Last time they had such a botched project was with F-111. That time too they had the same thought process of common platform for all arms. Instead of a affordable all around fighter, it turned into a jack of all.
F-35 is no different. They will soon realize the blunder they have done.
Nothing like that. The F-16 would be a good comparison, especially given what is written around in the media (and what was written about it then). The F-35 aims very high, Granted. Both in terms of a common platform and system performance. It aims high and aims to enter with a lot of capability in addition to capability in the spiral. There is no blunder here to realize, only a weapons system to develop and get out into the field. Software is always going to be a problem, because the hardware folks keep designing awesome hardware that requires a tremendous capability from the software to extract the most out of it. How will the russians manage without software for all the hardware that is being speculated about for the PAKFA? The F-35's software is its biggest concern as far as delays are concerned, much like the F-22 program (Go over the archives). Yet just like the F-22 program the software will catch up and provide what its required to. Software also has a different "curve" than traditional hardware cockups. While hardware delays are painstaking due to physical stuff that needs to be re-done to validate changed designs, software control can be established once you add more engineers to the team and once they are up to the standard as far as experience is concerned.
Philip wrote:I don't have a "death wish" for the JSF.US allies need it to succeed to face China in the future.However,all the negative news is coming from the US defence establishment itself.When you add up the list ,you can see that the programme is in serious crisis.
Reduced operating parameters/capabilities,equiv to 30 yr. old designs."irrelevant without the F-22",component unreliability like tyres,an AAM that doesn't work properly with the aircraft's communications,the helmet--there's no HUD, that needs to be replaced,parts cracking up,and the worst problem of all,the software glitches.
The same Bogdan also said:
Lieutenant General Bogdan said with more planes in the skies, program bosses now know parts are coming off the aircraft "too frequently" for maintenance. (!)
"The problem here is you're not going to see results in the next two to three months," he said.
"It's going to take months and months and months of constant efforts to see this improve.
"Our goal is by 2015 to see the aircraft at 60 per cent (reliability)."
When is 100% reliability going to arrive? Which buyer will want a less than 100% reliability primary strike fighter paying anywhere between $110M to $150Ma bird at current flexible estimates? Oz's 58 aircraft are costing a total figure of $11.5B! This makes the Rafale look like a steal.
The rising acquisition costs ,maintenance costs,etc.,and extra funding needed to keep the programme on track is getting dangerously close to the Pentagon's "unaffordable" figure.True,orders are coming in from loyal allies,but at reduced numbers which add another 3% approx to unit costs. If you read carefully the GAO report,it says that
"Additionally, the most recent life-cycle sustainment cost estimate for the F-35 fleet is more than $1 trillion, which DOD officials have deemed unaffordable. "
The allies unlike the US which has the F-22,however do have a major problem.The aircraft was "never meant to be an air superiority fighter",and US analysts say that it is even inferior in that aspect to current 4th-gen aircraft from both east and west.So they need to buy-like Oz,a fleet of EW Growlers in addition to make up for the JSF's EW deficiencies.When faced with overwhelming superiority in numbers of 4th-gen aircraft like Chinese Flankers ,which can carry upto 16 AAMs,the small numbers of JSFs will as the Rand report said,be outnumbered and outgunned.
Now compare that programme with the FGFA/T-50.
If this too like the JSF comes in at horrendous "unaffordable" prices,surely the IAF /MOD will take a good hard look at it before going for it or dumping it. Its development however has been apparently less troublesome thus far.It's the Russian incremental philosophy of testing some tech on existing frontline aircraft like the SU-35,validating them and using upgraded existing engines for initial versions.It is working to an initial IOC by 2016 and is receiving the max support from the govt.The AWST report with the numerous innovations and difference/improvement over the F-22 concept has been well spelt out (posted earlier).There may be delays here too,but given the track record of post Cold War Russian aviation development of the Flanker variants,on solid ground.What the IAF want or do not want in the programme is a matter that must be sorted out asap,once the new dispensation takes charge. One expects that the defence budget will be raised,given the clarion cry from the armed forces,starved of replacements and new weaponry for decades,but there is so much of expectation from the voters that money will be in short supply to go around and priorities must be clearly reviewed and defined.
Xcpt from the Senate hearings on the DEf. avquisitions,budget,etc:
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/im ... 4-8-14.pdf
Senator McCain.
. This is the first trillion dollar system that we
have ever had. What are the lessons learned in this imbroglio
where we have gone from $233 billion in 2001 to over $391 billion
this year? What are the lessons learned here, General?
General BOGDAN
. Sir, we could probably, you and I, get together
and write a book about this. But I will give you a couple of the
things from my perspective on some good lessons learned.
The first lesson is we tend to be overly optimistic when we start
programs in terms of how much they are going to cost, what the
real risk is, and how long they are going to take. We need to do
a better job up front of being more realistic and more honest with
ourselves about how much programs are really going to cost and
what the real technical and fiscal risks are. I do not think we did
that on this program. That is one.
Two, it is very, very hard to run a program when you start pro-
duction before you have ever tested a single airplane because every
time you find something new in flight test, you now have to not
only go back and fix airplanes you have already produced, but you
have to cut all those fixes into the production line. That creates a
complexity that is pretty significant and it costs some money.
Senator MC CAIN
. Well, at least we ought to know the names ofthe people made this kind of cockamamie agreement to start with
because there were many of us that—you forgot the fundamentalthat we adopted during the Reagan years: fly before you buy. Fly
before you buy.
General BOGDAN
. I do not disagree with you, sir.
Senator MCCAIN.If we had adhered to that principle, we probably would not find ourselves in the situation we are in.
I just have a short time left. General Davis, right now I understand the A–10s are to be phased out. Is that your understanding?
General DAVIS
Sir, that is.
Senator MCCAIN.What is going to replace it?
General DAVIS
. Sir, if you look at the systems we are using today and have used since Iraq, the A–10s have basically failed about 20
percent of the call for CAS missions. So that means we are doing it with F–16s. We are doing it with F–15Es. We are doing it with
B–1s and B–52s. We are doing it with precision weapons that werenot part of the A–10 suite.
Senator MCCAIN
. So they are better suited for close air supportthan the A–10 is. Is that correct?
General DAVIS
. Sir, I did not say they are better suited. I saidthey can do that mission based on—
Senator MCCAIN
. Depending on what kind of conflict we are in.Right?
General DAVIS
. It does.
Senator MCCAIN
. If we are in a more conventional conflict, there
is no aircraft or weapons system that does the job of the A–10. Is
there?
General DAVIS
. Sir, it does its mission very well. It is designed or one mission. It does that mission well.
Senator MCCAIN
. That one mission happens to be close air support.
General DAVIS
. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCAIN
. I thank the chairman
What is the point of bringing up the Mccain testimony into this discussion (btw i have seen the entire 3 odd hours video of the event and if you so wish you can as well :
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/he ... -air-force )? His job is to protect the A-10 as it based out of his home state. He laughs at the fact that the B-1 is a CAS platform but it has done CAS in an increasing fashion in the last 2 conflicts as has been shown to him. The Air force has built up its ability to do CAS through various platforms (traditional and non-traditional) due to the demand for it:
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/05/sen- ... ly-do-cas/
I can go at lengths, talking about what an idiot Mccain is but that has nothing to do with the F-35 or its program.
First of all reliability is a IOC problem, so where they are can only be determined post the depot work and full missions software for both the aircraft and ALIS. Secondly, the australian money budgeted is a NOTIONAL amount and not a fixed amount with which you can simply divide the number of airframes and get a "cost per jet". Kindly do read the way the JSF program buys its aircrafts and how each partner pays for them exactly. Most international programs work this way. The country budgets a certain amounts, but does not pay it until a contract is negotiated. The final contract may be much lower than what that country may have put aside.
http://www.elementsofpower.blogspot.com ... space.html
Even if the RAAF were to pay current block prices for the F-35 (which are higher than full production jets) the cost of acquiring the jet would be 7 billion 200 million. The LRIP7 APUC is for all to see. Full production jets however are expected to have considerably lower costs, and would require ZERO depot work. The JPO pegs that cost to be around 85 million per jet including everything (At FPC). The overall APUC for the program (All 2000+ fighters) stands at 77 million minus the engine, and an APUC of around 12-15 million for the engine. So the APUC for the Alpha version is expected to be around 90 million per jet which is tilted slightly to the right by the expensive early L-RIP jets of course much like any other fighter before it.
I don't have a "death wish" for the JSF.US allies need it to succeed to face China in the future.However,all the negative news is coming from the US defence establishment itself.When you add up the list ,you can see that the programme is in serious crisis.
Reduced operating parameters/capabilities,equiv to 30 yr. old designs."irrelevant without the F-22",component unreliability like tyres,an AAM that doesn't work properly with the aircraft's communications,the helmet--there's no HUD, that needs to be replaced,parts cracking up,and the worst problem of all,the software glitches.
Like I said earlier, go read the F-16 development history and negative media reports on the same. You had bulkhead cracks, wing refixes, crashes due to poor mission systems occur and widely reported by the media much of which labeled it as a lemon that would be the most risky, unsuccessful big budget program in US history. The US media is free to report on defense matters and the unclassified nature of the JSF means that 100's of pages are released on information from various sources per year. A lot of the times reports that were written in June-July, to be published in September are quoted in January of the following year by the so called defense expert's "blogs" and the program office has to clarify that fixes to the issues "found last year" have either been implemented or designed and being implemented etc. Helmet issues, Tailhook issues, software reliability issues, lightning protection issues have all been dealt like this by the media, despite of the program office issuing clarification after clarification that it has "fixes" in place and its not unusual to find faults during testing and that it was the "entire purpose of rigorous testing". There has been no program in the US department of defense history that did not find issues in developmental and operational testing. Not the F-22, not the F-16 and definitely not the F-15. As far as concurrency (the much talked about buzzword for f-35 basher arm chair generals) there has not been a single weapons program in the US since WW2 that has not required concurrency work. Not a single fighter ever developed in US has waited for full testing of capability block before beginning production. Do you know that over 1500 F-16's were produced for the US and partners before the first useful block 30 version was fully completed? For the F-35 the number will be below 300, and if you exclude the block 8 and 9 that will have retrofits built into the frames as they leave the factory it will be close to 200. The way a program that is required to produce 300-400 fighters is run is much different from a program that needs 3000 fighters. Concurrency costs for the first couple of hundred are negligible to the overall acquisition cost and therefore not a bad thing to have if that means that you can begin introducing active fighters fleet wide at a much faster pace. This was the reason why the concurrency model was chosen for the f-16 and why it was also chosen (although not as aggressively ) for the F-35.
Read:
http://www.elementsofpower.blogspot.in/ ... again.html
As the tests progressed, cracks developed in several structural bulkheads. News of this problem resulted in hostile comments in the media, but GD pointed out in its own defence that the cracks had occurred not in flying aircraft but on ground test specimens. If the risk of such cracks during development testing was not a real one, a company spokesman remarked to the author at the time, no-one would be willing to pay for ground structural test rigs. GD redesigned the affected components, thickening the metal, and installed metal plates to reinforce existing units.
Sounds familiar? Its actually from the F-16 development program.
Here's a guy who unlike the so called expert bloggers actually was a part of both the F-16 development program and the F-35 development effort
http://www.defensenews.com/article/2012 ... nav%7Chead
I see the US purchase for 2015 being spun into the fact that the performance is poor so they are buying less. This is definitely not the case as most of the folks reporting on it know it (but it does not make for a good click bait). The Navy reduced its 5 year plan much like the french armed forces, to accommodate the new budgetary realities. They saved money by running a SLEP on the classic hornet so that the purchase of the F-35 ramp up could be pushed back to past a point where the budget controls no longer exist (the new sequestration budget). The Air force reduction is small and only reflects the budget they have left after cuts made to it.
I don't claim that you are wishing or hoping for the F-35 to fail, all I am saying is that rather than just reading negative articles and posting them in bulk, you try to understand the "pains" in development, report on them, in a balanced fashion and actually see what are the current roadblock to the three IOC's and how far they are to meeting those targets. Like someone from WAR IS BORING mentioned, 2b is 13% instead of 27% so a 13 month delay in Marine IOC Crap, when they actually totally failed to report what is really happening with the IOC. A basic understanding of the IOC procedures even by looking at past history (Super hornet or F-22 raptor developmental history and IOC) could paint a complete picture. One just needs to spend a few minutes on the internet to figure out what and how each service IOC's and what it looks for to claim that capability. For the USMC its a 200+ parameters that need to be fully tested, debugged and handed over in toto. Secondly, they need the L-RIP4/5 jets to get back to the depot and get concurrency changes (planned from the start just like the F-16 program). They know that its tough to predict how rapid the depot changes will yeild in terms of the jets coming back to them. Hence they have built a minimum threshold of 10 that is required to IOC. When they have 10 2b aircrafts that meet testing targets for their IOC parameters, and that have completed depot work and are back, they will declare IOC. Their target is 16 but that is contingent on the depot work. Anywhere between 10-16 is fine for them and the timeframe they are confident on (including the confidence of the Program head) is between July next year and December of the same year. This is exactly how the F-22 program IOC in 2004 (or 05) for the air force. United States Air force laid out a set of parameters that it required to be completed and delivered, once that was done they declared IOC. The same block software took months after that to deliver full capability, but that is how software development works in a spiral development. The P8 program is a perfect example and relevant for us. It also introduces a baseline capability (comparable to P3) which is added through mostly system integration and software work. The F-35 is no different, just that its software is many times more complex due to the nature of the architecture and performance required from all its sensors and net-centricity demanded by the services.
How confident are the marines of actually meeting the IOC deadline (range) and not the crap 13 month delay as is being claimed? Well for one they have already firmed up plans to deploy the F-35B's in early-mid 2016 outside of the US (Japan or South korea, i cannot recall exactly) for the first unit.
Edit: Here's something i found from f16net forum, an interesting watch, rather long though (nearly 1 hour)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vxe4Jv1cJxI