Here is a 3-part report on why the
F-35/JSF,"the Dog",as US experts describe it, is the wrong choice for Canada.Shortcomings highlighted.
"Outclassed by even earlier Russian and Chinese jets...".So much for comparing it with the T-50/FGFA! Nevertheless read on.
the F-35 is “an inferior combatant, seriously outclassed by even older Russian and Chinese jets that can fly faster and farther and maneuver better.” It is a “dog… overweight and underpowered,” said Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Project on Governmental Oversight in Washington, D.C. It has “inferior acceleration, inferior climb [rate], inferior sustained turn capability [and] lower top speed. Can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run.”
Why The F-35 Is The Wrong Choice for Canada – Part 1
February 19, 2014.
Editor’s note: Last year Defence Watch reader Kyle Meema wrote a two-part series arguing that Canada should purchase the Gripen fighter aircraft plus other aviation assets. In this three-part series he argues against the purchase of the F-35 as a replacement for the CF-18. In the coming weeks Defence Watch will be publishing another article from a reader arguing for the need to purchase the Rafale. If other readers want to take a supportive position on the F-35 let me know and I’ll review and edit that submission.
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By Kyle Meema
Defence Watch Guest Writer
Intro:
The F-35 is the wrong choice for a sole-sourced replacement for Canada’s aging CF-18 fighters. It is also the wrong choice for any air force using a single plane for all its fighter needs. This is because of one simple fact: it was never designed to be used in such a way.
The F-35 was designed from the very start to be a strike aircraft; to drop bombs on enemy ground targets. It was never designed to be an air-to-air combat powerhouse. Its air-to-air combat abilities, as limited as they are, were designed for limited self-defence purposes. It was never meant to be a front-line air-to-air fighter taking Super Flankers and the T-50 head on; that was always meant to be the task of the vastly superior F-22. Gen. Michael Hostage, head of Air Combat Command and a staunch supporter of the F-35 programme, even admitted that
“if I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, then the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant.”
History:
The US’s plan regarding the “stealth family” of aircraft was originally rather sensible, if expensive. The F-22 was to handle the air-to-air missions, F-35 was to handle the light air-to-ground strike missions, and the B-2 Spirit bomber was to handle the heavy air-to-ground missions.
However, this plan was dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow when the number of F-22s significantly scaled back to the point where there are simply not enough F-22s to meet America’s air-to-air needs. Originally, the USAF was to receive 750 F-22s. That number was scaled back to 381 and then later scaled back again due to its high costs. In total, a mere 186 were produced, of which only 123 are immediately available for deployment.
While the F-22 is certainly a very impressive and capable aircraft, the USAF lacks sufficient numbers to adequately meet its air superiority needs and, as a result, has had to bolster its numbers with the
vastly inferior F-35.
With the death of the F-22 programme, the USAF was left with a serious problem. It had insufficient numbers of F-22s to meet its air superiority needs. Their solution, as inadequate as it was,
was to hastily rebrand the F-35,
their former air-to-ground strike aircraft, as an all-in-one air-superiority-capable fighter.
However, the F-35 was never designed with such a role in mind and is grossly inadequate for such use. USAF chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh stated that air superiority was “not the original intent of the F-35 development.” Rebranding the F-35 as being capable of air-superiority missions is like taking a mid-range SUV, painting flames on the sides, and rebranding it as a Formula 1 race car. That’s not to say that the F-35 will never adequately perform its original role as a strike aircraft dropping bombs on ground targets, but
it will never adequately perform its new role as a front-line air-superiority fighter.
In a 2008 RAND simulation, the U.S. was tasked with defending Taiwan from a massive Chinese air and sea attack. While the F-22 performed well, it was not present in sufficient numbers to do anything other than forestall the Chinese assault.
That left F-35s to continue the fight, but were “no match for Chinese warplanes” to which they were considered “double-inferior.” In this battle, hundreds of simulated American air crews perished and Taiwan fell to China.”
From a global perspective, the lack of American F-22s and other advanced air superiority aircraft in Western air forces, should widespread F-35 procurement occurs, will be compounded by the U.S. congress banning the F-22′s export and providing the F-35 a near-total monopoly on U.S. fighter exports and acquisitions.
Countries like Japan and South Korea would jump on the chance to buy the F-22, providing additional F-22 fighters to the global “Western Community” against mutual threats such as Russia and China. Instead, such countries are left with only the F-35 if they wish to have a “stealth” fighter in their arsenal. The Western Community’s practically sole-sourced F-35 collective air force presents a global security threat as it means such nations will lack effective air-to-air combat aircraft capable of taking on present and future Russian and Chinese fighters.
However, countries like Japan and South Korea operate mixed fleets, do not intend to rely solely on the F-35, and are also developing their own state-of-the-art fighters. This approach means that such countries will have other fighters to compensate for the F-35′s serious air-to-air deficiencies. Countries like Canada, that insist on operating a single-fighter fleet, do not have that option and are left with no options when the F-35 fails to get the job done.
“The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform,” said Gen. Hostage. “It needs the F-22″ or other air-superiority fighter to deal with airborne threats; the F-35 cannot perform such missions alone.
F-35 Fails Requirements for Air-to-Air Missions:
Air-to-air combat can largely be divided into two types; air-superiority and interceptors. Both are fast and capable of flying at high altitudes, although interceptors tend to favour additional speed over the tight-turning manoeuvrability of traditional air-superiority fighters. In the Western world, dedicated interceptors seem to have fallen out of favour and their mission overlaps with air-superiority and multi-role fighters.
Thus, in Western air forces, a plane used for air-superiority missions must be fast, highly manoeuvrable, capable of flying at high altitudes, and carry a fierce arsenal of air-to-air weaponry; these are the four requirements for an effective air-superiority fighter. The F-35 fails three of these requirements outright with the forth being under question due to testing restrictions.
In this regard,
the F-35 is “an inferior combatant, seriously outclassed by even older Russian and Chinese jets that can fly faster and farther and maneuver better.” It is a “dog… overweight and underpowered,” said Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Project on Governmental Oversight in Washington, D.C. It has “inferior acceleration, inferior climb [rate], inferior sustained turn capability [and] lower top speed. Can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run.”
Speed:
It is not fast. This is the chief failing of the F-35; it is slow by fighter jet standards. With a top speed of a mere Mach 1.6. it is inferior to air-superiority fighters and even the fourth generation strike and multi-role fighters it is meant to replace. To make matters worse, the F-35B and F-35C models require complex manoeuvres to accelerate to top speed which burns nearly all of its internally stored fuel, thus making even this meager speed useless.
By comparison, true air-superiority fighters can reach above Mach 2. In a world where speed is life, the F-35 is on life-support.
For example: Top speeds of air superiority fighters
- the F-22 can reach Mach 2.25
-the F-15 can reach over Mach 2.5
-the Eurofighter Typhoon can reach Mach 2
The F-35 is even slow by multi-role and strike fighter standards; the very fighters it is meant to replace.
For example: Top speeds of multi-role and strike fighters
-the F-16 can reach Mach 2
-the F-18 C/D can reach Mach 1.8
-the F-18 E/F can reach Mach 1.8
-the Dassault Rafale can reach Mach 1.8
-the Saab Gripen can reach Mach 2
The F-35 also compares very poorly to the fighters trying to shoot it down. For example:
Top Speeds of Russian and Chinese fighters
-the Su-27 and its derivatives between Mach 2 and 2.35 depending on the variant
-the T-50 PAK-FA can reach Mach 2
-the MiG-31 can reach Mach 2.83
-the J-15 can reach Mach 2.4
-J-20 and J-31 top speeds unknown
Acceleration:
Coupled with poor top speeds is the
F-35′s downgraded acceleration.
According to the new relaxed requirements,
it now takes the F-35A eight additional seconds to go from Mach 0.8 to Mach 1.2. The F-35B and F-35C’s acceleration rates were also reduced, adding sixteen seconds and forty-three seconds respectively.
“Every second counts” and “the longer it takes [to accelerate to supersonic speeds] the more compressed the battle space gets… that is not a good thing.”
Importance of Supercruise:
The F-35 lacks supercruise; the ability to achieve and sustain supersonic flight for long periods of time without using the fuel-consuming afterburner.
This feature is standard in current generation fighters such as the F-22, the Typhoon, the Rafale, and the Gripen. Legacy fighters, such as the F-15, F-16, and F-18 are not supercruise enabled. The F-16XL was able to achieve supercruise, but this particular variant never entered production.
To make matters worse, this feature has been standard on Russia’s fourth generation fighters for some time, such as the MiG-31 and Su-35, as well as its fearsome fifth generation fighter, the T-50 PAK-FA.
The F-35′s lack of supercruise, coupled with its poor top speed, make it inadequate for air-to-air combat. Lockeed Martin claims that the F-35 can supercruise for 150 miles at Mach 1.2.
However, this is not supercruise; this is limited supercruise. 150 miles is nothing by fighter jet standards, particularly when racing to intercept an incoming target or flee from enemy fighters. Supercruise must be sustainable for long periods of time in order to be effective and this something that the F-35 simply cannot do.
It has no supercruise capability for practical purposes.
Importance of Speed:
The F-35′s low top speed also puts it at a disadvantage when using Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) missiles. This is because fighter jets rely on high speeds to give their missiles additional energy. Flying at high speeds means that the missile, when fired, is already travelling at the same high speed as the aircraft, therefore requiring less fuel and time to achieve its maximum speed.
The faster the missile is travelling, the less time the enemy has to evade, and the greater the likelihood of a successful kill. Unfortunately,
BVR combat is the only area where the F-35 has any chance to successfully engage enemy fighters and even here its capability is limited.
There are only two realistic ways in which the F-35 could be effective in an air-to-air engagement. The first is to detect and fire on the enemy using BVR missiles while the enemy is still beyond visual range before fleeing. However, even this tactic is extremely risky.
Due to its slow top speed, all current and future enemy fighters could easily catch up to and shoot down the an F-35, which would be largely defenceless due to a lack of any internally stored Within-Visual-Range (WVR) missiles. The F-35 would have to rely solely on its internal gun to defend itself, but its poor manoeuvrability, discussed later, puts it at a severe, if not fatal, disadvantage.
The second tactic is for the F-35 to pick off enemy fighters who have decided to flee the battle. An enemy fighter that has spent its missile ordinance is largely defenceless, save for its gun. In such a situation, the F-35 could risk getting closer.
But even here the F-35 has three key failings compounded by the fact that enemy fighters carry significantly more missiles. The first failing is that the F-35 cannot carry enough missiles to take on enemy fighters as it has only four internal hardpoints.
By contrast, the Super Flanker has fourteen hardpoints. Such a fighter, brimming with missiles, would not run out of ammunition quickly and could even fire volleys of missiles. The F-35, by contrast, cannot afford to miss its first shot. The second failing is that the F-35 cannot carry any WVR missiles in its internal weapons bay.
Even if the F-35 was in range and had a lock on an enemy fighter, it would not be equipped with any WVR missiles capable of shooting it down and would, again, have to rely solely on its gun, which would be less effective given the F-35′s poor manoeuvrability. The third failing is that all current and future enemy aircraft can simply outrun the F-35 thanks to their superior speed and escape to fight another day
In both these strategies, the F-35′s lack of speed, along with its other failings, which are discussed later, cripples its effectiveness. The significance of this limitation can be illustrated by an incident during the First Gulf War.
A pair of Iraqi MiG25s attacked a group of F-15Cs, but failed to score a kill. The F-15Cs pursued the MiG-25s, but were unable to shoot them down. The MiG-25s, due to their superior speed, simply outran the F-15Cs and the ten missiles they fired.
This illustrates the importance of top speed in terms of survivability. Being able to successfully flee the enemy is just as important as being able to successfully kill the enemy. The F-35 lacks the teeth to kill and lacks the legs to run. This also illustrates the importance of basic performance. Even though the Iraqi MiG-25s were considered technologically inferior, they still survived because of raw speed.
All the technological advantages in the world won’t help a fighter that simply doesn’t perform well at a basic level. Even if the F-35′s sensor arrays, data fusion, helmet mounted display, and other technological tools actually perform as intended, which they have yet to, it lacks this basic performance of high speed, making it, its pilot, and soldiers on the ground extremely vulnerable. It would be like taking laptop into battle against a Colt 45; the Colt 45 will always win.
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Part-2:
Altitude:
A fighter’s maximum altitude is an important capability. The higher an aircraft can fly, the faster it can go due to less air resistance. It also means that the aircraft can achieve faster speeds when going into a dive. When engaging enemy fighters, a higher-flying aircraft can trade altitude for speed. Likewise, a fast-flying aircraft can trade speed for altitude.
Spec-wise, altitude is the only basic requirement that the F-35 does not fail miserably. It should be able to fly up to 60, 000ft, but this has yet to be achieved due to flight-testing restrictions. Thus far, it has been tested up to 43, 000ft. To put this in perspective, the Gripen can fly at 50, 000ft and the Typhoon and F-22 can fly at 65,000ft.
However, while the F-35 should be able to fly at sufficient altitudes, this has yet to be achieved even though it was supposed to be fully operational and combat ready by now. There is no guarantee that the 60, 000ft ceiling will ever be reached. Even if it is reached, altitude alone does not sufficiently compensate for its other deficiencies, such as low top speed, lack of supercruise, and limited payload capacity/compatibility.
Manoeuvrability:
Like the F-35′s other flaws, its lack of manoeuvrability lies in its inherent design and compounded by its lack of thrust. Its small wings results in poor wing-loading and therefore poor manoeuvrability comparable to the level of a 1960s F-105. (! Remember the "lead-sled" F-105 description?)
Its wide, high-drag design means that it is incapable of generating the excess thrust in order to compensate. Wing loading refers to the weight of the aircraft divided by the area of its wings. The lower the wing loading ratio, the greater manoeuvrability the aircraft possesses
Wing Loading
-F-22: 313.5kg per square metre
-F-35A: 428kg per square metre
-Gripen E: 317kg per square metre
-Typhoon: 311kg per square metre
-Rafale C: 328kg per square metre
-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: 620kg per square metre
From these numbers, it is apparent that dedicated air-superiority fighters and air-superiority-capable multi-role fighters should have a wing loading just over 300kg per square metre.
However, the F-35 and the Super Hornet are not designed for air-superiority as their primary mission and thus have very high wing loading numbers. They are, at heart, strike fighters. Strike fighters are designed to carry bombs, not pull tight, fast, high G turns. The aircraft with wing loading numbers of air-superiority fighters such as the Typhoon can manoeuvre significantly better than aircraft with high wing loading numbers, such as strike fighters like the F-35.
Thrust-to-weight ratios also is the amount of thrust divided by the weight of the aircraft. A high thrust to weight ratio means that the aircraft produces a large amount of thrust compared to its weight.
A low thrust to weight ratio means that the aircraft produces little thrust compared to its weights. Air-superiority fighters have high thrust to weight ratios because it means they have extra thrust to maintain speed when making tight manoeuvres.
Thrust-to-weight ratios
-F22: 1,2
-F-35A: 0.83
-Gripen 0.94,
-Typhoon: 1,18
-Rafale: 1,13
-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: 0,93
Again, a pattern emerges. Air-superiority fighters such as the F-22 and Typhoon have high thrust-to-weight ratios whereas strike fighters, such as the F-35A and Super Hornet, have low thrust-to-weight ratios. Air-superiority fighters require large amounts of thrust in order to stay nimble in the air.
The F-35, however, lacks such thrust. The F-35′s deficiencies all compound one another, thus making a fighter that is worse than the sum of its parts.
The F-35 design also lacks the features that other fighters employ. Fighters such as the F-22, Su-35, and T-50 use vectored thrust in order to produce enhanced manoeuvrability. Fighters such as the Gripen, Rafale, and Typhoon all use canards coupled with tail-heavy and inherently unstable designs that greatly increase manoeuvrability and are managed by flight-control computers.
Three-dimensional thrust vectoring as been rumoured to be a feature that will be added to Tranche Three Typhoons, adding to its already impressive manoeuvrability.
Such features can add to the nimbleness of a fighter in the air and can also help compensate for poor wing-loading or thrust-to-weight numbers. The only variant of the F-35 to employ any such features is the F-35B with its thrust vectoring. However, the F-35B uses limited thrust vectoring in order to facilitate its short-take-off-vertical-landing (STOVL) ability and provides no use in combat manoeuvres because thrust can only be vectored 90 degrees straight down.
This need for STOVL in the F-35B also means the F-35 does not and cannot use an inherently unstable design to increase manoeuvrability. Because the F-35 seeks to maintain commonality, all three F-35 models have had their manoeuvrability crippled by the severe design compromises that have been made in order to make the F-35B model achieve STOVL. In terms of its ability to manoeuvre, the F-35 is the worst fighter Canada could opt for. One Typhoon test pilot said there is “no way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat.”
If poor wing-loading and thrust-to-weight numbers were not bad enough, the U.S. Department of Defence has had to consistently lower the F-35′s performance requirements in order to meet the significant limitations of the aircraft. For example, the F-35A’s sustained g’s rating was reduced from 5.3 sustained Gs to 4.6 sustained Gs. (!!!)
The F-35B was lowered from 5 sustained Gs to 4.5 sustained Gs and the F-35C was reduced from 5.1 sustained Gs to 5 sustained Gs. To put this in perspective, the F-35′s sustained G performance is “the equivalent of an F-4 or F-5… [it is] certainly not anywhere near the performance of most fourth and fifth generation aircraft.”
This limitation has been described as “an embarrassment” with “obvious tactical implications.” At high altitudes, the inability to sustain high Gs reduces survivability of high altitude surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and at low altitude makes the aircraft more vulnerable to short-range SAMS and anti-aircraft fire.
Weapons:
The F-35 lacks the teeth to meet the air-to-air threats or today and tomorrow. The menu of armaments for non-stealth aircraft is quite broad. Virtually anything can be loaded under the wings or on the body provided the aircraft has enough thrust to get it off the ground, including air-launched cruise missiles. However, stealth aircraft suffer from severe size restrictions due to the limited space available in their internal weapons bays.
This limits the size and number of weapons that can be carried internally. While weapons can be mounted externally, this defeats the purpose of having a stealth fighter in the first place. In the world of air-superiority, a pilot needs every edge possible. F-35 pilots will have to sacrifice additional weapons in order to maximise what dubious stealth they have.
There are three significant failings suffered by the F-35 that cripple its air-to-air capability from a weapons standpoint. The first is the limited number of weapons it can carry in its internal weapons bay. The F-35 can only carry four missiles internally. That is a laughably small payload, particularly when compared to the F-22 with its eight internal pylons and the T-50′s ten internal pylons.
Proponents claim that the F-35′s limited internal weapons capacity is redressed by an increase in speed and stealth due to “flying clean;” not carrying weapons under the wings. However, the extra thrust generated by its competitors compensates for the extra drag, making the “flying clean” speed gains minimal; capped by an already inadequate top speed and poor acceleration as discussed above.
The second failing is the limited size of weapons it can carry in its internal weapons bay. For example, it cannot carry the MBDA Meteor BVR missile, the most advanced BVR missile in the Western world, as it simply does not fit in the F-35′s internal weapons bay. Given how heavily the F-35 will have to rely on BVR combat in order to stand a chance against modern and future airborne threats, it will need the best BVR weapons available.
Modifying the Meteor’s tail fins has been proposed, but no action has thus far been taken. As such, the F-35 is only equipped to carry the AMRAAM BVR missile. The Meteor is the best BVR missile on the market and if the F-35 has to do without it will further lower its already small chances of surviving an encounter with fourth or fifth generation enemy fighters.
The third failing is that it cannot carry any WVR missiles internally, such as the Sidewinder stocked by Canada; its standard air-to-air load out being four internal AMRAAM BVR missiles. This means that its only hope so scoring a missile kill against an enemy fighter would be using a BVR weapon. Within visual range, the F-35′s only offensive capability is its gun, but the likelihood of a successful kill using the gun is limited by the F-35′s poor manoeuvrability. Going into a situation without WVR weapons where enemy fighters are present is practically suicidal.
Of particular importance is the IRIS-T infrared WVR missile which is capable of intercepting incoming missiles from all directions, even from behind. The IRIS-T will become essential for modern Western air forces in the future, particularly as a countermeasure for Russia’s new AESA radar-guided missile which cannot be avoided, like most missiles before it, by making a sudden sharp turn at the last second. As such, a fourth generation fighter equipped with the IRIS-T would have a significantly higher rate of survivability due to this missile-interception ability.
The only WVR missile the F-35 is planned to be able to carry internally is the ASRAAM IR.
However, like the Meteor, it has yet to be integrated or tested. Particularly troubling is that only the British RAF are likely to use the ASRAAM IR. Given the F-35′s many unresolved issues, it will likely be a long time, if ever, before the ASRAAM or Meteor are fully compatible with the F-35′s systems. While this may slightly assuage the fears of the unfortunate RAF pilots who are to fly the F-35, it is of little comfort to other pilots and air forces worldwide. Coupled with their better base performance and greater missile compatibility and capacity, the very fourth generation fighters the F-35 is meant to replace would have a better chance against current and future threats than the F-35.
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Part-3:
Limitations of Stealth:
However, even its stealth advantage is highly questionable and would likely offer little advantage. Stealth offers reduced detection, not invisibility. Even the F-22, an air-to-air fighter so superior to the F-35 that it defies comparison, has been shot down in exercises by non-stealthy aircraft, such as the Typhoon, Rafale, and F-18G “Growler” Electronic Warfare fighter. The F-117 Nighthawk was shot down over Serbia by a Soviet era SAM system as its stealth did not hide it from RADAR scanning in longer wavelengths. The F-35 itself is not even particularly stealthy by stealth standards, receiving a Low Observable designation instead of the Very Low Observable Designation of its superior cousin , the F-22.
The F-35′s limited stealth is further compromised by advances in detection technology. Infrared and RADAR detection is advancing all the time. In particular, the F-35, as with most stealth aircraft, are designed to be stealthy in X-band RADAR. However, as the Serbians discovered, stealth aircraft are much more easily detected when scanning in other wavelengths. Russia has already integrated this into the T-50, which comes equipped with L-band and X-band radar.
Thus, the F-35′s already questionable stealth advantage is constantly being eroded. As stealth becomes more common, so too will the advances in counter-stealth detection systems specifically designed to hunt them down, such as SMART-L Radar. The F-35 is also incredibly loud, much more so than the F-15. This sharp increase in noise makes the F-35 more susceptible to detection through auditory means. To make matters worse, passive radar threatens to render stealth aircraft entirely obsolete.
Sensors and Data Fusion:
Like altitude, the F-35′s specs are impressive in terms of sensors and data fusion. With Active-Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, helmet mounted display Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOST), and Distributed Aperture System (DAS). However, there are two large caveats that come with this impressive sensor suite. The first is that it assumes that this sensor suite works probably.
Given the F-35′s list of technical troubles this is a very legitimate concern. For example, the software problems with the U.S. Marines F-35B have raised the possibility of a thirteen-month delay of the Block 2B software. The second is that similar, though admittedly not as advanced, systems are standard on other aircraft already in production and have been proven to work properly. The Gripen and Rafale both boast AESA radar and the Typhoon will receive AESA radar in Tranche 3. All three have helmet mounted display systems and Electro-Optical Targeting Systems (EOTS).
While proponents of the F-35 would praise the F-35′s sensor suite, it is not so significant an improvement over existing and working sensor systems already deployed on other fighters to make a serious difference on the battle field. This is of little comfort since these technological improvements do not nearly compensate enough for the F-35′s other glaring deficiencies
Testing Limitations and Problems:
The F-35 operates under a protective testing bubble specifically designed not to push the aircraft to its limits. While the F-35 has flown a good many hours, it is not being pushed to its limits and has failed its original operational requirements. Instead of designing the fighter to operational requirement, the USAF’s solution to this problem is to lower the operational requirements according to the F-35′s limitations.
Despite being seven years overdue, the F-35, as of March 6, 2013, had yet to
-Descend at rates more than 6,000ft per minute
-achieve airspeed above Mach 0.9 (supposed to achieve Mach 1.6)
-Angle-of-attack beyond -5 and +18 degrees (supposed to achieve +50)
-Fly at night
-Fly in weather
-Use simulated weapons
-Use real weapons
-Use rapid stick or rudder movements
-Perform air-to-air tracking manoeuvres
-Perform air-to-ground tracking manoeuvres
-Perform mid-air refuelling
-Fly within 25 miles of lightening
-Use electronic countermeasures
-Use anti-jamming systems
-Use secure communication systems
-Use datalink systems
-Use electro-optical targeting system
-Use distributed aperture system to detect targets or threats
-Use Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system
-Use helmet mounted display as pilot’s primary reference
-Use air-to-air or air-to-ground radar for Electronic Attack Mode, Sea Search Mode, Ground Moving Targets Mode, or Close-In Air Combat Mode
Cost:
The cost of a fighter is a vital piece of information. Regardless of a fighter’s capability, it is useless if it is too expensive to fly. This is a lesson the USAF learned with the F-22 due to its high initial procurement and operating costs, which was the reason for the programme’s untimely demise. RAND has reported that the F-35′s costs are so high that it would have been less expensive to build three separate planes; each tailored to the user’s specific needs.
That would have been highly desirable as it would have meant that a capable and effective fighter could have been produced at all, let alone at a lower price tag. The saddest part of this finding is that it defeats the reason why the F-35 was developed to begin with; to have a low-cost and effective fighter. To make matters worse, the goal of 80% commonality between the three variants was never achieved, with 2008 estimates showing between 27% and 43% commonality.
Initial “Flyaway” Cost
-F22: $218 million per plane
-F-35: as of 2014, $188.5 million per plane (conflicting unit costs have been touted,from around $100m to the $188M fig.No idea what the eventual cost will be)
-Gripen E: approximately $50 million per plane
-Typhoon: $199 million per plane
-Rafale C: $94.5 million per plane
-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: $65 million per plane
The sticker price of a fighter is the obvious figure to place importance on. However, when it comes to fighter jets, the operating costs are, in fact, far more important.
Operating Costs Per-Flight Hour:
-F22: $61, 000
-F-35A: $21, 000 (latest figs from AWST posted show an increased fig as high as $40,000/hr)
-Gripen E: below $5000
-Typhoon: $18, 000
-Rafale C: $16, 500
-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: $11, 000
The Saab Gripen E is the clear winner in terms of costs. About three Gripen Es could be bought for less than one F-35A. Air forces could also operate four Gripen Es for every one F-35A.
F-35′s Fatal Flaw:
The F-35′s fatal flaw lies in the shoehorning of STOVL capability into the F-35B model for the U.S. Marines. The original X-35 design had serious potential to be the fighter the F-35 claims yet completely fails to be. The F-35B is to take off on short runways and land vertically (STOVL). While building a “universal” fighter to meet all needs is incredibly difficult, the addition of the STOVL requirement added even more unreasonable expectations of one design and crippled the F-35.
In order to incorporate STOVL capability onto the F-35 design while still maintaining stealth, internal weapons bays, and supersonic flight, severe design compromises had to be made.
The area behind the pilot was reserved for a lift-fan to work in conjunction with a downward-swivelling rear thrust nozzle. In order to incorporate this system, the airframe had to be very wide; much wider than the “area rule,” which dictates that a narrow fuselage delivers the best aerodynamics, would deem desirable.
This unusual width makes the F-35 experience higher than normal drag which negatively impacts, acceleration, speed, fuel efficiency, and range. To make matters worse, the lift-fan means that the pilot is unable to see behind the aircraft, a severe disadvantage when engaging enemy aircraft and a fatal flaw that can and will get pilots killed.
The F-35 attempts to compensate for this lack of visibility by incorporating a helmet mounted display system that allows the pilot see a virtual image of what is around the aircraft. However, this is inadequate as it is much lower resolution than the human eye and generally inadequate for detecting distant or low-contrast objects. To make matters worse, this helmet mounted display system, as inadequate as it is, is far from being ready for testing, let alone being fully functional and combat-ready.
The lift-fan area takes up so much space that it meant that the plane could only have a single engine, decreasing maximum thrust and therefore speed and payload capacity, which would not necessarily cripple the plane were the F-35 not so overly heavy.
The STOVL requirement also necessitated the F-35 have smaller wings that provide less lift and negatively impact the performance of the aircraft. Worse yet, these elements of the F-35 cannot be altered because it would decrease the commonality among the three variants and thus drive costs even higher.
The F-35A and F-35C cannot make use of the lift-fan space for more/bigger internal weapons bays or another engine; it is used simply as a fuel tank.
However, further compromises had to be made in order to incorporate the STOVL ability desired so much by the U.S. Marines. To keep the aircraft light enough to achieve STOVL, safety equipment was removed and parts of the fuselage were made thinner and less durable, making all three variants much more dangerous to fly. According to the Pentagon, “elimination of 11 pounds’ worth of valves and fuses made the [F-35] 25-percent more likely to be destroyed when struck by enemy fire.”
(latest dev. AWST reports posted "Fix it or Else" indicate an increased breakage rate of airframe components than estimated,new failures,etc.)
The decreased durability of the airframe also means that the lifespan of the aircraft will likely be much shorter than its predecessors and contemporaries, which, in the end, may turn out to be ironically desirable.
Conclusion: Failure-35
Any one of the F-35′s failings by itself would not necessarily, by itself, render the aircraft utterly unfit for air-to-air combat. It is the combination of problems that make it unfit; each compounding the limits of the others to the point of total ineffectualness.
If it were significantly faster and had supercruise, then the payload and manoeuvrability limitations would be mitigated. However, the F-35′s deficiencies keep adding up until one incredibly expensive and remarkably un remarkable mess remains. It has “inferior acceleration, inferior climb[rate], inferior sustained turn capacity…[and] lower top speed. Can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run.” said a leaked war game summary by RAND, a think tank with close ties to the USAF.
The only thing 5th Generation about the F-35 is its price tag. Any government purchasing the F-35 as a sole sourced fighter is reckless with its sovereignty and the safety of its soldiers, citizens, and allies and is wilfully blind to its deficiencies.
For such countries, purchasing the F-35 is nothing short of negligent. The F-35 is seven years behind schedule and fifty years behind the rest of the fighter world. It doesn’t matter how much production issues improve or flight testing progresses or costs go down. The F-35 was simply never designed to fill the air-superiority role, the U.S. Air Force said as much. It tries to do too much and consequently fails at just about everything.
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