Deterrence

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 30 May 2015 10:05

Shiv,

Have a look at this:

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb412/

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 May 2015 10:08

RoyG wrote:Shiv,

Have a look at this:

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb412/

Strange use of language: "Clear as mud"

Mud is not clear

Tuvaluan · Post by **Tuvaluan** » 30 May 2015 19:40

shiv wrote: Mud is not clear

shivji, That is the intent of the phrase -- that article says that there is no evidence that a test took place, which is not really news, given that the test was cancelled in 1995.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 02 Jul 2015 08:08

The South Asia Nuclear Equation - Kunal Kapoor

Overall, the deployment of TNWs should aim to save Pakistan from a conventional defeat and prevent further escalation to the level of strategic nuclear weapons. The ability of Pakistan’s TNWs to do either is dubious.

While the TNWs do not tilt, in this writer’s opinion, the scales one way or the other from what was set in 1998, there are other changes afoot in the region that call for greater examination. The re-emergence of the debate, courtesy of Kidwai, offers an occasion to look at these changes. With its growing leverage over Pakistan and Afghanistan, Beijing is likely to displace Washington from the region. Before that, however, let us recapitulate the old debates on nuclear stability in South Asia and the role played by the United States.

As China supplants U.S. as Pakistan’s primary ally and gradually increases its profile in Afghanistan, it understands its responsibility to monitor the potential for a nuclear exchange in South Asia. As a seeker of global leadership, China is prepared to demonstrate its regional leadership credentials. Beijing, as a result, is likely to adopt a more neutral stance between India and Pakistan. It has been increasingly wary of taking Pakistan’s side in the dispute over Kashmir and the India-Pakistan wars. In a sign of changing realities, Chinese officials have shown interest in civil nuclear cooperation with India.

While the incipient factors seem encouraging, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. The next time, whenever it is, India and Pakistan come close to a conflict with nuclear clouds overhead, the role of China will be much more important than it has been in the past. And that role will be studied by scholars in great detail.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 14 Jul 2015 08:07

Audio only.

India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and Doctrine

India stands at a new juncture in its nuclear development. New Delhi is unveiling ballistic missiles of ever-greater range, while its nuclear-armed submarine fleet is finally taking operational form with the launch of the Arihant. Despite these developments, India’s nuclear doctrine has not been officially updated since 2003. What is the future direction of India’s doctrine? Will India continue to adhere to a force posture informed by credible minimum deterrence? What are the potential implications for India’s relationships with the United States, Pakistan, China, and the global nonproliferation regime?

Frank O’Donnell and Yogesh Joshi discussed current Indian perspectives on these questions and more. Carnegie’s George Perkovich moderated.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Jul 2015 19:28

Any discussion on India moderated by grand ayotallah Perkovich is useless.

Tuvaluan · Post by **Tuvaluan** » 14 Jul 2015 19:36

What are the potential implications for India’s relationships with the United States, Pakistan, China, and the global nonproliferation regime?

Quite amusing that these NPA mofos like perkovich are talking about India's relationships with the so-called "global nonproliferation regime" that has been winking at actual nuclear proliferation between China and Pakistan, with US standing by and allowing it.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 14 Jul 2015 23:15

Self Del.

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 14 Jul 2015 23:30

ShauryaT wrote:Self Del.

2 Congress Chamchas wasting everyone's time

. 1 more than the other tho.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 15 Jul 2015 10:33

shiv wrote:Actually PK Iyengar's criticism of R Chidambaram now falls into place. A two-stage thermonuclear device was tested - which means there was a fission primary and a fusion secondary. The fusion secondary had Lithium. Iyengar said that the presence of Lithium after the test meant "partial burn". These criticisms caused a huge upheaval on BRF and we had people beating their breasts and crying that there is no TN device. That is actually wrong. A TN device was tested. It did work - at least partially, giving a yield far in excess of the basic primary. The moot point was that the Lithium did not "burn" (fuse) 100%. Not that it did not burn at all. The reasons for that could be many ranging from deliberate design, to partial failure of containment (ie the fission primary explosion was "contained" only for 0.1 seconds rather than 0.15 seconds. The other point that has been mentioned in passing by BRFites and others is that the same weapon, if encased in Uranium could increase the yield by huge amounts. The main arguments here are not capability, but efficiency.

IIRC Iynger mentioned that secondary burn should be higher than 25-30 % to qualify it as TN , if the yeald is higher then it may just qualify as Boosted Fission Weapon.

I have seen some technical reports from Russian Nuclear weapon designer who mentioned burn efficiency of 80-90 % or even higher for secondary device.

So the trick is to get highest possible burn effciency for secondary which translates to most effecient design and smallest possible primary with aid of boosted fission to get smallest possible weapon in terms of size/weight , combined both qualities you can the most effecient and smallest TN weapon

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 21 Jul 2015 08:40

Shaurya here's something for you
http://bharatkarnad.com/2015/07/21/indi ... ntainment/

And no Indian PM has had the “long view” and guts to try and bring down the oppressive non-proliferation treaty system targeting India by selling the 220 MW CANDU-derivative, the INDU workhorse reactor, to any country with the cash, and to secure the necessary natural uranium from strip-mining reserves in Manipur mountains (and arresting foreign-funded eco-NGO protestors) and from Niger and Gabon.

Besides, creating its own nuclear market in the Third World – India didn’t have to be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to sell indigenously produced nuclear goods – New Delhi would have had the West, espying a non-proliferation system breakdown, pleading for mercy. That’s how a country gains respect and leverage. Ask China!

Except in Manmohan Singh, India found a sap and Washington a sucker. For a pat on the back for leading a “responsible” state – whatever that is – he shifted most of the CANDU reactors into the international safeguards net, thereby stuffing the country’s capacity for surge WgPu production, and decommissioned the 40 MW Cirus reactor before the second military-dedicated 100MW plutonium producer came on stream.

All those who were excited about the nuclear deal — the government, the Indian policy establishment and the media — never wondered why, despite having met all conditions, India has not been conferred “the rights and privileges” of a nuclear weapons state and membership of the NSG as was promised in the July 2005 joint statement between Manmohan Singh and George W Bush.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 22 Jul 2015 08:10

My response to the above, posted in Karnad's blog.

Here is the problem with the opposition to the nuclear deal. I believe there was only one person – Arun Shourie in the entire BJP, who had an understanding of the strategic game being played by the US. The rest in the BJP were essentially playing a political game of being the opposition along with the left. The opposition had no chance to explain this to the electorate, which understood only one thing that this deal was about electricity. The electorate was largely lost on what was the BJP really opposing. Explaining strategic games to a mass and diverse electorate, that did not get the message of 26/11 in Mumbai let alone a strategic compromise, is well nigh impossible.

Hence the BJP did the next best thing in opposition by inserting poison pills by way of the liability bill but even that has been unilaterally diluted through fraudulent interpretations by the Modi Govt.

My point is, our political leadership by and large lacks the strategic mindset to understand, let alone play this game. Having said all that, I still like Vajpayee for making the strategic call to test, even if we can fault him or the advise of (BM/KC) for the unilateral moratorium.

I have very little to no hopes of ANY strategic moves by the Modi administration as it does not have any political dividends, only liabilities. Au contraire, I fear that Modi will concede too much to the US, especially giving in to US strategic plans in the naval domain towards a 1000 ship naval alliance.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 29 Jul 2015 22:32

What would happen if an 800-kiloton nuclear warhead detonated above midtown Manhattan?

One city, one bomb

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 31 Jul 2015 09:30

Scathing but expected. Alarming. Maybe our best hope is for the Pakis to show us the way and they test their TN device.

Paki DARHT up

What’s a country to do if the international milieu, or one’s own self-constrained nature, prevents physical explosive tests. You do the next best thing to actual testing. Like, get yourself a Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility. Such a unit uses X-ray cameras to see just how a hydrodynamic shock to simulate implosion works — the process in effect of a fission bomb blowing, and study the integrity of this process in a fission bomb, or in the fission trigger of a fusion weapon. Technically this takes some doing. But, not if an all weather friend is supplying designs, expertise, and materials. As is the case with the DARHT unit the Pakistanis have succeeded in engineering and installing with, of course, China’s help and assistance, at Chaklala — headquarters, Strategic Plans Division — the Pakistani counterpart of the Indian Strategic Forces Command, the weapons directorate at BARC, and the nuclear cell in PMO rolled into one. It is expected to become operational by September-October this year. Boy, does that advantage Pakistan! And it shows just how serious the Pak Army is about that country’s nuclear security. Now turn your gaze homewards and what do we find? India has no DARHT, no inertial confinement fusion chamber, no nothing — not even computing speeds, but GOI still finds the situation hunky-dory! That same old — no need to test — canary continues to hold fort as S&T adviser to the PM — R Chidambaram, erstwhile chmn, AEC, the man singularly responsible for keeping the Indian boosted-fission and thermonuclear weapons sub-par, when he should have been the first person Modi ought to have unceremoniously dumped! This state of affairs about sums up the situation India is in today. India is forced to rely over much on Agni-5 (and technologies), a damned accurate missile at extreme range. The case made in govt circles no doubt prompted by this same Chidambaram is that, high accuracy means India can field just this one low yield but only proven warhead/weapon in our arsenal — the 20KT fission, and that this is more than adequate for the country’s strategic deterrence purposes! And to think the incoming Chinese DF-21mod2s will have a one megaton warhead, and nothing less than a fully performing 500 KT warhead. One is compelled to bury one’s head in a pillow, and moan. In the past, I called India’s approach “nuclear amateurism”. It is actually much worse, it is “nuclear fatalism”.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Jul 2015 19:42

ShauryaT, Pak goes through all the motions of research etc. in the end the weapons are Chinese made.

Supratik · Post by **Supratik** » 31 Jul 2015 20:40

Ramana is right. What is a quack going to do with a five star neurosurgery setup. They are going to or already have transferred the H-bomb tech to Pak and then claim that Pak developed it through research using the facility.

ramdas · Post by **ramdas** » 31 Jul 2015 23:39

AFAIK DAHRT is meant to study implosion of fission/boosted fission devices. DAHRT seems to be an experimental setup with flash X-ray imaging on two axes to study implosions driven by conventional explosions…

Both TBRL and BARC have some 450 KV flash X-ray machines used for various imaging purposes (BARC also has a 1MV machine based on the KALI). Whether they have used these to set up a DAHRT type facility is not known. Hope they do.

Also, not all DAHRT facilities are likely to be equal. Khan's facility has fully come up only in 2008. Probably has higher beam power, etc and hence, more imaging capabilities. Whether the TSP facility is of a similar capacity is unknown. Very unlikely.

In all probability, this might be a cover for the transfer of boosted fission weapons to TSP. I do not know if PRC would be stupid enough to transfer a full fledged TN…to cover that, PRC would need to transfer a ICF facility, or engage in a NATO-like nuke sharing agreement with TSP like U.S had with West Germany in the cold war: involving PRC control of the warheads until their usage (if such an eventuality occurs).

In any case, these facilities by themselves would not help us resolve the issue with the 1998 TN: after all, in 1998, everything that was primary/fission related worked perfectly as per what is known in the open. The issues with the secondary can only be addressed with access to an ICF type facility (or a poor man's version of such a facility). Even so, these tools are no substitute for full testing as they most probably cannot yet replicate those physical conditions.

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 01 Aug 2015 00:12

Regarding : India’s nuclear doctrine has not been officially updated since 2003.

It is just a way to get information on newer developments related on TNW, devices, operational details and numbers etc. It is better to keep the doctrine short and clear leaving out our all operational details. It is better to keep operational side a state secret as long as possible. It will avoid any unnecessary competition with China. Anyway pure land gonna go bust sooner or later with west cleaning the floor of their mess.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 Sep 2015 09:11

Posting this here as a useful reference - has descriptions of various programs including Swedish and South African anjd other details that I need from time to time
http://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads/6_3libin.pdf

arun · Post by **arun** » 26 Sep 2015 11:20

X Posted from the “India Nuclear News and Discussion 4 July 2011” thread.

It is extremely foolish for India in any shape or form to endorse this fallacious notion of “Third Party Mediation”. India has devoted an enormous amount of time and energy starting with the Simla Accord to lay down the policy that there is no room for third party mediation in bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Let us not flush it down the toilet for some self serving US manipulation under the guise that Indian’s themselves arrived at this conclusion.

Let there also be no room for illusion on the part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan that fomenting Mohammadden Terrorism under a Nuclear Umbrella will result in anything but severe punishment being meted out to the Islamic Republic irrespective of the damage India will have to absorb irrespective of any third party mediation attempts:

In an unusual dialogue that highlights Washington's concerns for the region, senior analysts, retired military officers and former diplomats met in Dubai last week to discuss options of pulling back from the brink of a full-blown nuclear war that would cause massive damage in the eventuality of an exchange of tactical (mini) nuclear weapons. ……………………..

The broad scenario that was followed started from a terror strike in India, in which a former ISI Major is caught, prompting Delhi to ask for the handing over of conspirators.

When Pakistan does not comply, India carries out strikes on military targets in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).

This escalates into a full-blown war, in which an Indian armoured column enters Pakistan, which results in a tactical nuclear strike by Islamabad on its own territory to blunt the Indian attack ..……………

Senior analyst Gurmeet Kanwal, who was present at the dialogue, told ET that among the key lessons that transpired from the three-day project was that third-party mediation would be vital for pulling back India and Pakistan from the brink of a full-blown annihilation war as neither India nor Pakistan would back out after a tactical nuclear strike.

"There was a consensus that deescalation would be vital after a limited nuclear strike and that a third-party mediation would be extremely necessary," Kanwal said.

Read more by Manu Pubby on Economic Times at:

US moderates dialogue on defusing tension post nuclear war between India, Pakistan

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 27 Sep 2015 08:08

all in all, a good article
http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2015 ... issile.pdf

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 27 Sep 2015 21:31

The only sensible response to an ask for foreign mediation.

Isn’t it time an Indian government with some strategic wits about it hosted an international conference about the nuclear touch-trigger situation now obtaining in Europe and the imminence of a US-Russian nuclear war which, by the way, is a far greater possibility than a nuclear conflagration in South Asia?

N-“flashpoint” for 3rd party intervention

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 01 Oct 2015 06:55

Russia’s New Military Doctrine Tells It All

Despite the public debate, the Russian doctrine makes no change to the principles of using nuclear weapons. As before, Russia will retaliate against a nuclear/WMD attack against itself and/or its allies; and it will also go nuclear if an existential threat is posed by a conventional attack.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Oct 2015 21:22

ShauryaT, BBC reported on Obama Putin meeting. No other press reports....
Putin was informed about nuke warhead modernization in Europe.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 14 Oct 2015 22:26

This is not news here, but it is out "officially" now.

US help for the Pakistan nuclear program and its conduct in 1971 are two events, that should remind one and all, what strategic relationships are all about.

To Maintain Ties During Afghan War, US Ignored Pakistan's Nuclear Smuggling, Documents Suggest

The US went soft on Pakistan's nuclear smuggling efforts during former President Ronald Reagan's administration, fearing that any action would upset their bilateral ties at a critical time of the Afghan war, according to new declassified documents.

The documents were declassified amid reports that the Obama Administration is considering a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan.

Declassifying a number of documents, the National Security Archive (NSA) said that the Reagan administration had an internal debate over policy towards Pakistan's developing nuclear capability.

The debate led to a letter from President Reagan to Pakistani dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, never before published, asking for a commitment to low levels - five per cent - of nuclear enrichment.

Five per cent would amount to a "red line", which some in Washington believed would trigger sanctions, although President Reagan's letter did not directly threaten to cut aid in the event of non-compliance.

Through the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan had priority over Pakistan's nuclear programme and President Reagan and his top advisors did not want to take any action that would jeopardise Pakistan's role as a conduit for US aid to the Mujahadin, NSA said in a media release.

In his letter dated September 12, 1984, Ronald Reagan wrote of his "appreciation" that Zia-ul-Haq had made the assurance on five per cent, further stating that higher levels of enrichment above five per cent "would have the same significance" as the other nuclear activities, such as unsafeguarded reprocessing which "I had personally discussed with you and would have the same implications for our security programme and relationship."

Ronald Reagan said enrichment above five per cent was "no different" from the other activities, but the letter did not make explicit the threat of an aid cut-off.

NSA said the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and US support for Pakistan's aid to the mujahidin, was the context for President Reagan's points on nuclear proliferation.

That Afghanistan was the overwhelming priority was also evident in draft talking points that were prepared for Ambassador Hinton: Washington remained "fully committed to supporting you in our common effort."

The talking points went on at some length about nuclear issues, including the importance of Pakistani assurances and the need for Indian-Pakistani dialogue, but they included no reference to penalties if Pakistani cooperation was found wanting, NSA said.

Significantly, the talking points refer to Washington's "judgment" that it is "likely that at some point India will take military action to pre-empt your military programme".

Such a possibility had been discussed in previous national intelligence estimates, NSA said.

Consistent with the allusion to an Indian threat, the talking points included an inducement for Pakistan to adopt safeguards on its nuclear facilities: in light of the threats that Pakistan faced, "we would be prepared to act promptly to discourage or help deter such action as you move toward safeguards".

Whether this offer, close to a security guarantee, was actually made to General Zia-ul-Haq remains to be learned, NSA said.

It added that a wide-ranging 1985 CIA report analysed General Zia's "gamble" on a close strategic relationship with the US, waged in the face of broad domestic opposition which was deeply suspicious of Washington and fearful that Pakistan would be embroiled in a conflict with the Soviet Union.

To keep India and the Soviet Union at bay, Zia-ul-Haq wanted to pursue a close security relationship with Washington and secure increased aid to support military modernisation.

To avoid "pressure" from Moscow, however, Zia-ul-Haq opposed any publicity for US indirect aid to the insurgents in Afghanistan, although he wanted it to keep flowing to prevent the Soviets from consolidating their position, it said.

The CIA saw Zia-ul-Haq and the Pakistani public generally as deeply committed to a nuclear weapons capability as security against India; accordingly, if Washington cut aid to Pakistan for non-proliferation reasons, CIA analysts argued that Zia-ul-Haq would reduce support for the resistance in Afghanistan and intensify work on nuclear weapons development.

An aid cutoff could even lead to General Zia's overthrow or resignation in light of his gamble on close relations with the United States, NSA said referring to the documents.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Oct 2015 00:09

Such a long article to say Reagan turned a blind eye to TSP acquiring nuclear fuel enrichment.

ITs amazing the tortuous wordings used by US writers to explain US policy where they assuage rogues(TSP) and beat up saints(India)!

India in those days was non-nuclear and it was only when Rajiv Gandhi found out how nuke nude he had made India in 1987 that he turned to weaponization.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 21 Oct 2015 05:30

Let us learn, how to negotiate with a gun in hand to your own head.

Some reports from the briefing cited Chaudhury saying tactical nuclear weapons had already been deployed in border areas, even as US officials have been signaling in recent days that Washington would like to roll back Pakistan's tactical nukes program for a possible civilian nuclear deal that will mainstream Islamabad's pariah status in the international community because of its ugly proliferation record. US interlocutors have argued that battlefield nukes are vulnerable to a heist by terror groups and rogue commanders with jihadist sympathies.

For first time, Pakistan admits it’s ready with battlefield nukes

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 24 Oct 2015 21:34

x-post. Shiv ji: Great video.

shiv wrote:Nasr missile and the response it will get
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxJvLNrZzdU

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Oct 2015 07:35

Thanks Shaurya.

One of the things I wanted to stimulate with this video is a discussion on what Pakistanis are trying to say about their nukes when they claim "low yield" battle field nuclear weapons.

I have been reading whatever is available to me in open source about nuclear weapons and low yield ones. It is fundamentally very difficult to drop nuclear bomb sizes below a point without dropping the yield to abysmally low levels and using up humongous amounts of fissile material per bomb The "we will eat grass' rhetoric makes one think that cost is no issue - but one paper I read said that .gold is one material that can be used as tamper and while this may seem expensive - the cost of fissile material is so high that gold is cheap in comparison. But I can guess where US aid is going.

I haver been desperately trying to locate an image of a Paki design signed by AQ Khan and given to Iran. I know I saved the image but I am unable to locate it. Basically a lot of these "low yield" designs need to be made narrow enough to fit in a small missile or artillery shell. the only way one can do that is to take a lump of Pu or U235 that is almost critical mass or even bigger and shape it into a long narrow thing - like an oval maybe and then devise some method of quickly reshaping it into a sphere or compressing it so at least parts of it go critical and give some bang.

Most small nukes require much refinement to work and without testing they may yield less than 0.1 kiloton apart from using up three times as much fissile material as a bigger bomb. The accuracy of that Nasr missile is in doubt. The original Chinese missile from which it was developed had a CEP of 600 at 150 km. Maybe at 70 km it is less - maybe 100 meters CEP. That means 50% inside 100 m and 50% outside. But the small warhead barely does severe damage beyond 100 to 150 meters. That apart - if an advancing Indian column is targeted - the nuke will be going off inside Pakistan.

The possibility is that Pakistan is trying to instil doubt into the Indian politician in that a nuke had been used inside Pakistan and has not done much damage, so can you really nuke Islamabad now? But they forget that it may not be Islamabad that India nukes first. 30 nukes on Pakistan can be selected to cause least damage in terms of civilian casualties and maximum damage to the Pakistani military, economy and the LeT.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 25 Oct 2015 08:20

^^^ Shiv Ji, there is a video linked by Gaganullah on the TSP Multimedia thread recently with Pervez Hoodbhoy speaking on Paki Nukes. Even he says that the amount of fissile material for small tactical nukes is large.

Am I to understand that it is larger than say a 1 KT nuke for a .5 KT nuke or that the decrease in fissile material is not linear from 1 KT yield to 0.5 KT yield?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Oct 2015 09:24

deejay wrote:^^^ Shiv Ji, there is a video linked by Gaganullah on the TSP Multimedia thread recently with Pervez Hoodbhoy speaking on Paki Nukes. Even he says that the amount of fissile material for small tactical nukes is large.

Am I to understand that it is larger than say a 1 KT nuke for a .5 KT nuke or that the decrease in fissile material is not linear from 1 KT yield to 0.5 KT yield?

There is no linear decrease in amount of fissile material for smaller diameter bombs. In fact the amount increases for small diameter bombs. Most of the diameter is because of conventional explosive to cause efficient compression and if you reduce that the bomb won't work. A compromise is to take a huge amount (critical mass or almost critical mass) of Pu/U and compress it just a bit using explosive placed near the ends (length wise so less bulky) and getting a less efficient bomb that simply breaks apart and spreads radioactive nuclear material around after giving a very small yield. Maybe even zero yield if it is not tested and constructed properly.

The best technology on earth can manage with just 2 kg Plutonium using various tricks like neutron reflector, tamper and high quality high explosive for compression. But for all this it is very difficult to get a diameter less than 30 cm and weight less than 200 kg. That design can get a good 12-20 kt

For nukes of low diameter a compromise route is chosen by taking a large amount of Pu. Perhaps an oval or otherwise "long, heavy" mass of 10 -12 kg Pu (critical mass or just less) is compressed into a ball by placing explosive charges that send an appropriate shock wave to make the oval shape a sphere as well as compressing a little bit. The yields obtained tend to be less than 1 kiloton because with a large ball some parts start fissioning early (predetonation) and disrupt the structure before much of the fissile material can be utilised.

So see the difference: Best tech - gets a 20 kt bomb from 2 kg Pu
Rudimentary method gets 1 kt or less from 10 kg Pu. Of course maybe Pakis are using 6 kg rather than 10 but see the calculation

Pakis have (or will get) 450 kg Pu. With this they may make 45 to 75 small Nasr type nukes. Or - if they have the highest tech they could make 200 nukes of 12-20 kilotons.

Why have the Pakis chosen this wasteful, dangerous, useless, low yield route?
1. Simply to say they have a counter to Cold start
2. It is possibly easier and less expensive to simply construct an untested small nuke and hope it works
3. The are trying to bypass/undermine India's nuke doctrine and "test India's resolve"
4. Bigger nukes require bigger missiles and better guidance. MTCR makes both more difficult
5. Possibly other reasons that I cannot think of

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 25 Oct 2015 13:23

^^^ Thanks Shiv Ji, for a noob like me that was an excellent laymanish explanation.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Oct 2015 14:35

deejay wrote:^^^ Thanks Shiv Ji, for a noob like me that was an excellent laymanish explanation.

Thanks deejay. For completion let me mention that there is also no linear increase in yield by increasing fissionable material beyond a point. If you collect up a lump of pure Pu more than 12 kg or pure Uranium more than 50 Kg it will try to become a nuclear reactor by heating up and melting down. Pakis will have to quickly put it in a boat and hope that they can call it "New-clear powered boat"

Bigger and bigger bomb yields are obtained by tricks like using a neutron source like Tritium gas placed in a hollow in the bomb core, or having a tamper of fissionable Uranium that also explodes along with the core with or without Tritium. Finally there is the "Thermonuclear" bum which has a separate "secondary bum" that undergoes fusion.

I don't think anyone has any bomb that has more than 10 kg Plutonium in its core for any reason.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Oct 2015 14:48

Here are two very interesting graphs

This one shows the maximum and minimum weight for radius of bomb for Plutonium
According to the graph:
1. 30 cm diameter bombs have a minimum weight of about 300 kg and max weight of over 500 kg
2. 40 cm bombs have minimum weight of about 500 kg and max of about 1000 kg

The Nasr has been developed from a Chinese missile with a warhead weight of 200 kg onlee. What do the Pakis think they are doing?
___________________________________________________________________________________________

An interesting table below:

The table classifies countries as "Low tech" medium tech and high tech

A low tech nation will need 3 kg Pu for a 1kt bomb. A high tech one will do it in 1 kg
A low tech nation needs 4 kg Pu for a 5 kt bomb. High tech will do it in 1.5 kg

But all the radius constraints would apply. You cannot explode very low amounts of Pu without very very efficient compression using conventional explosive and that requires a fantastic design that causes compression in microseconds before fission energy disrupts the bomb itself. Any errors will lead to a fizzle.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 25 Oct 2015 16:24

^^^ I saw that video of yours on Nasr again after this post of yours. Suddenly, that video has new meaning. Mullah N^3's nuke nude sounds real.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Oct 2015 17:18

deejay wrote:^^^ I saw that video of yours on Nasr again after this post of yours. Suddenly, that video has new meaning. Mullah N^3's nuke nude sounds real.

LOL!

But the point you made in the other forum (Paki arms thread) and the arguments made by some others may be more appropriate for this thread.

Pakis have everything to gain from bluffing. They have known for decades that they will not prevail in conventional conflict. Threatening nuclear retaliation is something they have done time and time again. The fact that Nasr was aimed at Indian forces was well known for a long time and quite apart from that nuclear threats have been made time and again.

But if India has not attacked them despite grave provocations from Pakistan, it means that the bluff has worked. However if the grave provocations from Pakistan start becoming less common or stop altogether, does it mean that Indian anti-terror mechanisms are efficient or that an Indian threat, bluff or not is working on Pakistan? I did not want to join the "bluff or not bluff" argument in the other forum. Bluff is also required and bluff also works and the very few occasions on which Indians have made nuclear retaliation threats they have been chillingly clear in meaning even if the intent was only bluff.

The way I see it is as follows. Nuclear weapons remain the one major weapon system that can bring down western (read US) dominance. That is why they are so keen on keeping conflict non nuclear if possible. Any India Pakistan conflict will be watched by multiple intel gathering means and anything that looks like preparations for nuclear exchange will be noted and notified in private or public before it happens and intense pressure will be put on both sides.

It suddenly strikes me now that statements coming from the US that India has a right to retaliate against a terror attack would be scary to Pakis because to them it means that unkil is encouraging India to retaliate and their nuclear bluff may not be good enough to protect them.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Oct 2015 03:50

Nuke doctrine relook

http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Jour ... 4&ano=2181

Indian Nuclear Doctrine – A Re-look

Dr KR Singh*

Introduction

Henry Kissinger, the noted expert on nuclear strategy, had commented that only a doctrine which defined the purpose of these weapons and the kind of war to which they were to be employed permitted a rational choice.1 Doctrine enables decision makers to initiate a considered response. Lack of doctrine leads to improvisation which is not desirable, especially in a possible nuclear stand-off or confrontation. A doctrine is formulated in the context of a given set of variables at a given time. Hence, it needs to be periodically reviewed and, if necessary, updated in the light of new challenges as also possible changes in regional and international environment.

Reasons for Review

There are several reasons why such a revision has become necessary in the case of India. Regional and global environment has changed rapidly in the context of India. India’s nuclear doctrine (IND) was first formulated in 1998-99 and released for debate in 2003. It was essentially Pakistan-focussed. Today, India’s region, in the context of nuclear deterrence, stretches from the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific.

As noted, when IND was first formulated, India’s nuclear deterrence was geared to counter the nuclear threat posed by Pakistan alone. Since then, due to India’s success in developing medium range and long-range SSMs like Agni III and Agni V, and proposal to develop still more sophisticated Agni VI ICBM, as also the possible deployment of high performance aircraft like Su-30, with inflight refuelling facility, China too has entered as a factor in determining IND. Unlike Pakistan, China is a much stronger military power both in terms of conventional as also nuclear war fighting capability.

International environment has also altered greatly in favour of India since 1998-99. During the Clinton era, the USA was almost hostile to nuclear weaponisation as also to the development of Agni II missile by India. Now, it has virtually given up its hostility. With the USA gradually disengaging itself from Afghanistan and refocussing on the Asia-Pacific, India is being seen by some as a potential interest partner in the US policy of containing China.

While terrorism was always considered as a threat, fear of nuclear proliferation via Pakistan is causing concern. The growing apprehension that at least some of the fissile material might fall into the hands of elements that belong to or sympathise with radical Islamic groups, has lent credence to the potential threat posed by these non-state actors, be they state-sponsored or not, of threatening others with nuclear blackmail if not its actual use. IND, thus, needs to factor in not only role of state actors but also of such non-state actors.

Another reason for a re-look at IND is the need to correct misinterpretations that have got associated with terms like no-first use (NFU), second strike, minimum credible deterrence (MCD) etc.

India’s Nuclear Doctrine – Backdrop

Though India had exploded its nuclear device in 1974, it took a long time to weaponise it. It is not revealed as to when India acquired that capability. On 11 May 1998 the day of Pokhran II, Brijesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to Indian Prime Minister, said that these tests had established that India had a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme.2 Pakistan, to assert that it too had that capability, followed suit by publicly demonstrating its nuclear weapon capability soon after Pokhran II.

India’s decision to go nuclear provoked severe adverse international responses, especially from the USA. One possible reason for India to formulate and publicise its nuclear doctrine was to mitigate the intensity of that hostility. In that context, Brijesh Mishra, while addressing a select group of journalists, had said that the structure of India’s nuclear forces and the operational doctrine guiding them would be rooted in the broad principles of minimum deterrence and nuclear NFU.3 K Subrahmanyam, who was credited to have a role in formulating India’s nuclear doctrine, also underlined these two points in his article in India International Centre Quarterly.4

IND was drafted in June 1998 by a 27-member National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) under the Chairmanship of K Subrahmanyam. The Board comprised of non-official experts and had only an advisory role. Thus, formally speaking, the doctrine had no official stamp upon it except that it was released by Brijesh Mishra who was the then National Security Adviser as also Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister AB Vajpayee. The doctrine, among other things, outlined the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India’s nuclear force and was intended to serve as a basis for the policy and strategy concerning force structure, deployment and employment of nuclear forces.5

Shri Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister, in an exclusive interview to S Raja Mohan, made it very explicit that the IND prepared by the NSAB was not an official nuclear doctrine. It was released to the public for a wider debate and, thus, was not a policy document of the Government of India. When asked about the essence and thinking on India’s doctrine, Jaswant Singh said that key elements of India’s nuclear policy were spelt out by the Prime Minister in the Parliament in December 1998. He recapitulated them briefly as follows. India shall maintain a minimum nuclear deterrence and shall undertake necessary measures to ensure its credibility. India had declared a policy of NFU. Moreover, India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Also, India shall not enter into an arms race. India’s commitment to global nuclear disarmament would remain undiluted.

Jaswant Singh also listed three other points that were not part of Prime Minister’s speech in the Parliament but were related to India’s nuclear policy. The first was that India had declared a moratorium on undertaking any further underground nuclear tests. He, however, insisted that R&D activities that included computer simulation and sub-critical tests would be conducted as and when necessary. The second point that was made by Jaswant Singh in his interview with C Raja Mohan was that India would continue further development of extended-range Agni missile. He added that additional flight testing would be undertaken in a manner that was non-provocative, transparent and consistent with established international norms and practices. Lastly, he said that India would seek to negotiate confidence building measures, both in the conventional and nuclear fields, with the aim of reducing lack of trust in the region.6

Confusion over Terms

Some terms like NFU, minimum credible deterrence (MCD) and second strike, that had got associated with IND, have evoked serious comments. They were probably used at that time to ward off international criticism of India’s gesture of publicly defying efforts by some great powers, mostly from the West, to impose a non-proliferation regime upon states that had not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India had publicly defied them by conducting Pokhran II. Though Pakistan too followed suit, it was India that was targeted most virulently. Use of terms like NFU, MCD was probably designed to justify India’s nuclear weaponisation while simultaneously projecting a non-aggressive posture. But, these very terms drew maximum criticism. It is time that IND is gradually disassociated with these terms in the light of changing regional and global environment.

Few took India’s offer of NFU seriously even in 1998. Pakistan rejected it outright. The entire nuclear deterrence of Pakistan was designed to deny India its advantage vis-à-vis conventional weapons. Hence, Pakistan had publicly proclaimed that it would exercise its nuclear option to deter India’s conventional warfare capability. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz reiterated that position on 19 August 1999 when he warned that a growing conventional imbalance would intensify Islamabad’s dependence upon its nuclear capability to deter India.7

There are examples of other nuclear weapon powers that had earlier declared NFU as a policy, altering their stand and threatening to use nuclear weapon in the context of asymmetry in conventional forces. Russia, in 1993, reneged on the earlier Soviet pledge of NFU and reserved the right to use nuclear weapon in response to a large-scale conventional attack by NATO forces. That policy was reiterated in 2000 in Russia’s military doctrine.8

China had announced NFU after its nuclear weapon test in 1964. It was reiterated in 1995 even when it was becoming clear that India was embarking on the path of acquiring nuclear deterrence. But, in 2005, Major-General Zhu Chenghu, in a press interview, said that China would use nuclear weapons if it was attacked with highly sophisticated conventional weapons.9 It is possible that the Chinese were warning the USA against repeating Iraq vis-à-vis China. China reiterated that policy in 2011.

Kyodo, a Japanese news agency, revealed that Chinese policy called ‘Lowering the Threshold of Nuclear Threat’ stated that PLA’s Strategic Missile Forces would readjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile possessing country carried out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in China with absolutely superior conventional weapons.10 That statement could even be India-specific; since by 2011, India had started deploying Su-30 aircraft in the context of China, besides proposing to develop longer range missiles like Agni V. Thus, even China, that is a nuclear weapon power and has a strong conventional weapon capability, has put conditions on its NFU policy.

India, in its nuclear doctrine, has also made some exceptions to its NFU policy. IND has made nuclear deterrence a part of India’s overall weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. IND clearly states that India would reserve the right to use nuclear option in the event of a major attack against India or Indian armed forces anywhere by biological and chemical weapons. Is it possible to extend the scope of the exception to enable India to use its nuclear option in case of gross asymmetry in conventional forces as was done by Russia and China?

IND, when it was first released, was Pakistan-focused. India’s position on NFU was more in the context of Pakistan since India had an edge over Pakistan in the context of conventional warfare. It could well afford the concept of NFU. By contrast, Pakistan had created its nuclear capability to counter India’s edge in conventional warfare. India’s NFU concept, thus, put the onus of resorting to nuclear threat on Pakistan. No wonder Pakistan refused to accept that concept. But, is the concept of NFU equally valid in the case of China? Not only China has advantage over India in the case of nuclear but also conventional warfare. It has also said that it would, if need be, resort to use of nuclear weapon if its strategic targets were subjected to superior air strikes.

India also needs to keep its nuclear option open in case it is subjected to a massive conventional strike that is likely to adversely affect its strategic interests and territorial integrity. If Russia and China can modify their concept of NFU in this context, India cannot be blamed for taking such a step.

IND says that nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against nuclear attack. Phrases only and retaliation against nuclear strike need to be revised in the light of altered environment so as to free India from its self-imposed limitation in the use or threat to use nuclear deterrence in pursuance of its national interests. The revised version can include, “Indian nuclear weapons will be employed in the event of use or threat to use nuclear weapon against India on its forces anywhere. India’s response will be massive and designed to inflict maximum damage on the adversary.”

The second point that needs to be refuted strongly is the linkage by some commentors of India’s nuclear strike with second strike. Nowhere does IND use the term second strike. It, however, does mention that India’s nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive. Thus, the term used is massive retaliation and not second strike. The confusion arises partly because of the policy of NFU as also because of calling the adversary’s nuclear attack as first strike. The confusion can be easily removed by substituting the term first strike with nuclear strike.

Nuclear deterrence can be broadly classified under two heads; pre-emptive and punitive. Pakistan has, time and again, reiterated its policy of pre-emptive deterrence. Since IND has reiterated NFU, Indian nuclear strategy is restricted to punitive deterrence. IND states that Indian response to a nuclear strike will be massive. Thus, the term strike (by adversary) becomes the core for determining India’s nuclear deterrence. How does one define nuclear strike? Unlike conventional war or even in the case of manned nuclear bombers, that can be recalled, nuclear missiles, once launched, cannot be recalled. Thus, does strike commence once the missile is launched or after it has hit the target? Since the missile cannot be recalled, the term strike should logically be associated with the launch of the missile.

Even if one takes that as the benchmark for determining nuclear strike and subsequent steps for launching massive retaliation (punitive deterrence), still the time span for effective response is limited, in the case of South Asia, to a narrow margin of 3-7 minutes only. Does India have the capability to detect the launch, communicate it to appropriate decision-making authorities for taking final decision to retaliate within a span of 3-7 minutes? Thus, whether one likes it or not India’s real and effective capability for conveying a convincing punitive response will still depend largely upon the credibility of its second strike capability.

Another phrase that needs to be reviewed is MCD. It is vague and hence subject to conflicting interpretations. This phrase can be faulted on several counts. MCD had indirectly got associated with NFU and massive destruction of the adversary. That meant that India’s command and control structure as also its nuclear strike capability will not only survive the so-called first strike of the adversary but will also retain its capability to launch a retaliatory strike that is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the adversary. Hence, it meant that India must possess nuclear capability that is large enough to deter adversary from launching any nuclear strike. That makes the term ‘minimum’ superfluous if not contradictory to the ethos of IND.

No one will deny the fact that deterrence to be effective has to be credible. But that adjective itself defies exactitude because it is subject to different assessments by those who want to deter and those who need to be deterred. Adjective minimum only adds to the confusion.

Hypothetically, can 120 SSMs of different types deter Pakistan that seems to be bent upon an arms race to overtake India in the field of tactical SSM, strategic SSMs and nuclear capable cruise missiles, and which never ceases to flout its nuclear capability and intention to deter India from using even its conventional warfare capability? Can India pose a credible deterrence to China with a nuclear force level of 20 Agni II/III, 10 Agni V and 5 Agni VI missiles? Can India claim that mix as its MCD vis-à-vis China since it cannot enter into an arms race with China under the present conditions as it can do in the case of Pakistan.

Hence, does India need to incorporate MCD concept vis-à-vis China and balanced nuclear force concept vis-à-vis Pakistan in its revised nuclear doctrine? The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on January 4, 2003, had reviewed the IND.11 In that review it had totally ignored the term MCD. Now, in 2013, we need to once again review IND and re-examine the relevance of terms like MCD and credible punitive deterrence (CPD) in the context of China and Pakistan respectively.

Another criticism of the term minimum is that it is not quantifiable but is related to adversary’s capability to fight a nuclear war. For example, what could have been considered minimum and credible in 1999 or even in 2003 may not be so in 2013. Thus, India will have to constantly anticipate capability of adversaries and relate its so-called MCD to their nuclear strategy. Hence, India’s nuclear strategy will only keep on responding to moves of the adversaries instead of charting its own course and let adversaries respond to it. The term MCD is also difficult to define. Who decides whether it is credible, India or its adversaries?

IND was formulated in 1999 or at best in 2003 when India’s nuclear strategy was largely Pakistan-focussed. Now, China has also emerged as a variable in determining India’s nuclear strategy. Can India have a single norm to determine MCD or will it evolve separate norms for the two potential nuclear adversaries. It must be underlined that India’s threat perception, especially on nuclear confrontation, differs vis-à-vis the two countries. IND needs to provide for that so that it does not send wrong signals to either of them.

If IND was aimed at reassuring adversaries and thereby preventing an arms race, it has failed in its objective as far as Pakistan is concerned. One witnesses a sustained growth, both in terms of quality and quantity, of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia. As per details provided in the Military Balance, in 2005 India had about 45 SSMs of the Prithvi series and about 24 SSMs of the Agni series; a total of 69 SSMS. Pakistan was reported to have about the same numbers. By 2010, the number had increased to about 60 SSMs of the Prithvi series, about 100 of Agni-I and 25 of Agni II series; a total of 185 SSMs. Pakistan had about 105 Hatf I/II, 50 Hatf III, 25 Ghauri missiles and 10 Shaheen SSMs, a total of 190 SSMs.12 Since then both the countries have been not only updating their delivery system by adding new missile systems but also improving upon their quality.

There are reports that India has tested Prahar, a 180-km range missile, designed to replace the Prithvi series of that range. It has quick response time and is mounted on vehicle that can carry four such missiles.13 If these specifications are true then Prahar can also serve as a tactical SSM, a counter to Nasr of Pakistan. India is also qualitatively improving its Agni II and III SSMs. It has not only launched Agni V, an ICBM, but is reported to be developing Agni VI, a longer range ICBM with capability to launch multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It is also reported to be working on Nirbhay, a 1,000 km range cruise missile. In the meanwhile, Pakistan has inducted Nasr as a tactical level nuclear-armed SSM as also Babur and Raad cruise missiles. The arms race goes on.

IND – Points for Review

It is necessary that IND if and when revised needs to address two different types of challenges; from Pakistan and China. There is a basic difference between the approaches of India and Pakistan towards nuclear deterrence. CCS’s review of IND in 2003 had emphasised the retaliatory or punitive aspect of India’s nuclear strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. By contrast, Pakistan’s strategy is based upon threat of pre-emptive nuclear strike as deterrence not only vis-à-vis nuclear strategy but also conventional threat. Indian decision-makers have so far refused at least publicly, to base India’s nuclear strategy upon pre-emptive (i.e. first strike) deterrence but have emphasised upon credible retaliatory or punitive deterrence as the basis of its strategy.

Such a policy ipso facto requires that India must not only demonstrate a credible or convincing retaliatory or punitive capability for the proposed massive retaliation after absorbing the adversary’s nuclear strike but also a decision-making authority as well as command and control mechanism, that can be effectively activised within a short time span of 3-7 minutes, as a part of its credible punitive deterrence (CPD) strategy. Indian decision makers will also need, in that context, to make a fine distinction between nuclear launch based upon pre-emption, on warning or on actual launch. Is India’s retaliatory capability suitably geared and does IND reflect the same?

When IND was formulated it was largely Pakistan-focussed. India had neither the resources nor the intention to openly pursue a policy of nuclear confrontation vis-à-vis China. But, by 2012, by developing Agni V (and working on Agni VI) as also the decision to arm its SSBN with long-range SLBMs, India is sending signals that it is preparing for a possible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis China also. Hence, India needs a nuclear doctrine that is also China focused.

Of course, India’s relations with China are of a different nature than that with Pakistan. But, it needs to be underlined that China is, since a long time, pursuing a policy of confronting India directly on what can be called a low key but is doing its best since long to assist Pakistan to act as a proxy against India. This is true not only about its significant support to Pakistan in the field of conventional but also nuclear warfare. How does India define its nuclear doctrine to deal with two different sets of threats; from Pakistan and from China? Is its present doctrine sufficient to address these twin challenges or does it need to be reviewed and, if need be, revised in the light of new developments?

Doctrines are not sacrosanct and need to be adjusted in the light of new challenges and opportunities. That is true of India as well. It is possible that Indian decision makers have made suitable modifications. If so, as the CCS had done a decade ago in 2003, they have not been shared with the public so far. One wonders why?

Endnotes

1. Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapon and Foreign Policy, W.W: Norton, New York, 1969, p. 225.

2. Joshi, Manoj, Strategic Analysis, 22 (10), January 1999, p. 1469.

3. Raja Mohan, C., “India committed to minimum deterrence”, The Hindu, December 7, 1998.

4. Subrahmanyam, K. “Nuclear tests: What next?”, IIC Quarterly, 25(2-3), Summer-Monsoon, 1998, p. 57.

5. Katyal, KK, “A motivated exercise?”, The Hindu, August 23, 1999.

6. The Hindu, November 29, 1999.

7. The Hindu, August 20, 1999.

8. Thawale, Jogesh V., “No-first use principle – does it affect deterrence?” Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, 19(2), August 2011, p. 235.

9. Ibid., p. 234.

10. Times of India, January 7, 2011.

11. The Defence Watch, March 2006, p. 30.

12. The Military Balance (IISS), 2010, London, pp. 360, 367.

13. Times of India, July 1, 2013.

*Dr KR Singh was teaching at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi till 1997. He also served as Director, National Security Programme, JNU; Editor in Chief of International Studies Quarterly and Visiting Professor, Chair for Maritime Studies, University of Calicut.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIII, No. 594, October-December 2013.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 04 Nov 2015 08:38

Pakistan’s nuclear program threatens the world, not just India

Should India revise its nuclear doctrine in the light of Pakistan’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons? Unlike Pakistan, India considers its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear attacks and they are not Pakistan-specific. The label on a nuclear weapon, tactical or strategic, fired against India or Indian forces makes no difference to its consequences. A nuclear exchange, at whatever level it is initiated, will inevitably result in an all-out strategic exchange. To believe that either side would, in the fog of war, be able to limit the exchange only to a theatre level is a dangerous illusion.

It would, however, be reckless for Pakistan to believe that having a nuclear deterrent, even a full spectrum one, gives it the licence to use cross-border terrorism against India, without fear of retaliation.

member_29004 · Post by **member_29004** » 06 Nov 2015 00:31

[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZpIrZvP0Co[/youtube]

Seminar: Challenges to India's Nuclear Doctrine

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored this talk entitled “A Covenant Sans Sword:
Challenges to India's Nuclear Doctrine” by Retired Indian Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar on Oct. 6, 2014.

India's nuclear policy faces significant challenges from the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear thinking and its development of tactical nuclear weapons. The combustible mixture of these factors has not only made it prickly for India to find coherence in its long-term policies, but it has also increased the threat of a nuclear standoff between the two countries. The status-quo is unacceptable for India because Pakistan upholds an ambiguous nuclear doctrine that could have perilous effects if India were to retaliate against an attack on Indian soil. Critics of India's No First Use policy argue that it abrogates the duty of the state to protect its citizens by leaving them vulnerable to a first strike. Can India find a way to strengthen its long-term security without risking nuclear escalation?

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM is the former commander-in-chief of the Andaman & Nicobar Command, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Forces Command, and flag officer commanding the Western Fleet. He retired on September 30, 2009, after nearly forty-five years in uniform, and today passes down his operational and strategic experience through articles and participation in seminars, and lecturing at various universities. The Admiral is an adjunct faculty at the National Institute of Advanced Studies where his papers have been the prime mover for several seminars and workshops; a distinguished fellow and columnist at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies New Delhi; a member of the Forum for Strategic Initiative New Delhi; and the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute India. Internationally, his active participation in dialogues represents a commitment to provide a new paradigm for maritime and nuclear security on the sub-continent. He holds an MSc in Defense Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA, Naval Higher Command College and the Defense Services Staff College India.

My input : what he speaks about Manmohan Singh, shows he was such a weak prime minister who didnt have a decisive gene!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Nov 2015 00:53

Please use following links for above talk:

http://www.independentnews.com/labs_lin ... 5fce6.html

And see the other links on the right hand column.