Indian Naval News & Discussion - 12 Oct 2013

K_Rohit · Post by **K_Rohit** » 18 Jun 2014 10:26

maz wrote:Good catch on the missing main gun on F40. I am wondering if the ship was pulled out from a refit to make up numbers for the DAS event.

The 8 cell Klub UVLM launcher should be compatible with Brahmos unless I am mistaken.

The Navy is currently upgrading some of the guns to resolve serviceability and other issues, Navy officers are quite proud of what they are doing with this local, indigenous upgrade. cant share details.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 Jun 2014 11:13

on that note I was reading about the gsh-6-30 on the mig27. seems to be a inappropriate design for a fighter and has lots of collateral. beast of a gun but perhaps more suited to a AN32G concept.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gryazev-Shipunov_GSh-6-30
On the Mikoyan MiG-27 the Gsh-6-30 had to be mounted obliquely to absorb recoil. The gun was noted for its high (often uncomfortable) vibration and extreme noise. The airframe vibration led to fatigue cracks in fuel tanks, numerous radio and avionics failures, the necessity of using runways with floodlights for night flights (as the landing lights would often be destroyed), tearing or jamming of the forward landing gear doors (leading to at least three crash landings), cracking of the reflector gunsight, an accidental jettisoning of the cockpit canopy and at least one case of the instrument panel falling off in flight. The weapons also dealt extensive collateral damage, as the sheer numbers of fragments from detonating shells was sufficient to damage aircraft flying within a 200 meter radius from the impact center, including the aircraft firing.

uddu · Post by **uddu** » 18 Jun 2014 17:47

Flat surfaces which reflect radar signals much more for anti-Ship missiles, its better to go for vessels that minimizes these kinds of threats. Notterdam looks like target practice vessel.
The competition is going to be between Juan Carlos and Mistral since these two meets the Navy's requirement. Juan Carlos is more bang for buck and Mistral is more about French sophistication.

sum · Post by **sum** » 18 Jun 2014 18:30

X-post:

sum wrote:Wonder if this is true:
Contrary to Claims, Arihant not Prepared for Sea Trials

Contrary to claims, India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine INS Arihant is still not ready for sea trails, a stage critical for testing the vessel’s systems and weapons before it can be commissioned into the Navy.

Arihant’s miniaturised nuclear reactor, built with Russian help, had gone critical in last August and since then the 6,000-tonne vessel has been put through a series of harbour acceptance trials, which could take a few more months, according to top navy sources here.

The vessel, powered by a 83-MW pressurised light-water reactor operated with enriched uranium fuel, was to sail out for sea trials earlier this year, but the Navy has not been able to take the vessel out, as more tests are being conducted to ensure foolproof sea trials of all systems on board, sources said.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Jun 2014 04:21

If the USN's CNO is advocating a less confrontational attitude towards China and the PLAN,then why should the IN be roped into a US-led anti-Chinese naval axis?

http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/greener ... 234c8f82d4

Greenert: Don’t ‘Unnecessarily Antagonize’ China
By: Sam LaGrone
Published: June 17, 2014

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert and Chief of Navy of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Adm. Wu Shengli greet each other in Qingdao, China on April 21, 2014. US Navy Photo

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert and Chief of Navy of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Adm. Wu Shengli greet each other in Qingdao, China on April 21, 2014. US Navy Photo

NEWPORT, R.I. — Open discussion of how U.S. forces could deter Chinese ships and aircraft could unnecessarily antagonize one of America’s largest trading partners, the Navy’s top admiral said during an address at the U.S. Naval War College on Tuesday.

“If you talk about it openly, you cross the line and unnecessarily antagonize,” said Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert during the Current Strategy Forum in Newport, R.I. in response to an audience question.
“You probably have a sense about how much we trade with that country, it’s astounding. “

Greenert was responding to an audience question on how to speak to mid-level officers and enlisted U.S. sailors on tactics, techniques and procedures how to counter Chinese ships and aircraft.

“In a classified nature we look at all of this. There are groups up [Naval War College] that talk about it all the time,” Greenert said.

While the Pentagon seldom singles out China as potential adversary publically, the growing capability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — especially the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) — drives larger strategy discussions in the military and in Congress.

Military planners present the problem of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) — the ability of a force to deny a superior force access to a particular area — agnostically without mentioning specific countries or regions

“It would be antagonistic to any country to openly say that we are preparing [for conflict],” Greenert said later to reporters.

The Pentagon ultimately wants to be able to access any part of the globe with military forces in an all-domain access plan and worked through the all-service Air Sea Battle Office.

“Air Sea Battle is about access and assuring access, and that’s anywhere in the world, it is our intention [to have] all domain access as part of our strategy,” Greenert said in the meeting with reporters.

But key strategic crossroads, like the Strait of Hormuz, the areas around North Korea and the South China Seas are omnipresent in any discussion of A2/AD threats.

To be fair, U.S. strategists constantly generate plans based on a variety of scenarios, no matter how unlikely. For example the U.S. in the lead up to World War II had a war plan designed to counter an attack from the British Isles and more recently created a plan to handle a so-called zombie infestation.

However, the ultimate plan that guided U.S. construction ahead of World War II was War Plan Orange, the plan that focused on the contingency of an expansionist Japanese Empire.

While Chinese capabilities are surely in the mind of U.S. strategists, the Pentagon is also seeking closer military-to-military relationship with Beijing and the PLA.

China is sending four ships to the U.S. led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 multi-national exercise later this month and Greenert and his wife are set to meet his counterpart, PLAN chief Adm. Wu Shengliin, in a July visit to China.

China and the U.S. are also signatories to the Conduct Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).

A late 2013 run-in between a PLAN amphibious ship and the guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG-63), in part, prompted 21 Pacific nations to sign a military maritime rules-of-the-road earlier this year.

“My view when people ask me ‘what are you going to do about the South China Sea?’ we’re going to manage it, we’re going to work CUES,” Greenert said.
“We’ve got to manage through it, kiddo.”

Greenert’s view on discussing countering China openlly was disputed by at least one speaker at the Current Strategy Forum.

“I think it’s important for leaders to find ways to talk about China as a military rival,” in order to inform civilian leadership, Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University said in a later panel.

Sid · Post by **Sid** » 19 Jun 2014 08:30

Philip wrote:If the USN's CNO is advocating a less confrontational attitude towards China and the PLAN,then why should the IN be roped into a US-led anti-Chinese naval axis?

http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/greener ... 234c8f82d4

Nop, that's not what this article talks about at all.

He is just saying "don't call a spade a spade".

“My view when people ask me ‘what are you going to do about the South China Sea?’ we’re going to manage it, we’re going to work CUES,” Greenert said.
“We’ve got to manage through it, kiddo.”

Good general mentions that they are tackling Chinese behind the curtains while doing regula pappi jhappi during photo ops to mislead the aam janta.

They have succeed in misleading at least one

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 19 Jun 2014 08:38

Philip wrote:If the USN's CNO is advocating a less confrontational attitude towards China and the PLAN,then why should the IN be roped into a US-led anti-Chinese naval axis?

Who said we should join a US-led anything? Cooperation and exercising is hardly the same thing as joining a formal military alliance. And even for low grade stuff, we've gone out of our way to not ruffle China's feathers.

And while on the topic, perhaps you should also explain China's confrontational attitude over Tawang, Senkaku, South China Sea etc.

In the first intrusion by air this year, Chinese helicopters came a couple of kilometers inside India in Uttarakhand on April 30 and as recent as on June 13, and returned after hovering over Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) posts. (link)

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 19 Jun 2014 08:56

India Proposes $2.25B Tender for ASW Shallow Water Craft

NEW DELHI — India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a tender to local shipyards to build 16 shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels, a $2.25 billion program that would mark the first such effort by domestic yards.

The tender, in the “Buy and Make India” category, was issued last week to private sector companies Larsen & Toubro, ABG Shipyard, Pipavav Defense and Offshore Engineering, and to state-owned Goa Shipyard and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers. The vessels would replace Russian-made Abhay-class corvettes commissioned in 1989 and 1991.

The domestic companies will need to tie up with overseas defense companies to acquire certain critical technologies, officials said.

“The domestic defense companies have the ability to build the shallow craft but will need to tie up with overseas companies, especially to procure a variety of sonars,” said a senior Indian Navy official.

An executive of Garden Reach said they are already searching for global partners but would not discuss which shipyards they are contacting.

Shyam Kumar Singh, retired Indian Navy captain, said he is confident domestic shipyards can build the vessels.

“Indian warship building has matured with the shipyards having acquired good capability over the years. So there is no risk as far as shipbuilding is concerned. This is an ASW platform. The main equipment onboard such a ship is the sonar. There are two sonars on such platforms, namely, hull mounted sonar and the low frequency variable depth sonar. The technology does not exist for such sonars in India and will need to be procured from abroad,” Singh said.

Under a policy change in 2013, MoD decided to explore all avenues to buy weapons and equipment first from the domestic markets and then, if needed, by direct purchase from overseas. In the case of the shallow craft, officials and analysts said, domestic industry has the ability to build the boats.

Anil Jai Singh, a retired Indian Navy commodore and defense analyst, said, “We have gained enough experience in building large warships over the years. These are going to be small platforms [about 750 tons]. It is also important that the private defense sector becomes competitive and is able to undertake construction of weapon platforms. This is a good project for them to ascend the learning curve in building weapon platforms, including system integration, as it is small and weapon integration would not be too complex.”

The ASW shallow water crafts will be used for anti-submarine warfare operations in coastal waters, low intensity maritime operations and mine-laying. The first Indian Navy official said requirements include the capability for sub-surface surveillance of coastal waters; coordinated anti-submarine warfare operations with aircraft; destruction of sub-surface targets in coastal waters; ability to carry out search and rescue, day and night, in coastal areas; and the ability to engage intruding craft.

The ship would be required to operate within 200 nautical miles of the base port.

The dimensions of the shallow craft with stealth capabilities include a draft not exceeding 2.7 meters in fully laden condition without the sonar dome. The vessel should have a speed of not less than 25 knots fully loaded and be able to carry at least seven officers and more than 50 sailors.

The vessels will be connected with the Navy’s network-centric warfare system, which will also be linked with other ASW assets, including airborne manned and unmanned platforms, the Navy official said. ■

titash · Post by **titash** » 19 Jun 2014 10:12

Austin wrote:India Proposes $2.25B Tender for ASW Shallow Water Craft

NEW DELHI — India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a tender to local shipyards to build 16 shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels, a $2.25 billion program that would mark the first such effort by domestic yards.

The tender, in the “Buy and Make India” category, was issued last week to private sector companies Larsen & Toubro, ABG Shipyard, Pipavav Defense and Offshore Engineering, and to state-owned Goa Shipyard and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers. The vessels would replace Russian-made Abhay-class corvettes commissioned in 1989 and 1991.

The domestic companies will need to tie up with overseas defense companies to acquire certain critical technologies, officials said.

“The domestic defense companies have the ability to build the shallow craft but will need to tie up with overseas companies, especially to procure a variety of sonars,” said a senior Indian Navy official.

An executive of Garden Reach said they are already searching for global partners but would not discuss which shipyards they are contacting.

Shyam Kumar Singh, retired Indian Navy captain, said he is confident domestic shipyards can build the vessels.

“Indian warship building has matured with the shipyards having acquired good capability over the years. So there is no risk as far as shipbuilding is concerned. This is an ASW platform. The main equipment onboard such a ship is the sonar. There are two sonars on such platforms, namely, hull mounted sonar and the low frequency variable depth sonar. The technology does not exist for such sonars in India and will need to be procured from abroad,” Singh said.

Under a policy change in 2013, MoD decided to explore all avenues to buy weapons and equipment first from the domestic markets and then, if needed, by direct purchase from overseas. In the case of the shallow craft, officials and analysts said, domestic industry has the ability to build the boats.

Anil Jai Singh, a retired Indian Navy commodore and defense analyst, said, “We have gained enough experience in building large warships over the years. These are going to be small platforms [about 750 tons]. It is also important that the private defense sector becomes competitive and is able to undertake construction of weapon platforms. This is a good project for them to ascend the learning curve in building weapon platforms, including system integration, as it is small and weapon integration would not be too complex.”

The ASW shallow water crafts will be used for anti-submarine warfare operations in coastal waters, low intensity maritime operations and mine-laying. The first Indian Navy official said requirements include the capability for sub-surface surveillance of coastal waters; coordinated anti-submarine warfare operations with aircraft; destruction of sub-surface targets in coastal waters; ability to carry out search and rescue, day and night, in coastal areas; and the ability to engage intruding craft.

The ship would be required to operate within 200 nautical miles of the base port.

The dimensions of the shallow craft with stealth capabilities include a draft not exceeding 2.7 meters in fully laden condition without the sonar dome. The vessel should have a speed of not less than 25 knots fully loaded and be able to carry at least seven officers and more than 50 sailors.

The vessels will be connected with the Navy’s network-centric warfare system, which will also be linked with other ASW assets, including airborne manned and unmanned platforms, the Navy official said. ■

So the 'Janata' class will eventually replace the Pauks. A good decision to involve private sector shipyards with these lower tech projects - they will be needed if we are to produce P-15B/P-17A/P-28 like sausages down the line

The HMS should be the local 'Abhay' sonar that was recently showcased. The LFVDS will be imported it seems...I wonder why, the Pauks used the Ka-25's dipping sonar. I assumed the new LFDS showcased with the Dhruv would be used here too. Apparently not...looks like these boats will have more powerful purpose designed sonars + satellite integration

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Jun 2014 17:35

Sorry if posted before.
http://www.janes.com/article/38672/indi ... rce=Eloqua

The Indian Navy (IN) is seeking INR160 billion (USD2.66 billion) over the next 2-3 years from the newly-elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to resume construction of the Project 71 indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC).

Official sources told IHS Jane's that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is expected to imminently clear a "significant portion" of the IN's financial demand to revive work on Phases II and III of the 40,000-tonne IAC at the Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) yard at Kochi in southern India.

The carrier was launched and named Vikrant in August 2013, with senior Naval Design Bureau (NDB) sources saying that 75% of the carrier's structure was complete. However, work on the carrier has virtually come to a standstill in recent months due to a resource crunch. This includes modular construction work and the installation of radar, sensors, and weapon systems.

Senior officials said the new CCS would require clearances from the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the federal Finance Ministry to approve the funds. The CCS of the outgoing Congress Party-led federal coalition had secured both of these approvals earlier in 2014 but failed to implement them - resulting in the near-suspension of work.

IN officials also warned that further delays in sanctioning additional funding for the IAC could delay its commissioning beyond its already extended 2017-18 deadline.

Three quarters of the basic structure of the IAC has been completed at an estimated cost of INR35-40 billion. The carrier is eventually expected to cost between INR240-250 billion.

IN Chief of Staff Admiral D K Joshi told IHS Jane's in January 2013 that work on the IAC had been delayed due to financial and technological hurdles, and a traffic accident involving the truck transporting the carrier's generators.

India currently operates INS Vikramaditya (ex- Admiral Gorshkov ), a modified Kiev-class 44,750-tonne carrier that entered service in January, and INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes ), a 54-year-old 28,000-tonne Centaur-class platform that has locally undergone multiple refits.

That's $4-5B for the Vik-2.

member_27164 · Post by **member_27164** » 20 Jun 2014 19:14

Phillip, my openion:
1. $4-5B is the cost at current rate of doller. And that keeps fluctuating.
2. the entire amount is/will not be spent in one go.
3. a fair amount of money should have gone into developing new systems and creating infrastructure. this will be used further for IAC 2 and it is one time cost.
considering this, i would rather say cost of the ship be $2.5 - 3B. not bad i guess.

maz · Post by **maz** » 21 Jun 2014 03:00

List of ships from RIMPAC 2014.

http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2014/participants/

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 21 Jun 2014 09:53

Philip wrote:That's $4-5B for the Vik-2.

That's $4 billion for the IAC of which less than $1 billion has been sanctioned so far. The rest will be disbursed post 2015. Adjust that figure backwards to fit the Sevmash's timeline, and the cost will fall to about $3 billion or so. This for a ship -

- intended from ground up to operate fixed wing aircraft (no compromises, no jugaad)
- a far more modern design
- cost includes radars, weaponry, combat management systems
- cost includes fixed investments into the domestic industry
- leads to the development of Indian 'know-how'
- takes same time for construction by CSL, as refurbishment by Sevmash

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 21 Jun 2014 10:01

I can't see costs falling whatsoever.When complete it will in all probabaility cost another B or two.Just look at the track record of warship construction in the country.Delays due to funding,tech problems,etc.,have plagued our shipbuilding industry.Just look at the Scorpene escalation,and escalation of DDgs and FFGs.It is appalling that politicos and MOD babus begin grandiose programmes and then abandon them halfway. The LCA is another example.

Roperia · Post by **Roperia** » 21 Jun 2014 10:37

This AC is a beauty

[youtube]pO3j4OAB374&[/youtube]

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 21 Jun 2014 11:07

Philip wrote:Sorry if posted before.
http://www.janes.com/article/38672/indi ... rce=Eloqua

The Indian Navy (IN) is seeking INR160 billion (USD2.66 billion) over the next 2-3 years from the newly-elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to resume construction of the Project 71 indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC).
...

The carrier was launched and named Vikrant in August 2013, with senior Naval Design Bureau (NDB) sources saying that 75% of the carrier's structure was complete. However, work on the carrier has virtually come to a standstill in recent months due to a resource crunch. This includes modular construction work and the installation of radar, sensors, and weapon systems.

Senior officials said the new CCS would require clearances from the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the federal Finance Ministry to approve the funds. The CCS of the outgoing Congress Party-led federal coalition had secured both of these approvals earlier in 2014 but failed to implement them - resulting in the near-suspension of work.

IN officials also warned that further delays in sanctioning additional funding for the IAC could delay its commissioning beyond its already extended 2017-18 deadline.

So the construction work on the IAC comes to a virtual standstill due to the fund crunch, but some how we can afford super expensive Rafales, Apaches etc

.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 21 Jun 2014 13:27

Philip wrote:I can't see costs falling whatsoever.

No one's predicting that costs will fall. Simply adjusting the cost for inflation. Rs 240-250 billion is $4 billion.

$4 billion invested over 2009-18 (IAC) is not necessarily higher than $2.5 billion invested 2004-09 (Gorshkov).

Just look at the track record of warship construction in the country.Delays due to funding,tech problems,etc.,have plagued our shipbuilding industry.

10 years to refurbish a carrier. Twice what was agreed upon. And delivered at twice the cost.

So cost overruns and delays are fine... as long as its Russians who're receiving the Indian taxpayer's money?

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 22 Jun 2014 11:25

No one is defending the delay in the Vik-A's arrival and escalated costs.Both Russia and India grossly underestimated the cost of refurbishing and rebuilding the carrier.We studied it for a whole decade before deciding to buy it.The case is history now.Both sides came to a mutual agreement upon final costs (remember the boiler cladding problem,due to our specs),etc. The Q now is at what cost are we building our own carrier? The QE carriers are a case in comparison.If our funding is patchy,work now stopped because there are no funds in the kitty,eventually it is going to keep on rising as CAG reports have shown with other ships and subs constructed in the country.Even.our homebuilt warships have key components like sensors,weaponry,powerplants,etc. obtained from abroad.Take the case of the minesweepers ,no decision yet! HSL dismantled a Kilo sub and cannot put it together again,infuriating the IN which has lost a sub worth at least $300M for no fault of its own,requiring all Kilos to be refitted/upgraded in Russia.

It is inescapable that if we are to build up the IN to planned future strengths,the entire fleet cannot be built solely at home,especially when the MOD thus far has protected the DPSUs and not awarded major contracts to pvt. yards like L&T,etc.,which are quite capable of building subs,warships,etc. In several cases foreign yards can build faster and at affordable rates sophisticated vessels like the fleet auxiliaries built in Italy. One must compare the time taken to build the 6 Talwars with the time taken to build the Delhis and Shivaliks.There are many reasons for this.Dockyard space constraints,lack of modernisation,etc.
A complete revamp of the indigenous warship and sub building capability is required if the IN's planned replacements,modernisation and future ambitions are to be realised.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 22 Jun 2014 19:10

Philip wrote:No one is defending the delay in the Vik-A's arrival and escalated costs.Both Russia and India grossly underestimated the cost of refurbishing and rebuilding the carrier.

The liability for an increase in cost usually lies with the contractor if the contractor was the party responsible for a huge mistake during appraisal. Which is the case here.

We studied it for a whole decade before deciding to buy it.The case is history now.

I'm willing to call it history, a done deal, as long as you don't keep slipping in dubious statements about how the deal resulted in great value-for-money.

Both sides came to a mutual agreement upon final costs (remember the boiler cladding problem,due to our specs),etc.

Were the boiler cladding requirements slipped in by the Indian Navy after negotiation? Was it not known to the Russian side when the deal was originally being hashed out?

For that matter, did the Russians negotiate in good faith once the actual costs for refurbishing the Gorshkov were revealed? Did they convey any contrition? Or did they instead -

1. Keep the escalation and delays under wraps for a long time?
2. Demand nearly $3 billion to complete it?
3. Try to influence negotiations by blackmailing an Indian naval officer?
4. Pressurize India by hinting it could be transferred to the Russian Navy?

The QE carriers are a case in comparison.

No they're not. The QE program had been built around fixed price contracts. With a funding crunch in 2008, the UK govt decided to extend the delivery schedule and draw out payments over a longer term. That was the primary reason for the cost escalation along with the flip flop on adding CATOBAR capability.

Had its construction continued uninterrupted, it would have cost maybe about 1.5 times as much as the Vikad, while delivering far superior value.

If our funding is patchy,work now stopped because there are no funds in the kitty,eventually it is going to keep on rising as CAG reports have shown with other ships and subs constructed in the country.Even.our homebuilt warships have key components like sensors,weaponry,powerplants,etc. obtained from abroad. Take the case of the minesweepers ,no decision yet! HSL dismantled a Kilo sub and cannot put it together again,infuriating the IN which has lost a sub worth at least $300M for no fault of its own,requiring all Kilos to be refitted/upgraded in Russia.

- Does awarding contracts to Russia for Talwars increase or decrease the funds available for the Shivalik/P-17A?
- Does sourcing 'key components' from abroad made locally developed ships less capable?

- Are the Shalki and Shankul, less capable by virtue of having been built at MDL?
- Were some industrial capacity generated at MDL through the U-209 production?
- If so, was it a wise decision or a mistake not have placed follow-on orders to capitalize on that?

- Will Scorpenes built by MDL be mothballed because they are late/over-budget?
- Should the capabilities built up at MDL, at a non-refundable cost, be written off (instead of being exploited with follow-on orders)?

- Is the nuclear triad a farce because the Arihant is being built by domestic yards?

It is inescapable that if we are to build up the IN to planned future strengths,the entire fleet cannot be built solely at home,especially when the MOD thus far has protected the DPSUs and not awarded major contracts to pvt. yards like L&T,etc.,which are quite capable of building subs,warships,etc.

If it was a mistake to involve private yards, one would presume that it would be rectified by including them now, rather than dispatching work and funds overseas.

In several cases foreign yards can build faster and at affordable rates sophisticated vessels like the fleet auxiliaries built in Italy. One must compare the time taken to build the 6 Talwars with the time taken to build the Delhis and Shivaliks.

The Shivalik was a clean sheet design, so it was bound to take longer. That said, the third and final Shivalik was launched nine years ago. Is it your case that MDL was incapable of building anymore from that day forth?

There are many reasons for this.Dockyard space constraints,lack of modernisation,etc. A complete revamp of the indigenous warship and sub building capability is required if the IN's planned replacements,modernisation and future ambitions are to be realised.

On 07 August 2007 ShipbuildingRu reported that Kaliningrad based Yantar shipyard had laid down the head project 1135.6 frigate for Navy of India. For this contract Yantar had invested considerable means in modernization of the manufacturing infrastructure, and bought a lot of modern equipment. Construction of the frigates was to be completed in 2012.

The Baltic Shipyard did not receive the contract for the second consignment of three frigates. After extended talks, it was given to Kaliningrad shipbuilders. "The Yantar plant was given the second series of ships for political reasons," said Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. "This was done not so much to support the specific plant as the economy of the entire Kaliningrad exclave." (link)

^ So orders from India funded the modernization of Russia's Yantar shipyard.

Yet the 'lack of modernization' in domestic shipyards is offered as a reason why India should continue importing ships from Russia.

titash · Post by **titash** » 24 Jun 2014 21:04

Shiv Aroor has several new pics of the Kamorta class:

http://www.livefistdefence.com/

This TOI article talks about the Kamortas being 3400 tonnes full load displacement. That's bigger than a Leander:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=21082

kala desi has been sneakily inducting frigates disguised as patrol craft

member_23370 · Post by **member_23370** » 24 Jun 2014 21:15

A 3400 tonne ship is in same class as G class frigates. A pity if it doesn't even carry 8 urans and 24 barak-1's. Even livefist blog says 3400 tonne displacement.

narmad · Post by **narmad** » 24 Jun 2014 21:21

India's first indigenous anti-submarine warfare ship ready

corvette INS Kamorta, named after islands in Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshwadeep archipelago, ASW corvettes Kadmatt, Kiltan and Kavaratti are to follow suit progressively.
The sophisticated front line warship with stealth features will also be the first warship armed with the new trainable chaff launcher - Kavach.

With an approximate displacement of 3400 tonnes, it can achieve a maximum speed of 25 knots. It is powered by four indigenously designed 3888 KW diesel engines at 1050 rpm and can cover nearly 3,500 nautical miles at 18 knots.
The overall length of the ship is 109 meters and is nearly 13 metres wide at its maximum bulge.

It is also the first naval ship fitted with bow mounted 'Sonar' (sound navigation and ranging) for enhanced underwater surveillance.
Integration of indigenous surveillance radar (Revathi) for surface and air surveillance is another first on any Indian warship.

Comments by gurus?

Mayuresh · Post by **Mayuresh** » 24 Jun 2014 21:37

titash wrote:Shiv Aroor has several new pics of the Kamorta class:

http://www.livefistdefence.com/

This TOI article talks about the Kamortas being 3400 tonnes full load displacement. That's bigger than a Leander:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=21082

kala desi has been sneakily inducting frigates disguised as patrol craft

We've been doing that for quite some time now. Notice that the Shivalik frigates are 6,200 tonnes full load displacement, while the Rajput destroyers from the 80s just about touch 5,000 tonnes full load. The Delhi destroyers are 6,700 tonnes newer Kolkata destroyers will be 7200 tonnes. Looks like we have added a 1,000 tonnes displacement to our destroyers every decade! Probably similar ratios for frigates and corvettes

titash · Post by **titash** » 24 Jun 2014 21:45

The MoD's man in the east, Group Captain Tarun K Singha, a MiG-21 pilot whose been dedicated the publicity for the defence forces for the last few years, sent out this note on the new ships and the upcoming induction:
...
The weapons and sensors include fire-control radar, surface-to-air missiles, close-in weapon system, medium-range gun system, surveillance radar, chaff system for counter-measures against enemy radars and missiles, torpedo launcher, anti-submarine rocket launchers, EW system, combat management system and advanced sonar system.

If this is coming straight from the MoD, should we assume that there is a Barak-1 system on board? Or perhaps its a "fitted for, but not with" space for a Maitri installation? I recall below pics that showed the Revathi radar interfacing with a Maitri SAM

http://i.imgur.com/6Ol3Tgz.jpg
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/T ... 727718.jpg

titash · Post by **titash** » 24 Jun 2014 22:06

Among the other firsts on this ship, these are always listed in press releases:

The ship is also capable of deploying a helicopter, adding considerable punch to the ship’s anti-submarine capability. With a foldable hangar door fitted for the first time with a rail-less helicopter traversing system fitted -- also a noteworthy first on any naval ship -- helicopter operations from the corvette decks will have a significant edge over existing platforms of other warships.

Aren't hangar doors always foldable just like a garage door? what am I missing?

Also, how is the "rail less" system different from a conventional system? And how does it enable better helo ops? I wish they'd explain this is better detail.

Note that the maximum beam is close to the stern and the helo deck itself is extremely spacious. It will easily be able to support 2x helicopters and possibly rotary UAVs.
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-4cniQ_S4JU0/U ... 715257.jpg

Basically this is a very desi warship: desi stealth design, desi steel, desi radar, desi sonar, desi rocket launcher (copy of RBU-6000), desi twin-HWT, desi 76 mm and 30 mm (license manufactured). Hopefully this will be our Type 056 equivalent that we can turn out like sausages in the improved P-28A version.

John · Post by **John** » 25 Jun 2014 00:09

Bheeshma wrote:A 3400 tonne ship is in same class as G class frigates. A pity if it doesn't even carry 8 urans and 24 barak-1's. Even livefist blog says 3400 tonne displacement.

The 2 RBU-6000 (RPK-8) system weight more than 8 Klub or Shtil single arm missile system, one of the reasons Talwar has one not two RBU-6000.

Picklu · Post by **Picklu** » 25 Jun 2014 00:21

narmad wrote:India's first indigenous anti-submarine warfare ship ready
It is powered by four indigenously designed 3888 KW diesel engines at 1050 rpm and can cover nearly 3,500 nautical miles at 18 knots.

Who provides these diesels?

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 25 Jun 2014 02:23

Kirloskar, license production from SEMT PIELSTICK of France.

Picklu · Post by **Picklu** » 25 Jun 2014 02:26

Thanks IRbabu. As I suspected, nothing indigenous in design.

narmad · Post by **narmad** » 25 Jun 2014 03:11

Picklu wrote:Thanks IRbabu. As I suspected, nothing indigenous in design.

I suppose you meat Just the Engines, and not Design of the Ship as whole .

And as it is KOIL is a listed company and would provide cost effective and efficient support for those engines.
They have to in order to win other bids.

John · Post by **John** » 25 Jun 2014 03:38

Picklu wrote:Thanks IRbabu. As I suspected, nothing indigenous in design.

Even US Coast guard uses license built pielstick diesels. They have more or less monopolized that market.

Picklu · Post by **Picklu** » 25 Jun 2014 03:43

^^ Narmad and John, yes my objection is against the reporting of "indigenously designed" part of the line "four indigenously designed 3888 KW diesel engines at 1050 rpm".

John · Post by **John** » 25 Jun 2014 03:53

Supposed to be indigenously "built" not "designed".

uddu · Post by **uddu** » 25 Jun 2014 06:46

What about the follow on P28A? Any news about the same. There were reports of 8 such ships to be built. Must have some offensive capability with Brahmos-M installed.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 25 Jun 2014 08:26

The Kamorta is supposed to be commissioned within a month.The design is certainly "desi",but the point that I've been making about the Vik-A,Talwars,etc.,vs Shivaliks,Delhis,etc., is that barring the hull and some systems,the bulk of the cost of the ship is of foreign origin.Engines,radars,sensors,FCS,weaponry,are almost entirely foreign or foreign systems built locally like main guns.The time taken by our domestic yards to build these warships is far too long.Inordinate delays have been experienced.It was way back in the '80s that the so-called "stealth" warship programme was touted,the Shivaliks.How many have been built thus far? Only 3.

One also cannot understand why after decades of operating the Pauks/Abhays,we cannot design and produce the small sonars for that class of vessel.DDGs,FFGs,subs too now feature indigenous sonars,so to say that we don't have the tech in one of the reports is fallacious.The simple truth is that we didn't bother to develop such a sonar.Incidentally,as posted a long time ago,the Russians used the same sonar on the Pauks for the KA-28ASW helo for its dipping sonar.It was a deliberate policy of designing one system for multiple use for the sake of modularity and economy.A similar strategy could've been used by us for our ASW Dhruvs,and the planned "janata" ASW coastal craft.

Here are details about our indigenous warship building capability.

India’s Indigenous Warship Programmes Plagued by Constant Cost and Time Overruns
http://www.defencenow.com/news/261/indi ... rruns.html

The excessive delays and cost escalation in various homegrown warship building exercises of Indian Navy has been brought to the notice of the Indian Parliament. The key projects plagued by delays and cost escalation include the Project 15A involving the Kolkata -class guided missile destroyers, Project 17 involving the Shivalik -class stealth frigates and Project 28 involving the Kamorta -class Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) corvettes.

As per the details given to the Indian Parliament, the cost escalation in these projects has been about 225 per cent for Project-15A, about 260 per cent for Project-17 and about 157 per cent for Project-28. The reasons that have been cited include the complex nature of warship building process, delays in finalization of structural drawings, absence of timely availability of steel and inadequate infrastructure. The programmes in jeopardy include the Project 15A for building three 6,500 tonne frigates, Project 17 for three 4,900 tonne frigates, and Project 28 for four ASW Corvettes.

Regarding the Project-15 A involving the Kolkata-class guided missile destroyers, the reason for cost escalation includes delay in supply of warship building quality steel by Russia. Besides, there has been escalation due to increase in expenditure towards services of Russian specialists on account of inflation during the build period. As for the Project-17, the reasons contributing towards cost escalations include delay in supply of warship building quality steel by Russia, delay in acquisition of weapon equipment from Russia and delay in finalization of propulsion equipment. The delay in decision is caused considering the complex combined diesel and gas arrangement being created for the first time in an Indian Navy frigate.

While there was undue delay in the conclusion of contracts for Project-17 and Project 15A, the contract for the Project-28 was not even signed even after seven years of the commencement of the project. Regarding Project-28 which involves ASW Corvettes, Indian Navy was using D40S/B-quality high tensile strength steel for construction of warship. But due to steep import costs, indigenously developed DMR 249A steel was decided to be used on Project-28 ships. However, there was delay in development of indigenous steel and associated complexities related to development of new weld consumables and welding techniques. Added to this, inability to identify a suitable propulsion package to meet stealth requirement of ships and delay in development of indigenous weapons and sensors also resulted in cost escalation. It must be noted that the contract for the Project-28 was not signed till June 2010 even though the letter of intent was signed in March 2003.

The Indian Navy’s projects have come under scanner for its substantial time and cost overruns before. In a Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) report earlier this year, Indian Navy’s methodology for estimating the cost of ships came under severe criticism. The CAG report indicated that the methodology has resulted in unrealistic approvals for funding projects with every likelihood of cost growth at the time of project itself. In fact, it has even resulted in reduced naval force levels and mega price escalation in its key projects. The CAG report has also pointed out that by 2012, the Indian Navy may retain only 61 per cent, 44 per cent and 20 per cent of the envisaged force levels of frigates, destroyers and corvettes respectively. The lead ship in all the projects is being delivered or expected to be delivered only after a delay of four to five years from the original date.

Costs as per report:
http://www.stratpost.com/indian-warship ... e-over-225

Project-15A Kolkata-class guided missile destroyers

Cost: INR 11662 crore

INS Kolkata: March, 2012
INS Kochi: March, 2013
INS Chennai: March, 2014

Project-17 Shivalik-class frigates

Cost: INR 8101 crore

INS Shivalik, delivered: April, 2010
INS Satpura, delivered: August, 2010
INS Sahyadri: Early 2012

P-15B (follow on to the P-15A Kolkata-class) destroyers

Cost: INR 29345 crore

July, 2018
July, 2020
July, 2022
July, 2024

Follow on Talwar-class (Krivak III variant) frigates

Cost: INR 5514 crore

INS Teg: April, 2012
INS Tarkash: September, 2012
INS Trikand: June, 2013

Note: 1 crore = 10 million

From this one can see that the cost of the follow-on Talwars is very reasonable in comparison to the other desi-built warships,admittedly that these warships are larger in size.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ins ... ses-03283/

Vikramaditya was joined by an armada of Indian warships for the last leg of its journey to Karwar. The problem is the lack of an effective towed sonar on Indian surface combatants, due to obstruction by the defense bureaucracy. Coming as it does on top of the MoD derelict performance with respect to anti-submarine helicopters, it creates a huge naval weakness that would doom India’s carriers in a shooting war.

The Indian Navy has been trying to import an Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS) since the mid-1990s, but the Ministry of Defence has blocked it in favor of DRDO projects that went nowhere. The Nagan project was finally shut down in 2012, but DRDO just pulled a switch and started a new ALTAS project in its place. As a result, 21 destroyers, frigates and corvettes bought since 1997 lack key sonar systems: 3 Delhi Class destroyers, 3 Kolkata Class destroyers, 6 Talwar Class frigates, 3 Brahmaputra Class frigates, 3 Shivalik Class frigates, and 4 Kamorta Class corvettes. They must depend, instead, on an Indian HUMSA passive array towed sonar with limited capabilities.

MoD approval for a limited 6 ATAS buy was finally granted to an exasperated navy in 2009, but baseless complaints of wrongdoing left Atlas Elektronik’s systems in limbo, despite investigations that cleared the procurement. It remains to be seen whether changing control of the MoD away from the Congress Party will change anything. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Warships in peril as defence ministry blocks sonar purchase”.

Astonishing!

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 25 Jun 2014 12:05

I regret to inform members of the death of Cmde.G.M. (Jack) Shea AVSM+ IN (retd) at the age of 90 in Bangalore. Cmde.Shea was a veteran of the old school of the IN ,contemporary of the late Adm.RL Pereira and Adm. OS Dawson,both former chiefs of the IN .He was instrumental in setting up the ASW warfare school at Cochin.He was decorated in both wars with Pak with the AVSM.He was the naval attache in Karachi in '65,during the war ,when the Indian diplomatic staff were treated despicably by the Pakis. Cmde.Shea even survived an assassination attempt by the Pakis.He was intimately involved in the planning of the naval attacks on Pakistan in '71.As the bard said,"revenge is a dish best served cold". RIP Jack,you f'd em well and true!

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 25 Jun 2014 12:34

Philip wrote:The Kamorta is supposed to be commissioned within a month.The design is certainly "desi",but the point that I've been making about the Vik-A,Talwars,etc.,vs Shivaliks,Delhis,etc., is that barring the hull and some systems,the bulk of the cost of the ship is of foreign origin.

What proportion of the Talwar class is of domestic origin?

The time taken by our domestic yards to build these warships is far too long.Inordinate delays have been experienced.It was way back in the '80s that the so-called "stealth" warship programme was touted,the Shivaliks.How many have been built thus far? Only 3.

So what if the Shivalik was conceived in the 80s. Its still more sophisticated than the Talwar as of today.

There is a learning curve involved in developing a new ship unlike producing more units of an in-service ship (read:Krivak III). However, once the development is complete and production has matured the sensible thing is to keep it humming with follow-on orders.

But the follow-on orders go to the Russian yards (which use the funds for modernization) while the orders for the Indian yards get capped at three units (while the next new program gets rolling).

How many Shivaliks did you expect MDL to deliver given that only three were ordered?

Here are details about our indigenous warship building capability.

India’s Indigenous Warship Programmes Plagued by Constant Cost and Time Overruns
http://www.defencenow.com/news/261/indi ... rruns.html

As per the details given to the Indian Parliament, the cost escalation in these projects has been about 225 per cent for Project-15A, about 260 per cent for Project-17 and about 157 per cent for Project-28.[/b] The reasons that have been cited include the complex nature of warship building process, delays in finalization of structural drawings, absence of timely availability of steel and inadequate infrastructure. The programmes in jeopardy include the Project 15A for building three 6,500 tonne frigates, Project 17 for three 4,900 tonne frigates, and Project 28 for four ASW Corvettes.

Even after cost escalation the Shivalik is available at a cost comparable to the Talwar, despite its vastly greater displacement and capability. Easily better value for money.

So delays in P-17 caused by - delay in supply of warship building quality steel by Russia, delay in acquisition of weapon equipment from Russia and delay in finalization of propulsion equipment.

Will · Post by **Will** » 25 Jun 2014 15:51

Nice to know that the Kamorta class is using an indigenous diesel engine.... or is it really?

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 25 Jun 2014 19:49

the costliest and long lifetime (ie continuous cost to keep in good shape) parts of warships would be
- engines - we neither make marine diesels or gas turbines
- gearboxes - elecon of pune makes renk gearboxes under license, but I guess there is no indigenous maker
- the 3D search radar - i think we are making a start on P28 need to scale up
- the combat radar to track and guide missiles - we are far from MF-STAR capability so far / not even top plate class
- the main 76mm gun - no indigenous soln except the Medak 76mm I think...may lack the rapid fire and smarty shells of the Otobreda 76mm and the redoubtable Oto127mm with vulcano ER shells..not sure how much we care so long as it can fire rapidly and accurately upto say 8km to take out crossing and inbound targets..and use a radar to track shells
- AK630 I guess we license make or atleast overhaul
- no domestic SRSAM for CIWS
- no domestic MRSAM until Barak8 and even then I guess Rafael will own most of it ??
- no domestic heavy torpedo in service yet
- no domestic towed sonar in service yet
- no desi IRST to track heat plumes
- no naval ASW helis

so mainly one can say we make neither the eyes or the teeth. rest of it like brahmos, HVAC, electrical fittings, living areas, kitchen, cold stores, life rafts, VHF radio systems, softkill EW systems, floating decoys, radar jammers can be found domestic fittings for

--
if make the inevitable comparison to Cheen
- their diesel plants are mainly german I think
- their gas turbines are license made or imported from zorya of ukraine
- with ukrainian help they have devised the 4 panel radar of their DDGs and the long-wave radar seen in the middle mast of some DDG(looks like old doordarshan era tv antenna)
- they have domestic family of LACM (long sword being the latest)
- domestic family of ASM from uran class to heavier
- they a SN-n-6 derived domestic system
- they have a crotale derived SRSAM
- some form of MLRS for scaring / beach mine clearing ops seen in some ships
- their main gun I think they import from russia still

their direct import bill is much lesser and the money is going to improve their original domestic capability and improve the 'clones' and 'secretly licensed produced' kit(while russians loudly protest for public consumption the way amir khan protests TSP atrocities)

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 25 Jun 2014 19:59

Read the rest of the report.What was the ultimate cost of a Talwar in comparison to anything similar from the west or built in India? They were found to be excellent warships and a second order was placed,which if it had been before a deadline,would've cost even less-reportedly at the same price as the first 3,but babudom delayed the decision.No one is denying that its great building our warships and subs at home,but how do we do it? Plus,as Singha has mentioned,how much is just the "empty vessel" and how much indigenous systems? Stealth tech has even been obtained from Canada.

While there was undue delay in the conclusion of contracts for Project-17 and Project 15A, the contract for the Project-28 was not even signed even after seven years of the commencement of the project. Regarding Project-28 which involves ASW Corvettes, Indian Navy was using D40S/B-quality high tensile strength steel for construction of warship. But due to steep import costs, indigenously developed DMR 249A steel was decided to be used on Project-28 ships. However, there was delay in development of indigenous steel and associated complexities related to development of new weld consumables and welding techniques. Added to this, inability to identify a suitable propulsion package to meet stealth requirement of ships and delay in development of indigenous weapons and sensors also resulted in cost escalation. It must be noted that the contract for the Project-28 was not signed till June 2010 even though the letter of intent was signed in March 2003.

The Indian Navy’s projects have come under scanner for its substantial time and cost overruns before. In a Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) report earlier this year, Indian Navy’s methodology for estimating the cost of ships came under severe criticism. The CAG report indicated that the methodology has resulted in unrealistic approvals for funding projects with every likelihood of cost growth at the time of project itself. In fact, it has even resulted in reduced naval force levels and mega price escalation in its key projects. The CAG report has also pointed out that by 2012, the Indian Navy may retain only 61 per cent, 44 per cent and 20 per cent of the envisaged force levels of frigates, destroyers and corvettes respectively. The lead ship in all the projects is being delivered or expected to be delivered only after a delay of four to five years from the original date.