LCA Tejas: News and Discussions

[Karan M]

Russian or European retired engineers be willing to relocate and work given enough incentives.

Most sensible programs start like this onlee.

The ALH actually started like this but greedy, thoroughly incompetent and glory hunting Indian guys in the program, who were more politicians than actual goal oriented engineers, completely queered the pitch and thoroughly buggered the program. Many of them are safely rotting in hell. They all crashed and burned, one by one, when they could not produce results as promised. Each worthy grabbing promotions far beyond their capability.

The MBB guys left in sheer disgust.

Oh the poor MBB guys. Whereas of course the Indian guys were as usual "incompetent and glory hunting" etc. Lets hear from the horse's mouth.

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2013/02/ ... -hand.html

The following paper by HAL's Group Captain (Retd) Hari Nair is to be presented at the Aero India 2013 seminar this week. It is, perhaps, the first brutally honest look at India's Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv programme. A fantastic, enlightening read:

By Group Captain (Retd) Hari Nair

4. The ALH (Dhruv) was designed against then futuristic benchmarks and its design and technology is indicative of this fact. At the time of inception in the early Eighties, there were several budding technological options in rotor blades, gearboxes and vibration control that promised large jumps in performance and other benefits. At that period of time, when these budding technological options were still in a state of flux, the Negotiations Committee took their considered decision to approve certain design options recommended by MBB to achieve the specified benchmarks.
Lessons Learnt

5. While its quite easy to be wise after the event and hindsight is always ‘6x6’, the indisputable fact is that the combination of spectrum-sweeping performance and role requirements that were demanded from a single platform and certain design options that were incorporated, caused extremely severe hurdles to practical implementation. Whereas today one is not aware of the imperatives that influenced the drafting of the staff requirements in the late Seventies, or the decision of the Negotiations Committee in accepting the recommendations of MBB in the early Eighties, the fact remains that some of the futuristic design options put forth by MBB were initially resounding failures. The project that was supposed to have progressed smoothly under the tutelage of advanced German technology, instead stumbled badly to almost a point of no-return and required extreme effort by our indigenous teams to recover, re-develop from basic design stages and optimise for production. Each of the contributory factors therefore needs deeper scrutiny for better clarity.

It would also appear that MBB had either over-estimated their capabilities or perhaps had even attempted to experiment the feasibility of some of these concepts at the cost of our project.

The project to develop the MGB was sub-contracted by MBB to ZF (Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen), Germany, a drive-train specialist that had previous aviation experience limited to developing and building gear boxes for the smaller MBB’s BK-117 and Bo-105 helicopters.

(b) Although ZF’s BK-117 MGB also uses a two-stage reduction, it has important differences in layout and geometry of the bevel and collective gears. Also, it handles only about half of the power of the ALH MGB. The first series of ALH MGBs were spectacular failures – these would not even last one hour of ground run on the Ground Test Vehicle (GTV). After every ground run, shed gear material would be found on the magnetic plugs indicating commencement of gear teeth failures. Initially ZF’s MGBs stubbornly refused to improve despite various efforts and this threatened to bring the whole project literally and figuratively to a grinding halt. After MBB (and ZF) left, it took our dedicated in-house transmission team many years of sweat and hard work, to recover the situation by going back to the drawing board, experiment with several remedial measures and introduce numerous modifications, so as to gradually bring the MGB to production standard. Obviously, this caused severe delays in the project.

Like the MGB, the initial ARIS design by MBB was another spectacular failure. All four ARIS failed halfway through the first flight itself and on return, all the four ARIS’s composite diaphragms were found cracked. Like the MGB, the ARIS proved to be another extremely difficult design failure to correct. Despite initial modifications, the ARIS springs used to routinely fail within 10 hours of flight. Again after MBB left, it was another herculean task again taken on by our in-house vibration analyses group to re-design, experiment and gradually bring the ARIS to a standard suited for production aircraft.

(b) Subsequently, it was learnt that MBB had worked in parallel on another version of vibration isolators and had installed a simpler two-axis SARIB vibration dampers on their Tiger attack helicopter, which uses a main rotor similar to the ALH. During an informal interaction many years later with MBB’s then chief designer for ALH in India, he candidly indicated to this author that the ARIS in his opinion was not an easy concept to implement and should not have been used for a first-time project like the ALH. Here it would appear that there was an attempt by MBB to experiment with an uncertain high-risk design option on our project.

etc etc.

Poor MBB left in disgust indeed. Or rather, they were kicked out (and happily scuppered since they didn't have to fix their own mess).

Accountability of Design Consultant. The abrupt departure of MBB during 1994-95 was due to non-renewal of contract and this was at the time when flight testing had picked up and all the problems related to some of the new concepts being implemented, especially the MGB, ARIS and increase in Empty Weight had clearly manifested. HAL designers, with no previous experience were now suddenly required to tackle these issues, which led to further delays. Ideally, MBB should have been held accountable and asked to stay on to rectify these difficult design deficiencies. They could have been contracted to stay on, until the design was successfully transferred to the regular production line. The extension contract document could have been structured to include these aspects and also progressively reduce their involvement as the project matured towards production.

[Karan M]

From the discussion in last few pages, what emerges is ADA wanted to design a flying plane while IAF wants a fighter plane.

It is the IAF which asked for TDs first, only after which they cleared FSED. Sequential development comes with timeline impact. The IAF asked for flying planes aka TDs which were tech demos and the PVs ended up having to be significantly redesigned as combat aircraft. The IAF raised a huge number of late change requests. Ideally these should have been baked into the program much much earlier. The crux is the IAF played the far away customer as versus being an integrated member. Fighter pilots being deputed late into the program and saying "change the cockpit" is an example of hands off customer style which is not sufficient given our challenges.

In the last few pages we find:
- The whole aerodynamics is incorrect for the mission. Its draggy in the transonic region.

Which is directly linked to the fact the IAF asked for MiG-21 dimensions with HAS shelters and basing optimized for the MiG-21. The IAF has admitted as much tacitly and withdrawn this, hence Mk2 and NLCA Mk2 have different dimensions.
Next, draggy in the transonic region? As compared to what, our MiG-21s which we will flog into the 2020s, the MiG-27s and Jaguars? Hardly.

- A whole slew of irritants come up regularly delaying the project. The five milestones is an example.
Derby, radome, radar all three linked.
Refueling probe is also linked to radome mfg!
Gun firing trials this late in game even after HF-24 gun hamartia is not right. Was the LCA structure not stiff enough to absorb the shock and vibrations.
The reason given of LRUs need requalification shows a big gap.
Makes you wonder if it was meant to fight or just fly.
IAF is not the best customer but they seem to have point here.

Program management with LCA has always been dysfunctional with a lightweight ADA trying to negotiate with two powerful entities outside of its control, the IAF and HAL, and also being prey to internal politics (the decision to keep flogging the Kaveri despite program managers wishing to go for a proven engine earlier).
Having said that, these are all minor irritants and peanuts compared to the real challenges faced such as FBW development, composite wing, and engine availability. Overall. the program is on the cusp of delivery and its upto HAL to get numbers out at the right quality.

[shiv]

Gun firing trials have got me worried now. Revelation that LRUs need to be re-qualified is very revealing.

There is no running commentary on the program any ways. So don't worry. The golden rule is , no news IS good news! There was a video earlier of the guns being fired on the ground, posted on BRF too. The gun firing thing is the easy part. Vibration loads are easily quantified and in this day and age handled quite easily , that too with a proven gun that has been integrated and used in an airframe for like 50 years.

I would agree with this. LRUs of course need to be revalidated after being subjected to such intense vibration because that might set a limit on the length of burst of gunfire. Every time I have read about powerful aircraft I have read that pilots need to keep the shooting down to short bursts. Other than perhaps A-10 no one goes "brrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrp". It is "brrp" brrrp"

So LRU would have to be revalidated after 1/4 second, 1/2 second and 1 second burst. The GSh 23 I think has a rate of fire of 60 rps - so that would be 15 rounds, 30 rounds and 60 rounds. It probably only carries 2-3 seconds worth of ammunition anyway. I'm no expert but each 23 mm round is 325 grams being shot out of a 1 meter barrel at 700 m/sec works out to a massive 80,000 Joules per round - or 4.8 million Joules in 1 second. I would be happy to hear about electronic items that are designed to sit next to something being treated to the recoil from such energy release.

Looking at the Eurofighter timeline I find
1. First flight of demonstrator - 1986
2. First gun firing trial 2004
3. The UK took delivery of EF without guns and decided it would not need them

[ramana]

KaranM, Lots of lessons learned in handling foreign consultants. The problem is always something new will happen when using consultants.

BTW, from your link above looks like NP3& NP4 are the ones to watch.

Shiv, very good perspective on gun trials.

Usually electronics packages near such high vibration environments need to be mounted on isolators.
Some of the recoil is used to energize the other barrel in the GAST design.
So not all the 4.8MJ is absorbed in the structure.


KaranM, very good summary of the program history of the various phases.

[SaiK]

We trash JSF like as if we are so good about building advanced fighters.. what problems JSF faced is nothing compared to what LCA faces. LCA problems are kinda miniature JSF problem, and what they did is moving towards "capability driven architecture". /search chacha.

JSF is nearing realization even though there are politically motivated people who dislike JSF. forget about the few params that they argue about, and heck it is not meant to be a raptor by design. its use cases are entirely different.

@EoD, IAF is only interested in capabilities.

[chetak]

Karan,

I do not agree with all that Nair says. He has the right to say what he does.

I know many test pilots who know full well what they are talking about and who would see things very differently. Most of these experimental TPs have flown for HAL over extended periods and have been involved in both rotary and fixed wing testing per their specialization.

The non renewal of the contract was a politically manipulated decision by motivated people based on assurances that the Indian team was capable of completing the project. The problems that manifested then are still around in one form or the other today.

The IN paid money first to HAL for the development of the ALH because that is how badly they wanted it to succeed but finally reduced their orders from the +200 or so nos, give or take, to the paltry numbers that they operate now because the helo was not viable for IN use and HAL had no solution then and still does not have any. The unacceptable stuff were all safety critical.

I am not trolling or trying to start a flame war.

[srin]

Chetak-sir, that document is from a person who has been associated with the project (and a member of this forums too) and so has the status of authoritative information. If you could provide any open source doc that throws alternate light on the subject, I'm sure nobody would consider it trolling.

[Karan M]

Karan,

I do not agree with all that Nair says. He has the right to say what he does.

I know many test pilots who know full well what they are talking about and who would see things very differently. Most of these experimental TPs have flown for HAL over extended periods and have been involved in both rotary and fixed wing testing per their specialization.

The non renewal of the contract was a politically manipulated decision by motivated people based on assurances that the Indian team was capable of completing the project. The problems that manifested then are still around in one form or the other today.

The IN paid money first to HAL for the development of the ALH because that is how badly they wanted it to succeed but finally reduced their orders from the +200 or so nos, give or take, to the paltry numbers that they operate now because the helo was not viable for IN use and HAL had no solution then and still does not have any. The unacceptable stuff were all safety critical.

I am not trolling or trying to start a flame war.

Chetak, we are not exactly babes in the woods here. We too have spoken to many folks from these orgs and who have led these programs or have been involved with them.

Sorry to say, but your view on what MBBs role is/was and what HAL did/was is completely lopsided.

There is a recurrent theme in all your posts. All the local guys are trash, glory hunters, good for nothing etc. Guys abroad who waltz in were pious innocents etc.

Truth is more prosaic and usually in the middle, but so far none of the claims you have made actually bear out.

Hari Nair has hard data above. Where is the counter to that?

I can even quote what the Navy/IAF guys who worked on the ALH said about some of the shady shenanigans pulled (and continue to be pulled by many of these foreign vendors), but I don't have an interest in washing dirty linen.

Plus this:The IN paid money first to HAL for the development of the ALH because that is how badly they wanted it to succeed but finally reduced their orders from the +200 or so nos, give or take, to the paltry numbers that they operate now because the helo was not viable for IN use and HAL had no solution then and still does not have any. The unacceptable stuff were all safety critical.

is irrelevant to the original claims made about MBB et al.

[chetak]

Chetak-sir, that document is from a person who has been associated with the project (and a member of this forums too) and so has the status of authoritative information. If you could provide any open source doc that throws alternate light on the subject, I'm sure nobody would consider it trolling.

There is no open source for this.

My inputs are personal involvement in this project and inputs from ETPs who have actually flown the ALH and who are decades old friends of mine and folks with whom I willingly trusted my life on multiple occasions. I am that sure. I have no dog in this deal now.

The IN would not have withdrawn from this project is so drastic a fashion as it did if things had not seriously gone awry. It is a bad setback for them.

They are still looking for helos which they thought would be covered fully by the ALH purchase.

[Karan M]

All the "hush hush" stuff apart, none of this counters the stuff about what MBB pulled and what the TP who is actually involved with the program and who has been running it (and driving it to success) says.

That the ALH is unsuited for naval ops has long been known. No surprise there either.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2008/09/i ... n-two.html

1. Strengthened Undercarraige. The undercarriage must be specially adapted for deck landings. Unlike landing on terra firma, where the impact is primarily in one dimension (that of the weight of the helicopter impacting on hard ground) a ship is moving in three dimensions (roll, pitch and yaw) and the undercarriage must be capable of absorbing the impact of landing in all three dimensions. The navy says that the Dhruv’s undercarriage does not meet that requirement.

2. Folding Main Rotor. An on-board helo has to be accommodated into a very small hangar space, which means that the main rotors must have a system of hinges, which allow them to be quickly folded before putting the helo into the hangar (and then, equally quickly, unfolded when it is brought out for another flight). The navy’s initially stated requirement was for the rotors to be folded within a width of 3.5 metres.

Furthermore, the navy wants an automatic blade folding facility, of the kind that is installed in its Sea King helos. In this, onboard electrical or hydraulic actuators fold up the blades quickly, rather than having to go through the longer and more painstaking process of manually folding the blades. Remember, that in the smaller warships, the tips of the main rotor blades extend beyond the deck, overhanging the sea. So manually folding them --- by removing bolts and supporting the blades during folding/unfolding --- is an exercise that the navy would rather avoid.

HAL had a problem with foldable blades, as well as with installing an automatic system. A senior Dhruv designer told me, “the requirement of Blade Folding with a width of 3.5 metres was not feasible due to the inherent design characteristics of the ALH hingeless Main Rotor Blade with an Integrated Dynamic System”.

However, HAL worked on the problem and came up with the concept of “segmented blades”, which would be 5.1 metres wide instead of the navy’s requirement of 3.5 metres. HAL says the navy has agreed to the 5.1 metre width, and that the process of manually folding the “segmented blades” has been demonstrated to the navy.

However, HAL has not installed an automatic folding facility. HAL tells me, “Automatic blade folding was not pursued due to weight penalty of about 100 kgs”.

It may be useful here, for the readers’ understanding, to describe what HAL means by “segmented blades”.

“Segmented blades” comprise of two blade parts. The outer part is folded inwards to obtain the desired folded width. The other option is that of “Hingeless blades”, which have no physical hinges. These are made of composite materials, which ensures “virtual hinges”.

3. More “Time on Task”. The navy is demanding that the Dhruv must be able to spend 2 hours and 20 minutes on task (i.e. airborne with its task payload), and have an additional reserve of 20 minutes.

The Dhruv is simply not capable of meeting this requirement. HAL points out that, “this (requirement) is beyond the inherent payload capacity of any 5.5 tonne class helicopter in the world and can be met with difficulty by a 10-tonne class helicopter, given the Naval specification and weight requirement.”

If the Dhruv were flying empty, additional fuel tanks could have given it the ability to meet the Time on Task requirements. But the navy demands that the Dhruv must carry a heavy weapons and sensor payload, which rules out the fitment of extra fuel tanks. The need to carry such weapons and sensor payload put most naval helos, e.g. the Sea King, in a much higher weight class (10-14 tonnes).

IN SIMPLE TERMS, THE 5.5 TONNE DHRUV FALL BETWEEN TWO STOOLS. IT IS TOO LARGE AND HEAVY TO PERFORM THE ROLE (SEARCH & RESCUE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC) THAT 3-TONNE HELOS LIKE THE CHEETAH AND THE CHETAK CURRENTLY DO… AND TOO SMALL AND LIGHT TO REPLACE 10-14 TONNE HELOS LIKE THE SEA KING AND THE KAMOV.
.

[chetak]

Karan,

I do not agree with all that Nair says. He has the right to say what he does.

I know many test pilots who know full well what they are talking about and who would see things very differently. Most of these experimental TPs have flown for HAL over extended periods and have been involved in both rotary and fixed wing testing per their specialization.

The non renewal of the contract was a politically manipulated decision by motivated people based on assurances that the Indian team was capable of completing the project. The problems that manifested then are still around in one form or the other today.

The IN paid money first to HAL for the development of the ALH because that is how badly they wanted it to succeed but finally reduced their orders from the +200 or so nos, give or take, to the paltry numbers that they operate now because the helo was not viable for IN use and HAL had no solution then and still does not have any. The unacceptable stuff were all safety critical.

I am not trolling or trying to start a flame war.

Chetak, we are not exactly babes in the woods here. We too have spoken to many folks from these orgs and who have led these programs or have been involved with them.

Sorry to say, but your view on what MBBs role is/was and what HAL did/was is completely lopsided.

There is a recurrent theme in all your posts. All the local guys are trash, glory hunters, good for nothing etc. Guys abroad who waltz in were pious innocents etc.

Truth is more prosaic and usually in the middle, but so far none of the claims you have made actually bear out.

Hari Nair has hard data above. Where is the counter to that?

I can even quote what the Navy/IAF guys who worked on the ALH said about some of the shady shenanigans pulled (and continue to be pulled by many of these foreign vendors), but I don't have an interest in washing dirty linen.

Plus this:The IN paid money first to HAL for the development of the ALH because that is how badly they wanted it to succeed but finally reduced their orders from the +200 or so nos, give or take, to the paltry numbers that they operate now because the helo was not viable for IN use and HAL had no solution then and still does not have any. The unacceptable stuff were all safety critical.

is irrelevant to the original claims made about MBB et al.

We lost a lot of money on the MBB deal. It is not that the goras are always right. I don't particularly like the goras as anyone who knows me would vouch but somehow always ended up working with them or for them. They are arrogant and racist but always conscientious and do a full days work for a full days pay. At work, personal stuff aside, I admire them. The buggers are knowledgeable. The MBB guys said openly to extend their contract conditionally because the problems that the project had hit were difficult to solve and since the Indian team had made it's intentions clear, they respected that and understood that they (MBB) were not there for the full duration of the project as earlier envisaged. This was seen as a ploy by the MBB team to stay on. The entire team hated India and they wanted to go back because their lives were uncomfortable here. They maintained project secrecy by not having a single Indian employee of any consequence, even their secretaries were german women. Any inputs that came to the Indian side was half baked and not complete. This triggered resentment in the HAL team and that is how the scheme to cut short the contract was born. In design meetings the MBB guys were always guarded and the HAL guys did not know enough at that time to ask the right questions.

It was a disaster in the making.

BTW, the wasn't ALH the flown by a lot many pilots before Nair got there and a bulk of the development flying done and dusted??. There may be very little developmental flying of the ALH now and more on the new armed variant .

[Cain Marko]

From the discussion in last few pages, what emerges is ADA wanted to design a flying plane while IAF wants a fighter plane.d:

+100. I have come to a similar conclusion. The political masters at the time took this decision and it has led to most of the problems. The DRDO promised the moon and was taken in by US support what with RJ hobnobbing with Reagan and all...would have worked too had India toed the line. but considering Indian penchant for independent foreign policy, it was a disaster in the making . While it is true that the IAF took ahandsoff policy, it was also far more pragmatic than the technocrats and their political masters.

[SaiK]

what do you think is the solution?

[chetak]

So we have some failures, it's not the end of the world and this is a situation that every aircraft designing and building country in the world has found itself in, at some stage or the other. At least after the cancellation of the Kaveri project, a strong message has gone to all, PSUs and the services included. It's no longer business as usual.

Pick yourself up, dust off and press on.

but what is to be done in the interim as the fighter inventory is aging fast and serviceability rates seriously down and cost of maintenance is rising exponentially and normal attrition is not helping.

Agencies which promised stuff earlier may have to revamp and reboot to deliver, and the IAF may have to live much longer with inventory long past it's sell by date. One has only to remember the accident rates of the MiG 21s, the TV pictures of wailing families and public outcry to know what this can do to a nationalistic government and it's prospects.

It's no wonder that the IAF is perturbed and strongly pitching for imports. Good that Modi and Parikar are at least aware of this and are taking some action though not to the entire satisfaction of the IAF per reports. Next option may be to look for used aircraft of compatible types or similar types to ramp up numbers and capability quickly.

Didn't (east ) germany have some MiG 29s??

[sankum]

Karan M,

DAC has cleared the induction of 32 Naval Dhruv for Rs 7000 Cr to Coast Guard(16 nos) and IN (16 nos).

For CG Naval Dhruv won beating 4.3T naval Panther and one IN naval Dhruv sanctioned earlier by DAC as a test platform is already reported to be under test for ASW role.

These new Naval Dhruv will have new folded segmented main rotor of folding width of 3.5m as shown in recent Aero India and by 2020 you can expect this 32 nos in service.

It was a propaganda against Dhruv by lobbies for last several years and it matches endurance requirements.

AS story is now a old story.

[Suraj]

I am not trolling or trying to start a flame war.

But you are. He quoted an reference article from someone officially involved with the project. You are stating hearsay. As much as you'd like to believe your perspective is right, please don't continue when you cannot provide comparable references. Just an informal moderation note.

[member_22539]

So we have some failures

Would that be the LCA or the Dhruv?

[shiv]

From the discussion in last few pages, what emerges is ADA wanted to design a flying plane while IAF wants a fighter plane.
In the last few pages we find:
- The whole aerodynamics is incorrect for the mission. Its draggy in the transonic region.
- A whole slew of irritants come up regularly delaying the project. The five milestones is an example.
Derby, radome, radar all three linked.
Refueling probe is also linked to radome mfg!
Gun firing trials this late in game even after HF-24 gun hamartia is not right. Was the LCA structure not stiff enough to absorb the shock and vibrations.
The reason given of LRUs need requalification shows a big gap.
Makes you wonder if it was meant to fight or just fly.
IAF is not the best customer but they seem to have point here.

Ramana that is a very interesting observation and to put it in perspective we need to go back to Europe and America in the 1904 to 1914 period. People back then were building planes to fly, not to fight.

But a war started and European and American forces wanted a plane for war. They started by using what was available by having the pilot throw grenades or messages out of the open cockpit. Later they had a co-pilot/passenger with a gun.

It was years of failure and death that created close cooperation between user agency and plane-maker.

For India the user agency (IAF) has been accustomed to simply demanding and getting the performance they want from plane-makers abroad with a 50 year lead on India. Indian plane makers are still collecting the data needed to make planes fly and handle right.

The disagreement/dysjunction between IAF (user) and plane maker (ADA) is perfectly understandable but this is a birth pang that the nation must go through, in peace time if possible.

[Hobbes]

^^^^

That is a spot-on analysis. This is what has been bedeviling the Arjun as well as the LCA. I'm optimistic about the Forces changing their points of view and working to bridge the user/ builder gap, considering the positive changes we've been seeing in their attitude towards radars, the AE&WC and AWACS projects, the Astra missile and of course the Akash missile. The Navy of course has been the honourable exception, working to support domestic projects since inception.

[Singha]

one thing is sure- goras look after their own. you get a bunch from france, they will subcontract work only to people they are comfortable with back home or owe favours to and persuade the project team its in best interest and tfta stuff will be provided.

if you want to put saab as consultant for tejas mk2, rest assured a lot of high value parts will be sourced from sweden only.

[SaiK]

there should be no doubt on that at all.

[srai]

What is the long-term incentive for foreign nations/companies to help India become self-sufficient?

[Prasad]

But shiv ji,
Why has the IN been able to build its own aircraft carrier and a nuclear sub and dozens of other warships on its own without any of the nonsense we hear from the IA/IAF ? Truth be told a nuclear sub is leagues ahead of a fighter or tank no?

[nash]

Sweden offers India collaboration on fighters and submarines

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 632861.cms

Sweden has offered to collaborate with India on production of light combat aircraft in the country along with state-of-the-art submarines as part of the 'Make-in-India' initiative.

[shiv]

What is the long-term incentive for foreign nations/companies to help India become self-sufficient?

As long as it means their continued ability to do business and make money they will be interested. If it means selling out their core technological strengths and creating a competitor - they would be stupid to be interested.

I think all of us Indians too have been bewitched by Nehruvian words like "self sufficient". The impression that has been given to Indians by the use of that word is that "Oh we Indians, we are peaceable and poor and we lack so much. All we need is that little extra to make us self sufficient. We do not ask for more and we promise to harm you in no way"

These are the words of the "dignified beggar" - a recently wealthy man who has now fallen into bad times. We need to stop seeing ourselves that way because we are a threat to all the worlds resources and all the world's power. Oh of course we mean no harm, but many people see our existence as harm or at least as one problem they do not want to see enlarging.

If you now look at the last 40 years:
1. India has been inside Pakistan, east and west
2. India has been in Sri Lanka
3. India has been in Nepal
4. India has been in Myanmar
5. India has been in the Maldives
6. India has been active along the gulf and African coast

So we need to stop speaking of ourselves as the fakir who wants a little to keep himself alive for another day
Screw "self sufficiency". We need to be looking at "self reliance" and dominance. The country is big and has unavoidable clout and no one will really want to make that clout much bigger if it entails some loss to them at some time down the line.

When you rise you must rise on your own. Everyone will help you fall.

[geeth]

one thing is sure- goras look after their own

Ha ha! Everybody looks after themselves..India is the only exception who gives precedence to interests of other countries than their own. Often we dont mind getting screwed in the bargain.

[ramana]

shiv, The long gap between HF-24 and LCA ensured that any expertise, lessons learned were all wasted. Off course a fighter plan is for fighting and not just flying.


I know forum hates pingrezi of UB and Vina but to me they are two the best aerodynamicists on the forum who have described the issues. If any one cares go back and read with calm mind.


Also Kaveri didn't help. It doesn't have the oomph to help overcome LCA shortcomings.
And all the "it will be ready tomorrow" type statements did not help.

I agree IAF has its shortcomings but these masked the real concerns, as everyone went into a defensive mode when national efforts are criticized.

To me the NP3& NP4 will be markers to see if the LCA has traction or not.

--Technical comment:

They already make a good enough Kevlar radome.
They can make radomes with quartz using polyester resins.
The gap is in the resin system.
India has some of the best chemical engineers who can produce any of the required resins.
Yet Cobham was chosen for quartz and most likely BMI (which is a high temp strength resin)
And leads to delays.
Parallel track would be to get who ever makes epoxy resins in India to start pilot plant production of BMI type resins.
or do that in the numerous DRDO labs or CSIR labs.

[SaiK]

seriously, we can consult for the problems of LCA given such expertise on the forum. let us put a BRF team (UB saab, vina, ramana and shiv ji), and get a public driven management council on this project. ultimately, we also need proxy and resident consultant (vina?) in bengaluru who can directly contact team LCA, especially GTRE.

bottom line, jingo power the LCA where it is failing to present the right process/data for IAF to consider them seriously. we can work out the consulting fees. for what we may or may not know, all it might take is to nudge a few collars and squeeze few ears.

[Hobbes]

seriously, we can consult for the problems of LCA given such expertise on the forum. let us put a BRF team (UB saab, vina, ramana and shiv ji), and get a public driven management council on this project. ultimately, we also need proxy and resident consultant (vina?) in bengaluru who can directly contact team LCA, especially GTRE.

bottom line, jingo power the LCA where it is failing to present the right process/data for IAF to consider them seriously. we can work out the consulting fees. for what we may or may not know, all it might take is to nudge a few collars and squeeze few ears.

++++10^6

Maybe start by creating a special purpose website for this? It could have a FQDN like tejas.bharat-rakshak.com.

In this context, I think a critical bit is to manage the public message. While I'm sure the ADA and associated orgs have plenty of qualified folks, their problem is that (1) they're engineers, not PR folk/ messengers; (2) their communications ability is severely constrained by their employment conditions; (3) the channels they can work are limited. Knowledgeable folks like Vina and UBji can help deliver the right message and dispel FUD, and of course expose the lies of the DDM and various vested interests for what they are.

[Gagan]

[ramana]

Is there a cutaway sketch of LCA like Flight Intl provides on some aircraft? I like to see where the gun is empalced.

answering my own ?

http://img7.imageshack.us/img7/4035/escaneo001.jpg

Under engine intake.

(#38) LRUs are above the gun.

Hence requal.

[tsarkar]

I was a very early supporter of LCA having followed the HF-24 -> HF-74 saga. Used to scour Interavia, Flight and other obscure mags to get an idea of LCA progress since 1986. I thought after 1995 rollout of LCA TD1 its matter of time the plane will be complete. After the first flights of the series and IOC announcement thought its just a bunch of tests that need to be complete.
From the discussion in last few pages, what emerges is ADA wanted to design a flying plane while IAF wants a fighter plane.
In the last few pages we find:
- The whole aerodynamics is incorrect for the mission. Its draggy in the transonic region.
- A whole slew of irritants come up regularly delaying the project. The five milestones is an example.
Derby, radome, radar all three linked.
Refueling probe is also linked to radome mfg!
Gun firing trials this late in game even after HF-24 gun hamartia is not right. Was the LCA structure not stiff enough to absorb the shock and vibrations.
The reason given of LRUs need requalification shows a big gap.
Makes you wonder if it was meant to fight or just fly.
IAF is not the best customer but they seem to have point here.

Here is your observation astutely & precisely answered by one of the world's most renowned engineers in 1953.

In a statement to the U.S. Congress in 1953, early on in the development of nuclear reactors, Rickover addressed the confusion amongst the nation's decision-makers in his typical head-on fashion, and notably pointed out the chasm between the world of academia and the world of practical engineering:

“An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose (“omnibus reactor”). (7) Very little development is required. It will use mostly “off-the-shelf” components. (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now.

“On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated.

"The tools of the academic-reactor designer are a piece of paper and pencil with an eraser. It a mistake is made, it can always be erased and changed. If the practical-reactor designer errs, he wears the mistake around his neck; it cannot be erased. Everyone can see it.

“The academic-reactor designer is a dilettante. He has not had to assume any real responsibility in connection with his projects. He is free to luxuriate in elegant ideas, the practical shortcomings of which can be relegated to the category of “mere technical details.” The practical-reactor designer must live with these same technical details. Although recalcitrant and awkward, they must be solved and cannot be put off until tomorrow. Their solutions require manpower, time and money."

Do you notice eerie coincidence in the usage of the words Small, Cheap, Light, Quickly, Flexible couple of decades back and Long Time, Large, Heavy, Complicated now?

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyman_G._ ... _practical

[Singha]

wow...that hyman rickover para is worth saving and repeating to every fresher in every industry.

[Cain Marko]

Tsarkar sir, wow simply wow. Seems that IAF were handsoff during the academic phase and came on board much later during the practical phase

[Sid]

Timeless statement by a visionary. I used to read similar statements in Janes on JSF when all of its partners were running to get onboard a stealth fighter program.

TSarkar, thanks for sharing.

[member_28108]

It also applies to the armchair designers who criticize development efforts too with the paper planes they argue they could build.

[Singha]

^ it applies to all - immature design teams, armchair experts, immature end users, program managers, Phd's floating around with paper ideas and big ego's ...

not for nothing the man is a legend in the lines of some of the skunk works gurus.

[sankum]

Dual pulse I-Derby ER with 100 Km range for LCA.

That explains new Radome and also AESA LCA mk1 P for 100 Km target detection range.

Middle wing station should be able to carry two derby per station using multi rack just like in Sea Harrier.

I-Derby ER – All New Performance

[SaiK]

it does not mean academic process is not needed. it is a core step, and fundamental to going practical. it depends on the level of system complexities in design. btw, why not consider armchair as genuine jingo club who likes to get it done based on metrics collected from other similar projects.

and, nothing is being created new.. at worst, it is a re-invention of wheels.

[shyamoo]

Last week, I was talking to buddy of mine. He did his M.S. from a university in massa ( not your ivy league ). For his project work, he worked on smart fluids based suspensions ( project for the US army ). The fluid contains iron particles and when piston ( of the shock absorber ) is pushed, a magnetic field is applied around the field to align the particles in the direction of pressure, thereby increasing resistance and acting as a damper. I haven't explained the process in detail but you get the idea. Now when the piston moves out, it should move out a little slower than when moving in, ie, there must be a differential. So my friends's prof asks him how he would achieve this. My friend thought for a few seconds and said that he would use a funnel inside. The prof then thinks about it for a bit asks him, if he read this somewhere. But my friend informed him that he just thought of it and the prof wondered why this idea was never used before. He called in a post doc candidate working this problem and asked about using a funnel. He also never heard of it and decided to 'run the math'. They calculated that there would be quite a bit of differential.

The fun part started when they actually tried to build a device based in this principle. After overcoming a lot of techinical hurdles, my buddy managed to build one, but the real life performance did not exactly match the designed/expected parameters. The prof actually hired a contractor for 2 weeks to search for any instance where a funnel mechanism was used anywhere in the world and couldn't find one example of it.

The amount of effort it takes to translate a simple/novel idea into practice is substantial. The above is a simple example.