Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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Yagnasri

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 23 Sep 2014 08:33

Yes. Purpose of any war initiated by China will be to show the world how weak Indian military is and to humiliate India. They only care about the resources of land and sea, not the boundaries. The claims are made to ensure that everyone falls in place when China wants and no one dares to oppose them. But how long this will continue is the question. Countries like Vietnam may not bow to middle kingdom so easily. But they also are not capable to stop China from taking over the south china sea. Only Khan can do it. Why Khan wish to do that when they are actively promoting P2 system and many of their "leaders" on china payroll- oops - campaign contributions ?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 23 Sep 2014 17:00

Is Xi Jinping's combat-ready order to PLA a bid to win over India's strategic advantage in Chumar?
The intransigence by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to stay put in Chumar (Ladakh region) across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), despite assurance of withdrawal by none other President Xi Jinping last week, is being viewed as part of its strategy to win over Indian Army's strategic advantage in the area.

It is now clear that PLA troopers did not withdraw from the Chumar area on Thursday night after talks between Xi and Narendra Modi and reports reaching Delhi to that effect was a false alarm. Since the stand-off began thirteen days back PLA has pressed in more soldiers in the Chumar region -- an alarming number in recent times - where they transgress on a regular basis, sources in the Indian security establishment told ET. This also comes amid Xi -- chief of China's Central Military Commission head - exhorting PLA to remain ready for a regional war.

What has baffled the Ministry of Defence and mandarins in the South Block is PLA's behaviour despite Xi's assurance at Delhi at the highest level on last Thursday. Sources said they are trying to ascertain is this a classic Chinese doublespeak or does this signal any sort of fissures within the Chinese establishment. "Knowing the Chinese system they do not act independent of the other. Moreover Xi wields tremendous power as he is three-in-one -- President, General Secretary of the Party and CMC Chairman. Can PLA act independent of him? We are trying to ascertain the behaviour and raise it at the appropriate level," noted an official, who did not wish to be named.{Absolutely. PLA is not disobeying Xi's orders. That is a wrong line of reasoning. There has been nothing to suggest that there is a division between Xi and the PLA. The suggestion that Xi's actions against corrupt Chinese Generals is causing some revolt is not backed by any evidence. Besides, the incursions have been going on for a long time now, long before Xi came to power. It is very clear that the Chinese strategy is to delay border settlement until a more favourable time when it could be done to its great advantage and without firing a shot. The Chinese want to delay border talks even while developing the vastly one-sided trade with us. The skewed trade would also add to the pressure on India when time came. Preventing India from improving its logistics and infratsructure is another. China also believes in putting up a robust, unceasing and relentless articulation of its viewpoint and establish it with actions at every opportunity. During this time, therefore, China would claim more and more Indian land, deny India more and more land and make de facto as de jure}

Defence and security establishment sources did not mince words when they indicated that India has a geographical and therefore strategic advantage in Chumar along the 4,057 LAC. Indian Army has an observation post as well as building bunker in the area, sources said, adding, the observation post enables the Indian troopers to keep a watch deep inside the Chinese territory. PLA wants to thwart this move and therefore trying to build road in the area by transgressing into the Indian Territory with the objective of seizing the strategic advantage that India has, an official explained, speaking under the condition of anonymity.

However, the PLA has received some strong response from the Indian Army with its Chief General Dalbir Singh postponing his three-day visit to Bhutan amid the standoff and pressing 2000 troops to match the strength of over 1000 Chinese troopers in the area. Indo Tibetan Border Police man the area and Indian Army sent more reinforcements on Monday to sources said, adding, it has been decided that Indian forces will not concede to the Chinese and will stay put to put pressure on China to withdraw. In 2013, PLA had put similar pressure on Indian Army to dismantle its infrastructure in Chumar ahead of their Premier's trip to Delhi.

There are around eight battalions of ITBP comprising nearly 8,000 personnel in the region. In addition, the Army has around 15 battalions in the area.

Amid this Chinese Defence Ministry for the first time reacted to the incidents, saying there are differing perceptions of the LAC but the two sides could resolve boundary issues through dialogue. China's Foreign Ministry also echoed similar sentiments. It was decided during Modi-Xi meeting that the two sides will make resolution of boundary dispute as a "strategic objective".

Chumar, located over 300 kilometres Northeast of Leh and bordering Himachal Pradesh, has long been a flash point between the two sides, with the Chinese making several attempts to end India's dominance in the area in the last two to three years. India is strategically at a vantage position in this area and its defence structure is a matter of discomfort for China. It is one of the very few places along the Line of Actual Control where access to the border areas is easier from the Indian side. The PLA has been making repeated bids to claim Chumar as part of Chinese territory but has been thwarted every time by the Indian Army.

Transgressions by the Chinese troopers into the Indian territory have increased ever since Delhi has started building military infrastructure along the LAC over last couple of years in response Beijing's massive defence infrastructure and deployment of troops along the border.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 23 Sep 2014 17:14

Reports on Xi Jinping's regional war remarks are wild guess: China - PTI, ET
China today termed as "wild guess" reports that President Xi Jinping's comments asking the PLA to improve its ability to win a regional war were made in the context of the border standoff with India and said the leadership of the two countries have reached a consensus to solve the boundary dispute through friendly consultations.

"You said Indian media are asking this question but I believe that this may be a wild guess," Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying told a media briefing here when asked about the context of Xi's remarks.

Xi yesterday asked the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be combat ready to win a "regional war" and make sure that all decisions from the central leadership are strictly followed.

"Headquarters of all PLA forces should improve their combat readiness and sharpen their ability to win a regional war in the age of information technology," Xi, who returned from India last week after a three-day visit, was quoted as saying by the state-run Xinhua news agency.

Hua said, "President Xi concluded his very successful visit to India and was warmly welcomed by the Indian government and Indian people. During his visit, the two leaders reached important consensus on Sino-Indian relations."

"There may be some problems between the two countries but you can be assured that the two leaders also have consensus on such issues that is to solve the disputes through friendly coordination and pending the final settlement we will maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas," she said.

"We will never allow border area issues to influence Sino-India relations, so you may be assured," Hua said.

Asked about reports of presence of Chinese troops in the Ladakh region, Hua said "we have noted such reports."

"As I said earlier China and India have strong willingness and sincerity. Through the existing mechanism we can effectively and properly manage such an issue. As far as I am concerned such a dispute has been managed and border area is in tranquility," she said.

Responding to reports of India cancelling the interaction between Chinese and Indian media delegations raising concerns about future development of ties in the backdrop of Xi's visit, Hua said, "I do not believe that cancel is the right word. It may have been delayed. I will make further checks on this. It is not right to connect such two things."

Asked about concerns over future development of India- China ties, she said "I am wondering where your concerns come from. I believe that we all should take holistic and objective view in saying these things. We should be optimistic about the future."

"We have said many things about President Xi's visit to India. Foreign Ministry Wang Yi has briefed President Xi's visit to India including the significance and important consensus reached between the two leaders," Hua said.

During President Xi's visit to India, the two sides issued joint declaration to forge close relations in which there are some specifics for future cooperation, she said.

"So I believe to further China-India relations we are sincere and confident in doing so As for the Indian side cancelled media visit, this is a specific case. As for why the Indian side cancelled the trip, I would like to refer you to competent authority," Hua said.

Media of the two countries should enhance communication and cement public foundation of bilateral ties, she said.

Answering a question about a write up in Chinese media expressing concerns over Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Japan and whether India's "growing relationship" with Tokyo is coming in the way of Sino-India ties, Hua said "the Chinese people are not fragile and petty nation."

"We are happy to see other countries develop friendly bilateral relations as long as such relationship is positive and constructive," Hua said.

"I believe that as for the relations between the two countries we hold very open mind about it. We are willing to develop cooperative relationship with all countries based on five principles of co-existence {BS of the highest order}," she said.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 23 Sep 2014 17:19

China says ready to boost defence ties with Sri Lanka - PTI, ET
China today said it is ready to boost "pragmatic cooperation" with Sri Lankan military, days after Chinese President Xi Jinping described the country as an "all weather friend".

Sri Lanka's secretary of defence and urban development, Gotabaya Rajapaksa today met Xu Qiliang, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission and discussed steps to improve the military ties.

Hailing the friendship between China and Sri Lanka, Xu said leaders of two countries attached great importance to military-to-military ties and the Chinese military was willing to strengthen "pragmatic cooperation in various fields with the Sri Lankan military,"
state-run Xinhua news agency reported.

Xi and his Sri Lankan counterpart Mahinda Rajapaksa agreed to strengthen the two countries' strategic cooperative partnership during the Chinese President's state visit to Colombo last week

Gotabaya said Sri Lanka would continue to enhance cooperation with China to advance military-to-military ties.

During his Colombo visit, Xi elevated Lanka-China ties terming the island nation as an "all weather friend", a term Beijing exclusively used for Pakistan for many decades to characterise close relations between the two countries.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 23 Sep 2014 18:58

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 248842.cms

India's foreign policy an independent one: Chinese daily
BEIJING: India's foreign policy is an independent one and no major power can impose its will on the "giant elephant" of South Asia, a leading Chinese daily said in an article Tuesday, while underlining the importance of the Sino-Indian relationship.

The bilateral ties were complementary and improving, as the two neighbours have found a "practical and postive" way to manage their territorial dispute, the People's Daily said.

"India, the 'giant elephant' of South Asia, operates an independent foreign policy," the People's Daily in its online edition said in an article headlined "Japan cannot rely on India to counter China".

The paper, which is the mouthpiece of the ruling Communist Party of China, highlighted the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping, during his visit to India this month, met Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his home state of Gujarat.

"This visit was a symbol of mutual respect between India and China, and has been seen as the first step in establishing a personal relationship between the top leaders of the two countries," the article stated.{Yes Yes that is why the PLA also crossed into India .. for some chai-biskoot!}

"It is of indispensable strategic value for India to cooperate with China on a friendly basis. How India manages its other relationships is another story. To be good neighbours with China has significant geopolitical implications, and is of all-around benefit to both India and China."

Referring to Prime Minister Modi's visit to Japan earlier this month, the article stated: "Some commentators in Japan suggested that the leaders of Japan and India were aiming to build a strategic counterweight to China. The suggestions are groundless."

Stating that friendly relations between neighbouring countries are a basic precondition for health in other foreign affairs, the article said this applied especially to India today.

"It can be clearly asserted that the stronger the Sino-India relationship is, the better India will be able to manage its relationships with the US and Japan."

According to the article, China is considered to be the biggest rival to the US and Japan.

"Both the US and Japan are inclined to look for allies to help them counter China. These two countries will try to discourage India from any rapprochement with China if the two countries seem to be getting too close. However, they will want bilateral relationships to be improved if there is a downturn," the article said.

Mentioning that China sought to have long-term benefits from its relationship with India, the articl said the relationship between the two countries "is of independent strategic value and it has nothing to do with relationships with America and Japan".

"The Sino-India bond has been improving for many years, better than many other foreign relationships. Rationality and perspective play dominant roles in Sino-India relationships."

It said the governments of the two countries were taking a practical and positive approach when it came to territorial disputes in order not to damage their bilateral relationship.

"This is a most reasonable approach in dealing with territorial disputes in Asia. It also provide the two countries with a new angle to manage this kind of dispute," the article stated.

"It is necessary to understand that China and India are complementary to each other," it concluded.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RKumar » 23 Sep 2014 19:07

-- OT ---

^ It is perfect time to station Brahmos and Su-30 near SL. Stop offering all medical and military training to them, let them travel to Cheen or Pak. But keep giving them advance weather warning so they live long to see what options they have selected.

Let SL sleep with Cheen until they wake up. If they try to open 3rd front during their sleeping time with Cheen, simple wipe their infrastructure and any cheen military brothers. Strike fast and hard where Cheen are weakest and clear the whole IOC operational areas.

-- OT ---

Dear People's Daily farticle editor

"It is of indispensable strategic value for IndiaChina to cooperate with ChinaIndia on a friendly basis. How India manages its other relationships is another story. To be good neighbours with ChinaIndia has significant geopolitical implications, and is of all-around benefit to both India and China."

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 23 Sep 2014 19:26

http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140923000353

China’s measured embrace of India
BEIJING ― Chinese President Xi Jinping’s three-day visit to India, the main leg of a recent tour of Central and South Asia, sheds new light on China’s emerging approach to its neighbors, particularly Asia’s other giant. Recent subtle changes in Sino-Indian relations could prove to be enormously consequential for the world in the coming decades.

Under Xi, China is adopting a new grand strategy which can be called “dual rebalancing”: implementing bold domestic reforms to regain economic momentum while overhauling China’s global posture and diplomacy, focusing on sources of risk in its near abroad. The Silk Road Economic Belt, which is focused on Central Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which concentrates on the countries bordering the Indian Ocean’s shipping lanes, are leading initiatives on China’s foreign-policy agenda. Their success will depend, in large part, on whether China gets support from other great powers, specifically Russia in Central Asia and India in South Asia.

China understands that India’s position on the world stage has been strengthening since the beginning of this century. India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, an aspirational and authoritative leader from Gujarat, one of the country’s most developed states, has promised to bring India’s economy out of a half-decade funk, enhance the living standards of his country’s have-nots, and boost the country’s standing as a global power. The trick for Chinese policy is to reconcile Modi’s ambitions with China’s strategic goals.

Since Modi came to power, India has been basking in the adulation of major powers like Japan and the United States. Partly motivated by a desire to counterbalance China’s rising geopolitical influence, Japan and the U.S. have sought to draw India into a multilateral alliance consisting of democratic countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has vowed to forge a “democratic security diamond” with the US, Australia, and India.

During Modi’s visit to Japan in early September, Abe offered to invest $35 billion in Indian infrastructure projects over five years, accelerate negotiations on civil nuclear deals, and boost bilateral maritime security cooperation. The two sides agreed to build up a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” leaving Chinese strategists to wrestle with the implications of deeper India-Japan ties.

Likewise, despite an on-again off-again relationship with India since Bill Clinton’s presidency, the U.S. continues to view the country as a “natural ally.” U.S. cabinet members ― Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel ― both visited India in recent months to try and woo Modi by promising improved economic and strategic ties. In the last three years, the U.S. has surpassed Russia as India’s largest arms supplier. Modi’s government is desperate to diversity its sources of advanced weapons and become self-reliant in defense production.

Barack Obama’s administration is now expected to do whatever it can to strengthen relations with India during Modi’s upcoming visit to Washington. As Nicholas Burns, a former under-secretary of state, has argued, U.S. strategic interests in the century ahead will align more closely with India’s than with those of any other continental Asian power, making India central to America’s strategic rebalancing toward Asia.

Xi is confident that China can understand and satisfy many of Modi’s needs better than regional rivals like Japan. But China should not underestimate India’s determination to uphold its strategic autonomy in Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.

During Xi’s visit, the two leaders signed 15 agreements in the fields of trade, finance, and culture. Xi committed China to invest $20 billion in India over the next five years, particularly to modernize India’s decrepit and overused railway system. This compares with just $400 million, or 0.18 percent of India’s inward foreign investment, in Chinese investment from 2000 to 2014.

China also promised to establish two industrial parks, in Gujarat and Maharashtra, as well as provide greater market access to Indian products, in an effort to allay India’s worries over the widening bilateral trade deficit, which has soared from $1 billion in 2001 to more than $40 billion today. Modi’s efforts to revive market-oriented reform and improve the country’s business environment will help to attract Chinese corporations eager to capitalize on India’s vast labor force, varied skill base, and geographical advantages.

In addition, China wants to strengthen cooperation with India in regional and global affairs. India is likely soon to gain full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the club of Central Asian and Asian states formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union. India’s “Connect Central Asia policy,” and its efforts to build a North-South Transit Corridor, would benefit development in Central Asia, a region of major concern to China, because it abuts the restless Chinese province of Xinjiang.

As major aid providers and investors in Afghanistan, China and India also have common interests in stabilizing that country, and countering religious extremism and terrorism after NATO troops leave. Moreover, the two countries share similar interests in reshaping global economic governance, particularly by further strengthening cooperation among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and ensuring that climate change is addressed in a way that does not impede growth.

But India’s lingering bitterness over the 1962 war with China remains. On many occasions, Modi has voiced suspicions about China’s growing footprint in disputed border areas. India’s sensitivity to potential Chinese encirclement is similar to China’s fears of encirclement by the U.S. and its allies. That is why China is unlikely to develop its relations with India and Pakistan (with which China still values its all-weather partnership) on separate tracks, as the U.S. did during the Bush administration.

Xi’s visit to India strongly suggests that China is determined to engage with Modi in ways that are intended to inhibit the bilateral rivalry from intensifying. But, despite Xi’s investment pledges, it is far from certain that Asia’s two giants, both with growing global aspirations, can bridge the differences that continue to burden their relationship.

By Minghao Zhao

Zhao Minghao, a research fellow at the Charhar Institute, a Chinese foreign-policy think tank, is an adjunct fellow with the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University and the executive editor of China International Strategy Review. ― Ed.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 23 Sep 2014 19:51

Zhao Minghao is a worthy Chinese scholar to follow. He has written in the past.


Also in my opinion PRC wont do any regional war with India during Modi's term. The time is past with MMS era being over.

Buddha will roar this time.

And its not in PRC interests to let that happen. With world economy in doldrums putting sanctions on India post such an event is not useful.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 23 Sep 2014 19:57

Is there a web link to China Intl Strategy Review?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 23 Sep 2014 20:01

11 could become 14.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 24 Sep 2014 08:34

India digs in heels as PLA seeks flag meet - Rajat Pandit, ToI
India is sticking to its tough stance in the ongoing troop face-off in eastern Ladakh, blaming the People's Liberation Army for violating bilateral border protocols by attempting to construct a road in a disputed area, even as China on Tuesday sought another flag meeting between local military commanders.

With around 1,500 troops deployed in "dominating tactical positions" and backed by "better logistics" against the 750-1,000 PLA soldiers in the Chumar sector, India is taking its own time to respond to China's request for the fourth flag meeting after the first three last week failed to make any headway.

"Informal parleys" between the rival troops on the ground are also intermittently taking place but the deadlock persists, with the PLA insisting on its intention to build the road ahead of Chepzi into the Chumar sector, said sources.

The "decision" on whether to go ahead with the formal flag meeting at Spanggur Gap, in turn, is still being debated by a top-level group, which includes national security advisor Ajit Doval, Army chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag and representatives from the foreign ministry, intelligence agencies and ITBP, among others.

"PM Narendra Modi will be briefed on the face-off on Wednesday. It's a political decision now since we have got conflicting signals from the PLA commanders on the ground and the top Chinese political leadership. Till Tuesday evening, there was no change in the ground situation, tactically or numerically," said a source.

External affairs ministry spokesperson Syed Akbaruddin, in turn, said diplomacy was at work "quietly" and "several follow-up issues" connected to the border stand-off had been taken up with China.

The Indian defence establishment says there is "total clarity" that China violated the 2005 border protocol by trying to construct the road, which led to the face-off after Indian soldiers intercepted the PLA troops equipped with cranes, bulldozers and other equipment on September 10.

The PLA, conversely, is demanding that Indian troops demolish a recently-built hut at Tible in the Chumar sector. Even during the 21-day Depsang Valley face-off in April-May last year, just before Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to India, a "tin shed" at Chumar had become the bone of contention. The PLA troops had then withdrawn only after the "tin shed" was dismantled. The situation is somewhat similar in the ongoing Chumar face-off, which coincided with President Xi Jinping's visit here.

As reported by TOI earlier, the Modi government has decided to further strengthen force-levels in eastern Ladakah, where the Army is keeping its existing 15 battalions (800 soldiers each) as well as "reserve units" on "high alert" to cater for any contingency. Incidentally, the Army even has an armoured regiment of T-72 tanks co-located with the 70 Brigade at Kiari, one of steps taken last year to strengthen defences in the region.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 24 Sep 2014 09:47

China will be foolish escalate further at this point when NM is going to US and Obomber is trying to have his Asia Pivot with India being critical for that effort. Had China tried to befriend India for the last 10 years, we could have been their good friends. Now China is forcing us to become anti Chinese - and for what cost - for a few sq miles of land in which China has no great interest or right in the first place. I wonder what happened to the Chinese famous capability to think long term? Are we missing something here?

As of now, I guess they will keep the pressure on and on, just to test the resolve of NM before he settles in his post. They seems to be unconcerned about the India anger and do not care India join anti Chinese group of nations in Asia.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chaanakya » 24 Sep 2014 12:22

Don't forget China wants India to be confined to South of Himalayas. Indian Boundary Proposal follows highest points in watershed division . now water is a commodity much coveted for various reasons and is going to be scarce with global warming. That is one reason why China is surreptitiously laying claims to World's highest water resource.To preempt China India should have disputed status of Tibet, rather Nehru conceded it. India's China problem is Congi legacy. And Namo has limited leeway given that economy and armed forces , both , were emasculated by congis. But opening Tibet issue may not be difficult as China has slowly opened AP on eastern fron and may lay claim to Sikkim as well in future. So now it needs to be reopened.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 24 Sep 2014 15:07

China respects Indian policy, need to improve ties: Chinese media - PTI, ET
Amid a continuing border standoff, an influential state-run Chinese think tank here has said that the country should initiate a "China respects India" policy to improve bilateral relations.

"We should implement a 'China respects India' policy, on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect," said an article in the state-run Global Times written by Chen Xiankui, Professor of School of Marxism at the Renmin University.

"We can also organise mutual visits between universities and even between religious groups. In these programmes, China needs to be modest and prudent, and put forward the slogan of 'learning from India', proposed by Xi in his address in New Delhi outlining China's thinking," the article said.

"This will help promote the integration of Asia and motivate India to join the embryonic Sino-Indian axis under the framework of 'Chinese respect for India'," it said.

"Even though our current national power is much stronger than India's, we should not indiscriminately imitate Western traditional realism. Instead, we should insist that China and India have equal rights, obligations and benefits, and we can even actively and appropriately surrender part of our rights and benefits to India," the article said.

China should support India to be the leader on significant international issues concerning environment, climate and the rights and benefits of other developing countries, to enhance India's international status, it said.

The article stressed that China should grant same decision-making powers to India in the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank mooted by Beijing even if India's contribution is less than China's, it added.


The article comes in the backdrop of a sense of unease prevailing between the two countries due to a border standoff in the Ladakh region which had also threatened to overshadow President Xi Jinping's visit.

The visit was described by both sides as having a positive influence on bilateral ties as it paved the way for more Chinese investments in India.

Chinese military and the Foreign Ministry have also played down the standoff between the troops focussing on the gains of Xi's visit.

The article said Chinese public and top leaders should stay modest and prudent and sincerely stick to the idea of learning from India.

This would help relieve the objective pressure that the rise of China has put on India after the border conflict in 1962. It would fundamentally improve the national psychology and public opinion about Sino-Indian cooperation, the article said.

"There are definitely things we can learn from India, such as the active role of private enterprises, which remains a tough problem for the Chinese economy," it said .

The Indian government has a high return on investment to achieve six percent growth rate, it said.

"In contrast, the Chinese government threw trillions of dollars into investment and barely retained economic growth of 7 to 8 per cent, while leaving behind a pile of problems such as structural and market distortions. We can greatly benefit from learning from India's experience," the article said.


Meanwhile, a state-run daily here said that grievances might loom over Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first visit to the US and it will not be as fruitful as Chinese President Xi's maiden visit to India.

"It can be anticipated that Modi's US visit won't be as fruitful as Xi's visit to India. Washington requires payback for every investment and New Delhi has not offered anything back after reaping a lot of benefits from the US. Grievances might loom over Modi's visit," said the article in print edition of Global Times run by the ruling Communist Party.

"What Beijing and New Delhi have achieved during Xi's visit is beyond expectations. Not only has a whole package of 12 agreements has been signed, both nations have also made breakthroughs in some crucial fields," said the paper, known for its nationalistic views.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby member_28714 » 24 Sep 2014 16:30

SSridhar wrote:China respects Indian policy, need to improve ties: Chinese media - PTI, ET
Amid a continuing border standoff, an influential state-run Chinese think tank here has said that the country should initiate a "China respects India" policy to improve bilateral relations.

"We should implement a 'China respects India' policy, on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect," said an article in the state-run Global Times written by Chen Xiankui, Professor of School of Marxism at the Renmin University.

"We can also organise mutual visits between universities and even between religious groups. In these programmes, China needs to be modest and prudent, and put forward the slogan of 'learning from India', proposed by Xi in his address in New Delhi outlining China's thinking," the article said.

"This will help promote the integration of Asia and motivate India to join the embryonic Sino-Indian axis under the framework of 'Chinese respect for India'," it said.

"Even though our current national power is much stronger than India's, we should not indiscriminately imitate Western traditional realism. Instead, we should insist that China and India have equal rights, obligations and benefits, and we can even actively and appropriately surrender part of our rights and benefits to India," the article said.

China should support India to be the leader on significant international issues concerning environment, climate and the rights and benefits of other developing countries, to enhance India's international status, it said.

The article stressed that China should grant same decision-making powers to India in the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank mooted by Beijing even if India's contribution is less than China's, it added.


The article comes in the backdrop of a sense of unease prevailing between the two countries due to a border standoff in the Ladakh region which had also threatened to overshadow President Xi Jinping's visit.

The visit was described by both sides as having a positive influence on bilateral ties as it paved the way for more Chinese investments in India.

Chinese military and the Foreign Ministry have also played down the standoff between the troops focussing on the gains of Xi's visit.

The article said Chinese public and top leaders should stay modest and prudent and sincerely stick to the idea of learning from India.

This would help relieve the objective pressure that the rise of China has put on India after the border conflict in 1962. It would fundamentally improve the national psychology and public opinion about Sino-Indian cooperation, the article said.

"There are definitely things we can learn from India, such as the active role of private enterprises, which remains a tough problem for the Chinese economy," it said .

The Indian government has a high return on investment to achieve six percent growth rate, it said.

"In contrast, the Chinese government threw trillions of dollars into investment and barely retained economic growth of 7 to 8 per cent, while leaving behind a pile of problems such as structural and market distortions. We can greatly benefit from learning from India's experience," the article said.


Meanwhile, a state-run daily here said that grievances might loom over Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first visit to the US and it will not be as fruitful as Chinese President Xi's maiden visit to India.

"It can be anticipated that Modi's US visit won't be as fruitful as Xi's visit to India. Washington requires payback for every investment and New Delhi has not offered anything back after reaping a lot of benefits from the US. Grievances might loom over Modi's visit," said the article in print edition of Global Times run by the ruling Communist Party.

"What Beijing and New Delhi have achieved during Xi's visit is beyond expectations. Not only has a whole package of 12 agreements has been signed, both nations have also made breakthroughs in some crucial fields," said the paper, known for its nationalistic views.



Yeah, sounds like todays version of 'hindi chini bhai bhai'

Considering 1962 happened in October and our broken supply chains due to the floods and fatman eleven's recent rhetoric of regional war, a conflict seems to be a real possibility.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 24 Sep 2014 18:59

Something to mull over....
Surasena wrote:
Matthew W. Mosca. From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The
Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing
China. Stanford Stanford University Press, 2013. 408 pp. $60.00
(cloth), ISBN 978-0-8047-8224-1.

Reviewed by Richard J. Smith (Rice University)
Published on H-Diplo (July, 2013)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach

Matthew W. Mosca has made a graceful and substantial contribution to
our understanding not only of late imperial China (the expansive and
multicultural Qing Empire in particular) but also of Inner Asian
politics, the growth of "British" India, and the nature of global
interactions during the period from 1750 to 1860. His basic interest
is in the way that China's rulers, officials, and scholars
interpreted the rising power of the British in India, and how their
understanding of the unfolding geopolitical situation on China's
remote southwestern borders influenced Qing policymaking.
In the
process, he traces, as the title of his book suggests, the
transformation of China's "frontier policy"--one based on "regionally
specific" political and military strategies--into a genuine "foreign
policy," predicated on the idea of "a single hierarchy of imperial
interests framed in reference to a unified outside world" (pp. 2-3).

Ultimately, the author argues that "this shift in outlook led to a
revolution in how Qing rulers and subjects perceived their position:
no longer unique, the Qing empire became one among several large
entities locked in [international] competition" (p. 3). One may
question, however, how truly "revolutionary" this transformation
was--especially since the author's chronological framework ends at a
point where China's engagement with "modern" Western diplomacy had
just begun. From that time onward, it seems to me, there remained
significant vestiges of a "frontier" mentality on the part of many
Qing officials and even some "progressive" scholars. Perhaps the
subtitle of Mosca's conclusion--"Between Frontier Policy and Foreign
Policy"--would be a more apt description of the period covered by his
book than the actual title. Still, there can be no question that
significant changes took place during the time under discussion, and
these changes had important implications for China's foreign
relations throughout the remainder of the Qing period.

Mosca's introduction lays out with admirable clarity the
historiographical and interpretive issues that frame his study. He
addresses, for example, the debate surrounding the idea of a Chinese
"tributary system," as well as the question of the degree to which
the vast Qing Empire was truly integrated. Mosca's approach to these
issues, based on a careful analysis of Chinese policy toward British
India from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, involves
judicious compromises between contending poles of scholarship.

With respect to the tributary system, for instance, he shows that in
most spheres of Qing policy toward India the formalized features and
ritual procedures associated with tribute giving had little to do
with either the decisions that were made or the actions that were
taken. But he also recognizes that tributary relationships were not
entirely irrelevant to the conduct of Qing foreign relations. His
discussion of the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16 sheds important light on
the way the tributary system often worked in practice, with each
party attempting to use the formalized relationship to its own
advantage.

At this particular time, the Gurkhas, as rulers of Nepal and
tributaries of the Qing, were threatened not only by the British but
also by a tribal group known as the Pileng people. The Gurkhas,
viewing their relationship to the Qing in terms of a strategic
alliance, sought assistance from the Jiaqing emperor against both
adversaries. The Qing government, however, did not credit the claims
of the Gurkhas and refused to help. In fact, the Jiaqing emperor
rebuked the Gurkhas for their narrow self-interest and their apparent
deceit, informing them that failure to deliver their tributary
products on time would be considered "treason" (_beipan_). In short,
from the Qing government's standpoint, tribute was exclusively
bilateral. As long as it was submitted on schedule, "the Qing
[rulers] would neither constrain their agreements with other states
nor [necessarily] support them in their quarrels" (p. 179). To be
sure, there were occasions when the Chinese state gave substantial
military assistance to its tributaries (notably to Korea in the late
sixteenth century), but it did so almost exclusively in defense of
its own strategic interests.

As to the issue of the degree to which the Qing Empire was
"integrated," Mosca argues that "before 1800, the Qing realm was an
amalgamation of diverse conquered peoples united by common
subordination to the same ruling house. Although the emperor and a
small cohort of high advisers had a panoramic view over the entire
domain, on the ground the administration of different regions relied
heavily on indigenous power holders following their local political
traditions" (p. 3). But around 1800, as the capabilities of the
imperial court began to diminish, networks of Han Chinese literati
(as opposed to Qing bureaucrats) eventually produced a relatively
coherent vision of the threat posed by European imperialism. They
also devised a more or less coordinated strategy for dealing with it.


Mosco's first chapter 1 ("A Wealth of Indias: India in Qing
Geographic Practice") demonstrates vividly that information about the
world beyond China's borders was abundant but extremely varied in
quality.
It is not quite correct to assert (as the author does,
probably for rhetorical effect) that in the early Qing, "Chinese
geographers had too much information about the outside world" (p.
26). It is perhaps more accurate to say that they had too much _bad_
information about the outside world, and they lacked mechanisms by
which to sort it out effectively. This produced what Mosca calls
"geographic agnosticism"--the idea that "some claims [about the
outside world] might be preferred and others doubted, but none could
be absolutely endorsed or eliminated" (p. 26).

The author goes on to recount some of the problems and confusions
that this situation produced for Qing policymakers. One of the main
difficulties was a lack of consistency in the transliteration of
foreign names. In the absence of any clear conventions, and
complicated by the problem of several different dialects (for an
example in Western transliteration, compare Beijing [Mandarin
pronunciation] and Peking [Cantonese pronunciation]), there might be
any number of names for the same place. "India," variously rendered
as Tianzhu, Shendu, Yindu, Xindu, Xindusi, Yingdiya, etc., is a case
in point.
Traditional Chinese mapmaking produced similar problems.
Although Chinese cartographers were capable of making mathematically
precise renderings of space, a great number of different types of
maps circulated in Qing times, many produced for reasons that had
little to do with calibrating precise distances or conveying accurate
proportions.

Chapter 2 ("The Conquest of Xinjiang and the Emergence of
'Hindustan,' 1756-1790") does a splendid job of recounting and
explaining Qing political and military policy in Central Asia at a
time that coincided, more or less, with the decline of the Mughal
Empire (conventional dates: 1526-1857). Mosca's discussion is
extraordinarily nuanced and, as with several other sections of the
book, it is not designed for people who describe themselves as "not
good with names." In addition to detailing military operations and
diplomatic negotiations, Mosca explains--both in this chapter and the
next ("Mapping India: Geographic Agnosticism in a Cartographic
Context")--why it was that, despite the Qianlong emperor's earnest
efforts to acquire and "synthesize" knowledge of India during the
course of his campaigns in Xinjiang (the "New Territory"), the Qing
court failed to achieve a meaningful degree of data coordination. As
Mosca puts it: "the centrifugal force of an influx of new terminology
and information overpowered even the centripetal pull of the court's
ordering efforts" (p. 70).


The great achievement of chapter 3 is its cogent analysis of the vast
surveying projects undertaken by the Qing court under the Kangxi,
Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors. This discussion, which emphasizes
the understudied mapping projects of the Yongzheng reign, nicely
complements the cartographically oriented work of scholars such as
Laura Hostetler (_Qing Colonial Enterprise, Ethnography and
Cartography in Early Modern China_ [2001]). It also indicates with
new research both the achievements and the limitations of the Jesuit
missionaries who were employed as technicians by the Qing court. A
point of particular interest in this chapter is the way that certain
inherited assumptions about the shape of the Chinese Empire--Tibet in
particular--influenced maps of India.
Mosca asks and answers: "would
the imperially approved image of Tibet, made by trusted Qing
surveyors, yield to the latest European data? It would not" (p. 115).

Chapter 4 ("Discovering the 'Pileng': British India Seen from Tibet,
1790-1800") describes the place of Tibet in Chinese strategic
calculations at a time (the 1760s) when the British "began to eye the
Himalayas as a potential route of trade with China" (p. 129). Here we
see how the Qing government's decisive conquest of the Junghars (aka
Dzungars), which took place from 1755 to 1759, lured the Manchus into
a false sense of security. As Mosca indicates in his introduction,
"Qing policy diverged from that of its neighbors, ultimately at great
cost to its security." Why? Because after this resounding victory,
the Manchus "had a completely different perception of prevailing
geopolitical dynamics and the extent of foreign threats" (p. 9). One
of the most interesting sections in chapter 4 is Mosca's analysis of
the possible influence of the Gurkha Wars (1788-93) on the outcome of
the famous mission of Lord George Macartney to China in 1793-94.

Although the evidence is both ambiguous and contradictory, it is
possible that Lord Macartney was at least partially correct in
surmising that the negative Qing reaction to his embassy "was
conditioned by the court's knowledge of British power in India" (p.
150).

Although virtually every page of Mosca's book brings new information
to light, and in many of these pages we find sharp and valuable
insights, chapters 5 ("British India and Qing Strategic Thought in
the Early Nineteenth Century") and 6 ("The Discovery of British India
on the Chinese Coast, 1800-1838") seem particularly fresh and
illuminating. In them, Mosca examines the dramatic rise of British
power in Asia from three perspectives: the eastern seacoast, Tibet,
and Xinjiang. In the case of the China coast, Great Britain's
presence in the early nineteenth century was not only economic (as is
well known), but also military (for example, the British made two
attempts to occupy the Portuguese port of Macao). And yet, as Mosca
points out, officials in south China, including the strategically
important area of Guangzhou (aka Canton), had little interest in
learning about British India.

Meanwhile, on the Tibetan frontier, as discussed earlier, the Qing
government evinced no real concern with the British role in the
Anglo-Nepal War, and felt "no moral or strategic need to defend the
Gurkha regime by force," despite its tributary status (p. 184). The
same was true for Central Asia (Xinjiang), despite British efforts to
extend their influence into the area (for example, the so-called
Moorcroft Expedition). Mosca concludes: "Seen in Eurasian
perspective, the most striking feature of official Qing strategic
thought between 1790 and the 1830s is that it remained unaltered by
the rise of British power in Asia" (p. 191). The author ascribes this
situation less to inadequate intelligence gathering than to a lack of
centralization in the process.


Chapter 6, which more or less parallels chapter 5 chronologically,
shifts the focus of inquiry from official policies and procedures to
the new role assumed by Han literati after 1800. Here we see evidence
of the emerging "private" study of India on the maritime frontier.

Many of the names are familiar to students of nineteenth-century
Chinese history--Ruan Yuan, Chen Lunjiong, Li Zhaoluo, Li Mingche,
and Bao Shichen--but many are not, including figures such as Yan
Ruyi, Xie Qinggao, Yi Kezhong, and Xiao Lingyu. In any event, Mosca
sheds new light on their ideas and influence. Taken together the
writings of these scholars "began to corrode the three major pillars
of the frontier policy"--the uncritical accumulation of local data,
the loose link between geographic research and strategic policy
proposals, and the tendency to focus on individual cases or "units of
responsibility" rather than a broader perspective (pp. 232, 233).

Chapter 7 ("The Opium War and the British Empire, 1839-1842"), like
chapter 6, covers familiar territory, but again presents new
perspectives. Here, Commissioner Lin Zexu naturally looms large, but
the emphasis, to a much greater extent than in previous
Western-language studies of the man, is on the remarkable and
previously underappreciated mechanisms of intelligence gathering
during the first Opium War. Of particular interest in this chapter is
the author's description of Commissioner Lin's efforts to acquire
information from China's southern and western frontiers. "By 1842,"
Mosca writes, "lines of intelligence gathering using multiple sources
in different places had underscored India's key role in British
power" (p. 269). And yet within the Qing bureaucracy, the empire's
strategic position was still seen through the prism of frontier
policy.


Chapter 8 ("The Emergence of a Foreign Policy: Wei Yuan and the
Reinterpretation of India in Qing Strategic Thought, 1842-1860")
revisits the much-studied career of Wei Yuan (1794-1856) and his
famous book, _Haiguo tuzhi_ (Illustrated treatise on the maritime
kingdoms (1844). Here, too, Mosca makes a valuable contribution by
focusing in particular on Wei's analysis of British India, and the
problems he faced in deciphering and correlating vast amounts of
geographical and other data for his book. Mosca also sheds useful
light on such individuals as Wei's collaborator and fellow
researcher, Yao Ying, who assisted in intelligence gathering in
Tibet.


In placing Wei in broader perspective, Mosca points out that "a cause
and consequence of Wei's geographic achievement [the _Haiguo tuzhi_]
was a growing rapprochement between text and map" (pp. 279-280).
Indeed, his work marked a "watershed" in the history of Qing
geographic research on the "outside world" because it "succeeded in
bringing into dialogue elements from virtually all geographic
traditions within the Qing empire" (p. 285). And on the basis of his
careful research, Wei devised a foreign policy that "put him on
common ground with at least some Russian, Nepali and British
geo-strategists" (p. 301). This policy, as Mosca convincingly
demonstrates, did not involve any of the traditional "ideological
ties binding tributary states to the Qing emperor" (p. 302).


As indicated above, I believe that Mosca has somewhat overstated the
degree to which, by the mid-nineteenth century, "multiple sources of
intelligence, once virtually incommensurable, were now coordinated
and interpreted with relative ease even if certain details remained
problematic" (pp. 308-309). It is true, of course, that the conduct
of Qing foreign relations became increasingly coordinated after 1860,
"buttressed by new institutions" (such as the Zongli Yamen, a
proto-foreign office created in 1861 as a subcommittee of the Grand
Council) (p. 309). We should remember, however, that the Zongli Yamen
was an ad hoc institution essentially forced upon the Qing government
by the Conventions of Beijing (1860), which mandated official
diplomatic representation at the Chinese capital. Moreover, the
presence in Beijing of foreign diplomats (such as Frederick Bruce)
and foreign advisers (such as Robert Hart) during the remainder of
the Qing period did much to shape official Chinese perceptions of the
world.


Mosca ends his book with a number of useful research suggestions, one
of which is a plea for further investigations into "the way
information circulation had a differential impact on various groups
within the Qing empire between 1860 and 1911 as they interpreted how
external trends impinged upon the continued viability of its internal
political order" (p. 310). This sort of research, if carried out as
carefully and creatively as Mosca has done, would be most welcome
indeed.

http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse. ... DYStbkGkCA

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 24 Sep 2014 19:17

I think Maoist China's India Policy is based on the Qing Frontier policy and not on equal states policy. Hence the old knife to a gun fight paradigm.

And also explains the 'expansionist' policy of PRC which seeks a fight with every neighbor while the neighbors have moved on.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 24 Sep 2014 19:26

X-Post....
nits wrote:And a comment from Dear Chinese via Chumur - China lauds India's Mars mission as 'pride of Asia'

China on Wednesday hailed India's successful Mars orbiter mission - the first such success by an Asian country - as the "pride of India" and the "pride of Asia", and said it was interested in working together with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) on future projects.

"We congratulate India on the Mars satellite for entering orbit successfully," Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said.

[b"This is the pride of India and the pride of Asia, and is a landmark progress in humankind's exploration of outer space[/b] so we congratulate India on that," Ms. Hua said.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby KLNMurthy » 24 Sep 2014 19:34

How about a sudden spectacular cyberattack by China? Xi has signaled it in his message to PLA and it will put a big dent in Modi's claim to technological prowess. And Chinese spokescreature can say media is imagining it. The Ladakh activities could be a distraction.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Arihant » 24 Sep 2014 23:38

KLNMurthy wrote:How about a sudden spectacular cyberattack by China? Xi has signaled it in his message to PLA and it will put a big dent in Modi's claim to technological prowess. And Chinese spokescreature can say media is imagining it. The Ladakh activities could be a distraction.


That cyber-attack scenario is the most worrying one. They have made enormous investments in cyber-warfare (possibly with more people involved than the US), and this could be a painless way to teach us a lesson.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby member_23365 » 25 Sep 2014 07:10

I think we are looking at war with China within next 6 months.
My take on this is, govt also have intelligence report regarding chinese plan and Modiji is getting ready for it. I believe that food storage or additional foodgrains being pushed in NE is for war preparation. Major attack will happen in NE not in Ladhak. We do have forces in quite good strength in J&K so that region is safe.
I dont think that Eleven dont have knowledge of Chumar transgression. It is all scripted.
Things are quite serious but good thing is we have Modiji at helm. He is not taking anything lightly and preparing for worse.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 25 Sep 2014 07:54

Any India-US alliance against China will be a disaster, says Natwar Singh - ToI

Though Natwar Singh's days are over and his influence over the MEA have been dismantled and undone, yet, I welcome his views. Let us confuse the Chinese as to what our intents are. Let them work hard to decipher our motives.

Former external affairs minister Kunwar Natwar Singh on Wednesday advised US-bound Prime Minister Narendra Modi to refrain from forging an alliance with the US against China.

"Modi should be careful. America will try to forge an alliance with India against China. But it will be a disaster," said Singh, while delivering the Prabha Khaitan Memorial lecture on the current Indian foreign policy here on Wednesday. He, however, expressed optimism that Modi will pay no heed to any such US overture during his visit, and stressed, "India's alliance with Japan against China will also not work." {The problem in this argument is the fallacy of zero-sum. India's relationships with the US and Japan would stand on their own legs because India has one-sixth of humanity within its borders, it is also the third largest economy, it is a powerful country in the making etc. We have to come out of this mindset of 'balancing' our relationship with one country against that of another all the time. There may be occasions for that but not every move should be so compensated. Those days are well and truly behind us and today it is our very own interests that matter. If giving BrahMos to Vietnam serves our interests we do so, if collaborating with China on global warming helps us then we do so, if demanding unfettered maritime access in the China Seas is what we need to emphasize we do so, if we oppose the TFA we do not hesitate etc. This is the new found confidence.}

Singh said the economy is taking precedence over foreign policy nowadays and corporate organizations are integral part of the delegations accompanying country heads. "Foreign policy is bound to be in shape, if your economy is well," he said, highlighting that there is no possibility of another world war, thanks to existence of several nuclear powers in the world. Therefore, economy has superseded the foreign policy of most of the countries, Natwar stressed.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sivab » 25 Sep 2014 09:43

Lot more details in this article with info feeds from both sides.

http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/2 ... FU20140924

Insight - With canal and hut, India stands up to China on disputed frontier

Earlier this month, the Indian army, stationed on a remote Himalayan plateau, built a small observation hut from where they could watch Chinese soldiers across a disputed border.

The move so irked China's military that it laid a road on territory claimed by India and demanded that the tin hut be dismantled. India refused, destroyed a part of the new road and promptly raised troop numbers in the area.


Prime Minister Narendra Modi is making good on election promises of a more robust national security policy, and the fact that around 1,000 soldiers from each side are facing off in Ladakh is evidence even mighty China is not off limits.

No shots have been fired, and a brief border war between the world's two most populous nations was fought 52 years ago.

But Indian military officials said the situation in the Chumar area of Ladakh had been unusually tense in recent weeks, highlighting a simmering disagreement between the nuclear-armed neighbours that is back on the agenda at the highest level.

Modi, a nationalist who swept to power in May, was unusually forthright when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited India in mid-September, challenging Xi in private on the question of incursions along their 3,500-km contested frontier.

Afterwards, he told a news conference in the presence of the Chinese leader that peace and stability on the border were needed for better economic ties Beijing has been pressing for.

P. Stobdan, a former Indian ambassador and a Ladakhi with deep knowledge of the competing claims in the region, sees a shift in New Delhi's thinking.

"The hut has become the bone of contention. The Chinese have drawn a red line. They want it demolished before they will withdraw," he said.


Last year, the Chinese forced the Indians to demolish another hut in Chumar in return for ending a face-off.

"This time the new government does not seem to be in a mood to budge," Stobdan added.

NO LONGER BUSINESS AS USUAL

Beginning in June, as it prepared to receive Xi, Modi's government set in train a series of bold actions on the border where Indian officials say China has long been nibbling away at its territory.

It ordered faster construction of 72 strategic roads along the border to narrow the gap with China's vastly superior and intricate network of roads and tracks in the mountains.

It has also rebuilt airfields, including a landing strip laid in Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh in 1962, the year the two countries fought their short war.

Over the past few months C-130 Hercules planes bought from the United States have been landing at the airfield some 30 km from Depsang, the site of a 21-day standoff last year when People's Liberation Army soldiers set up tents on India's side of the 1962 ceasefire line.

V.K. Singh, minister for the northeastern states, another area where the border is in dispute with China, says it is no longer business as usual on the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC) dividing the two countries.

Incursions from both sides are common along the ceasefire line, because their armies cannot agree where it lies, making a final settlement a distant prospect.

"Sometimes (in the past), I think for political reasons or other reasons, we would have said OK, leave it. But that perpetuates the problem, it doesn't solve the problem," said Singh, a former army chief handpicked to beef up civilian and military infrastructure in the northeast.

"You keep giving a concession, it only perpetuates the problem. So somewhere up the hierarchy someone has to say 'let's hold on'," he told Reuters in an interview about the latest confrontation with China.


India was humiliated in the 1962 war and, since then, while it has built up its conventional military and nuclear and missile capabilities, it has been careful to avoid showdowns at the border, which, despite 17 rounds of talks over two decades, remains unsettled.

Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow with the Institute of International Relations at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told China's state-run Global Times that the Modi government's moves to build up infrastructure and equipment on the Indian side of the LAC signalled a shift in posture.

"The 'offensive' strategy aims to gain more leverage in the talks," Hu told the fiercely nationalist newspaper.

HIGH-ALTITUDE HUT

The chain of events leading to the latest tensions began in Demchok, on the southeastern corner of Ladakh. On August 18, India started building an irrigation canal there as part of the government's rural jobs guarantee programme.

China protested, saying it was located inside its territory.

Then, on September 8, Indian troops erected their observation hut on a hillock in Chumar, one of the areas along the LAC where India has the tactical advantage of height.

Retired Indian army brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, who has served in high-altitude areas, said India's position there overlooks Chinese encampments and a dirt road leading up to the area.

Beijing's response was swift. Within a day, some 500 PLA troops crossed into the area and used cranes and bulldozers to build a 2 km (1.2-mile) road.

Later that night, Indian soldiers dug up part of that road, but the Chinese have not withdrawn from the area, which New Delhi considers to be several kilometres inside its territory.

Around 1,000 soldiers from each side are ranged against each other, and further to the east, a group of Chinese civilians backed by the PLA intruded into the Demchok sector where India was trying to build the irrigation canal, Indian officials said.

China's public comments on the latest row with India have been measured.

"The China-India border dispute is a left-over from history. The two countries' border, to this day, has not been designated, and the two sides' understanding of the real line of control is not the same," the Defence Ministry said, adding that both New Delhi and Beijing were resolved to manage the problem.

A CIVILISED CUP OF TEA

India says China violated the ceasefire line 334 times in the first eight months of this year. Chinese officials with Xi on his visit last week said India had violated the LAC 410 times, according to an Indian government official at the talks.

Border patrols have become more frequent and probing deeper into each other's territories, officials say, often running into each other. Earlier, the two armies sent out patrols on alternating days along the most contentious areas of the border so that their troops wouldn't come into contact.

"If there is a border patrol that crosses the LAC as perceived by the other side, they are supposed to offer them a cup of tea and ask them to leave immediately. The idea is it should be civilised behaviour. At times this civilised behaviour has spun out of control with soldiers roughing each other up," said an Indian officer at the army headquarters in New Delhi.


But the head of Ladakh's local government said India had neglected the border area for decades to its own and local people's detriment. Only now was it starting to plug the gaps, he added, and that had provoked the Chinese.

"We have lost so much pasture land, grazing land over a period of time to China," said Rigzin Spalbar, chief executive councillor of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council.

"We told our people not to go close to the LAC, the area was left vacant and the Chinese sent their herders in. Now those areas have become their possessions."

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 25 Sep 2014 12:20

Indian Navy monitoring Chinese activity in Indian Ocean: Chief Admiral Robin Dhowan - ET
Against the backdrop of incursions in Ladakh, Navy today said it was continuously monitoring the activity of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

"Chinese warships are deployed in the Indian Ocean Region and we are continuously monitoring them and see what is their deployment. Along with it, our aircraft, submarines and warships are always deployed to face any challenge.

"....IOR is our area of operations and we see what is Chinese deployment in IOR and how it can create challenges for us and how we can face them....We are always ready," Navy Chief Admiral Robin Dhowan told reporters here.

He was asked to comment on the situation in Chumar in Ladakh where Chinese troops intruded more than two weeks back and are engaged in stand-off with Indian soldiers on the sidelines of the golden jubilee of the Navy Warship Design Bureau.

The Navy Chief said only the Army was competent to comment on the particular incident in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir.

He said it was the Navy's responsibility to look after Indian maritime interests in IOR. "We are always ready to face them. Our economic interests are there in the maritime region and their protection is also our responsibility."

In the recent times, the Chinese Navy has been deploying its warships and submarines in IOR.

Asked about the proposed maritime dialogue between India and China this year, he said the two sides have been cooperating in terms of port visits and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Asked if the Indian Navy would be required to protect country's economic interests in the oil exploration activity planned with Vietnam, Dhowan said the Navy will show its presence wherever it is required.

He said the Navy's eastern fleet had recently gone to Vladivostok in Russia and then sailed to the Pacific Ocean to hold exercises with the US and Japanese Navy under the Malabar series of war games.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 25 Sep 2014 12:29

SSridhar wrote:Any India-US alliance against China will be a disaster, says Natwar Singh - ToI

Though Natwar Singh's days are over and his influence over the MEA have been dismantled and undone, yet, I welcome his views. Let us confuse the Chinese as to what our intents are. Let them work hard to decipher our motives.



Its this buffoonery which has lead us to where we are today. Fortunately, Natwar has no influence left. And hopefully, such thinking will be eliminated within a generation.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 25 Sep 2014 13:53

Japan, Australia leaders agree to speed up work on defense cooperation pact - Japan Times
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Australian counterpart have agreed to speed up work on a new defense pact that would facilitate joint exercises and deployments.

“We would like to work on our security cooperation in a positive manner and to start arrangements for the new pact as early as possible,” Abe was quoted by a Japanese government official as telling Prime Minister Tony Abbott in New York on Wednesday.

The meeting came on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly.

The proposed defense pact would strengthen cooperation in security and disaster relief between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the Australian military.

A joint statement issued after their summit meeting in Canberra in July said the two countries would begin talks on foreign and defense policy.

Abe and Abbott also agreed to work closely together to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, along with India and the United States, said Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroshige Seko, who briefed reporters on the meeting, which was held over sushi lunch.

“Trilateral cooperation between Japan, Australia and the United States is very important for peace and stability in the region,” Abe was quoted as saying.

The two leaders shared the view that cooperation between Japan, Australia and India is also important for the Indo-Pacific region, the spokesman said. {Is there a nuanced approach here between Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific?}

Abe and Abbott also discussed the U.S.-led military actions against the Islamic State militant group, a bilateral free trade deal that has already been signed, and the broader Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative.

Earlier on Wednesday, Abe had separate meetings with Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Varela said he hopes that more Japanese companies and financial institutions will get involved in infrastructure projects in Panama. Meanwhile Abe called for Ban’s support in reforming the U.N. Security Council next year, which is the 70th anniversary of the United Nations’ founding.

Japan argues the Security Council should be expanded, and is seeking a permanent seat, along with places for the other Group of Four countries — Brazil, India and Germany.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 25 Sep 2014 20:27

My old article in BRM:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... amana.html

Not much has changed since then.


...
China in contrast is both a rising economic and political power. Its military though modernizing is limited to strategic weapons and does not have any real capability to influence any major event in the near term. Unlike Soviet Union, which was implementing a Western ideology, China's political thought is rooted in nationalism. It has been beating back invaders for over 3000 years. Few nations can boast of its continuity in history and a track record of survival. It has absorbed many invasions and has survived each of them. Its interlude with Communism should be seen in that light as another invasion – an invasion of ideas.

China’s evolution today represents the vision of two individuals- Mao Ze Dung and Deng Xiao Peng. The Mao’s contributions are many, but key among them is his role as nation builder. In particular, he unified China under communist rule, obtained nuclear weapons, and consolidated China’s place in the world. It took the Soviet Union seventy years to realize the folly of its economic policies. China, on the other hand, realized this in about thirty years and Deng launched the four modernizations to transform it. Significant among them is the absence of any devolution of political power. In fact soon after the modernization program was launched, the regime suffered a jolt in the form of political dissent form of the Democracy Movement and led to the Tienannmen Square massacres. This event shook the very core of the regime and hardened its attitudes towards political dissent. The West hopes that by constructive engagement it can bring about gradual changes to the Chinese polity. The hope is that the government will transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism to eventually democracy. The adoption of pragmatic policies by Deng Xiao Peng, and end of Cold War show that it is making the transition to authoritarian state. In all possibility this could be the most that will happen. Engagement with the West is bringing about tremendous pressure for political change from the newly rich. However, the regime in Beijing wants to keep all political freedoms in control while it leapfrogs from ox-carts to a modern economy without giving up anything on the political side. It fears democratization could derail the process of modernization and undermine the authority of the Communist Party. Consequently, economic liberalization has not been accompanied by political liberalization.

...



Threat to India and responses

The post Cold War was hoped to give rise to multiple poles. China sees for itself a bipolar role globally and a unipolar role regionally. It is in this aspect that its moves to check India’s rise to power should be seen. Most Indian observers state that the loss of Tibet as a buffer has brought about problems in the Indo- Sino relationship. However it is not understood that the occupation of Tibet was an essential element of the Chinese worldview for gaining domination in Asia. It is the desire to dominate and play a zero sum game that drives the dissonance in the relationship and than mere border disputes. Here again it has taken advantage of the confusion among the Indian elite in recognizing the challenge it presents to them. Here is an instance of Sun Tzu’s precepts in practice to confuse the challenger in order to achieve strategic surprise.

Ever since Sumdrong Chu, China seems to have decided that direct confrontation is not a feasible option and has propped up Pakistan as a surrogate. The proliferation of delivery systems started in late 1988 along with the declarations of peace. It is notable that these transfers took place after the Cold War was waning and appears to be part of a long-term strategy to tie up India locally. The hoped for response did not materialize as India took steps to protect its strategic autonomy.

The potential areas where China could cause direct problems for India are mainly two – proliferation of WMD to Pakistan and support for insurgencies in the North- East region. It can cause indirect problems through dragging its feet on the unsettled border and veto India’s membership in world councils. Proliferation of weapons and delivery systems to Pakistan increases instability and causes resources diverted to defense related systems. The umbilical can only be cut by forceful posture with Agni-III deployment and a visible the C3I system put in place. The nuclear tests in the late nineties and the deployment of the deterrent will contribute in mitigating the effects of the proliferation. Active dialog and steps have to be taken to raise the costs to the proliferators to dissuade them. Pursuing peace efforts in Kashmir with the local militants will go a long way to diffuse the situation and remove the rationale for Pakistan to offer ‘moral ‘ support to the militancy.

The trouble in North East and an unsettled border lead to increase or sustained military/paramilitary expenditure, which reduces economic growth. These could be accompanied by encouraging intransigence in neighbors- Myanmar etc. Here again a mixture of economic and political measures should tackle the internal troubles. Integrating the North East into the mainstream of the Indian economy is an urgent and required step and should be pursued regardless. As regards the neighbors, expansion of BMIST, and a new regional economic integration are needed to ensure ASEAN type of system. This should go a long way in discouraging the propensity to support such behavior in neighbors.

Conclusion

Its threat is mainly an indirect one through proliferation to Pakistan and support of insurgencies in the North East. It could also harass India by prolonging the border settlement and oppose entry into world bodies. The response has to be increased economic growth and regional integration to reduce propensity for conflict accompanied by a watchful eye on defense related systems. As China eventually resolves for itself the role that it wants to play in the world, India has to be on its guard. China’s attempts to constrain India are doomed to fail for India has historically never taken a back seat to China. The realization should be that it is not that China directly threatens India but rather it reduces and diminishes India’s power.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 26 Sep 2014 08:57

Border dispute with India now part of China's 'core national interests' - Dipanjan Roy Choudhury, Economic Times
China's incursion in Ladakh is part of Beijing's strategy to transgress into India after it included the border dispute with New Delhi in its 'core national interests' comprising Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.

China's new Ambassador to India Le Yucheng indicated this less than a week after President Xi Jinping's visit when the boundary dispute dominated the strategic discourse between the two sides. Le was speaking at an event on Xi's visit to Delhi organised by the India East Asia Foundation which is headed by Tarun Vijay, BJP leader and president of the India-China Parliamentary Friendship Group.

"Our army under the leadership of the Communist Party of China serves to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation and to protect our core national interests," Le had said on Wednesday, when he was asked if the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops was a result of PLA's independent move.

"PLA is fully under control of the Communist Party of China " he said, dismissing speculation over disconnect between PLA and CPC.

Besides Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang where Beijing has territorial disputes, its core interests include maritime territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Official sources said Le's remark linking PLA's latest transgression in Chumar with "core interest" is significant as it indicates China's hardening of stand on its dispute with India.

ET had reported earlier that PLA transgresses into Chumar to neutralise India's strategic advantage in the area and sent an unusual large contingent of troopers ahead of Xi's visit to negotiate hard so that India is forced to dismantle its infrastructure there.

However, PM Narendra Modi's tough stand on the issue and Indian Army's decision to stay put to thwart any advantage to PLA has taken the latter by surprise, sources claimed.

Foreign affairs expert G Parthasarathy said: "After the Chinese signed an agreement with India on political parameters for boundary dispute in 2005, they have become aggressive. PLA will continue to press hard along LAC and we have to resist. They are militarily superior to us but they will not go to war. We have to handle Beijing in a matured fashion — engage economically, but resist their aggression."


I am not too sure if we have to interpret the Chinese ambassador's answer in that fashion. The State Council's White Paper of September 2011 defined China's core national interests as state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification. The Ambassador is repeating that. The law in China is that concession of Chinese land is punishable by death, like the Blasphemy law in Pakistan.

However, frankly, we do not care if China chooses to describe the border issue as Core, Non-Core, Peripheral, Fringe or whatever. These are its decsriptions and carry absolutely no sense to us. Our actions would be the same irrespective of China's characetrizations. Someone in that think-tank or among the journalists must have also indicated to the Chinese Ambassador that India cares a rat's ar$e for China's core interests. India has its own core interests too just as Sushma Swaraj said just ahead of Xi's visit regarding the 'One China' policy. China must realize that unlike its other 'core-interests' which involve smaller countries like Taiwan or Philippines or non-entities like Tibet, India can give equally back if China chooses to do any mischief.

On the eve of Xi's visit, I posted that Xi may well push a hesitant India into the fledgeling alliance that is getting formed. It is beginning to happen. China may labour under a [false] impression that this alliance may be just an alliance of fair-weather friends, but it must recognize that it has simply no friends in South East Asia or the Indian Subcontinent (save a worthless Cambodia or an even more worthless Pakistan).

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 26 Sep 2014 09:58

India, China agree on withdrawal of troops from Ladakh - PTI, Economic Times
India and China have resolved the stand-off at the Ladakh border and withdrawal of troops will begin today and be completed by September 30, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said describing the resolution of the issue as a "big accomplishment."

"I am happy to tell you that both nations have sat down and resolved the (border-standoff) issue. Timelines have been decided," Swaraj told Indian reporters here [New York] after her meeting with the IBSA Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.

Swaraj met with Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi yesterday at the United Nations and said that she discussed the border stand-off issue with him.

Swaraj said during Chinese President Xi Jingping's visit to New Delhi this month, somewhere a "shadow" of the border incident was cast on the visit even though the visit in itself was "very historical" and very good outcomes came from it.

Swaraj said the withdrawal of the troops will begin today and will be completed by September 30, adding that the troops of both the nations will return to their positions as they were on September 1, 2014.

"The bad phase will end and by September 30th, the withdrawal of troops will be completed. I talked about this with the Chinese Foreign Minister. I beleive this is a big accomplishment," she said.

Swaraj said she also discussed with China the issue of UN Security Council reform and the need to complete the reform process, including expanding its permanent membership by 2015, which will be the 70th anniversary of the world organisation.

She described her meeting with her Chinese counterpart as "very successful."


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 26 Sep 2014 12:30

From NightWatch for the night of Sep 25, 2014
China: Update. Chinese media reported a significant upward revision to the number of casualties in the 21 September riots and explosions in Luntai County in western China. State media reported 40 "rioters", six civilians and four policemen killed. The bombs injured 54 people. Police captured two rioters.

Comment: Earlier in the week, state news services reported only two people killed. The significance of the numbers is that they expose a more serious breach of local security than authorities were willing to admit at first. Chinese security officials do not seem to appreciate that the bombers are a manifestation of what appears to be a large and durable living system that protects and supports Uighur militants and is viscerally hostile to the Han Chinese. The Chinese security agencies know about the hostility, to be sure, but they do not seem to approach it as the output of a robust living system. They prefer arrests and cracking the heads of minorities, whom they judge to be inferior.

China's supreme court distributed new wide-ranging guidelines for prosecuting terrorism cases. Xinhua reported that making and displaying banners and other materials of "religious extremism" is criminalized. It also criminalized insults, such as calling a person a "religious traitor" or a "heretic."

Comment: Authorities severely restricted public displays of Islamic devotion during Ramadan this year. The new court guidelines extend the ban on public displays of religious observance.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 26 Sep 2014 14:56

Chinese answer to India’s manufacturing push - ToI
If the focus on Thursday afternoon was on 'Make in India', by evening 'Made in China' — a campaign that includes tax concessions from the Chinese government to promote high-tech imports and research and development — too had become part of the conversation.

After all, the bid to boost manufacturing by the 'world's factory' comes at a time when its economy is slowing down and it is bound to make public sit up and take note. And, more so in India, where the government launched its most ambitious bid to attract investment in setting up factories and create jobs.

China will encourage high-tech imports, research and development (R&D) to upgrade 'Made in China', the Chinese central government said. Under the new campaign, China will use tax breaks to encourage enterprises to upgrade their equipment and increase R&D efforts to improve the manufacturing industry.

Companies that bought new R&D equipment and facilities after January 1 or possess minor fixed assets, will be offered reduction in taxes based on value, the Cabinet, presided over by Premier Li Keqiang, has decided.

Imported high-tech equipment will also enjoy tax deductions in aviation, bio-medicine production, manufacturing of railway and ships, electronics production, including computer and telecommunications, instrument production and those used in making IT products and software, state-run Xinhua news agency reported on Thursday.

For India's neighbour the focus is on moving up the value chain — from low-cost manufacturing of skirts, handbags and electronic goods to more sophisticated products and equipment. In contrast, the Indian government is targeting all manufacturing sectors, besides the mass-job creators such as tourism and hospitality to create employment. Several government officials have suggested that a key element of India's manufacturing plan should be to target sectors such garments and engineering goods, where China is giving up space as it looks at higher-end goods.

Government officials played down China's campaign, saying the two were very different. "What we are talking about is increasing the share of manufacturing to a quarter of the economy. They seem to be talking about specific sectors," said an official.

In several sectors such as aerospace and defence, where high-end production is involved, the government has only recently opened the doors and the volumes are much lower to justify a full-fledged presence for international majors. In addition, India still suffers from several infrastructure handicaps, while China has rapidly ramped up capacity at ports and has added significant power generation capacity.

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Postby Prasad » 26 Sep 2014 15:22

Haven't the chinese been saying this for a long time? TOIlet making up news again?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 27 Sep 2014 09:44

China's Choice: India or Pakistan?
http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-c ... ign=buffer

Among China’s relations with Asian neighbors, its ties with the countries in South Asia are generally considered to be the weakest. Now, with Sino-Japan tensions over the East China Sea and conflict with many Southeast Asian countries over the South China Sea, the role of South Asian countries has become more prominent. South Asia is now a focus in China’s regional strategy, as shown by President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the area.When it comes to South Asia, people think of India and Pakistan first. China has an “all weather friendship” with Pakistan but an ambivalent, often testy relationship with India. But the future is sometimes different from both the past and the present. Moving forward, which country is more important for China? Even without a clear answer, just puzzling through this question can help make many issues clear.

In fact, we only to need to answer two questions to know whether India or Pakistan is more important for China. First, which one is a major power? Second, which one can better help China realize its interests?Which is the major power, India or Pakistan? The answer is relatively simple — India. When it comes to international influence, India is part of BRICS and the G20 and is a leader of the developing world through the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. India is well poised to become a major power in the world arena.The answer is even more obvious from the economic perspective. According to the World Bank, India’s GDP in 2013 was roughly $1.9 trillion. By contrast, Pakistan’s GDP was only $236 billion, only about 12 percent of India’s. In 2013, India was the 10th largest economy in the world in terms of GDP.India’s economy is just beginning to boom; its growth rate in 2013 was 4.5 percent. Experts believe that India today is like China in the mid-1980s, poised for rapid economic growth. Despite many difficulties, there is no reason for India’s economic growth to come to a halt. By contrast, Pakistan has not enjoyed the same type of economic growth in the past decade. Of course, at 1.2 billion, India’s population is far greater than Pakistan’s, but even when looking at per capita GDP India outranks Pakistan. The gap between two countries will probably widen in the future, placing Pakistan at even more of a disadvantage when compared with India.
Of course, it’s worth asking the obvious question: as India becomes a major power in the international stage, will it necessarily be friendly toward China? Indeed, not all major countries look kindly on China — just look at Japan. However, Sino-Indian international cooperation far outweighs the disputes between two counties. This is the point where they can carry out friendly cooperation. China’s top leaders understand this clearly.Though the Sino-Indian border problem has to be addressed, it is fundamentally different from the Sino-Japan conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The problem has not become a precondition and impediment for bilateral development; it is instead viewed as one of many issues that are part of a normal bilateral relationship between two countries. Looked at another way, existing issues in the Sino-Indian relationship have not impeded China’s important strategic initiative of “marching West.” Meanwhile, the China-Japan disputes have seriously impacted China’s strategy for oceanic development.Since these two countries kicked off negotiations on border issue in 1981, China and India have established coordination and communication mechanisms on a variety of fronts, including official meetings at the deputy-minister level, task-force meetings, meetings of diplomatic and military experts, special delegate meetings, and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India Border Affairs. It’s safe to say that these mechanisms rule out the possibility of war over the border issue, even though so-called sensitive incidents are often hyped by the media in both countries. By contrast, there are no such mature communication mechanisms for China and Japan in their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.Given that India is a major power and that the Sino-India border issue has not scuttled bilateral relations, China has good reason to develop diplomatic ties with India. As top Chinese leaders are devoting much effort to establishing a presence in the South Asia, this trend will continue and intensify in the future. Beijing also hopes that India can become a partner to support China’s interests when it comes to international issues. For China, the potential rewards of such a strategy are huge.For a country often seen as “isolated,” as China is, it’s extremely important to have a friend that shares the same stance on international issues. To play such a role, this partner should be economically strong with some clout in international politics. Besides Russia, India is the natural choice to play this role in China’s foreign policy. Hence, the answer to my second question becomes evident – a Sino-Indian partnership can help China achieve its national interests more quickly and easily.

Chinese leaders are aware of this. After taking office, China’s Premier Li Keqiang paid a visit to India as part of his first trip abroad. Li also proposed establishing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, a sign of how valuable India is to China. Undoubtedly, India was the most important destination during President Xi’s visit to the South Asia. It is quite rare for both top Chinese leaders to visit the same country so soon after taking office; this was China’s way of endorsing Sino-Indian friendship.China and India already have similar positions on a number of issues, including their stances toward Syria, Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, and the need to protect the interests of developing countries. Together with Russia, these three countries have formed a kind of “quasi-alliance” relationship. These three countries already work together in the BRICS organization; now India is getting ready to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These are the foundations for China and India to work together as major world powers.Unlike India, Pakistan cannot become a top-level strategic partner of China in international affairs due to its limited capabilities in the world arena. Pakistan is not a major country in a global sense, although it plays an important role in regional affairs. Despite this, for a long time, China has tried to contain India diplomatically by intensifying bilateral relations with Pakistan. This formed the foundation for China to form a “strategic alliance” with Pakistan in the 1970s. As China seeks more cooperation with India, this rationale for the China-Pakistan friendship becomes less important.

At the same time, Pakistan is becoming more important to China due to the frequent occurrence of terrorist attacks in west China. Pakistan plays a bigger role in fighting terrorism than India, and Chinese leaders believe that terrorism will become a major obstacle for China in developing its western regions. In response, China has established an alliance with the SCO to fight terrorist forces in northwest China; it also works with Pakistan to do so in southwest China, giving new meaning to the “strategic alliance” between China and Pakistan.However, Pakistan’s rise in importance brings both opportunities and risks for a stable Sino-Pakistani relationship. The strategically adjusted Sino-Indian relationship and new developments in anti-terrorist cooperation will pose constraints for the development of China-Pakistan relations.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship deteriorated significantly due to different approaches to the fight against terrorism. China will have to be careful to avoid repeating the failure in U.S.-Pakistan relations when it comes to fighting terrorism. Based on my own interactions with Pakistani officials, though they expressed their support for fighting terrorism, they would not talk much about specific cooperation and results in this regard. Judging from Pakistan’s military capabilities and ideology, they face some objective and subjective constraints in fighting terrorism. That in turn could pose a constraint for future China-Pakistan cooperation. For example, the media will eagerly publicize China’s privately aired resentments in this regard to the international community.

Of course, there are also some constraints for developing Sino-Indian relations. Beyond the border issue, India’s cooperation with other Asian countries such as Japan and Vietnam could have a negative impact on Sino-India relations.However, the criteria to judge if the Sino-Indian relation is healthy is to see if India has the intention to contain China in these outward activities. If Indian outreach to Japan and Vietnam is just part of normal national exchange, China should be tolerant. For example, Russia’s sales of weapons to Vietnam will not affect the strategic landscape between China and Russia.
Any relationship between major powers includes both cooperation and competition, and Sino-India relation is not an exception. The competition between China and India, however, is mostly about safeguarding territorial sovereignty. The conflict between China and Japan, as a comparison, goes deeper and involves the two countries’ differing outlooks on the international order. Therefore, the Sino-Japan competition is more problematic as each seeks to contain the development and international exchanges of the other country.As China has become the world’s second largest economy (and will soon become number one), India has lost its edge to compete with China economically. The Indian people are quite realistic about this. Therefore, the economic competition between China and India will become less fierce in the future as India focuses on its own growth rather than comparing itself to China. In fact, the China-India partnership can benefit as China increases its investments and helps propel economic growth in India.
Politically, China is already accepted as an internationally important country, one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and a major voice within the existing international order. India does not seek to challenge to China’s position. On the contrary, India seeks to work with China in certain international platforms (such as G20, BRICS, and now the SCO) so as to attain greater international influence. China already plays an important role in these organizations and can help India do the same. In this sense, both countries have stronger incentives to cooperate politically.India is a major power with clear development prospects while Pakistan is a regionally important country facing an uncertain economic future. China has to take this into consideration with developing relations with India. However, this is not to say that Beijing should abandon Pakistan. It’s also in China’s interests to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan, both to in promote diplomatic relations in South Asia and to fight terrorism.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 27 Sep 2014 15:31

Xinjiang police killed 40 assailants after 10 died in terrorist attack: state media - AP, Japan Times
In what officials said was a severe terrorist attack, Chinese state media reported Thursday that 50 people, including 40 assailants, were killed in a series of explosions over the weekend in the far western region of Xinjiang.

Regional authorities had earlier said that the explosions in Luntai County on Sunday killed at least two people and injured many others.

The news portal Tianshan Net said bombs exploded at two police stations, a produce market and a store.

It said the attack killed two police officers, two police assistants and six bystanders, and that 54 others were injured. It said police took swift action and 40 assailants were either shot dead or died in explosions.


Police captured two attackers, and an investigation found that Maimaiti Tuerxun, a man who was fatally shot, was responsible for the attack, the news portal said.

The official Xinhua News Agency spelled the man’s name as Mamat Tursun.

Names for people from the Uighur and other ethnic groups in China are sometimes transcribed differently in English.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby rajrang » 27 Sep 2014 18:00

Jhujar wrote:China's Choice: India or Pakistan?
http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-c ... ign=buffer


Though the Sino-Indian border problem has to be addressed, it is fundamentally different from the Sino-Japan conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The problem has not become a precondition and impediment for bilateral development; it is instead viewed as one of many issues that are part of a normal bilateral relationship between two countries.


There can be another perspective. For over two decades starting with the 1980s, China treated Japan the same way as it appears to be treating India today, because they wanted Japanese investment and trade for their own economic growth. Now they are willing to throw that relationship with Japan out of the window because China does not need Japan to the same extent now - given that China has become economically so powerful today - and so territorial issues with Japan have been raked up. The same could happen to India in the future, when China does not need India anymore, then the Sino-Indian border problem CAN "become a precondition and impediment for bilateral development."

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 27 Sep 2014 18:27

China will never give up Pak because Pak being so much inferior to India in every respect apart f om promoting terrorism,that it behaves and is treated like the Middle kingdom's catamite.It is easy to control with a few trinkets and military toys.India on the other hand is a giant that demands equality with China,the world's largest democracy.China's thrust therefore is to ensure the neutrality of India,prevent it from becoming enmeshed into the US led mil. alliance in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theatre arena,hoping that India's participation the BRICS and SCO entities will prevent it from becoming a Yanqui stooge.Thus the eternal tussle and tug-of-war on the border,with Chinese "skinching" into Indian territory by stealth.This is simply explained by the statement about different perceptions of where the border is nd what is Indian and what is Chinese territory.

Thus far India amazingly has not responded by sending China an equally irritating message by using the two "T" cards,Tibet and Taiwan.India simply has to say that it is the motherland of Buddhism and will protect the religion anywhere upon the planet,especially the Tibetan Buddhist peoples.As for Taiwan,a huge trade delegation say headed by Subramaniam Swamy will do the business! AS a parallel to these moves,a high-powered Indian defence delegation to Vietnam,India's "all-weather friend",and supply of cutting edge Indian developed hardware and establishment of a permanent Indian defence presence in Vietnam,similar to that the Chinese "takeaway" at Gwadar and recent statements by XI Gin's deaf min. pegs in Colombo,will send an equally penetrative message.

The other card in India's pocket rarely used is its "old friend" relationship with Russia.A strategic expert in the capital once told me that we should build upon this time-tested relationship as a counter to both the US and China.Diversifying some of our arms acquisitions away from Russian dependence will not impede upon a close diplomatic and strategic relationship,as it is only Russia that provides us with the most important defence cutting edge tech.,with no strings attached.The improved situation of support for its wares will resolve much of the heartburn that existed in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR and support of Soviet era systems in the past.One signal to India is the refusal by Russia to sell China large quantities of TU-22M Backfire strategic bombers,of which Russia has dozens of them surplus.They were once offered to India.It would be seriously worth considering acquiring a sizeable qty. of them (upgraded though) both for the IAF and IN ,as we have no strat. bomber,evem a LR bomber like the erstwhile Canberra in our inventory today.The IN/IAF must be able to swiftly strike deep and hard thousands of KMs away from Indian territory both on land and at sea in any future spat with China.

Let none be fooled.The current Chinese withdrawal is solely because Mr.Modi is in the US.China does not want the mil. stand-off to happen when Modiji is visiting the US.Bad form.It could spur India into further cementing the thaw in mil. relations and exploring options with the US led anti-China mil. alliance.hat would be an unmitigated disaster for China.

sanjaykumar
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 27 Sep 2014 23:22

Let none be fooled.The current Chinese withdrawal is solely because Mr.Modi is in the US.China does not want the mil. stand-off to happen when Modiji is visiting the US.Bad form.It could spur India into further cementing the thaw in mil. relations and exploring options with the US led anti-China mil. alliance.hat would be an unmitigated disaster for China.



I believe it was engineered to diminish Modi and India as US-India relations are being rebooted. Unfortunately, India did not get the script and upped the ante. Note has been taken in the circles that matter.

Vayutuvan
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Vayutuvan » 28 Sep 2014 02:05

rajrang: But but but China is investing in India (and India should encourage them even more). In a decade or two, India can do to China what China did to Japan. Recursively fractal chanakyan.

rajrang
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby rajrang » 28 Sep 2014 04:30

matrimc wrote:rajrang: But but but China is investing in India (and India should encourage them even more). In a decade or two, India can do to China what China did to Japan. Recursively fractal chanakyan.


There is a big difference. China has 10 times the population of Japan and potentially the economic power of the two countries will also reach a similar ratio in the near term (given China's continued growth rate) - with the greater military power for which resources will become available. India does not have 10 times the population of China and therefore the potential for India's economy to be several times as big as China - and the corresponding power that this would translate into - is non-existent. Therefore, India will not be able to do to China what China is doing to Japan today. China will not even invest in India if they thought that such a scenario could happen. Remember, Chinese investment in India will have different motivations than the purely capitalist motivations of Japan and the US when they invested in China.

China is taking on Japan/ SE Asia / US in order to strengthen their relative power along China's seaboard. This is more important than solidifying their power along the Himalayas. Once that goal has been reached, (and by then, the US may have ceased to be an effective Asian power), then, conceivably the entire South Asian region could be declared a "region of core interest" by China and India will be at the receiving end of China's hubris.

The above possible scenarios may be no more than a couple of decades away.

India may have to plan for a scenario of being a neighbor and having to co-exist with a sole super power (i.e. China) by the middle of this century.

Alternative scenarios that could counter the above scenarios include the emergence of an Asian NATO (with or without India), a NATO that includes Russia, and a rapid Indian economic growth (sustained for decades) that could make it difficult for China to dictate to India.

Emphasize that the above are only scenarios.

member_19686
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby member_19686 » 28 Sep 2014 05:29

rajrang wrote:
matrimc wrote:rajrang: But but but China is investing in India (and India should encourage them even more). In a decade or two, India can do to China what China did to Japan. Recursively fractal chanakyan.


There is a big difference. China has 10 times the population of Japan and potentially the economic power of the two countries will also reach a similar ratio in the near term (given China's continued growth rate) - with the greater military power for which resources will become available. India does not have 10 times the population of China and therefore the potential for India's economy to be several times as big as China - and the corresponding power that this would translate into - is non-existent. Therefore, India will not be able to do to China what China is doing to Japan today. China will not even invest in India if they thought that such a scenario could happen. Remember, Chinese investment in India will have different motivations than the purely capitalist motivations of Japan and the US when they invested in China.

China is taking on Japan/ SE Asia / US in order to strengthen their relative power along China's seaboard. This is more important than solidifying their power along the Himalayas. Once that goal has been reached, (and by then, the US may have ceased to be an effective Asian power), then, conceivably the entire South Asian region could be declared a "region of core interest" by China and India will be at the receiving end of China's hubris.

The above possible scenarios may be no more than a couple of decades away.

India may have to plan for a scenario of being a neighbor and having to co-exist with a sole super power (i.e. China) by the middle of this century.

Alternative scenarios that could counter the above scenarios include the emergence of an Asian NATO (with or without India), a NATO that includes Russia, and a rapid Indian economic growth (sustained for decades) that could make it difficult for China to dictate to India.

Emphasize that the above are only scenarios.

By the middle of this century, PRC will be full of geriatrics with a declining population. They will get old before they get rich and by the end of this century their population is expected to fall by as much as 2/3rd's.

US has healthier demographics.
A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations by Mark L. Haas
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf ... 7.32.1.112




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