JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

The problem with O&S cost is that there is a huge risk involved with calculating it. When the O&S cost comes down by something like 300 billion (With a B ) its not that somehow the F-35 just magically became more fuel efficient or cheaper to operate. The reduction came from the services sitting down with the accountants and telling their collective rear-ends that the underlying assumptions of the assessments were false and ignored the basic CONOPS of peacetime operations and training. The original estimate assumed for instance that the B variant would be doing STOVL operations day in and day out. This is not the case with the Harrier, nor will it be the case with the F-35B. Pilots would be required to maintain a basic capability for performing STOVL but regular sorties of the jet would be in the CTOL mode out of the Marine stations around the world. Only when the pilots need to do their regular STOVL checks, or when the aircraft is deployed onboard a ship would STOVL operations be the norm and not the exception. Similarly the Navy pilots would not be doing Carrier landings all the time at the Naval bases. The original estimate also used afterburner modes liberally ignoring that during peacetime the majority of the sorties are limited by the number of cycles per sortie (engine cycles) requirement. The pilot can simply not throttle up or down as per his/her own whims and fancy during peacetime routine training.

The second aspect to this is that the model currently has too little of statistical data to be of much use. With 16K hours of operation spread over three variants with varying software modes, and with concurrency changes yet to be implemented there is very little accuracy with which one can predict costs. That is not going to stop anyone from calculating however, especially those who's job it is to calculate but if history is an indicator such assessments are almost never accurate. A better grip on the entire O&S cost aspect would be made when the cumulative fleet hours reach around 50K with something like 30K out of them with the operational fleet (as opposed to the test fleet) that is running a close to delivered software version that is mature..Don't expect a clear trend and stability in projections to appear before 2018-19 or so when the USMC will have 3-4 years of hard operational data including forward deployments, and the USAF would have 2-3 years of hard data including a few years with a operational and working/debugged ALIS..The latest on the operational cost is that the fleet of the Alpha variant is going to be around 10% more expensive than an equivalent fleet of block 50/52 F-16's (Amy butler reported it for aviation week a little while ago..I may have posted it on this thread)..Even if this holds true, the increased capability more than justifies the rise in cost and the rise is not unusual given what the cost of 4th generation aircraft was compared to the 3rd generation aircraft and considering the fact that historically X no of 4th generation fighters could up considerably the air combat capability of the air-force when compared to the same number of 3th generation figthers. 5th generation would only build upon that..so despite of having a 10% rise in O&S cost over the lifetime the capability added with 1750 odd F-35A's when compare to an equal amount of F-16's is much greater than 10%. Add to that, the O&S cost of the F-16's going into the future would only rise given that the Operating cost of the USAF's current F-16C Block 50/52 has increased by a factor of 3x simply due to addition of huge volume of fuel and flying hours per sortie (missions over iraq and afghanistan required long sorties) and due to the addition of heavy weaponry which warrants a greater fuel, greater tanker support in addition to pods, jammers and other strap on enhancements.

This is how the original F-16A was designed to fight (Basic radar equipped WVR fighter = ridiculously low cost of operation)

Image

This is how a modern F-16 fights (Lots of Fuel, weapons, pods, EW gear, self defense weapons = Increased operating cost )

Image

No one complained of the O&S cost rise with capability when Sprey's beloved F-16 bare bone LWF became a useful multi-role fighter..No one will complain about the 10% rise in the O&S bill when the F-35 fleet replaces the Viper fleet in the USAF.
Last edited by brar_w on 05 Aug 2014 08:07, edited 2 times in total.
Philip
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Philip »

Surely there must be some stats/models available with manufacturers on the annual average usage of an aircraft,flying time,engine hours,service checks,component replacement cycle,etc.,just as one has with automobiles,to determine reasonably accurate life-cycle costs? Air forces would also have their hands on experience of the same with differing figures. I think that in the case of the JSF,a brand new bird with the new tech involved,stealth coatings,etc.,one is entering into a realm that is more difficult to predict even with the F-22's experience.Another factor may be that for this aircraft,development is taking place simultaneously with LSP,so when parts fail or have to be modified,it results in another factor whose cost,replacement cycle,etc., has to be modified.If the Rafale availability factor is reportedly "40%",the same as the MKI (the std. av for most 4th-gen fighters),and the JSF availability matches that figure,I don't think that any operator will worry too much about costs having opted for the bird with its stealth+ (improved) capability.

One supposes that the same may be happening with the LCA.Here however it is a matter of great "prestige" and being desi will be bought and operated whatever the cost,which should be lesser or at least equiv. to buying anything firang.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

@brar_w,

I would not take the assumptions nor the number of test hours lightly. IF the data they have gathered is good, then their models have to be great. Have worked with tiny number of data points with very, very good results. And, I expect - especially with this team - the entire process to be water tight. I, for one, would have a great deal of confidence in them.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

I think that in the case of the JSF,a brand new bird with the new tech involved,stealth coatings,etc.,one is entering into a realm that is more difficult to predict
Boss, no "difficult", challenge - yes.

There have been Masters degree granted in this field since the 60s.

India used to lead - IIS, Cal - the democratic world.

You cannot put up a serious factory without such things.

*but*, no matter how good people you have, when a manager is lousy you get bad results - that is the JSF. They changed the managers and now they are getting better results. They will do well - technically. Cost wise, yes, it could have been far less. But that is a managment issue, not a technical one.

Just remembered, there is one on BR, who teaches at a hot shot Univ too, from this field. does not visit this/such thread.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Surely there must be some stats/models available with manufacturers on the annual average usage of an aircraft,flying time,engine hours,service checks,component replacement cycle,etc.
OEM's can do little as the costs are dependent on the usage by the service operating the hardware. They can tell you the fuel burn with a particular degree of accuracy as long as one provides flying data. They can also tell you the KPPs to which the fighter has been designed and whether the testing has indicated a favorable performance or not. Ultimately its the operating air-force that works its own operational model and determines its O&S costs as per that model hence you'll see the same kit give you a different value when used by one air-force vs another air-force. Lets say I buy the F-16 and want simply a radar and internal fuel..I don't care about range or any added SA..I want to carry a load of 2 AIm-120's and 2 AIm-9X's X miles (and my f-16 can reach that clean) and shoo off intruders. You on the other hand want to actually send the F-16 into well defended areas..You pile on a capable FLIR or IRST-21..Some Electronic warfare pod..CFT's for that quick dash and extra range..Perhaps even EFT's for the OSIRAK style runs..Even before you have pilled on weapons your basic F-16 is not so basic anymore :) and the cost dynamics have shifted significantly given that you have upped the sensor count, the avionics usage, the fuel usage and the wear and tear on the fighter. Now add heavy weapons and add engine cycles onto the sortie which are bound to go up vs a relatively clean sortie with little tactical variation and the cost to operate your F-16 and my F-16 would be far far apart (Think 2 to 3X)
I think that in the case of the JSF,a brand new bird with the new tech involved,stealth coatings,etc.,one is entering into a realm that is more difficult to predict even with the F-22's experience
So far the stealth side of it has been handled both in the R&D pipeline and through the various programs run concurrently. Let me give a bit of a background on this since it may help to put things into prospective -

FiberMAT was not developed exclusively for the F-35 although the timelines of its patents and revelation conceded with an R&D bump in the F-35 spending. The plan @ skunk works and at the USAF Tactical fighter group was always to progress in the ATF towards more durable, easier to maintain stealth that not only decreases RCS and makes the aircraft more stealthy but does so by baking the stealth into the skin rather than having to coat it and apply coatings routinely to manage the signature as per the tactical situation. The Plan always was to shift the F-22 production to the new system after a 100-200 F-22A's have been produced. This would have meant F-22B's (or waterer they would have called them) that were more durable, easier to maintain and more capable than the F-22As. This was not much different from what happened with the F-15 development where the F-15C/D were more capable and the airframes more resilient than the A/B versions. After the cold war ended, many things were culled from the ATF program. One of this was the development of future F22 variants and improvements of the program (original plan was to replace the entire Eagle fleet as well as the strike eagle fleet with the F-22). Material research specific to the F-22 was one of this and as such Lockheed could only finish developing this once R&D funding was restored into this aspect of material research with the F-35's R&D arrival.

Now coming to the reason why the F-35's figures cannot be accurately measured and why they have been coming down. In addition to the cost estimates being based on wrong assumptions which to some degree have been corrected with the current cost revision the following are some other reasons -

- Too few fleet hours - While the capers recognized that the C variant had too flew fleet hours to develop any sort of chart (Don't know how janes got the info even when CAPE couldn't predict) the reality is that the B and A fleet has also not flown that much, especially when one figures that throughout the flying the software has gone from buggy to mature only to go buggy again with the arrival of the next batch. Block 1a arrived with bugs, once it was debugged it was smooth sailing for a few weeks before 1b arrived with bugs..Once it was debugged again block 2A arrived with bugs and so this back and forth continues as it would with any high end software development program.

- Concurrency ID'd but Not implemented - The concurrency changes, particularly on the first 5 LRIP blocks have been ID'd i.e they have isolated the changes, marked them and charted out the ways to change them. The depot run that precedes IOC will see these changes incorporated. They do not send the jets to the depot every time a concurrency change is ID'd. They will do all of them in one go prior to IOC. The Marines will begin sending their jets to depots for concurrency changes around Feb of next year and would have 12-15 aircraft ready (post depot runs) for IOC by July or August. Same would happen with the Alpha variants for the Airforce around the same time in 2016. The batches post LRIP 5 i.e All of LRIP 5 and half of LRIP 6 (Currently LRIP 6 is being delivered) aircraft have flown to few hours to be included in the CAPE study and these are the jets that have more than 50% of the ID'd concurrency changes incorporated from the ground through production. Jets that have not yet received concurrency changes require greater inspections, don't perform as fully operational jets would (without depot changes) and therefore their performance in the O&S arena is not indicative or an accurate measure of how the jet is designed to be operated.

ALIS in development and not fully sorted out - Currently the F-35 is being maintained as per a hybrid system of legacy techniques (Borrowed from the F-16 and F-18 books) and modern F-35 specific techniques. ALIS is not ready for prime time and the maintenance learning curve is barely at 50% as most of the maintainers are still finishing writing the syllabus for maintainer training and how to maintain the jet. ALIS is going to take 12-18 months to fully sort out, and until then the F-35 will still be maintained using the hybrid system. Every new batch that graduates does so with a more up to date system and syllabus but this is very much a work in progress as would be for a system that is a step up from the legacy way and a year from operation. Expect things to change in the next 12 months making cost prediction easier.
If the Rafale availability factor is reportedly "40%",the same as the MKI
Rafale's availability should be comparable to the F-16..F-22's availability is around 60% and that is without things like fiber mat and the giant leap in avionics and 5th gen sustainability that the f-35 is designed around..
and the JSF availability matches that figure
F-35 is still in development. Rafale and MKI are fully operational jets. One cannot even begin comparing operational availability until the F-35 is at least as mature..or at a minimum a couple of years in operation with its service (USMC)..
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Carried over from the PAKFA thread

** Read this thread, or at least the last 10-15 pages. All evidence to counter most of the links you have thrown around about cost, delivery time-lines has already been discussed extensively. If you still have any points, make counter points and we can carry on discussing the matter further.
2015 for the JSF to begin flying?
If you choose to ignore the facts then you do so at your own expense. The fact is that the F-35B IOC is July 2015, with the A IOC during July-Dec 2016. THESE are the FACTS, every supporting thing has been provided to you on the appropriate thread. Quit trolling.
The Australian government also believed Lockheed Martin's dates, and an entire fleet of F-18 later, not even 1 JSF fighter is in Oz. There isn't even a 1% chance that 2015 will see a JSF fly. It didn't even fly in the UK airshow.
These dates are not established by Lockheed Martin. Do you even know or have any sort of understanding on how IOC dates are decided? Dates are set by the individual services based on their own criteria. Lockheed martin had no say in this. The ITT determines when a particular testing set will be finished and delivered. The service takes that input and piles onto it its depot runs, time taken to mature training and declares a set date. The USMC has declared July 2015, and as recently as a couple of weeks ago, they have reaffirmed this. The USAF has declared July-Dec 2016 as their IOC with the Head of the USAF reaffirming that date just 3 days ago (all evidence provided to you). The Engine Type A incident that happened in June lead to a safety grounding of the fleet which is routine (happens to even operational jets all around the world) and that is what caused the safety concerns to not give flight clearance for the trip to the UK, program officials, Service chiefs from all over the USAF and JPO have said that this has ZERO impact on testing. This is because the only thing grounding or a reduced envelope impacts is Life Sciences testing (if you do not know what it is - ask - or better read the turkey thread) which is 95% complete and not challenged by the IOC dates.

Australian dates have absolutely nothing to do with USMC or USAF dates. The RAAF IOC criteria are different from both these services and so is their training regime and contribution to the SDD phase of the program. Try to gather what is a standard requirement for IOC, what sort of pilot, airframe, maintainer strength is required. How many batches need to graduate from the various training programs at various levels. What sort of capability is demanded by each customer from the jet at the time of IOC etc etc etc. I have provided a 150+ page write up on the F-35 program on this thread that includes answers to many of these questions. I am not going to waste my time and try to explain them. You can download the document and read it for yourself.
The issue is the track record. Nothing in LM's track record to date inspires confidence in any part of their ability to meet cost, time or capability targets.


Do they need to inspire you on any cost? The bottom line is that audited documents (Audited by Government Auditors) reveal that the Unit cost of the F-35 has decreased by over 50% from LRIP 1 to LRIP5. LRIP6 costs were about 3% lower than LRIP5 costs and LRIP7 costs are around 5% lower then LRIP5 costs. All these costs are Fixed price contracts. The evidence is right there, on the world wide web (Unlike other programs), if you choose to ignore the search feature on this forum, or go over the Turkey thread, its not my fault.
Russian Wikipedia on PAKFA, There are two prototypes on the ground and 7 planes flying. Don't know what happened to the plane that was on fire.
Missiles have been fired from the PAK-FA and bombs have been dropped. I would assume exactly as per the Tejas programme, that it has to be cleared to 8Gs etc. The Russians have built and flown many planes, it's to be expected that they can beat LM to the punch using their experience From what I can see, the Russians did concurrent engineering correctly while LM stuffed it up. Also, PAKFA is an ongoing program. It didn't start 2 years ago.
So basically your link in Russian Wikipedia answers none of my questions. Even I know how many aircraft are in the air and what has been done. I want to know some facts which I asked you based on which you are claiming x number of things with operational capability, when you cannot even define for me what the operational capability is for the PAKFA in 2016.

BTW Prototype testing was accomplished on the JSF program way back including High Alpha and High G testing. The current jets are full production representative with a full mission system load. Big difference which you clearly do not understand.
F-22, B-2, F-117,B-1. Essentially every stealth program the US has run has ended in failure.
The F-22 and B-2 were children of the cold war. What did you expect the Pentagon to still buy 500-700 F-22's of multiple variants despite of the threat vanishing with the fall of the Iron curtain? They bought the basic A version in modest amounts as an insurance policy and moved along. Same happened with the B-2. No one was going to need 3 digit B-2's or 700 F-22's given that your enemy during the cold war days collapsed. When you have A huge sunk cost which was designed around a requirement 3-4 times your ultimate procured the individual cost of the unit cost sky rockets (Basic common sense) leading to a Nunn Mcurdy breach in legal terms. But that is acceptable because the cold-war ended and no one needed that sort of capability anymore, so only a basic capability with the basic F-22 version was absorbed while the doctrinal shift occurred institutionally to prepare for the challenges of the future.
These are all the same issues faced by the JSF. History repeats.
The problem here is that you have access to auditor, (often manipulated by the free media) statistics on the US programs. Provide me some audited financial papers on various Russian programs and we can judge and compare. Otherwise you will end up comparing Russian Wikipedia to official SAR documents (audited) or compare program read ups on the US programs based on authors that have extensively researched cost projections and pegged them to audited program financial performance. None of these comparisons are doable on the russian systems. Another problem is that estimates are not required to be 100% accurate. Its quite tough to predict the exact cost of a system 20 years before it is operational especially with very high end systems. The F-117 was a first generation stealthy plane flying decades before any other country had any sort of stealth prototype in the air. How do you peg a cost of that sort of capability 10-12 years before development? The YF-22 prototypes were flying some 24 years ago with a mach 1.5+ Supercruise, verifiable Low Signature, launching weapons from their internal bays and acquiring targets with their prototype sensors. How do put a cost peg on that sort of capability in 1991? Similarly by the turn of the millennium F-22 production jets were super cruising at mach 1.72, with a lower RCS than the prototype YF-22 or the ATF program requirements and all aspect stealth when compared to the YF-22 prototypes and launching weapons using production standard avionics with full production standard clean sheet 5th generation engines. How do you put a price on having a capability in that timeline?
Acquisition cost 100 million 45 million
For the Su-30MKI a cost much more of that has been cited on this forum. Somewhere around 70-75 million per jet has been cited including various links provided to support that figure. Use the search feature.
Yet this is small change compared to the massive order of 272 Su-30MKIs, which started out as a bargain at $30 million apiece, but which are now priced at $75 million each.
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com.au/2014/ ... 30mki.html
Upgrades N/A 5 million
5 million for what capability with what sort of longevity
Maintenance 1/2 because single engine craft and smaller than MKI
Which is a single engine craft?
I would love to produce a Life Cycle Cost, but will settle for one that includes everything we have actual hard data on.
So you throw around life cycle cost that is exaggerated on the JSF without any sort of context of what these costs are for various systems around the world. GREAT!
A lot of the life cycle costs should be exactly the same between these two planes, because pilots are being trained on the same Hawk-IJT trainer, both use aviation fuel, Indian missiles and bombs etc. So the PAK-FA operating cost should be the same as the Su-30 MKI. So please post with news links and calculations, so I can figure out what the real cost of the S-30 MKI is.
This is just great. Should be this, should be that. Operating life cycle cost does not involve training on trainers. Lets assume for a second that the Su-30MKI is an 8000 hour airframe (which it is not)..How much fuel would be required for 8000 hours of flying?..How many engines would be required to ensure 1 airframe lasts 8000 hours etc etc. With PAKFA you add considerably to the Avionics footprint, internal weapon bays, add stealth and adherence to a signature regimen (not on legacy)..I can count a dozen things right of the bat that would be different between 4th gen and 5th gen..But you haven't worked on any of these numbers before coming to the conclusions you have come to. Quite strange..The reasons I am asking these questions is that you have liberally thrown around costing figures of the F-35 which have been shown to be exaggerated and consistently lowered by the auditors over the life of the program. You are claiming that these lifetime cost figures are unaffordable, but provide absolutely no context to compare them to 4th or 4.5th generation costing data. How exactly did you arrive to your conclusions about what is a fair life cycle cost of fifth generation capability when you nothing on the Russian MKI life cycle cost over similar parameters as the F-35, or that of the PAKFA?
Thanks Austin. The bit about the AESA Radar on pg 37 was interesting, and confirmation that the radar part is going well. It seems at least 4 more prototypes are planned, and they have fitted all the existing prototypes with the AESA radar and have tested air to air and air to ground modes. So the current status of the PAK-FA is: No known problems to stop production in 2016.
You need to have a better understanding on advanced programs run testing. Because an aircraft has a radar integrated that has been tested on some a2a and a2g modes, and because it has fired a few weapons (How many fired from internal bays?) does not mean that radar testing is complete or weapons testing is complete. And these are prototypes are they not? What about running a full mission load..A lot of the testing has to be repeated when the fusion engines and all of the active and passive testing are crammed into a fully representative frame. The F-22 had a radar integrated and launched weapons with the YF-22 prototypes, this did not mean that they didn't have to run an extensive weapons clearance and testing regime once the production representative F-22's took to the air? Prototype and system architecture verification is done quite early in most programs. When the final mission systems are strapped onto fully production representative jets (ideally from a production line representative of final production) the magic of testing really starts. Buy yourself a decent book on test programs, or try to download one form scribd.

By the way the Dates you throw around on the PAKFA have already been clarified by informed members on this thread as to what "induction" means in the Soviet/Russian context.
Last edited by brar_w on 05 Aug 2014 19:38, edited 1 time in total.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

NRao wrote:
I think that in the case of the JSF,a brand new bird with the new tech involved,stealth coatings,etc.,one is entering into a realm that is more difficult to predict
Boss, no "difficult", challenge - yes.

There have been Masters degree granted in this field since the 60s.

India used to lead - IIS, Cal - the democratic world.

You cannot put up a serious factory without such things.

*but*, no matter how good people you have, when a manager is lousy you get bad results - that is the JSF. They changed the managers and now they are getting better results. They will do well - technically. Cost wise, yes, it could have been far less. But that is a managment issue, not a technical one.

Just remembered, there is one on BR, who teaches at a hot shot Univ too, from this field. does not visit this/such thread.
Well its not about the competency of the calculators, but the underlying assumptions that drove the studies. The auditors have realized some of those mistakes and adjusted the estimates downwards by a whopping percentage. Its just that they won't get fired because of the gross miscalculation on their part, while the Wheeler's and the Axe's of the world would call for heads to roll if the JPO screwed up their numbers by an amount much smaller than that. It took a year and a half for the JPO to sit with the auditors to show to them how their model was factually inaccurate and ignorant of the way the USAF , USMC (to a lesser extent the USN) operates its fleet of tactical fighters.

There are still issues with the costing model and Chris Bogdon eluded to this as recently as Farnborough 2014 in the video interview with Vago Muradian..The assumptions still do not fairly do an apples to apples comparison of the arriving weapons system with the departing weapons system. Then there is the accuracy issues with 16K fleet hours spread over multiple models with varying software maturity and without concurrency changes incorporated. Expect another 20-25% dip in O&S cost in line with a similar one the last time around by 2018 or so or by the time a stable software mode has flown in concurrency enabled jets for around 30K flight hours. Flight hours will exponentially rise as the fleet matures and the much better availability rates of the LRIP6 and LRIP 7 begin to contribute towards the overall flying..
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

^^^^^^

Could be, I have not followed it.

My point is that the process of estimating or predicting is very, very well established. Even in the most complex situations *we have* done a very good job. Such as predicting 25 years out - we still do it - by law - every year.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Predicting years out into the future is not tough once the current costing data is extensive and fully validated. This is however not the case with in-development products especially which are developed using the concurrency model. What must have been the estimates on Avionics down times for the F-16A's when the early program jets were crashing due to issues with the FBW. I bet no one thought that the F-16 would be the benchmark in the west for affordable fighters back then. Who would have thought that the F-16A, designed with a basic radar and just a WVR load would eventually be capable of carrying a load that compares nicely to medium-heavy fighters and carries a sensor load that is more advanced per delivery date than 4.5 generation fighters...The costing went out of the window, because the modern F-16 aint your light weight fighter that gives you 5K per hour flying. Its a big, heavy, payload hauler with a very very extensive avionics suite that doubles or triples your cost of operating but does so with a significantly enhanced capability compared to the first iteration of the aircraft.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

No need to have extensive data - granted the more the better, but science exists to predict with very, very little data.

The whole purpose of assumptions is to deal with dirty data ......... a lack of "fully validated" data.

From a science pov, nothing new here. Predicting in uncertainty (climate is a big area).

My feel is that the JSF was a very badly managed project. The processes and sciences have existed.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

No need to have extensive data - granted the more the better, but science exists to predict with very, very little data
How do you come up with a down time calculation when your software is still crashing? How do you decide what is a stable configuration before you start comparing that level to the KPP? What if the Operator tells you that this configuration is still not stable enough and things will get better. Do you wait, or do you start assuming a particular MTBF for a component. Predictions are only as accurate as the underlying assumptions and their accuracy. Update the assumptions and the model requires updating. That is why there has been a greater than 30% dip in O&S estimates. The program has not magically transformed the F-35 through proper management into a more efficient to operate weapons system - the model has been updated with more accurate data and with proper understanding of how the operators operate tac fighters and how they intend on operating the JSF.
My feel is that the JSF was a very badly managed project. The processes and sciences have existed
While that could be said about the UFC that cannot said of the O&S cost. Program management has nothing to do with this. The auditors displayed a complete lack of knowledge on the way the three services operate their tactical fighters. Assumptions were made that were grossly inaccurate..The B is a STOVL so they used STOVL calculations for fleet wide O&S costs not realizing that more than 2/3 of the sorties over the lifetime for the B version would be in the CTOL mode. The program management had absolutely nothing to do with CAPE estimate as it was done by independent government auditors. Once the JPO worked with these people to better explain to them the faults in their models, corrections were made. It took a while to collaborate however before the costing data began showing a downward dip. That was enough time for the wheelers and Axe's of the world to jump up and down.

We do not even need to get into the accuracy aspect. If they were off by 15-20% at the end of 55 years (their scope of prediction) they'd be given a pat on the back at the end. They however have adjusted their costing data by almost a third even before the Jet has IOC'd.

Breaking Defense readers will remember that this estimate is extends more than half a century and includes such assumptions as the Marines will fly the F-35 vertically or in hover much more frequently than they will horizontally.

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... space.html

What the new management shakeup and the program restructure has meant is that the program has been put back on track with annual test points being exceeded every year since 2010 (verifiable fact). Even with the 3 week odd grounding they still expect to exceed the test points for Testing year 2014, and are well on their way on wrapping up life science testing and 2b mission testing and delivering a fully working 2b load to the marines for certification. The O&S model has been adjusted, the engine has not suddenly become more efficient by an order of magnitude that would be a challenge even for variable cycle - next generation engines. We can discuss the blueprint of affordability and the link you have posited. The current focus is on UFC which would logically extend towards O&S cost as the effort matures. The program has had sustainability baked into the design of each and every component and this is a big difference between it and the F-22. For everything to be realized they need to first get all the jets to post-concurrency status (or release premature data on LRIP6 jets) and fully deliver a debuged ALIS. This will happen in due course. One that is done each service will develop and re-do its training and maintaining manuals and with time the entire system will become more efficient. Depot and warehousing costs on a host of components will be greatly reduced through common components between three aircrafts. Upgrade costs will be effectively reduced by 1/3 since each and every sensor development is retrofittable on all the 3 services. This will be the major driver of reduced O&S costs going into the next 20, 30 or 40 years.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

* There are Masters level programs to deal with Uncertainty. Have been since 60s. Done it.
* How do you predict a population mix in 25 years, when you have no clue what the immigration policy will be in 20 years. Done it.
* Software example: Std use case in studying Uncertainty. (If someone complains about HW, understandable)
Program management has nothing to do with this. The auditors displayed a complete lack of knowledge on the way the three services operate their tactical fighters.
That, in bolded, is a lack of program management. Job of the PM to have the right people, may be - in this case - there are none among the auditor community that have such knowledge, but then that is a known factor to overcome and should have trained such auditors.

Heck we humans have sent men to the moon. The one time two teams did not communicate about space travel they goofed it up, when the spacecraft to Mars crashed because one team dealt in metric and the other in something else (???) ......... Project Management responsibility.

PMs job to get teh right people, get the right training, ............. do whatever to see that the project is on track: on time, under budget.

A very good PM will accommodate "failure" in the project.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

There are Masters level programs to deal with Uncertainty. Have been since 60s. Done it.
* How do you predict a population mix in 25 years, when you have no clue what the immigration policy will be in 20 years. Done it.
* Software example: Std use case in studying Uncertainty. (If someone complains about HW, understandable)
None of this is possible if your underlying assumptions are littered with mistakes, miscalculations and inaccuracy.
That, in bolded, is a lack of program management
How can the program be held responsible (I assume here that you refer to the F-35 program) for something that is carried out by an institution that is outside of its sphere of influence? The program provides raw data, its unto the independent auditors to assume away..
there are none among the auditor community that have such knowledge, but then that is a known factor to overcome and should have trained such auditors.
Thats the point. Wrong assumptions at the wrong time.. This doesn't stop folks for blaming the JSF program or the JPO for a huge increase in F-35 O&S cost when factually there is no increase at all. 2012 and 2013 was littered with articles about the massive O&S cost and the JPO took a massive hit in the media and through bloggers with dubious credentials. Yet when the estimates were quietly adjusted not once but twice not much was made of the effort. The program (JPO) is still actively working with the institutions concerned to have a better O&S price model. Just don't expect the downward dip in the model to stop anytime soon.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

brar_w wrote: None of this is possible if your underlying assumptions are littered with mistakes, miscalculations and inaccuracy.
Hire the right guy and you will not have problems (does not mean there will not be failures - there will be, but the right person is trained to recover from it within time/budget)
How can the program be held responsible (I assume here that you refer to the F-35 program) for something that is carried out by an institution that is outside of its sphere of influence? The program provides raw data, its unto the independent auditors to assume away.
Thats the point. Wrong assumptions at the wrong time.. This doesn't stop folks for blaming the JSF program or the JPO for a huge increase in F-35 O&S cost when factually there is no increase at all. 2012 and 2013 was littered with articles about the massive O&S cost and the JPO took a massive hit in the media and through bloggers with dubious credentials. Yet when the estimates were quietly adjusted not once but twice not much was made of the effort. The program (JPO) is still actively working with the institutions concerned to have a better O&S price model. Just don't expect the downward dip in the model to stop anytime soon.
Apologies. I was on a different page.

I would not worry about such matters. $hit happens. I know (from experience) that many a times it is not fair. *But* it is what it is. Independent auditors and pop-up commentators from the land of oz, the prior is a given, the latter a new breed are part of the landscape. The prior is also - at times - a part of the political process and there are processes within the system that take care of these things.

When I say the JSF could have been better managed, at a very high level this is what I mean: IIRC, the F-35's first estimated "price" was placed at $40 million per plane. It escalated to some $60 million over time. Even at 60 it would have been a steal. I am convinced they could have brought it under the $85 million they are talking of now.

No color for Auditors or Oz commentators in my painting. (For all I know the Auditors are paid by Philip. Clever as he is, I am sure he collects it from the Russians.) (JK, Philip)
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

BTW, please visit: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 35-int.htm.

check out the original (or thereabouts) estimates of sales (by LM of course).

They had, then, pegged a total of 150 JSFs for India!!!!

Then check out some of the other nations: Germany, Taiwan, Greece, etc.

Provides what level of thinking goes into such projects.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

They did a overall market research to identify potential markets to invest in. All companies do this. Do you think Dassault predicted when they launched the Rafale program that they'd have ZERO export sales by 2014? Even in commercial aviation both A and B have market forecasts based on which their sales team develop strategies. But these are just broader market outlooks meant to prepare a strategy to sell a product to potential customers.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Viv S »

NRao wrote:I am convinced they could have brought it under the $85 million they are talking of now.
They're now talking $80 mil in 2019 (down from $85M), which is about $70 mil at current day prices and about $55 mil in 2004 dollars.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_23694 »

They're now talking $80 mil in 2019 (down from $85M), which is about $70 mil at current day prices and about $55 mil in 2004 dollars.
Who knows they might even give it for free to certain countries if the situation demands :rotfl:
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_20317 »

dhiraj wrote:
They're now talking $80 mil in 2019 (down from $85M), which is about $70 mil at current day prices and about $55 mil in 2004 dollars.
Who knows they might even give it for free to certain countries if the situation demands :rotfl:
Well it can actually be done. Leasing model. In any case Indians with ToT get only screw drivers. With JSF, Indians can get even the drivers from outside. Screw drivers to Drivers - real progress.

There is also another way to get it for free. Host a base then they will do the fighting also for you. Screw Drivers to Drivers to Fighters - really real progress.

There is still third way to get it for free. Put 88 years in the field meant for 55 years and just put a learning curve of brazillion magnitude. After all god never put any upper limit on learning curves.

There could be a still fourth way of getting it for free. Call Musharaff uncle he has a trillion dollar gas find in Balochistan - tell him to finance it and leave the Baloch to their haal-e-ishq with the Miyan Mushy. Something along the same lines in AFG can also be done to sweeten the deal.

There is a fifth way too. Just do not fight so no need for any air force and you can even have as a bonus a JSF for one of the IMyTs and then we can all model the strategic bakwasbazzi in fifth generation style.

There is a sixth way also. Put up a fixed deposit with the Umrikhans. That is an asset in your books an interest generating asset. The ask them to supply you with JSF which on secured loan basis. JSF is your liability with 2/4 x asset cover. See the assets are more and everybody can be happy.



.......................


On a more serious note, there is nothing to stop the IAF while operating its MKIs to lug on its pylons an AAM from Russia, a whatever pod from Israel, a LGB from DRDO/DPSU and a fizzled out non-TN from BARC and a Brahmos from Brahmos Corp. What does the JSF carry except some good wishes from its program office for which they themselves claim they don't have much of an ability to estimate into the future. Which aircraft from the Umrikhan stable has had a cost reduction as it goes into production. F-22 the numbers were cut. B-2 the numbers were cut. F-117 well I was not born yet but still what happened to it we all know.

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,


$55 mil in 2004 dollars - :rotfl: Gem. How much in 1947 dollars?
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Viv S »

dhiraj wrote:
They're now talking $80 mil in 2019 (down from $85M), which is about $70 mil at current day prices and about $55 mil in 2004 dollars.
Who knows they might even give it for free to certain countries if the situation demands :rotfl:
Japan or South Korea maybe when war clouds gather. If you were referring to Pakistan, well its country that was once refunded in soyabeans for undelivered F-16. The country's utility in the GWOT is fading as the US pulls out of Afghanistan. Its come to consider the Haqqanis/Taliban to be in Pakistan's pocket, Pakistan to be in China's pocket, and the US as a result is now even stonewalling the sale of a measly 160 MRAPS for the Pak military, despite having 1,200 excess vehicles lying around in Afghanistan and having donated hundreds (as far off as Croatia).
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Viv S »

ravi_g wrote:What does the JSF carry except some good wishes from its program office for which they themselves claim they don't have much of an ability to estimate into the future.
Over the short term

- SDB
- SDB-II
- JDAM/LJDAM
- Paveway II/II
- Paveway IV
- ASRAAM
- Aim-9X Blk2
- Aim-120D
- JSOW/JSOW-ER
- NSM/JSM

and eventually

- MALD-J
- AARGM
- JASSM/JASSM-ER
- JAGM
- LRASM
- Aim-9X Blk3
- Meteor
- Storm Shadow
- Brimstone/SPEAR 3
- Python-6/Stunner
- Spice
- CUDA

Plus Next Generation Jammer. After the introduction of the 'Universal Armament Interface' (UAI) in Block 4, operators will be able to add their equipment without a lengthy integration process involving the OEM.
Which aircraft from the Umrikhan stable has had a cost reduction as it goes into production.
From low rate production to full rate production? That would be all of them.
F-22 the numbers were cut. B-2 the numbers were cut.
Thanks to the collapse of Soviet Russia and the resulting peace dividend.
F-117 well I was not born yet but still what happened to it we all know.
Full production run and 27 years of operational service. One combat loss because of poor mission planning.
$55 mil in 2004 dollars - Gem. How much in 1947 dollars?
Manufacturing on the first F-35 began in 2004. Most complaints about how it overshot the budget, take a benchmark of $50M/unit. A figure that was floating around in 2004/2005.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

What does the JSF carry except some good wishes from its program office for which they themselves claim they don't have much of an ability to estimate into the future
No program manager is claiming any such thing. The JPO has its own costing data and the program point man has reiterated it time and time again. No other program at this stage of development can predict variables with any greater degree of accuracy. That is why these are variables. The Program boss wasn't criticizing his own inability to nail down the cost, he was criticizing the assumptions of auditors that based their data on assumptions which were grossly ignorant of the SOP of peacetime training and operations in all three services of the US armed forces air wings. Once the auditors began listening to the point the services made with regards to their wild assumptions, they began to make corrections to the O&S costs and so far they have been revised 2 times in 3 years or so. The JPO is clear on O&S cost - The Baseline F-35A costs according to it around 10% more than a baseline F-16 Block 50/52 in a configuration that is prevalent within the USAF. Compared to the janes data this is about 20-30% more expensive than aircrafts like the Super Hornet, Rafale and Eurofighter and pretty much in line with a generational shift that the increased capability such as LO maintaince, internal weapon bays and increased avionics footprint provides.
$55 mil in 2004 dollars - :rotfl: Gem. How much in 1947 dollars?
Sarcasm aside, the programs usually start to target costs in the current year dollars around the time they are launched. The SDD phase started post the down-select in late 2001 or 2002 so it is not unusual to expect the costing numbers around that time to be benchmarked for then year dollars. This is how accounting works. The number is adjusted with the standard defense industry inflation formula that prevails within the US DOD.
Which aircraft from the Umrikhan stable has had a cost reduction as it goes into production.
Each and every aircraft produced has shown a downward curve from the time of early prototyping to LRIP 1 and beyond into full scale production. The cheapest F-22's were those that were negotiated in the last batch (Around 60) . Similarly, the LRIP1 cost was 50+% greater than the LRIP5 cost of the F-35. These are verifiable, audited, fully transparent disclosures made by the auditing authorities. The curve that I have posted a few pages back is 100% verified up to LRIP 7 and is estimated beyond LRIP 7 towards LRIP10 and full rate of production. There is no dispute with the first 7 Low rate blocks. Price for the Alpha started at above 250 Million UFC at early production and by the time the LRIP7 fixed price contract was signed this price had fallen to 112 million UFC. As economies of scale are realized this will further reduce till a point comes where the production machinery (and industry train) is at an equilibrium with the design threshold for the JSF program. That would most likely occur at a production rate of around 150-200 aircraft per annum (Its an aircraft a day assembly line) which would be realized by around 2018 contract year (not delivery but contract).
F-22 the numbers were cut.
F-22 numbers were cut because of a lack of a credible threat that warrant the aircraft. A token fleet was kept as an insurance policy after the USAF lobbied very very hard for it (At the expense of other modernization programs such as the E-10) Cuts into the ATF program began almost immediately post- Soviet Union collapse. Out went the top speed requirement, out went the wing assembly/IRST, out went a host of upgrades for the Next (F-15C like ) version of the production standard that included durable RAM like fiber mat (now on the F-35) and out went a host of weapons for it. Remember the Have Dash II? It also went out along with other concepts to arm 5th generation fleets. The reduced numbers not only threw off the production dynamics for a program that from its inception had set itself up for a 500-700 unit production run, and the R&D spread over a fifth of the unit meant huge spiral in cost (common sense dictates that an AMOUNT which was to be divided over 700 units, when divided over just 180 will result in a much greater per unit spread).
B-2 the numbers were cut.
Just for the same reason the F-22 numbers were cut. It was a bomber meant to penetrate the inner reaches of the Soviet Union and conduct stealthy strike. Soviet Union collapsed, and there was no other threat that warranted huge number of stealthy bombers at a time when there was absolutely no other nation out there that would be able to field a bomber with the capability of the B-2 till 2025 perhaps ( A full 36 years after B-2's first flight). Again a token force was maintained and the program culled away as the threat disappeared. The strategic bomber funding went towards making the legacy bomber fleets smarter, more competent to handling the threats that the USAF was likely to face post-SU collapse. In came the precision bombing doctrine that replaced the carpet bombing mind set of the good old days of the cold war. Massive investments were made in PGM's with the trend shifting form sorties per target towards targets per sortie The results of these efforts showed themselves quite well in Afghanistan when the cold war strategic bomber fleet was actually doing CAS for the troops on the ground..Things which would have been unheard of during the SAC times..
F-117 well I was not born yet but still what happened to it we all know.
It was a first gen design, that lasted its entire operational service life till a point in time when the F-22 with the SDB or 1000 lb bomb was able to replace the mission set. It was a dated strike aircraft in terms of upgradability yet still lasted for a while. First generation stealth has its disadvantages just like first generation jet fighters or first generation supersonic fighters.
Last edited by brar_w on 06 Aug 2014 03:45, edited 6 times in total.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

What does the JSF carry except some good wishes from its program office
And that is what the Russians are comparing their PAK-FA to. India has and may continue to buy into this Russian vision.....potentially to the tune of $35 billion.

China has gone to the length of stealing. And building.

India, SK, Japan, Turkey and perhaps a few others are spending billions to emulate.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Philip »

If my name was "Philby" instead of Philip I would be singing like Topol in Fiddler...! Alas,my favourite tipple isn't vodka and I haven't "two roubles to rub with",only fast depreciating rupees.As for accountants from the land of Oz,they're no wizards at all,just look at how they've screwed up their sub programme.But perhaps if I changed my name to "Philby"...........?!

Meanwhile...
https://www.google.co.in/search?newwind ... XN4gu8gq9I
The same old story over and over again

Gepubliceerd door Christiaan Meinen onder Global F35 News

The NOS (Dutch Broadcasting Organisation) has the following story. On television they show a big smiling Maxime Verhagen, former minister of Foreign Affairs (CDA) now appointed as special representative to get as many orders on the JSF program as possible for Dutch industry. Of course he is very positive but he also exaggerates enormously about the possible values. Some of the “facts” of this broadcast:

• 27 Dutch companies have made it to generate work from the JSF program (0:22)
• Fokker: for 40 JSF per year they build parts (0:26)
• Aeronamic has an order ( worth € 220 milj) work for at least 50 people (0:32)
• There will be more work, € 8 to € 9 billion with hundreds of jobs. (0:36)
• Maxime Verhagen: After building there also will come future contracts for the maintenance work also worth € 10 to € 20 billion

I would like to ask Mr. Verhagen some key questions: On what grounds where those prognoses based? These where the figures based on the business case of the Dutch Air Force buying 85 JSF not 37.

Another quote of mr Verhagen: If you don’t invest.. you won’t receive anything. (0:45)

Can we expect the US to give us the same amount of orders? What about some non-partnernations willing to aquire the JSF with demands of large production participation? Like Japan, South-Korea and Israël? Howe come they didn’t invest a billion euro’s in this program and still receive orders far more wort than ours? While they even order in the same amount of aircraft (arrount 40 each?) And what about those figures and orders we see sometimes in the Dutch News. Stories about new orders, signature signing of orders. All celebrated but not always clear if it’s a new one… or one already arranged long time ago… but celebrated as a new victory (for marketing purposes ofcourse).

Repeating old contracts and framework agreements with each small successor agreement, if re-extracted billions turnover ……….
The annual PV F16 allow hitherto SALES tens of millions to the recognition of the “JSF Business Case” (which is not MARGIN = value) show per year.
Super nice of course …….

But Aeronamic works for Airbus; and work would have been if we DO NOT F-35 bought; simply because they are innovative.

BREEDER / STORK
October 2009
THE HAGUE - Stork Fokker’s flaperons, movable flaps on the wings, producing for American combat unit JSF. For this purpose, Tuesday (October 6) signed a contract with aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin.
(and even at least 4 times, and so on)

Aeronamic (part of the work is outsourced to Romanian branch)

November 17, 2010
Aeronamic has a contract for the supply of the so-called Air Management System for Turbomachinery energy on board the aircraft.

May 2013
Honeywell, a company that for years Aeronamic Siezen recent works, signed an agreement for the construction of Terminal Power Management Systems (PTMs) for half of the total number of building F-35’s. “The system regulates the energy system aboard the new American fighter. It is an order of 500 to 600 million and provides 50 to 60 of our people for thirty years working on “The deal goes through, but under one condition., The Dutch government should proceed to purchase the F-35. “How many devices they buy does not matter. If only they buy. ”

July 2014
Production of 220 million and 50 men work.

How often do we have to repeat this??
This is an April report/analysis on costs,informative and before the gine fire.

http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/?p=1139
Three Reports on the F-35: One of Them Informative

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl om 1:12 onder Global F35 News

A few days ago, Breaking Defense reported an $11.5 billion cost decrease in the F-35. The outlet proclaimed “This is no program estimate that critics might savage. This comes from the Government Accountability Office’s definitive annual Assessment of Selected Weapons Report [sic.].”
Breaking Defense also quoted GAO’s report (titled “Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs”) that the newly discovered reduction in costs was “due solely to efficiencies found within the program as no decrease in quantities was reported.” (See pages 11-12 of the GAO report.)

The message of F-35 advocates: cost would come down

It all fit in nicely with the ongoing advocate narrative on the F-35: costs are coming down; yes, software and a few other things are a problem, but despite a few bumps in the road, the program is headed in the right direction, especially on cost.

The news of cost reductions, validated by GAO, was surely welcome in the face of GAO’s other report, detailing some of those software issues. They threaten to force a delay in the Marine Corps’ plan to declare the F-35B “initially operationally capable” in 2015 and the Air Force’s plan to do the same in 2016, or to require them to declare IOC with even less capability than had been originally-and very modestly–planned.

The wrong comparison…

There’s just one thing wrong with the new cost reduction report, reported in the opening sentence of Breaking Defense’s report as a “major win” that was “just scored” by the F-35 program. As GAO explained in detail in the 10 page explanation of its methodology (on pages 149 to 159), its analysis compared the DOD Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) that came out in early 2013 (dated December 2012) to the previous SAR that was issued in 2012 (dated December 2011). Or as GAO put it “We compared the programs that issued SARs in December 2012 with the list of programs that had issued SARs in December 2011.”

In that more than year old SAR (dated December 2012), DOD reported that it had declared total F-35 costs to be lower than estimated in the previous SAR (dated December 2011): costs had come down by $10.8 billion in 2012 dollars, which translates to $11.5 billion in GAO’s conversion to 2014 dollars.

And that’s your savings, reported by Breaking Defense as something new.

Note also, this is not “GAO’s F-35 Estimate” (as proclaimed in Breaking Defense’s headline: “GAO’s F-35 Estimate Plunges $11.5 Billion; EELV Costs Soar $28.1 Billion”), it is GAO’s regurgitation of what DOD reported in its past F-35 SARs, comparing the 2012 numbers to the 2011 numbers.

Cost down ? Only by Adjusted inflation estimates, lower requirements

Moreover, take a look at the reasons for the lesser costs in the newer (2012) SAR, described by GAO as “due solely to efficiencies found within the program.” Those “efficiencies” are variously listed on pages 77 - 81 of the December 2012 SAR; they include subcontractor re-estimates of costs, revised (more favorable) inflation estimates, redefinition of customer (DOD) requirements, and realignment of where to charge costs. Rejiggering inflation numbers, lesser hardware requirements, and unverified subcontractor numbers are what GAO characterizes as “efficiencies.” Let’s be polite and describe GAO’s characterization as incomplete.

Note also that what we are getting is subcontractor and other numbers reported by DOD (with or without independent verification), re-reported by GAO (apparently without any verification or analysis, none of which appeared in the report). And finally, all of it misinterpreted to us by Breaking Defense.

March 2014 “Systems Engineering Annual Report”: confirmation of more bad F-35 news

Meanwhile there is more informative reporting on the F-35, mostly uncovered by the media, except for the revealing work of Jason Sherman at InsideDefense.com. He summarized most of a new annual report from DOD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Systems Engineering, Stephen P. Welby. His March 2014 “Systems Engineering Annual Report” confirms some of the bad news we have already heard from other DOD testing reports, and the report implies some important contradictions to GAO’s prognosis of declining F-35 costs and that there is anything approaching new “efficiencies” that can be understood to justify an estimate of lower cost being in hand. The bad news comes in four categories: Performance, Reliability, Software and Manufacturing, as follows.

F-35 Performance not meeting contractual thresholds

The F-35 is hiccupping on one of its Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). It happens to be one that many ignore but which is integral to the aircraft’s ability to engage in combat. The issue is the F-35’s “sortie generation rate,” or how often it can fly in either combat or-very important-training. In addition, there are problems in other KPPs where DOD has already relaxed the standard, and there are numerous “non-KPP” thresholds where the F-35 is having problems. DASD Welby puts it as follows:
“Performance: The program is on track to meet seven of the eight KPPs. An issue with incorrect analysis/assumptions is hampering the attainment of the sortie generation rate (SGR) KPP. The program office is examining the sensitivity of the SGR KPP to establish more operationally realistic ground rules and assumptions. As a result, the program plans to reassess SGR. Although on track, the combat radius, STOVL performance, and CV recovery KPPs have limited margins. During a requirements review this year, the program determined of 62 non-KPP ORD thresholds, 16 are not achievable by the end of SDD based on the current plan, and eight others are at risk of not achieving the threshold. The program identified corrective actions or has way-ahead recommendations.”

F-35 Reliability: not meeting standards

In addition and as we already know from previous test reporting, the F-35 is not meeting its interim standards for reliability. Note that as DASD Welby states, this can mean more, not less, cost. As Welby puts it:
“Reliability: Reliability data are below growth curves for all variants, and the program could face a risk to meeting reliability requirements without dedicated funding for a reliability growth program. Similarly, since O&S costs are based on meeting the required reliability at maturity, there are increasing risks to O&S cost and future aircraft availability. The program does not plan to complete prognostics portion of the Prognostics Health Management (PHM) requirements within SDD.”

F-35 software: serious problems; delaying IOC

We know from a different GAO report, which goes more seriously into the issue at hand than the GAO report discussed above, that the F-35 is having serious problems with its all-important software. Note that Welby projects an actual delay in the Marines’ and Air Force’s IOC plans, while GAO only asserted the possibility of it (which F-35 program manager Lt. General Bogdan tried to minimize to as little as 30 days). Welby says:”
“Software: Software delivery for the remainder of Blocks 2/3 is a challenge because of the size and complexity (~28.9 million software lines of code (SLOC), with ~2 million SLOC remaining). DASD(SE) forecasts a schedule delay for Block 2 and a delay for Block 3. As a result, the program improved software processes but also shifted resources to Block 2 at the expense of Block 3.”

Manufacturing, steady progress hand in hand with concerns

DASD Welby’s findings on manufacturing “efficiencies” are hardly grist for a declaration that cost reductions are in hand. While he cites “progress,” his caveats are so serious as to question whether the direction of cost estimates should be up, rather than down-at least until there is a proven, empirical basis for declaring any savings whatsoever. Nonetheless, both DOD and GAO find the basis for a rosy future. More wary, Welby states:-
“Manufacturing: There was steady manufacturing progress in FY 2013, but quality, scrap/rework/repair, on-time part delivery, supplier execution, and reduced funding for future affordability initiatives are issues that may have an impact on costs for LRIP ramp-rate increases and FRP. In addition, there are production risks including part-interchangeability variation and fix schedule, outer-mold-line control, and maturing international capabilities. DASD(SE) participated in two supplier reviews and the annual prime contractor PRR. There was improvement from the previous year, but there are risks remaining for all eight manufacturing areas assessed. Mitigation plans are in place or in development for all production issues, risks, and PRR findings.”

Sometimes, reports serve only the purpose of informing us what the advocates happen to be pushing and who or what they have enlisted in their efforts. Having worked at GAO for nine years and witnessing all too close the mentality of some senior management there, it does not surprise me that GAO’s-shall we say–incomplete descriptions of DOD’s numbers have the effect of enabling the advocates and their mouthpieces.

We should thank InsideDefense.com for bringing the Systems Engineering Annual Report to our attention. Needless to say, we can ignore the ressed

References:
US GAO; March 2014; “Summary Report GAO 14-340″”
US GAO; March 2014; “GAO 14-340; 10 Mb. PDF of report; Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

Author:
Winslow Wheeler; Director, Straus Military Reform Project, CDI at POGO, POGO
His areas of expertise include Congress, the Defense Budget, National Security, Pentagon Reform and Weapons Systems
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Winslow Wheeler; Director, Straus Military Reform Project, CDI at POGO, POGO
His areas of expertise include Congress, the Defense Budget, National Security, Pentagon Reform and Weapons Systems
Again its wheeler and the wheelerites pushing his brand of Liberal anti-defense non sense. He has been exposed by the informed for years through his effort at POGO. His cost has been thoroughly exposed in the past and even with the F-22 analysis. If you just bothered to read the last 2 pages of this thread, I have provided the links for you to see and come up with your own conclusion including the costing graphics to show what cost definition covers what all and how wheeler and the other Fiscal think tanks distort the argument by using a non-traditional unit price for the F-35 and then claiming in the same study that the F-16 costs 30 million per.

Read this Again - Along with the links provided within it

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=6203&start=1520#p1696394

At least wait for a few days before bringing the same stuff back and the same line of argument.

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... s-aft.html

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... space.html

You have to realize the PR train that is at full swing and has been since the industrial base was setup to support the JSF program. Briganti was out of the bat straight away and he has fallen to the levels of bringing in a totally anonymous internet troll whose real name is not disclosed, nor are his credentials presented for anyone to verify, yet he is given a front page article on his website. Wheeler is not industry funded hack like some others but just someone who has been working alongside shady left-wing sponsors that would like to see defense spending in the US decline by a significant margin. His financial associations with institutions setup by these organizations have been previously exposed. He has taken a negative position on pretty much all defense acquisition or development programs and spins his own web of distortions by assuming (quite rightly) that most folks visiting his website would not have the time, inclination or the know-how to check facts on their own and to use their own critical thinking to judge a particular boring topic of financial accounting when it comes to weapons system. The F-16 community that includes fighter pilots, weapon officers, engine engineers and defense analysts and industry folks have exposed him multiple times as have others. This isn't much different form your normal/ regular super pack type of effort that is prevalent in the US political circles, but just more oriented towards bringing down the military spending through sensationalizing distorted facts and spinning them off as well thought out research.

A 10 minute video interview of Chris Bogden by Vago Muradian basically discredits all of what he has had to say on costing over the years, but he counts on the regular joe types not to do a search and find that interview or others like it. Then there are others like Bill Sweetman that are otherwise very bright, and knowledgable reporters with an enviable track record but who's ego's are so large that they are stuck with a position anti-to the program after a verbal spat with Lockheed martin the maker of the jet. They aren't going to ever deliver a fair and balanced commentary on the F-35 and have gone to sledging the OEM quite publicly that got him banned from his publications for a brief time. He has taken a position that the next 6th generation fighter is the Gripen-E and everything everywhere in the future will resemble it in specs and capability.

POGO doesn't take sides based on industrial layout (Euro bashing or US bashing) but just takes a position that is anti- any defense spending on advanced capability hardware.
Last edited by brar_w on 06 Aug 2014 06:32, edited 1 time in total.
Philip
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Philip »

Well at least we have some gratifying news that after the fire the bird has been allowed to do "3-G" frolics from "1-Gs". Sounds very swish,much like smart phone tech what! Jokes aside,has there been any improvement upon these last yr.
stats where JSF performance parameters were deliberately reduced just to allow the aircraft to meet test deadlines? It would be nice to see if the bird has caught upto 4G or 5G smart phone std.

http://www.wired.com/2013/02/pentagon-d ... jet-specs/
The latest bad news came in mid-January the form of the annual weapons-testing report (.pdf) overseen by J. Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. The report revealed that the government’s F-35 program office had changed performance specs for all three JSF variants: the Air Force’s F-35A; the vertical-landing Marine Corps F-35B; and the carrier-launched F-35C flown mainly by the Navy.

“The program announced an intention to change performance specifications for the F-35A, reducing turn performance from 5.3 to 4.6 sustained g’s and extending the time for acceleration from 0.8 Mach to 1.2 Mach by eight seconds,” Gilmore’s report stated. The F-35B and F-35C also had their turn rates and acceleration time eased. The B-model jet’s max turn went from 5.0 to 4.5 g’s and its acceleration time to Mach 1.2 was extended by 16 seconds. The F-35C lost 0.1 g off its turn spec and added a whopping 43 seconds to its acceleration.

The changes likely reflect higher-than-expected drag on the JSF’s single-engine airframe, according to Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week. The implications for frontline pilots are pretty serious. Less maneuverability makes the F-35 more vulnerable in a dogfight. And the slower acceleration means the plane can spend less time at top speed. “A long, full-power transonic acceleration burns a lot of fuel,” Sweetman explained.

This is not the first time the Pentagon has altered its standards to give the JSF a pass. In early 2012, the military granted the F-35 a longer takeoff run than originally required and tweaked the plane’s standard flight profile in order to claw back some of the flying range lost to increasing weight and drag.

Despite the F-35 growing heavier, slower and more sluggish by the Pentagon’s own admission, Lockheed insists its product is still the second most maneuverable warplane in existence.
Company test pilot Billy Flynn told Flight‘s Dave Majumdar that the JSF accelerates better and flies at higher angles than every other fighter except the Lockheed-made F-22. “The F-35 is comparable or better in every one of those metrics, sometimes by a significant margin,” Flynn said.
"Tell that to the Marines",who will be the first US operators of the bird,hopefully sometime in the near future.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... ne_nowhere
The Pentagon's $399 Billion Plane to Nowhere
The next-generation F-35, the most expensive plane ever built, may be too dangerous to fly. Why is Congress keeping it alive?

Less than a month old,this piece puts into perspective the crucial reason why the JSF will not be abandoned "at any cost",precisely because of that glorious factor! Over its lifespan,a trillion $$$ to farm out to all Congressional Districts,since L&M have cleverly shared the JSF workload all across the US of A.So which Congressman or Senator is going to be bold enough and repeat the words of
Thomas Christie, a former senior Pentagon acquisitions official,who said,"This government has sold this turkey and is still selling it,".Good luck to the allies who've bought it and will have to eat it too!

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... here[quote]
BY Kate Brannen
JULY 8, 2014
Burying bad news before a long holiday weekend, the Pentagon announced just before 9 p.m. on July 3 that the entire F-35 Joint Strike Fighter fleet was being grounded after a June 23 runway fire at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.

The grounding could not have come at a worse time, especially for the Marine Corps, which had lots of splashy events planned this month for its variant of the next-generation plane, whose costs have soared to an estimated $112 million per aircraft.

Effectively saying that the most expensive warplane in American history is too dangerous to fly is a huge public relations blow for the Pentagon, which has been under fire for years for allowing the plane's costs to increase even as its delivery time continued to slide right. The plane's prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, could also take a hit to its bottom line if the F-35 isn't cleared to fly to the United Kingdom for a pair of high-profile international air shows packed with potential customers. One thing the grounding won't do, however, is derail the F-35, a juggernaut of a program that apparently has enough political top cover to withstand any storm.

Part of that protection comes from the jaw-dropping amounts of money at stake. The Pentagon intends to spend roughly $399 billion to develop and buy 2,443 of the planes. However, over the course of the aircrafts' lifetimes, operating costs are expected to exceed $1 trillion. Lockheed has carefully hired suppliers and subcontractors in almost every state to ensure that virtually all senators and members of Congress have a stake in keeping the program -- and the jobs it has created -- in place.

"An upfront question with any program now is: How many congressional districts is it in?" said Thomas Christie, a former senior Pentagon acquisitions official.

In the case of the F-35, the short answer is: a lot. Counting all of its suppliers and subcontractors, parts of the program are spread out across at least 45 states. That's why there's no doubt lawmakers will continue to fund the program even though this is the third time in 17 months that the entire fleet has been grounded due to engine problems. In fact, in the version of the defense appropriations bill passed by the House, lawmakers agreed to purchase 38 planes in 2015, four more than the Pentagon requested.

The Pentagon has offered little information about the cause of the fire or whether the Marine Corps' version of the plane, the F-35B, had been cleared to participate in the Royal International Air Tattoo and the Farnborough International Airshow in the U.K. next week.

"Nobody wants to rush these aircraft back into the air before we know exactly what happened and investigators have a chance to do their work," Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby told reporters Tuesday.

In addition to the Marines, the F-35 is also being built for the Navy and the Air Force. Each service is getting its own unique version of the aircraft, though the most important part -- the engine -- is being shared across all three models.

But the armed services are not the only customers. Eight international partners have signed on to help build and buy the planes: the U.K., Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. While not involved in the development of the plane, Israel and Japan are buying it through the foreign military sales process, and South Korea recently indicated that it would buy at least 40 of the aircraft.

It's crucial for the Pentagon that each of these countries sticks with their planned buys to prevent the unit price of each aircraft from increasing even further. Lockheed, in turn, sees those foreign sales as an important part of its strategy to diversify away from the shrinking U.S. defense market in favor of expanding overseas ones.

Unfortunately for the Pentagon -- and for Lockheed -- the Pentagon's decision to ground the planes has already caused the aircraft to miss its scheduled July 4 international debut: flying over the naming ceremony for the British Royal Navy's new aircraft carrier -- the HMS Queen Elizabeth -- in Scotland.

"This government has sold this turkey and is still selling it," Christie said.

None of the countries involved in the program have indicated their commitment to it has changed since the planes were grounded.

Its future really isn't in doubt, but the F-35 is facing some criticism at home. On Capitol Hill, the F-35's biggest critic is Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). He's famous for his tirades against the plane, bemoaning the program's cost and the fact that the United States is buying the fighter jet before its testing is even complete. But so far his rhetorical bark is worse than his legislative bite when it comes to the annual defense authorization bill.

On Tuesday, McCain told Defense News that the F-35 is the worst example "of the military-industrial-congressional complex," but other senators, including Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), were mostly confident that its problems would be fixed.

Meanwhile, Lockheed's rival Boeing, which builds EA-18G Growlers and F/A-18 Super Hornets, criticizes the F-35's capabilities in the press and vies with it for money on Capitol Hill. But even Boeing is careful about how far it will go with its criticism, because at the end of the day, the company doesn't want to burn its relationship with its government customers, said Winslow Wheeler, a former congressional staffer who closely tracks the program's ups and downs.

"The political armor of the F-35 is as thick as the heads of the people who designed the airplane and its acquisition plan," he said.


Wheeler is one of the F-35's biggest critics, but his view of the program's political protections is widely shared, and it's one of the reasons that the program appears to be here to stay despite a growing record of problems.

In September 2013, the Pentagon's F-35 program office announced that the tires on the Marine Corps model were wearing out way too fast. This February, the entire fleet was grounded for a whole week after a crack was discovered in a test aircraft's engine turbine blade. As recently as June 9, the Pentagon had to ground the entire fleet after an oil leak occurred midflight, causing a Marine pilot to emergency-land the plane at a base in Arizona.

But the program office and Lockheed have worked hard to solve these problems as they crop up. And Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the F-35 program manager, has brought new focus to the program's price tag, pressuring Lockheed to bring down its costs.

Still, the problems continue. According to congressional and defense sources, the June 23 incident happened right before the F-35A -- the Air Force variant -- lifted off the ground. The pilot was able to abort the takeoff and get out of the plane in time.

"The root cause of the incident remains under investigation," the Pentagon said in its July 3 statement. More than two weeks since the event, there has been little official news. The companies, meanwhile, are staying mum.

"Lockheed Martin is working closely with the F-35 Joint Program Office and industry partners in supporting the Air Force investigation," said Lockheed spokeswoman Laura Siebert. "Safety is our team's top priority."

The plane's engine maker, Pratt & Whitney, also said it's standing ready to assist the investigation, but it wouldn't offer any more details.

Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, attributed the F-35 grounding to the growing pains inherent in any complicated new weapons program. "It absolutely doesn't do anything to shake our confidence in the F-35 program and the progress that has been made both from an engineering and from a financial perspective," he said.

While no one is predicting any drastic changes to the program, defense and congressional sources said the F-35's current engine problems could lead to a revival of the battle over whether General Electric and Rolls Royce should build a second engine for the plane. The effort had been deeply controversial within the Pentagon, where senior leaders like then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates derided it as a waste of taxpayer money. The effort was finally killed by Congress in 2011.

If it turns out that there is a serious problem with the Pratt & Whitney engine, though, you can expect to see an explosion of advertisements from GE-Rolls Royce in the Pentagon's metro station, one former defense official said. "There will be a lot of I-told-you-sos," he said. [/quote]
Last edited by Philip on 06 Aug 2014 06:38, edited 1 time in total.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Well at least we have some gratifying news that after the fire the bird has been allowed to do "3-G" frolics from "1-Gs". Sounds very swish,much like smart phone tech what! Jokes aside,has there been any improvement upon these last yr.
Are you going to spin off an event that took place much earlier and claim that it follows the engine fire incident?

The Sustained G spec change has been talked about in depth since it was announced. And remember the KPP requirements have not been met by other programs as well. Read up on the KPP relaxations on the F-22 and F-16 programs. This is again not an exception as these things happen and a call is made whether to spend extra money, spend time (valuable) to redesign and try to meet the KPP's. If the performance reduction is insignificant compared to the time and money required to regain it, the KPP's are lowered. Standard with all programs in the past. Just try to get some background on historic fighter developments. No need to dwell into drag when the Navy is about to finalize a 5% thrust increase on their engine. The USAF is already considering bringing these changes into the planned post block 4 production runs. The increased thrust would go a long way in making up for those lost seconds and the sustained changes to the G are not very significant. Pilot after Pilot is on record of stating (after these changes btw) that the EM charts on the F-35 are fairly similar to the F-16 and F-18 they are replacing. The requirements were not for anything superior to them since the F-35 relies on sensors and SA in close quarter fighting in addition to a much better Low speed High AOA performance when compared to all viper and hornet/shornet variants.

Since you bring about old news spun off as if its new news here's an explanation in detail along with a technical analysis on what this means - Read along if you're interested.

Part 1

http://www.elementsofpower.blogspot.com ... -spec.html

Part 2

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... -spec.html

Part 3

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... ec_26.html

Technically challenging at times to follow but informative..Do read if interested to go deeper into the matter
"Tell that to the Marines",who will be the first US operators of the bird,hopefully sometime in the near future.
You may not notice this but the Marine pilots may know a bit more than you and your LINKS to useless old articles that have been discussed at length all around the internet. The Marine pilots along with others have had a lot to say about the handling qualities of the aircraft and how it compares to the aircraft its replacing. Heck , I've provided a very comprehensive list for you to try to gauge. A few hours of video, an hour or so of audio from a person no less than the ACC boss of the USAF and a boat load of pilots who fly this aircraft for a living.
The Pentagon's $399 Billion Plane to Nowhere
The next-generation F-35, the most expensive plane ever built, may be too dangerous to fly. Why is Congress keeping it alive?
Not sure, but I think you have posted this before on this thread.
Less than a month old,this piece puts into perspective the crucial reason why the JSF will not be abandoned "at any cost",precisely because of that glorious factor! Over its lifespan,a trillion $$$ to farm out to all Congressional Districts,since L&M have cleverly shared the JSF workload all across the US of A.So which Congressman or Senator is going to be bold enough and repeat the words of
Thomas Christie, a former senior Pentagon acquisitions official,who said,"This government has sold this turkey and is still selling it,".Good luck to the allies who've bought it and will have to eat it too!
And this is where the critical thinking ends and Kool aid talk begins. Which replacement program for the 3 variants would not yield industrial spread similar to that of the JSF? Get serious. Do you think the USAF , USMC and USN will continue to fly their current fighters until they are retired and then move on to NO fighters in their force structure? Any fighter program that replaces one , two or all three programs will have to be the largest fighter program procurement in the history. Moreover, if you replace the 3 requirements with 2 or 3 fighters by using simple common sense the industrial base would be spread out, larger since the 2 or 3 different programs will produce to a different spec. As a mere matter of industrial participation and "spreading the love" a joint program is the absolute worst case for promoting that aspect. Multiple programs that essentially do the same thing (replace the 3 services retiring fighters) will create a larger industrial base and " spread the love" better.
One thing the grounding won't do, however, is derail the F-35, a juggernaut of a program that apparently has enough political top cover to withstand any storm.
Because Groundings are supposed to derail programs? So is HAL canning the Dhruv? How many fleet groundings did the F-16 have? The F-16 had over 40 Class A incidents while still in the SDD phase (concurrency model) including crashes. Should it have been cancelled because A GROUNDING is so bad..It just happened to become the most successful western fighter program of its generation and the benchmark for reliability and affordability in the NATO fleet. The F-35 fairs better than the F-16, F-22, SAAB Gripen and F-18 programs in terms of Class A incidents. Yet none of those programs were cancelled.
Lockheed has carefully hired suppliers and subcontractors in almost every state to ensure that virtually all senators and members of Congress have a stake in keeping the program -- and the jobs it has created -- in place.
What lockheed has done is standard practice in the US aerospace industry. Boeing does the same. Its called balancing out the allotment resources to get the most from offsets from states, creating political mileage and addressing the larger issue of community revitalization and creating an industrial base. Take the B-3 bomber as an example. Northrop tried its level best to move its efforts to Florida..Didn't happen. They would have won a lot of political milage and secured offsets, but alas the technical know for such projects resides in California along with the tax subsidy.
"An upfront question with any program now is: How many congressional districts is it in?" said Thomas Christie, a former senior Pentagon acquisitions official.
How many congressional districts was the X-32 planned to be in?
even though this is the third time in 17 months that the entire fleet has been grounded due to engine problems.
And how does this compare to the F-16 program?
"The political armor of the F-35 is as thick as the heads of the people who designed the airplane and its acquisition plan," he said.
Every acquisition program has a political element. Just read up on GD's strategy with the F-16 program. The larger the program the more of an industrial base to "spread the love".
Last edited by brar_w on 06 Aug 2014 06:55, edited 1 time in total.
Philip
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Philip »

Why go back to the KPP for the F-22 and F-16.If that's the case then one can go back to the SU-27 and MIG-21 when discussing the FGFA! Talk about the JSF.Hard authentic news .The authoritative report says that performance stats have been reduced to allow the JSF meet its testing deadlines woefully delayed.That was one year ago,why the yr. old report was posted.One hoped that in a year's time much progress would've been made.So have they been allowed to test to full parameter specs as yet or not for all 3 versions? If not, any idea when it will happen?

And here's an editorial from the New York Times.Tough talk,plain and simple,with hard facts.

Rough Ride for the F-35
By THE EDITORIAL BOARD JULY 27, 2014
The F-35 fighter jet was expected to be exhibited at an international air show a few weeks ago — a chance for America to showcase its state-of-the-art war plane, the world’s most expensive weapons project. But, in an embarrassing turn of events, the star-crossed, single-engine F-35 was a no-show.

Instead of making its debut at the event in Farnborough, England — where government officials, defense contractors and experts gather annually to ogle new aviation technology — the plane was back in the United States, crippled by the latest in a series of setbacks. Despite this tormented history, Congress is still pouring money into a program that is intended to produce more than 2,400 F-35s for the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines through 2037.

The most recent problem was the failure of a Pratt & Whitney engine on an F-35 at a Florida air base on June 23; a fire broke out as the pilot was preparing for takeoff. Afterward, the Pentagon grounded and ordered inspections of the entire 97-plane fleet, built by Lockheed Martin. The F-35 was allowed to resume flying in mid-July but at a slower speed; pilots were required to have the engines inspected every three hours, thus dooming plans for a trans-Atlantic trip to the air show.

Although a safety board is still analyzing the problem, the Pentagon and the contractors are confident it was a temporary glitch. But trouble has dogged the F-35 since development began 14 years ago. The program was supposed to prove that the Pentagon could build a technologically advanced weapon affordably, without huge delays. But the $400 billion price tag is 42 percent higher than the 2007 estimate. The cost per plane has doubled, and it will not go into full production until 2019, six years late.

Successive reports — from the Government Accountability Office, nongovernmental groups, even the Pentagon’s own testing office — have exposed serious deficiencies.
The F-35’s most unusual aspect is its ability to integrate sensors and weapons, but the software still isn’t working. In March, an accountability office report highlighted “delays in software delivery, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions.”

In January, the Pentagon’s testing office called the F-35’s performance “immature” and said it “relies heavily on contractor support and workarounds unacceptable for combat operations.” William Hartung of the Center for International Policy has argued that even if the technical problems are solved, the plane “will be too small to serve as an effective bomber, not maneuverable enough for aerial dogfights and too fast and vulnerable to do well at supporting troops on the ground.”
And there is more at stake than just American needs. A dozen other countries plan to buy the planes.

Some experts say the Pentagon could save money and still ensure that America has a better plane than its adversaries by buying fewer F-35s and more of the F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighter jets already in the arsenal and modernizing the A-10 Warthog, a ground-attack plane. Others propose halting F-35 purchases until operational testing is completed in 2019 and everyone has a clearer sense of the plane’s strengths and weaknesses.


Those are sensible ideas. But common sense evaporates when it comes to big-ticket weapons, and members of Congress are being heavily lobbied by deep-pocketed defense contractors. In approving the 2015 defense bill recently, the House Appropriations Committee voted to buy 38 new F-35s, while the Senate committee agreed on 34, which is how many the Pentagon had requested.

Even budget hawks aren’t pushing to restrain or seriously reconsider the program. But a serious reappraisal is long overdue.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Why go back to the KPP for the F-22 and F-16.
Because this happens in complex aerospace programs. One would like to be rigid with KPP's but a time comes when tradeoffs have to be made in spec, performance and cost and mission effectiveness. These tradeoffs are a part and parcel of advanced aerospace programs. On the flip side KPP specs are also beaten on many parameters and no one spends money to lower the performance where it exceeds the KPP. Any astute program manager or project director would make the call - Do you go back and re work the % KPP lost which could potentially delay the program or add massive cost to it. They run a tradeoff analysis on this and make a call. In the case of the B and its weight the call was made to spend the time and money to re-work that aspect and get the model back up to spec. With the Sustained G's this was not the case and definitely with acceleration since what they have in the pipeline in propulsion actually brings back a lot of the capability lost both in the acceleration department and the range department.

Such calls have been made in aerospace programs of the past and its nothing earth shattering. They have been made on the F-22 program and the F-16 (among others). In a nut shell extremely successful fighters and other aerospace products have existed and done remarkably well for their services and customers that did not meet their KPP's in some areas yet exceeded them in others.
The authoritative report says that performance stats have been reduced to allow the JSF meet its testing deadlines woefully delayed
The trade offs are made based on cost, complexity and timing. Its fairly simple. You want to regain the capability, you compare to what you have to spend to get it. If its not worth it you move on. Some areas you cannot relax while in others a trade off is the absolute right way to go about. Mission system weight is one such element where the predictions have been traditionally extremely hard to make decades out (when the KPP's are written).
That was one year ago,why the yr. old report was posted.One hoped that in a year's time much progress would've been made
You do realize that they do not make progress on this? They have made the call on sustained G spec change..Its done and dusted. The capability on acceleration would be regained with propulsion advances that are being tested at the moment. 1 year, 2 years or 5 years won't change this.

Read the technical analysis on the sustained G spec change and try to figure out the difference in capability.
So have they been allowed to test to full parameter specs as yet or not for all 3 versions? If not, any idea when it will happen?
Life science testing is 95% complete as of Farnborough 2014. The last 5% remaining is most likely the heavy stuff on the F-35C since they are the fewest jets flying over Eglin. Expect that to be wrapped up by the end of the year.
But the $400 billion price tag is 42 percent higher than the 2007 estimate. The cost per plane has doubled, and it will not go into full production until 2019, six years late.
6 years late is absolutely correct. In fact I'd say 7 if you round things off. However that again comes to the tradeoffs I am speaking about - they took the extra time to work on critical design aspects that needed the extra time. Now coming to the costing - its an interesting topic - Cost has been SHOWN TO be on a downward trajectory. You know this. I have shown you the evidence at least a dozen times. The LRIP 1 costs and LRIP 7 costs can be compared by all to see. The projected costs are also available in the open and the point man has been on the air, on the radio and in print talking about the cost aspect and the number of measures that are in play and why the cost is coming down AT THE MOMENT and why the cost is going to come down further as the economies of scale are realized. The F-35 is a 3000 unit production fighter, if the costs stay on the trajectory they are currently on around 90% of the accepted deliveries would be at a cost that is the acceptable cost of the jet i.e around 75-80 Million in 2018 year dollars.

The cost per plane has not doubled. If you take the 2004 estimate of the cost per plane, DO NOT adjust it for inflation and then compare the current price then yes. The cost has doubled. If you take the actual cost of production of the very first F-35 and then compare that to the cost of the LRIP7 F-35 ordered last year (through a fixed price contract) the price is down by almost 60%. The SAR is for all to see, don't understand why its so hard to read an official audited document.
Successive reports — from the Government Accountability Office, nongovernmental groups, even the Pentagon’s own testing office — have exposed serious deficiencies.
And each one of the DOT&E reports have been discussed by

- The JPO and rebutted
- By myself after you have posted reports after reports

Again , The DOT&E reports are transitional in nature. The helmet wasn't working properly in Q4 2012. The helmet in the gen2 form is working fine now, and gen3 helmet is on its way to the fleet soon. Does the DT report from that time have any relevance now that this problem is sorted out? DOT&E reports are there for one purpose - Reflect upon the transitional nature of the program so that the babudome and political class is aware of the challenges that need to be worked upon before the next stage of the program is achieved . Same thing with the tail hook issues - old dated report - the aircraft is trapping now and is preparing to go out to sea in the coming months based on carrier availability (it has to compete with the X-47B which is also due to go out on a carrier at the same time). Software maturity is cited by the report in January or Feb, and that report reflects the position of software testing in 2013. The fact is that the latest program briefing has verified/clarified that 95% life sciences testing is complete and as of July 2014, 80% of the Software 2b is fully tested.
In January, the Pentagon’s testing office called the F-35’s performance “immature” and said it “relies heavily on contractor support and workarounds unacceptable for combat operations.”
To which the reply is -

- Concurrency changes not yet implemented
- Software testing not required to be completed for 2b before December 2014 ( January 2014 report means they are citing evidence from Q3 or Q4 of 2013)
- Depot runs not required to be made before Q1 2015
- ALIS still in development
- IOC not expected till Q2-Q3 2015
Some experts say the Pentagon could save money and still ensure that America has a better plane than its adversaries by buying fewer F-35s and more of the F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighter jets already in the arsenal and modernizing the A-10 Warthog,
To which the EXPERTS that do this for a living disagree. The ACC boss is on record to state otherwise, same for other strategists. Do you buy something because your own strategy calls for it or because the New york times posts it?
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Rien »

NRao wrote:
What does the JSF carry except some good wishes from its program office
And that is what the Russians are comparing their PAK-FA to. India has and may continue to buy into this Russian vision.....potentially to the tune of $35 billion.

China has gone to the length of stealing. And building.

India, SK, Japan, Turkey and perhaps a few others are spending billions to emulate.
Mate the PAKFA has nothing do with the JSF. It is the counter to the F-22. At least get your planes correct. The Chinese project, again has nothing in common with the JSF. No country is basing their stealth figher off the jsf.The MCA is wildly different again.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Rien »

brar_w wrote:Some updates from the mouth of the Head of Australian airpower, and US Marine core tacticians that operate the F-35 for a living . I'll post only some of the stuff as the articles are lengthy.
Brar, this stuff is too lengthy. Can you doublecheck this, because I'm not sure my summary is totally fair or not, because I'm annoyed at the sheer length of the stuff you post.

The main point is that you can work together as a team because the stuff is the same. Therefore, just like standardized ammo for weapons, standardized parts for weapons cuts down on the logistics headache. Rather than having 6-7 different weapon systems to do the same task: Drop bombs and fire missiles, one aircraft that does it all. Correct? Y/N?
For example, both the Netherlands and Australia see the need to involve assets in the current post-Malaysian Ukrainian situation to secure the crash site. With the F-35 future fleet, Australia could send a four ship F-35 force to marry up with the Dutch and be supported by a Dutch maintenance capability supplemented by Aussie maintainers. Rainbow fleets will provide an important political tool matching a variety of anticipatable settings for 21st century operations.
All of these points are negative points for the IAF.

1.) The IAF is not going to be participating in any of these missions for a start. Bharat will not be fighting any of the US wars for it. We weren't in Iraq, we won't be in Iran etc. So why would we spend over 500 billion to enable missions we are not going to do?

2.) It makes no sense to add another aircraft to the menagerie that is the IAF. Given the Sukhois, Migs, Mirages, Jaguars, PAKFA and Rafales, yet another type is insanity. What is needed is what the JSF gave the Western alliance.
A reduction of weapon systems. That means getting rid of the obsolete aircraft like the Mig 21 with Tejas, and consolidating to a fleet that has only the Tejas, MCA, Rafale and PAK-FA. You've just supported my point that the JSF isn't needed.

I fully agree that a reduction of aircraft types and logistics commonality is the way to go. This will be achieved with the IAF's plan with the Sukhoi MKI/PAKFA sharing engines, avionics and as many other systems as possible. Likewise with the Rafale/Mirage 2000 H sharing weapons/avionics etc. There is a benefit to having a toolbox instead of trying to solve every problem with a hammer. Bharat has a sledgehammer to smash concrete, a regular hammer for nails, and a mallet for those jobs when neither a hammer or sledgehammer are appropriate. The right tool for the job.

The sheer range, and load carrying capacity of the Sukhoi is more than 3-4 JSF's. This is a mission the JSF can't do. The low cost and quantities the Tejas is available in make it the perfect weapon for taking out Taliban like the Pakistan Army. Again, a job the superexpensive JSF can't do. The Rafale is capable of performing JSF style missions at a lower price. So why spend more?

3.) Networking - Bharat's AWACS,AEC and radars are not NATO standard. They are designed to integrate with Russian/French hardware, and cannot work with the F-35's unique data link/IFF. This means the Akash would shoot down a friendly JSF! Likewise with the Indian NCW efforts, they are not identical to the US efforts and would be incompatible.

So in short, the JSF can't fire Russian or French missiles, drop Indian bombs or fire the Astra. In addition to the fighter, here is the added huge cost of buying Tomahawks and JDAMs etc. This doesn't make fiscal sense. It doesn't make operational sense, because neither the Chinese nor the Pakis have an airforce comparable to the Soviet Union. Their airforce is composed of Mig-21 class aircraft. There's hardly a need for a JSF to take out obsolete junk from the 70s.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

I am not advocating the F-35 for the IAF. I don't see it or want it. I am 100% in favor of a limited procurement rafale and PAKFA and the speration of the TOT from procurement
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_20317 »

Accounting and audit principles say a lot lot more. Just cherry-picking things that suit the truth claim is not one even though completely doable. In any case accounting and audit are matters of practice and not of proving theorems ergo cannot be Authoritative. But still what does it take away from the fact that 2004 is gone. That is a fact and quoting it today could just as well be to show that everything is falling into place as per plans. So I suggest that you go slow on an auditor’s work. Just swearing at highly Authoritative critics of Tide-White publications, will not help convince anybody.

In any case the big daddy in the room the fizzled out TN mating :P to the innards of the JSF and subsequent tossing methodology and safing, the Brahmos like highly capable missiles some of which will, in next 55 years, come in from the Indian stable are never going to ride the JSF. There is the Russian element involved and then the already once bitten Indian strategic forces managers and then there would off course be the free press of India and other sensibilities.
NRao wrote:
What does the JSF carry except some good wishes from its program office
And that is what the Russians are comparing their PAK-FA to. India has and may continue to buy into this Russian vision.....potentially to the tune of $35 billion.

China has gone to the length of stealing. And building.

India, SK, Japan, Turkey and perhaps a few others are spending billions to emulate.
NRao ji the Russians may or may not be comparing PAK-FA to JSF. That is there prerogative. Mine is to keep track of what suits us, which may or may not involve buying into the Russian vision. In any case it is not like the Umrikhans were not allowed level playing field in India. Whatever extra benefits the Russians have gotten in the past were, at least in my view, well earned. If anything for almost every single strategic need the Indians went to Captain America first and only when it did not work out did the Indians went elsewhere and only when even the second option did not work out did the indigenization route figure in the process. Having tasted blood in the home grown projects you would be wrong to think we will not protect the home grown stuff just so we can import a one night stand.

PAK-FA, Rafale were old decisions and these decisions do not get made at the beck and call of Govt. of the US. Rafale in particular took years to crystallize and will be able to handle ~90% of the adversaries that IAF will have to face in next 30+ years. With the Amerikhans, some decisions were considered and seems like they worked so perhaps in future insha allah the Greatest Democracy will have some more chugga for the largest democracy, provided off course the small matter of indigenous efforts do not come in the way.

As for stealing, emulating waghera – please be realistic. What constitutes 5th Gen today is different from what it was yesterday and the day before it was Stealth. Remember those days of The World This Week with Pronoy Roy where we were told of aircrafts that cannot be seen :eek:. From faceted to planform to tiling to no tails to canted tails to two axis engines to golaakar engines to data muddled vision to WT_. It is a mosaic tile tree that does not breath. Besides we Indians are mere SDRE people – it is good for us that we emulate the TFTAs of the world – I wonder why people are not proud of us Indians emulating the Amerikhans.

And despite all the above I am not against JSF. I wonder if anybody is. If anything it is the JSF fanbase that is against everything that is not JSF.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

If all that constitutes good wishes, then we seem to be on the same boat.

But, going a step further, even though I have not come out right in favor of the F-35 for the IAF, it is certainly the best air craft out there. IMHO.

More l8r, on a smart phone, cannot type too much.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Accounting and audit principles say a lot lot more. Just cherry-picking things that suit the truth claim is not one even though completely doable. In any case accounting and audit are matters of practice and not of proving theorems ergo cannot be Authoritative
Just two points -

1) The Procurement costs are all fixed price contracts (have been since the last 3 or so Low rate of production blocks) therefore there is no chance that one persons interpretation differs from another. The SAR charts are fairly straight forward. The UFC of the jet has decreased by 50+ % from LRIP 1 to LRIP5 and has decreased further during LRIP 7 contracts. No matter which cost one looks at the more typical Unit fly away cost, whellers deception cost, total ownership cost..the fall has not changed in degree. Simply put the learning curve and the associated economies of scale along with an improved program management and time to sort things out have lowered the cost. LRIP 7 to FSP is an estimated and here there is room to discuss. You may think that they would not reach the 80 million desired level, I may think that they may. We can only go by the current known facts and what is trending at the moment. In a few years it would be clear as to whether the trend holds true or not.

2) The O&S costs were based on poor assumptions and the dialogues between the agency basing those costs and the services was a healthy one and the proper communications lead to reductions in the costs as well. The dialogues have not stopped. No one is disputing the science of auditing or whether proper practices are being followed - they surely are. However the people computing the cost grossly miscalculated many aspects of how the USAF and the USMC operates its current tactical fighters and how it plans on operating its future tactical fighters. I have shown what some of the faulty assumptions were and Colin clark eluded to them in his article.

There is nothing wrong with auditing or interpretations of the audited figures. There was a mistake in the assumptions and how the services contested some of them. It took more than a year to sort out but it appears that the trends with O&S costs are also on the way down having come south from 1.5 to 1.3 to the current 1.04 trillion over 55 years for an overwhelming majority of the tactical fighter fleet of the USAF , USN and USMC.

The current O&S cost for the F-35A are around 10% greater than the blk 50/52 aircraft as the USAF flies them today. This adds to around a 20-30% greater cost when compared to more modern 4th or 4.5th generation frames such as the Rafale or Typhoon provided that the Janes article uses the same metrics that the USAF uses (highly unlikely but this is the best head to head we can independently get). So the O&S bump from 4th - 4.5th gen is between 10-30% which is fairly in line with O&S bumps that regularly occurred with legacy jets over their lifetime. Remember the F-16 started off as a Light weight fighter with a ridiculously low O&S CPH, fast forward decades later and the current block 50/52 as kitted in the USAF has an O&S cost 2-3 times that of where it was when it started and in line with what other multi-role medium role fighters such as the rafale cost.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_20317 »

NRao ji you have put me through some embarrassing moments now. I tried some sarc on you and you came out with almost a love letter.

If its any consolation I am sorry for the sarc.

....................

brar_w ji,

Auditing is not science. Also not mathematics. Like Medicine, Yoga and much else it is a Practice. Two different auditors and accountants can and often do have different views. But no, both cannot and often in large unprecedented areas, are not right. Invariably only one hits the spot right. In any case cooked up audits are done after the real audit has already been done and found unpalatable. Hence the template style of audit practices as it came in from the west, with US being the foremost proponent of it. But even for these template-wala Amerikhan auditors, there is every likelihood that they have enough backing of certifications from the managers to have said what they said whenever they did.

Thanks to you I read Winslow a little (out of 5 part series on Times) and the essence of the point he raises are all perfectly thought out even if not well laid out. Though I fail to see how that criticism is relevant, since even he writes that things are inexorably moving towards JSF. Had I been a good Amerikhan, chances are I would have supported JSF too. But luckily I am an Indian and I do not have to. The sole superpower cannot afford to not produce airplanes. With tech levels of everything else becoming commonplace the Amerikhans do need a new aircraft in the production lines. Not having one has its own implications.

But again we Indians do not have to face these decision dilemmas nor the implications of such decisions. We however do have to face much more grave and urgent implications of decisions taken much earlier wherein JSF does not figure as a solution. For example I would myself be waiting for the RFI from Indian Navy to crystallize any further - I am betting nothing will happen, max to max some chai-naashta and that is it.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Philip »

The hard facts are that the programme is experiencing major problems that simply can't be wished way,washed away or spun-dry away. There have been enough posts from authoritative sources confirming them.As Gen B. has admitted in an interview ,new problems keep cropping up with regularity and fixing them would take a long,long time.That such a sophisticated programme has a "teething period" isn't under Q,the Q still unanswered which no one can give as of now,is a definite date as to when dev. ends and series production of aircraft that can perform as advertised to full parameter specs happen and at what acquisition and operational cost.The NYT says 2019.That's when the USN are supposed to form their first operational sqd. We'll wait for official news updates and see what the GAO/Pentagon have to say next year to estimate whether the aircraft is meeting its schedules or not and whether costs are firming up. What we are witnessing right now is ultra-optimism drum-beating by L&M and co.,with a supporting cast of politicos to keep the programme alive ,who want the $trillion+ to be spent on the programme,keeping their industries happy and their seats safe,vs those who are highlighting the problems and are worrying about,delays,costs,etc,wondering what will be the ultimate result and at what cost,not taken in by all the hoopla and razzmatazz.

If the US is going to acquire 2000+ JSFs regardless of any negativity whatsoever,taking a "JSF or bust" attitude,it needn't worry too much even if the % of aircraft operational is below average.It has other birds in the pie to fly ,with several LR long endurance UCAVs both in service and under development to do the business,apart from a large bunch of legacy aircraft.If the IAF could keep the MIG-21 operational in some style for over 50 years,one is sure that the US could also do the same with their F-15s,F-16s and F-18s,accompanied by a host of specialised EW aircraft and UAVs.

Low availability of the JSF may not be a major problem.Which major enemy is the US going to fight in the future? The F-22 wasn't even required in Libya. During the Cold War , it was "kabuki" between the principal players and proxy wars were the flavour of the era. Barring going to Taiwan's defence if China attempt a "takeaway",one cannot see the US sparring with either Russia or China. The advent of drone warfare has already made such an impact.By 2025,another decade from now,we may see tech. developments,strategies and tactics, that would not have been anticipated. As for lesser wars with "inferior opposition",using asymmetrical warfare,which makes all this immense cost sometimes look like good money thrown down the drain,the ungodly have sadly already found their answers.Take Libya for example.The West has retreated Saigon style in the nick of time before their tails were set on fire.The Hamas and the Hiz are giving the Israelis a hard time with their homespun weaponry and tactics, and ISIS is cleansing vast swathes of Iraq from both white firangs as well as Shiites. As for as Afghanistan,where the war has lasted longer than the Vietnam War,a 2*-star US general has just been sent to the happy hunting ground by an Afghan ungodly in a "green-on-blue" suicide op!
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Viv S »

Rien wrote:2.) It makes no sense to add another aircraft to the menagerie that is the IAF. Given the Sukhois, Migs, Mirages, Jaguars, PAKFA and Rafales, yet another type is insanity. What is needed is what the JSF gave the Western alliance.
While the consolidation on the Tejas and Su-30MKI should be natural, the Rafale is completely superfluous - too late and too expensive for the level of capability delivered.
I fully agree that a reduction of aircraft types and logistics commonality is the way to go. This will be achieved with the IAF's plan with the Sukhoi MKI/PAKFA sharing engines, avionics and as many other systems as possible.
The Su-30MKI might share a radar with the PAK FA, but not an engine unless the MKI upgrade is to be postponed past 2020 when the Izdeliye 30 becomes available.
Likewise with the Rafale/Mirage 2000 H sharing weapons/avionics etc.
Avionics are irrelevant (and not shared here either). Its the spares, weapons and other consumables that matter. In this case only the MICA is shared, no significant savings through common spares have been elucidated by Dassault.
There is a benefit to having a toolbox instead of trying to solve every problem with a hammer. Bharat has a sledgehammer to smash concrete, a regular hammer for nails, and a mallet for those jobs when neither a hammer or sledgehammer are appropriate. The right tool for the job.

The sheer range, and load carrying capacity of the Sukhoi is more than 3-4 JSF's. This is a mission the JSF can't do.
The Rafale is capable of performing JSF style missions at a lower price. So why spend more?


1. In a fleet that includes the Tejas, Su-30MKI and the PAK FA, the Rafale serves no purpose.

2. Its not capable of performing 'JSF style missions'. Not with zero VLO capability.

3. While somewhat cheaper to operate, the Rafale is not so much cheaper to acquire than the F-35.

4. The F-35 carries more fuel than the F-22. On internal fuel, its range is just 20% less than the Su-30MKI and probably comparable to the PAK FA.
3.) Networking - Bharat's AWACS,AEC and radars are not NATO standard. They are designed to integrate with Russian/French hardware, and cannot work with the F-35's unique data link/IFF. This means the Akash would shoot down a friendly JSF! Likewise with the Indian NCW efforts, they are not identical to the US efforts and would be incompatible.
India's datalinks and IFF are not designed to 'integrate with Russian/French hardware'. They are specifically built only for Indian aircraft regardless of their origin. Which is why they're equipped on the IAF's C-130J & C-17 as well as the IN's P-8Is. The F-35 too can be modified with add-on Indian kit, the same way the Rafale would. Its still retain the MADL for F-35-to-F-35 comms. The Israelis are already doing so with their F-35s.
So in short, the JSF can't fire Russian or French missiles, drop Indian bombs or fire the Astra.
It can do all three (read: Universal Armament Interface).
In addition to the fighter, here is the added huge cost of buying Tomahawks and JDAMs etc. This doesn't make fiscal sense.
- The Tomahawks have nothing to do with any air force. Since the retirement of the ground launched variant its meant solely for naval platforms now.
- JDAMs are an option not a necessity. But for the record, US munitions are far more cost effective and diverse than their French equivalents.
It doesn't make operational sense, because neither the Chinese nor the Pakis have an airforce comparable to the Soviet Union. Their airforce is composed of Mig-21 class aircraft. There's hardly a need for a JSF to take out obsolete junk from the 70s.
# Su-27, Su-30MKK, J-11, J-11B, J-16.
# J-10, J-10B, J-10C.
# J-20, J-31

More importantly their IADS has seen a world of improvement with the S-300 and derivatives including the AESA based HQ-9, and the S-400 systems recently ordered from Russia. All networked with medium and short range radar/AD systems and managed by a comprehensive C4I system that will eventually be tied in with airborne systems (KJ-200, KJ-2000, Y-8 as well as fighters & aerostats).

On the Pakistani side, while the IAF can handle the PAF without any new acquisitions, to be fair the JF-17 for all its MiG-21 pedigree is a fairly modern and reliable workhorse. Delivers decent value for its cost.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Viv S »

ravi_g wrote:In any case the big daddy in the room the fizzled out TN mating :P to the innards of the JSF and subsequent tossing methodology and safing,
Its the F-22's shallow weapons bay that couldn't accommodate the B61. The USAF's F-35s will certainly be capable of employing it and the aircraft will serve in a nuclear role with other NATO air forces as well.

The Dutch government wants the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F-35 fighter aircraft to carry nuclear weapons. In a letter to the Lower House, defense minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and foreign affairs minister Frans Timmermans said that the JSF may indeed have nuclear weapons on board, Nos reported on Tuesday. (link)
the Brahmos like highly capable missiles some of which will, in next 55 years, come in from the Indian stable are never going to ride the JSF. There is the Russian element involved and then the already once bitten Indian strategic forces managers and then there would off course be the free press of India and other sensibilities.
The Brahmos-M cannot be carried internally by any fighter including the PAK FA. As for external carriage, it can be adapted onto most fighters (including the F-35).
Having tasted blood in the home grown projects you would be wrong to think we will not protect the home grown stuff just so we can import a one night stand.
The FGFA is no longer even partly home grown. Its a slightly customized PAK FA with Russian airframe, engines, avionics and mission systems.
PAK-FA, Rafale were old decisions and these decisions do not get made at the beck and call of Govt. of the US. Rafale in particular took years to crystallize and will be able to handle ~90% of the adversaries that IAF will have to face in next 30+ years.
The MMRCA's RFP was drafted between 2005 and 2007, with a guarantee against obsolescence for 15 years. Given the delay in the program, that goalpost has already shrunk by a decade.

The Rafale would certainly be a match for the latest 4.5G fighters fielded by the PLAAF before the end of the decade (J-10C, J-16B), but any technological edge is upset by a significant numerical disadvantage. They have twice our budget and build at half our cost. And that's without going into their 5th gen designs.
And despite all the above I am not against JSF. I wonder if anybody is. If anything it is the JSF fanbase that is against everything that is not JSF.
For and against shouldn't matter. The only thing I'm really 'for' is greater adoption of more domestic equipment. But when it comes imports, there needs to be an absolutely dispassionate analysis of all the alternatives. No different from buying a car in principle - you look at the price and balance it against the size, performance, fuel efficiency and features on offer.

Back in 2010, I wasn't particularly impressed by the F-35. A whopping $250 mil cost (LRIP 1), a host of technical problems, mediocre performance, a hugely delayed delivery timeline and a line of JSF consortium members preparing to jump ship. While I expected the technical issues to be worked out (there being no other option for the USAF), I didn't expect significant gains on the cost front. Which is why the LRIP 7 cost of $112 mil came as a jolt. On closer examination, one realized that most of the technical issues had been addressed and on critical parameters (sensor performance & stealth) the aircraft had exceeded its design requirements.

Meanwhile, the Rafale's delivery date slipped to 2018, the cost doubled, all coinciding with an economy in the doldrums. The 'joint-venture' aspect of the FGFA devolved into a farce and the Russians blocked significant ToT for even licensed production. Not to mention the PAK FA's cost too escalated, stealth features turned to be... err not quite at par with the F-22, and the induction date got pushed to 2022 (and it'll probably start out as a smaller dribble when it does).

The Chinese economy continues to steam on and they're putting out over 50 J-10s & J-11s annually (30+25) and that rate is being boosted further (HAL delivered an 'impressive' 15 fighters last year). Along with bulk production of the Tejas, the F-35 seems like the only option that would significantly even the odds (and it'll be a tough business even after).
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

From the Rafale MMRCA thread
Orders have been cut and the cost estimates of the Pentagon are not credible. The Pentagon's cost nos are based on orders of over 3500 JSF fighters. These are unattainable numbers
First of all the orders being cut is something that is due to the economic state of the nations doing so and as such not a product of the program. Every nation that suffered economic damage over the last few years has readjusted its defense spending including the US. Some nations have made a decision to acquire a lesser number of 5th generation jets to replace their legacy fleets. That is understandable. That however, has not occurred within the USAF, USMC and USN. They have taken the hit elsewhere but the service buying the most (USAF) has put its F-35A procurement at the top of the 3 priorities for the service both as far as development and procurement. General Mark Welsh has repeatedly said that the service's priority is to procure the 1776 F-35A's that it absolutely requires to modernize its fleet of cold war era jets. That number still stands strong and just last week the Head of then USAF Air combat command again drove home the importance of that number. Unless the USAF makes a strategic decision to shrink its air force's tactical fighter wings the overall procurement of the F-35A is not going to significantly alter from the current plan. The USMC will also buy the B since thats the only fighter they'll get till 2050 or so. The USN has deferred some of the LRIP jets since they do not need a large force to finish testing and will shift its order base from expensive LRIP jets towards full rate production just like the french have deferred deliveries of the rafale to later blocks freeing up export orders. The USN's cheif of Naval operations was also on record late last year stating that he sees the USN procure more F-35C's under the FA-X fighter development plan since it is quite likely that the service add a 2-5 year buffer in the FA-x development plans that require IOC around 2030 (So it shifts to 2032-2035 timeframe) which would logically mean that early retiring F-18E/F's would also be replaced by iterations of the F-35C since no other naval fighter would be in production in the 2020's. Unless the US DOD decides to shrink its tactical fighter fleet, or starts all of a sudden a brand new program to significantly upgrade the legacy jets (Brand new NG versions) or develops a brand new program at the fastest pace in its history - the F-35 will be procured in the required numbers.

Coming to the overall program orders. Italy, Spain have cut their orders based on their economic state, Canada may hold a competition and Denmark will delay its plans post a competition. On the other hands those less affected by economic recession or those that have pressing national security needs have stepped up to pick up the slots left behind. Israel was not a development partner and came in as the first FMS customer, followed by Japan and then South Korea. Singapore has already said they'll consider it after they finalize the F-16 modernization program and the Middle eastern market is not yet tapped (UAE should be certain) until the IDF gets its first deliveries. The overall market outlook for first wave sales has not significantly altered and the program total sales would dependent upon the economic state and national security needs around the world over the next 30-40 years or so.
The reality is only 3 148 orders. That's it, and these orders will be subject to cancellations as people become aware of how expensive the JSF actually is
Only 3148? Yeah thats short change and would put it amongst the most unsuccessful tactical fighter programs in history ;)
Jokes aside, it won't sell as much as the F-16 did due to the market outlook in the post cold war world. That should not be surprising, the F-16 didn't match or exceed the f-4 sales either. The 3000-3100 fighter outlook over its production lifetime is quite achievable and not too optimistic.
That's it, and these orders will be subject to cancellations as people become aware of how expensive the JSF actually is
The classic Wheeler meme.."I know the true cost of the jet, air chiefs around the world that order it do not" " When they figure out that cost (the one I already know) they will all bolt out and massive cancellations would occur". I bet these folks are sooooo frustrated when nations order the F-35... I bet they must be saying " Damn it, didn't they read my blog and my cost analysis".
24 billion for 58 fighters. That's over 400 million per plane! 200 million is just for the plane itself, and 200 million to keep them running. Where's the fuel and the weapons? As a comparison, the Su-30 MKI comes in 65 million with everything. You can 6 of those plus 10 million for fuel, Nirbhay, Astra and Brahmos. That's the comparison that has to be made
Australia paid something like 120 Million per F-35A recurring fly away in LRIP 6 fixed price contract negotiated by the JPO on behalf of all the customers last year. LRIP 7 contracts also negotiated alongside brought this down to 112 million. Expect LRIP8 to be somewhere closer to 110 but not significantly less as the next cost decrease would come with the next production bump that occurs in LRIP9. LRIP 7 was the first contract negotiated in the history of the program where the recurring fly away cost of the air vehicle (minus the engine) and sub systems (everything inside of the jet including the sensors and gear) fell below 100 million.

Basing upgrades, new construction, changes and modernization of the air-force's logistical, training and maintenance wings is something that is a part and parcel of any generational shift in capability. Is happening within each and every F-35 operator around the world. It also happened when the F-15 and F-16 fighters came into the picture.

Secondly, the life time operating cost of the jet (any fighter jet) is usually considered to be 2/3 the cost of ownership of the jet. So its a fairly accurate measure to consider 2/3 the cost of the jet as the life-time operations cost, 1/3 the procurement cost and a negligible portion the disposal cost. This holds true for the F-15, F-16 and also would hold true for the F-35. As per the RAAF's own data published by Janes their life time operations cost on the military hardware associated with the F-35 would be around 168 million over its airframe life but that costs need to be paid for any fighter. Lets take the Vanilla Alpha viper and give it a then year CPH of 2500 dollars. Over the life thats a 20 million O&S cost for the F-16A, for a procurement unit price of around 15 million in then year dollars. Similarly lets give the Rafale an 18k CPH ( as per the janes report cited by yourself), thats 144 million O&S cost over the service life for around a 90 million UFC jet. The standard formula of

2/3 cost = Life time O&S cost
1/3 cost = Unit fly away procurement cost

is fairly standard and can be used for ball park calculations.
24 billion for 58 fighters. That's over 400 million per plane! 200 million is just for the plane itself, and 200 million to keep them running
No its not. The Unit fly away cost even in LRIP is 112 million (LRIP 7), and LRIP block production @ 35 is grossly inferior to the design of the F-35 production process which would work at its more efficient state at a rate greater than 100 per annum. If you want to add a whole bunch of other costs you must do the same on all other fighters. Find the gross systems cost including spares, initial training, factory training and ancillary equipment boosts the total unit cost for all fighters. These things do not come for free. Depot and stock uptake required with fresh orders are also variables that need to be maintained as the fleet grows. They also do not come for free. The F-35 is not the only fighter in the world whose's cost rises when you pile stuff onto the recurring fly-away cost that includes the airframe, engine, systems, subsystems, avionics and hardware. The wheeler meme is getting rather stale without any context what so ever.

Read this -

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=58&t=25794



the Su-30 MKI comes in 65 million with everything.
The only link i have seen (which i provided to you) claimed that the Su-30MKI now comes in at around 65 million but that does not mention what all is included in the cost of that. Secondly, you are comparing western hardware to russian hardware. Big difference. Whats the airframe life of the Su-30MKI? To do an apples to apples comparison between total cost of the MKI you'd need to find basic answers to the questions I asked you earlier to which you have not responded with firm figures which i concede are hard to nail down.
You can 6 of those plus 10 million for fuel
10 million for fuel? what sort of math is this? Modern fighters CPH (Just that of the system not of the air force operating it) are heavily driven by fuel costs. A huge chunk of the 168 million - 8000 hour lifetime cost (As per RAAF estimates) would be fuel.
And that's being way too generous to the JSF. Neither LM nor the US or Oz governments have ever done upfront honesty on how expensive weapons are
No only wheeler'ites have a monopoly on true cost ;). The total acquisition cost has been projected as a model by the US government ever since the program began (they started even before the first aircraft took flight). Lockheed has no say in this, the model is created, updated by the government (they do not leave such things to the OEM).
Last edited by brar_w on 06 Aug 2014 22:21, edited 2 times in total.
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