PAK-FA and FGFA Thread

[NRao]

And how expensive is that altogether? Any ideas? 200 odd birds with some control and input included (much more than say a JSF or even a Rafale/Typhoon) for estimated $ 30 billion (last I checked). Not too much considering the costs of the Rafale, Tiffy or a JSF.

A far more appropriate metric is - per Wiki - estimated cost of a PAK-FA: $50 million. Estimated cost of a FGFA: $100 million.

So, the IAF/HAL/India has found the PAK-FA to be so inadequate that they are willing to modify it to double the cost of the PAK-FA!!!!!

Even then it will not be in the class of the F-35.

For that India will perhaps have to go to the the AMCA. Which seems, at this point in time, to be a better alternative to the FGFA.

Why? a) Because despite everything, they are still the most affordable

50 to 100 million is affordable?

I doubt that is true any more. Furthermore, I am inclined to believe that Russia is actually depending on India to finance their efforts.

We will have to wait a wee bit to see how this PAK-FA/FGFA dance turns out.

[Cain Marko]

that other designs do not/could not incorporate

AL-55I? Or the 40 improvements HAL made to the MKI to make it fly more efficiently?

Saar, we are talking of the JSF no? Please correlate (spell it out if possible) that with AL-55 and MKI, me not getting it. IOWs, how do the AL-551/MKI improvements add up to JSF being "world beater bar none"?

[NRao]

^^^^^^

Please visit the JSF thread. Beside my "data point" there are few others who have made very valid points - especially in the past 2-3 days.

You need to make some efforts too.

[Cain Marko]

And how expensive is that altogether? Any ideas? 200 odd birds with some control and input included (much more than say a JSF or even a Rafale/Typhoon) for estimated $ 30 billion (last I checked). Not too much considering the costs of the Rafale, Tiffy or a JSF.

A far more appropriate metric is - per Wiki - estimated cost of a PAK-FA: $50 million. Estimated cost of a FGFA: $100 million.

Come now, since when did Wiki become a reliable website?

So, the IAF/HAL/India has found the PAK-FA to be so inadequate that they are willing to modify it to double the cost of the PAK-FA!!!!!

A spurious conclusion based on unreliable wiki data. You can do better than this - wiki says FGFA = 2X pakfa, therefore, Pakfa is so bogus that IAF has to fix it up twice over!

Even then it will not be in the class of the F-35.

Again, based on what data?

For that India will perhaps have to go to the the AMCA. Which seems, at this point in time, to be a better alternative to the FGFA.

Agree on the AMCA route, however, we can easily do both. And a straight buy of the Pakfa might serve just as well as the FGFA

50 to 100 million is affordable?

$ 100 mil for a 5Gen bird is insanely affordable.

We will have to wait a wee bit to see how this PAK-FA/FGFA dance turns out.

No argument here

[Viv S]

Indian decision makers (and this includes everybody from the MOD babus, scientists to IAF personnel) must be totally clueless (which I doubt they are) to not be able to catch such a lopsided deal - either that or they are actually getting something from it. Take your pick.

To be fair, it wouldn't be first time that the MoD has screwed up. And the evidence of the FGFA devolving is pretty blatant at this stage; same air-frame, propulsion and avionics as the PAK FA.

Why should they? Simply because they signed a JV does not mean that they buy something they don't need. It is ridiculous to expect them to do so.

That's how JVs usually work. When a company committed to a JV, introducing a competing product onto the market will usually be considered an act of bad faith even if its not addressed in the agreement.

Look at it purely from India's pov - they get a worldclass weapon and insights into its design/development as well. If it is a matter of reducing costs, Russia will have to buy far more than a token number, which they simply don't need.

We could gotten the same without a JV as well, as we did with the Su-30MKI wherein our relative contribution is arguably superior to that on the BrahMos.

So? How is this unfair? India gets a superb aircraft that is superior to all other possible candidates (read Mirage 2000) at a fraction of the cost, with lots of control over its development. But it aggravates folks if Russia if Russia gains something from it?

The aggravation is more because the Chinese are gaining from it. Though given that most of China's arsenal shows Russian fingerprints I suppose we should have gotten somewhat inured to it.

The bigger issue here is the FGFA JV rather than the PAK FA. This entire PAK FA vs F-35 debate can be resolved by the IAF & MoD within the span of a few months. Gifting the Russians a single-vendor position, much less cash upfront, means relying on them not to exploit that. Some like Philip will do so unhesitatingly. Most others however have gotten a lot more cynical over the last few years; from the MiG support and Krasnopol to the T-90, Gorshkov and Su-30MKI.

I don't entirely disagree here, only will mention that the advantages of the JV might be more hidden and not easily apparent. E.g. while the aero design on the Pakfa is complete, the avionics and weapons/sensor integration can involve India in a big way. In a 5gen bird, this is often the most complicated piece, and could help India in terms of the AMCA

Given the stage at which the PAK FA is (EW suite close to delivery), one can't help but agree with Pogosyan's statement about the FGFA being near identical to the PAK FA. And as much as we may still learn from it, HAL & DRDO would learn so much more if $6 billion was invested in them directly.

[NRao]

Come now, since when did Wiki become a reliable website?

If you have better sources please go for it. The others that I have found are worse - some say the PAK-FA will come in at $30 million!!

Again, based on what data?

Based on the "data points" I mention, which you seem to have not read (over the months). Nothing I can do about that.

$ 100 mil for a 5Gen bird is insanely affordable.

errr... The F-35 is below that and with much better features. (In fact I would expect the AMCA to be more compatible with the JSF than the PAK-FA).

However, even if I were to go with your statement, what does this 5th Gen bird have for $100 million?

[Cain Marko]

^^^^^^

Please visit the JSF thread. Beside my "data point" there are few others who have made very valid points - especially in the past 2-3 days.

You need to make some efforts too.

Sir, other than the DAS, there is very little that the JSF offers over a Pakfa like bird. The rest, including the APG 81, can be very matched, and beaten.

IN terms of pure flight characteristics, iirc, the JSF lacks the foll compared to f-22/pakfa/Su-35/Typhoon/Rafale:

1) supercruise - range and time to station is therefore compromised
2) acceleration
3) STR/ITR
4) supermaneuverability

The above points alone make the JSF anything but a "world beater", at least A2A

[NRao]

IF that is your view of the F-35, then so be it. I cannot help any more than what I have done so far. Check this out and see if it makes any diff:

http://www.themercury.com.au/news/natio ... 6861468997

But, I will say this: the PAK-FA will not help India. The FGFA will but it will be less than a AMCA. IF the goal is to face the J-20 and a bunch of Russian supplied SX00s, then the Russian bird is not worth it.

[Cain Marko]

If you have better sources please go for it. The others that I have found are worse - some say the PAK-FA will come in at $30 million!!

In view of the fact that good sources are unavailable, shall we just drop this?

Based on the "data points" I mention, which you seem to have not read (over the months). Nothing I can do about that.

I have read plenty sirji, thing is nothing there convinces me that the JSF is "the best, barring none". Btw, I hope your datapoints were/are not from wiki! In any case, we can agree to disagree here. No problem.

errr... The F-35 is below that and with much better features. (In fact I would expect the AMCA to be more compatible with the JSF than the PAK-FA).However, even if I were to go with your statement, what does this 5th Gen bird have for $100 million?

Why then sirji is Canada reconsidering it? Here is another datapoint to consider - The JSF bid for S.Korea for about 60 units was about $ 11 billion, Japan = $ 10 bill - 40 a/c. These figures do not include weapons but do include other doodads such as support, equipment etc.

[Viv S]

Here is a thought: You will notice that the above purchases are quite carefully thought through - the P8i is based on possibly the most sold (easily available spares - hardly sanctionable) airliner in the world, the 737-800. As far as ship engines are concerned, iirc, the MTBO figure is pretty high to begin with - 20-30K hours? In any case, it takes one atomic test for US law to go into effect, and all the EULA clauses/fine print do make Indians a bit weary. Nevertheless, one has to realize that things have warmed up since POKII although recent issues suggest that they are not as cozy as once thought.

Well, the pitiful scale of US sanctions against Russia is pretty damning evidence of how far its willing to go against a country that has been a staunch opponent to the US everywhere from Kosovo to Iran.

Very different case vis a vis India. We trade more with them than the Russians, and as the economy grows, the scale of that trade will increase manifold. There is a strong pro-India lobby in the US Congress, driven by an increasingly assertive Indian-American community. An even more influential lobby is the defence industry who will oppose any sanction tooth-and-nail. And a Pentagon (as well as establishment hawks) extremely concerned about China and trying to nurture military ties with India. The American public holds India in a more positive light than it does South Korea & Israel and you'll find their media (mistakenly) referring to India as an ally. With Pakistan (formally still an ally) being viewed by the public and their lawmakers as downright treacherous, the govt would be hard pressed to explain why it was sanctioning the only 'friend' (lukewarm though the reality may be) it has in the region.

Also, at this point (after NSG & IAEA waivers) most of the world already views India as a nuclear state since we're unlikely to undertake another of tests except in an exceptional situation, it wouldn't be too hard to present that as a decision as one forced on us by a tough neighborhood. Its a similar situation to South Korea really. If they were to go nuclear tomorrow they'd be a lot of criticism but no one would actually try to sanction the country.

And how expensive is that altogether? Any ideas? 200 odd birds with some control and input included (much more than say a JSF or even a Rafale/Typhoon) for estimated $ 30 billion (last I checked). Not too much considering the costs of the Rafale, Tiffy or a JSF. I'd say that it is still too early to write off the FGFA, wait another 25 painful years before truly judging it.

Total cost $150 million per unit? Given what the latest Su-30s are costing, that's highly unlikely. That's the other thing. Given how opaque the program is I doubt one could really estimate what it costs, including the Indian MoD.

Even if we do decide to go for the PAK FA, we don't have to sign up now. Wait until they have a production variant ready and then evaluate it and then ask the Russians for a price quote. But to fund its development is going too far, thereby losing critical leverage when it comes to cost negotiations.

Yes, but this is not completely a commercial deal, and there is no "normal" way to run it. The only other option is the JSF, and that hardly seemed/seems like an option at all. As in the past, and presently, the establishment is very cagey about the US. And the price would not be anything to sneeze at either, Lawd knows even the Super Hornet might be too expensive for India.

Even if we don't want to acquire the F-35, there is absolutely no reason not to use that possibility as leverage, when we're haggling with the Russian side.

In case of Pakfa/FGFA, India will at least get a whiff of design/development as per what HAL bosses have said, small as the share might be. Yes it will be painfully done, but there will be much to learn, and of course, this will be in addition to getting very effective flying machines. If this was not the case, and Russian purchases were as lopsided as some suggest, why even bother with developing further products with them? Why for example, do we need to develop a hypersonic brahmos? or a Brahmos M?

$6 billion is a heavy price to pay for a 'whiff of design/development'. Not to mention what we'd lose out when the Russia present a take-or-leave-it cost for the PAK FA. I'm not convinced that we couldn't have run the BrahMos-M and BrahMos-2 programs completely in-house, but at least Indian involvement is genuine (as opposed to minor customization for the FGFA/PAK FA). Hopefully the Russians will place actual orders rather than introduce competing designs, when both programs fructify.

The Indo-Russki relationship is such that there will be always some wrangling, hairpulling, arm twisting etc., but overall, despite complaints, India will continue new product development with them, more so than most other nations. Why? a) Because despite everything, they are still the most affordable, and b) because they tend to offer technology that others simply don't have (Israel) or are unwilling to sell.

'Most affordable' might have been true when the Soviet were offering friendship prices. But with production costs within Russia shooting up with the scale of production remaining limited, that's less true today. As far as technology transfer is concerned, they're certainly more forthcoming than the Americans, but then again how much have we learned from purchasing technology vis-a-vis developing it? I'd say the latter always remains a better investment for the same capital.

[Cain Marko]

That's how JVs usually work. When a company committed to a JV, introducing a competing product onto the market will usually be considered an act of bad faith even if its not addressed in the agreement.

Aah but here is the crux, this is not just another JV; and it is a lot more than just "faith". A lot hangs in the balance between India and Russia, brahmos is just one small piece, and a piece that still offers tremendous benefits to India. As far as selling another similar product (I assume you refer to Yakhont), how big is the loss incurred by India so far, at least monetarily?

We could gotten the same without a JV as well, as we did with the Su-30MKI wherein our relative contribution is arguably superior to that on the BrahMos.

Possibly but doubtful - Bmos has serious indian input/workshare - everything other than seeker? and propulsion are Russian manufacture. IIRC, the input is only increasing with time. In any case, wherein is the loss vis a vis the MKI model?

The aggravation is more because the Chinese are gaining from it. Though given that most of China's arsenal shows Russian fingerprints I suppose we should have gotten somewhat inured to it.

How can Chinese gain from FGFA or Brahmos JV? At least this is a distinct advantage over the MKI model suggested above - China cannot gain from it - it can neither buy bmos nor FGFA. And it sure can't buy the Pakfa. China is gaining because it is willing to invest in R&D and piracy not because the Russkis are giving them weapons that counter India (unilke some other nations).

Given the stage at which the PAK FA is (EW suite close to delivery), one can't help but agree with Pogosyan's statement about the FGFA being near identical to the PAK FA. And as much as we may still learn from it, HAL & DRDO would learn so much more if $6 billion was invested in them directly.

Read Russian statements with a lot of salt, plenty is lost in translation. Did Pogosyan mean to include every component of the Pakfa? The airframe? Engines? Avionics? Sensors? What part. There has to be a lot of similarity, but there will be distinct differences for sure.

[member_23694]

::::::
::::::
This will probably be my last reply to an argument(s) that are needless and quite besides the point.

Will not go in much detail as how it feels shortchanged when China gains as a result of some Indo-Russia JV,or where a much hyped JV regarded as a symbol of freindship has only one buyer etc. Regarding needless and quite besides the point stuff, please Sir, if you know more
then do enlighten me , I am always ready to learn

However two points :

the avionics and weapons/sensor integration can involve India in a big way. In a 5gen bird, this is often the most complicated piece, and could help India in terms of the AMCA

Can't we learn this from the French as part of Rafale deal. I don't think that the French Avionics / EW suite are in any way inferior to the Russian offer . Or is it ? then please correct me. Since a few French avionics find their way in Su 30 MKI also

Where is the connection between a UCAV and a 5gen fighter? I don't see china flying UCAVs but has 2 5Gen designs already, ditto with Russia, ditto with America before it got all the reapers it was flying the F22. Wherefrom this rule that requires a UCAV before a 5gen fighter?

So what ? It was mentioned somewhere that DRDO is working on AURA UCAV so what are the things that DRDO can prove with this project in quick time which could be reassuring for future AMCA project.
1. True Stealth design with VLO
2. Reliability of Kaveri engine , as it can be used in UCAV with the current thrust level
3. Autonomous capability , Situational awareness and all the data link etc
4. Composites
5. RAM

Point is I am right now not comparing say an F-22/F-35 to a X-47B capability wise, rather I am trying to minimize the risk+cost and at the same time suggesting an option for validating some of the critical 5th gen stuff that will be definitely required in AMCA and future generation combat aircraft.

[Viv S]

Sir, other than the DAS, there is very little that the JSF offers over a Pakfa like bird. The rest, including the APG 81, can be very matched, and beaten.

IN terms of pure flight characteristics, iirc, the JSF lacks the foll compared to f-22/pakfa/Su-35/Typhoon/Rafale:

1) supercruise - range and time to station is therefore compromised
2) acceleration
3) STR/ITR
4) supermaneuverability

The above points alone make the JSF anything but a "world beater", at least A2A

Pure flight characteristics is where the PAK FA's advantages begin and end. On all other aspects, the F-35 comes out ahead -

1. Radar signature
2. IR signature
3. EM emission control
4. EW/ESM suite
5. DAS
6. EOTS
7. VSI HMDS
8. Sensor fusion
9. Munitions complement (SDB, CUDA)
10. Maintenance
11. Reliability

And given the size of the antenna on the PAK FA, if the radar merely matches the much smaller APG-81, that's a pretty indicative of the very different levels of technology in play.

Why then sirji is Canada reconsidering it?

Canada is not really reconsidering it. The govt took a lot of flak for an 'non-competitive' purchase and the officially budgeted costs being exceeded. They then made a big show of inviting other companies, (which duly came and made presentations) but then didn't bother to ask for any actual financial bids. As a result SAAB officially withdrew from the competition while Rafale is hanging in there (EF didn't bother to enter). Being a political hot potato the govt has kicked the decision forward for the next govt to decide, but at this point even the aircraft's critics agree that the RCAF is going to end up operating the F-35.

Here is another datapoint to consider - The JSF bid for S.Korea for about 60 units was about $ 11 billion, Japan = $ 10 bill - 40 a/c. These figures do not include weapons but do include other doodads such as support, equipment etc.

Support/equipment package aside, the simple flyaway cost of the F-35A at full production is pegged by the JPO at $75 million (2014 dollars). Even assuming that don't achieve that target they'll still come under $85 million. That's a hard figure for the PAK FA to match, especially without Indian orders suppressing the cost.

Which brings to the lifecycle cost. The PAK FA is a huge aircraft that weighs as much as than the Su-30MKI. And while the F-35 was designed with a requirement for 'maintainable stealth' (in contrast to the F-22), it remains to be seen whether the PAK FA resembles the F-22 or the F-35 in that respect. Also remains to seen is how much fuel the high TWR low bypass 117 engines will guzzle. Overall, I'm betting the PAK FA will cost a lot more to operate than the F-35.

The galling fact is not that I don't know exactly what it costs but that the MoD and IAF don't know but are still expected to pay for it upfront.

[Cain Marko]

the govt would be hard pressed to explain why it was sanctioning the only 'friend' (lukewarm though the reality may be) it has in the region.

Because the law requires them to in case of an indian POKIII. And then there is the matter of EULA, inspections etc. to boot.

Also, at this point (after NSG & IAEA waivers) most of the world already views India as a nuclear state since we're unlikely to undertake another of tests except in an exceptional situation, it wouldn't be too hard to present that as a decision as one forced on us by a tough neighborhood. Its a similar situation to South Korea really. If they were to go nuclear tomorrow they'd be a lot of criticism but no one would actually try to sanction the country.

I wouldn't be too sure on the bold part - iirc, not all folks were truly convinced about INdian thermobums in the past, and the whole Dabholkar vs. Santhanam debate highlighted that.

Total cost $150 million per unit? Given what the latest Su-30s are costing, that's highly unlikely. That's the other thing. Given how opaque the program is I doubt one could really estimate what it costs, including the Indian MoD.

Irrespective, there is even lesser chance that JSF will cost less, if at all we can even manufacture it in India.

$6 billion is a heavy price to pay for a 'whiff of design/development'. Not to mention what we'd lose out when the Russia present a take-or-leave-it cost for the PAK FA. I'm not convinced that we couldn't have run the BrahMos-M and BrahMos-2 programs completely in-house, but at least Indian involvement is genuine (as opposed to minor customization for the FGFA/PAK FA). Hopefully the Russians will place actual orders rather than introduce competing designs, when both programs fructify.

How can we do Brahmos M and II if we didn't have access to design of critical components? Just because India license produced Migs, and MKI, doesn't mean it can build a flanker in reasonable time-frame.

'Most affordable' might have been true when the Soviet were offering friendship prices. But with production costs within Russia shooting up with the scale of production remaining limited, that's less true today. As far as technology transfer is concerned, they're certainly more forthcoming than the Americans, but then again how much have we learned from purchasing technology vis-a-vis developing it? I'd say the latter always remains a better investment for the same capital.

As far as price goes, iirc, the price of the last batch of MKI (circa 2012) was a bit undecided, varying from about $ 1.6 to 3 billion for 42 a/c, and these were to be the Super 30 batch. Compare this to Singaporean or Saudi Eagles with similar fitting, and it becomes quite clear, the difference is astronomical even if we take the MKI at its most expensive. Ditto with MiG-29UPG. Total cost of MKI procurement as per AKA is about Rs. 55000 crore (not too bad at all if compared to MRCA figures). So they're still cheap once they get the lines going. In terms of side benefits and "learning", here the gain is immeasurable - from the PSLV to the Arihant to the Akula(s).

[Cain Marko]

Sir, other than the DAS, there is very little that the JSF offers over a Pakfa like bird. The rest, including the APG 81, can be very matched, and beaten.

IN terms of pure flight characteristics, iirc, the JSF lacks the foll compared to f-22/pakfa/Su-35/Typhoon/Rafale:

1) supercruise - range and time to station is therefore compromised
2) acceleration
3) STR/ITR
4) supermaneuverability

The above points alone make the JSF anything but a "world beater", at least A2A

Pure flight characteristics is where the PAK FA's advantages begin and end.

Well then, this should at least take away "the worldbeater, barring none" title. And there is lot more to a fight than geewhiz electronics/sensors alone. Let us not forget the Shornet did not make the cut for the IAF's MRCA tech evals despite arguably boasting "world best" sensors. Different AFs emphasize different aspects, clearly kinematic performance is important to the IAF.

On all other aspects, the F-35 comes out ahead -

Most debatable: let me explain:

1. Radar signature - finalized pakfa hasn't yet flown so no way to know, at least head on there is nothing between the two
2. IR signature Again, final model is due, and some suppression is expected
3. EM emission control LPI is talked about, and so is passive detection
4. EW/ESM suite based on what?
5. DAS a 360 deg IR detection system is planned
6. EOTS - OLS 50M
7. VSI HMDS
8. Sensor fusion to what extent, one can never say. In any case, there was some debate whether pilots could suffer from information overload as was the case with some Rafale pilots
9. Munitions complement (SDB, CUDA) new munitions are on the way, best part is, there should be no problem integrating a large number of upcoming indian made weapons
10. Maintenance this is hardly a given
11. Reliability ditto, iirc, the f-35 has been grounded for engine problems...

And given the size of the antenna on the PAK FA, if the radar merely matches the much smaller APG-81, that's a pretty indicative of the very different levels of technology in play.

I said "matches" simply to underscore the point, in all probability, the radar complex on the t-50 will overpower the JSF considering that there are 5 main antennae including at varying frequencies (x and l band). not to mention more cooling space for the extra power.
All in all, a combination of great kinematics (high speed/high altitude, greater maneuverability+agility), range, coupled with VLO and excellent sensors should be hard to beat, especially if your only real strength lies in just one/two of these categories - sensors.

Support/equipment package aside, the simple flyaway cost of the F-35A at full production is pegged by the JPO at $75 million (2014 dollars). Even assuming that don't achieve that target they'll still come under $85 million. That's a hard figure for the PAK FA to match, especially without Indian orders suppressing the cost.

Aah but with all things western, it is the support and additonal packages that really hurt! Hell, 10 years ago an Aussie deal for the shornet (some paltry number of a/c) cost about $ 4 billion! A quick look at the C-17 purchase is enough to tell us that US goodies are rather nicely priced!

Which brings to the lifecycle cost. The PAK FA is a huge aircraft that weighs as much as than the Su-30MKI. And while the F-35 was designed with a requirement for 'maintainable stealth' (in contrast to the F-22), it remains to be seen whether the PAK FA resembles the F-22 or the F-35 in that respect. Overall, I'm betting the PAK FA will cost a lot more to operate than the F-35.

Open to debate. Let us not forget that somewhere in that lifecycle, there are upgrade costs, which again cause a whole lot of hurt in case of western birds (US, French, whatever)

The galling fact is not that I don't know exactly what it costs but that the MoD and IAF don't know but are still expected to pay for it upfront.

This is not fact - it is only based on open source speculation. When the FGFA first came about workshare was supposed to be 50:50, then 35:50 and so on... but HAL is still not complaining, there is obviously something in it. LIke I said earlier, let us wait for the details to be out.

[Cain Marko]

Will not go in much detail as how it feels shortchanged when China gains as a result of some Indo-Russia JV,or where a much hyped JV regarded as a symbol of freindship has only one buyer etc.

Do you also feel shortchanged when India gets Russian help on things such as the Arihant and Akula and space programs? Probably not. There is more to this relationship than a JV in which our egos are slightly bruised; the financial losses incurred by Russia not buying the Brahmos or the sales of Yakhont to countries like Syria (whom we wouldn't sell to anyways) is negligible in the overall picture. Hell, even the Gorky, with all the bait/switch mechanisms is not that expensive a deal irrespective of what folks want to say (asking for QE class or modded Juan Carlos types).

Regarding needless and quite besides the point stuff, please Sir, if you know more then do enlighten me , I am always ready to learn

It is hardly a question of knowing more or less but of using irrelevant arguments. E.g. Why bring up Russian bankruptcy? Hardly addresses my point that Russia did and has the capability to build top notch platforms. Their economic acumen was never in question - their ability to put out a stellar warbird is. In the same vein, how do we know what is exactly being done via this JV? Do we even have open sources documenting the details? No, all we have is a few sporadic reports with dubious sources that suddenly pop up and then melt away. The latest being Saurav Jha's piece, which started a new strain of R&D. Nothing confirmed.

Can't we learn this from the French as part of Rafale deal. I don't think that the French Avionics / EW suite are in any way inferior to the Russian offer . Or is it ? then please correct me. Since a few French avionics find their way in Su 30 MKI also

It is not the avionics as much as suppression techniques and sensor-data integration from what I gather is where the complications pop up. Not that the french are any less (or more) capable, but the Rafale is already a "seasoned" bird, what new sensors will India specifically integrate with it? Otoh, the FGFA might involve a lot more - from airframe changes to flight testing, inclusion of Indian composite structures, integration of weapons, custom sensors - who knows? At least that was the original idea.

So what ? It was mentioned somewhere that DRDO is working on AURA UCAV so what are the things that DRDO can prove with this project in quick time which could be reassuring for future AMCA project.
1. True Stealth design with VLO
2. Reliability of Kaveri engine , as it can be used in UCAV with the current thrust level
3. Autonomous capability , Situational awareness and all the data link etc
4. Composites
5. RAM

A UCAV is a rather complicated piece of technology. Most advanced nations are just working on TDs as yet. The problem is not in what you suggest perse, it lies in the fact that the AMCA is a critically needed piece for the IAF's operational strength around 2025-30. Rest assured, that role is not going to be taken up by any UCAV in that time frame.

[Viv S]

Because the law requires them to in case of an indian POKIII. And then there is the matter of EULA, inspections etc. to boot.

Why aren't we under sanctions right now then? We haven't signed the CTBT or FMCT. As per law the US President can waive any and all respects of the sanctions. Also I believe that was superseded by the 123 agreement wherein the clause for the 'termination of cooperation' is (deliberately) vaguely worded to enable flexible interpretations of it. The point is, if they want to apply sanctions they can do that, though at a heavy strategic and economic cost. If however, as is more likely, bilateral ties take priority they can just easily withhold them.

I wouldn't be too sure on the bold part - iirc, not all folks were truly convinced about INdian thermobums in the past, and the whole Dabholkar vs. Santhanam debate highlighted that.

The size of our nuclear arsenal has never been disclosed but I doubt any adversary would disregard it even if its comprised primarily of hundreds of boosted-fission weapons. Its a MAD scenario either way. Besides... the purpose of the program is to deter the enemy rather than efficiently kill people. Either we have a credible deterrent today or we don't. I would assume we do.

Total cost $150 million per unit? Given what the latest Su-30s are costing, that's highly unlikely. That's the other thing. Given how opaque the program is I doubt one could really estimate what it costs, including the Indian MoD.

Irrespective, there is even lesser chance that JSF will cost less, if at all we can even manufacture it in India.

The procurement cost (incl support & spares) for the USAF is $135 million. Depending on the size of the order and various misc elements the cost I imagine will range around $160 million for export. And assembly line can be established (Italy, Japan) as can local production (UK) but that'll inflate the price. Same will apply to the PAK FA though its starting off at a higher baseline.
Frankly, I'd rather see that capital invested in the Tejas and AMCA than on ToT or licensing costs.

How can we do Brahmos M and II if we didn't have access to design of critical components? Just because India license produced Migs, and MKI, doesn't mean it can build a flanker in reasonable time-frame.

We could most certainly have gotten access to designs of critical components for the BrahMos without a JV. The BrahMos-2 on the other hand a is 'clean sheet' design that shares only its name with its predecessor. As far as Flankers are concerned, the Chinese are building Flankers (including naval variants) without a JV or any other kind of hand-holding from the Russians.

As far as price goes, iirc, the price of the last batch of MKI (circa 2012) was a bit undecided, varying from about $ 1.6 to 3 billion for 42 a/c, and these were to be the Super 30 batch. Ditto with MiG-29UPG. Total cost of MKI procurement as per AKA is about Rs. 55000 crore (not too bad at all if compared to MRCA figures). So they're still cheap once they get the lines going. In terms of side benefits and "learning", here the gain is immeasurable - from the PSLV to the Arihant to the Akula(s).

Okay. But isn't it better still to wait until those costs are known/can be negotiated? If we're already committed to the FGFA to the tune of $6 billion (with no fallback), what incentive do the Russians have for giving us a fair deal when it comes to supply/production? And how do we ensure that they respect the contract thereafter?

[Viv S]

Well then, this should take away at least, "the worldbeater, barring none" title away. And there is lot more to a fight than geewhiz electronics/sensors alone. Let us not forget the Shornet did not make the cut for the IAF's MRCA tech evals despite arguably boasting "world best" sensors. Different AFs emphasize different aspects, clearly kinematic performance is important to the IAF.

The Super Hornet fielded an AESA before the competition but it was hardly at the head of the pack in terms of avionics.

Most debatable: let me explain:

1. Radar signature - finalized pakfa hasn't yet flown so no way to know, at least head on there is nothing between the two
2. IR signature Again, final model is due, and some suppression is expected
3. EM emission control LPI is talked about, and so is passive detection
4. EW/ESM suite based on what?
5. DAS a 360 deg IR detection system is planned
6. EOTS - OLS 50M
7. VSI HMDS
8. Sensor fusion to what extent, one can never say. In any case, there was some debate whether pilots could suffer from information overload as was the case with some Rafale pilots
9. Munitions complement (SDB, CUDA) new munitions are on the way, best part is, there should be no problem integrating a large number of upcoming indian made weapons
10. Maintenance this is hardly a given
11. Reliability ditto, iirc, the f-35 has been grounded for engine problems...

The crux of your rebuttal is that the PAK FA's definitive version with lower RCS, IRS and IR MAWS has not flown yet and will be substantially different from the five prototypes flying so far. Given that deliveries to the RuAF are to start next year, when can we expect to see this evolved variant?

- OLS 50M cannot be employed for target designation/laser guidance.

- The purpose of sensor fusion is to reduce information overload (the alternative being reducing the number of sensors). If it did occur on the Rafale its a more a reflection of the degree of sensor fusion achieved.

- Russian aircraft have always been harder to maintain. I've seen nothing to suggest that the PAK FA is poised to break that mold.

- Indian munitions can be equipped on the F-35 as well. Case(s) in point - Brimstone, Meteor, ASRAAM, Python-VI, NSM, SOM, Storm Shadow, Pv IV, Spice

- Which SDB or CUDA equivalent munition is under development for the PAK FA?


With regard to the F-35's grounding -

Thermal creep from high-temperature, high-intensity testing was found to be the cause of the crack. The engine, the tenth built, powers the second F-35A, was tested extensively at supersonic speeds and at low altitudes, generating significantly more heat than expected, says Croswell.

"It was operating at levels four times higher than an operational mission, and four times greater than the levels we had qualified the engine for," says Croswell. (link)


The aircraft have all returned to flight. I'd would though like to know how rigorous the PAK FA's test program is.

And given the size of the antenna on the PAK FA, if the radar merely matches the much smaller APG-81, that's a pretty indicative of the very different levels of technology in play.

I said "matches" simply to underscore the point, in all probability, the radar complex on the t-50 will overpower the JSF considering that there are 5 main antennae including at varying frequencies (x and l band). not to mention more cooling space for the extra power.

The radar's range however will be determined only by the power output of the primary radar.

All in all, a combination of great kinematics (high speed/high altitude, greater maneuverability+agility), range, coupled with VLO and excellent sensors should be hard to beat, especially if your only real strength lies in just one/two of these categories - sensors.

Its VLO qualities aren't borne out by the prototypes built so far. As for 'excellent sensors', well... the RuAF is importing (obsolescent) Damocles pods from France to enable its Flankers to carry out precision strike. It has never operationalized a fighter AESA, while the Raytheon & NG between them have delivered over a thousand. As for EW & sensor fusion, no history to speak of, even the French & British claim to be ahead, but lets see.

Aah but with all things western, it is the support and additonal packages that really hurt! Hell, 10 years ago an Aussie deal for the shornet (some paltry number of a/c) cost about $ 4 billion! A quick look at the C-17 purchase is enough to tell us that US goodies are rather nicely priced!

Well, in the west you usually get what you pay for and transactions are usually quite transparent. Despite their higher upfront prices western aircraft (plus Embraer) have continued to dominate all segments of the civil aviation industry, while Russian aircraft are still to breakthrough. The IAF too opted for the C-17 over the Il-76, wherein Boeing carries out support and has guaranteed a certain operational availability. Similarly, the A-330 was found to have a lower lifecycle cost compared to the Il-78MKI.

With Russian purchases, the real negotiations start after the item is in service. As is evident with the Su-30MKI - where HAL is reduced to 'pleading' with the Russians, while MRO facilities remain unbuilt and the deputation of Russian experts remains 'on hold'. And the MiG-29 where we've been reduced to seeking spares in the open market.

Open to debate. Let us not forget that somewhere in that lifecycle, there are upgrade costs, which again cause a whole lot of hurt in case of western birds (US, French, whatever)

French birds yes. US birds not so much. Function of scale.
Eg. F-16C/D upgrades with AESAs, JHCMS and new cockpit/EW avionics are priced at about $35 million. About midway between the Mirage & MiG-29 upgrades.

The galling fact is not that I don't know exactly what it costs but that the MoD and IAF don't know but are still expected to pay for it upfront.

This is not fact - it is only speculation based on open source. When the FGFA first came about workshare was supposed to be 50:50, then 35:50 and so on... but HAL is still not complaining, there is obviously something in it. LIke I said earlier, let us wait for the details to be out.

The work-share is 15% according to HAL. And seeing as the FGFA will use the same air-frame and avionics as the PAK FA (acc to UAC's chairman) one wonders how even that 15% will be accommodated. From the Russian perspective, there need to 'create' some work to pacify the Indian side but the real prize is the Indian hard capital which not only reimburses the Russians but also locks India into the program, whereafter the Russians call the shots.

In any case, we're forking over a 'buy-in' amount upfront. Before we know what the aircraft costs to acquire, maintain or operate, how it performs, or even how much tech will be transferred.

[NRao]

CM,

As I have stated, up to you.

As far as the Wiki costs are concerned - again as I stated - that was the best ration I could find in favor of the PAK-FA. I suspect there is a Russian web site that could provide a better cost estimate, but I got tired of translations. I did try.

On agree to disagree, again, up to you. I am not posting anything here for others to agree with me. In fact, if they can disagree and provide some direction that is the very, very best. For me to get better I need that resistance.

On what is so diff between the PAK-FA and the JSF:

* By their own admission, the Russians have stated that they have designed the PAK-FA to match the F-22. May be I missed it, but I do not recall the Russians pitting it against the F-35. If there are cites out there please let me know
* As a side bar, India has suggested some 40 improvements to the PAK-FA, including introducing more composite, this ref is out there

* I would actually paint the JSF as follows:
** Networks. I have not checked in recent past, but I am fairly confident, very briefly, that no one else has built one like the US. I had posted a few articles in the Tech thread for the MMRCA competition - about 10 yearish ago. Again I am open to other suggestions, etc.
** Sensors. The US has been thinking, has invested and executed in this area as none other has. So, it is not that others are not capable, but the chances are at best they can say - we are planning. Even then what version will their plans produce is an interesting question to ask
** The now famous 8 million+ lines of code. Before they sit to write this code they have to have a vision, then the experience (R&D, design, execution, test, usage in live situation). Dunno. Where does Russia stand in any of these?

I am sure others, like you, have read, that is not the point. The point is what have they figured out out of that reading. And what does the entire landscape tell them.

I stated about a year or so ago (in the JSF thread) that I would bet on the JSF and today the very man who was so critical of the JSF and often quoted here on BR, himself has turned around (Fighter pilots are ecstatic about the RAAF’s next generation Joint Strike Fighter).

On the flip side I just do not see much progress with the WRT the FGFA (not PAK-FA). The R&D phase has not even been signed - though there seems to be noise on a regular basis. The engine India seeks is way out there (the US is on to there next gen engine). A lot of things are "planned" for the PAK-FA, so how does that reflect on the FGFA?

[brar_w]

OLS50M is not an EOTS like system. Unless one suggests the pakfa be inverted during air 2 ground missions. It would still require a pod for targeting though.

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/attach ... eots-3.jpg
http://himg2.huanqiu.com/attachment/090 ... 447672.jpg


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPc8UlkqYr8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mf0KuzvLTec

[Manish_Sharma]

Do you also feel shortchanged when India gets Russian help on things such as the Arihant and Akula and space programs? Probably not....

This is the crux of the matter that while Russia helps on Arihant kind of projects and is taken for granted by some; while on the other hand it is considered a great positive of US that they're not creating hurdles openly against Agni and Arihant projects anymore.

So would be a blunder mistake to put Russkies and US equal equal.

[member_23694]

So would be a blunder mistake to put Russkies and US equal equal.

Who cares to put them together , For me it is the French Rafale and then something like nEURON [hopefully the AURA UCAV ]
Further from the current state of affairs Russia does need to speed up in the avionics / composites and VLO capability to catch up with the West. It is still planning to buy Mig-35 in large number with the suggestion that it is a 5th gen fighter
The serious issue however , and which is an unfortunate departure from the past, is that at least in the open source information there does not
seem to be any current/future tech in aerial combat where Russia seems to be a pioneer. It is more in a catch up mode and that too
seems to be tough going for now.
All the above details and support for PAK-FA was supported by the words , might, will etc which suggests that their is hope based on past track record and honestly I don't see anything like an FGFA , probably only an MKIsed PAK-FA is what we may get.

[Viv S]

Aah but here is the crux, this is not just another JV; and it is a lot more than just "faith". A lot hangs in the balance between India and Russia, brahmos is just one small piece, and a piece that still offers tremendous benefits to India. As far as selling another similar product (I assume you refer to Yakhont), how big is the loss incurred by India so far, at least monetarily?

What was the monetary gain to Russia? Didn't stop them from putting the Yakhont on the export market, BrahMos be damned.

We could gotten the same without a JV as well, as we did with the Su-30MKI wherein our relative contribution is arguably superior to that on the BrahMos.

Possibly but doubtful - Bmos has serious indian input/workshare - everything other than seeker? and propulsion are Russian manufacture. IIRC, the input is only increasing with time. In any case, wherein is the loss vis a vis the MKI model? [/quote]

BrahMos; seeker jointly developed, propulsion Russian. The Su-30MKI has been customized and produced by HAL unlike the BrahMos wherein we've given away half the stake in BAPL and received no Russian orders to justify it.

How can Chinese gain from FGFA or Brahmos JV? At least this is a distinct advantage over the MKI model suggested above - China cannot gain from it - it can neither buy bmos nor FGFA. And it sure can't buy the Pakfa. China is gaining because it is willing to invest in R&D and piracy not because the Russkis are giving them weapons that counter India (unilke some other nations).

That statement was in the MKI's context with Chinese having reportedly having signed a contract for Su-35. Don't get me wrong, if this is a business is business arrangement, I'm all for it, but the Russians shouldn't complain when India doesn't hand out preferential treatment to Russian companies.

Read Russian statements with a lot of salt, plenty is lost in translation. Did Pogosyan mean to include every component of the Pakfa? The airframe? Engines? Avionics? Sensors? What part. There has to be a lot of similarity, but there will be distinct differences for sure.

Pogosyan further insisted that both Russian and Indian versions “will be based not only on the same platform, but also have identical onboard systems and avionics.

http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ ... hter-plans

There are distinct differences between the Su-30MKI and Su-30SM as well, but not worth paying upfront for. In the FGFA's case, we'd want to integrate our own munitions, datalink, modify the IFF for compatibility, integrate the Litening LDP and possibly add a different HMS. All of which can be catered to through a direct acquisition as well.

[Viv S]

Do you also feel shortchanged when India gets Russian help on things such as the Arihant and Akula and space programs? Probably not....

This is the crux of the matter that while Russia helps on Arihant kind of projects and is taken for granted by some; while on the other hand it is considered a great positive of US that they're not creating hurdles openly against Agni and Arihant projects anymore.

So would be a blunder mistake to put Russkies and US equal equal.

Did they offer their services pro bono or did we pay them for consultancy? And if we're to treat that as a 'favour', what inference do we take from this -

1. JF-17: RD-93
2. J-10: AL-31
3. J-11: AL-31
4. Su-27
5. Su-30MKK
6. Su-30MK2
7. J-15: AL-31
8. J-20: AL-31
9. J-31: RD-33
10. Ka-28
11. Ka-31
12. IL-76/78
13. Y-20: D-30
14. IL-78
15. Tor SAM
16. Buk SAM -> HQ-16
17. S-300 SAM -> HQ-9
18. Varyag -> Liaoning
19. Sovremenny class
20. Kilo class (-> Yuan class?)
21. Moskit (Sunburn), Klub-S
22. Kh-31, Kh-35
23. R-73, R-27, R-77

'Business is business'? And if so why should we not treat our defence purchases as business as well, instead of considering them a collection of favours to be dispensed out? Run fair head-to-head evaluations. If Russian equipment comes out ahead, well and good, if not... too bad.

[Manish_Sharma]

Did they offer their services pro bono or did we pay them for consultancy? And if we're to treat that as a 'favour', what inference do we take from this -

PAY THEM FOR ??? BLOODY PAAAYY THEM FOR ????

THOSE Co*&*&#$*g american ba#$$#ts won't ever share any nuke submarine tech. Ask them not much just HY 100 steel tech for Bharat and see them laugh their ass off.

Let the Russians transfer a more than 300 km + heavier warhead missile with us and WHO will object? america.

These same american had even confiscated desi made equipment in amrika for Tejas and kicked out our scientists brutally.

TELL HOW MUCH MONEY THIS PROSTITUTE AMRIKA WANTS FOR SHARING W-87 WARHEAD TECH, SEA-WOLF SUB LEASE AND WE'LL PAY. JUST GATHERING AMERICAN SALESMAN HERE TO PUT FORWARD THEIR LEMONS.

Just putting in grey comments about amrika not putting sanctions on us anymore with committing. Hope Pokharan 3 happens soon to shatter this myth forever.

The truth is amrikan prostitute has not even scrapped EULA & EUMA kind of shit for such big deals like C-17 and C-130.

[NRao]

Do you also feel shortchanged when India gets Russian help on things such as the Arihant and Akula and space programs? Probably not....

India needs to do what is in her best interests. We - on the net - can say only so much and do pretty close to nothing. Russia is doing what is in her best interests. I cannot say how good or bad it is, but I would hope that the techs that India gets are able to defend India.

So, if the MMRCA costs $20+ billion or the FGFA - in whatever shape it comes - costs $30 billion, ultimately it is up to India.

[Viv S]

PAY THEM FOR ??? BLOODY PAAAYY THEM FOR ????

Gosh, this must be closest thing to a violent response on BRF.

THOSE Co*&*&#$*g american ba#$$#ts won't ever share any nuke submarine tech. Ask them not much just HY 100 steel tech for Bharat and see them laugh their ass off.
.
.
.

You've ducked the whole point entirely in your tirade. I get that you have grudge against the Americans for trying to (mostly unsuccessfully) restrict Indian strategic programs. Understandable. The surprising part is the lack of similar vehemence when it comes to Russian or Russian-origin equipment (mostly successfully) forming the backbone of the Chinese military.

Some curious reason inhibits that rage when it comes to Russian engines in Chinese stealth fighters, Kilo subs in the PLAN fleet, the numerous SAM systems directly acquired from Russia or derived therefrom, or all the other similar transfers of lethal equipment. Perhaps you don't consider those as having as big an impact on Indian security as the MTCR or EULA on US equipment... which is puzzling in itself.

Just putting in grey comments about amrika not putting sanctions on us anymore with committing. Hope Pokharan 3 happens soon to shatter this myth forever.

^ would suggest you've not been following US foreign policy and strategic thought as closely as you ought to.

[TSJones]

Ah luv it when they write in all caps. It means they're getting desperate.

[Raja Bose]

Dhananjay, friendly unofficial warning: Calm Down.

[Cain Marko]

On the flip side I just do not see much progress with the WRT the FGFA (not PAK-FA). The R&D phase has not even been signed - though there seems to be noise on a regular basis. The engine India seeks is way out there (the US is on to there next gen engine). A lot of things are "planned" for the PAK-FA, so how does that reflect on the FGFA?

Raosahab, let us wait and see - the FGFA could be a clunker of a deal or it could be something v.useful. There is enough around to support both perspectives. Like I said earlier, officially I have not read any real complaint, least of all from HAL - everything from new composites for the tails to joint radar development (NO79) has been spoken of in open sources. In terms of the parameters you mention:

Networks: The thing about this aspect is that whatever the JSF offers, it can be used optimally by only those AFs that work within that framework. Networking requires more than just one asset, and IAF does not have the others. IIRC, the IAF has its own infrastructure reg. this, and has invested in the ODL as well as IACCS over the last decade. I expect the Pakfa to fit in quite smoothly here.

Sensors: See below. While the investment might not be as heavy as the US, the Russians have put much on hold for this bird.

Coding: The conditions you specify here are equally applicable to the US. 8 milllion lines of code sounds very impressive, but iirc, they had and still have a lot of integration issues.

Btw, dhanyawad for the bandish, it was enjoyable.

Viv, from what I see reg. the Pakfa itself, the aircraft in its flight parameters seems excellent. It is very similar to the flanker vs. f-18, f-16, f-15 situation. The former is such an exceptional airframe that stays competitive with multiple upgrades over a period of decades. the performance of the pakfa so far seems encouraging - buggers did a cobra during the last MAKS, speaks volumes about their confidence. And yes, they are still at the 5th prototype, which means a true comparison with the in production JSF might be too early. But things are shaping up very nicely based on the little research I did:

And this is for other posters as well in terms of the sensor suite available for the Pakfa:

1) the use of GaN based TRMS for the FCR (expected around circa 2018). Currently being worked on by Phaza, and NIIP will probably just buy + integrate the same.
2) L-Band radar in the LEX
3) The DAS analogue is a comprehensive 360 deg. suite to tackle IR, RF and laser threats.

And yes, it does remain that we are still only on the 5th prototype, so a true comparison with the JSF would be a bit early. My take on this is simple: the Russians have cleverly developed a basic airframe that is sound and provides a very high end performance - ultra maneuverability to supercruise, they have not compromised here at all. Thing is, the sensors, electronics etc. can always be upgraded throughout the life of the a/c. But when it comes to the aero layout, upgrading is painfully difficult (the Shornet is a fine example and so is the Solah). This is a huge drawback for the JSF imvho.

At this early stage, Sukhoi seems to have compromised a bit on stealth in the rear aspect. However, this might change once the definitive engine comes up - it is as yet an unknown quantity (at least to me since I have not kept up). Further, they have done enough in terms of shaping and materials that head on at least, most feel that the Pakfa is quite competitive. Again, the philosophies behind the two birds are quite different - I expect the JSF needs to come in rather close to attack surface targets, the all aspect stealth is needed. The Pakfa otoh, aims to have a number of long ranged weapons for such tasks.

Of course, one might view it critically and say that these are all "plans", but the bottomline remains that the Pakfa is flying, and quite well at that. There were naysayers about the program for years but then it did actually happen in 2009-10. Still a new bird, but I expect to see the real deal circa 2018 and FGFA, if it comes about, in 2022.

[Cain Marko]

Why aren't we under sanctions right now then?

Because no dhamaka has taken place yet. Another POK type test, and sanctions are automatic.

The procurement cost (incl support & spares) for the USAF is $135 million. Depending on the size of the order and various misc elements the cost I imagine will range around $160 million for export. And assembly line can be established (Italy, Japan) as can local production (UK) but that'll inflate the price. Same will apply to the PAK FA though its starting off at a higher baseline.

Viv, when was the last time you saw US hardware being cheaper than Russian counterparts? Last I checked, it was $ 199 million per bird. Everything with the US is gilded, and the cost is premium. The MKI is a fine example - total procurment cost of 55000 crore ($ 9 odd billion for 275 4.5 gen birds). That is HARD to beat.

Frankly, I'd rather see that capital invested in the Tejas and AMCA than on ToT or licensing costs.

I don't think it has to be a either or situation, all three can and should be pursued. Now under what framework should the partnership with Sukhoi/Russia be? Honestly, I am not sure, but the Pakfa or FGFA should certainly be pursued.

How can we do Brahmos M and II if we didn't have access to design of critical components? Just because India license produced Migs, and MKI, doesn't mean it can build a flanker in reasonable time-frame.

We could most certainly have gotten access to designs of critical components for the BrahMos without a JV.

Could we? Do we have access to MKI radar and engines? Including the core components. IIRC, Russia still sends HAL "kits" for these components. The Brahmos is increasingly being built in India and even the seeker might be indigenous. Possibly even the engine in time. More importantly, we do get some control as to who gets the end products.

As far as Flankers are concerned, the Chinese are building Flankers (including naval variants) without a JV or any other kind of hand-holding from the Russians.

True that, but then China is willing to violate IPR, India is not.

Okay. But isn't it better still to wait until those costs are known/can be negotiated? If we're already committed to the FGFA to the tune of $6 billion (with no fallback), what incentive do the Russians have for giving us a fair deal when it comes to supply/production? And how do we ensure that they respect the contract thereafter?

So far India has not invested the $ 6 billion has it? Let us see if they find it worthwhile to do so and see what the contract entails.

[brar_w]

I expect the JSF needs to come in rather close to attack surface targets, the all aspect stealth is needed. The Pakfa otoh, aims to have a number of long ranged weapons for such tasks.

The JSF only needs to come close of the mission complexity so demands. The line up of Stand off and medium-long range weapons for the F-35 is extensive and includes multiple options. Not only that but the approach from day 1 (program conception) has been to have it net enabled so a considerable dollar amount was spent to get the weapons ready so that they are net-enabled as well. This is the concept for the Air sea battle spearheaded by the US navy. For SO targeting the F-35 has options to carry the JASSMER externally (1000 km range), JASSM (350 km), JSOW (Internally or externally ; 130 km), AGM-84H (250+ km), Kongsberg JSM (250-300 km). Out of the cheaper PGM's (less than 200K$ cost) you have the SDB I and SDB II that will give you a range greater than 100 km from altitude (tri mode weapons with layer of GPS targeting added if required), and of course you have your line of standard US PGM's and LGB's. The external weapons are mostly Stand OFF weapons and much like the F-22 the F-35 would be able to jettison the pylons to recover its LO once it gets into enemy territory (http://www.vaq34.com/junk/f22droptanktest.jpg) Most of these weapons are delivered to their services and operational and will be systematically added to the software through incremental upgrades as and when required. For air to air you have the Aim-120D that is brand new version of the AMRAAM that will become operational later this year, European Meteor (longer ranged weapon to the aim-120D). For the future the US will look at the AMRAAM/HARM replacement (NGM) that should have even longer range, the Navy will get the Blk 3 Aim-9x by 2022 that will have a considerable range overlap to the Aim-120C amraam and will be carried internally, this missile seems to be a direct result of the EODAS capability.

Other future missile projects include the Long range anti ship missile, which is a net enabled long range (500-600 km) weapon (more like a UAV) for AsW that focuses on anti-jamming countermeasures and net-centric tactics (as are being added to the Tomahawk). DARPA has already tested one missile from Lockheed which is a version of the JASSM-ER but other solutions also exist that will participate in the program. This requirement is separate from another one that requires a shorter ranged missile with supersonic speed requirement.

Other more ambitious missile programs out there are your Hypersonic weapons that exist in the classified and the unclassified domain. Out of the unclassified programs, the recent waverider program has now been tasked to produced a weapon that can be carried by the F-35 and the B-2 bomber. Boeing and Lockheed both have proposals for the HSSW program and may even team up given the cross company work that both design houses have performed for hypersonic programs. The goal is to get such a weapon out by 2020-2025 time frame.

http://aviationweek.com/awin/high-speed ... -51-flight

The need to get close for A2G is born out of experience and not through free will. Stand off SEAD or air to ground work sounds very good on paper but in reality its tough to execute especially against a peer-adversary. Your SAM guy is just not sitting there with an emitting element just dying to become a martyr when an ARM missile hurls towards him from hundereds of km's away. In reality a lot of the A2G and SEAD work is to use sensors to comb areas to pick off passive and active elements. Most of the SO targeting is reserved for fixed C2C assets, infrastructure targeting or legacy Air defences. The challenge for the JSF program and for the operators was to create not the weapons (most of the weapons existed anyways) but to prepare them for what was coming. The US Navy for example is spending billions to get a new family of tactical data links that are long range and LPI that would effectively enable the Standard missile to be launched from a ship based on a real time targeting track done by an F-35C (Data linke being tested right now under the NIFC-CA banner, to be brought in through the E-2D and the F-35C (AADL block 4 capability) that enables OTH linking of sensors and weapons). The air sea battle (aimed towards CHINA) only looks at the battlespace through the lense of "sensors", "weapons", "cyber-warfare". It refuses to look at whether its an F-35, A-10, F-18 or a damn Cesna doing the bloody work, all it cares for is a sensor on target linked to a weapon on target. SM6 and F-35C EOTS/Apg-81 link up is only a start for where that effort wishes to take the capability.

While the PAKFA has many very impressive capabilities and i strongly believe that for an air dominance mission it is the best bet for the IAF given the options in front if it (i however disagree with the path the IAF is taking, I would have saved the 6 billion and bought off the shelf T-50's while putting that 6 billion into the AMCA) however weapons lineup, capability both at IOC/FOC and projected weapons development is not its strong suite when compared to the F-35, for in the weapons development race its the $$ that count and amrika has spent the billions over the last decade or so to have a long list of net-enabled weapons both operational and in the pipeline, in addition to the fact that they along with others are spending money to make sure partner weapons are also integrated which the PAKFA/FGFA program never will due to it being a fairly closed program. Come 2020's and many European (Meteors, maybe storm shadow, JSM/NSM), Israeli and asian (japanese and South Korean) weapons would involve zero integration costs for a new customer.

[NRao]

CM ji,

Do not know what to say.

We are not even in the same city, leave alone the same ball park.

IF that is your understanding of the situation, then best of luck.

I would be scared as hell with that kind of a Russian plane.

[Philip]

The JSF has along way to go before IOC.Read the Pentagon report posted earlier where it says that production aircraft are unfit for flight with structural problems.In the flight testing regime,it is 50% behind the time schedule,causing a 13 month delay for the USMC version.The way the slippages are going,we will see in 2016,if the T-50 remains on schedule,entering service with the RuAF earlier than the USAF with the JSF.

Incidentally,Oz's 58 JSFs (IOC 2020) are going to cost it almost $200M per bird which is a full Monty package.A$12.4 billion ($11.5 billion).The cost of the deal includes facilities, weapons and training. About A$1.6 billion will be spent on building support infrastructure at two Royal Australian Air Force bases.Therefore the fig. of approx $150M or thereabouts appears to be a more accurate figure for the aircraft.

I've brought this up before.Why don't we make a pitch for the LCA to be developed into Russia's requirement for a light fighter? Given that we've bought so much of Russian aviation hardware,it could also help in developing the MK-2 with extra features and capabilities that could be leveraged from Russia.We could leverage the deal as barter for FGFA funding too.This would be a far more important boost for indigenous exports than that of a few dozen BMos missiles,of which Russia already has its own longer ranged equivalent.A task for the new dispensation?

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... or-394022/

Russia considers funding MiG-29 successor
Source:
11 Dec 2013

Russia is to build a new lightweight fighter, deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin told parliamentary deputies on 11 December.

“There already is the task in our rearmament programme of creating a future light fighter, and it will be built,” Rogozin said in response to a question from a Duma deputy. “Light fighters are always in demand from the point of view of export potential. Look at the [RAC] MiG-29, for example; it outperforms heavy fighters.”

Russia has always produced a mix of heavy and light fighters, notes Rogozin, who oversees the defence industry. It is currently manufacturing derivatives of the Sukhoi Su-27, designated for its forces, as well as the advanced Sukhoi T-50 stealth fighter, to replace the early-variant Su-27s in service. There is no apparent replacement, however, for the hundreds of MiG-29 fighters in use.

RAC MiG has not had a clear designated successor for the MiG-29 since the demise of the twin-engined Article 1.44 demonstrator in the 1990s. It revived the concept for such a light tactical fighter with initial interest from India around 2001, but New Delhi later opted for the developmental T-50.

Previous Russian air force commanders have referred to a single-engined light fighter sharing the same engine, radar and weapons as the T-50.

RAC MiG is likely to be out of production work once a current batch of MiG-29K naval fighters is completed for the Russian navy. The first four have already been delivered.

Air force commander Lt Gen Viktor Bondarev said in April 2013 that a heavy replacement will be also be built for the service’s modernised MiG-31BM interceptors, with a planned in-service date of 2028.

Funding the construction of another new fighter design, let alone two, would be problematic for the Russian government, which said earlier this month that its budget in the next decade is likely to fall well short of earlier projections.

[brar_w]

The F-35B is absolutely on schedule as per the latest report issued by the congressional research committee (april 29th 2014). There is no 13 month delay you speak of. The IOC is between August 2015 and December 2015. The USAF IOC is also stated to be on schedule, as the software maturity required for the F-35B and the A is 100% the same. Only difference is hardware (between B and A IOC configurations). The only delay the F-35 may face (of significance anyhow) is on the 3F block software, where even the JPO chief has stated that considerable progress would be required to be made (not uncharacteristic of software programs worldwide) if 100% of the 3f capability is to be realized by the 2018 time-frame. He is confident as far as 2b and 3i are concerned (with 3i he is even more confident since there is no software work on 3i post 2b debug). As far as T-50 entering earlier than the F-35, i really do not see this as a possibility given only things flying are prototypes.

As far as IOC with a less than 100% capability is concerned, the USMC would not mind much, its happened before with the F-22 program where it took a few months to get most if not all of that capability that they could not IOC with. IOC is all about getting the jet to the tempo of training ops and integrating it into the force structure. Its not about taking the jet to war (that would be closer to FOC). Also the concurrency model (as was for the F-16) ensures that an IOC comparison cannot be made between the F-35 and the T-50/FGFA. By the time the USN IOC's with Full Block 3 configuration, the Program will have more than 200 fighters running full block 3F. A vast majority of those fighters would require very minimal concurrency depot work and some would not require any at all. So from IOC to FOC the F-35 will see a rise of a fleet of hundreds of fighters quite unlike the T-50 ramp up.

BTW could you point to some similar articles on the maturity in development and testing of the PAKFA software? Surely it would require some amazing software capability given what many are claiming it is supposed to be capable of.

For the 2B capability that the U.S. Marine Corps is going to use to declare IOC and limited warfighting capability, we are tracking 206 individual capabilities within the software,” U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, F-35 program executive officer, told the House Armed Service Committee on Wednesday. “As of today, 80 percent of those have been verified as good to go,” he said.

Bogdan expects the remaining 20 percent to be verified by the end of the year.

“I’m within 30 days of completing 2B on time,” he said.

The bigger problem is modifying all of the older aircraft that have already been delivered up to the operational standard, he said. Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, the Marine Corps’ deputy commandant for aviation, mirrored Bogdan’s concerns during his testimony.

Bodgan said he is also confident that the Block 3i software—which is the same capability as the Block 2B configuration, but rehosted on improved computer hardware—will also be completed in time for the Air Force’s 2016 IOC date.

Bogdan said he is most concerned about the final Block 3F configuration that the U.S. Navy hopes to declare the F-35C variant operational with in 2019. Currently, that software version will be delivered late if no course corrections are made.

“If we don’t do anything else and we just continue to perform the way we are performing right now and not getting any better, we will be somewhere between four and six months late,” Bogdan said. “It’s as simple as that.”

Bogdan said that he will take action to mitigate the problem, but the Block 3F software is extraordinarily complex. “I’m just projecting that we’re going have some trouble getting it done,” he said.

http://news.usni.org/2014/03/26/f-35-pr ... ready-2015

The DEPOT , Concurrency issue is not a concern for the USMC (as big as it is for the JPO). The Marines know that the F-35 will be coming out of the depot after retrofits so they have built in a margin. Their IOC is with a minimum of 10 aircraft. If and when they get 10 F-35B's out of the depot they'll declare IOC for the VFA121. It could be more but the minimum threshold is 10.

As far as Australia's cost for the program is concerned. Its a Fantasy as per most reasoned judgements. They cannot pay more than what the US pays for its birds, and the US estimates its jets at a certain cost for a certain time. The US APUC costs are well provided in the latest report. The Joint program office has also issued estimates for a notional 2018 full operational capability. Australia will pay for its jets what the US pays for them given similar block purchases. Since no block is mentioned the monetary figure mentioned in news articles and press releases is a notional figure, as is usually the case with advanced procurement notifications (common international practice). Their P8 purchase contract estimates are also notional for all international customers or potential international customers. The final price paid for the F-35 would be what is negotiated at that time (has the RAAF released any information on the blocks they wish to purchase the 58 fighters?). The current program has recently released initial contracts for LRIP purchase. The RAAF purchase is way out into the future and as such any cost that they may be budgeting is notional at best.

The current cost (APUC for LRIP 7 jets) is 98 million for the weapon system minus the engine plus the engine. These are Low rate of production costs without the curve being in a favourable position for the production design/strategy for the program. The optimum production rate for the F-35 has always been 100+ fighters per annum (as per design and pentagon requirement) and closest to the "1 fighter a day" as possible. To claim that APUC for the F-35 would be greater at full rate of production than it is now is ludicrous. Perhaps a better understanding is required on the program than just paying attention to only the "negative" media coverage on the program (as opposed to a totally opaque T-50 program). The Marines are confident of a 2015 (august-december) IOC. The JPO is confident of it. The Congressional research is reporting the confidence. I guess you can just wait till that timeframe to be proven wrong.

[Philip]

There is!
https://www.google.co.in/search?newwind ... D1D9wIf6uw
GAO: Software Delays Could Translate into Less Effective Marine JSF
By: Dave Majumdar
Published: March 24, 2014

Delays in software developing and testing could limit the capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps variants of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter when the plane becomes operational in 2015, according to a report released today from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

“The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) predicts delivery of warfighting capabilities could be delayed by as much as 13 months,” read the report.

It’s not clear what specific F-35 capabilities will be impacted by the delay. What is clear is that as of January 2014, the JSF program was expected to have verified 27 percent of the Block 2B software’s capability on-board the F-35, but had only managed to clear 13 percent of the total.

Block 2B is the configuration the U.S. Marine Corps hopes to declare the short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B variant operational by July 2015.

According to the report, slow progress on verifying Block 2B capabilities mean that the JSF program will not likely meet the Oct. 2014 deadline to complete development of that software block.

“Delays of this magnitude would mean that the Marine Corps will not likely have all of the capabilities it expects in July 2015,” the report states. “The effects of these delays compound as they also put the timely delivery of Air Force and Navy initial operational capabilities at risk.”

Further delays could increase the level of concurrency between aircraft production and testing, which could result in further cost increases, read the report.

“Without a clear understanding of the specific capabilities that will initially be delivered, Congress and the military services may not be able to make fully informed resource allocation decisions,” the report said.

Nonetheless, the GAO notes that there have been improvements in flight sciences testing and that operational testing is slated to start in 2015.

“The program has continued to make progress in addressing some key technical risks,” the GAO said.

However, if the JSF program is to remain on track, the Defense Department will have to ramp-up funding for the program over the next several years.

“The Department of Defense (DOD) will have to increase funds steeply over the next 5 years and sustain an average of $12.6 billion per year through 2037; for several years, funding requirements will peak at around $15 billion,” the report states.
“Annual funding of this magnitude clearly poses long-term affordability risks given the current fiscal environment.”

JSF program executive officer Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan told USNI News in a written statement that the program office values the GAO’s analysis and provided the government watchdog agency with unfettered access.

“We agree with the GAO’s recommendation to assess the specific capabilities the F-35 will have for the military services’ initial operating capability,” he said.

Bogdan said that there were no surprises in the GAO report, and while he agrees that software is the F-35 program’s “number one technical risk”, the program is confident it will deliver the required warfighting capability to the Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force on time.

“We are confident about delivering the F-35′s initial warfighting capability to the U.S. Marine Corps in 2015 and to the U.S. Air Force in 2016. The aircraft’s full warfighting capability is scheduled to be delivered to the U.S. Navy in 2018.” Bogdan said.

“There is more risk to that delivery schedule because it is naturally dependent upon the successful delivery of the previous software releases. We are working relentlessly to reduce this risk by tracking software development daily and fixing issues as we find them.”

One U.S. Air Force official familiar with the F-35, who had predicted the potential delay months ago, said that eventually the JSF program would deliver a useable aircraft but that there is a long way to go.

“We’ll get something usable. But it will take a while to get it done, and the final jet configuration will look a lot like Block 2B,” the official said.

http://www.nltimes.nl/2014/01/24/jsf-ba ... ty-report/

The report, by the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester Michael Gilmore, says that the Marine Corps’ plans to start using F-35 by mid-2015 could be delayed due to some ongoing software, maintenance and reliability problems with F-35, Reuters reported on Friday.According to the report, there will be 13-month delay in completing testing of the Block 2B software required for the Marine Corps to clear the jets for initial combat use next year.

The $392-billion F-35 project is the Pentagon’s costliest weapons program, and it has been highly criticized by Gilmore, who is director of operational test and evaluation for the U.S. Defense Department.

The report says that F-35 is proving less reliable and harder to maintain than expected. Also, the aircraft remains vulnerable to propellant fires sparked by missile strikes, the report notes.

In response to the report, Dutch Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert said that she has not read the report yet but she was shocked to hear about the risks.

[Philip]

Here is a comprehensive analysis of the GAO's report:

http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/?p=1111

US GAO Report 2014: F-35 Software Problem Number One

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl om 21:42 onder Ontwikkeling JSF

Latest US Goverment Accountability Office Report confirms: software is problem number one. Affordability problem two.
Continued software problems could lead to further delivery delays of less-capable, less-reliable aircraft at a long-term pricelevel and with long-term operating and support costs that may prove unaffordable.

US GAO report too optimistic

The US GAO conclusions and suggestions on software- and mission system tests and outcomes are too optimistic. The complexity of the software is huge and further delays of Initial Operational Capability seem to be unavoidable. Also their statements on long-term affordability don’t balance the fact that US DoD has never predicted the right cost of any F-35A, F-35B or F-35C the previous budget cycles since 2010. Every budget year it comes up different (and higher as predicted one year before). Only one budget year ahead their predictions are quite right. (!)

Not much attention for high cost of modifications

This year US GAO report has a focus on software problems, but a long series of other technical problems has to be solved.
An other fact that is nearly missing in this latest US GAO report is the budget reservation of an unprecedented US$ 1.4 billion over five years (FY2015-2019), with much more to come, to repair deficient parts at early production aircraft and bring them up to a more capable software block.
The most extensive jump between blocks, from 2B to 3i, involves:
- Installation of new radar
- Installation of integrated core processor
- Newer electronic warfare modules.
In the US GAO report is also missing the complete list of over 150 priority issues, well known within the JSF Program Office. On this list we may find:
- lightning protection
- power and thermal management system
- update air ducts on the Pratt & Whitney-produced engine
- ejection seat
- wing tip lighting and taxi system lighting
- weapon bay lights
- upgrades of bulkheads due to durability issues
- replacing the current complicated helmet-mounted display system by a newer version.
Other necessary modifications:
- IPP - integrated power package
- Life support system
- Communication equipment
- OBOGS - on-board oxygen-generation system
- Several other less important items.

This will bring high cost for (operational) testing and modification. The F-35 system still has a long way to go.

Here follows some contents of the US GAO Report, texst copied from the report:

Conclusions

Since the F-35 program restructuring was completed in March 2012, acquisition cost and schedule estimates have remained relatively stable, and the program has made progress in key areas. However, persistent software problems have slowed progress in mission systems flight testing, which is critical to delivering the warfighting capabilities expected by the military services. These persistent delays put the program’s development cost and schedule at risk.

As a result, DOT&E now projects that the warfighting capabilities expected by the Marine Corps in July 2015, will not likely be delivered on time, and could be (extra) delayed as much as 13 months.This means that the Marine Corps may initially receive less capable aircraft than it expects, and if progress in mission systems software testing continues to be slower than planned, Air Force and Navy initial operational capabilities may also be affected. The program may also have to extend its overall developmental flight test schedule, which would increase concurrency between testing and production and could result in additional development cost growth.

In addition to software concerns, the current funding plans may be unaffordable, given current budget constraints. This situation could worsen if unit cost targets are not met. Finally, the estimated cost of operating and supporting the fleet over its life-cycle continues to be high and could increase further if aircraft reliability goals are not met.

DOD has already made a number of difficult decisions to put the F-35 on a more sound footing. More such decisions may lie ahead. For example, if software testing continues to be delayed, if funding falls short of expectations, or if unit cost targets cannot be met, DOD may have to make decisions about whether to proceed with production as planned with less capable aircraft or to alter the production rate.

Also, if reliability falls short of goals, DOD may have to make decisions about other ways to reduce sustainment costs, such as reduced flying hours. Eventually, DOD will have to make contingency plans for these and other issues. At this point, we believe the most pressing issue is the effect software testing delays are likely to have on the capabilities of the initial operational aircraft that each military service will receive. In order to make informed decisions about weapon system investments and future force structure, it is important that Congress and the services have a clear understanding of the capabilities that the initial operational F-35 aircraft will possess.

Recommendation of US GAO

Due to the uncertainty surrounding the delivery of F-35 software capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense conduct an assessment of the specific capabilities that realistically can be delivered and those that will not likely be delivered to each of the services by their established initial operational capability dates. The results of this assessment should be shared with Congress and the military services as soon as possible but no later than July 2015.

Testing of Critical Software Poses a Significant Challenge

Delays in the testing of critical mission systems software have put the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps at risk, and could affect the delivery of capabilities to the Air Force and Navy as well. F-35 developmental flight testing is separated into two key areas: mission systems and flight sciences. Mission systems testing is done to verify that the software and systems that provide critical warfighting capabilities function properly and meet requirements, while flight science testing is done to verify the aircraft’s basic flying capabilities. In a March 2013 report we found that development and testing of mission systems software was behind schedule, due largely to delayed software deliveries, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions. These same challenges continued thorough 2013, and as a result progress in mission systems testing has been limited. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) predicts that the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps could be delayed by as much as 13 months. Delays of this magnitude could also increase the already significant concurrency between testing and aircraft procurement and result in additional cost growth. Although mission systems testing is behind, the F-35 program has been able to accomplish nearly all of its planned flight science testing. The program also continued to make progress in addressing key technical risks, although some of that progress has been limited.

Limited Progress in Mission Systems Software Testing May Cause Delays and Add Costs

While the F-35 program was able to accomplish all of the mission system test flights it had planned in 2013, it did not accomplish all of the planned test points, Developmental testing of Block 2B software is behind schedule and will likely delay the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities. The delivery of this software capability is of high near-term importance because it provides initial warfighting capability for the overall F-35 program, and is needed by the Marine Corps to field its initial operational capability in July 2015. As of January 2014, the program planned to have verified the functionality of 27 percent of the software’s capability on-board the falling short by 11 percent. The F-35 program planned to fly 329 mission systems test flights and accomplish 2,817 test points in 2013. The program actually flew 352 test flights, exceeding the goal, but only accomplished 2,518 test points. According to program and contractor officials, slow progress in developing, delivering, and testing mission systems software continues to be the program’s most significant risk area.

Further Delay of DOT & E testing

Developmental testing of Block 2B software is behind schedule and will likely delay the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities.
As of January 2014, the program planned to have verified the functionality of 27 percent of the software’s capability on-board the aircraft, but had only been able to verify 13 percent. This leaves a significant amount of work to be done before October 2014, which is when the program expects to complete developmental flight testing of this software block. According to DOT&E, Block 2B developmental testing will not be completed as scheduled and could be delayed by as much as 13 months, as the program has had to devote time and resources to address problems and completing development of prior software blocks.

Higher Development Costs

Delays in mission systems software testing could also increase costs. As currently planned, DOD expects to complete developmental flight testing in 2017. If the flight test schedule is extended, the program may have to retain testing and engineering personnel longer than currently expected, which would increase development cost.

Program Funding Projections and Unit Cost Targets May Not Be Achievable

The F-35 program’s high projected annual acquisition funding levels continue to put the program’s long-term affordability at risk. Currently the acquisition program requires $12.6 billion per year through 2037, which does not appear to be achievable given the current fiscal environment. The program is reducing unit costs to meet targets, but a significant amount of additional cost reduction is needed if it expects to meet those targets before the beginning of full rate production—currently scheduled for 2019. Additionally, the most recent life-cycle sustainment cost estimate for the F-35 fleet is more than $1 trillion, which DOD officials have deemed unaffordable. The program’s long term sustainment estimates reflect assumptions about key cost drivers that the program does not control, including fuel costs, labor costs, and inflation rates. The program is also focusing on product reliability, which is something that the program can control, and something we have found in our prior best practices work to be a key to driving down sustainment costs. According to program reliability data, each F-35 variant was tracking closely to its reliability plan as of December 2013, although the program has a long way to go to achieve its reliability goals.

Long-term Acquisition Funding Projections Pose Affordability Challenges

The overall affordability of the F-35 acquisition program remains a significant concern. As of March 2013, the program office estimated that the total acquisition cost will be $390.4 billion. At $12.6 billion a year, the F-35 acquisition program alone would consume around one-quarter of all of DOD’s annual major defense acquisition funding. Therefore, any change in F-35 funding is likely to affect DOD’s ability to fully fund its other major acquisition programs. In addition, maintaining this level of sustained funding will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense budgets and competition with other large acquisition programs such as the KC-46 tanker and a new bomber. These costs do not include the costs to operate and maintain the F-35s as they are produced and fielded.

F-35 low reliability major concern

As the program faces key decisions about its F-35 operation and support strategy reliability is still a significant concern. Our past work has found that weapon system operating and support costs are directly correlated to weapon system reliability, which is something the program can affect.
DOT&E’s recent report noted concerns about the program’s ability to achieve its reliability goals by the time each of the F-35 variants reaches maturity—defined as 75,000 flight hours for the CTOL and STOVL variants; and 50,000 flight hours for the CV. DOT&E also noted that the F-35 design is becoming more stable, and although the program still has a large number of flight hours to go until system maturity, additional reliability growth is not likely to occur without a focused, aggressive and well-resourced effort.

Program Manufacturing Processes Continue to Show Improvement

F-35 manufacturing has improved and the contractor’s management of its suppliers is evolving. As the number of aircraft in production has increased, learning has taken place and manufacturing efficiency has improved.
The prime contractor continues to gain efficiencies in the manufacturing process as it learns more about manufacturing the aircraft. Reductions in the amount of time spent on work completed out of its specific work station have contributed to overall labor hour reductions.
As manufacturing efficiency has improved, the prime contractor has also been able to increase throughput, delivering more aircraft year over year—9 in 2011, 30 in 2012, and 35 in 2013. Over the past year, the prime contractor continued to deliver aircraft closer to contracted delivery dates. Last year we found that deliveries averaged 11 months late.

Source:
US GAO Report 2014;24-Mar-2014; “What GAO Found”

[brar_w]

Here is a comprehensive analysis of the GAO's report:

http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/?p=1111

US GAO Report 2014: F-35 Software Problem Number One

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl om 21:42 onder Ontwikkeling JSF

Latest US Goverment Accountability Office Report confirms: software is problem number one. Affordability problem two.
Continued software problems could lead to further delivery delays of less-capable, less-reliable aircraft at a long-term pricelevel and with long-term operating and support costs that may prove unaffordable.

US GAO report too optimistic

The US GAO conclusions and suggestions on software- and mission system tests and outcomes are too optimistic. The complexity of the software is huge and further delays of Initial Operational Capability seem to be unavoidable. Also their statements on long-term affordability don’t balance the fact that US DoD has never predicted the right cost of any F-35A, F-35B or F-35C the previous budget cycles since 2010. Every budget year it comes up different (and higher as predicted one year before). Only one budget year ahead their predictions are quite right. (!)

Not much attention for high cost of modifications

This year US GAO report has a focus on software problems, but a long series of other technical problems has to be solved.
An other fact that is nearly missing in this latest US GAO report is the budget reservation of an unprecedented US$ 1.4 billion over five years (FY2015-2019), with much more to come, to repair deficient parts at early production aircraft and bring them up to a more capable software block.
The most extensive jump between blocks, from 2B to 3i, involves:
- Installation of new radar
- Installation of integrated core processor
- Newer electronic warfare modules.
In the US GAO report is also missing the complete list of over 150 priority issues, well known within the JSF Program Office. On this list we may find:
- lightning protection
- power and thermal management system
- update air ducts on the Pratt & Whitney-produced engine
- ejection seat
- wing tip lighting and taxi system lighting
- weapon bay lights
- upgrades of bulkheads due to durability issues
- replacing the current complicated helmet-mounted display system by a newer version.
Other necessary modifications:
- IPP - integrated power package
- Life support system
- Communication equipment
- OBOGS - on-board oxygen-generation system
- Several other less important items.

This will bring high cost for (operational) testing and modification. The F-35 system still has a long way to go.

Here follows some contents of the US GAO Report, texst copied from the report:

Conclusions

Since the F-35 program restructuring was completed in March 2012, acquisition cost and schedule estimates have remained relatively stable, and the program has made progress in key areas. However, persistent software problems have slowed progress in mission systems flight testing, which is critical to delivering the warfighting capabilities expected by the military services. These persistent delays put the program’s development cost and schedule at risk.

As a result, DOT&E now projects that the warfighting capabilities expected by the Marine Corps in July 2015, will not likely be delivered on time, and could be (extra) delayed as much as 13 months.This means that the Marine Corps may initially receive less capable aircraft than it expects, and if progress in mission systems software testing continues to be slower than planned, Air Force and Navy initial operational capabilities may also be affected. The program may also have to extend its overall developmental flight test schedule, which would increase concurrency between testing and production and could result in additional development cost growth.

In addition to software concerns, the current funding plans may be unaffordable, given current budget constraints. This situation could worsen if unit cost targets are not met. Finally, the estimated cost of operating and supporting the fleet over its life-cycle continues to be high and could increase further if aircraft reliability goals are not met.

DOD has already made a number of difficult decisions to put the F-35 on a more sound footing. More such decisions may lie ahead. For example, if software testing continues to be delayed, if funding falls short of expectations, or if unit cost targets cannot be met, DOD may have to make decisions about whether to proceed with production as planned with less capable aircraft or to alter the production rate.

Also, if reliability falls short of goals, DOD may have to make decisions about other ways to reduce sustainment costs, such as reduced flying hours. Eventually, DOD will have to make contingency plans for these and other issues. At this point, we believe the most pressing issue is the effect software testing delays are likely to have on the capabilities of the initial operational aircraft that each military service will receive. In order to make informed decisions about weapon system investments and future force structure, it is important that Congress and the services have a clear understanding of the capabilities that the initial operational F-35 aircraft will possess.

Recommendation of US GAO

Due to the uncertainty surrounding the delivery of F-35 software capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense conduct an assessment of the specific capabilities that realistically can be delivered and those that will not likely be delivered to each of the services by their established initial operational capability dates. The results of this assessment should be shared with Congress and the military services as soon as possible but no later than July 2015.

Testing of Critical Software Poses a Significant Challenge

Delays in the testing of critical mission systems software have put the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps at risk, and could affect the delivery of capabilities to the Air Force and Navy as well. F-35 developmental flight testing is separated into two key areas: mission systems and flight sciences. Mission systems testing is done to verify that the software and systems that provide critical warfighting capabilities function properly and meet requirements, while flight science testing is done to verify the aircraft’s basic flying capabilities. In a March 2013 report we found that development and testing of mission systems software was behind schedule, due largely to delayed software deliveries, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions. These same challenges continued thorough 2013, and as a result progress in mission systems testing has been limited. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) predicts that the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps could be delayed by as much as 13 months. Delays of this magnitude could also increase the already significant concurrency between testing and aircraft procurement and result in additional cost growth. Although mission systems testing is behind, the F-35 program has been able to accomplish nearly all of its planned flight science testing. The program also continued to make progress in addressing key technical risks, although some of that progress has been limited.

Limited Progress in Mission Systems Software Testing May Cause Delays and Add Costs

While the F-35 program was able to accomplish all of the mission system test flights it had planned in 2013, it did not accomplish all of the planned test points, Developmental testing of Block 2B software is behind schedule and will likely delay the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities. The delivery of this software capability is of high near-term importance because it provides initial warfighting capability for the overall F-35 program, and is needed by the Marine Corps to field its initial operational capability in July 2015. As of January 2014, the program planned to have verified the functionality of 27 percent of the software’s capability on-board the falling short by 11 percent. The F-35 program planned to fly 329 mission systems test flights and accomplish 2,817 test points in 2013. The program actually flew 352 test flights, exceeding the goal, but only accomplished 2,518 test points. According to program and contractor officials, slow progress in developing, delivering, and testing mission systems software continues to be the program’s most significant risk area.

Further Delay of DOT & E testing

Developmental testing of Block 2B software is behind schedule and will likely delay the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities.
As of January 2014, the program planned to have verified the functionality of 27 percent of the software’s capability on-board the aircraft, but had only been able to verify 13 percent. This leaves a significant amount of work to be done before October 2014, which is when the program expects to complete developmental flight testing of this software block. According to DOT&E, Block 2B developmental testing will not be completed as scheduled and could be delayed by as much as 13 months, as the program has had to devote time and resources to address problems and completing development of prior software blocks.

Higher Development Costs

Delays in mission systems software testing could also increase costs. As currently planned, DOD expects to complete developmental flight testing in 2017. If the flight test schedule is extended, the program may have to retain testing and engineering personnel longer than currently expected, which would increase development cost.

Program Funding Projections and Unit Cost Targets May Not Be Achievable

The F-35 program’s high projected annual acquisition funding levels continue to put the program’s long-term affordability at risk. Currently the acquisition program requires $12.6 billion per year through 2037, which does not appear to be achievable given the current fiscal environment. The program is reducing unit costs to meet targets, but a significant amount of additional cost reduction is needed if it expects to meet those targets before the beginning of full rate production—currently scheduled for 2019. Additionally, the most recent life-cycle sustainment cost estimate for the F-35 fleet is more than $1 trillion, which DOD officials have deemed unaffordable. The program’s long term sustainment estimates reflect assumptions about key cost drivers that the program does not control, including fuel costs, labor costs, and inflation rates. The program is also focusing on product reliability, which is something that the program can control, and something we have found in our prior best practices work to be a key to driving down sustainment costs. According to program reliability data, each F-35 variant was tracking closely to its reliability plan as of December 2013, although the program has a long way to go to achieve its reliability goals.

Long-term Acquisition Funding Projections Pose Affordability Challenges

The overall affordability of the F-35 acquisition program remains a significant concern. As of March 2013, the program office estimated that the total acquisition cost will be $390.4 billion. At $12.6 billion a year, the F-35 acquisition program alone would consume around one-quarter of all of DOD’s annual major defense acquisition funding. Therefore, any change in F-35 funding is likely to affect DOD’s ability to fully fund its other major acquisition programs. In addition, maintaining this level of sustained funding will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense budgets and competition with other large acquisition programs such as the KC-46 tanker and a new bomber. These costs do not include the costs to operate and maintain the F-35s as they are produced and fielded.

F-35 low reliability major concern

As the program faces key decisions about its F-35 operation and support strategy reliability is still a significant concern. Our past work has found that weapon system operating and support costs are directly correlated to weapon system reliability, which is something the program can affect.
DOT&E’s recent report noted concerns about the program’s ability to achieve its reliability goals by the time each of the F-35 variants reaches maturity—defined as 75,000 flight hours for the CTOL and STOVL variants; and 50,000 flight hours for the CV. DOT&E also noted that the F-35 design is becoming more stable, and although the program still has a large number of flight hours to go until system maturity, additional reliability growth is not likely to occur without a focused, aggressive and well-resourced effort.

Program Manufacturing Processes Continue to Show Improvement

F-35 manufacturing has improved and the contractor’s management of its suppliers is evolving. As the number of aircraft in production has increased, learning has taken place and manufacturing efficiency has improved.
The prime contractor continues to gain efficiencies in the manufacturing process as it learns more about manufacturing the aircraft. Reductions in the amount of time spent on work completed out of its specific work station have contributed to overall labor hour reductions.
As manufacturing efficiency has improved, the prime contractor has also been able to increase throughput, delivering more aircraft year over year—9 in 2011, 30 in 2012, and 35 in 2013. Over the past year, the prime contractor continued to deliver aircraft closer to contracted delivery dates. Last year we found that deliveries averaged 11 months late.

Source:
US GAO Report 2014;24-Mar-2014; “What GAO Found”

And the US defense acquisition system is littered with examples of the GAO bean counters being wrong on numerous occasions. They are accountants, and look at everything from that perspective. Has a weapons system been developed in the United states that is a success as per the GAO? You can keep on believing the notion that the F-35B will be 13 months delayed. I'll get back to you late next year to see if the Marines have declared IOC or not. And in the meantime I'll also wait on some of your research on the T-50's Software development activity and auditor reports.

[Philip]

It's not just "bean counting",that is as far as costs go,looking like it may reach the Pentagon's "unaffordable" limit.Please read the numerous development issues,faults,etc.,well documented/listed out.In earlier posts ,AWST reports etc.,spoke of new structural failures,failures earlier than anticipated,with a less stringent testing regime performance wise-capability lowered, so that the aircraft could make the reduced grade.Look at what the programme head Gen."Bogged-Down" himself says!

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-27/f ... rs/5348414
F-35 Joint Strike Fighters: Australia's biggest Defence acquisition 'unaffordable', US congressional committee hears
Updated Wed 23 Apr 2014,

Parts coming off the aircraft 'too frequently': Bogdan

Ms Sanchez says the F-35 is currently four hours between "critical failures" rather than 13 hours as expected, and at that rate the program will not even meet its reliability goal of 50 per cent.

Lieutenant General Bogdan said with more planes in the skies, program bosses now know parts are coming off the aircraft "too frequently" for maintenance.

"The problem here is you're not going to see results in the next two to three months," he said.

"It's going to take months and months and months of constant efforts to see this improve.
"Our goal is by 2015 to see the aircraft at 60 per cent (reliability)."

Not a pretty picture at all.

A summing up in plain lingo:

Trillion-Dollar Jet’s Software Is in Development Hell
Code delays hobble the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Michael Peck in War is Boring

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is supposed to be America’s premier fighter jet for the next 30 years. But its biggest foe isn’t enemy planes—it’s ones and zeroes.

Software problems, that is. According to a Congress-mandated report released on March 24, the F-35’s mission management system is having so many problems that debugging the software requires extra work and could delay some of the aircraft’s advertised capabilities by more than a year.

This means taxpayers will have to fork over even more money for thousands of F-35s. The stealth jet program already has an over-budget program cost of more than $1 trillion, once you factor in maintenance expenses.

It’s more bad news for the troubled F-35, which Lockheed Martin designed as an all-in-one warplane for carrying out a gamut of missions normally conducted by more specialized planes. There are separate but similar versions for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. This “commonality” forces design compromises that make the JSF arguably less capable than even older fighters such as the F-16.

The F-35 also needs a daunting eight million lines of software code.

The Government Accountability Office report highlights delays with the stealth fighter’s mission system software. This programming controls the aircraft’s vital functions such as sensors and communications.

The audit found that testing of this software is behind schedule “due largely to delayed software deliveries, limited capability in the software when delivered and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions.”
F-35 arrival ceremony at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, on March 19, 2013. Air Force photo

The military has made limited progress in testing the F-35’s mission systems software, which caused the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to predict that “the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps could be delayed by as much as 13 months,” the report added.

How bad is the situation? Only 13 percent of the Block 2B portion of the software—needed to make the F-35 operational—had been tested as of last January. The target was 27 percent.

Marine F-35s are supposed to become operational in July 2015, but “at this time it is not clear exactly which of the expected capabilities will be available as testing is still ongoing,” the GAO warned.

Meanwhile, GAO auditors question whether the U.S. can even afford the F-35. Current plans are to purchase 2,457 aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps by 2037, with development and acquisition costs estimated at $400 billion.

The jets would replace the bulk of the military’s F-16s, F/A-18s and A-10s.

But for the program to remain on schedule, the Pentagon will have to “steeply” ramp up spending for the next five years, disbursing an average of $12.6 billion per year until 2037. And that’s just on F-35 research and acquisition. The cost of operating and maintaining the JSF fleet could exceed $1 trillion, which Pentagon officials have deemed “unaffordable,” according to the GAO.

But the Air Force insists the F-35 is here to stay. Lockheed also touts the plane as an “unprecedented capability.” But considering the accumulating problems, it may turn out to be an unprecedented mistake.

Check out this link,lengthy report, and accompanying video which explains the issues in great detail.
"The F-35 is a bad deal"
Tag Archives: Delays
February 18, 2014

In a recent segment on “60 Minutes,” titled, “Is the F-35 Worth it?” David Martin, national security correspondent for CBS News, noted that the program is seven years behind schedule and $163 billion over budget.

The piece also touched on the aircraft’s many developmental problems, including improperly installed valves, gaps in the stealth coating, wingtip lights that failed to meet Federal Aviation Administration standards, tires that blow out too frequently and software glitches impacting everything from the helmet-mounted display to the automated parts-replacement system, known as the Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS (pronounced “Alice”).

And just last month, the Pentagon’s top weapons tester, J. Michael Gilmore, concluded the military’s newest and most advanced fighter jet has cracked during flight tests and isn’t yet reliable for combat operations.

Report: Pentagon to Buy Fewer F-35s in 2015

[brar_w]

It's not just "bean counting",that is as far as costs go,looking like it may reach the Pentagon's "unaffordable" limit.Please read the numerous development issues,faults,etc.,well documented/listed out.In earlier posts ,AWST reports etc.,spoke of new structural failures,failures earlier than anticipated,with a less stringent testing regime performance wise-capability lowered, so that the aircraft could make the reduced grade.Look at what the programme head Gen."Bogged-Down" himself says!

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-27/f ... rs/5348414
F-35 Joint Strike Fighters: Australia's biggest Defence acquisition 'unaffordable', US congressional committee hears
Updated Wed 23 Apr 2014,

Parts coming off the aircraft 'too frequently': Bogdan

Ms Sanchez says the F-35 is currently four hours between "critical failures" rather than 13 hours as expected, and at that rate the program will not even meet its reliability goal of 50 per cent.

Lieutenant General Bogdan said with more planes in the skies, program bosses now know parts are coming off the aircraft "too frequently" for maintenance.

"The problem here is you're not going to see results in the next two to three months," he said.

"It's going to take months and months and months of constant efforts to see this improve.
"Our goal is by 2015 to see the aircraft at 60 per cent (reliability)."

Not a pretty picture at all.

A summing up in plain lingo:

Trillion-Dollar Jet’s Software Is in Development Hell
Code delays hobble the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Michael Peck in War is Boring

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is supposed to be America’s premier fighter jet for the next 30 years. But its biggest foe isn’t enemy planes—it’s ones and zeroes.

Software problems, that is. According to a Congress-mandated report released on March 24, the F-35’s mission management system is having so many problems that debugging the software requires extra work and could delay some of the aircraft’s advertised capabilities by more than a year.

This means taxpayers will have to fork over even more money for thousands of F-35s. The stealth jet program already has an over-budget program cost of more than $1 trillion, once you factor in maintenance expenses.

It’s more bad news for the troubled F-35, which Lockheed Martin designed as an all-in-one warplane for carrying out a gamut of missions normally conducted by more specialized planes. There are separate but similar versions for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. This “commonality” forces design compromises that make the JSF arguably less capable than even older fighters such as the F-16.

The F-35 also needs a daunting eight million lines of software code.

The Government Accountability Office report highlights delays with the stealth fighter’s mission system software. This programming controls the aircraft’s vital functions such as sensors and communications.

The audit found that testing of this software is behind schedule “due largely to delayed software deliveries, limited capability in the software when delivered and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions.”
F-35 arrival ceremony at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, on March 19, 2013. Air Force photo

The military has made limited progress in testing the F-35’s mission systems software, which caused the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to predict that “the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps could be delayed by as much as 13 months,” the report added.

How bad is the situation? Only 13 percent of the Block 2B portion of the software—needed to make the F-35 operational—had been tested as of last January. The target was 27 percent.

Marine F-35s are supposed to become operational in July 2015, but “at this time it is not clear exactly which of the expected capabilities will be available as testing is still ongoing,” the GAO warned.

Meanwhile, GAO auditors question whether the U.S. can even afford the F-35. Current plans are to purchase 2,457 aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps by 2037, with development and acquisition costs estimated at $400 billion.

The jets would replace the bulk of the military’s F-16s, F/A-18s and A-10s.

But for the program to remain on schedule, the Pentagon will have to “steeply” ramp up spending for the next five years, disbursing an average of $12.6 billion per year until 2037. And that’s just on F-35 research and acquisition. The cost of operating and maintaining the JSF fleet could exceed $1 trillion, which Pentagon officials have deemed “unaffordable,” according to the GAO.

But the Air Force insists the F-35 is here to stay. Lockheed also touts the plane as an “unprecedented capability.” But considering the accumulating problems, it may turn out to be an unprecedented mistake.

I have provided with rebutals to most of the points you raise in the links and reports. That the GAO reports something is not the be all end all of the program. A proper understanding is required to get into what the issues are , what the fixes are and how far along they are into the phased introduction of those fixes. Fixing solely on negative reports (As you exclusively do) gets you absolutely no where, for if you go to the archives and see the same reports on the F-16 you'd be amazed that the fighter actually flew. You seem to be hell bound on linking only the negative information on the program and seem to spend quite a bit of time finding it (exclusively). Perhaps the discussion is best left for next year when the Marines IOC the F-35 and most of the things you post are proven wrong. Perhaps then you'll change your mind.

A case in Point:

Your Link:

How bad is the situation? Only 13 percent of the Block 2B portion of the software—needed to make the F-35 operational—had been tested as of last January. The target was 27 percent.

Vs Actual Program Head (The person running the damn program)

For the 2B capability that the U.S. Marine Corps is going to use to declare IOC and limited warfighting capability, we are tracking 206 individual capabilities within the software,” U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, F-35 program executive officer, told the House Armed Service Committee on Wednesday. “As of today, 80 percent of those have been verified as good to go,” he said.

Bogdan expects the remaining 20 percent to be verified by the end of the year.

“I’m within 30 days of completing 2B on time,” he said.

If you have time go read between the GAO and the F-22 program office back in the early 2000's. Its a fascinating read and i bet it is archived somewhere. War is boring is a JOKE of a website to put it mildly. 2b testing is separate of Marine core IOC and this is known and has been for quite a time. The marine core has a set of parameters (targets) that 2b testing must verify before they meet IOC, not all the testing for 2b needs to be complete for the marine core to declare IOC. 2b completion has a 1 year BUFFER built into it, since the USAF requires that all 2b be debugged before they declare their IOC (with new hardware which transforms 2b nomenclature to 3i nomenclature) while the marine core requirement is different. The USN requirement is also different from both the USAF and the USMC in what they expect as far as 3f capability is concerned for them to declare IOC, but of course writing that within the article would have been bad for business for the tabloid blog, and would not have gotten it as many "clicks" as the flashing headline would.

A must read

http://op-for.com/2014/02/punk-journali ... -f-35.html