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A sex shop in Mecca? What's the big deal?

Comment: No comment on this ! You have to read the article!

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Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State

In fact, not even those who shot and killed him after a brief firefight in the town of Tal Rifaat on a January morning in 2014 knew the true identity of the tall man in his late fifties. They were unaware that they had killed the strategic head of the group calling itself "Islamic State" (IS). The fact that this could have happened at all was the result of a rare but fatal miscalculation by the brilliant planner. The local rebels placed the body into a refrigerator, in which they intended to bury him. Only later, when they realized how important the man was, did they lift his body out again.

Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was.

But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state. It is a folder full of handwritten organizational charts, lists and schedules, which describe how a country can be gradually subjugated. SPIEGEL has gained exclusive access to the 31 pages, some consisting of several pages pasted together. They reveal a multilayered composition and directives for action, some already tested and others newly devised for the anarchical situation in Syria's rebel-held territories. In a sense, the documents are the source code of the most successful terrorist army in recent history.

Until now, much of the information about IS has come from fighters who had defected and data sets from the IS internal administration seized in Baghdad. But none of this offered an explanation for the group's meteoric rise to prominence, before air strikes in the late summer of 2014 put a stop to its triumphal march.

For the first time, the Haji Bakr documents now make it possible to reach conclusions on how the IS leadership is organized and what role former officials in the government of ex-dictator Saddam Hussein play in it. Above all, however, they show how the takeover in northern Syria was planned, making the group's later advances into Iraq possible in the first place. In addition, months of research undertaken by SPIEGEL in Syria, as well as other newly discovered records, exclusive to SPIEGEL, show that Haji Bakr's instructions were carried out meticulously.

Bakr's documents were long hidden in a tiny addition to a house in embattled northern Syria. Reports of their existence were first made by an eyewitness who had seen them in Haji Bakr's house shortly after his death. In April 2014, a single page from the file was smuggled to Turkey, where SPIEGEL was able to examine it for the first time. It only became possible to reach Tal Rifaat to evaluate the entire set of handwritten papers in November 2014.



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"Our greatest concern was that these plans could fall into the wrong hands and would never have become known," said the man who has been storing Haji Bakr's notes after pulling them out from under a tall stack of boxes and blankets. The man, fearing the IS death squads, wishes to remain anonymous.

The Master Plan

The story of this collection of documents begins at a time when few had yet heard of the "Islamic State." When Iraqi national Haji Bakr traveled to Syria as part of a tiny advance party in late 2012, he had a seemingly absurd plan: IS would capture as much territory as possible in Syria. Then, using Syria as a beachhead, it would invade Iraq.

Bakr took up residence in an inconspicuous house in Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo. The town was a good choice. In the 1980s, many of its residents had gone to work in the Gulf nations, especially Saudi Arabia. When they returned, some brought along radical convictions and contacts. In 2013, Tal Rifaat would become IS' stronghold in Aleppo Province, with hundreds of fighters stationed there.

It was there that the "Lord of the Shadows," as some called him, sketched out the structure of the Islamic State, all the way down to the local level, compiled lists relating to the gradual infiltration of villages and determined who would oversee whom. Using a ballpoint pen, he drew the chains of command in the security apparatus on stationery. Though presumably a coincidence, the stationery was from the Syrian Defense Ministry and bore the letterhead of the department in charge of accommodations and furniture.

What Bakr put on paper, page by page, with carefully outlined boxes for individual responsibilities, was nothing less than a blueprint for a takeover. It was not a manifesto of faith, but a technically precise plan for an "Islamic Intelligence State" -- a caliphate run by an organization that resembled East Germany's notorious Stasi domestic intelligence agency.




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This blueprint was implemented with astonishing accuracy in the ensuing months. The plan would always begin with the same detail: The group recruited followers under the pretense of opening a Dawah office, an Islamic missionary center. Of those who came to listen to lectures and attend courses on Islamic life, one or two men were selected and instructed to spy on their village and obtain a wide range of information. To that end, Haji Bakr compiled lists such as the following:


List the powerful families.
Name the powerful individuals in these families.
Find out their sources of income.
Name names and the sizes of (rebel) brigades in the village.
Find out the names of their leaders, who controls the brigades and their political orientation.
Find out their illegal activities (according to Sharia law), which could be used to blackmail them if necessary.


The spies were told to note such details as whether someone was a criminal or a homosexual, or was involved in a secret affair, so as to have ammunition for blackmailing later. "We will appoint the smartest ones as Sharia sheiks," Bakr had noted. "We will train them for a while and then dispatch them." As a postscript, he had added that several "brothers" would be selected in each town to marry the daughters of the most influential families, in order to "ensure penetration of these families without their knowledge."

The spies were to find out as much as possible about the target towns: Who lived there, who was in charge, which families were religious, which Islamic school of religious jurisprudence they belonged to, how many mosques there were, who the imam was, how many wives and children he had and how old they were. Other details included what the imam's sermons were like, whether he was more open to the Sufi, or mystical variant of Islam, whether he sided with the opposition or the regime, and what his position was on jihad. Bakr also wanted answers to questions like: Does the imam earn a salary? If so, who pays it? Who appoints him? Finally: How many people in the village are champions of democracy?

The agents were supposed to function as seismic signal waves, sent out to track down the tiniest cracks, as well as age-old faults within the deep layers of society -- in short, any information that could be used to divide and subjugate the local population. The informants included former intelligence spies, but also regime opponents who had quarreled with one of the rebel groups. Some were also young men and adolescents who needed money or found the work exciting. Most of the men on Bakr's list of informants, such as those from Tal Rifaat, were in their early twenties, but some were as young as 16 or 17.

The plans also include areas like finance, schools, daycare, the media and transportation. But there is a constantly recurring, core theme, which is meticulously addressed in organizational charts and lists of responsibilities and reporting requirements: surveillance, espionage, murder and kidnapping.

For each provincial council, Bakr had planned for an emir, or commander, to be in charge of murders, abductions, snipers, communication and encryption, as well as an emir to supervise the other emirs -- "in case they don't do their jobs well." The nucleus of this godly state would be the demonic clockwork of a cell and commando structure designed to spread fear.

From the very beginning, the plan was to have the intelligence services operate in parallel, even at the provincial level. A general intelligence department reported to the "security emir" for a region, who was in charge of deputy-emirs for individual districts. A head of secret spy cells and an "intelligence service and information manager" for the district reported to each of these deputy-emirs. The spy cells at the local level reported to the district emir's deputy. The goal was to have everyone keeping an eye on everyone else.



A handwritten chart shows Bakr's thoughts regarding the establishment of the Islamic State. Zoom

A handwritten chart shows Bakr's thoughts regarding the establishment of the Islamic State.
Those in charge of training the "Sharia judges in intelligence gathering" also reported to the district emir, while a separate department of "security officers" was assigned to the regional emir.

Sharia, the courts, prescribed piety -- all of this served a single goal: surveillance and control. Even the word that Bakr used for the conversion of true Muslims, takwin, is not a religious but a technical term that translates as "implementation," a prosaic word otherwise used in geology or construction. Still, 1,200 years ago, the word followed a unique path to a brief moment of notoriety. Shiite alchemists used it to describe the creation of artificial life. In his ninth century "Book of Stones," the Persian Jabir Ibn Hayyan wrote -- using a secret script and codes -- about the creation of a homunculus. "The goal is to deceive all, but those who love God." That may also have been to the liking of Islamic State strategists, although the group views Shiites as apostates who shun true Islam. But for Haji Bakr, God and the 1,400-year-old faith in him was but one of many modules at his disposal to arrange as he liked for a higher purpose.

The Beginnings in Iraq

It seemed as if George Orwell had been the model for this spawn of paranoid surveillance. But it was much simpler than that. Bakr was merely modifying what he had learned in the past: Saddam Hussein's omnipresent security apparatus, in which no one, not even generals in the intelligence service, could be certain they weren't being spied on.

Expatriate Iraqi author Kanan Makiya described this "Republic of Fear" in a book as a country in which anyone could simply disappear and in which Saddam could seal his official inauguration in 1979 by exposing a bogus conspiracy.

There is a simple reason why there is no mention in Bakr's writings of prophecies relating to the establishment of an Islamic State allegedly ordained by God: He believed that fanatical religious convictions alone were not enough to achieve victory. But he did believe that the faith of others could be exploited.

In 2010, Bakr and a small group of former Iraqi intelligence officers made Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir and later "caliph," the official leader of the Islamic State. They reasoned that Baghdadi, an educated cleric, would give the group a religious face.

Bakr was "a nationalist, not an Islamist," says Iraqi journalist Hisham al-Hashimi, as he recalls the former career officer, who was stationed with Hashimi's cousin at the Habbaniya Air Base. "Colonel Samir," as Hashimi calls him, "was highly intelligent, firm and an excellent logistician." But when Paul Bremer, then head of the US occupational authority in Baghdad, "dissolved the army by decree in May 2003, he was bitter and unemployed."

Thousands of well-trained Sunni officers were robbed of their livelihood with the stroke of a pen. In doing so, America created its most bitter and intelligent enemies. Bakr went underground and met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Anbar Province in western Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian by birth, had previously run a training camp for international terrorist pilgrims in Afghanistan. Starting in 2003, he gained global notoriety as the mastermind of attacks against the United Nations, US troops and Shiite Muslims. He was even too radical for former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi died in a US air strike in 2006.

Although Iraq's dominant Baath Party was secular, the two systems ultimately shared a conviction that control over the masses should lie in the hands of a small elite that should not be answerable to anyone -- because it ruled in the name of a grand plan, legitimized by either God or the glory of Arab history. The secret of IS' success lies in the combination of opposites, the fanatical beliefs of one group and the strategic calculations of the other.

Bakr gradually became one of the military leaders in Iraq, and he was held from 2006 to 2008 in the US military's Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib Prison. He survived the waves of arrests and killings by American and Iraqi special units, which threatened the very existence of the IS precursor organization in 2010, Islamic State in Iraq.

For Bakr and a number of former high-ranking officers, this presented an opportunity to seize power in a significantly smaller circle of jihadists. They utilized the time they shared in Camp Bucca to establish a large network of contacts. But the top leaders had already known each other for a long time. Haji Bakr and an additional officer were part of the tiny secret-service unit attached to the anti-aircraft division. Two other IS leaders were from a small community of Sunni Turkmen in the town of Tal Afar. One of them was a high-ranking intelligence officer as well.

In 2010, the idea of trying to defeat Iraqi government forces militarily seemed futile. But a powerful underground organization took shape through acts of terror and protection rackets. When the uprising against the dictatorship of the Assad clan erupted in neighboring Syria, the organization's leaders sensed an opportunity. By late 2012, particularly in the north, the formerly omnipotent government forces had largely been defeated and expelled. Instead, there were now hundreds of local councils and rebel brigades, part of an anarchic mix that no one could keep track of. It was a state of vulnerability that the tightly organized group of ex-officers sought to exploit.

Attempts to explain IS and its rapid rise to power vary depending on who is doing the explaining. Terrorism experts view IS as an al-Qaida offshoot and attribute the absence of spectacular attacks to date to what they view as a lack of organizational capacity. Criminologists see IS as a mafia-like holding company out to maximize profit. Scholars in the humanities point to the apocalyptic statements by the IS media department, its glorification of death and the belief that Islamic State is involved in a holy mission.

But apocalyptic visions alone are not enough to capture cities and take over countries. Terrorists don't establish countries. And a criminal cartel is unlikely to generate enthusiasm among supporters around the world, who are willing to give up their lives to travel to the "Caliphate" and potentially their deaths.

IS has little in common with predecessors like al-Qaida aside from its jihadist label. There is essentially nothing religious in its actions, its strategic planning, its unscrupulous changing of alliances and its precisely implemented propaganda narratives. Faith, even in its most extreme form, is just one of many means to an end. Islamic State's only constant maxim is the expansion of power at any price.

The Implementation of the Plan

The expansion of IS began so inconspicuously that, a year later, many Syrians had to think for a moment about when the jihadists had appeared in their midst. The Dawah offices that were opened in many towns in northern Syria in the spring of 2013 were innocent-looking missionary offices, not unlike the ones that Islamic charities have opened worldwide.

When a Dawah office opened in Raqqa, "all they said was that they were 'brothers,' and they never said a word about the 'Islamic State'," reports a doctor who fled from the city. A Dawah office was also opened in Manbij, a liberal city in Aleppo Province, in the spring of 2013. "I didn't even notice it at first," recalls a young civil rights activist. "Anyone was allowed to open what he wished. We would never have suspected that someone other than the regime could threaten us. It was only when the fighting erupted in January that we learned that Da'ish," the Arab acronym for IS, "had already rented several apartments where it could store weapons and hide its men."

The situation was similar in the towns of al-Bab, Atarib and Azaz. Dawah offices were also opened in neighboring Idlib Province in early 2013, in the towns of Sermada, Atmeh, Kafr Takharim, al-Dana and Salqin. As soon as it had identified enough "students" who could be recruited as spies, IS expanded its presence. In al-Dana, additional buildings were rented, black flags raised and streets blocked off. In towns where there was too much resistance or it was unable to secure enough supporters, IS chose to withdraw temporarily. At the beginning, its modus operandi was to expand without risking open resistance, and abduct or kill "hostile individuals," while denying any involvement in these nefarious activities.

The fighters themselves also remained inconspicuous at first. Bakr and the advance guard had not brought them along from Iraq, which would have made sense. In fact, they had explicitly prohibited their Iraqi fighters from going to Syria. They also chose not to recruit very many Syrians. The IS leaders opted for the most complicated option instead: They decided to gather together all the foreign radicals who had been coming to the region since the summer of 2012. Students from Saudi Arabia, office workers from Tunisia and school dropouts from Europe with no military experience were to form an army with battle-tested Chechens and Uzbeks. It would be located in Syria under Iraqi command.

Already by the end of 2012, military camps had been erected in several places. Initially, no one knew what groups they belonged to. The camps were strictly organized and the men there came from numerous countries -- and didn't speak to journalists. Very few of them were from Iraq. Newcomers received two months of training and were drilled to be unconditionally obedient to the central command. The set-up was inconspicuous and also had another advantage: though necessarily chaotic at the beginning, what emerged were absolutely loyal troops. The foreigners knew nobody outside of their comrades, had no reason to show mercy and could be quickly deployed to many different places. This was in stark contrast to the Syrian rebels, who were mostly focused on defending their hometowns and had to look after their families and help out with the harvest. In fall 2013, IS books listed 2,650 foreign fighters in the Province of Aleppo alone. Tunisians represented a third of the total, followed by Saudi Arabians, Turks, Egyptians and, in smaller numbers, Chechens, Europeans and Indonesians.

Later too, the jihadist cadres were hopelessly outnumbered by the Syrian rebels. Although the rebels distrusted the jihadists, they didn't join forces to challenge IS because they didn't want to risk opening up a second front. Islamic State, though, increased its clout with a simple trick: The men always appeared wearing black masks, which not only made them look terrifying, but also meant that no one could know how many of them there actually were. When groups of 200 fighters appeared in five different places one after the other, did it mean that IS had 1,000 people? Or 500? Or just a little more than 200? In addition, spies also ensured that IS leadership was constantly informed of where the population was weak or divided or where there were local conflict, allowing IS to offer itself as a protective power in order to gain a foothold.

The Capture of Raqqa

Raqqa, a once sleepy provincial city on the Euphrates River, was to become the prototype of the complete IS conquest. The operation began subtly, gradually became more brutal and, in the end, IS prevailed over larger opponents without much of a fight. "We were never very political," explained one doctor who had fled Raqqa for Turkey. "We also weren't religious and didn't pray much."

When Raqqa fell to the rebels in March 2013, a city council was rapidly elected. Lawyers, doctors and journalists organized themselves. Women's groups were established. The Free Youth Assembly was founded, as was the movement "For Our Rights" and dozens of other initiatives. Anything seemed possible in Raqqa. But in the view of some who fled the city, it also marked the start of its downfall.

True to Haji Bakr's plan, the phase of infiltration was followed by the elimination of every person who might have been a potential leader or opponent. The first person hit was the head of the city council, who was kidnapped in mid-May 2013 by masked men. The next person to disappear was the brother of a prominent novelist. Two days later, the man who had led the group that painted a revolutionary flag on the city walls vanished.

"We had an idea who kidnapped him," one of his friends explains, "but no one dared any longer to do anything." The system of fear began to take hold. Starting in July, first dozens and then hundreds of people disappeared. Sometimes their bodies were found, but they usually disappeared without a trace. In August, the IS military leadership dispatched several cars driven by suicide bombers to the headquarters of the FSA brigade, the "Grandsons of the Prophet," killing dozens of fighters and leading the rest to flee. The other rebels merely looked on. IS leadership had spun a web of secret deals with the brigades so that each thought it was only the others who might be the targets of IS attacks.

On Oct. 17, 2013, Islamic State called all civic leaders, clerics and lawyers in the city to a meeting. At the time, some thought it might be a gesture of conciliation. Of the 300 people who attended the meeting, only two spoke out against the ongoing takeover, the kidnappings and the murders committed by IS.

One of the two was Muhannad Habayebna, a civil rights activist and journalist well known in the city. He was found five days later tied up and executed with a gunshot wound to his head. Friends received an anonymous email with a photo of his body. The message included only one sentence: "Are you sad about your friend now?" Within hours around 20 leading members of the opposition fled to Turkey. The revolution in Raqqa had come to an end.

A short time later, the 14 chiefs of the largest clans gave an oath of allegiance to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. There's even a film of the ceremony. They were sheiks with the same clans that had sworn their steadfast loyalty to Syrian President Bashar Assad only two years earlier.

The Death of Haji Bakr

Until the end of 2013, everything was going according to Islamic State's plan -- or at least according to the plan of Haji Bakr. The caliphate was expanding village by village without being confronted by unified resistance from Syrian rebels. Indeed, the rebels seemed paralyzed in the face of IS' sinister power.

But when IS henchmen brutally tortured a well-liked rebel leader and doctor to death in December 2013, something unexpected happened. Across the country, Syrian brigades -- both secular and parts of the radical Nusra Front -- joined together to do battle with Islamic State. By attacking IS everywhere at the same time, they were able to rob the Islamists of their tactical advantage -- that of being able to rapidly move units to where they were most urgently needed.

Within weeks, IS was pushed out of large regions of northern Syria. Even Raqqa, the Islamic State capital, had almost fallen by the time 1,300 IS fighters arrived from Iraq. But they didn't simply march into battle. Rather, they employed a trickier approach, recalls the doctor who fled. "In Raqqa, there were so many brigades on the move that nobody knew who exactly the others were. Suddenly, a group in rebel dress began to shoot at the other rebels. They all simply fled."

A small, simple masquerade had helped IS fighters to victory: Just change out of black clothes into jeans and vests. They did the same thing in the border town of Jarablus. On several occasions, rebels in other locations took drivers from IS suicide vehicles into custody. The drivers asked in surprise: "You are Sunnis too? Our emir told me you were infidels from Assad's army."

Once complete, the picture begins to look absurd: God's self-proclaimed enforcers on Earth head out to conquer a future worldly empire, but with what? With ninja outfits, cheap tricks and espionage cells camouflaged as missionary offices. But it worked. IS held on to Raqqa and was able to reconquer some of its lost territories. But it came too late for the great planner Haji Bakr.

Haji Bakr stayed behind in the small city of Tal Rifaat, where IS had long had the upper hand. But when rebels attacked at the end of January 2014, the city became divided within just a few hours. One half remained under IS control while the other was wrested away by one of the local brigades. Haji Bakr was stuck in the wrong half. Furthermore, in order to remain incognito he had refrained from moving into one of the heavily guarded IS military quarters. And so, the godfather of snitching was snitched on by a neighbor. "A Daish sheik lives next door!" the man called. A local commander named Abdelmalik Hadbe and his men drove over to Bakr's house. A woman jerked open the door and said brusquely: "My husband isn't here."

But his car is parked out front, the rebels countered.

At that moment, Haji Bakr appeared at the door in his pajamas. Hadbe ordered him to come with them, whereupon Bakr protested that he wanted to get dressed. No, Hadbe repeated: "Come with us! Immediately!"

Surprisingly nimbly for his age, Bakr jumped back and kicked the door closed, according to two people who witnessed the scene. He then hid under the stairs and yelled: "I have a suicide belt! I'll blow up all of us!" He then came out with a Kalashnikov and began shooting. Hadbe then fired his weapon and killed Bakr.

When the men later learned who they had killed, they searched the house, gathering up computers, passports, mobile phone SIM cards, a GPS device and, most importantly, papers. They didn't find a Koran anywhere.

Haji Bakr was dead and the local rebels took his wife into custody. Later, the rebels exchanged her for Turkish IS hostages at the request of Ankara. Bakr's valuable papers were initially hidden away in a chamber, where they spent several months.

A Second Cache of Documents

Haji Bakr's state continued to work even without its creator. Just how precisely his plans were implemented -- point by point -- is confirmed by the discovery of another file. When IS was forced to rapidly abandon its headquarters in Aleppo in January 2014, they tried to burn their archive, but they ran into a problem similar to that confronted by the East German secret police 25 years earlier: They had too many files.

Some of them remained intact and ended up with the al-Tawhid Brigade, Aleppo's largest rebel group at the time. After lengthy negotiations, the group agreed to make the papers available to SPIEGEL for exclusive publication rights -- everything except a list of IS spies inside of al-Tawhid.

An examination of the hundreds of pages of documents reveals a highly complex system involving the infiltration and surveillance of all groups, including IS' own people. The jihad archivists maintained long lists noting which informants they had installed in which rebel brigades and government militias. It was even noted who among the rebels was a spy for Assad's intelligence service.

"They knew more than we did, much more," said the documents' custodian. Personnel files of the fighters were among them, including detailed letters of application from incoming foreigners, such as the Jordanian Nidal Abu Eysch. He sent along all of his terror references, including their telephone numbers, and the file number of a felony case against him. His hobbies were also listed: hunting, boxing, bomb building.

IS wanted to know everything, but at the same time, the group wanted to deceive everyone about its true aims. One multiple-page report, for example, carefully lists all of the pretexts IS could use to justify the seizure of the largest flour mill in northern Syria. It includes such excuses as alleged embezzlement as well as the ungodly behavior of the mill's workers. The reality -- that all strategically important facilities like industrial bakeries, grain silos and generators were to be seized and their equipment sent to the caliphate's unofficial capital Raqqa -- was to be kept under wraps.

Over and over again, the documents reveal corollaries with Haji Bakr's plans for the establishment of IS -- for example that marrying in to influential families should be pushed. The files from Aleppo also included a list of 34 fighters who wanted wives in addition to other domestic needs. Abu Luqman and Abu Yahya al-Tunis, for example, noted that they needed an apartment. Abu Suheib and Abu Ahmed Osama requested bedroom furniture. Abu al-Baraa al Dimaschqi asked for financial assistance in addition to a complete set of furniture, while Abu Azmi wanted a fully automatic washing machine.

Shifting Alliances

But in the first months of 2014, yet another legacy from Haji Bakr began playing a decisive role: His decade of contacts to Assad's intelligence services.

In 2003, the Damascus regime was panicked that then-US President George W. Bush, after his victory over Saddam Hussein, would have his troops continue into Syria to topple Assad as well. Thus, in the ensuing years, Syrian intelligence officials organized the transfer of thousands of radicals from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to al-Qaida in Iraq. Ninety percent of the suicide attackers entered Iraq via the Syrian route. A strange relationship developed between Syrian generals, international jihadists and former Iraqi officers who had been loyal to Saddam -- a joint venture of deadly enemies, who met repeatedly to the west of Damascus.

At the time, the primary aim was to make the lives of the Americans in Iraq hell. Ten years later, Bashar Assad had a different motive to breathe new life into the alliance: He wanted to sell himself to the world as the lesser of several evils. Islamist terror, the more gruesome the better, was too important to leave it up to the terrorists. The regime's relationship with Islamic State is -- just as it was to its predecessor a decade prior -- marked by a completely tactical pragmatism. Both sides are trying to use the other in the assumption that it will emerge as the stronger power, able to defeat the discrete collaborator of yesterday. Conversely, IS leaders had no problem receiving assistance from Assad's air force, despite all of the group's pledges to annihilate the apostate Shiites. Starting in January 2014, Syrian jets would regularly -- and exclusively -- bomb rebel positions and headquarters during battles between IS and rebel groups.

In battles between IS and rebels in January 2014, Assad's jets regularly bombed only rebel positions, while the Islamic State emir ordered his fighters to refrain from shooting at the army. It was an arrangement that left many of the foreign fighters deeply disillusioned; they had imaged jihad differently.

IS threw its entire arsenal at the rebels, sending more suicide bombers into their ranks in just a few weeks than it deployed during the entire previous year against the Syrian army. Thanks in part to additional air strikes, IS was able to reconquer territory that it had briefly lost.

Nothing symbolizes the tactical shifting of alliances more than the fate of the Syrian army's Division 17. The isolated base near Raqqa had been under rebel siege for more than a year. But then, IS units defeated the rebels there and Assad's air force was once again able to use the base for supply flights without fear of attack.

But a half year later, after IS conquered Mosul and took control of a gigantic weapons depot there, the jihadists felt powerful enough to attack their erstwhile helpers. IS fighters overran Division 17 and slaughtered the soldiers, whom they had only recently protected.

What the Future May Hold

The setbacks suffered by IS in recent months -- the defeat in the fight for Kurdish enclave Kobani and, more recently, the loss of the Iraqi city of Tikrit, have generated the impression that the end of Islamic State is nigh. As though it, in its megalomania, overreached itself, has lost its mystique, is in retreat and will soon disappear. But such forced optimism is likely premature. The IS may have lost many fighters, but it has continued expanding in Syria.

It is true that jihadist experiments in ruling a specific geographical area have failed in the past. Mostly, though, that was because of their lack of knowledge regarding how to administer a region, or even a state. That is exactly the weakness that IS strategists have long been aware of -- and eliminated. Within the "Caliphate," those in power have constructed a regime that is more stable and more flexible than it appears from the outside.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may be the officially named leader, but it remains unclear how much power he holds. In any case, when an emissary of al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahiri contacted the Islamic State, it was Haji Bakr and other intelligence officers, and not al-Baghdadi, whom he approached. Afterwards, the emissary bemoaned "these phony snakes who are betraying the real jihad."

Within IS, there are state structures, bureaucracy and authorities. But there is also a parallel command structure: elite units next to normal troops; additional commanders alongside nominal military head Omar al-Shishani; power brokers who transfer or demote provincial and town emirs or even make them disappear at will. Furthermore, decisions are not, as a rule, made in Shura Councils, nominally the highest decision-making body. Instead, they are being made by the "people who loosen and bind" (ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd), a clandestine circle whose name is taken from the Islam of medieval times.

Islamic State is able to recognize all manner of internal revolts and stifle them. At the same time, the hermitic surveillance structure is also useful for the financial exploitation of its subjects.

The air strikes flown by the US-led coalition may have destroyed the oil wells and refineries. But nobody is preventing the Caliphate's financial authorities from wringing money out of the millions of people who live in the regions under IS control -- in the form of new taxes and fees, or simply by confiscating property. IS, after all, knows everything from its spies and from the data it plundered from banks, land-registry offices and money-changing offices. It knows who owns which homes and which fields; it knows who owns many sheep or has lots of money. The subjects may be unhappy, but there is minimal room for them to organize, arm themselves and rebel.




Advertisement


As the West's attention is primarily focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks, a different scenario has been underestimated: the approaching intra-Muslim war between Shiites and Sunnis. Such a conflict would allow IS to graduate from being a hated terror organization to a central power.

Already today, the frontlines in Syria, Iraq and Yemen follow this confessional line, with Shiite Afghans fighting against Sunni Afghans in Syria and IS profiting in Iraq from the barbarism of brutal Shiite militias. Should this ancient Islam conflict continue to escalate, it could spill over into confessionally mixed states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon.

In such a case, IS propaganda about the approaching apocalypse could become a reality. In its slipstream, an absolutist dictatorship in the name of God could be established.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 29274.html

[Philip]

Faliji,tx. Yes,the Yanquis must take in millions of refugees from the MEast ,it is their responsibility for effing up the entire region.

UB spot on.What will the despots and mullahs of "Soothi Barbaria" do after their "droppings" on the civilians of Yemen? Will they expect garlands from the locals? Grenades perhaps! The advent of the new
Soothi warmongering king,hell bent upon "rattling his sabre" in the region (but preferring to shoot from a Paki or Egyptian's back as per custom!),has spectacularly relit flames in places where there were only embers. Moreover,he seems to have no political solution to enforce once the fighting has ceased.
If he wants along with his brother Gulfies to take on Iran,then he is running the risk of becoming the Arab "fuhrer" taking on Iran just as Adolf took on Russia.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/a ... an-iraq-un

The $18bn arms race helping to fuel Middle East conflict

Saudi army artillery fires shells towards Houthi positions from the Saudi border with Yemen. Photograph: Faisal Al Nasser/Reuters
Peter Beaumont

Thursday 23 April 2015

The Middle East is plunging deeper into an arms race, with an estimated $18bn expected to be spent on weapons this year, a development that experts warn is fuelling serious tension and conflict in the region.

How arms imports are destabilising the Middle East

Given the unprecedented levels of weapons sales by the west (including the US, Canada and the UK) to the mainly Sunni Gulf states, Vladimir Putin’s decision last week to allow the controversial delivery of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran – voluntarily blocked by Russia since 2010 – seems likely to further accelerate the proliferation.

That will see agreed arms sales to the top five purchasers in the region - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt and Iraq – surge this year to more than $18bn, up from $12bn last year. Among the systems being purchased are jet fighters, missiles, armoured vehicles, drones and helicopters.

The Russian declaration came only two days before Iraq’s prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, disclosed he was seeking arms worth billions of dollars from Washington – with payment deferred – for the battle against Islamic State (Isis).

Last week France’s foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, disclosed progress in talks to sell Rafale fighter jets to the UAE, one of the Middle East’s biggest and most aggressive arms buyers.

States in the Middle East are now more prepared to use the weapons they are buying

With conflicts raging in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, and with Egypt also battling Islamist extremists in the Sinai, the signs that Russia is preparing to increase its own arms sales – and to the Gulf states’ biggest rival, Iran – are raising fears that tensions will be stoked further still.

In particular Saudi Arabia and Iran are facing off in the conflict in Yemen where, despite the announcement by Riyadh on Tuesday that it had halted its month-long bombing campaign, jets continued to strike Houthi rebel positions close to the capital Sanaa, around the third city Taez, and in the central town of Yarim.

According to the New York Times, defence industry officials have notified Congress that they are expecting additional requests from Arab states fighting Isis – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Egypt – for thousands of new US-made weapons, including missiles and bombs, to rebuild depleted arms stockpiles.

Ironically, among the key weapons suppliers in the arms race are permanent members of the UN security council who have been at the centre of two unconventional arms control initiatives – disarming the Syrian government’s stockpiles of chemical weapons and negotiating for a deal on Iran’s nuclear programme.

The scale of the arms race was revealed this year in reports published by IHS Jane’s Global Defence Trade Report and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri). They showed how Saudi Arabia had become the world’s largest importer of weapons and fourth-largest military spender and that other Middle East states were sharply increasing their arms purchases.

Adding to concern is that the spending spree on arms comes against the background of a marked increase in military interventions by countries in the region since the Arab spring in 2011.

Missiles are displayed by the Iranian army in a military parade marking National Army Day just outside Tehran. Photograph: Ebrahim Noroozi/AP

Saudi Arabia has intervened in Bahrain (at the request of that kingdom’s ruler during the so-called Pearl revolution), in Yemen in 2009 and again in Yemen this year.

In addition, a new Saudi-led and largely Sunni military alliance – announcedthis year and dubbed the “Arab Nato” – appears primarily designed as a new foil to Iran in the widening proxy conflict between Riyadh and Tehran.

And among those concerned by Saudi’s new military assertiveness - on the back of its arms buying spree - was the Iraqi prime minister, Abadi.

“The dangerous thing is we don’t know what the Saudis want to do after [their intervention in Yemen],” Abadi told US reporters last week. “Is Iraq within their radar? That’s very, very dangerous. The idea that you intervene in another state unprovoked just for regional ambition is wrong. Saddam has done it before. See what it has done to the country.”

And if the Saudi intervention in Yemen has been overt, no less real has been the proxy conflict that has set Iran and the Gulf states against each other in Syria, where Tehran has backed the government of Bashar al-Assad with military assistance and weapons, and Gulf states have backed different rebel groups, including Islamist ones.

“It’s crazy,” says Ben Moores, author of IHS Jane’s annual report on arms buying trends. “The one Canadian deal alone – to supply Saudi Arabia with light armoured vehicles – will account for 20% of the military vehicles sold globally in years covered by the contract. And this is just the thin edge of the wedge. Saudi has booked enough arms imports in 24 months for them to be worth $10bn a year.”

While some countries, such as Kuwait, are in the process of modernisation, a key trend identified by Moores is how states are retooling to fight insurgency conflicts in the same way the US military has in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“Look at UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. They were all countries that bought a lot of conventional arms in the past that are no use in a sectarian war or an insurgency.

“If you look at what was bought at the recent Idex arms fair in Abu Dhabi it was drones, high-end surveillance satellites, strategic transport aircraft for projecting power. One of the reasons Egypt went with its recent purchase of Rafale jets [from France] is because it wanted planes that could deliver precision-guided standoff weapons.

And as Tobias Borck of the Royal United Services Institute points out, states in the Middle East are now more prepared to use the weapons they are buying.

“[The] Saudi-led military operations in Yemen [are] the latest manifestation of Arab interventionism, a trend that has been gaining momentum in the Middle East since the uprisings of the Arab spring,” he says. “Middle Eastern countries appear to be increasingly willing to use their armed forces to protect and pursue their interests in crisis zones across the region.”

Referring to the inconsistent approach by key security council members towards arms control in the region, he adds: “There are a lot of different streams feeding into this arms race.

“On Syria’s chemical weapons and the Iranian nuclear programme the two issues were ringfenced as pure arms control questions. When it comes to how we perceive our arms sales – whether they are British or US or whatever – it tends to be seen as a domestic economic issue – protecting our factories.

“That neglects the regional political dimensions, with arms sales taking place with a lack of regard for that context and without long-term strategic awareness.”

An Al Sabr unmanned aerial vehicle at the Idex arms fair in Abu Dhabi. Photograph: Bloomberg/ Getty Images

Borck says the sheer scale of the arms being supplied to countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE by the west may also be acting as an incentive for Russia to get back into the Middle East – not least via arms sales to its old clients such as Iran – and may have been a motivating factor in the Kremlin’s decision to lift the ban on the delivery of the S-300 missile system.

Putin, defending the decision to supply the missiles during a call-in television show last week, cited Russia’s prerogative to pursue its own foreign policy initiatives and suggested the missiles could represent “a deterrent factor in connection with the situation in Yemen”.

Omar Ashour, an expert on Middle East security issues at Exeter University, adds another caution, this time over the intentions of the new Saudi-led Arab coalition, warning that its interventions are unlikely to contribute to stability.

“The rise of Arab military coalitions raises serious concerns,” he wrote in a recent piece for Project Syndicate. “Such interventions were usually aimed at empowering a proxy political force over its military and political rivals, instead of averting humanitarian disaster or institutionalising a non-violent conflict-resolution mechanism following a war.”

Speaking to the Guardian last week, he added: “On top of that, the increases in arms sales are bound to be extremely destabilising. At the moment most of the interventions have been against softer targets – Saudi Arabia targeting guerrillas in Yemen; Egypt against Bedouin in Sinai; or strikes against ragtag armies in Libya.

“But if the ‘soft’ keeps being hit hard they won’t remain soft. They will find their own patrons and proxies and hit back and it will lead to a vicious cycle.”

Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher at Sipri, which maintains a database tracking arms contracts, raises another concern. “Something that doesn’t get mentioned is the complete lack of interest in arms control among the countries in region. It is not in the minds of leaders and decision-makers except for the need to arm to defeat any potential opponent.

“There is already instability in the region on several levels. You have instability in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. There is instability between Iran and the Gulf states. What is important now is how the massive expansion of the armed forces of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar will be seen as posing a clear threat to Iran.”

Borck adds a final warning: “If you are going for an ever-bigger hammer, then the more desperate you are to make every problem a nail.”

If the Soothis do go after Iran in any manner,the Iranians needn't even attack the Soothis.just a few well guided missiles fired by Iran to hit the Burj in Dubai, singeing the beard of the monarch of Abu Dhabi,hitting the Emirates engineering workshops at Dubai airport and a few in the direction of Qatar,not to leave them out of the firework display,will cause havoc in the entire region and a stampede of humanity out of the region not seen since the dawn of time. Who will then be left to wash the precious backsides of the "sheiky" despots? They too may be fleeing for their hideouts in European fleshpots!

[vijaykarthik]

More confirmation of the IP:

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies ... scmp_today

So the Chinese have indeed decided to do only the IP pipeline. Mmh. Isnt the same pipeline the one that US and KSA hated and did everything possible to thwart it. Now with China taking up the lead, what happens?

With this move, Pak has given 2 quick slaps to KSA. Or make it three.

a. Took 1.5bn USD to delay the pipeline - that was last year and stopped it. Now they are ready to get the pipeline [1.5bn for just a years delay?]
b. Has refused KSA's request for troops
c. Now has gone into a deeper embrace with China and also got into a deal for the pipeline.

Looks like a comprehensive mistake. Predictably, Shabaz has gone to KSA. And brought very disturbing news which prompted Nawaz, Raheel and defense min to go to KSA.

-- I will not be surprised if KSA wants a quick intervention in Yemen and Pak is forced to send some troops [either as troops inside KSA border for defense / as troops to be sent directly to Yemen]

[deejay]

Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State

...
http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 29274.html

Wig Sir, great find this article. Thanks.

[Y. Kanan]

Iranian naval convoy forced away from Yemen by US warships
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/24/politics/ ... index.html


Almost feel sorry for the Houthis. They're one of the few Islamic groups in the region that actually has principles; a code of honor that goes beyond the usual BS muslim platitudes. And everybody's ganging up on them. After all their valiant struggles they're going to lose and suffer abject humiliation and persecution. Not going to be much fun being a Houthi in Yemen after the Wahabbis and their Paki mercs roll back in.

[habal]

this is a very complex game going on. Iran, China & Russia are in sync. USA wants to tap Iran to supply gas to Southern Europe to bypass Russian gas. So it will not annoy Iran beyond a limit. If Iran wishes to resupply the houthis, they will find out a way by hook and crook and USA will not stop every move that Iran makes. Situation is tighter than the usual tight in that region.

[Multatuli]

Syria conflict: The illicit art trade that is a major source of income for today's terror groups is nothing new

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 04285.html

[Singha]

the KSA plan is probably for their AQ affiliates in eastern yemen (well supplied across the ksa border) to roll into west yemen, eliminate the houthis, "restore democracy" and install the deposed president now hiding in riyadh as the nominal head while AQ and riyadh run the show behind the green door.

the US will extract a promise they will not interfere with red sea shipping and come down heavily if a wayward munna violates. beyond that it does not give a rats behind about yemen welfare.

[Tuvaluan]

Iran, China & Russia are in sync. USA wants to tap Iran to supply gas to Southern Europe to bypass Russian gas. So it will not annoy Iran beyond a limit.

Let us assume this is true just for argument's sake. If Iran and Russia are in sync, then, unless the Russians are complete jokers, they won't be allowing Iran to take over their market....so what's the common Iran/Russia motivation here that would allow Russia to overlook Iran taking over their markets to the EU?

[Multatuli]

Iran ships 'turn back' from Yemen as fighting rages

Sanaa (AFP) - An Iranian naval convoy suspected of carrying weapons for Shiite rebels in Yemen has turned back, US officials said, as Saudi-led warplanes kept up air strikes on anti-government forces.

......

Yemeni Foreign Minister Riyadh Yassin accused Tehran Thursday of trying to break a naval blockade on his country, describing the war as an "Iranian plot implemented by the Huthi militia".

A US official said Thursday the nine-ship Iranian convoy that had been heading for Yemen is "no longer on the same course".

The USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier and other American warships have deployed off Yemen's coast to track the Iranian flotilla and possibly prevent any arms deliveries to the rebels.

The flotilla included two "armed vessels," said the US official.

......

Iran vehemently denies arming the rebels and has presented a peace plan to the UN calling for a ceasefire and the formation of a unity government.

On Friday, Tehran summoned the Saudi envoy to protest after warplanes allegedly turned back humanitarian aid flights headed for Yemen, whose airspace is controlled by a Saudi-led coalition.

http://news.yahoo.com/iranian-ships-tur ... 09507.html


Aden hit by coalition airstrikes amid fierce street battles

SANAA, Yemen (AP) — Saudi-led coalition warplanes launched dozens of airstrikes on Yemen's southern port city of Aden Saturday, as Shiite Houthi rebels and their allies mobilized hundreds of reinforcements in an effort to wrest control of the city from militias supporting embattled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, security officials and eyewitnesses said.

SANAA, Yemen (AP) — Saudi-led coalition warplanes launched dozens of airstrikes on Yemen's southern port city of Aden Saturday, as Shiite Houthi rebels and their allies mobilized hundreds of reinforcements in an effort to wrest control of the city from militias supporting embattled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, security officials and eyewitnesses said.

......

Saudi Arabia had announced on Tuesday that it was entering a new phase in its campaign against the Houthis, who captured Yemen's capital last year. The air campaign is aimed at rolling back the rebels and restoring Hadi, a close U.S. ally who fled to Saudi Arabia last month. The coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia began conducting airstrikes against rebel positions on March 26.

......

A security official said that living conditions in Aden are deteriorating, with most shops closed due to a lack of bread, flour and fuel.

http://news.yahoo.com/aden-hit-coalitio ... 46094.html

[Falijee]

‘Jinn converts to Islam on Twitter’

Comments: on a "lighter" note!

A man claiming to be a spiritual healer has announced that he converted a jinn to Islam on Twitter, according to a report in a local newspaper recently.

Recently Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheikh has slammed people for using the practice to exploit people and make money. He said the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice plans to set up a committee to regulate the work of these healers.

[Falijee]

Why young Saudis turn down blue-collar jobs

Comment: A good article on Saudi work ethic

Based on a survey, there are at least five reasons why young Saudi males turn down menial jobs,” said Mohsin Shaikh Al-Hassan, program host.

He added that they also fear not being accepted by women in marriage because of the kind of job they have. “In other words, a menial job is not one which a prospective wife could be proud of,” he said.

At 'Jobs on Air’ we received a curriculum vitae from a Saudi who had worked for 13 companies in one year,” he said.

[Multatuli]

"wig" posted:

Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State

http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 29274.html

The story appears to be an example of topnotch investigative journalism, for the 'average' news reader that is, those who are not inclined to think and just believe everything newspapers write.

For the discerning reader however, it's quite obvious that the 'documents outlining the structure' of ISIS/IS are most likely planted by the intelligence service of one (or perhaps more) of the countries who really finance and control ISIS. This could be (obviously) the US, Israel, UK or Turkey. Perhaps with some help from the Sunni Gulf Arabs. I do not think the Sunni Gulf Arabs capable of doing this by themselves.

We are to believe that Sunni ex-officers of Saddam Hussein's regime cooked all this up and somehow were able to gather the resources needed to run this operation! Wow! Notice how cleverly ex-officers of Saddam Hussein's intelligence services and President Assad of Syria (the Syrian intelligence services) are blamed for the germination of ISIS. It's those baddies (Saddam Hussein and Assad) who are really to blame, you know. If they hadn't systematically cultivated EVIL, we wouldn't have had ISIS/IS today.

There is no mention of the fact that Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab dominated Gulf states assisted the IS in various ways: paying the 'salaries' of the IS terrorists, arming them, training them, etc.. Even I know this much from reading the news (here in BRF).

This article is clearly meant to divert the attention from the real forces behind the ISI/IS. This is intriguing disinformation. The 'Der Spiegel' journalists/editors/owners may or may not be part of this propaganda effort.

And then there is this extremely 'naive' paragraph:

As the West's attention is primarily focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks, a different scenario has been underestimated: the approaching intra-Muslim war between Shiites and Sunnis. Such a conflict would allow IS to graduate from being a hated terror organization to a central power.

Already today, the frontlines in Syria, Iraq and Yemen follow this confessional line, with Shiite Afghans fighting against Sunni Afghans in Syria and IS profiting in Iraq from the barbarism of brutal Shiite militias. Should this ancient Islam conflict continue to escalate, it could spill over into confessionally mixed states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon.

Yeah, we all know that Shia-Sunni conflict/war is the last thing the West wants and god forbid such a thing should come to pass. Because that would bring chaos, poverty, disease and even cause civilians to die! Millions of Arabs/Muslims could die. Oh my God! Such HORROR! The Western Mind is so sensitive to the pain and suffering of others, particularly of non-Western people, that just the thought of it is traumatizing to the Western Mind!

[pankajs]

FrancescaMarino ‏@francescam63 5h5 hours ago

Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dead: Radio Iran
http://dnai.in/cFCY via @dna @dna

[ramana]

"We are telling them, 'shame on you'. Why don’t you face us on the ground? Why don’t you fight like men? We will always face you as the Yemenis are solid like rocks."

Ouch! This taunt is going to sting the musharrafs very badly in Riyadh. It is going to be picked up throughout the ME. When it was the Pakis on the Shomali Plain, it was different - here the Saudis are bombing residential areas. The hatred and contempt are likely to be pan-Arabic, and all that pent-up hate against the Eagle and the Star are now going to be focused on the much-more accessible fat musharrafs in the white sheets. Bentley-driving bomber pilots are not going to convey a great message either. Remember what the ISIS did to the Jordanian F-16 pilot..
KSA cannot survive without imported labor. What are they going to do when every pakistan-cleaner and every camel-driver is a potential assassin with no regard for their own life because of what happened to their loved ones and their home village?

The exact very same words were used by Seljuk Turks against the Ottoman Turks who were using muskets and fighting from far.
This "why don't you face us on the ground" meme is a pan Islamist theme. In fact the Spanish imbibed this in their "let us settle this mano, mano!" cry.

[Hari Seldon]

>>Jaideep A. Prabhu ‏@orsoraggiante 7m7 minutes ago
Iranian general says Saudi government will be toppled soon...inshallah: http://goo.gl/mQvS5J | But what comes in its place?

[Singha]

Ksa can split 3 ways per ralph peters map.
A rump wahabi caliphate in nejd highlands
Eastern shia emirate allied to oman, yemen and cough cough iran
A western vatican type papal state with makkah and medina jointly run by all islamic states

[ramana]

Ksa can split 3 ways per ralph peters map.
A rump wahabi caliphate in nejd highlands
Eastern shia emirate allied to oman, yemen and cough cough iran
A western vatican type papal state with makkah and medina jointly run by all islamic states

If they split three ways no reason for Sunnis to claim the Hejaz.

It might go back to Ali's followers aka the Shia emirates.

[Avarachan]

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/04/25/2 ... mists.html

The loss of Jisr al Shugur all but closes the government’s land supply routes to two major bases in the west of Idlib, Mastuma and Ariha, both of which are surrounded by rebel forces and can now be supplied only by air. Rebels captured the provincial capital, Idlib city, on March 28 ....

Videos posted on social media showed that U.S.-supplied TOW missiles played a critical role, destroying dozens of government tanks and vehicles. The opposition run Masar News Network reported that rebel forces captured dozens of regime troops as well as three tanks and three other armored vehicles.

Berri said the main factor behind the victory was surprise. The government forces were expecting the attack to target the town of Ariha from the east. Instead, the rebels, including fighters from the Islamist Ahrar al Sham group, opened the fight from the west and cut the supply routes quickly.

Government forces withdrew to the west and south to Jourin and other towns in the mountains of Latakia.

The official SANA news agency posted a brief item about the fighting, saying that the army “is conducting heavy battles against the terrorist groups” in Jisr al Shughur and is “reinforcing its defensive lines around the city,” wording that suggested it had retreated.

However, the Syrian Army (SAA) has opened a new supply route.

http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syr ... te-opened/

According to field reports from the SAA and NDF, the SAA’s 106th Brigade and their allies captured the villages of Qastoun, Misheek, and Zayarah, killing over 40 enemy combatants and destroying three armored vehicles that were mounted with 23mm and 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns.

As a result of this success in west Idlib, the Syrian Armed Forces were able to create a new supply route to the besieged city of Ariha from the village of Joreen in the Al-Ghaab Plains; this is a major development for the beleaguered soldiers that are entrenched in Al-Mastouma and Ariha, as their lifeline in the province has been extended as a result.

[Singha]

I have never understood why israel and the US want to depose Assad. his govt has no real track record of funding the wahabbi warriors running around burning the farm, hezbollah is mainly in lebanon, hamas is palestinian...there aint no syrian militia chanting "death to america" in the streets.

if the islamic warriors now generously equipped with TOW missiles takes over they will quickly throw out any covenant they have and the death to amrika chants will start, ISIS will gleefully extend their caliphate from raqqa to damascus and then what? how is the region more secure?

their next stop will be eastern turkey and inciting a civil war inside turkey and jordan.

they are playing with fire and it will burn them both.

[Falijee]

Kerry, Zarif meet at Iranian envoy's residence


Comment: Note body language of both men in the picture!

[Tuvaluan]

Looks like Iran its own separation of civilian/military/research nuclear centers, with Natanz being the only non civilian facility.

[Falijee]

Islamist Turkish President Erdogan Says A 'Mastermind' Is Plotting Against Turkey; Antisemitic 'Documentary' Says Jews Have Been 'Mastermind' For Over 3,500 Years

Comment: This guy is an out and out Islamist plus a confirmed anti semite!

[Falijee]

Robert Fisk in Abu Dhabi: The acceptable face of the Emirates

When you own nine per cent of the world's oil and close to five per cent of the planet's natural gas, you have to decide whether you shout about it, display it before all with Saudi abandon, or send it off to fund charitable projects or cult-like Islamist militias. Abu Dhabi has stuck to charity, avoided the darkness of Wahabism, the gloomy puritan version of Sunni Islam fatally adopted by the House of Saud in the 18th century, but can't shake off the need for ostentation. And the Emirates Palace Hotel is an obscenity. I've stayed there twice (not at The Independent's expense) and I've written of its imperial architecture – Mogul-Gothic Lutyens, I suppose, with just a hint of Saddam and just a dangerous flavour of Titanic.

Comment : Dont miss the "tongue in cheek" references !

[UlanBatori]

TOW missiles

Taliban - Stinger scam all over again. Can't wait to hear of their performance against KSA tanks and tank-transporters.

[Prem]

Saudi Arabia´s crown prince dismissed: royal decree

Aag Laggi Saudi gaggaria Mey ,Paki Gaye Malhar

RIYADH: Saudi Arabia´s King Salman on Wednesday dismissed the heir to the throne, Crown Prince Moqren bin Abdul Aziz bin Saud, and replaced him with the Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef. "We have decided to respond to his highness and what he had expressed about his desire to be relieved from the position of crown prince," said a statement from the royal court, carried by the official Saudi Press Agency.

[Philip]

Crown Prince becomes "Clown Prince"! Even though he was a son of the founder of the Soothi Barbaria dy-nasty,palace intrigue has seen to it that the new monarch is protecting his back with close family members who will support his military adventurism. The Soothi monarchy isn't as stable as it appears to the outside world. Soothi reverses in the Yemen or elsewhere will reverberate back home.

Saudi Arabia's crown prince dismissed
King Salman removes Moqren bin Abdul Aziz bin Saud as heir and deputy prime minister and installs Mohammed bin Nayef, grandson of kingdom’s founder

Associated Press in Riyadh
Wednesday 29 April 2015

Saudi Arabia’s King Salman has removed his half-brother from the post of crown prince and named a nephew, the country’s interior minister, in his place.

The post of crown prince secures Prince Mohammed bin Nayef as the most likely successor to King Salman. He is widely known internationally as Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism tsar and was previously deputy crown prince. He takes over the post of crown prince from Prince Muqrin.

The royal decree also announced that the king’s son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, had been appointed deputy crown prince. He is believed to be around 30 years old and is also the country’s defence minister. The deputy crown prince is essentially seen as being second in line to the throne.

Also in the reshuffle longtime foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal was replaced wtih Adel al-Jubeir, the kingdom’s current ambassador to the US.

The new appointments further thrust a new generation of Saudi princes into the line of succession.

Prince Moqren, who was crown prince until Wednesday’s reshuffle, is the youngest son of the founder of Saudi Arabia, the late King Abdul-Aziz al-Saud. At 69 years old he once headed the kingdom’s intelligence agency but was largely seen as a transitional figure in his post as crown prince.

Power has passed among Abdul-Aziz’s sons, from brother to brother, since his death in 1953. The crown prince and deputy crown prince are both from among a generation of grandsons of Abdul-Aziz.

The late King Abdullah had named Moqren as crown prince in a move approved at the time by the Allegiance Council, a body made up of the living sons of Abdul-Aziz and some of the prominent grandsons who vote to pick the king and crown prince from among them.

The Allegiance Council, whose work was formalised under Abdullah before his passing in January, was likely consulted about the current reshuffle.

[Singha]

>> king’s son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, had been appointed deputy crown prince. He is believed to be around 30 years old and is also the country’s defence minister

he is the one pushing the yemen offensive. probably future king.

[vijaykarthik]

Link for the same here: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world ... c=rss&_r=0

Crazy shit, I think, this decision is. I think there is going to be a serious push pull in the royalty now.

Now, I wish the idiots really make a move into Yemen and be caught in a bind!

[Shreeman]

Hmm. Worse than one thought, this reshuffle. But, yemen is at least six months behind schedule. Ukraine, nepal, whatever. Yemen needs its five minutes in the limelight.

Now if only saddam had thought of only air strikes for 6 months! Will the iraqis wait for SA to pacify Yemen before turning on them? Or will they make for an interesting time on the other side? Will pakistan let lose on western iran with its non-state acting? Kuwait, Bahrain, UAEish. All will have shia issues too.

[vijaykarthik]

Don't know if this is true. But an alternate counter view. Seems to make a bitta sense too.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan ... with-iran/

What No One Tells You: The Real Reason For Nuke Deal With Iran

IMO, I would rather have an independent Iran w/o sanctions than have them under the current Charlie foxtrot environment.

[Falijee]

Don't know if this is true. But an alternate counter view. Seems to make a bitta sense too.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan ... with-iran/

What No One Tells You: The Real Reason For Nuke Deal With Iran

IMO, I would rather have an independent Iran w/o sanctions than have them under the current Charlie foxtrot environment.

Vijaykarth ji _ Your "alternate counter view" makes sense when you factor in Pak's refusal to send troops, the presence of the Iranian Foreign Minister in Isloo , during the NA debate, and later the decision to again revive the IP pipeline.( which will also be used to supply China).
The clear loser, in all of this is US and SA

[kmkraoind]

Saudi royal coup over succession changes thwarted by lack of wheelchair access

Revolutionary Saudi royals hoping to topple King Salman after he dramatically announced new heirs to the throne have blamed a lack of disability access for the rebellion’s failure.

The new Saudi premiere, who took over from the late King Abdullah in January, yesterday revealed a major cabinet reshuffle that saw a new, younger generation of princes lined up to succeed him.

The move was met with anger from a group led by the 69-year-old Crown Prince Muqrin, who had been previously next in line. But a planned coup that would have removed Salman and installed Muqrin as ruler fell short this morning, with sources citing wheelchair access as the main obstacle.

“Until the royal palace installs the necessary ramps, we’ll have to put our revolution on hold,” said an insider, who added that a shortage of disabled toilets was also a “major concern.”

First I thought it must be some satire website, but its not, and I am after reading this.

[Shreeman]

This is an actual material deterioration --
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wir ... e-30695024

[Agnimitra]

X-post from Kurdistan thread:

White House opposes key bill recognizing Iraqi Kurdish, Sunni forces as 'country'

WASHINGTON DC – The Obama administration is opposing a US defense bill that authorizes “direct military assistance” for Kurdish forces and Sunni tribal forces and recognizes them as “country,” the State Department said on Wednesday.

The House Armed Services Committee on Monday released the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Markup for Fiscal Year 2016, a draft bill auhthorizing $715 million in aid to forces fighting the Islamic State (ISIS) Iraq.

“The policy of this Administration is clear and consistent in support of a unified Iraq,” acting State Department spokesperson Marie Harf said during a daily media briefing.

[Philip]

There is one analyst who says that the Saudi palace pecking order reshuffle has had a benevolent "Uncle's" hand behind it. Whatever the truth,the Yemen spat ,and the Houthis being urged on by Iran,now appears to be another "lie". This has been another engineered spat thanks to the benevolent "Uncle".

A new book is out about Israel's search for friends in the region.V.interesting,by a dormer Mossad agent.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-b ... ook-review
Periphery: Israel’s search for allies in the Middle East by Yossi Alpher

For those weary of the rhetoric of politicians or the propagandizing of think tanks, former Mossad agent’s new book is like a ‘torrent of fresh air’ based on over three decades of information and experience

Periphery book
Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies
Gareth Smyth for Tehran Bureau

Thursday 30 April 2015
A new book by Yossi Alpher, who has been both a Mossad operative and co-editor of the Israeli-Palestinian newsletter Bitterlemons, examines the history of the “Periphery doctrine”, a general rubric covering Israel’s search for allies in the Middle East.

Despite originating in the office of prime minister David Ben Gurion around 1957-8, the doctrine has been more influential in Mossad and other intelligence agencies than in Israeli diplomacy or covert politics. Its basic aim has been finding regional partners against the “Arab core”, originally understood as a coalition of states led by the Egypt of Gamal Abdul Nasser.

These allies have been both countries and ethnic or religious minorities within countries, and have at various times included Turkey, the Shah’s Iran, Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco and Greece as well as the Maronites of Lebanon, the Iraqi Kurds, the south Sudanese and the Berbers. The doctrine was most significant, argues Alpher, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, when faded in response to apparent progress in peace talks with the ‘core’ Arab states and the Palestinians, before re-emerging after 2010 with the Arab Spring as “years of Arab state dysfunction” spawned a new era of Arab revolution”.

The highpoint of the periphery doctrine - the “flagship operation” - was Trident, an intelligence alliance with Turkey and Iran beginning in the late 1950s. This lasted with Iran until the 1979 Revolution, and with Turkey until prime minister Recep Erdogan took a distance from Israel around 2009.

How useful Trident was to those involved remains unclear. A Trident headquarters in Israel was paid for by the CIA – with a blue section for Iranians and a yellow one for Turks – but never really used and soon became a Mossad training facility.

Iran did at least export oil to Israel, beginning when Mohammad Mossadegh was prime minister, and by the later 1970s there were also arms sales and several thousand Israeli businessmen living with their families in Tehran. While there was “almost daily sharing of raw intelligence data”, writes Alpher, mainly concerning Nasser’s Egypt or the Soviet Union, both Turkey and Iran kept a distance, a kind of plausible deniability, especially to defray Arab fears.

Alpher argues Trident had little practical value for Israel: he quotes David Kimche, a Mossad veteran, that “it’s astounding how shallow in vital areas their [ie Iran’s] intelligence was”. Its importance, argues Alpher, was rather in sending “an important message to the Americans, the Soviets, and the Arabs: Israel was not alone; it had important regional allies”.

Perhaps the most gripping part of Alpher’s book for those most interested in Iran is his critique of what he calls “periphery nostalgia”, which he defines as “the presumption that because Iran has historic tensions with the Arab world and because one Iranian regime, that of the shah, seemingly allied itself strategically with Israel…this pattern of alliance and shared strategic interests must…continue…”

Alpher ridicules any notion of a natural affinity between Jews and Persians going back to King Cyrus in the 6th century BC allowing Jews exiled in Babylon to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the temple. He cites Trita Parsi, who studied the Iran-Israel relationship in depth for his book Treacherous Alliance, quoting an interview where Parsi sums up his discussions with diplomats from the Shah’s time, contrasting, on one hand, the Israelis for whom “there seemed to be not only an ideological [tie] but also a fulfilment of destiny... [a belief in] a new chapter of the Bible being written” with, on the other hand, the Iranians who had “no idea” of these supposed ties and who “couldn’t care less”.

Alpher analyses Iran-Contra and Israel’s arms supplies to Iran during the 1980-88 war with Iraq as examples of the same fallacy, through a misplaced conviction that “a moderate faction involved in a power struggle in Iran would be strengthened...thereby paving the way to a strategic breakthrough in Israeli-Iranian relations”.

Alpher sees more recent advocates of “regime change” as another instance of Israelis who “willfully or erroneously engage in wishful thinking and ignore the dramatic change that has taken place in Iran’s power structure since the shah’s day”. The reality, he argues, is that “the majority of Iranians appear to support at least the idea of the regime, which has struck deep institutional and cultural roots”.

For those weary of the rhetoric of politicians or the propagandizing of think tanks, Alpher’s sparkling book, based on information and experience acquired over 30 years, including interviews with several heads of Mossad, is a torrent of fresh air. As a former intelligence operative, he well knows that all rulers – Israeli or Iranians – combine pragmatism with core beliefs and ideology.

He is also aware they can come to believe in their own half-truths and wishes. Hence his argument over “periphery nostalgia” is not just that it distorts reality but that it is dangerous.

For Alpher is among those Israelis who still believe that, despite formidable obstacles, peace with the Palestinians and the “Arab core” is both possible and desirable. The danger in a nostalgic approach to Iran is that it encourages Israel “consciously or inadvertently [to] ignore prospects for coexistence with its immediate Arab neighbours because it convinces itself of the seeming immutability of its periphery relationships”.

Yossi Alpher, Periphery: Israel’s Search for Allies in the Middle East, is published by Rowman & Littlefield

[ramana]

Real lesson is ties must be based on current realities and not hopeful nostalgia of the past. Some thing JLN coterie in IFS/MEA forgot

[RamaY]

The exact very same words were used by Seljuk Turks against the Ottoman Turks who were using muskets and fighting from far.
This "why don't you face us on the ground" meme is a pan Islamist theme. In fact the Spanish imbibed this in their "let us settle this mano, mano!" cry.

Sir, what happened to Seljuk Turks?

[RamaY]

Islamist Turkish President Erdogan Says A 'Mastermind' Is Plotting Against Turkey; Antisemitic 'Documentary' Says Jews Have Been 'Mastermind' For Over 3,500 Years

Comment: This guy is an out and out Islamist plus a confirmed anti semite!

There is no good Christian/Muslim who isn't an anti-Semite.