LOL, Ballistic projectile becomes ballistic missile according to ZEEZee News on You-e-tube: Bharat ke dushman kanpne lage hain...
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LOL, Ballistic projectile becomes ballistic missile according to ZEEZee News on You-e-tube: Bharat ke dushman kanpne lage hain...
The Himalayas are both higher and more dangerous, including violent weather than Afghanistan. The Dhruv faces a harsher environmental challenge. But the Dhruv safety record beats the Apaches.The U.S. has over the past year doubled its number of helicopters based in Afghanistan to about 225, but troop numbers have risen even faster, making for a more acute chopper shortage. <snip>
Air Force Captain Matthew Miller wrote about the challenges of flying in Afghanistan after returning from a four-month deployment there in 2007. His medevac unit, from Georgia's Moody Air Force Base, had lost three helicopters and seven crew members in the two wars. Enemy fire had been a factor in none of the Afghan crashes. "In Iraq, helicopter pilots face a greater prospect of being shot at by ground fire," Miller wrote. "In Afghanistan, the greatest threat is the terrain." He described flying in Afghanistan as "'graduate level' piloting more challenging than cruising over the flatlands of Iraq. "It didn't take long to feel the perils of mountainous flying in Afghanistan," he added. "Between Iraq and Afghanistan, most helicopter pilots I've spoken to consider Afghanistan the more dangerous place to fly."
101 deaths. Over the course of just one year and 250 Apaches. No matter how you choose to calculate the deaths, the Dhruv wins whether by flying hours, total accident rate or any other safety metric."Helicopters are not shot down in battle very much in either place [Iraq or Afghanistan]," says Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon. He and his colleagues are keeping running tallies of U.S. fatalities in both theaters. While 5% of U.S. deaths in Iraq have been caused by helicopter crashes — 216 out of 4,348 — the total is 12% in Afghanistan — 101 of 866 — even before Monday's losses.
And there we have it why the Apache, a helicopter that "appears" to have served well for the USA fails at altitude. It's too damn heavy!Aircraft engines produce less power at high altitudes, reducing maneuverability and limiting load capacity. In addition to a
reduction in engine power, helicopters lose rotor efficiency in low air pressure. Hovering is difficult and risky, and most helicopters are unable to lift normal loads at altitudes above 13,000 feet (3,965 m).
Most attack helicopters are too heavy to fly at high altitude.
+1brar_w wrote:This is a valid argument. Any decision to go in for a foreign helicopter, whether russian or american has to be made after weighing in an indigenous option even if that particular helo is not optimum for the sort of usage the service wants to put the particular hardware. A compromise here and another there will go a long way in reducing import culture and restricting it to areas where it is absolutely necessary.We can have 3Rudra's for every Apache
Dude,Rien wrote:<SNIP> From the same Time Magazine Article linked above
101 deaths. Over the course of just one year and 250 Apaches. No matter how you choose to calculate the deaths, the Dhruv wins whether by flying hours, total accident rate or any other safety metric."Helicopters are not shot down in battle very much in either place [Iraq or Afghanistan]," says Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon. He and his colleagues are keeping running tallies of U.S. fatalities in both theaters. While 5% of U.S. deaths in Iraq have been caused by helicopter crashes — 216 out of 4,348 — the total is 12% in Afghanistan — 101 of 866 — even before Monday's losses.To make it comparable to Dhruv one has to divide by 2, so you wind up comparing 125 Apaches to 150 Dhruv.
The Dhruv has been flying since 2002, so that's over 12 years. That works out for the Dhruv to be 1.3 accidents per year. In just one year 55 Americans have been killed in 125 Apache. Vs 1.3 deaths for 150 Dhruv over 1 year. That is a 450% difference. The Apache is a flying deathtrap. The IAF's evaluation is very much in doubt on safety grounds. It was always going to be the case that any cost analysis will favour desi maal over videshi, but safety is much more open to question. <SNIP>
That excerpt from your article is about HELICOPTER operations in their totality in Afghanistan and NOT about Apache's performance. I mean, seriously, how can you mix the two?"Helicopters are not shot down in battle very much in either place [Iraq or Afghanistan]," says Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon. He and his colleagues are keeping running tallies of U.S. fatalities in both theaters. While 5% of U.S. deaths in Iraq have been caused by helicopter crashes — 216 out of 4,348 — the total is 12% in Afghanistan — 101 of 866 — even before Monday's losses. "The main issues [responsible for the higher rate of helicopter-crash casualties in Afghanistan] have to do with terrain, weather and of course frequency of use," O'Hanlon says.
Only 225? Are you serious? In addition to the LARGE fleet of AH-64's deployed to Afghanistan the Brits by 2008 had put 50,000 combat hours on the AH-64 fleet in Afghanistan alone and that made between 1/3 and 1/2 of their entire AH-64 flying time even when combined with peacetime training hours. Thats a ridiculous portion of the flying hours that is in combat. I do not recall them ever loosing an AH-64D pilot to enemy fire.Rein wrote:An apples to apples comparison will revolve around Afghanistan, since the only place the US flies at high altitude over the entire service history of the Apache has been there. Likewise with nos. Only around 225 Apaches have served in Afghanistan
And do extract the required data from that performance based on your technical evaluation. You won't find any. Apart from the Combat operations, the AH-64 has a high altitude mountain training base, data from which must have been submitted by Boeing as required along with submissions on particular key performance criteria that the IAF ranked high up on their requirements. But don't expect the IAF to take their word for it, that is why the OEM is allowed to shell out its own money, send its aircraft along with support equipment to the home country and in IAF's case they trialled the aircraft over Leh for testing its effectiveness in that extreme performance envelope. Jaisalmer was the other extreme. One does this for flexibility even though the bulk of the aircrafts operations are going to be somewhere in the middle.since the only place the US flies at high altitude over the entire service history of the Apache has been there
Terrain challenges are absolutely nothing new in combat. You do realize this do you not? You are taking pilots who train for a host of challenges, plucking them from their home bases and taking them 10,000+ Km out and asking them to conduct warfare in an inhospitable place that brings altitude, terrain and climatic challenges. Hardly something that is routine. No? Other challenges in Afghanistan were the vast distances that fixed winged aircraft had to cover them putting more than stresses on the airframes and using up faster than usual the tanker support. I guess those fixed winged aircraft must also be crap. The Warfighter fights where and when the political class tells it to. He/she has to overcome the challenges that have to do with things like weather, support, having depots and make shift expeditionary air bases 10000 km's out of your "comfort-zone" etc etc. The 101st for example never trained much at 10,000+ASL or above with their Apaches until they got to Afghanistan where this aspect of performance again gained a lot of emphasis. When you train for 10 different things you are going to have less time for any one particular thing. Just like the Apache is flexible and has conducted warfare in Afganistan all the up to 12000 Feet ASL and destroyed more than 500 tanks and radar sites in Iraq the Apache pilot has also shown to be flexible and reformed his/he training procedures to better cope with any one particular situation. They reformed the training with the Longbow once it came into service (had to) and did so again when the Afghanistan missions required greater emphasis on high mountain warfare. Similarly there are talks about adding changes with the Echo particularly given the ease in which UAV's operate with it and are controlled by it.The Himalayas are both higher and more dangerous, including violent weather than Afghanistan. The Dhruv faces a harsher environmental challenge. But the Dhruv safety record beats the Apaches.
Those who conducted that conflict, and those who won it decisivly are the ones who found the AH-64 to be competent and much ahead of the competing system at high altitude and desert trials in India.The Apache's poor safety record at high altitude is due to
And there we have it why the Apache, a helicopter that "appears" to have served well for the USA fails at altitude. It's too damn heavy!
So combat deployment, actual combat missions at a war footing 10000-11000 km away from home base is pretty much comparable to peacetime or civilian operations of other equipment around the world?. Are you seriously going to say that with a straight face? If you do not know the difference between peacetime training and civilian flying vs wartime deployment then there isn't much to discuss further..There have only been 9 safety incidents in the entirety of the Dhruv's record since 2002. It has served in multiple high altitude nations, like Turkey, Ecuador, Peru, Nepal and Bharat of course. Let's just compare it one year of the Apache AH-64D deployed in Afghanistan shall we?
Is there a US system that you haven't called obese, overweight and incompetent? The Apache is a heavy attack helo while the dhruv is not. There is a place for both and both bring different tactical advantages in warfare. Go read up on the difference.To put it in perspective, that's both a heavier load and higher altitude than the obese, obsolete, overweight Apache chopper could even dream of.
Offset requirements have been met by US companies (Its the companies that meet offset requirements not the US as a nation). Whether its 30%, 50% or 100% US Majors have met these obligations for nations around the world. The proof is out there for you to search and locate.Tot requirements are something the US cannot meet. 50% offset obligations are law.
Why not post the exact RFP docent and we can judge on our own?Clearly the GoI is planning to give the US an exemption.
No your brilliant technical analysis was good enough, this is just icing.This is another reason to kill this deal cold.
We should only be buying systems designed post 1992. Scrap the MKI fleet, scrap the Mig-29 fleet, scrap the C-130 fleet, the C-5 fleet, the P-8 fleet and basically everything other than the Dhruv. The Echo model is just a slight Bump from the YAH-64A that flew in the 70's. In fact the bump in capability is so little that the IAF would be better served in asking for the capability of the YAH-64 since it would be cheaper and offer the same level of capability as the AH-64E with the longbow.It's an old obsolete piece of junk whose only supplier of parts is the Sanction levying US.
Yeah, as soon as the war breaks out the apache's The Apache pilot's will get this message delivered through whattsapp.There is no way to keep the Apache operational in an Indo-Pak war,
You just had to come in and burst the bubblerohitvats wrote:The two Mi-25/35 Helicopter Units of IAF which 22 AH-64 Apache are supposed to replace are based in Pathankot and Suratgarh. So, I guess IAF knows where it wants to fight wars with Apaches. Similarly, the IA is going to have 1 Squadron each for its three Strike Corps - again, to be deployed from anywhere from Sambha to Barmer.
And before I forget - between IA and IAF, the order for LCH stands at 179 (114 and 65) and further 60 Rudra/Dhruv-WSI. So, if IA ever equips its mountain formations with Attack Helicopters, it would well be LCH. Though, I have no doubt that they'll also try Apaches in Ladakh.
I think we can lay this 'safety record' argument to rest - which is dubious to begin with!
No we don't need gold plated Apache to take on Pakis trashcans. We can do it with our bear hands. But, the Armed Forces just don't believe in this. They want to equip themselves with weapons like tin cans and gold plates with money which should have gone in setting up Indian MIC.nik wrote:Why do we need gold plated Apache to take on Pakis trashcans? Oh, because we bought tin cans instead of Arjuns![]()
Two wrong decisions do not become a correct one!
Although no breakdown is available as far as I have looked the total number of combat hours for the delta in OEF and OIF combined stood at 800,000 by 2011. Of course the D continues to be in Afghanistan at the moment and the echo arrived just recently. I have also provided a tactical breakdown of the operations during both these wars including operations, mission requirements, how the units adapted and everything that went down during the deployments. The link to the book is in the Helo thread.rohitvats wrote: What would be interesting to see is the total number of flying hours put in by the US Army AH-64 fleet in Afghanistan.
There is utter disregard for peacetime flying vs flying full mission combat sorties (doing CAS no less) in an expeditionary setup some 10K Km away from home base with an attack helicopter over hostile territory. If only services around the world looked at mission effectiveness and safety with the same degree of asininity..I bet the Iraqi air force would have been shocked given the record of their fleet during the Gulf war compared to routine flying during peacetime..rohitvats wrote:That excerpt from your article is about HELICOPTER operations in their totality in Afghanistan and NOT about Apache's performance. I mean, seriously, how can you mix the two?
Reg. the IJT,it should be scrapped or consigned to tech-demo status,and one possibility is to induct PC-21s after the PC-7 BT trg. period, which can simulate jet fighters,with Hawks the next step as advanced trainers.Rostvertol report sheds light on deliveries, customers, propects, and a technical issue.
The Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant developed the Mi-28N Night Hunter, and they’ve been produced at the Rosvertol aviation plant since 2005.
June 12/14: Rostvertol report. Rosvertol’s 2013 annual report contains a number of interesting details regarding its orders. Deliveries to Russia are confirmed at 14 Mi-28Ns and 1 Mi-28UB. Evidence is conflicting, but the report also cites a 2013 prototype launch for the of Mi-28UB OP-1, and the helicopter and its and its mast mounted radar enclosure are photographed.
Iraq [foreign customer K-8] has its October 2012 order confirmed at 15 machines, and Algeria [foreign customer 012] is confirmed to have ordered 42 Mi-28NE attack helicopters on Dec 26/13. That Mi-28NE order makes them the type’s 2nd export customer after Iraq (15), but they are the largest. Other serious prospects include Egypt [customer 818], Turkmenistan [customer 795], and Uzbekistan [customer 860].
The report adds that Mi-28s have been having problems with increased vibration in the main gearbox. They decided to continue operations with an upgraded set of main gears in the 1st stage. Sources: Rostvertol PLC external link, “Annual Report ‘Rosvertol’,
In August 2012, Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev pledged that the state would buy 60 Mi-28UB attack and training helicopters by 2020. That would be good news for the VVS, as well as the Rosvertol plant at Rostov on Don.
Russia is slowly modernizing its military, and its attack helicopter force is one of the areas being given priority. New Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-28N Night Hunter machines are beginning to replace the VVS’ 240 or so old Mi-24 gunships, but training has been an issue for the nascent Mi-28 fleet.
Your post has been reported. Please desist from posting one-liners about your feelings for IAF today.Vivek K wrote:IAF = Imported Air Force.
What I object to is not the truth. I object to your post.Vivek K wrote:^^^^Truth hurts, right?
LCHs will soon arrive, yes. Rudras are being inducted, yes. Mi-25/35s can persevere a little longer, yes. The threat from PA tanks is less than daunting, yes. All in all, a good case for scrapping the Apache deal. Which makes your advocacy for the Mi-28N in the same post, utterly bizarre.Philip wrote:Since the LCH is already in the air flying,whyfore the need for the Apaches at all? The MI-35s can be nursed like the MIG-21s for a little longer until the LCHs start rolling off production lines,like the Dhruvs. We already have armed versions of MI-17s,Dhruvs in service,which can assist the MI-35s until the LCHs arrive. The Apache deal was just another of Quisling Singh's gifts to his master Uncle Sam.The MI-28N is an equally decent attack helo which may be even cheaper to acquire and operate.We've used the MI-24/35s well for ages,should face little problems with the MI-28Ns.
The fact that an Apache can be used for SEAD-like missions doesn't mean it should be used for SEAD-like missions. You can hit insurgent camps with fixed wing aircraft just as effectively (in a net-centric environment) but with a far greater degree of safety.agupta wrote:Serious question:
How long do you think it will take us to develop the LCH "full system" (not airframe) capabilities with the kind of NCW-enabled SEAD-like search and destroy missions that will allow us to strike at jihadi clusters behind the LoC.
Does today's non-Apache equipped IAF lack the capability to hit Pak hard? Its conventional advantage aside, the PA deployment on the LoC/IB is already at all-time lows and their adventures in the NWFP & Balochistan will carry on for a couple of years at the very least.Make a list, assess probabilities of developing/qualifying and inducting all of those ... and you're easily into the 5+ yr timeframe. So are we advocating that India's policy towards Pak becomes. "We will hit you hard... in about 5+ years" so you better not direct those talibunnies towards India ?
And yet no the other service in the world operates two classes of attack helicopters. Attack helicopters are primarily for tank-busting/anti-vehicle + anti-infantry roles. The LCH can get both jobs done. Not nearly as well as the Apache to be sure, but well enough.The LCH and Apache occupy distinct roles in the Army/IAF ConOps; to say dont do that AH-64 because you have the LCH is like saying we don't need to buy the Su-30 becauseyou have the LCAwe are developing the LCA
The correct analogy would be we don't need to buy the MRCA because of the LCA and that is exactly what a lot of members have been suggesting.agupta wrote:to say dont do that AH-64 because you have the LCH is like saying we don't need to buy the Su-30 becauseyou have the LCAwe are developing the LCA
All armies fight with what they have, be it the most well equipped ones like that of the USA or cash strapped ones like ours. Not having a bunch of wet dream weapons is not what is preventing us from taking out "jihadi clusters".agupta wrote:Serious question:
How long do you think it will take us to develop the LCH "full system" (not airframe) capabilities with the kind of NCW-enabled SEAD-like search and destroy missions that will allow us to strike at jihadi clusters behind the LoC.
Make a list, assess probabilities of developing/qualifying and inducting all of those ... and you're easily into the 5+ yr timeframe. So are we advocating that India's policy towards Pak becomes. "We will hit you hard... in about 5+ years" so you better not direct those talibunnies towards India ?
The AH-64E has that mast mounted MMW radar that's ideal for anti-vehicle roles, but how is the LCH any less able than the EC Tiger, A129 or the AH-1 (all of which I'd imagine are hi-end aircraft)?agupta wrote:Viv S: If India could afford or have the capability (like other countries do) to use a single fleet to cover the entire spectrum, I am sure they would standardize on one hi-end solution. And BTW, if you're thinking of the US - you may want to account for Combined Arms etc stuff - they have the luxury of differentiating roles between Army and Marine Corps etc. We don't - or at least currently don't. India has always done what it thought as efficient by mixing hi-lo solutions... seems to be a old habit.
Well.. how much higher is a high-end solution? LCH deliveries should start by 2018. AH-64E deliveries will likely begin by 2016 assuming the deal is signed in the next fiscal.agupta wrote:Bingo. The answer is in WHEN ? And HOW MUCH well enough, right ?
Somehow many Armies in the world do have "heavy" attack helicopters depending on the terrain/scenarios similar to ours. You have to think of the LCH as our Low-end-indigenous optimization to reduce the overall bill and have internal growth options.
Rohit and others have talked earlier about how the new Strike/Mountain formations can be effective and will need to be effective. With those evolving needs, you still think we can make do with an all LCH fleet available at scale sometime??? (when?)
The MSC will have the (relatively mature) Rudras to start off with. They can eventually be supplemented with LCHs.You expect these new armies to get ready without having any mature heliborne options... I can understand there can be more will and support - but rarely have I seen that have any significant impact when raw capability did not exist for certain aspects; and certainly overall combat systems is one such area - hell, even the Russians after so many decades can't effectively match that.
Why 50 LCHs specifically? Do you foresee a spike in force levels on the Pak front in the immediate future?agupta wrote:OK. Yes .."should". How well have "shoulds" gone - can we make that prime reliant assumption for future force planning. So how long before 50+ LCHs available for full induction. We wait until then ? Perhaps we allow that the experts do know a bit about Con Ops
The USMC is doctrinally independent of the US Army. Its plans and trains for expeditionary operations without factoring in any support from Army Aviation even after the amphibious phase of the operation ends. The Germans, French and Italians in Western Europe would have been doing the same exact thing as the AH-64 and not necessarily in conjunction with it either.US Army and US MC are both one country.... so the US does mix hi- and lo-. NATO (and the US Army therefore as per div. of roles and responsibilities) would have had AH-64s in Western Europe so that allowed the Germans, French and the italians to focus on the Tiger and Mangusta.
Tanks as well as mountainous terrain. Not that unsimilar to our scenario.Turks have threats on their frontiers not of their own making - including tank and mountainous terrain ? C'mon, man...
Do they have a joint doctrine? They just ended a long and fairly public squabble over ownership of AH assets. I doubt there's any consensus about how they're to be employed.All right, I bet otherwiseSome Apaches will end up supporting mountain region ops. IF the current IAF-Army joint ops doctrine (or drift - your call!), I think you'll see IAF only take on more specialized CAS work and the Army will use its AH-64s and LCHs/Rudras to do more "run of the mill" stuff.
USMC have *far* more commonality with the USN. Including being (very, very reluctantly) clubbed under them.US Army and US MC are both one country.
The principle behind the EC Tiger and the Leopard was the same that as that which drove the AH-64 and Abrams. The AH-64 was intended primarily to combat the massive Soviet/Warpac tanks armies to the East. The primary requirement spelled out for the Tiger project was the same i.e to be an anti-tank platform. It started a decade after the Apache project and then dropped to 'simmer' post-1991, so it hasn't been nearly as successful. Had the Cold War not ended, it would have served in the same front-line role as the AH-64.brar_w wrote:In an active european war, neither the french nor the Germans could push 200-300 nm into Russian head positions especially when attacked..They would most likely be able to hold formation for some time before the larger NATO and American fleets began operating (this assumes that only 2 nations begin to defend themselves which would not have been the case as the entire NATO was there all along).
Vivek K, looking at your past history of shenanigans & warnings issued by other mods, any further attempts by you to derail a thread will not be tolerated. You have been warned.Vivek K wrote:^^^^Truth hurts, right?