Poor IAF role in R&D, manufacture - HAL/IAF tiffs to blame?

[shiv]

Lest we forget.

Paper specs and reputations do not necessarily match reality. From the History of the HF 24

[deejay]

Shiv ji and others interested, I am cross posting a video linked by Andy B on the Su 30 thread. It is a Sukhoi PR video. If one can filter out the hype it is a treasure trove of valuable insights for India, IAF, ADA, HAL. From a national perspective to the perspective of Air Force, to that of the Engineers to Designers. From concept to Production with challenges be it political / economic etc. Around 50 mins so it will take time.

Here is another one looking at history of SU family developments. Hope Mods wont mind given that it does have great footage of SU30 and others including Pak Fa. It is a bit jingoistic but quality of footage is A grade!
Apologies if double post.

[Yagnasri]

May HF-24 was also suitable for low level attacks even today. One mango and OT question - Is it possible for us to make HF-24 today with some investment etc? More powerful engines and a export version - cheap and suitable for many developing nations?

[chetak]

May HF-24 was also suitable for low level attacks even today. One mango and OT question - Is it possible for us to make HF-24 today with some investment etc? More powerful engines and a export version - cheap and suitable for many developing nations?

carbon-fiber composites version, with advanced materials and alloys

It is one of the good looking fighter aircraft that I can remember.

[Baikul]

This is presently one of the best threads on BR.

Identifying fighter jock 'mentality' and 'attitude' as a phenomenon significant enough to impede indigenous manufacturing/ industrial progress of our air force doesn't feel right to me. Is the character of other major air forces around the world so significantly different from ours? Has the Indian fighter jock dominated the IAF to an extent unheard of in other comparable and more 'modern' air forces? So how do these other nations manage to do better than us at integrating with defence manufacturers? How do our fighter jocks manage to upset the whole apple cart? By extension, I believe that the Indian Navy does a better job of engaging with HAL not because it has a better attitude, but because systemic conditions have resulted in it developing a better attitude and doing a better job. So what are the systemic changes that would result in the IAF doing the same?

OT, but BR must find a way of collating and transforming some of these discussions into a more coherent format. Perhaps Shivji can be tempted to write a collection of sharply focused essays, along the lines of what he'd written on Bakistan. There's too much knowledge here it would be a pity to see going waste, too many lessons we seem to be condemned to repeat time and again.

[enaiel]

Does anyone know what the IAF is doing with the Tejas SP-1 fighter? Is it just sitting in a hangar?

[chaanakya]

Lest we forget.

Paper specs and reputations do not necessarily match reality. From the History of the HF 24

Something to add here

HF24 Marut

[Philip]

Tongue in cheek. Resurrect the HF-24 with new engines,he!he!

[shiv]

Anyone interested in a post of mine from 2011?
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1181085

The latest issue of Vayu has another great article from AM Philip Rajkumar about his days testing missiles and bombs - but he deliberately restricts himself to a period more than 30 years ago.

Did you know that in 1973-74 the Armament Testing Lab had replaced the very limited Infra red seeker of the K-13 (Atoll) misile with a radar seeker of equivalent size and weight. The modified missile was then able to follow radar signals from the parent aircraft and hit targets hidden by cloud/fog. The IAF was not interested.

On the other hand the IAF wanted a dumb bomb with fins to retard it so that it could be dropped from 100 feet and still allow the plane to escape the bomb blast. Simple fins were designed to be held by canvas straps that could withstand airspeed up to 450 knots. But quality control was poor and they could never design straps that could withstand speeds up to 1000 kmph which is what the IAF wanted. But later parachute retarded bombs were successfully designed. Before testing them the cameras designed to film the bomb drop became unserviceable. A search for a replacement revealed brand new cameras that were unused and had come with the B-24 Liberators and were not even known to be on the IAF inventory. Those cameras are still with ASTE apparently.

In another innovative act they fitted an R-60 on the overwing pylons of a Jaguar and test fired it successfully. The entire testing was done in 90 days at a cost of Rs 25,000! The problem after that was to design an overwing pylon for the Jag to carry the R-60. The pylons ended up being too high and AM Rajkumar tested the Jag with the new pylons and found that the flight characteristics of the Jag were unacceptable with teh R-60 pylons.

[Karan M]

Superb post Shiv. We can add the LGB jugaad in Kargil to the list. I wish the IAF catalogued all this for posterity. Am sure even today a lot of weapons and systems have been made interchangeable across platforms thanks to IAF ingenuity but we dont know about it publicly.

[shiv]

This is not about the IAF but it seems symptomatic of what we hear has been happening
http://idrw.org/indian-army-chasing-pip ... more-67262

The Army’s request is for an FRCV that will not only serve as a ‘medium’-sized main battle tank to replace the Army’s ageing fleet of licence-built Russian T-72s but also as a ‘light-tracked and wheeled tank’, built on the same platform. In layman terms, this is like asking for a Humvee and a Maruti 800 on the same platform. Hopefully, the document will be either withdrawn or amended before its July 31 deadline.

<snip>

Senior Army officers concede that such over-ambitious and flawed requests for information, leading to equally over-stretched, faulty and diluted tenders, are largely responsible for the alarming equipment shortage that the forces face today. The shortfall includes small arms, howitzers, assorted helicopters, armour with night-fighting capacity, air defence capability and varied ordnance, among other things.

<snip>

“The whole process is carried out with limited knowledge and blinkered views,” said former Maj. Gen. Mrinal Suman, the Army’s leading authority on acquisitions and offsets. Poorly conceived, formulated and drafted QRs create confusion and delays, resulting in the entire process being aborted much later, he said. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence concurs.

In its report tabled in Parliament on April 30, 2012, the Committee declared that as many as 41 of the Army’s proposals for diverse equipment in recent years were withdrawn or terminated. The reasons included faulty or over-ambitious qualitative requirements.

<snip>

The typical process is this: all available literature on the equipment is gathered and its multiple characteristics collated. The idea is to include as many features as possible to demonstrate how exhaustively the task has been performed. Thereafter, as the draft travels up the chain of command, it gathers additional parameters, as each officer feels compelled to suggest more improvements. “The final QR takes the shape of a well-compiled wish list of utopian dimensions, which simply do not exist,” stated Gen. Suman.

HOW ABOMINABLY STUPID!!!

[member_22539]

^Reminds me of one episode of the Simpsons, where Homer's brother allows him to design their company's new model of car. The buffoons of DGMF are about as intelligent and competent as Homer Simpson. At least, Homer knows he is stupid and yields to better sense sooner or later, which is more than I can say about the DGMF.

The DM must drag the officer in charge of the DGMF and ask for his immediate resignation. Sometimes, I wish we had a stalinesque system with firing squads waiting for such morons.

This is what you get with pompous asses for generals, obsessed with displaying their stars everywhere, even their stupid golf carts

[maitya]

This is not about the IAF but it seems symptomatic of what we hear has been happening
http://idrw.org/indian-army-chasing-pip ... more-67262

The Army’s request is for an FRCV that will not only serve as a ‘medium’-sized main battle tank to replace the Army’s ageing fleet of licence-built Russian T-72s but also as a ‘light-tracked and wheeled tank’, built on the same platform. In layman terms, this is like asking for a Humvee and a Maruti 800 on the same platform. Hopefully, the document will be either withdrawn or amended before its July 31 deadline.

<snip>

Senior Army officers concede that such over-ambitious and flawed requests for information, leading to equally over-stretched, faulty and diluted tenders, are largely responsible for the alarming equipment shortage that the forces face today. The shortfall includes small arms, howitzers, assorted helicopters, armour with night-fighting capacity, air defence capability and varied ordnance, among other things.

<snip>

“The whole process is carried out with limited knowledge and blinkered views,” said former Maj. Gen. Mrinal Suman, the Army’s leading authority on acquisitions and offsets. Poorly conceived, formulated and drafted QRs create confusion and delays, resulting in the entire process being aborted much later, he said. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence concurs.
<snip>

The typical process is this: all available literature on the equipment is gathered and its multiple characteristics collated. The idea is to include as many features as possible to demonstrate how exhaustively the task has been performed. Thereafter, as the draft travels up the chain of command, it gathers additional parameters, as each officer feels compelled to suggest more improvements. “The final QR takes the shape of a well-compiled wish list of utopian dimensions, which simply do not exist,” stated Gen. Suman.

HOW ABOMINABLY STUPID!!!

He! He! Now, can it not be related to the LCA ASR framing business as well - a la my post here

After all, what is the gurantee that such malaise is limited to the office of DGMF alone, and is not prevalent in the Vayu Bhavan as well ...
Rhyming with what is posted above, I'm sure "the LCA ASR framing business" has been certified as a "demonstration of a task been done exhaustively" and some "of the parameters (e.g. the STR)" may have been "strengthened" as the "draft travelled up the chain of command" and as "as each officer felt compelled to suggest more improvements", there as well - no?

So, maybe a 14deg/sec STR gathered 3-4 more deg/secs as it travelled 3-4 such layers of chain of command to eventually become unobtanium of 18deg/sec STR alongwith a 24deg/sec ITR (at 0.7M and 8Gs etc), there!! No chance of that happeneing, right??

Admins, sorry to have requoted to entire quote ...

[shiv]

After all, what is the gurantee that such malaise is limited to the office of DGMF alone, and is not prevalent in the Vayu Bhavan as well ...
Rhyming with what is posted above, I'm sure "the LCA ASR framing business" has been certified as a "demonstration of a task been done exhaustively" and some "of the parameters (e.g. the STR)" may have been "strengthened" as the "draft travelled up the chain of command" and as "as each officer felt compelled to suggest more improvements", there as well - no?

So, maybe a 14deg/sec STR gathered 3-4 more deg/secs as it travelled 3-4 such layers of chain of command to eventually become unobtanium of 18deg/sec STR alongwith a 24deg/sec ITR (at 0.7M and 8Gs etc), there!! No chance of that happeneing, right??

Admins, sorry to have requoted to entire quote ...

It sounds like exactly the same disease of mug-pot incompetence may well have affected Vayu bhavan as well with the man creating the requirements doing his best to extract the best from every foreign brochure with no knowledge whatsoever about what is technologically feasible and then passing it to his superior who, being superior feels compelled to add two paise of his own to show how much more he knows about all this and so on. In a private civilian establishment - sooner or later someone will call out any unrealistic, unachievable bullshit that is brought up by seniors or juniors. But in the armed forces I am sure the junior who knows must shut up on pain of his next promotion or posting. This is so sad.

There is a complete disconnect between army and air force from industrial capability and technology in India. The way every foreign country puts pretty girls and champagne glasses out for potential buyers is a long long way from what these people get from a visit to a DRDO establishment.

Time and time again sub-standard equipment has been imported because of this. It's a shame

[rohitvats]

It sounds like exactly the same disease of mug-pot incompetence may well have affected Vayu bhavan as well with the man creating the requirements doing his best to extract the best from every foreign brochure with no knowledge whatsoever about what is technologically feasible and then passing it to his superior who, being superior feels compelled to add two paise of his own to show how much more he knows about all this and so on.

When it comes to LCA, was it not the R&D establishment which went ahead and promised a world class airplane in double quick time to fill the IAF requirement? And subsequently missed every deadline which they themselves have given out? So, who was detached from the technological reality of India? And was the plane designed to meet ASR or were ASR enforced on existing design which could not meet them in first place?

In a private civilian establishment - sooner or later someone will call out any unrealistic, unachievable bullshit that is brought up by seniors or juniors. But in the armed forces I am sure the junior who knows must shut up on pain of his next promotion or posting. This is so sad.

I think the same applies to R&D establishment as well. No skin of anyone's back if the product meets the use requirement or gets delivered on time or not.

[shiv]

When it comes to LCA, was it not the R&D establishment which went ahead and promised a world class airplane in double quick time to fill the IAF requirement? And subsequently missed every deadline which they themselves have given out? So, who was detached from the technological reality of India? And was the plane designed to meet ASR or were ASR enforced on existing design which could not meet them in first place?

rohit - you and I are old hands at this. I have deliberately started a completely different thread to bash DRDO and HAL. Having started that thread this thread is to pinpoint the other hand that failed to clap - the armed forces side.

We have been following these issues for over a decade. Every time DRDO is blamed, someone pipes up and blames the armed forces and vice versa. May I point out that on this thread, specifically designed to make the armed forces walk the plank - you are changing the subject and pointing fingers at DRDO. DRDO is being drawn and quartered in another parallel thread.

No one is going to escape. While the DRDO may be incompetent bums the armed forces are not free of blame. It is the "ping pong" of tossing the blame to the other court that simply muddies the issue.

[member_22539]

When it comes to LCA, was it not the R&D establishment which went ahead and promised a world class airplane in double quick time to fill the IAF requirement? And subsequently missed every deadline which they themselves have given out? So, who was detached from the technological reality of India? And was the plane designed to meet ASR or were ASR enforced on existing design which could not meet them in first place?

It was due to those sky high promises that we today have the LCA and even the ADA. If it were up to IAF, we would have been stuck with white elephants like the Rafale, forced to sell the family silver to protect the nation, beggaring ourselves in the process (of course, that is no skin off the nose of the IAF).

Thanks to those scientists, who knew the kind of politics being played, we are at the cusp of the only viable solution for the dwindling numbers and indeed increased requirements.

Without those sky high promises for the LCA, we wouldn't have dared to even think of the AMCA and would have been at the mercy of the Russians and their crappy products for ever.

[shiv]

I don't think anyone deliberately wants to be unfair. Both threads were started by me nearly simultaneously. The DRDO bashing thread has more posts and more replies. The blame on the armed forces is smaller. But there is no need to over react. On BRF most of us are sympathetic to the armed forces. But blame must be apportioned when necessary and justified. the article that I linked above is written by an army officer. That is why it found a place here.

[ramana]

Shiv, In the TV serial Chanakya, there are a number of episodes where Chanakya suborns the Magdha army commander (Played by a young Irfan Khan) into arms/horses purchases corruption. And then blackmails him into inaction later on.

Looks like modern day DGMF doesn't even need suborning. All that has to be done is flood them with brochures and they will themselves lead to inaction (force disarmament) by asking for composite requirements which cannot be met.

[rohitvats]

It was due to those sky high promises that we today have the LCA and even the ADA. If it were up to IAF, we would have been stuck with white elephants like the Rafale, forced to sell the family silver to protect the nation, beggaring ourselves in the process (of course, that is no skin off the nose of the IAF).

If it were to IAF, and if the R&D establishment had listened to what IAF wanted, we would've had 5-6 Squadrons of operational light fighter in service by now. It is exactly because R&D establishment made LCA into a science project w/o bothering to factor in the operational requirement of IAF, that we're where we are. The true worth of LCA is only when it can be inducted and deployed as a weapon system in IAF. And sustained and maintained effectively by the production agency during its lifetime.

Till date, LCA has not reached that stage.

And net result is that LCA will enter service with a series of permanent waivers to original promised performance levels by the same R&D establishment.

IAF had planned to induct 220 numbers of new light fighter to replace its fleet of Mig-21; the ultimate irony is Mig-21/Mig-23/Mig-27 in IAF service have been mostly replaced by Su-30 MKI and few that are left will mostly be again replaced by balance number of Su-30MKI and 2 squadrons of Rafale.

I'd be happy if combined order for LCA Mk1 and LCA Mk2 reaches 220 number.

Thanks to those scientists, who knew the kind of politics being played, we are at the cusp of the only viable solution for the dwindling numbers and indeed increased requirements. Without those sky high promises for the LCA, we wouldn't have dared to even think of the AMCA and would have been at the mercy of the Russians and their crappy products for ever.

Going by the overtly optimistic timelines being given for AMCA, it seems no lessons have been learned from LCA project. And before we reach AMCA, there is a small milestone of meeting LCA Mk2 deadline as well.

[ramana]

I guess you have not read the LCA aerodynamics discussion especially the contradiction between ITR and STR and the wing shapes coupled with underpowered engine?

In effect there would have been no plane if IAF requirements were followed.


BTW its good thing the Mig fleet is being replaced with SU-30MKIs which are a much, much more capable planes.

[Karan M]

If it were to IAF, and if the R&D establishment had listened to what IAF wanted, we would've had 5-6 Squadrons of operational light fighter in service by now.

Nope. Idris Latif was the chief when the IAF asked for the LCA ASRs and they said what they wanted
Nobody asked them to specify a MiG-21 sized Mirage/MiG-29, but they did.
IAF's Krishnaswamy was the one who came up with serial TD to FSED plan. Why didn't he think of how much delay converting the Tech Demo ("science project") to an actual fighter (FSED Phase1 and 2) would entail? Why didn't he ask for a full scale development program with a standard fit from day one?

Lets face the reality, IAF was never into the LCA, never supported it, wasn't sure it'd fly either & set a convoluted path, TD then FSED to the program with near zero involvement from their side. They perforce took interest only much after TD stage by which time, huge amounts of time had been spent in coming up with the first designs which had to be completely reengineered to todays flight designs.

It is exactly because R&D establishment made LCA into a science project w/o bothering to factor in the operational requirement of IAF, that we're where we are.

Not really.

Original LCA was to fly with a significant amount of imported parts and foreign collab. in areas where India didn't have experience. That was stopped due to sanctions and funds crunch. No "science project" this. As matter of fact our renewed focus on domestic science "first" as versus import substitution later was driven by solid compulsion.

IAF came up with some cockeyed plan to have Dassault provide an obsolete FCS and Dassault told the ADA guys irrespective of what they wanted, they would land the deal due to their contacts. Open info from SR Valluri who led the negotiations. US offered a sweetheart deal for FCS and systems plus CALSPAN and it went to them. Rajiv Gandhi wanted to improve ties with US and clearly politics too had a role.

Note the scientists didn't give the deal to MBB which was honest in terms of the interaction but inexperienced.

Dropping R73 adding Python-V late into the program, having entire avionics changed in FSED from Su-30MKI level to OAC etc, having hundreds of change requests flagged is because of IAF or who exactly?

All tied to IAF disinterest in the program and "let it wither away on the vine, who is bothered".

The true worth of LCA is only when it can be inducted and deployed as a weapon system in IAF. And sustained and maintained effectively by the production agency during its lifetime.

Which the IAF didn't seem to grasp till pretty late

Till date, LCA has not reached that stage.

It will, and part of that depends on IAF being reasonable. Here they are with obsolete MiG-21s and MiG-27s galore, facing an opponent with JF-17s and F-7s and Mirage-3/5 for bulk of fleet and they wont consider Mk1s as a replacement. Which world do they inhabit, it must be asked.

[shiv]

Nobody asked them to specify a MiG-21 sized Mirage/MiG-29, but they did

Here is a history of the mysterious Su-7 acqusition, and guess what it says:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/aircr ... hoi-7.html

For its warload-range capability, the Su-7 was considered an "oversize" aircraft by many in the IAF, the service having been used to more "compact" aircraft, the Gnat being of the other extreme!

There were some people in the IAF, in 1965, who considered the Su-7 as being too big. Remember that a senior pilot in 1965 would have been commissioned around 1950 with retirement in 1990. So the "mindset" of "small" "compact" etc was surely alive and thriving within the IAF, given that the Gnats were the predominant fighter for a long time followed by the MiG 21. While we may not be able to "blame an individual" it would be complete nonsense to claim that the idea of a "light fighter" arose de novo within the ADA.

May I point out that one of the definitions of cognitive dissonance is the acceptance of what one has as being the best possible under the circumstances. I interact with retired IAF people on a regular basis and all of them feel love and sentiment about the Gnat, the Su-7 and the MiG 21 because these are machines they learned to fly and fight with as young men. They know the innards and the behaviour and they accept any misbehaviour or bad qualities as "part of adjusting to the aircraft".

When the Su-7 was bought no one guessed that it would be a great fighter. When the Gnat was bought no one guessed that it would be a great fighter. But let me point out a curious fact. A handful of air forces bought the Gnat, but it became a great fighter only in IAF hands. Dozens of air forces operated the Su-7. Only in the IAF did it get a formidable reputation and a hard hitting survivor, Everywhere else NATO were derisive of the Soviet creation. So now in retrospect it looks like all those aircraft "too small Gnat", "too big Su-7", "too short legged MiG 21" are all "great", "classic" aircraft. The designers and manufacturers did not make those aircraft great. The IAF did.

I think the IAF and the army need to understand that national technical capability cannot be divorced from national preparedness and strategic long term vision. The armed forces ignore our industry at the peril of the nation in the long term.They have to learn to understand what is possible and what is not possible within the nation and arrive at a compromise that is achievable. The problem is that the men who approved the Gnat have retired by the time the next guy approves the MiG 21. By then hundreds of pilots have "excused" those aircraft for their faults and have learned to love them.

[shiv]

Looks like modern day DGMF doesn't even need suborning. All that has to be done is flood them with brochures and they will themselves lead to inaction (force disarmament) by asking for composite requirements which cannot be met.

ramana, retired armed forces officers often get plum jobs in private overseas companies where they represent that company's products. These people have access to other serving officers as friends - and possibly play a role in making some tech things seem more attractive than they should be.

[member_22539]

^All of the above are euphemisms for dishonesty and corruption, and in the end that is what this is all about.

[Philip]

I think that enough has been posted about the LCA's genesis.The IAF was v.sceptical about the development time of the several new technologies ,FBW,composites,engine,radar,etc,when we did not have a flourishing aero industry in the country. They were proven right.The fatal error was to imagine that the Kaveri engine would power the aircraft.US sanctions after P-2 added to the delay.The Bison was the IAF's insurance policy. NOT listening to the ONLY client and end-user,the IAF by the ADA/HAL boffins,about their scepticism on many issues,added to the stand-off between the two entities,with the people of India being the loser. It takes two hands to clap,both have their share of the blame,but the designing,development and production agencies have the most to bear,having fundamentally failed to deliver even an underperforming Mk-1 on time.

[Karan M]

Oh sure, now we have the eggspert with decades of technology eggsperience telling us who bears what and "enough has been posted about LCAs genesis" since the facts cut through his one sided screed.

[Karan M]

Nobody asked them to specify a MiG-21 sized Mirage/MiG-29, but they did

Here is a history of the mysterious Su-7 acqusition, and guess what it says:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/aircr ... hoi-7.html

For its warload-range capability, the Su-7 was considered an "oversize" aircraft by many in the IAF, the service having been used to more "compact" aircraft, the Gnat being of the other extreme!

There were some people in the IAF, in 1965, who considered the Su-7 as being too big. Remember that a senior pilot in 1965 would have been commissioned around 1950 with retirement in 1990. So the "mindset" of "small" "compact" etc was surely alive and thriving within the IAF, given that the Gnats were the predominant fighter for a long time followed by the MiG 21. While we may not be able to "blame an individual" it would be complete nonsense to claim that the idea of a "light fighter" arose de novo within the ADA.

May I point out that one of the definitions of cognitive dissonance is the acceptance of what one has as being the best possible under the circumstances. I interact with retired IAF people on a regular basis and all of them feel love and sentiment about the Gnat, the Su-7 and the MiG 21 because these are machines they learned to fly and fight with as young men. They know the innards and the behaviour and they accept any misbehaviour or bad qualities as "part of adjusting to the aircraft".

When the Su-7 was bought no one guessed that it would be a great fighter. When the Gnat was bought no one guessed that it would be a great fighter. But let me point out a curious fact. A handful of air forces bought the Gnat, but it became a great fighter only in IAF hands. Dozens of air forces operated the Su-7. Only in the IAF did it get a formidable reputation and a hard hitting survivor, Everywhere else NATO were derisive of the Soviet creation. So now in retrospect it looks like all those aircraft "too small Gnat", "too big Su-7", "too short legged MiG 21" are all "great", "classic" aircraft. The designers and manufacturers did not make those aircraft great. The IAF did.

I think the IAF and the army need to understand that national technical capability cannot be divorced from national preparedness and strategic long term vision. The armed forces ignore our industry at the peril of the nation in the long term.They have to learn to understand what is possible and what is not possible within the nation and arrive at a compromise that is achievable. The problem is that the men who approved the Gnat have retired by the time the next guy approves the MiG 21. By then hundreds of pilots have "excused" those aircraft for their faults and have learned to love them.

100% Sense.
The basic issue is that IAF has no real plan or path to train, expose its people long term to these aspects. Its a pilots group which gets exposed to operational aspects and logistics at sq leader and above but has limited focus on items like you mention above. Add civil-military issues, disdain for "babus" etc to delays from HAL etc and the toxic mess continues. Earlier plan had IAF folks like Wollen go to HAL. It was stopped and the problems have only worsened.

[Sid]

When you sit back and take a look at this thread it looks like this topic is just too obvious and IAF must be really a dick not to realize it by now.

Can we invite some retired IAF personal to this discussion to understand their point of view on this? Are we missing something? What reasons do they have not to pursue the obvious?

Until that happens I think this is a one sided discussion, since we don't have a rohitvats type poster from IAF side.

[Sid]

Looks like modern day DGMF doesn't even need suborning. All that has to be done is flood them with brochures and they will themselves lead to inaction (force disarmament) by asking for composite requirements which cannot be met.

ramana, retired armed forces officers often get plum jobs in private overseas companies where they represent that company's products. These people have access to other serving officers as friends - and possibly play a role in making some tech things seem more attractive than they should be.

Shiv, that's an over simplification of issue. For most of the products/projects related to Defense MoD or defense arms asks for background experience and a company with public undertaking (no private). Many serving officers (from technical branches) prematurely retire to open their companies to cater for such demand or such other companies. But that represent a smaller pie in overall defense spending.

There are only a select few, who have prior contacts in procurement, who land such high flying consulting positions after retirement.

Only recently (if I am correct) MoD has placed this "conflict of interest clause" to stop them from joining other companies immediately after leaving forces.

[Karan M]

When you sit back and take a look at this thread it looks like this topic is just too obvious and IAF must be really a dick not to realize it by now

IAF is anything but a dick, its just an organizational issue. They have defined their role as air warriors, whereas we are talking of "air managers", "air production" and so forth. Some issues they themselves know and debate about and things have remained stuck. There was this, dont know where it went:

http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/ban ... 985188.ece

The other aspect is IAF is a cog in a larger wheel. The MOD has almost completely been asleep at the wheel and PSUs became the parking spot of political appointees (eg a certain truck manufacturer and its left hand drive assembly trucks!) with zero process/input from the IAF in day to day ops.
Now, IAF folks are on board of certain DPSUs (the better run ones) and hopefully given a better role.
In short, the system is broken at multiple levels and IAF has remained in its assigned role to a T in a restrictive fashion. However, the Navy being much smaller has decided its assigned role needs it to be more agile and created several levels of its own management, production interfaces.

[fanne]

One of the bummer in LCA saga on BR has been Shalav's post. This question is for Shalav, Does your simulation take take into account static instability ? That would effect STR and ITR of LCA. I guess can you please complete analysis of these planes (with approx numbers if real numbers are not there) - LCA vs Mig 21bs/F-16 A-D/Mirage 2000/JF-17 and J-10. I would assume whatever drawback your software may have would be consistent across all and would give low numbers throughout. That will settle the theoretical debate.

[shiv]

Army again:
Army invites proposals for designing tanks, DRDO surprised

Intending to replace Soviet-origin T-72 tanks, the Army has invited proposals from domestic and foreign firms for designing ‘Future Ready Combat Vehicle’ (FRCV) tanks, significantly at a time when DRDO is already working on such a project.

The Army has issued a Request for Information (RFI) inviting responses from companies by July 31 to design tanks which could replace the T-72 tanks, official sources said. The RFI is open to both domestic and foreign firms.

According to the Army, the best design will be chosen and given to nominated developing agency for production of the prototypes. The selected prototype will be given for bulk production to a production agency, which could be a domestic firm.

The move is significant as the country’s premier defence research agency DRDO is already working on a futuristic tank — Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT).

The Army has earlier been at loggerheads with the DRDO over the Arjun tank that it had developed.

Defence experts hold the view that if the Army goes in for a foreign tank, it will spoil the indigenous effort of nearly 30 years of designing and building the Arjun tank that can be used for making the next-generation tank.

Asked about Army’s RFI, Director of DRDO’s Combat Vehicles Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE), which is working on the FMBT, told PTI, “We have a long-term perspective plan from the Army. We are working on the technology development and will continue with it”.

DRDO officials are stunned by the Army’s RFI and are wondering why it was issued when it is already working on it.

They are hoping that the Ministry of Defence, which has been pushing for ‘Make in India’, will look into the issue.

A senior official noted, “DRDO has been doing well with the Air Force and the Navy but always hits a roadblock when it comes to the Army”.

Meanwhile, defence sources maintained that the RFI is open to all and even the DRDO can take part.

[rohitvats]

I guess you have not read the LCA aerodynamics discussion especially the contradiction between ITR and STR and the wing shapes coupled with underpowered engine?

But I did.

Where the line of argument is that if the LCA does not meet STR and ITR parameters, it must be because IAF indulged in 'best of brochure' activity. And all this is basis assertion by one BRF member (@maitya) who has gone to the extent of claiming that IAF deliberately drafted performance expectations which can never be met and were meant to kill the LCA program!

Let me ask you a couple of very straight forward question:

(a) If the LCA design choice means that ITR and STR as specified in ASR cannot be met (and are actually contradictory as per wisdom of BRF), then how come LCA Mk2, which involves minimum design changes, will meet these ASR requirements?

(b) Is the engine on LCA Mk1 under-powered or is the aircraft overweight? The CAG Report on the LCA Program clearly shows that LCA is 1,366 Kg overweight with fuel load. And 1,370 kg overweight as basic empty.

The irony is that IAF had reviewed the Project Definition Phase literature from ADA in 1989 and commented then itself that aircraft will be overweight. What measures did ADA take to resolve the weight and other issues?

Here is the excerpt from CAG Report on LCA Program:

The Project Definition Phase (PDP) document of LCA prepared by ADA (December 1988) had been reviewed by Air HQ (March 1989) who found it deficient in the crucial parameters of aerodynamic configuration, volume and weight as set in ASR, particularly with reference to significant increase in weight of LCA, which could adversely affect performance. To resolve the deadlock, it had been decided (March 1990) that the development may be executed as Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED) in a phased manner.

Maybe the aerodynamic experts on BRF can comment what would have been the STR and ITR performance of LCA if it had met the weight parameter?

In effect there would have been no plane if IAF requirements were followed.

But there are already 20 permanent concessions on IAF requirement. And 33 temporary ones which are expected to be met by FOC. So, in effect, LCA Mk1 to a great degree is NOT the a/c which actually meets the IAF requirements. And which you think could not have been met in the first place.

BTW its good thing the Mig fleet is being replaced with SU-30MKIs which are a much, much more capable planes.

Do you realize the irony in your statement? If my lesser performance and old planes have been replaced by a much-much more capable plane(s), what will the replacement plane originally meant to fill in for older planes do?

BTW - remember the chest beating on BRF about 'traitorous' and 'Import' Air Force asking for 'last minute' changes WRT radome of LCA? How one tweet from Sanjay Jha which carried lament from scientists about LCA being made to do so much to meet FOC set the whole BRF on fire?

Here is the full story from CAG Report on Radome issue:

The Radome is a primary structure on an aircraft, which houses the antenna. It needed to possess electro-magnetic (EM) transparency to get the best performance of the Antenna as well as structural integrity. The Radome designed and developed by the Advance Systems Laboratory (ASL), Hyderabad was selected (December 1989) for the LCA prototypes.

Manufacturing of Radomes was started (June 2008) in HAL and the Regional Centre for Military Airworthiness (Aircraft), Bangalore accorded structural clearance (October 2009) to Radome manufactured by HAL. The first Electromagnetic test result of production Radome, supplied (December 2011) by HAL showed (June 2012) high loss of signal power resulting in significant reduction in radar range thereby affecting its performance. The Empowered Committee (June 2013) noticed that the losses of signal power were due to design deficiency and choice of Kevlar3 material. Subsequently, due to this deficiency, ADA had to conclude (September 2013) a contract with M/s Cobham, England for development and supply of six Radomes4 with quartz material at a cost of GBP 2.5 million (`22.75 crore) by January 2015 for testing on LCA.

That CAG Report is pretty fine document, actually. It pulls up every stakeholder in LCA program for their role in delaying the program and does so with proper examples. One would in fact find many points to populate this thread about lack of IAF involvement initially in LCA Program.

But the reason it is derided is because it attributes more issues to R&D establishment than IAF, which runs contrary to expectations of crowd. And hence, not much discussion. After all, it is easier to call names to Services.

[member_23694]

^^^^^^^^
could not help +100

[shiv]

which are much, much more capable planes.

Do you realize the irony in your statement? If my lesser performance and old planes have been replaced by a much-much more capable plane(s), what will the replacement plane originally meant to fill in for older planes do?

Actually I disagree with ramana and will comment on Rohits response. The Su 30 has not replaced the MiG 21 and cannot replace it. It is being forced into that role. It is capable yes and while appropriate analogies can never be right, it is like replacing my old family car with a lorry. The lorry has everything the car has and more.

Unfortunately on BRF we always talk about capability and do not factor in cost. Huge twin engine aircraft pose a huge burden in fuel costs, traing and maintenance compared to a smaller figher. And a huge jet capable of long range attack and air dominance missions cannot subsititute for a light fighter in interdiction, CAS and CAP roles.

So the LCA still has a definite role to play.

[rohitvats]

Nope. Idris Latif was the chief when the IAF asked for the LCA ASRs and they said what they wanted

Nobody asked them to specify a MiG-21 sized Mirage/MiG-29, but they did.

IAF's Krishnaswamy was the one who came up with serial TD to FSED plan. Why didn't he think of how much delay converting the Tech Demo ("science project") to an actual fighter (FSED Phase1 and 2) would entail? Why didn't he ask for a full scale development program with a standard fit from day one?

Correction. Idris Latif/IAF DID NOT ask for a quadruple FBW aircraft with a de novo developed MMR, Kaveri Engine and composite heavy air-frame. That is what the R&D establishment said we'll give you. IAF requirements were much more conservative. IAF ASR were drafted around the 'technological' achievements which LCA project was to make.

It was one case where a Service did not ask for the 'best and latest' but R&D establishment promised them the moon. On this thread, it has been suggested that Services need to be in sync with technological and industrial base of the nation but when LCA was being projected, it was our R&D establishment which was not in sync with what could be achieved. And more importantly, in what TIMELINE!

As for ACM krishnaswamy and him proposing that LCA be developed in TD and FSED phases, well, he was proven right in his assessment. Irony is that an Air Force fighter pilot (albeit a Test Pilot), much derided here as simply a fighter jock good only for seats of pant flying, could see the folly in objectives and timelines being projected but the scientists did not.

How many objective of TD development phase were met and when?

And inspite of ongoing challenges with development of critical technologies, on what basis were repeated timelines for IOC/FOC/Induction/Production given? Was lack of IAF involvement to be blamed when these self declared timelines were not met?

Lets face the reality, IAF was never into the LCA, never supported it, wasn't sure it'd fly either & set a convoluted path, TD then FSED to the program with near zero involvement from their side. They perforce took interest only much after TD stage by which time, huge amounts of time had been spent in coming up with the first designs which had to be completely re-engineered to today's flight designs.

Karan - while it is customary of you to quote the lack of involvement of IAF in LCA program, how about giving equal commentary on delays in program due to technological choices made by ADA/DRDO for Tejas? And for that matter the delays by various DPSU which were tasked with various Work Packages?

On the Quadruple FBW technology front, you quote this:

IAF came up with some cockeyed plan to have Dassault provide an obsolete FCS and Dassault told the ADA guys irrespective of what they wanted, they would land the deal due to their contacts. Open info from SR Valluri who led the negotiations. US offered a sweetheart deal for FCS and systems plus CALSPAN and it went to them. Rajiv Gandhi wanted to improve ties with US and clearly politics too had a role.

Who said that Dassault FCS was obsolete?

AM Rajkumar categorically states in his book that IAF was OK with European technology even if it was not the best in the world. For a simple reason that it was averse to dealing with USA for fear of sanctions. But Indian R&D establishment went with US offer because it was best out there and they were more keen on acquiring the latest technology than deliver an operational aircraft to IAF in a timely manner.

And how prophetic IAF view came to be!

When the IAF had given the recommendation to MOD to go with Dassault and its strong reservation on partnering with USA for FCS, who asked Rajiv Gandhi to talk to American President on support for FCS? Why was Service recommendation over-turned?

How many years were lost due to sanctions and subsequent caution enforced in opening up the flight envelope as we were doing this for the first time?

On the one hand, R&D establishment talks about lack of user involvement and on another, does not respect the reservations and recommendations of the same Service.

What a fine model of Project development!!!

How many years were added to LCA program because we wanted to develop a Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) in house from scratch? This is what the CAG Report says about the MMR effort:

The MMR developed by HAL/LRDE was found (2006) short of expectations. Subsequently ADA concluded (October 2006) a contract with M/s Elta Israel for co- development/ consultancy, supply & integration of MMR on LCA at a cost of 26.5 Million USD (`119.25 crore) by June 2009. Though the MMR was ready by 2009 for integration on LCA, the LCA (LSP3) required structural changes in front fuselage for installation of MMR LRUs. After the LSP3 was ready in 2010, the MMR was put to functionality and performance testing. While the functionality testing of MMR was completed in December 2013, it could not be cleared in performance testing.

Could it have helped the project's cause if an external help had been taken in initial stage?

Not really.

Original LCA was to fly with a significant amount of imported parts and foreign collab. in areas where India didn't have experience. That was stopped due to sanctions and funds crunch. No "science project" this. As matter of fact our renewed focus on domestic science "first" as versus import substitution later was driven by solid compulsion.

Well, as per the CAG reports, as of January 2015 the import content of LCA stands at 65%; though it does not say whether this is by value or number of items. But going by the examples quoted as under imported (MMR, Radome, FCS Actuators, MFDS), this should by value.

It will, and part of that depends on IAF being reasonable. Here they are with obsolete MiG-21s and MiG-27s galore, facing an opponent with JF-17s and F-7s and Mirage-3/5 for bulk of fleet and they wont consider Mk1s as a replacement. Which world do they inhabit, it must be asked.

This part, I'll reply in detail later. Because it is no longer a simple one-to-one replacement issue.

[shiv]

Correction. Idris Latif/IAF DID NOT ask for a quadruple FBW aircraft with a de novo developed MMR, Kaveri Engine and composite heavy air-frame

Rohit do you (or anyone else for that matter) have any information on what the IAF asked for. In all these years I have never found out. But I do know (or I think I know) that the IAF asked for a "light fighter" to replace the MiG 21 which has replaced an earlier light fighter the Gnat.

Did the IAF specify single engine? Did the IAF specify multirole? What were the specs demanded.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>So the LCA still has a definite role to play.

Shiv - my comment on Su-30MKI replacing Mig-21/23/27 in IAF service was in context of squadrons operating these types having converted to Su-30MKI. And some of the remaining Mig-21/Mig-27 will convert to balance number of planned Su-30MKI and 2 x Rafale squadrons.

Had LCA been available earlier, many of these would've converted to Tejas - as 45 Squadron, which was Mig-21 squadron, will shortly (hopefully).

Your point about the relevance of capability bought by LCA is relevant and correct. IAF cannot afford to NOT to have LCA Mk1/Mk1.5/Mk2 level of capability.

Even if I take a simple case of 1 x Tejas squadron for each of forward AF bases on western frontier, I would need a minimum of 8 squadrons.

Here is a list of forward bases which I think have a Mig-21 squadron each:

Srinagar, Pathankot, Bhisiana (Bhatinda), Suratgarh, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer and Naliya.

5 out of these bases have a Mig-21 Bison squadron. And herein might lie one of the clues (apart from other factors) as to why IAF is not ordering more LCA Mk1:

Assuming each of above base has 1 x Mig-21 squadron, 5 at minimum have a Mig-21 Bison squadron. And these I think IAF intends to flog beyond 2020. Till 2025 as per some reports. So, IAF thinks it can afford to wait for LCA Mk2 for replacement of its Mig-21 Bison fleet as most of other Mig-21 and Mig-27 squadrons gets replaced by mix of 4 x Su-30 MKI and 2 x Rafale Squadrons.

Lets be honest - first two squadrons of LCA will not augment the fighting capability of IAF. They will be used primarily to create the flying and engineering work-force and evaluate and study the platform. And iron out technical and supply chain related issues in collaboration with R&D and production agency.

So, induction of these squadrons does not address the falling number of combat aircraft in IAF. And hence, it's insistence on Rafale/MMRCA.

However, I am absolutely sure that more of LCA Mk1.5 (HAL proposed LCA Mk1 with Israeli AESA Radar) will follow as transition from LCA Mk1 to Mk2 will not be a smooth process. Nor will the induction of Rafale.

It is my estimate that IAF will see at least 6 LCA Mk1 and Mk1.5 (2+4) and 6-8 Mk2 in service. This is the only way it will reach the 45 squadron number in respectable time-frame.

[fanne]

The last line is fine. IAF should start pronto with 2 sq of LCA (all the remaining test point look like delaying as all of that can be done after these planes get delivered). That puts intent beyond doubt and does good all around.