Anyway, some details I found interesting:
Nurturing shipyards: the case of HSL - Ajai Shukla
Besides all this, there is the fact that the defence ministry – at the navy’s urging – took over HSL from the Ministry of Shipping specifically to use it as a submarine yard.
I don't find this believable - if the Navy had asked the MoD to take over HSL, won't they have at least evaluated it for nuke ship building prior to making such a recommendation? Clearly, they decided against it and went with the SBC next door, so what's the point of a recent committee going over the same question? He should have asked the Navy for their comments on why HSL was chosen, and what role they expected it to play. Would clarify matters.Another reason for entrusting HSL with Kilo-class refits is that the defence ministry’s logic for taking over HSL from the ministry of shipping in 2010 no longer holds good. Amongst other uses, HSL was to build nuclear submarines, which are currently assembled next door at the Special Boat Centre (SBC), a small Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) facility. While MDL built conventional submarines, HSL’s protected location on the eastern coast and its deep-water harbour made it ideal for building larger nuclear submarines that are needed in growing numbers. The first nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant, will be followed by at least three more SSBNs. A line of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) is likely, though not yet sanctioned. But a defence ministry committee recently determined that HSL cannot build nuclear submarines, because of nuclear hazard --- its workers live too close to the shipyard.
This is interesting, so HSL can potentially build large supply ships and maybe even destroyers. Now the plan to give HSL some supply ship orders make sense.Its geographical advantages are priceless. Visakhapatnam port is ten metres deep, far better for launching big ships than the four-metre-deep MDL and GSL, or GRSE, which is on a riverfront. Visakhapatnam harbour requires little dredging because no river flows into it, and a narrow harbour mouth prevents the sea from bringing in sand. HSL owns a full kilometre of water frontage in Visakhapatnam, including a massive 560-metre outfitting jetty that would please any shipbuilder. It is the MoD’s largest shipyard with a work area of 117.55 acres and living accommodation of 142 acres, significantly larger than metro-based dockyards like MDL (75.5 acres). HSL’s shipbuilding facilities include an 80,000 DWT (dead weight tonnes) covered dry dock that can take in an aircraft carrier, and three slipways, including two with capacities of 33,000 DWT and one of 15,000 DWT.
Agree with the rest, except for the refit in Russia part. Without any comments from the Navy, it's unclear why that happened, or maybe there was some quid pro quo.
Given the volume of shipbuilding needed for meeting the navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP), the defence ministry has business enough for HSL, as well as every warship-building shipyard. The MCPP envisages the growth of today’s 137-ship navy, with barely 50 capital warships, into a 160-ship navy with 90 capital warships. Even as new warships are built, the existing fleet requires maintenance and refit, necessarily in country.
A quick survey of the load on defence shipyards shows how badly HSL is needed. Cochin Shipyard Ltd is occupied building India’s aircraft carriers. MDL and GRSE, which together cannot meet the requirement of capital warships like destroyers, frigates, corvettes and submarines, can be supplemented by Larsen & Toubro (L&T), which has valuable technical expertise and a new, 900-acre shipyard at Katupalli, Tamil Nadu. There is good infrastructure in other private sector shipyards, like ABG and Pipavav, but neither has ever built capital warships or submarines. Even so, there are adequate navy and Coast Guard orders for patrol vessels, survey ships, floating docks and diving support vessels. These are required not just for Indian maritime agencies but also for export to Indian Ocean countries as a part of naval diplomacy.
HSL, therefore, must be deliberately developed into a capital warship yard, given its location, infrastructure and recent expertise in refitting submarines. The defence ministry decision to send two Kilo-class submarines to Russia must be changed in favour of HSL. It must also be nominated to build the navy’s requirement of five fleet support ships, large vessels that HSL has experience in building. Perhaps most importantly, the defence ministry must alter HSL’s mindset as a sick shipyard, inherited from the Ministry of Shipping. Its accumulated losses and negative net worth must be made good and a stable cash flow ensured to allow HSL to operate like a corporation. The ministry’s fourth shipyard has the potential to come good; it cannot be allowed to fail.