Philip wrote:Dear Karan,I am merely being pragmatic.Due to historical facts,the major part of our weaponry is of Soviet/Russia origin.In general they have served us well.After the collapse of the USSR,the problems of spares,etc. began.We didn't help by buying from the grey market sub-std. spares which caused many MIG-21 crashes.There are also reports of sub-std. MIG-21s delivered to the IAF,I've posted them before.Quality control is a major problem with our DPSUs,we can't ignore the fact.
As usual, you don't get it (or try your best to throw fud and somehow dodge the main-issue of honoring contractual terms and conditions).
But, all these points are mere symptoms of our over-dependence on an entity which will not honor contracts .
You mention the issue grey market for sub-standard spares for MiG-21/23/27 etc. in late 80s and early 90s.
Pray tell us, what would a user do, if the OEM simply is incapable of supplying spares in time - and suddenly decides to over-subscribe the price by 10times etc (actually there were reports where parts, for which the price was jacked up 20-30times overnight)?
Stop flying a platform which comprises 50-60% of the combat strength and wait for the OEM parts to re-appear (according to whims and fancies of the OEM mgmt) at a price which is now being asked for?
So IAF/MoD took the next best approach, scouring for similar users across the globe and scavenging parts from mothballed (or sometimes even active) platforms - and still pay a higher price, mind you, as the new "grey-market" supplier would have sensed blood by then and jacked up the price anyway. Yes the price wouldn't be as high as the OEM is now asking for, but higher nevertheless.
And for each crash that happened, there were hundreds more flights possible with these same "grey-market" parts. Heck even our much-maligned DPSUs and HAL stepped up and did indigenously produce some (whatever they can).
Despite such “pure black-marketing” tactics by the OEM, IAF could maintain somewhere around, IIRC, 40-50% flight-availability, thanks to this “strategy”.
And yes, they lost some platforms (and more importantly, and infinitely more precious, fighter-pilots

) in the process – but what exactly is the alternative that they had, then?
As the mistake, of overdependence on a single OEM has been done three-four decades back, then.
And how is quality-control of DPSUs (which nobody would question) even relevant to this point? Isn’t it this same DPSU who first pointed out the combustor-turbine interface design issue (after RCA of, a couple of crashes)? What was the OEM response then – except from plain ignoring, disparaging and belittling it (and finally accepting it)?
May I ask, how many pilot-life and platform was saved due to this DPSU brilliance? Where is the acceptance and gratitude for the same?
And, as an Indian, you have the gall to demean them in order to shore-up Russian OEMs?
Philip wrote: The SU-30MKI acquisition has been in general a v. successful programme.However,if the Russians are as alleged being difficult with contract obligations then the MOD has to sort out the matter,impose penalties,whatever.There is no point in saying that the penalties are inadequate,etc.,as who negotiated them in the first place? Not the IAF but the MOD.
Nice try … but as usual very low on facts and mostly on rhetoric. Question to be answered is, who funded the MKI development? Today the same OEM who wouldn’t be in existence today, without that life-saver (nothing was coming from their own govt.), has the galls to renegade that contractual obligations.
And instead of condemning them, what we get from is you this circular logic why can’t penalty be imposed – well it can’t be, as that OEM platform happens to be the 100% of your heavy-fighter composition.
And impose penalty on whom and how, pray tell?
Don’t tell me about withholding a part of the payment of a contract which would be front-loaded heavily (80% or so) in the name of R&D etc. After all “Strategic” contracts are never about price-points mentioned there-in.
Penalties for “Strategic Contracts” need to be imposed “strategically” … and some of it’s already in witness vis-à-vis the MMRCA saga.
The OEM of 21/23/27 played footsie (admittedly, some of it was due to factors outside their control s usual – but they could have acknowledged it and be a lot more co-operative, and most importantly, not price-gouge etc).
A lesson learnt – a diversification was tried (M2K) and successes there actually contrasted the Russian OEM behavior more.
For example, the user was shocked to find out that 70-80% up-time etc is actually achievable – Parts supply can be actually automated and inventory mgmt. is much more than “simply stock up 10x times of all parts” in some warehouse (and hope some of them are actually used and don’t expire etc.). This is part of a paradigm called “life-cycle-cost” calc etc.
The 29s were in-running then, and what do we see, the user (IAF) used all tricks possible to pressurize MoD/GoI to get the M2K in 100s, enough to make it an alternative enough to fight atleast an one-theater war.
After all, what was the point of getting 70+ odd platforms and not able to form more than 3 sqds – because sqds are formed not by simply counting platforms assigned, but also by the number of platforms these sqds are able to put on air on a daily basis.
Isn’t that with 30-40% availability, that 70+ odd platform would be equivalent to 45-odd platform with 75% uptime, isn’t it?
And, as usual, the risk-averse MoD/GoI didn’t want to be seen favoring an OEM etc, brought out this whole almost-quarter-of-a-decade long MMRCA tamasha – and thankfully (to you and your Russian friends), this atleast allowed to have the 35s to compete.
Too bad, it lost – but hey, the parameters of the contest (on which it lost) were known before the contest.
So pls don’t talk about monetary-penalties etc when the deal is about an OEM who still supplies 70% of your defense needs – if penalties are required to be imposed, they will be imposed “strategically”.
Another heavily-IAF-pushed “penalty” is the C17 and heavy-transport category. And there again the USA is continuing to surprise IAF on what delivery-schedule-adherence and post-delivery-support means. And as a lollipop, most of the naysayers have only got the MMS-favoring-US line-of-crying, while the delivery and paradigm-shift-in-operational-thinking in the user community continues to happen, quietly!!
After all, when the user starts pressuring for funds to buy more of your products, what exactly is left there in terms of selling effort?
Take that, as a “Strategic Penalty”!!
Betw, none-of-these –above-points make the 35s and the Gajrajs any less acceptable etc –
but if your mgmt. team messes up in managing the customer expectations, brilliant platforms will not sell and remain showpieces.
Philip wrote:There are/were also serious delays with the Scorpene subs,Barak-8,Hawk deal,etc.,not to mention the AW VVIP fiasco where we are being denied our bank guarantee of almost $400M Euros
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Rest is all pure FUD.
Betw, wrt cost-percentage vs parts-percentage of a system/sub-system/platform. Let’s take AL-31FP (or for that matter, any aeroengine) as an example.
It’s a commonly known fact that HPT blades comprise as much as 20% (and thus LPT blades would be another 10%) of the total engine cost. Now be refusing to do an effective ToT of allowing the user to manufacture HPT/LPT blades from ingots etc, and forcing them to import these blades and screwdriver it locally, are you not straightway forgoing approx. 30% of the total engine cost?
Now an engine has around 5-7K parts – some small and some big stuff like the Turbine Disks, Shafts, Vanes, HPC blades and disks and Fans. The count of these “big” parts (also called the core parts and comparably costly to the turbine blades mentioned above) will not cross a few hundreds (approx. 200-300 max). If you ensure some of them are also basically exported in it’s finished form, how much cost-saving of the local-assembly of an AL-31FP would entail?
So, except for another larger chunk, the labour cost (approx 10-20%) where-in Indian labour is supposed to be cheaper by about 30%, where is this cost-saving going to come from?
And what about the various Capital costs of importing and settin gup Infra and specialised Rigs, Machines, Testing Equipments etc.?
And what about the opportunity cost of re-using some of these infra for another program?
So all these talk about Indian-lic-produced-equiment is costlier than those imported is all pure hogwash!!
And more silly is to try and compare component-cost % of a platform-in-R&D-or-dev with the unit cost of that of an already mass-produced-platform.
But it will still help the customer, as now he’ll be relatively free-of -your-whimsically-controlled supply-chain of the relatively numerous smaller parts , and make the whole platform relatively independent of your ransom-based whimsical-pricing (as was seen on 21/23/27 parts of the late 80s and early 90s).
Sure, these “big” components can be still be withheld, but then they can be also be stockpiled to some degree, by lying about “stock usage” etc. (for example, you can always call a particular runway “dusty” and ask for a more frequent D checks etc requiring replacement of some turbine blades on each of these checks – but on reality, the number those checks would have required only some-of-the-reported blades to be replaced, in the first place).
Games people play …
Oh betw, compare the above AL-31FP Turbine Blade scenario wrt Adour Turbine Blades (DS blades) that are manufactured from the raw-material by the HALs Engine division, indigenously. No prizes for guessing, which one has a higher % of cost-based-indigenous component counts.