ‘let the United States bring peace today and we will sign’ is meaningless. The negotiations were done; a text agreed on. To question the merit of signing it now will obviously generate a lot of concern, and the Afghan people are paying the costs. Food and fuel prices have shot up on panic buying. The little money investors were bringing in has been put on hold. Now, because this element of uncertainty about the post-2014 situation has been gratuitously injected on this situation, there is even volatility.
There have been some fears that in addition to all these problems, ethnic tensions are mounting, and that the election may end up contributing to the fragmentation of the nation. Do you share these concerns?
There are some people who want exactly this to happen. There are people who are instigating violence through hate speech, which inevitably provokes a response, pre-planned or spontaneous. I am not, however, concerned about the people. Afghans have learned that national unity is the key to our survival. So, while there are efforts to incite tensions, I think there is also a deep wisdom among the people, which will prevail.
A year ago, there were hopes that the election process would become more inclusive with the reconciliation process, which hoped to bring the Taliban, or a section of them, on board. Is there still any life in these hopes?
Whatever our desires or wishes might be, I do not see that the elements are there to make peace with the Taliban. While we should keep doing whatever is needed to work towards peace, realistically, the prospects of the desired outcome are not high.
Do you think, therefore, the election will be marred by violence? There are all kinds of conflicting reports on the reach of the Taliban.
It is how you look at these reports — the truth is that there are improvements in the security situation in some areas, and setbacks in others. I should candidly say that, yes, there are risks. It would be highly misleading if we say there is no security risk to the elections. Hopefully, though, with the joint efforts of the Afghan security forces and the people, we can have a good election.
Finally, in your view, is greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan something that is desirable, or does it hinder things by getting Pakistan’s back up?
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has sent the right signals and used the right words. I’m not going to be quick to judge though about what this means, but it is always good to hope for the best. Now, I think it is in Pakistan’s best interests to help stabilise the situation in Afghanistan. They cannot, for this, claim a veto over Afghanistan’s relationship with India. It is for Afghanistan and India to decide what their relationship should be like. It is for Afghanistan and Pakistan to decide what their relationship should be like.
President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has been engaged in secret contacts with the Taliban about reaching a peace agreement without the involvement of his American and Western allies, further corroding already strained relations with the United States. {The US has been doing this since much before Karzai started. The US cannot put on a face of injured innocence. It has been desperate to get a 'face saving' exit from Afghanistan without it appearing as another defeat like Vietnam. That desperation has driven it to extreme extents like buying into Pakistani theory that some Taliban are amenable for peace etc. Now that Karzai has hit back by refusing to sign the BSA, the US is up to its usual tricks of planting stories in state-controlled US news media}
The secret contacts appear to help explain a string of actions by Mr. Karzai that seem intended to antagonize his American backers, Western and Afghan officials said. In recent weeks, Mr. Karzai has continued to refuse to sign a long-term security agreement with Washington that he negotiated, insisted on releasing hardened Taliban militants from prison and distributed distorted evidence of what he called American war crimes.
The clandestine contacts with the Taliban have borne little fruit, according to people who have been told about them {The clandestine contacts between the US and the Taliban have also not borne any fruit}. But they have helped undermine the remaining confidence between the United States and Mr. Karzai, making the already messy endgame of the Afghan conflict even more volatile. Support for the war effort in Congress has deteriorated sharply, and American officials say they are uncertain whether they can maintain even minimal security cooperation with Mr. Karzai’s government or its successor after coming elections.
Frustrated by Mr. Karzai’s refusal to sign the security agreement, which would clear the way for American troops to stay on for training and counterterrorism work after the end of the year, President Obama has summoned his top commanders to the White House on Tuesday to consider the future of the American mission in Afghanistan.
Western and Afghan officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the private nature of the peace contacts, said that the outreach was apparently initiated by the Taliban in November, a time of deepening mistrust between Mr. Karzai and his allies. Mr. Karzai seemed to jump at what he believed was a chance to achieve what the Americans were unwilling or unable to do, and reach a deal to end the conflict — a belief that few in his camp shared.
The peace contacts, though, have yielded no tangible agreement, nor even progressed as far as opening negotiations for one. And it is not clear whether the Taliban ever intended to seriously pursue negotiations, or were simply trying to derail the security agreement by distracting Mr. Karzai and leading him on, as many of the officials said they suspected.
As recently as October, a long-term agreement between the United States and Afghanistan seemed to be only a few formalities away from completion, after a special visit by Secretary of State John Kerry. The terms were settled, and a loya jirga, or assembly of prominent Afghans, that the president summoned to ratify the deal gave its approval. The continued presence of American troops after 2014, not to mention billions of dollars in aid, depended on the president’s signature. But Mr. Karzai repeatedly balked, perplexing Americans and many Afghans alike.
Peace Contacts Fade
The first peace feeler from the Taliban reached Mr. Karzai shortly before the loya jirga, Afghan officials said, and since then the insurgents and the government have exchanged a flurry of messages and contacts.
Aimal Faizi, the spokesman for Mr. Karzai, acknowledged the secret contacts with the Taliban and said they were continuing.
“The last two months have been very positive,” Mr. Faizi said. He characterized the contacts as among the most serious the presidential palace has had since the war began. “These parties were encouraged by the president’s stance on the bilateral security agreement and his speeches afterwards,” he said.
But other Afghan and Western officials said that the contacts had fizzled, and that whatever the Taliban may have intended at the outset, they no longer had any intention of negotiating with the Afghan government. They said that top Afghan officials had met with influential Taliban leaders in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in recent weeks, and were told that any prospects of a peace deal were now gone.
The Afghan and Western officials questioned whether the interlocutors whom Mr. Karzai was in contact with had connections to the Taliban movement’s leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, whose blessing would be needed for any peace deal the group were to strike.
Though there have been informal contacts between Afghan officials and Taliban leaders since the very early days of the war, the insurgents’ opaque and secretive leaders have made their intentions difficult to discern. Afghan officials have struggled in recent years to find genuine Taliban representatives (Aren't we reminded of a prisoner that Pakistan faked as an important Taliban leader which the US marines 'escorted' for secret negotiation when it finally turned out the guy was a thief ?} , and have flitted among a variety of current and former insurgent leaders, most of whom had only tenuous connections to Mullah Omar and his inner circle, American and Afghan officials have said.
Western Outreach
The only known genuine negotiating channel to those leaders was developed by American and German diplomats, who spent roughly two years trying to open peace talks in Qatar. The diplomats repeatedly found themselves incurring the wrath of Mr. Karzai, who saw the effort as an attempt to circumvent him; he tried behind the scenes to undercut it.
Then, when an American diplomatic push led to the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, Mr. Karzai lashed out publicly at the United States. Afghan officials said that to them, the office looked far too much like the embassy of a government-in-exile, with its own flag and a nameplate reading “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Within days, the Qatar initiative stalled, and Mr. Karzai was fuming at what he saw as a plot by the United States to cut its own deal with Pakistan and the Taliban without him.
In the wake of the failure in Qatar, Afghan officials redoubled their efforts to open their own channel to Mullah Omar, and by late autumn, Mr. Karzai apparently believed those efforts were succeeding. Some senior Afghan officials say they did not share his confidence, and their doubts were shared by American officials in Kabul and Washington.
Both Mr. Karzai and American officials hear the clock ticking. American forces are turning over their combat role to Afghan forces and preparing to leave Afghanistan this year, and the campaigning for the Afghan national election in April has begun. An orderly transition of power in an Afghanistan that can contain the insurgency on its own would be the culmination of everything that the United States has tried to achieve in the country.
“We’ve been through numerous cycles of ups and downs in our relations with President Karzai over the years,” Ambassador James B. Cunningham said during a briefing with reporters last week {Karzai is not alone in the whimsical treatment that the US metes out to countries with which it deals. There are far too many and too serious cycles of 'ups and downs' that show the US diplomacy in very bad light}. “What makes it a little different this time is that he is coming to the end of his presidency, and we have some very important milestones for the international community and for Afghanistan coming up in the next couple of months.”
Mr. Karzai has been increasingly concerned with his legacy, officials say. When discussing the impasse with the Americans, he has repeatedly alluded to his country’s troubled history as a lesson in dealing with foreign powers. He recently likened the security agreement to the Treaty of Gandamak, a one-sided 1879 agreement that ceded frontier lands to the British administration in India and gave it tacit control over Afghan foreign policy. He has publicly assailed American policies as the behavior of a “colonial power,” though diplomats and military officials say he has been more cordial in private.
Mr. Karzai reacted angrily to a negative portrayal of him in a recent memoir by the former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, and he is still bitter over the 2009 presidential election, when hundreds of thousands of fraudulent ballots were disqualified and, as he sees it, the Americans forced him into an unnecessary runoff against his closest opponent.
Domestic Interests
In some respects, Mr. Karzai’s outbursts have been an effort to speak to Afghans who want him to take a hard line against the Americans, including many ethnic Pashtuns, who make up nearly all of the Taliban. With the American-led coalition on its way out and American influence waning, Mr. Karzai is more concerned with bridging the chasms of Afghan domestic politics than with his foreign allies’ interests.
If the peace overture to the Taliban is indeed at an end, as officials believe, it is unclear what Mr. Karzai will do next. He could return to a softer stance on the security agreement and less hostility toward the United States, or he could justify his refusal to sign the agreement by blaming the Americans for failing to secure a genuine negotiation with the insurgents.
Mr. Karzai has insisted that he will not sign the agreement unless the Americans help bring the Taliban to the table for peace talks. Some diplomats worry that making such a demand allows the Taliban to dictate the terms of America’s long-term presence in Afghanistan {It cannot be any worse than the announcement in 2009 by Obama that US withdrwal would start in 2011 and end by 2014} . Others question Mr. Karzai’s logic: Why would the insurgency agree to talks if doing so would ensure the presence of the foreign troops it is determined to expel?
The White House expressed impatience on Monday with Mr. Karzai’s refusal to sign the agreement. “The longer there is a delay, the harder it is for NATO and U.S. military forces to plan for a post-2014 presence,” said Jay Carney, the White House press secretary. “This is a matter of weeks, not months.”
The military leaders expected to attend the planning conference at the White House on Tuesday include Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the commander of American forces in Afghanistan; Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, the former Iraq commander now serving as head of the United States Central Command; and Adm. William H. McRaven, head of the United States Special Operations Command.
In recent statements, Mr. Karzai’s office in Kabul has appeared to open the door to a resolution of the impasse over the security agreement. The presidential spokesman, Mr. Faizi, has said that if one party is obstructing the American efforts to get talks going, the United States need only say so publicly.
“Once there is clarity, we can take the next step to signing” the agreement, he said. {There is hope as yet for the US but it would not bite that bullet for it will be an admission of another massive US failure}
Pieces from the Afghan puzzle are still missing
Wednesday, 05 February 2014 | Ashok K Mehta |
One major problem is fitting Afghanistan into an effective regional framework. Neither the SAARC nor the SCO nor the Istanbul Process is willing to assume a leadership role
At last count, there were some 1,365 policy papers on Afghanistan produced worldwide by recognised think-tanks and NGOs in the past five years. Here is one more, but substantially different paper, called Envisioning Afghanistan post-2014: Joint Declaration on Regional Peace and Stability, produced by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Why is it different? It is truly regional, emanating from policy groups and 60 experts from the neighbourhood who reconcile their national interests, through compromise, in seeking consensus to arrive at a common minimum interest paper, scripted, owned and driven by the Afghans. It took 18 months to produce. It was launched in Kabul, Istanbul, Islamabad, Brussels, Berlin, New York and Washington, DC — and will be launched in Central Asia and New Delhi later this year.
The Regional Declaration seeks to make Afghanistan an asset for all, through actions at national, regional and international levels, encompassing the period of transition and transformation ending in 2025. The ultimate goal is to secure enduring neutrality for Afghanistan which it enjoyed for a 100 years, especially in the period between 1929 to 1978 which was the most prosperous. The paper on neutrality is a work-in-progress. If neutrality is accepted by the Pakistani Army, a grand bargain could follow. Pakistan agreeing to end its support for the Afghan Taliban in return for Afghanistan accepting the Durand Line as its international border. For Pakistan and the region there are a number of other benefits including reducing security concerns from two hostile fronts to one. The Regional Declaration recognises a serious trust deficit between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and therefore, anoints Pakistan as the pivotal player — both as a spoiler and an enabler.
The recommendations call for inclusive, transparent and democratic presidential and parliamentary polls, which are the conditions set by the international community for keeping their financial commitments. A National Transition Strategy coupled with a National Development Strategy constitute Afghanistan’s national agenda. This agenda also includes capacity-building of Afghan National Security Forces to prevent civil war, the return of Al Qaeda and effectively combat the Afghan Taliban and other armed opposition.
To put it mildly, the Declaration encourages all entities in Pakistan to genuinely cooperate in fighting cross-border threats and pursue its legitimate interests through peaceful means. It calls for the establishing of an Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Experts’ Working Group to overcome historic bottlenecks and improve bilateral relations. Pakistan’s help is also sought for reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban in a dialogue with the High Peace Council. What emerges are two reconciliation processes: One with Pakistan, and the other with Afghan Taliban entities in Pakistan.
{IOW its a grand appeasement of Paakistan in the Munich tradition that lead to WWII.}
The importance of Pakistan implementing the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement is emphasised, as also its extension to India. Recognising that India and Pakistan seem to be working at cross-purposes in Afghanistan, the Declaration encourages the two to end differences and tensions, and commence dialogue on Afghanistan. It also advocates a trilateral dialogue between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
{The West is withdrawing due to lack of money. So where is the funding going to come from? Us is abandoning its heavy equipment and giving it to TSP for free. So what responsibility!}
A key pillar of the Declaration is a non-interference mechanism which includes codification of ‘interference’ — what neighbours should and should not do. This has been pledged by regional players at Bonn I and II, the Istanbul Process and Geneva but never been implemented in letter and spirit. The UN Special Envoy, with endorsement of P5 countries, is recommended to observe, monitor and investigate any breach of the Code of Conduct (most recently the UN brokered a similar ‘Good Neighbourliness’ code for neighbours of the Democratic Republic of Congo). However, non-interference is not about intent, but conduct.
{A toothless tiger like UNIMOGIP which was setup to moniter the peace between India and Pakistan and all they did was observe Pakistan breaching the peace time and again. Which type of morons come up with these ideas?}
The Regional Declaration is thin on the vital aspect of transferring responsibility from international powers to a regional compact for the purpose of preserving the gains in Afghanistan. One of the key problems is fitting Afghanistan to an effective regional organisation. Between the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Istanbul Process (which is not an organisation), none is willing or able to take charge since there is no one to assume leadership. Neither China, nor Russia, nor even India is willing to bell the cat. Instead, the region has sought collective leadership based on the Istanbul Process which has Track I institutions. At the very least, Afghanistan requires an active regional coordinator to channelise the regional compact.
With the US and West fast losing interest in Afghanistan, and India and Afghanistan both being in election mode, Pakistan appears to have assumed the role of a regional coordinator, at least to monitor in-flow of funds and financial commitments made at Chicago, Tokyo, Brussels and by other international monetary institutions. The World Bank office in Islamabad is setting up a team, mainly of economists, to study the fallout of a shortfall in funds and drawdown of the economy in Afghanistan. Frequently, Afghans remind you of the fate suffered by President Mohammad Najibullah, after the Soviet Union switched off the money tap.
Pakistan has rightly prioritised Afghanistan as its most important foreign policy issue, and also identified ‘a peaceful neighbourhood for revival of its economic agenda’. The big concern is the likely increase in the burden of refugees (already three million) inside Pakistan, in the event of anarchy and civil war. In the last six months, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif have held three meetings. President Karzai has had meetings with former Pakistani Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and his Director-General at the ISI on bringing the Afghan Taliban for talks to the table. Pakistan is seen as the most decisive player in the Afghan imbroglio. How is it that 30 million Afghans with the help of 2,00,000 US and ISAF troops, 3,50,000 ANSF personnel, supported by US air and drone power as well as Indian assistance, have not been able to disarm 20,000 Afghan Taliban? The reason is that instead of Pakistan acquiring strategic depth in Afghanistan, the Taliban have secured it inside Pakistan. Only Pakistan can rein in the Afghan Taliban but it says this is beyond its means. Pakistan has to make the right choice.
Returning to the Regional Declaration, prospects of regionalisation do not appear bright. Finding a regional political mechanism to address reconciliation among stakeholders in Afghanistan is also not bright, in the absence of any regional leadership. The Declaration has offered some ideas like neutrality and non-interference which are do-able. But let the Afghans decide.
svenkat wrote:The biggest elephent in the room is POTUS and SD not putting pressure on Pakistan to hand over Mullah Omar to Kabul and shut down the continuing terrorist sanctuaries.The reason is obvious.
Anglo-Americans want to somehow perpetuate the Strategic Depth of pakistan without which NWFP will be run over by pashtuns.The US will sacrifice even its soldiers for the objective of containing India.
The US intelligence chief said on Tuesday he does not expect Afghan President Hamid Karzai to sign a security agreement with the United States that would allow American troops to stay after 2014.
Washington has repeatedly appealed to Karzai to sign the bilateral security agreement (BSA) negotiated last year but James Clapper, director of national intelligence, said he had given up hope that the Afghan president would endorse the deal.
"Well, obviously, it takes two to sign this," Clapper told the Senate Armed Services Committee.
"And it's my own view, not necessarily company policy, ...I don't believe President Karzai is going to sign it," he said.
His comments were the most explicit yet by a senior US official acknowledging the bleak prospects of Karzai backing the agreement.
Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the committee, asked Clapper if it would be better for the US government to wait for the next Afghan president to sign the deal after the country's April elections.
Clapper said that would be a policy decision and not up to him but he said such a move could "have a salutary effect."
The United States favors leaving about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan after this year to help train Afghan forces and counter al-Qaida militants and its allies.
The delay in signing the security agreement, which would set up a legal framework for foreign troops to stay post-2014, has created uncertainty and undermined confidence among Afghans, Clapper said.
"The effect already of the delay has been negative in terms of the impact on the economy, not to mention I think the psychological impact," he said.
Worries about whether NATO-led forces will remain in the country have triggered negative trends in the economy, including a decline in foreign investment, he said.
Asked about the state of Afghan forces as NATO troops draw down, Clapper said the country's army has improved but suffers from "extensive desertion problems."
About 30,000 Afghans deserted last year out of an army of 185,000, the intelligence chief said.
On the battlefield, Afghan forces often score tactical victories against Taliban insurgents but have difficulties holding cleared territory, particularly when police units are involved, he said.
The head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, told the same hearing that Afghan troops have made "modest progress" but still need international assistance with logistics, air transport and intelligence.
Last year, whilst delivering a lecture at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Dr. Sanaa Alimia, a teaching fellow at the School of Advanced and Oriental Studies (SOAS), summed-up the Pakistani perception of Afghan refugees the best when she described the Afghan refugee image transforming over the decades from one of ‘victims of conflict’ to that of ‘liabilities’. Acknowledging Pakistan’s tremendous support for the Afghans and the hospitality extended to them, Dr. Sanaa Alimia went onto explain that ‘the lack of economic opportunities and education has meant that many Afghan refugees have been forced to become a part of the informal sector, thus resulting in further regional instability’. Interestingly, many Afghans are also uncomfortable with the return of Nawaz Sharif as Pakistan’s premier. One of Nawaz Sharif’s 1993 election campaign slogans (targeting the Pakistan People’s Party at the time) was ‘you gave up Dhaka, we took Kabul’. Till today, these words are recalled with equal dismay and aghast by Afghans. Today, the verdict from Afghanistan is loud and clear - the Afghans want to be left alone. They do not want international and regional powers to once again turn their country into a battle ground for their short-lived tactical gains. Their steaming anger, the highest it has ever been, should caution Pakistan as the scenario today is starkly different to what it was in the 90s.
Similarly, the Pakistani public seems to have run out of the love and sympathy it once espoused for Afghan refugees. From their perspective, the Afghan fall-out has been detrimental to Pakistan’s socio-cultural and political landscape – with drugs, weaponry and terrorism as its nagging legacy. Pakistanis feel that the undue criticism hurled at it from across the Durand line reeks of ungratefulness and only further maligns them at the global stage.
When this odious mantra is spewed by the usual suspects — rightwing leaders, assorted clerics and media anchors that grew up on a steady diet of Pakistan Studies and Islamiat during General Ziaul Haq’s martial law — one might understand. However, when the voices that have served as Pakistan’s conscience join the chorus, one’s heart really sinks. One felt dejected reading one of Pakistan’s foremost progressives, the writers’ writer and a mentor to my mentors, the venerable Mr I A Rehman this past week. Rehman sahib wrote: “An issue on which complete clarity is required is the territorial limits of the bargain. The Taliban, if they can prove that they enjoy the trust of the population of FATA, may be free to discuss the system of administration appropriate for their special relationship with the state but they have no right to tell Islamabad how the rest of the country is to be governed...The creation of workable political, administrative and judicial institutions in FATA can be discussed but in that area too the government will have to take a stand that the basic rights of the vulnerable sections of society, especially women and minorities, cannot be compromised.” It felt like the distinguished human rights campaigner was not just considering ceding the Pashtun areas to the TTP hordes but was giving up on us as a people. I just hope that I misread the piece or read too much into it.
The narrative that the Pashtuns, especially the tribesmen, crave sharia has been mainstreamed in Pakistan to the extent that even the most knowledgeable and liberal are falling for it. Never mind that the venues of political and religious decision-making, the hujra and mosque, have traditionally been separate in Pashtun tribal society. The tribal jirga (court), which had lost its usual effectiveness a few decades ago, is being touted as the conflict resolution institution of choice in the second decade of the 21st century without realising that the Talibanisation imposed from above has decimated the societal structures that could support the jirga. More importantly, even at the turn of the 20th century, the jirga was not exactly the jury of peers it used to be in an egalitarian acephalous Pashtun tribal society that conceived it a millennium or so ago. The British, and then Pakistani governments had, as a policy, consistently tempered with the jirga system and handpicked Maliks who were awarded stipends and titles (maajab and lungi) to remain pliant.
Whether good or bad, those tribal elders were slaughtered wholesale by the Taliban. According to The New York Times reporters Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, 200 tribal elders were killed in the NWA in just 2005 to 2006. That violent spree has never ended. How could then one go about determining whether the TTP “enjoys the trust of the people of FATA” to grant them those hapless lands? Indeed, how could the tribal people let out even a whimper, let alone freely express their scorn for the TTP when the state, and sadly the intelligentsia, appear on the verge of abandoning them? The TTP’s relentless assault on the Awami National Party (ANP), killing its leaders and cadres, was a major factor in its electoral rout, as the state stood by idly. The ANP’s replacement by the pro-Taliban PTI has provided the TTP the same ideological, political and operational space as its antecedents enjoyed during the 2002-2007 rule of the religious conglomerate Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal. Mr Imran Khan continues to insist that the TTP respects the constitution despite the terrorist spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, consistently deriding it on the record.
The TTP remains an ideologically anchored outfit keen to spread its brand of sharia across not just provincial but state boundaries as well. The tactical restraint the TTP and its allies have shown in Punjab helps it bide time till things become clearer in Afghanistan, ward off a potential military action and perhaps bag sections of FATA in the interim. However, in this sordid saga, the grand prize remains the Pakistani state, which the TTP may never get but, in its mind, deems imperative for helping and waging the global jihad. The Punjab-based rulers can try to encapsulate the TTP within the Pashtun lands but they are sitting on the powder keg of jihadism with assorted ‘jaishes’ and ‘lashkars’ headquartered in their province. The reprieve bought at the expense of the Pashtuns will run out in years, not decades.
Karzai,the latest in a long line of yanqui "friends" about to be dumped.Dan Roberts in Washington
the guardian.com, Thursday 13 February 2014
Karzai with Abdullah Gul Afghan president Hamid Karzai, left, talks with his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul on Thursday. Photograph: Adem Altan/AFP/Getty Images
Relations between Washington and Kabul took another turn for the worse on Thursday as Afghan president Hamid Karzai criticised a lack of US respect for its sovereignty and White House officials appeared increasingly resigned to gambling on a better rapport with his successor.
The two governments have been at loggerheads for several months over Karzai’s refusal to sign an agreement governing a continued American security presence in the country after the bulk of Nato troops pull out later this year.
But growing irritation on both sides boiled over this week after US criticism of an Afghan decision to release 65 suspected Taliban prisoners, and officials in Washington have begun openly speculating on what would happen if Karzai never signs the agreement.
“The longer the BSA goes unsigned by Karzai, it increases likelihood that there will be no troops after 2014 in Afghanistan,” said State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf in a conference call with reporters.
The threat to pull out entirely has been made before by the US, but the White House has previously insisted that Karzai sign it within weeks.
Instead, both Harf and White House spokesman Jay Carney declined to put a timeframe on the process during the latest press briefings and national intelligence director James Clapper said on Tuesday his personal view was that it would not be completed before the election.
“It is the Afghan government that negotiated this agreement,” said Carney on Wednesday.
“There is the reality that this is – we’re now in February of 2014 and we’re having to look at, with our Nato allies, what the world looks like in terms of our troops beyond 2014. And that’s why it needs to be signed promptly if we’re going to be able to fulfil our preferred approach here, which is to have a limited troop presence in order to continue to conduct [counter-terrorism] operations and to train and support the Afghan security forces.”
But a shared interest in combating Taliban attacks is not enough to prevent a growing clash, particularly over prisoner releases.
“Afghanistan is a sovereign country,” said Karzai at a conference in Turkey on Thursday. “If the Afghan judicial authorities decide to release a prisoner it is of no concern to the US. I hope that the US will stop harassing Afghanistan’s procedures and judicial authority and I hope the US will now begin to respect Afghan sovereignty.”
Karzai also insisted he still supports the principle of a bilateral security agreement, which was supported last year by a loya jirga of tribal leaders, but US officials are increasingly pinning their hopes on pressuring his successor instead after Karzai steps down for elections in April.
Speaking before the Senate armed services committee on Tuesday, Clapper said a formal US decision to wait for Karzai’s successor to sign the agreement instead could “have a salutary” effect on Kabul.
Is this for real???The United States may consider flying drones out of India if it is forced to leave Afghanistan, says US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel.
Mr Hagel hinted at this possibility at a Pentagon news briefing when asked: “If you don't have an option of a drone base in Afghanistan, if you don't have troops allowed to stay, you don't have a bilateral security agreement, would you consider basing drones in India?”
“Well, we have to consider everything, as we are,” said the US defence chief. “You're constantly updating and changing and looking at possibilities (and) strategic interests.”
Delhi and Moscow are working to reach a deal under which Russia would supply some military hardware to Kabul for which the payment would be made by India.
Indo-Russian military cooperation in the Afghan direction is not going to be confined to military supplies alone. Both countries are reported to have already taken decision to renovate a Soviet military hardware maintenances facility in the suburbs of Kabul
Chuck Hagel was under no obligation to confirm or deny anything and he didn't. He was speaking to a Pakistani journalist. 'nuff said.sooraj wrote:US may fly drones out of India after leaving Afghanistan
http://www.dawn.com/news/1085820/us-may ... fghanistan
Is this for real???The United States may consider flying drones out of India if it is forced to leave Afghanistan, says US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel.
Mr Hagel hinted at this possibility at a Pentagon news briefing when asked: “If you don't have an option of a drone base in Afghanistan, if you don't have troops allowed to stay, you don't have a bilateral security agreement, would you consider basing drones in India?”
“Well, we have to consider everything, as we are,” said the US defence chief. “You're constantly updating and changing and looking at possibilities (and) strategic interests.”
Anujan wrote:http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg ... 0648.story
The Obama administration is making contingency plans to use air bases in Central Asia to conduct drone missile attacks in northwest Pakistan in case the White House is forced to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan at the end of this year, according to U.S. officials.
But even if alternative bases are secured, the officials said, the CIA's capability to gather sufficient intelligence to find Al Qaeda operatives and quickly launch drone missiles at specific targets in Pakistan's mountainous tribal region will be greatly diminished if the spy agency loses its drone bases in Afghanistan.
The CIA's targeted killing program thus may prove a casualty of the bitter standoff with Afghan President Hamid Karzai over whether any U.S. troops can remain in Afghanistan after 2014, as the White House has sought. Karzai has refused to sign a bilateral security agreement to permit a long-term American deployment, and some White House aides are arguing for a complete pullout.
Forget that India would not allow it, nor will America do it. Just thinkingsooraj wrote:US may fly drones out of India after leaving Afghanistan
http://www.dawn.com/news/1085820/us-may ... fghanistan
Is this for real???The United States may consider flying drones out of India if it is forced to leave Afghanistan, says US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel.
Mr Hagel hinted at this possibility at a Pentagon news briefing when asked: “If you don't have an option of a drone base in Afghanistan, if you don't have troops allowed to stay, you don't have a bilateral security agreement, would you consider basing drones in India?”
“Well, we have to consider everything, as we are,” said the US defence chief. “You're constantly updating and changing and looking at possibilities (and) strategic interests.”
Karim Khan is a lucky man. When you’re picked up by 20 armed thugs, some in police uniform – aka the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – you can be “disappeared” forever. A mass grave in Balochistan, in the south-west of the country, has just been found, filled with the “missing” from previous arrests. But eight days after he was lifted and – by his own testimony, that of his lawyer Shasad Akbar and the marks still visible on his body – tortured, Mr Khan is back at his Pakistani home. His crime: complaining about US drone attacks – American missiles fired by pilotless aircraft – on civilians inside Pakistan in President Obama’s Strangelove-style operation against al-Qa’ida.
There are, as the cops would say, several facts “pertaining” to Mr Khan’s kidnapping. Firstly, his son Hafiz Zaenullah, his brother Asif Iqbal and another man – a stonemason called Khaliq Dad – were killed by a drone attack on Mr Khan’s home in December 2009. Secondly, he had filed a legal case in Pakistan against the American drone strikes, arguing that they constituted murder under domestic law. And thirdly – perhaps Mr Khan’s most serious crime – he was about to leave for Brussels to address European Union parliamentarians on the dangers of American drone strikes in Pakistan.
In Madiha Tahir’s recent documentary film Wounds of Waziristan, Mr Khan had talked about his family loss. His son Hafiz was a security guard at a local girls’ school, and also studying for Grade 10. Asif, who had a Master’s in English, was a government employee. Karim Khan saw what was left of their bodies, “covered in wounds”. He found some of their fingers in the rubble of his home.
Thanks to constant reports of his kidnapping in the courageous Pakistani media and to the Rawalpindi bench of the Lahore High Court who ordered the Pakistani government to produce Karim Khan by next Thursday, the anti-drone campaigner is safe. For the moment.
But this is not going to set the world on fire. The “drone war”, as American journalists inevitably call it – after all, it’s not as if al-Qa’ida or the innocent victims are firing back with drones of their own – started under George W Bush, but most of the attacks, 384 of them since 2008, have been authorised by Mr Obama. The statistics of civilian deaths fluctuate wildly since most of the missiles are fired into the Pakistani frontier districts in which the government has little power. The minimum figure for civilian victims is almost 300 dead – some say almost 900 – out of a total of 2,500 killed. At least 50 people are believed to have been killed in follow-up strikes which slaughtered those going to the rescue of the wounded.
Of course, the drone syndrome has spread across the Middle East. The missiles rain down on al-Qa’ida and civilians alike in Yemen. The Israelis fired them into Lebanon in 2006; when a youth on a motorcycle fired at a night-time drone over Beirut, it fired back a missile that destroyed a downtown civilian apartment block. In Gaza, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights reported 825 deaths from Israeli drones during the 2008-09 war, a large percentage of them civilians.
Pakistani witnesses have told me that the missiles don’t just appear suddenly in the sky. The drones arrive in clusters – 10 or 12 at a time, circling villages for an hour or two – a looking for targets on behalf of their “pilots” in the United States. Until at least 2009, the Americans flew drones – the most impressive was called the Reaper – from air bases inside Pakistan. Hence the sensitivities of the boys from the ISI and their irritation with Karim Khan.
The ethical disgrace of the drone syndrome is not that Mr Obama – or some US officer near Las Vegas – decides on the basis of satellite pictures, mobile phone calls, numbers dialled and the speed of vehicles, who should live or die. The really shameful aspect is that the drone war has become normal. It has gone on so long – and been the subject of so much protest, so regularly – that it has become banal, boring, matter-of-fact.
It was just the same in the 1990s when the US and Brits went hunting for Iraqi targets over the so-called “no-fly zones” in Iraq. For years they bombed and missiled “military targets” that supposedly threatened them. In the eight months up to August 1999, US and British pilots had fired more than 1,100 missiles against 359 Iraqi targets, flying about two-thirds as many missions as Nato pilots conducted over Yugoslavia during the 78-day bombardment of the same year. As well as anti-aircraft batteries, oil pipelines were blown up, storage depots destroyed and dozens of civilians killed, including several in a Basra housing estate. But each air raid was merely “nibbed” in our newspapers – a nib is a single paragraph in an inside-page News in Brief column – so that an entire air campaign was effectively carried out behind the backs of the US and British public in the years before the 2003 invasion.
In southern Lebanon, the Israelis controlled for 28 years a torture prison at Khiam for insurgents and their families – women as well as men – and electricity was frequently used on inmates by Israel’s “South Lebanon Army” thugs. Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and the International Red Cross complained. But I will always remember the words of a Swiss Red Cross official when I asked him, within sight of Khiam, why the world did not condemn this dreadful place. “It has become normal,” he replied.
And that’s it. Kill or torture often enough, over a long enough time – not too many massacres, just a dribble of deaths over months and years – and you’ll get away with it. If you kill the bad guys, it’s OK. Pity about the rest. Just make sure that the war is sufficiently prosaic, and don’t listen to Karim Khan.
KANDAHAR - Monitoring Desk/Agencies - Amidst a standoff between Hamid Karzai the embattled President of Afghanistan and the US, India has announced that it saluted the brave and extraordinary leadership of Karzai in nurturing peace and democracy into the country torn by years of war, reported Indian media on Sunday.Salman Khurshid, the Minister of External Affairs, in a speech inaugurating Afghanistan’s first agricultural university, backed the Afghan president and lauded the leadership he has shown for the past 12 years.The minister, who arrived earlier Saturday on a visit of one day, said the Afghan upcoming elections were a testament to how democracy has established firm roots.Khurshid said the election showed that democracy was working and that thanks to Karzai’s extraordinary leadership there has been great nurturing done to help it along.Just as in India today, said Khurshid, no one can determine the outcome of the elections in Afghanistan.In remarks during his speech, he extended the support of India to the government efforts in Afghanistan to establish a genuine Afghan-led, owned and controlled reconciliation procedure.
President Hamid Karzai on Saturday allayed India’s concerns over the uncertainty in Afghanistan ahead of the international troop pullout saying he is not against a ‘limited’ presence of international forces in the country.Karzai also met Khurshid separately to discuss security related issues including his reluctance to sign with the US a bilateral security agreement which is important for ensuring a residual presence of US troops.“I’m not against a limited presence of of Nato troops but this presence must become a source of support for Afghanistan,” Karzai told TOI after the meeting. He added that for that to happen Afghanistan needed support of both US and Pakistan.
Khurshid later said that India wanted some international forces to stay back in Afghanistan but added that Karzai had made a “careful calculation” in not signing the agreement with the US at this stage. He also appreciated the role of Afghan security forces in ensuring peace in the country.
On recent reports that he had clandestinely opened his own channel of communication with Afghan Taliban, Karzai said it was important to find “all opportunities for engagement”.
“To offer a chance to members of armed opposition groups willing to give up terror and abide by the Afghan Constitution, the possibility of participating as equal citizens in Afghanistan’s national life,” he said.While Karzai has repeatedly demanded more military assistance, including lethal equipment, from India without much success, he expressed satisfaction over help received from India. “We are very satisfied because India, despite traditionally not being a donor country, has gone beyond its means to help Afghanistan,” he said. While India is yet to make up its mind to what extent it can go to provide military assistance to Kabul, Khurshid reiterated India’s commitment to provide 3 military transport choppers to Afghanistan.
Khurshid called upon international community to fulfil its pledges to rebuild the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. He said the main threat to Afghanistan’s security and its internal stability is terrorism and extremism that continues to target the people of Afghanistan. “We too have been facing this threat for many years, and understand the importance in times like these of friends and strategic partners forging the closest of cooperation to defeat this evil scourge,” he said.Karzai expressed hope that Pakistan will provide access for a key transit route for trade between his land-locked country and India, underlining that commerce between the three nations is an essential element for their progress and stability.“The trade has to happen if they want to establish the region with prosperity and free of conflict. I hope Pakistan will soon give transit route to India,” he said.
“Trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Pakistan and India, and trade between the three countries is an essential element for the progress and stability of the countries,” Karzai said.
Commenting on the issue of a transit route with Afghanistan, Salman Khurshid said, “Pakistan has to open for the sake of Afghanistan. By this Afghanistan gets direct access to India via Pakistan. It will be of enormous help to Afghanistan.“It is important that Afghanistan success would be guaranteed, if it has connectivity from all sides of border. We would want to see all countries step in including Pakistan,” he added.Khurshid said India will continue to push for Chabahar Port in Iran as an alternative route to mineral-rich Afghanistan.Khurshid also said that India has to resolve issues with Pakistan like granting of the Most Favoured Nation (MNF) status.
“They have promised MFN status to India, which has not been given to us yet,” he said.Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has said that India will be providing helicopters to the Afghanistan army.“We are giving them helicopters, and we will be supplying them very soon,” Khurshid said in New Delhi upon his return from Kandahar.“We have also been giving them some logistical support and we hopefully will be able to upgrade and refurbish their transport aircraft,” he added.Khurshid also stressed that it is important to maintain stability in Afghanistan. “I think Afghan army has done a great job. We have contributed to their capacity building and their professional training. They are visible and are taking responsibility. They are responding well to the threats,” he said.Khurshid also asserted that India is not reluctant in assisting the Afghanistan and stated that India has a clear policy world over which aims at building capacity. “We are not in the game of giving people large scale equipment which is lethal and so on,” he added. He also described Afghanistan as ‘very special’ and said India is providing them whatever they felt up to now.
Conclusion
While the outlook for Afghanistan is currently bleak, there are still signs for cautious optimism. The possibility of a complete US withdrawal has India, Russia, and China all discussing what kind of aid they would be willing to provide to Afghanistan. While putting troops on the ground seems very unlikely (and, in the case of Indian troops, needlessly provocative), these countries are in a position to provide funding, arms, and parts which could improve the strategic standing of the Afghan security forces.
The other major factor determining Afghanistan’s future will be the country’s upcoming presidential election. This will be the first election where Hamid Karzai is ineligible to run, and while he will no doubt remain an influential figure behind the scenes, the uncertainty as to who will succeed him and their approach to Afghanistan’s many problems will have a major impact on the course of the country in the crucial months to come.
Hundreds of heavily armed Taliban insurgents attacked army checkpoints in eastern Afghanistan on Sunday, officials said, killing 21 soldiers in the deadliest single incident for the Afghan army in at least a year.
In response to the assault, which also left several Afghan soldiers missing, President Hamid Karzai postponed a planned trip to Sri Lanka.
General Mohammad Zahir Azimi, who is spokesman for the Defense Ministry, said "hundreds" of foreign and Afghan insurgents crossed the border to mount the attack, which took place in the remote and mountainous Ghazi Abad district of Kunar Province in the early morning hours.
Azimi did not specify which border, but Kunar lies next to Pakistan. It's a militant stronghold, and many Arab and other foreign insurgents are believed to operate there alongside the Afghan Taliban.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for Sunday's attack in an emailed statement, saying that one of their insurgents was killed and two were wounded.
The group has escalated attacks in recent months as it tries to take advantage of the withdrawal of foreign troops at the end of 2014.
Casualties among Afghan troops have been rising significantly since they took the lead in the war against the Taliban. Since the beginning of 2014, 84 Afghan army soldiers have been killed.
General Abdul Habib Sayedkhaili, chief of police for Kunar Province, said that there were around 30 Afghan soldiers manning the outpost when insurgents attacked from three sides with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and light weapons.
WASHINGTON: President Barack Obama told his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai on Tuesday he is now planning a full US troop withdrawal, but did not rule out agreeing a post-2014 mission with the next Kabul government.
The US threat was the latest twist in a long political tug-of-war with Karzai, who has infuriated Washington with his refusal to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) governing a post-2014 mission in the dying months of his mandate.“President Obama told President Karzai that because he has demonstrated that it is unlikely that he will sign the BSA, the United States is moving forward with additional contingency planning,” the statement said.“Specifically, President Obama has asked the Pentagon to ensure that it has adequate plans in place to accomplish an orderly withdrawal by the end of the year should the United States not keep any troops in Afghanistan after 2014.”
The White House has previously warned that Karzai’s intransigence on a deal painstakingly negotiated last year meant it had no choice but to consider a full withdrawal.It refuses to leave troops behind in Afghanistan after America’s longest war without the legal protections granted by the BSA.Though Karzai has refused to sign the pact, which defines a post-2014 NATO training and anti-terror mission, some of the candidates in April’s Afghan elections have indicated they would sign it. The deal has also been endorsed by a council of tribal elders.The statement said that Obama was reserving the “possibility of concluding a BSA with Afghanistan later this year,” should he find a willing partner in the government.It was the most concrete sign yet that Washington may be willing to wait out the Afghan electoral process before making a final decision on a future role in Afghanistan.However, the statement warned “the longer we go without a BSA, the more challenging it will be to plan and execute any US mission.”“Furthermore, the longer we go without a BSA, the more likely it will be that any post-2014 US mission will be smaller in scale and ambition.”The statement clearly implied that Karzai’s behavior would harm his nation’s security long into the future.Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel backed Obama’s move, and confirmed for the first time the Pentagon was actively planning a full troop withdrawal.
Hagel said that top Pentagon brass would simultaneously plan options for a full withdrawal and a prolonged mission in Afghanistan, which would likely to include at least several thousand US troops.The row over the BSA is the latest twist in the long and deteriorating relationship between Washington and the mercurial Karzai, who was once seen as a savior after the toppling of the Taliban but is now viewed in political and security circles here as unreliable and unpredictable.Obama has not yet made a decision on how many troops would be left behind to train and equip Afghan forces after the withdrawal of US combat teams by the end of this year, should he decide on a follow up mission.Obama’s political opponents have warned that leaving Afghanistan without Western troops would severely strain the fledgling national forces stood up by NATO and could lead to a return by the Taliban.Some have compared such a scenario to Washington’s loss of focus after helping rebels oust Soviet occupiers in the 1980s, leaving a power vacuum exploited by the Taliban, which eventually offered haven to al Qaeda as it planned the September 11 attacks in 2001.The White House said Obama used Tuesday’s call with Karzai, who is not standing in the election, to welcome the start of campaign season and to push for free, fair and credible polls.“The President reiterated that the United States would not support any candidate in the elections — the choice of who leads Afghanistan is for Afghans to make,” the statement said.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/01 ... wards-nonePerhaps then we can address the myth of ‘historic’ Afghan sovereignty and any territorial claims that might ensue from it. This notion is erroneous on two counts: first, Afghanistan was not a country, as we know it, before the 18th century when it was briefly brought under singular rule by Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1747. Before that, it was a lawless region inhabited by perpetually warring tribes ruled in fits and starts by neighbouring Persian, Indian and Turkish empires. Secondly, Afghan inhabited regions invariably had to be secured by regional empires as they sat astride two major trade and invasion routes into and out of the Indian subcontinent and flanked the Silk Route passing north of Oxus.
If 18th century was the cut-off point for defining the notions of a country, then what about Pakistan ?Paul wrote:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/01 ... wards-none. . . first, Afghanistan was not a country, as we know it, before the 18th century
The enigmatic Pakhtun
NADEEM F. PARACHA
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Updated
2014-03-02 11:02:35
Recently a Pakhtun friend of mine who is doing his doctorate in Anthropology from a European university emailed me the following: “Nothing has damaged us Pakhtuns more than certain myths about our character that were not constructed by us”.
We were exchanging views on how some self-proclaimed experts on Pakhtun history and character in Pakistan were actually using the stereotypical aspects of this character to deter the Pakistani state from undertaking an all-out military operation against religious extremists in the Pakhtun-dominated tribal areas of the country.
My friend (who originally hails from the Upper Dir District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) also made another interesting observation: “You know, these myths have been engrained so deep into the psyche of today’s Pakhtuns that if one starts to deconstruct them, he or she would first and foremost be admonished by today’s young Pakhtuns. They want to believe in these myths not knowing that, more often than not, these myths have reduced them to being conceived as some kind of brainless sub-humans who pick up a gun at the drop of a hat to defend things like honour, faith, tradition, etc.”
But in his emails he was particularly angry at certain leading non-Pakhtun political leaders, clerics and even a few intellectuals who he thought were whipping up stereotypical perceptions and myths about the Pakhtuns to rationalise the violence of extremist outfits like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that has a large Pakhtun membership.
He added that in the West as well, many of his European and American contemporaries in the academic world uncritically lap-up these perceptions and myths. He wrote: “They are surprised when they meet Pakhtun students here (in Europe), who are intelligent, rational, and humane and absolutely nothing like Genghis Khan”!
There have been a number of research papers and books written on the subject that convincingly debunk the myths attached to the social and cultural character of the Pakhtuns.
Almost all of them point an accusing finger at British Colonialists for being the pioneers of stereotyping the Pakhtuns.
Adil Khan in Pakhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separation to Integration writes that in 1849 when the British captured the southern part of Afghanistan, they faced stiff resistance from the Pakhtun tribes there. The British saw the tribes as the anti-thesis of what the British represented: civilisation and progress.
This is when the British started to explain the Pakhtuns as ‘noble savages’ — even though in the next few decades (especially during and after the 1857 Mutiny), the colonialists would face even more determined resistance from various non-Pakhtun Muslims and non-Muslims of the region.
From then onwards, British writers began to spin yarns of a romanticised and revivalist image of the Pakhtuns that also became popular among various South Asian historians.
Adil Khan complains that such an attempt to pigeonhole the Pakhtuns has obscured the economic and geographical conditions that have shaped the Pakhtun psyche. What’s more, the image of the unbeatable noble savage has been propagated in such a manner that many Pakhtuns now find it obligatory to live up and exhibit this image.
The myths associated with the Pakhtuns’ character have most recently been used to inform the narratives weaved by those who see religious militancy emerging from the Pakhtun-dominated areas in the north-west of Pakistan as a consequence of the state’s careless handling of the traditions of the ‘proud Pakhtun tribes’ (which may have triggered the ‘historical’ penchant of these tribes to inflict acts of revenge). Interestingly, the same myths were once also used by secular Pakhtun nationalists.
One of the most popular architects of Pakhtun nationalism, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, banked on the myth of Pakhtuns being unbeatable warriors to construct the anti-colonial aspect of his Pakhtun nationalist organisation, the Khudai Khidmatgar.
Earnest Gellner in Myths of Nation & Class in Mapping the Nation is of the view that though the Pakhtuns are an independent-minded people and take pride in many of their centuries-old traditions, they are largely an opportunistic and pragmatic people.
When Pakistan became an active participant in the United States’ proxy war against the Soviet forces that had entered Afghanistan, the Ziaul Haq dictatorship — to whip up support for the Afghan mujahideen — used state media and anti-Soviet intelligentsia to proliferate the idea that historically the Pakhtuns were an unbeatable race that had defeated all forces that had attempted to conquer them.
One still hears this, especially from those opposing the Pakistan state’s military action in the country’s tribal areas. But is there any historical accuracy in this proud proclamation?
Not quite. The truth is that the Pakhtuns have been beaten on a number of occasions. Alexander, Timur, Nadir Shah, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and the British, were all able to defeat the Pakhtuns.
In the 2008 paper, Losing the Psy-war in Afghanistan, the author writes: ‘True, the British suffered the occasional setback but they eventually managed to subdue the Pakhtun tribes. Had the British wanted they would have also continued to rule Afghanistan, only they didn’t find it worth their while and preferred to let it remain a buffer between India and Russia. The Russians (in the 1980s) too would never have been defeated had the Soviet economy not collapsed — and it didn’t collapse because of the war in Afghanistan — and had the Americans not pumped in weapons and money to back the so-called Mujahideen.’
The paper adds: ‘… while Pakhtuns are terrific warriors for whom warfare is a way of life, they have always succumbed to superior force and superior tactics. The Pakhtuns have never been known to stand against a well-disciplined, well-equipped, motivated, and equally ruthless force.’
When Taliban fighting forced Mohammed Ibrahim and his family to flee their village in Grashak, Helmand, they thought it would be months before they could return. That was five years ago. Now the place that Ibrahim calls home is a flimsy tarpaulin to keep the snow out, strung between three mud walls on the eastern outskirts of Kabul.
Ibrahim, 52, is one of more than 600,000 people scattered from their homes by fighting and insecurity. With a presidential election three weeks away and Nato troops starting to wind down their presence ahead of complete withdrawal at the end of the year, violence in Afghanistan is increasing fast.
Ibrahim is the leader of a camp of 300 families living in Karte Naw, Kabul. He is desperate to return to Helmand but every time he thinks of going back he hears bad news. "Recently we received a report that lots of our relatives have died," he said. "So how can we go back? Two months ago the Taliban came at midnight and killed them using knives. They cut every part of their body. They killed 20 people including three of my extended family.
"Inshallah [God willing] we'd love to go back to our own province. But only if there's security and an opportunity to work." More than 20,000 security incidents were registered by the United Nations last year, making it second only to 2011 in terms of the level of violence seen since the fall of the Taliban. The number of suicide bombings in particular has increased. In the three months to February, there were 35 suicide attacks across the country – more than double the previous year.
At the end of June last year there were an estimated 574,327 Afghanis internally displaced by war, according to the UN. By last month, this had risen to around 630,000. Almost 3,000 civilians were killed in fighting last year, a 14 per cent increase on 2012. The number of these deaths caused by pro-government forces increased by 59 per cent, to 341.
On Monday, the Taliban pledged that they would do all they could to derail the first round of presidential voting on 5 April, warning Afghanis not to take part. "We have given orders to our Mujahideen to use all force at their disposal to disrupt the upcoming sham elections and to target all workers, activists, callers, security apparatus and offices," a spokesman warned.
True to their word, militants kidnapped four election workers in eastern Nangarhar province on Wednesday. On the same day, in northern Faryab province, three elders were shot dead by militants as they left a public ceremony. Then, Taliban fighters armed with hand grenades attacked three campaign offices in Laghman province on Friday. "They killed them to threaten the rest," Mujib Rahman Rahimi, spokesman for the leading presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, told Afghanistan's Tolo News. "They said they would cut off their hands if they voted."
The pattern of election-related intimidation has been going on for months. Vice-presidential candidate and warlord, Ismail Khan was the victim of a failed assassination attempt on 24 January. This was followed by the fatal shooting of two members of Dr Abdullah's campaign team in the western city of Herat on 1 February – and a third in Sari Pul a week later. Dr Abdullah's convoy also came under gunfire when he was returning to Kabul from Nangarhar on 19 February, though he was unhurt.
President Hamid Karzai's refusal to sign a bilateral security agreement for a continued American military presence after 2014 has made the international community – and many Afghans – anxious about the future. All three leading candidates have indicated privately that they would be willing to sign it, but only Dr Abdullah has announced his backing for it in public.
Mahmood Gailani, a former MP and head of Dr Abdullah's election campaign, said that the loss of vice-president Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who died last weekend from a long-running heart problem, could lead to more post-election instability if the ballot is not seen to be fair. Like Dr Abdullah, Marshal Fahim was from the Tajik ethnic group, unlike the majority of senior politicians who are Pashtun. Mr Gailani said the vice-president was a pacifying influence. "He was a bridge between the opposition and the president, he was always calming down both sides.Over the last five years as a vice-president there were many times that issues were solved by him. Whatever the situation, he will be missed. One thing is clear – that in a bad situation he will be missed more."
Speaking about what would happen if the election result was not seen to be fair this time, Mr Gailani said: "You may have a coup …. Circumstances may turn ugly. It won't remain the same. It may go in armed clashes because one side will feel the other has been helped."
Dr Abdullah is understood to already be angry at President Karzai's interference in his brother Qayum Karzai's campaign – after the president encouraged his older brother to stand down and back another candidate, Zalmai Rassoul. The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan has reported 26 cases of violation of electoral law during the first month of campaigning, including threats, abuse of public resources and negative campaigning.
Analysts worry that without some foreign military presence, the country will once again become home to in-fighting among the Mujahideen, tribal militias that fought the Soviets and the Taliban but who also fought each other in a vicious civil war in the intervening years. Six of the 11 presidential candidacies have Mujahideen fighters on the ticket.
Michael Keating, Senior Consulting Fellow at Chatham House, and former UN Deputy Envoy to Afghanistan, believes continued investment in the country's troops will be necessary to prevent civil war. "If foreign financial support to the Afghan National Security Forces continues to flow, then they will remain functional," he said. "[But] there are parallels with the situation 25 years ago. Najibullah's army and government collapsed and the Mujahideen took over when Russian subsidies stopped in 1992, not when the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan three years earlier. Reconciliation efforts need to be stepped up once a new president is in place. Without a political settlement, the already massive human and economic cost of this conflict will increase."
Zahra Atayee, 25, lives in Bamyan, a peaceful mountainous province in the centre of the country, with her husband Mokhtar and their three children, Freba, five, Somaya, three and Najma, seven months. Like the majority in the province, she comes from the ethnic Hazara group, who still feel under-represented in government and were persecuted by the predominantly Pashtun Taliban.
During Taliban rule, her grandfather and uncle were murdered and she fled to Iran. For the last 10 years she has been back in Bamyan town. "I'm very concerned about the Nato troops leaving, especially for the Hazara people because they are weak and they will not be able to fight," she said.
Ms Atayee cannot read or write and believes peace is essential to the better future she wants for her children: "I hope my daughters will be educated and have more freedom. I hope they are not prevented from advancing by war."
Even comedy shows on US TV like Bill Maher Show on HBO, had some US experts wisely saying Taliban will take the Southern Pashtun region and the Northern Areas will be in opposition like it was before US intervention after 9/11. So in effect US intervwention was a failure in the end.With less than a fortnight to go for the all important Presidential Elections scheduled to be held on April 5, 2014, a wave of terror strikes has enveloped the length and breadth of Afghanistan. In the most recent of major incidents (each resulting in three or more fatalities) at least nine persons, including four foreigners and five Afghans (including two children and two women), were shot dead by Taliban terrorists inside the luxurious Serena Hotel complex in national capital Kabul, in the night of March 20, 2014. The attackers managed to smuggle pistols past security checkpoints and then hid in a bathroom, eventually springing out and opening fire on guests and hotel guards. All the four terrorists were killed in the subsequent operation by the Security Forces (SFs). The attack took place despite recent security reports rating Serena Hotel, guarded round the clock by dozens of security guards armed with assault weapons, among the highest-risk locales in the city. The hotel is frequented by foreign officials and the Afghan elite.
In another incident earlier in the day, Taliban terrorists killed at least 11 people, including the Police Chief of Jalalabad District, and wounded another 22, in a suicide bomb attack and gun battle at a Police Station in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar Province. The assault began with two explosions just before dawn targeting the Police Station and a nearby square, close to compounds used by international organizations, including the United Nations. The initial attack was carried out by two suicide bombers, one of them driving a three-wheeler vehicle. Afghan SF personnel, with the help of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helicopter gunships, launched retaliatory fire. The ensuing gun battle lasted for over three hours, at the end of which six Taliban terrorists, all of them wearing suicide vests, were killed.
On March 18, 2014, a suicide bomber riding a rickshaw blew himself up outside a checkpoint near a market in Maymana, the capital of Faryab Province, killing at least 15 civilians and injuring another 46. The explosion took place some 200 metres away from the Provincial Governor’s residential compound.
On January 17, 2014, at least 21 persons, including 13 foreigners and eight Afghans, were killed in a suicide bombing by the Taliban, at a Lebanese restaurant, Taverna Du Liban, in Kabul. Wabel Abdallah, the International Monetary Fund’s Resident Representative in Afghanistan, was among the dead. Three attackers were also killed. The restaurant, popular among foreigners and wealthy locals, is located in an area that houses several diplomatic missions.
According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management’s (ICM's) South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since the beginning of 2014, a total of 682 persons, including 141 civilians, 101 SF personnel and 440 terrorists, have been killed in terrorism-related incidents across Afghanistan (data till March 23, 2014). The country has recorded at least 45 major incidents in 321 deaths during this period. More worryingly, 21 out of these 45 incidents were suicide attacks, accounting for 132 killings.
Violence recorded a significant escalation through 2013. SATP data indicates that at least 6,363 fatalities were recorded through 2012, including of 2,754 civilians, 893 SF personnel and 2,716 terrorists, rising to 7,074 fatalities in 2013, including 2,959 civilians, 1,413 SF personnel and 2,702 terrorists - an increase of 11.17 percent in overall fatalities.
More worryingly, civilians continued to face the brunt, with civilian fatalities increasing by 7.44 percent in 2013. According to United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the number of civilians killed through 2013 surpassed civilian fatalities in all the previous years since the beginning of war in 2001, barring 2011, when the civilian fatalities stood at 3,021. UNAMA, however, started compiling data only from 2007, in which year 1,523 civilian deaths were documented across Afghanistan.
Other parameters of violence, includng suicide attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks also witnessed an increase in 2013, as compared to the previous year. As against 101 suicide attacks in 2012, year 2013 recorded 107 such attacks, according to UNAMA. 73 of 107 suicide attacks in 2013 targeted civilians, killing 255. Throughout 2013, the use of IEDs remained the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. 962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injuries occurred in 2013 due to IED explosions, as compared to 868 civilian deaths and 1,663 injuries in 2012.
Indeed, varying media sources estimate that the Taliban, which lost power in 2001 as the US and its allies launched Operation Enduring Freedom in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, has regrouped and now dominates an estimated 40 to 60 per cent of Afghanistan.
More than 50,000 ISAF combat troops who are still in Afghanistan are due to leave by the end of the year. Afghan Forces now control almost 93 per cent of their territory and lead 97 per cent of all security operations across the country. They are also responsible for over 90 per cent of their own training activities. Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) troops have demonstrated their capabilities in a number of successful operations, but difficulties persist, as is evident in the failure to stall the rise in violence. US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, thus told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 11, 2014, that, on the battlefield, Afghan Forces often score tactical victories against Taliban insurgents, but had difficulties holding cleared territory, particularly when Police units were involved. Clapper also observed that the Afghan National Army (ANA) had, improved but still suffered from “extensive desertion problems”. About 30,000 Afghans deserted from the ANA in 2013, out of a total strength of 185,000, Clapper disclosed. The head of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, added, at the same forum, that Afghan troops had made “modest progress”, but still needed international assistance with logistics, air transport and intelligence.
Clearly, the current situation demonstrates tremendous vulnerabilities in the ANSF, and the need for a continued and significant presence of ISAF troops, if the state is to retain its structure and dominance in future engagements. Nevertheless, the process of the premature drawdown of ISAF Forces continues to accelerate. On March 16, 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) handed over another two bases to Afghan Forces. From 137 UK bases in the country, there now remain just two bases - Camp Bastion, which is the main base for UK personnel, and observation post Sterga 2, both of which are in Helmand Province.
On February 25, 2014, the White House announced that US President Barack Obama had ordered the Pentagon to prepare for a possible complete withdrawal of troops, following Afghan President Hamid Karzai's refusal to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, despite the US and Afghanistan agreeing to details of the BSA and the agreement being endorsed by a council of 3,000 Afghan tribal elders, the Loya Jirga. Karzai has stated that he will only sign the BSA if the US publicly starts a peace process with the Taliban and ensures transparent elections this year. Indeed, according to a February 3, 2014, media report, President Karzai has been engaged in secret contacts with the Taliban. Aimal Faizi, Karzai's spokesman, characterized the contacts as among the 'most serious' the presidential palace had with the Taliban since the war, adding, “The last two months have been very positive. These parties were encouraged by the President’s stance on the bilateral security agreement and his speeches afterwards.” Despite coalition reservations, the Karzai Government has also gone ahead with its decision to release detainees at Bagram Prison in Bagram District, Parwan Province. It has so far released 120 detainees – 55 on March 20, 2014, and 65 on February 13, 2014. The US Forces had handed over the prison at Bagram Air Base to full Afghan control on March 25, 2013.
The final word on the BSA, however, will only be heard after the Presidential Elections of April 2014. Indeed, soon after Obama’s telephonic conversation with Hamid Karzai on February 25, 2014, the White House issued a statement noting, “We will leave open the possibility of concluding a (security agreement) with Afghanistan later this year. However, the longer we go without a (deal), the more challenging it will be to plan and execute any U.S. mission.” Crucially, all the nine candidates who are in fray for the President's post have supported the signing of the BSA, though none of them have stated this openly, with the exception of Abdullah Abdullah, who was the runner up to Karzai in the disputed 2009 elections. Abudllah observed, “It is in the interest of Afghanistan to sign the BSA.” The pact would allow the US to keep as many as 10,000 troops in the country to focus on counterterrorism and the training of Afghan security forces.
The BSA alone, however, cannot ensure peace in Afghanistan. Unless the Taliban's safe sanctuaries and infrastructure of support in Pakistan are dismantled, Pakistan-backed Islamist extremists will continue to wreak havoc in Afghanistan. In his final address to Afghanistan’s Parliament on March 15, 2014, Karzai declared, in an obvious reference to Pakistan, that the US could bring peace to Afghanistan if it went after terrorist sanctuaries and countries that supported terrorism. Similarly, Major General Stephen Townsend, who commands US and NATO Forces in eastern Afghanistan, noted, "Until the Pakistanis do something about the safe havens, that's going to be a problem. (Terrorists) can recruit and train and equip and prepare to launch in Pakistan."
The most immediate concern is, of course, conducting a free and fair Presidential election. Indeed, in 2004, the fatalities during the campaign period (September 7 to October 7) stood at 196. The elections, which were conducted on October 9, 2004, were by and large fair. As a result, violence in the post-election period remained low. On the other hand, in 2009, a total of 1,173 persons were killed during the campaign period (June 16 to August 18), and the elections, which were held on August 20, 2009, were marred with controversy so much so that a runoff election was declared on November 7, 2009, which was finally called off on November 2, when second runner up Abdullah Abdullah decided, on November 1, not to contest, citing the “inappropriate actions of the Government and the election commission”. The violence and lack of transparency in the elections catalyzed the growth of the Taliban. Present developments indicate that this process might well be repeated in the present round of polls. Since the beginning of the campaign on February 2, 2014, 534 persons have already been killed in Afghanistan, till March 23. The campaign will last till April 2. Unless this rising violence is contained at the earliest and an environment where free and fair elections can be conducted can be established, the outcome could bode ill for the future of Afghanistan.
On the US plan to provide an India type nuclear deal to the US’s Major Non NATO Ally, the nuclear weapon technology proliferating Islamic Republic of Pakistan:The central problem confronting the United States in the region is no longer al Qaeda or the Taliban. It’s the Pakistan Army, which has always pursued its own objectives over those of the country it is meant to defend. The Army has a 40-year history of supporting terrorists against Afghanistan, India, and (more recently) Americans. Even in the absence of a smoking gun, there is little doubt that the Army and its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, sheltered Osama bin Laden and protected Taliban leader Mullah Omar. This policy of supporting terrorism has been driven by a warped ideology, political imperatives, and corporate interests. The Army has long used Islamism and imagined foreign threats to consolidate its political primacy and shore up its commercial interests, which range from cement to telecommunications.
From here:The proposed agreement to mainstream Pakistan’s nuclear program and the failure to address the Pakistan factor in Afghanistan are, in Trump’s parlance, just dumb, dumb, dumb. The White House seems completely removed from South Asia’s political and security realities. It’s quaint, almost funny, that U.S. officials and experts still worry about a “rogue commander” with “radical sympathies” seizing control of a Pakistani nuclear bomb. The Pakistan Army radicalized and went rogue many years ago.
