maz wrote:Good catch on the missing main gun on F40. I am wondering if the ship was pulled out from a refit to make up numbers for the DAS event.
The 8 cell Klub UVLM launcher should be compatible with Brahmos unless I am mistaken.
sum wrote:Wonder if this is true:
Contrary to Claims, Arihant not Prepared for Sea TrialsContrary to claims, India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine INS Arihant is still not ready for sea trails, a stage critical for testing the vessel’s systems and weapons before it can be commissioned into the Navy.
Arihant’s miniaturised nuclear reactor, built with Russian help, had gone critical in last August and since then the 6,000-tonne vessel has been put through a series of harbour acceptance trials, which could take a few more months, according to top navy sources here.
The vessel, powered by a 83-MW pressurised light-water reactor operated with enriched uranium fuel, was to sail out for sea trials earlier this year, but the Navy has not been able to take the vessel out, as more tests are being conducted to ensure foolproof sea trials of all systems on board, sources said.
Greenert: Don’t ‘Unnecessarily Antagonize’ China
By: Sam LaGrone
Published: June 17, 2014
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert and Chief of Navy of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Adm. Wu Shengli greet each other in Qingdao, China on April 21, 2014. US Navy Photo
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert and Chief of Navy of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Adm. Wu Shengli greet each other in Qingdao, China on April 21, 2014. US Navy Photo
NEWPORT, R.I. — Open discussion of how U.S. forces could deter Chinese ships and aircraft could unnecessarily antagonize one of America’s largest trading partners, the Navy’s top admiral said during an address at the U.S. Naval War College on Tuesday.
“If you talk about it openly, you cross the line and unnecessarily antagonize,” said Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert during the Current Strategy Forum in Newport, R.I. in response to an audience question.
“You probably have a sense about how much we trade with that country, it’s astounding. “
Greenert was responding to an audience question on how to speak to mid-level officers and enlisted U.S. sailors on tactics, techniques and procedures how to counter Chinese ships and aircraft.
“In a classified nature we look at all of this. There are groups up [Naval War College] that talk about it all the time,” Greenert said.
While the Pentagon seldom singles out China as potential adversary publically, the growing capability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — especially the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) — drives larger strategy discussions in the military and in Congress.
Military planners present the problem of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) — the ability of a force to deny a superior force access to a particular area — agnostically without mentioning specific countries or regions
“It would be antagonistic to any country to openly say that we are preparing [for conflict],” Greenert said later to reporters.
The Pentagon ultimately wants to be able to access any part of the globe with military forces in an all-domain access plan and worked through the all-service Air Sea Battle Office.
“Air Sea Battle is about access and assuring access, and that’s anywhere in the world, it is our intention [to have] all domain access as part of our strategy,” Greenert said in the meeting with reporters.
But key strategic crossroads, like the Strait of Hormuz, the areas around North Korea and the South China Seas are omnipresent in any discussion of A2/AD threats.
To be fair, U.S. strategists constantly generate plans based on a variety of scenarios, no matter how unlikely. For example the U.S. in the lead up to World War II had a war plan designed to counter an attack from the British Isles and more recently created a plan to handle a so-called zombie infestation.
However, the ultimate plan that guided U.S. construction ahead of World War II was War Plan Orange, the plan that focused on the contingency of an expansionist Japanese Empire.
While Chinese capabilities are surely in the mind of U.S. strategists, the Pentagon is also seeking closer military-to-military relationship with Beijing and the PLA.
China is sending four ships to the U.S. led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 multi-national exercise later this month and Greenert and his wife are set to meet his counterpart, PLAN chief Adm. Wu Shengliin, in a July visit to China.
China and the U.S. are also signatories to the Conduct Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
A late 2013 run-in between a PLAN amphibious ship and the guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG-63), in part, prompted 21 Pacific nations to sign a military maritime rules-of-the-road earlier this year.
“My view when people ask me ‘what are you going to do about the South China Sea?’ [I say] we’re going to manage it, we’re going to work CUES,” Greenert said.
“We’ve got to manage through it, kiddo.”
Greenert’s view on discussing countering China openlly was disputed by at least one speaker at the Current Strategy Forum.
“I think it’s important for leaders to find ways to talk about China as a military rival,” in order to inform civilian leadership, Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University said in a later panel.
Philip wrote:If the USN's CNO is advocating a less confrontational attitude towards China and the PLAN,then why should the IN be roped into a US-led anti-Chinese naval axis?
http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/greener ... 234c8f82d4
“My view when people ask me ‘what are you going to do about the South China Sea?’ [I say] we’re going to manage it, we’re going to work CUES,” Greenert said.
“We’ve got to manage through it, kiddo.”
Philip wrote:If the USN's CNO is advocating a less confrontational attitude towards China and the PLAN,then why should the IN be roped into a US-led anti-Chinese naval axis?
NEW DELHI — India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a tender to local shipyards to build 16 shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels, a $2.25 billion program that would mark the first such effort by domestic yards.
The tender, in the “Buy and Make India” category, was issued last week to private sector companies Larsen & Toubro, ABG Shipyard, Pipavav Defense and Offshore Engineering, and to state-owned Goa Shipyard and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers. The vessels would replace Russian-made Abhay-class corvettes commissioned in 1989 and 1991.
The domestic companies will need to tie up with overseas defense companies to acquire certain critical technologies, officials said.
“The domestic defense companies have the ability to build the shallow craft but will need to tie up with overseas companies, especially to procure a variety of sonars,” said a senior Indian Navy official.
An executive of Garden Reach said they are already searching for global partners but would not discuss which shipyards they are contacting.
Shyam Kumar Singh, retired Indian Navy captain, said he is confident domestic shipyards can build the vessels.
“Indian warship building has matured with the shipyards having acquired good capability over the years. So there is no risk as far as shipbuilding is concerned. This is an ASW platform. The main equipment onboard such a ship is the sonar. There are two sonars on such platforms, namely, hull mounted sonar and the low frequency variable depth sonar. The technology does not exist for such sonars in India and will need to be procured from abroad,” Singh said.
Under a policy change in 2013, MoD decided to explore all avenues to buy weapons and equipment first from the domestic markets and then, if needed, by direct purchase from overseas. In the case of the shallow craft, officials and analysts said, domestic industry has the ability to build the boats.
Anil Jai Singh, a retired Indian Navy commodore and defense analyst, said, “We have gained enough experience in building large warships over the years. These are going to be small platforms [about 750 tons]. It is also important that the private defense sector becomes competitive and is able to undertake construction of weapon platforms. This is a good project for them to ascend the learning curve in building weapon platforms, including system integration, as it is small and weapon integration would not be too complex.”
The ASW shallow water crafts will be used for anti-submarine warfare operations in coastal waters, low intensity maritime operations and mine-laying. The first Indian Navy official said requirements include the capability for sub-surface surveillance of coastal waters; coordinated anti-submarine warfare operations with aircraft; destruction of sub-surface targets in coastal waters; ability to carry out search and rescue, day and night, in coastal areas; and the ability to engage intruding craft.
The ship would be required to operate within 200 nautical miles of the base port.
The dimensions of the shallow craft with stealth capabilities include a draft not exceeding 2.7 meters in fully laden condition without the sonar dome. The vessel should have a speed of not less than 25 knots fully loaded and be able to carry at least seven officers and more than 50 sailors.
The vessels will be connected with the Navy’s network-centric warfare system, which will also be linked with other ASW assets, including airborne manned and unmanned platforms, the Navy official said. ■
Austin wrote:India Proposes $2.25B Tender for ASW Shallow Water CraftNEW DELHI — India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a tender to local shipyards to build 16 shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels, a $2.25 billion program that would mark the first such effort by domestic yards.
The tender, in the “Buy and Make India” category, was issued last week to private sector companies Larsen & Toubro, ABG Shipyard, Pipavav Defense and Offshore Engineering, and to state-owned Goa Shipyard and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers. The vessels would replace Russian-made Abhay-class corvettes commissioned in 1989 and 1991.
The domestic companies will need to tie up with overseas defense companies to acquire certain critical technologies, officials said.
“The domestic defense companies have the ability to build the shallow craft but will need to tie up with overseas companies, especially to procure a variety of sonars,” said a senior Indian Navy official.
An executive of Garden Reach said they are already searching for global partners but would not discuss which shipyards they are contacting.
Shyam Kumar Singh, retired Indian Navy captain, said he is confident domestic shipyards can build the vessels.
“Indian warship building has matured with the shipyards having acquired good capability over the years. So there is no risk as far as shipbuilding is concerned. This is an ASW platform. The main equipment onboard such a ship is the sonar. There are two sonars on such platforms, namely, hull mounted sonar and the low frequency variable depth sonar. The technology does not exist for such sonars in India and will need to be procured from abroad,” Singh said.
Under a policy change in 2013, MoD decided to explore all avenues to buy weapons and equipment first from the domestic markets and then, if needed, by direct purchase from overseas. In the case of the shallow craft, officials and analysts said, domestic industry has the ability to build the boats.
Anil Jai Singh, a retired Indian Navy commodore and defense analyst, said, “We have gained enough experience in building large warships over the years. These are going to be small platforms [about 750 tons]. It is also important that the private defense sector becomes competitive and is able to undertake construction of weapon platforms. This is a good project for them to ascend the learning curve in building weapon platforms, including system integration, as it is small and weapon integration would not be too complex.”
The ASW shallow water crafts will be used for anti-submarine warfare operations in coastal waters, low intensity maritime operations and mine-laying. The first Indian Navy official said requirements include the capability for sub-surface surveillance of coastal waters; coordinated anti-submarine warfare operations with aircraft; destruction of sub-surface targets in coastal waters; ability to carry out search and rescue, day and night, in coastal areas; and the ability to engage intruding craft.
The ship would be required to operate within 200 nautical miles of the base port.
The dimensions of the shallow craft with stealth capabilities include a draft not exceeding 2.7 meters in fully laden condition without the sonar dome. The vessel should have a speed of not less than 25 knots fully loaded and be able to carry at least seven officers and more than 50 sailors.
The vessels will be connected with the Navy’s network-centric warfare system, which will also be linked with other ASW assets, including airborne manned and unmanned platforms, the Navy official said. ■
The Indian Navy (IN) is seeking INR160 billion (USD2.66 billion) over the next 2-3 years from the newly-elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to resume construction of the Project 71 indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC).
Official sources told IHS Jane's that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is expected to imminently clear a "significant portion" of the IN's financial demand to revive work on Phases II and III of the 40,000-tonne IAC at the Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) yard at Kochi in southern India.
The carrier was launched and named Vikrant in August 2013, with senior Naval Design Bureau (NDB) sources saying that 75% of the carrier's structure was complete. However, work on the carrier has virtually come to a standstill in recent months due to a resource crunch. This includes modular construction work and the installation of radar, sensors, and weapon systems.
Senior officials said the new CCS would require clearances from the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the federal Finance Ministry to approve the funds. The CCS of the outgoing Congress Party-led federal coalition had secured both of these approvals earlier in 2014 but failed to implement them - resulting in the near-suspension of work.
IN officials also warned that further delays in sanctioning additional funding for the IAC could delay its commissioning beyond its already extended 2017-18 deadline.
Three quarters of the basic structure of the IAC has been completed at an estimated cost of INR35-40 billion. The carrier is eventually expected to cost between INR240-250 billion.
IN Chief of Staff Admiral D K Joshi told IHS Jane's in January 2013 that work on the IAC had been delayed due to financial and technological hurdles, and a traffic accident involving the truck transporting the carrier's generators.
India currently operates INS Vikramaditya (ex- Admiral Gorshkov ), a modified Kiev-class 44,750-tonne carrier that entered service in January, and INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes ), a 54-year-old 28,000-tonne Centaur-class platform that has locally undergone multiple refits.
Philip wrote:That's $4-5B for the Vik-2.
Philip wrote:Sorry if posted before.
http://www.janes.com/article/38672/indi ... _campaign=[PMP]_PC5308_Jane%27s%20360%20Newsletter%2004.06.14_DeploymentEmail_KV&utm_medium=email&utm_source=EloquaThe Indian Navy (IN) is seeking INR160 billion (USD2.66 billion) over the next 2-3 years from the newly-elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to resume construction of the Project 71 indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC).
...
The carrier was launched and named Vikrant in August 2013, with senior Naval Design Bureau (NDB) sources saying that 75% of the carrier's structure was complete. However, work on the carrier has virtually come to a standstill in recent months due to a resource crunch. This includes modular construction work and the installation of radar, sensors, and weapon systems.
Senior officials said the new CCS would require clearances from the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the federal Finance Ministry to approve the funds. The CCS of the outgoing Congress Party-led federal coalition had secured both of these approvals earlier in 2014 but failed to implement them - resulting in the near-suspension of work.
IN officials also warned that further delays in sanctioning additional funding for the IAC could delay its commissioning beyond its already extended 2017-18 deadline.
.Philip wrote:I can't see costs falling whatsoever.
Just look at the track record of warship construction in the country.Delays due to funding,tech problems,etc.,have plagued our shipbuilding industry.
Philip wrote:No one is defending the delay in the Vik-A's arrival and escalated costs.Both Russia and India grossly underestimated the cost of refurbishing and rebuilding the carrier.
We studied it for a whole decade before deciding to buy it.The case is history now.
Both sides came to a mutual agreement upon final costs (remember the boiler cladding problem,due to our specs),etc.
The QE carriers are a case in comparison.
If our funding is patchy,work now stopped because there are no funds in the kitty,eventually it is going to keep on rising as CAG reports have shown with other ships and subs constructed in the country.Even.our homebuilt warships have key components like sensors,weaponry,powerplants,etc. obtained from abroad. Take the case of the minesweepers ,no decision yet! HSL dismantled a Kilo sub and cannot put it together again,infuriating the IN which has lost a sub worth at least $300M for no fault of its own,requiring all Kilos to be refitted/upgraded in Russia.
It is inescapable that if we are to build up the IN to planned future strengths,the entire fleet cannot be built solely at home,especially when the MOD thus far has protected the DPSUs and not awarded major contracts to pvt. yards like L&T,etc.,which are quite capable of building subs,warships,etc.
In several cases foreign yards can build faster and at affordable rates sophisticated vessels like the fleet auxiliaries built in Italy. One must compare the time taken to build the 6 Talwars with the time taken to build the Delhis and Shivaliks.
There are many reasons for this.Dockyard space constraints,lack of modernisation,etc. A complete revamp of the indigenous warship and sub building capability is required if the IN's planned replacements,modernisation and future ambitions are to be realised.
titash wrote:Shiv Aroor has several new pics of the Kamorta class:
http://www.livefistdefence.com/
This TOI article talks about the Kamortas being 3400 tonnes full load displacement. That's bigger than a Leander:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=21082
kala desi has been sneakily inducting frigates disguised as patrol craft
The MoD's man in the east, Group Captain Tarun K Singha, a MiG-21 pilot whose been dedicated the publicity for the defence forces for the last few years, sent out this note on the new ships and the upcoming induction:
...
The weapons and sensors include fire-control radar, surface-to-air missiles, close-in weapon system, medium-range gun system, surveillance radar, chaff system for counter-measures against enemy radars and missiles, torpedo launcher, anti-submarine rocket launchers, EW system, combat management system and advanced sonar system.
The ship is also capable of deploying a helicopter, adding considerable punch to the ship’s anti-submarine capability. With a foldable hangar door fitted for the first time with a rail-less helicopter traversing system fitted -- also a noteworthy first on any naval ship -- helicopter operations from the corvette decks will have a significant edge over existing platforms of other warships.
Bheeshma wrote:A 3400 tonne ship is in same class as G class frigates. A pity if it doesn't even carry 8 urans and 24 barak-1's. Even livefist blog says 3400 tonne displacement.
narmad wrote:India's first indigenous anti-submarine warfare ship ready
It is powered by four indigenously designed 3888 KW diesel engines at 1050 rpm and can cover nearly 3,500 nautical miles at 18 knots.
Picklu wrote:Thanks IRbabu. As I suspected, nothing indigenous in design.
Picklu wrote:Thanks IRbabu. As I suspected, nothing indigenous in design.
The excessive delays and cost escalation in various homegrown warship building exercises of Indian Navy has been brought to the notice of the Indian Parliament. The key projects plagued by delays and cost escalation include the Project 15A involving the Kolkata -class guided missile destroyers, Project 17 involving the Shivalik -class stealth frigates and Project 28 involving the Kamorta -class Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) corvettes.
As per the details given to the Indian Parliament, the cost escalation in these projects has been about 225 per cent for Project-15A, about 260 per cent for Project-17 and about 157 per cent for Project-28. The reasons that have been cited include the complex nature of warship building process, delays in finalization of structural drawings, absence of timely availability of steel and inadequate infrastructure. The programmes in jeopardy include the Project 15A for building three 6,500 tonne frigates, Project 17 for three 4,900 tonne frigates, and Project 28 for four ASW Corvettes.
Regarding the Project-15 A involving the Kolkata-class guided missile destroyers, the reason for cost escalation includes delay in supply of warship building quality steel by Russia. Besides, there has been escalation due to increase in expenditure towards services of Russian specialists on account of inflation during the build period. As for the Project-17, the reasons contributing towards cost escalations include delay in supply of warship building quality steel by Russia, delay in acquisition of weapon equipment from Russia and delay in finalization of propulsion equipment. The delay in decision is caused considering the complex combined diesel and gas arrangement being created for the first time in an Indian Navy frigate.
While there was undue delay in the conclusion of contracts for Project-17 and Project 15A, the contract for the Project-28 was not even signed even after seven years of the commencement of the project. Regarding Project-28 which involves ASW Corvettes, Indian Navy was using D40S/B-quality high tensile strength steel for construction of warship. But due to steep import costs, indigenously developed DMR 249A steel was decided to be used on Project-28 ships. However, there was delay in development of indigenous steel and associated complexities related to development of new weld consumables and welding techniques. Added to this, inability to identify a suitable propulsion package to meet stealth requirement of ships and delay in development of indigenous weapons and sensors also resulted in cost escalation. It must be noted that the contract for the Project-28 was not signed till June 2010 even though the letter of intent was signed in March 2003.
The Indian Navy’s projects have come under scanner for its substantial time and cost overruns before. In a Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) report earlier this year, Indian Navy’s methodology for estimating the cost of ships came under severe criticism. The CAG report indicated that the methodology has resulted in unrealistic approvals for funding projects with every likelihood of cost growth at the time of project itself. In fact, it has even resulted in reduced naval force levels and mega price escalation in its key projects. The CAG report has also pointed out that by 2012, the Indian Navy may retain only 61 per cent, 44 per cent and 20 per cent of the envisaged force levels of frigates, destroyers and corvettes respectively. The lead ship in all the projects is being delivered or expected to be delivered only after a delay of four to five years from the original date.
Project-15A Kolkata-class guided missile destroyers
Cost: INR 11662 crore
INS Kolkata: March, 2012
INS Kochi: March, 2013
INS Chennai: March, 2014
Project-17 Shivalik-class frigates
Cost: INR 8101 crore
INS Shivalik, delivered: April, 2010
INS Satpura, delivered: August, 2010
INS Sahyadri: Early 2012
P-15B (follow on to the P-15A Kolkata-class) destroyers
Cost: INR 29345 crore
July, 2018
July, 2020
July, 2022
July, 2024
Follow on Talwar-class (Krivak III variant) frigates
Cost: INR 5514 crore
INS Teg: April, 2012
INS Tarkash: September, 2012
INS Trikand: June, 2013
Note: 1 crore = 10 million
Vikramaditya was joined by an armada of Indian warships for the last leg of its journey to Karwar. The problem is the lack of an effective towed sonar on Indian surface combatants, due to obstruction by the defense bureaucracy. Coming as it does on top of the MoD derelict performance with respect to anti-submarine helicopters, it creates a huge naval weakness that would doom India’s carriers in a shooting war.
The Indian Navy has been trying to import an Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS) since the mid-1990s, but the Ministry of Defence has blocked it in favor of DRDO projects that went nowhere. The Nagan project was finally shut down in 2012, but DRDO just pulled a switch and started a new ALTAS project in its place. As a result, 21 destroyers, frigates and corvettes bought since 1997 lack key sonar systems: 3 Delhi Class destroyers, 3 Kolkata Class destroyers, 6 Talwar Class frigates, 3 Brahmaputra Class frigates, 3 Shivalik Class frigates, and 4 Kamorta Class corvettes. They must depend, instead, on an Indian HUMSA passive array towed sonar with limited capabilities.
MoD approval for a limited 6 ATAS buy was finally granted to an exasperated navy in 2009, but baseless complaints of wrongdoing left Atlas Elektronik’s systems in limbo, despite investigations that cleared the procurement. It remains to be seen whether changing control of the MoD away from the Congress Party will change anything. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Warships in peril as defence ministry blocks sonar purchase”.
Philip wrote:The Kamorta is supposed to be commissioned within a month.The design is certainly "desi",but the point that I've been making about the Vik-A,Talwars,etc.,vs Shivaliks,Delhis,etc., is that barring the hull and some systems,the bulk of the cost of the ship is of foreign origin.
The time taken by our domestic yards to build these warships is far too long.Inordinate delays have been experienced.It was way back in the '80s that the so-called "stealth" warship programme was touted,the Shivaliks.How many have been built thus far? Only 3.
Here are details about our indigenous warship building capability.
India’s Indigenous Warship Programmes Plagued by Constant Cost and Time Overruns
http://www.defencenow.com/news/261/indi ... rruns.html
As per the details given to the Indian Parliament, the cost escalation in these projects has been about 225 per cent for Project-15A, about 260 per cent for Project-17 and about 157 per cent for Project-28.[/b] The reasons that have been cited include the complex nature of warship building process, delays in finalization of structural drawings, absence of timely availability of steel and inadequate infrastructure. The programmes in jeopardy include the Project 15A for building three 6,500 tonne frigates, Project 17 for three 4,900 tonne frigates, and Project 28 for four ASW Corvettes.
While there was undue delay in the conclusion of contracts for Project-17 and Project 15A, the contract for the Project-28 was not even signed even after seven years of the commencement of the project. Regarding Project-28 which involves ASW Corvettes, Indian Navy was using D40S/B-quality high tensile strength steel for construction of warship. But due to steep import costs, indigenously developed DMR 249A steel was decided to be used on Project-28 ships. However, there was delay in development of indigenous steel and associated complexities related to development of new weld consumables and welding techniques. Added to this, inability to identify a suitable propulsion package to meet stealth requirement of ships and delay in development of indigenous weapons and sensors also resulted in cost escalation. It must be noted that the contract for the Project-28 was not signed till June 2010 even though the letter of intent was signed in March 2003.
The Indian Navy’s projects have come under scanner for its substantial time and cost overruns before. In a Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) report earlier this year, Indian Navy’s methodology for estimating the cost of ships came under severe criticism. The CAG report indicated that the methodology has resulted in unrealistic approvals for funding projects with every likelihood of cost growth at the time of project itself. In fact, it has even resulted in reduced naval force levels and mega price escalation in its key projects. The CAG report has also pointed out that by 2012, the Indian Navy may retain only 61 per cent, 44 per cent and 20 per cent of the envisaged force levels of frigates, destroyers and corvettes respectively. The lead ship in all the projects is being delivered or expected to be delivered only after a delay of four to five years from the original date.
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