Ukranian pretender,Arsenic Tatsenyuck,is running to (rich) Uncle Sam for help in maintaining his shaky hold over the country.Having lost the Crimea to Russia and the eastern regions chafing at the bit,Arsenic is looking for a heavy for a dose of dollars to tide over his rapidly bankrupting nation.But he is secretly hoping for some display of American/Western military however slight as a symbolic of western support for his truncated nation.The sort of might that has just been kicked out of Afghanistan with its tail firmly tucked between its legs and who have in similar fashion "exited" Iraq! Sending in one bum-boat by the USN into the Blakc Sea does not instill a sense of security amongst the Kiev clique .They know just how close Kiev is to the Russia front! They want an actual presence on the ground in Kiev of some show of military muscle either from the EU or from Uncle Sam.Will O'Bomber have the guts/courage/foolhardiness to venture into a region where angels fear to tread? Will the "tick" on the hair of the tail of a dog,Tatsen-yuck wag the White House? Watch this space!
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/m ... ]Ukrainian prime minister will visit White House to discuss Crimea[/b]
• Arseny Yatseniuk to visit Washington for ‘top-level meetings’
• White House official says Russia sanctions could be tightened
Arseny Yatseniuk, the prime minister of Ukraine’s fledgling government, will visit Washington on Wednesday, the White House has confirmed, as the crisis over the seizure by Russian forces of the Crimean peninsula continues.
Yatseniuk revealed the Washington trip, in which he will visit the White House, at a government meeting in Kiev on Sunday, saying it was aimed at “resolving the situation unfolding in our bilateral and multilateral relations”. It will involve “top-level meetings”, he said, though the White House has yet to make clear whether that would include an audience with President Barack Obama.
Obama’s press secretary, Jay Carney, said on Sunday the visit would highlight “the strong support of the United States for the people of Ukraine, who have demonstrated inspiring courage and resilience through recent times of crisis”.
Top of the agenda will be the search for a peaceful solution to Russia’s military intervention in Crimea, Carney said, as well as economic support for the new Ukrainian government.
The European Union has already offered Ukraine at least $15bn in aid, and the US a further $1bn.
With Russia defiant over its intervention in Crimea, the Yatseniuk visit underscores the difficult discussions held between the new Ukrainian government, European capitals and the White House about next steps in the clash with President Vladimir Putin. So far, Western leaders have been hoping that a combination of public condemnation and economic sanctions will turn the Russian leader away from his belligerent course, though so far there is little sign of that succeeding.
Tony Blinken, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, warned on Sunday that the sanctions regime that was announced last Thursday had been specifically designed so it could be tightened in the face of Russian intransigence over Crimea.
Speaking on CNN’s State of the Union, he said: “We’ve put in place a very flexible and tough mechanism to increase the sanctions, so if Russia makes the wrong choice going forward we have a way to exert significant pressure, as do our partners.”
But as the standoff in Crimea drags on, Obama is facing a growing chorus of criticism, even from within his own party. Chris Coons, the Democratic US senator for Delaware, has said that the Ukraine crisis was in part a product of the president’s track record in foreign policy.
“I frankly think this is partly a result of our perceived weakness because of our actions in Syria,” Coons said.
On Sunday Mike Rogers, the Republican chair of the House of Representatives intelligence committee, told ABC’s This Week: “We shouldn’t underestimate the kind of things [Putin] will do that he thinks is in Russia’s best interests.
“I think up to date we thought it was a different century and the administration thought ‘Well, if we just act nice everyone else will act nice with us. And that’s unfortunately just not the way Putin sees the rest of the world.”
Blinken dismissed the charge. “The notion that this is about Syria makes very little sense to me,” he said. “This is not about what we do, this is about Russia and its perceived interests, and we have made it very clear there is a choice Russia will have to make,” he said.
So far, Moscow has reacted to US-led sanctions with disdain. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, told his US counterpart, John Kerry, that sanctions “would inevitably hit the United States like a boomerang"
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 79093.html
Despite the fears of small states, President Putin is unlikely to seek to redraw his country's borders
Mary Dejevsky
Sunday 09 March 2014
There is a view, expressed in Brussels last week with much passion by President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania, that, having occupied Crimea, Russia will try to redraw the borders of its neighbouring states, starting with Moldova and the Baltic states. But how realistic is such a proposition?
Paradoxically, it is probably least likely in the Baltic states, the very place that Russian expansionism is feared the most. It was recognised in Moscow, even before the Soviet Union broke up, that the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was of dubious legality and that the three states should be allowed to break away. That they are now members of both the EU and Nato affords them exactly the protection they sought when they applied to join.
Estonia, as the closest to Russia and the one with a Russian minority concentrated at the border, might be seen as the most at risk. Russia could, for instance, invoke the same "responsibility to protect" as it has threatened to invoke in eastern Ukraine. Two factors militate against this. Nato's Article 5 – an attack on one is treated as an attack on all – is the first. The second is the border treaty recently agreed between Estonia and Russia, which means that the frontier is no longer disputed.
Moving east, there is Belarus. Like Ukraine, it has developed a sense of its own nationhood in the 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like Ukraine, too, its economic ties with Russia – energy dependence, in particular – have not changed to reflect that new reality. But there is no need at all for Russia to use force to tie Belarus to Moscow more closely, partly because Belarus has no equivalent of the western Ukraine which hankers after a future in the EU, and partly because ties of all kinds could hardly be closer.
Moldova is in many ways the most vulnerable, not least because, like Ukraine, it looks both ways and, were Romania to push for closer relations with Moldova, Russia might interpret this as a threat. Against that, Russia has done nothing about Romania issuing passports to Moldovans. Nor has Moldova made any move to incorporate the mainly Russian-speaking territory of Transnistria – whether for lack of will or lack of power. This makes it hard for Moscow to claim security as a pretext for seizing Transnistria with which it has no common border.
Would Russia try to reincorporate the republics of the Transcaucasus? It had its chance to occupy and effect regime change in Georgia in 2008, but settled for leaving its troops in the two contested Russian enclaves. Armenia is independent-minded, with a strong sense of identity, but also relatively compliant. Azerbaijan prefers to grow rich from oil than engage in international politics.
Different considerations apply to the five central Asian states, but the conclusion has to be the same. Intervention would be more trouble than it was worth. There is a large, but declining, Russian minority in Kazakhstan that might one day seek protection from the Kazakh majority, but the logistics would be horrendous. Russia had an opportunity to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, but to the surprise of many, declined.
The only possible reason for Russia to become more actively engaged militarily in central Asia would be to combat the influence of China, but that is some way down the line. The comparative poverty of these states, booming populations and distance from Moscow would make them more of a liability than an asset to Russia in almost every way.
A factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the reluctance of Russians to continue supporting the poor and populous south. That same sentiment is now directed against the subsidies being funnelled to Chechnya. Ukraine is unique in its combination of a divided population, its strategic position and its age-old ties to Russia. But even here, the huge costs – not just in financial terms – of intervention beyond Crimea are likely to make Moscow think twice.