Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 10 May 2003 08:09

Interesting, Gudakesa. However, the option of getting nukes from PRC on demand is not so clear. If TSP is declared nuke-free, then IN is free to blockade the sea-lanes, and IA is free to cut Rahim Yar Khan, even with losses of 30,000 men. The IAF will simply focus on smashing PAF for the first several days, then turn to smashing the land forces. Numbers are on India's side.

This would mean IOW, that the terrorist days are numbered - and India will strike with a vengeance to make up for 15 years of "thousand cuts".

In such a situation, India will not hesitate to cut the Karakoram Hwy and destroy any incoming PRC aircraft before they can unload. So no PRC nukes either.

I can't believe that any Paki neta will actually go declare this unless its involuntary denuking, and is accompanied by some big American security guarantee.

Anyway, I don't want to clutter this thread with my unproveable (but un-refutable) argument. You should have seen the panic on the SATribune Forum when some worthy posted the same arguments that I'm making, and someone else posted a link to my BRM article.

I still claim that the involuntary denuking has already occurred. BTW, my firm belief is that Mush is Top or #2 in the Global Terrorist Enterprise, so there's no question of any fallout between him and the LeT - they're the same.

Sam · Post by **Sam** » 10 May 2003 08:10

<blockquote>Gudakesa</blockquote>Good points. Add a few more.

<ol>[*]CIA floated a trial balloon to see if South Asia can be nuke-free, without the hassle of negotiations or an expensive war. Read somewhere that Jamali is an American stooge, in addition to dictator Musharraf.

</li>[*]Pakistan can avoid the fate of Iraq by getting rid of nukes ASAP, the meter is running for Pakistan.</li>[*]Pakistan cold very well have old and outdated junk nukes from China which would anyways need serious maintenance in the next 5/10 yrs. US hyping them to be superior to that of India could be just a part of the game.</li>[/LIST]

Anindya · Post by **Anindya** » 10 May 2003 08:15

Also, KSA funded the TSP nuke program with the intent of getting nukes on demand. I doubt that TSP can give up on this part of the equation without getting several jhapads from their KSA masters.

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 10 May 2003 08:27

The other question is - back to the irrelevance issue. Devoid of nukes, what is TSP? Even North Korea is more threatening than TSP. So I just can't see why Jamali can AFFORD to come out with such an offer. Won't all the Corpse Commandos shriek in protest? Unless they know that nothing is being given away?

VirenH · Post by **VirenH** » 10 May 2003 08:38

Originally posted by narayanan:
Won't all the Corpse Commandos shriek in protest? Unless they know that nothing is being given away?

Military junta could be giving Jamali a long rope. Mushy has nothing to loose either way.

Sam · Post by **Sam** » 10 May 2003 08:40

Originally posted by narayanan:
Devoid of nukes, what is TSP?
So I just can't see why Jamali can AFFORD to come out with such an offer.
Won't all the Corpse Commandos shriek in protest?

I believe behind the scenes there is some serious arm twisting going on for Pakistan to give up nukes. An ISI General summoned to DC ..., Armitage visiting etc. etc. So, if Pakistan gives up nukes just like that it would look foolish even worse than caving in of Saddam. Hence Jamali would make the offer to India and make it look as if it was not due to pressure from uncle. Commandos cant protest because it is they who are being squeezed in a Vise-Grip, you know where

Assuming such a deal, giving up of the nukes that is, goes thru, Pakistan would then become deeper blue eyed boy and get more $$$ from uncle.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 12 May 2003 04:06

From TIME magazine

Al-Qaeda's Nuclear Contact?

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the No. 3 leader of al-Qaeda, who was captured in Pakistan on March 1, has been questioned extensively about his relationship with Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers. But his U.S. interrogators have also grilled him about another figure of much concern to Washington: Abdul Qadeer Khan, the maverick Pakistani scientist who has been called the father of the Islamic Bomb. U.S. intelligence, according to one official, has information that the al-Qaeda man and the nuclear scientist had connections with the same safe-house operator and may have crossed paths. They were "reported to be at the same place at approximately the same time," the official said. Under questioning, according to the source, Mohammed denied seeing Khan and downplayed any usefulness Khan may have had to al-Qaeda. Khan declined repeated requests from TIME to comment on the accusations.

The CIA believes that Khan had a key role in helping North Korea develop at least one or two nuclear devices, a senior official tells TIME. Under pressure from the U.S., the Pakistani government two years ago stripped Khan of his position in the nuclear and military establishment and barred him from traveling abroad without official permission. Within Pakistan, Khan is always accompanied by two military officers, Pakistani officials say. But Washington fears that he may still have enough freedom to be able to shop Pakistan's nuclear secrets to other clients. Says a Washington official: "He moves around very freely and has everything he needs inside his head, if not his briefcase."

Gudakesa · Post by **Gudakesa** » 12 May 2003 04:45

narayanan & Sam,
Thanks for your comments.

Consider the following however:

I make the assumptions that :

i. It is in american interests to see India not solve its Pakistan problem, and to see India hurt by it.

ii. The "denuclearization" is a ploy by the official arm of Pakistan. In reality, the nukes are in "unconventional" hands. So, a deterrent does exist.

IF one is extremely paranoid, one could visualize a situation where Pakistan plays the "nuclear-free" ploy with tacit diplomatic support/ neutrality from GoTUS. In which case, considerable pressure is put on India on this matter, while the ground reality remains the same-Pakistan still has a deterrent, moreover it can use them deniably (to the extent that a nuclear weapon can be used deniably).

OF course, in all fairness, this is improbable for the following reasons:

A. The GoTUS would prefer nuclear weapons in conventional military control for reasons of its own security.

B. If the "unconventional" groups in Pakistan get nukes, Musharraf's reason to exist vanishes, and true to their nature, they will be able to bid for power. more to the point, India can simply say that they are the legitimate leaders of Pakistan and speak to them directly and ignore Musharraf & Jamali. However, I think there will be considerable instability created all the same if this was what they decided to do.

I think your (Narayanan)'s counterpoint about availability of weapons from China is a good counter to my initial suggestion #1.

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 12 May 2003 05:57

I don't really believe that American policy at that level cares about "countering" India. Some flunkies in the SD, of the Cohen/ Clancy School of Idiots may feel that way, but the top levels of the White House care more about preventing WMD attacks on the United States and its interests, first, middle and last.

And to them, the possession of nukes by Pakistan, given its propensity to hand them over to North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Al Qaeda poses a deadly threat - a Sword of Damocles. I simply do not believe that any POTUS will play games with that risk to test PhD theses on foreign policy. The top American interest, therefore, would be to ensure that no nukes ever get loose into the hands of anti-American interests. The Americans spent umpteeen millions sending experts to Kazakhstan to ensure its denuclearization, and dispose of its fissile material (some of those $$ came to some parts of the place where I work). And Kazakhstan is a heck of a lot less jehadi than Pakistan.

This is why I focused in my paper on learning of American threat perceptions, and what they considered to be thresholds of unacceptable threat. And by those declarations of thresholds, the Pakis certainly crossed those in 2002 - and have kept on crossing them since. I would consider it the boo-boo of the century by the GOTUS if they have NOT denuked Pakistan - and somehow, I don't associate that kind of incompetence with the GOTUS in such matters.

We see amazing incompetence in the GOTUS' dealings with TSP, but hey, that's our optimism, as TSJOnes was so wont to sneer at us. The GOTUS does not care particularly if Injuns and Pakis kill each other, but a full-scale nuclear war is of course bad for business.

But ALL of that pales into insignificance beside the threat of a Paki nuke going off above a US aircraft carrier Task Force, or, horror of horrors, in or above a US city.

According to Scientific American, the rush to "deploy" terminal-area, ground-based NMD systems despite their <50% demonstrated success rate, is because of the panicked realization that North Korea may have some uncounted number of nukes, and the delivery systems are already in place. That of course may be misinformation like the vaunted "Iraqi Chemical Weapons", designed to benefit a few friends of the Administration, but hey, the point is that such an argument carries enough weight to get Congress to sign off on billions and billions.

So what does Congress say to the deadly prospect of loose nukes in the unhinged slum filled with terrorists, with a regime they KNOW to be rabidly and incorrigibly anti-American? How will any POTUS go to sleep, knowing that the trigger to destroy a few million of his countrymen is in the hands of ***** drumroll here ***********

Our Valued Al-Lie in the Global Offensive Against Terrorism, General Musharraf

???

Come on, George Bush has figured out how to zip up his fly - don't you think he can figure out that Musharraf is a damn terrorist?

Conclusion: Musharraf is nook-nood. Nuclear-free Since June 2002.

And let the Pakis enjoy knowing that they Ate Grass in vain.

Arun A · Post by **Arun A** » 15 May 2003 18:06

Are TSPs nukes of Russian origin?
Pyongyang has dozens of nukes, top defector says

The general told the magazine that North Korea secretly imported nuclear bombs from the former Soviet Union in 1983 and now has four Soviet-made nuclear missiles which, with a range of 8,000 kilometres, could reach the west coast of the United States.

Leonard · Post by **Leonard** » 30 May 2003 22:20

U.S. must clamp down on Pakistan nuke dealing
By Selig S. Harrison

More Paki Nuke Proliferation Details

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 30 May 2003 22:54

On August 2, 2002, the Saudi defense minister was taken on a tour of Pakistani nuclear facilities, and lesser Saudi defense officials have visited Pakistani nuclear sites on two other occasions.

The strengthening of the saudi pak alliance after Jun 2002 is significant.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 01 Jun 2003 23:50

FWIW, TIME reports:

The U.S. has recently acquired a new asset in its diplomatic battle with North Korea over nuclear weapons. In what appears to be a major intelligence coup, the CIA last month recruited a scientist who worked on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, two U.S. officials and a foreign government source tell TIME. The scientist (who is not from the North and whose identity TIME was asked to withhold for the sake of his family's safety) has been relocated to the U.S. and has provided valuable information on the "location, degree of development in capabilities, where they are, and how far along they are in developing multiple weapons capability," a U.S. official said.

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 02 Jun 2003 00:00

Probably Chinese.

Arun A · Post by **Arun A** » 05 Jun 2003 00:22

Does Iran have nuclear ambitions?

A source close to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has told RIA Novosti the UN nuclear watchdog's recent mission to Iran led by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei had examined a site of more than 200 centrifuges, among other nuclear facilities.

The source, speaking on condition of anonymity, disclosed the centrifuges had been made using a technology owned by what he identified as British-Dutch-German firm Urenco. The source told RIA Novosti the technology might well have entered Iran from Pakistan.

It was widely reported in the world press at one point that the man behind Pakistan's atomic bomb, Abdul Kadyr Khan, had photocopied secret documents while working in the Netherlands in the Seventies. Pakistan's nuclear program was launched right after Khan returned to that country, which is home to a wealth of uranium deposits. Virtually none of Pakistan's nuclear facilities have ever been inspected by the IAEA.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 10 Jun 2003 04:06

Russia grows wary of Iran nukes

"Russian officials have made a huge evolution in understanding the threat from Iran" and are making "progress toward the US position," says Anton Khlopkov, an Iran expert at the PIR Center in Moscow, a military-research institute that predicts a "worst-case scenario" of Iran building a nuclear weapon by 2006, in a report soon to be released.

"Not only US but Russian experts were really surprised by the information about these two sites and these two plants," Mr. Khlopkov says of the enrichment facilities. "Russia and the US should engage with European experts to find the source of such technologies ... maybe in North Korea or Pakistan."

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 10 Jun 2003 19:07

Report in Jane's about the Iranian Nuclear Program

The Natanz inspections also showed that the gas centrifuges, believed to be based on a decades-old European design that US officials said was obtained from Pakistan in the early 1990s, had been substantially modified and upgraded. In fact, the IAEA inspectors described the Iranian machinery as "sophisticated" - hardly what would be expected from a country that previously had no uranium-enrichment centrifuge facilities declared to the nuclear watchdog agency or known publicly.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 10 Jun 2003 20:03

All this stuff about Iranian stuff being from Pakistan is bs. It was probably bought from Europe and US under the same arrangements as the Pakistanis. Someone is trying to cover up this fact. The ease with which people forget the details of the Iran-Contra affair is quite amusing to forget.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 17 Jun 2003 02:49

Cross posting:

Japanese were preaching nuclear virginity to Indian, now their tail is on fire with Puki-gifted nuclear weapon to N.Korea and they are ready to jump into the bed with Nukes to join the Noo-clear rouges

India should send them a Praful Bidwai et al in a peace missilen and then withdraw their pass port. Bidwai etc are better off there.
Japan reconsidering the bomb: Mercury News

CONCERNS ABOUT PRESTIGE, NORTH KOREAN THREAT FEED DEBATE ON ONCE-TABOO TOPIC OF NUCLEAR ARMS
By Karl Schoenberger
Mercury News

TOKYO - The Japanese are talking about the bomb. Not the one that incinerated Hiroshima 58 years ago, ushering in the Atomic Age, but the one they might consider building if the threat of missiles and nuclear weapons from North Korea gets out of hand.

Only a few people openly advocate going nuclear right now, but a lively debate on this once-taboo question is a sign that the public is shedding its commitment to unconditional pacifism and getting pragmatic about national security for the first time since the nation's defeat in World War II.

Some Japanese warn that extremist views associated with the nation's militaristic past are insinuating their way into mainstream society. But others say the debate over inflammatory issues such as nuclear weapons -- involving security hawks, government leaders and feisty news media -- is an expression of ``normal'' national pride.

``Japan should have clout, and to have clout we have to have military power,'' said Takeshi Fukushima, a soft-spoken, 43-year-old investment banker, during a lunchtime interview in Tokyo. ``Without clout, North Korea won't take us seriously. We could take a hard line if we had nuclear weapons.''

Japan has the technological capability to build nuclear weapons. But as the world's first and only victim of atomic warfare -- about 300,000 Japanese civilians died from the two 1945 atomic blasts and radiation injuries -- it has used its singular pulpit to advocate global peace and nuclear non-proliferation. Japan announced its ``Three Non-Nuclear Principles'' policy, which prohibits making or using nuclear weapons, or introducing them into Japan, in 1967.

Protected by a ``nuclear umbrella'' in Japan's Cold War security alliance with the United States, the public had seen few reasons to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. But a wake-up call came Aug. 31, 1998, when North Korea test-launched its Taepodong long-range missile over Japan.

``The Taepodong shot is comparable to Sputnik in terms of its impact on Japanese society,'' said Matake Kamiya, an analyst at Japan's National Defense Academy. `It was the first time in postwar history that Japan really felt threatened with harm by an external hostile power.''

More harm than good

Kamiya rejects the idea that Japan could go nuclear in the foreseeable future. The nuclear allergy still runs deep, he argues, and exercising the option would probably trigger a regional arms race and do more harm than good to the nation's strategic interests.

Kamiya said, however, that the nuclear question is a symbol of shifting views.

``Japanese attitudes on defense are becoming much more realistic. Political leaders are trying to reposition the policy of military restraint,'' Kamiya said.

Indeed, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has been pushing the boundaries of Japan's postwar Peace Constitution since he took office in April 2001. After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Japan deployed a ``non-combatant'' naval mission to the Indian Ocean to provide refueling support to U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan -- a bold forward deployment for the constitutionally limited Self-Defense Forces.

Later that year, Japanese coast guard and navy ships chased an intruding North Korean spy boat, returning hostile fire and sinking it. In December 2002, the navy sent Aegis-class destroyers equipped with sophisticated radar to the Indian Ocean. This March, Japan launched two military intelligence satellites into orbit over North Korea.

Japan has a $50 billion defense budget, making it the third-richest in the world, and commands 240,000 active military personnel. But it is only now acquiring the equipment for midair-refueling capability that would enable its warplanes to return home from North Korea, suggesting that the rigid strictures that once banned hardware for offensive missions are gradually fading. Japan is now asking the Pentagon for missile-defense technology.

``We're overcoming the reflex aversion to anything military,'' said Koji Tomita, a senior Foreign Ministry official.

A package of legislation spelling out the rules of engagement for Japanese troops in combat, Tomita noted, was held up for some 25 years by fierce opposition. Parliament finally approved the ``war contingency bills'' in mid-May.

Nervousness persists, however, about Japan's fascist past. Yasunori Matogawa, director of external affairs at the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, said he is upset by the government's use of a civilian H-IIA rocket, developed for commercial use by a rival space agency, to launch military payloads.

`It's deceptive'

``They call the payload `information-gathering satellites,' but everyone knows they are for military application. It's deceptive,'' said Matogawa.

His research institute has developed a solid-fuel rocket, the MU-5, that is smaller than the liquid-fuel H-IIA used by Japan's primary space agency. Liquid-fuel rockets take hours to prepare for launch, but solid-fuel rockets can be launched more rapidly, making them better suited for military use. Matogawa is made fearful by national security arguments raised by lawmakers for keeping Japan's solid-fuel rocket technology alive after the two space agencies merge in October.

``It seems the hard-line national security proponents in parliament are increasing their influence and they aren't getting much criticism,'' Matogawa said. ``I think we're moving into a very dangerous period -- it reminds me of the 1930s. When you consider the current environment and the threat from North Korea, it's scary.''

After the first nuclear crisis in North Korea in the early 1990s, the Defense Agency commissioned a secret study on the risks and benefits of developing nuclear weapons. A 1996 report on the findings, disclosed last year, concluded unequivocally that nuclear weapons would harm Japan far more than protect it, partly because Japan's population is so dense and vulnerable to a nuclear attack.

Yet Japan's hypothetical nuclear weapons survive as a rhetorical deterrent, putting pressure on North Korea -- and China, Japan's long-term strategic rival in Asia.

Two high-ranking government officials caused a furor last year with casual remarks about the nuclear option. Shinzo Abe, a Koizumi lieutenant, cited an official 1958 interpretation of the constitution that Japan could have nuclear weapons if they were small and ``defensive'' in nature.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda threw gasoline on the fire in a private conversation with reporters, saying circumstances ``could require Japan to possess nuclear weapons.'' Abe and Fukuda said their remarks were misunderstood and that they don't favor the nuclear option.

Pundits and politicians in Washington have floated the idea that Japan might go nuclear.

Cheney remarks

In a March 16 interview on NBC's ``Meet the Press,'' Vice President **** Cheney said it is ``important that our friends in the region deal effectively'' with North Korea's nuclear belligerence. Japan ``may be forced to consider whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear question,'' he said.

In Japan, the conversation pops up in surprising places. In a recent international-law seminar at Kyoto University, Professor Masahiko Asada asked students what they thought about Japan developing nuclear weapons. Several students thought it was a good idea.

``Some of the students talked about national pride, and the political leverage that nuclear weapons could bring,'' said Asada, who specializes in non-proliferation law. ``They said it would give us more power in the international arena. I was rather surprised to hear that.''

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contact Karl Schoenberger at kschoenberger@mercurynews. com or (415) 477-2500.

Arun A · Post by **Arun A** » 17 Jun 2003 22:57

Iraq: check
North Korea: check
Iran: check

TSP's got the axis of evil covered....

U.S. seeks world support in exposing Iran weapons

U.S. intelligence agencies have cited Russia and China as sources of Iran's nuclear technology. But U.S. officials have refused to confirm media reports that Pakistan, a close American ally in the war on terrorism, has supplied uranium enrichment technology to Iran. The reports have appeared in the publications Nucleonics Week and Nuclear Fuel.

"I'm pretty confident it's a Pakistani connection," said Jon Wolfstahl, a nuclear proliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He said Pakistan may have supplied not only equipment and technology to the Iranians, but also advice on purchasing. Officials at Pakistan's embassy did not return calls yesterday.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 17 Jun 2003 23:10

Oh I wish Dr Tim renewed his certification of Pakistan as the most rational, Non prolifirator Nuclear power well ahead of India.

Div · Post by **Div** » 17 Jun 2003 23:15

Originally posted by John Umrao:
Oh I wish Dr Tim renewed his certification of Pakistan as the most rational, Non prolifirator Nuclear power well ahead of India.

We're not holding our breath...since you've dispatched him to BR purgatory.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 17 Jun 2003 23:44

The following story is from The Times of London, dated June 13.

Nuclear threat to West's hopes of stability

Section: Overseas news, Foreign Editor's Briefing, pg. 18

BY blocking the inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has brought the world's attention on to its nuclear ambitions. The site where the standoff occurred is identified as particularly worrying in a report by the United Nations nuclear watchdog, due to be published on Monday, which has been obtained by The Times.

The report, dated June 6, lists the concerns about Iran's many-layered nuclear research programme, where inspectors have not been satisfied by its assurance that it wants to build nuclear power stations, not weapons.

Britain and the US fear that even if they establish a democracy in Iraq, next door is a regime which may equip itself with nuclear weapons. Headed by a Shia Islamic theocracy, tugged back and forth by hardliners and moderates, a nuclear Iran could dominate and destabilise the region.

40-year nuclear dream

Iran began its nuclear research in the 1960s, with US help. The Shah, helped by the 1970s oil price boom, was enthusiastic; after the 1979 revolution, the ayatollahs picked up the torch, with Chinese help.

However, the Clinton Administration persuaded China to cut off this help in 1994, in return for US help expanding its own nuclear power (and also out of its own unease about Iranian intentions).

If that had been the end of outside help, the Iranian programme would probably have remained vestigial. Russia has been helping it to develop a large reactor at Bushehr but, under huge international pressure, has done so very slowly.

However, despite US efforts to block foreign help, Iran achieved a crucial leap forward in the mid-1990s, when it acquired the basic centrifuge technology to enrich uranium.

It has yet to perfect this operation. But if it does so, it could take its plentiful deposits of natural uranium, and enrich the material to use in a reactor - or even further, to the grade needed for a bomb. This would free it from having to import enriched uranium, and make it easier to escape supervision.

Gary Samore, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, who was a member of the Clinton team striking the 1994 deal with China, says he firmly believes that Pakistani scientists gave Iran the centrifuge technology, although it might well have been without the sanction of their Government.

What Iran has now

The best-known part of the Iranian programme is the research reactor in Tehran, now running steadily but too small for either power or weapons, and the large reactor under development at Bushehr.

But the most worrying part of the programme, which has come fully to light in only the past year, is Iran's uranium enrichment programme based at Natanz, with technology from the workshops of Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran.

The IAEA inspection

The IAEA report, by its director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, is based on his visit to Iran in February. Iran falls under the IAEA inspection regime because it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under which nuclear power projects are examined to make sure that no material is diverted to military use.

Iran has always said that it wants only to produce nuclear power, which it insists it needs despite its huge reserves of much cheaper oil and gas.

The IAEA report

The conclusion of ElBaradei's nine-page report is that Iran has committed minor infringements of the IAEA reporting rules. The text pointedly does not use the word "violation" and says that Iran has taken steps to fill the gaps. But the list of complaints still amounts to two serious concerns.

The first, conveyed with alarm even through the reserved tone, is that Iran revealed two enrichment facilities at Natanz only during ElBaradei's visit in February. The pilot plant is nearly ready, and a large commercial-scale plant is under construction.

The second is Iran's 12-year delay in reporting earlier this year that it had imported natural uranium from China in 1991, and its failure to say in detail what it has done with it.

The quantity is too small - 1.8 kg - to be significant for a weapons programme; it is the pattern of delays that worries the IAEA as much as the risk that uranium is "missing".

This week's standoff

Iran blocked a new team of inspectors from looking at whether centrifuge components at Kalaye had been tested with uranium hexafluoride, a gaseous compound. Nuclear analysts argue that Iran could not have got so far with its centrifuges without doing this.

And if it had? This would be a clear breach of IAEA rules. However, under the NPT, provided Iran continued to claim that this was just for nuclear power project, it would not have to stop, just submit the factory to regular inspection.

Because of that, this week's standoff may prove a tactical mistake by Iran. No doubt some in the regime would prefer to keep all the programme secret, hence the repeated delays in reporting to the IAEA.

However, the tactically smart move might well be to declare the facility, allow it to be inspected, and allow the programme to continue. Overall, Iran has been very shrewd in making the most of the IAEA rules; it would not be surprising if it soon relaxed the block on the Kalaye inspections.

How far from a bomb?

Perhaps three years, according to Gary Samore. Iran almost certainly can complete the Natanz centrifuge facility without more foreign help; that will take perhaps another 18 months. Then it would need another a year, maybe a bit more, to produce a stock amount of low-enriched uranium suitable for a reactor.

But how would it get to a bomb from there? Two routes, neither easy, both taking several months and vulnerable to interruption by military strikes.

Either it could take spent reactor fuel and reprocess it to extract plutonium - but that needs a large, easily detected reprocessing plant. Or it would have to enrich the uranium in its reactor fuel even further - but that means reconfiguring the centrifuges: a tricky task, also easily detected.

Nightmare scenario

Still, there is a nightmare scenario for the West. Suppose Iran spends the next two years finishing the centrifuges and assembling reactor fuel. In secret, it prepares a small enrichment plant at a new site. Then it gives the stipulated 90-day notice that it is leaving the NPT, whisks its reactor-grade uranium away to the secret site, and begins turning it into weapons-grade material.

Even if the US bombed the known sites, the fissile material would have vanished.

What now?

On Monday, ElBaradei presents his report to the IAEA board of governors, made up of representatives of 35 countries. But the US, a board member, is not likely to to press it to refer the matter to the Security Council, as it did with North Korea.

Instead, in the past week, it has indicated that it wants the board to agree a resolution or a joint statement expressing "deep concern", demanding that Iran answer the IAEA's unanswered questions and urging it to sign an "additional protocol" to give the IAEA extra inspection rights.

Weak US move

The weakness of the US position is that if Iran signed the new protocol, nothing would stop it completing its centrifuge programme.

US hawks are far from content with this but appear to lack the support on the IAEA board for anything tougher. There are echoes of America's battles over Iraq in the Security Council, and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot help.

Room for a deal?

Possibly. To many IAEA officials and nuclear experts, there is a world of difference between a power plant, which is easily monitored, and a programme to enrich uranium or extract plutonium. On this view, the real threat is Natanz.

Could Iran be persuaded to shut Natanz? The only offer with a chance of being taken seriously (and probably not a great chance) would be the promise of fuel for Bushehr in exchange for scrapping Natanz. The condition would be that it sent back all the fuel when spent. Those who hope that Iran might do a deal point to its frequent remark that under the NPT, it is entitled to help with nuclear power, in return for abstaining from a weapons programme.

However, the US seems in no mood for a deal, nor for fine distinctions between reactors and enrichment plants. It slapped down Iran's offer this week of signing a new protocol in return for more help. It insists that Iran scrap its entire programme; given its 40-year interest, that seems unlikely.

The US dilemma

Washington is in a quandary. The hawks do not want a deal with Tehran, and yet there is no national appetite for more military strikes. The doves think Iran potentially helpful on pursuing al-Qaeda, cracking down on Hezbollah and building a stable Iraq, a hope Iranian moderates may try to encourage. Yet if Iran's programme develops for several years, the US could face a much harder decision against the clock: whether to launch a strike if it suddenly quits the NPT.

What can Britain do?

Tony Blair appears sceptical that Britain's much-touted "engagement" with Tehran is getting anywhere. All the same, Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, who may make another trip to Tehran, could explore whether Iran would give up Natanz, backed up by the implicit threat that, in the end, the US might well not tolerate a THE MAIN CONCERNS

Iran imported 1.8 tonnes of natural uranium in 1991 but acknowledged it only in April this year

Iran acknowledged using the uranium to produce nuclear materials and waste but not how much

Only in May did Iran provide details of, and access to, the facilities in Tehran and Esfahan where the undeclared processing took place

The IAEA was told of Iran's uranium enrichment programme - an essential step for making weapons - for the first time in February

Copyright (C) The Times, 2003

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 17 Jun 2003 23:45

Originally posted by John Umrao:
Oh I wish Dr Tim renewed his certification of Pakistan as the most rational, Non prolifirator Nuclear power well ahead of India.

Did he actually say that?

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 17 Jun 2003 23:53

IIRC
he said

Pakistan is a rational country.
Pakistan's arse_nal is superior. ( yes in view of vast experience in GUBO Tech)
Pakistan's delivery systems are proven and superior. ( Since they are far ahead in paint technology)

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 17 Jun 2003 23:59

more than centrifuges, or reactors, Irans progress in making Heavy water using petroleum by products as feed that is alarming unkil & co.

They are going by both routes, Pu and EU.

Even if they dont have a regular bomb, its enough if they pass on Radio active material to Hamas & Co to do the rest.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 18 Jun 2003 00:06

Calling JRJ/Avid etc.

Anyone with access to Platt's Nuclear Fuel/Nucleonics week kindly post the relevant parts of recent articles implicating TSP with Iran's nuclear program.

Thanks

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 18 Jun 2003 00:32

I fail to understand as to 'WHY does IRAN, a energy rich (with vast resources of OIL, gas & Petroleum) is persuing NUKES'. Do they need nuclear energy, when they have plenty of OIL and GAS ? Their motives on nuke energy seem very suspicious to me.

Iran defiant over nukes
From The Times' Anthony Browne

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,6614196%255E401,00.html

IRAN has rejected unprecedented pressure from the United Nations, the US, Russia and the European Union to agree to a stricter regime of nuclear inspections in the face of mounting international concern that the country is trying to develop nuclear weapons.

Tehran said yesterday it would agree to a new inspection regime only in return for more nuclear technology, an offer Western diplomats called unacceptable.

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 18 Jun 2003 01:04

John Umrao,

That's closer to what I did say. In fact, I pointed out that there were (this was around 2000) public statements by fairly authoritative people (General Zinni, to be exact) arguing that Pakistan had superior nuclear and missile capability.

Back to lurking

Tim

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 18 Jun 2003 01:06

Originally posted by muddur:
Do they need nuclear energy when they have plenty of OIL and GAS ? Their motives on nukes are suspicious to me.

Besides their vast energy resources, there are some other oddities.

The reactor under construction will have Russian supplied fuel with spent fuel sent back to supplier.
Yet Iran has built complete fuel cycle infrastructure, from mining ore to fuel fabrication to reprocessing.

Why have they begun to experiment with Uranium metal? This has no place in power plants.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 18 Jun 2003 01:20

Boss, because Iran wanted to sing U2 to unkil!!

With EU they can have small reactors exclusively to produce Pu and with Pu they can make small bums (All this outside the IAEA safe Gods!! He he

)of the Non proliferation jihadis in Spin city who lecture India to dis arm.
They see 'Kaan may beedi' in every Indian

Neshant · Post by **Neshant** » 18 Jun 2003 02:51

They have plans to mine uranium ore themselves. This means they can process some of it secretly without ever accounting for it to the IAEA.

I'm sure their decision to aquire nukes is partly based on pakistan having the bomb. Saudi arabia's funding of pakistan's nuclear program and aquisition of CSS-2 IRBMs in 1988 was a great concern to them. Saudis were hoping to get their nukes ready made via pak.

But with US now keeping an eye on pak's nuke program, it seems the saudis wasted their monies.

Anindya · Post by **Anindya** » 20 Jun 2003 04:40

Maybe this explains where the missing Pakistani nuclear specialists went ...

Saudi Arabia is already thinking nuclear, reports intelligence newsletter Geostrategy-Direct

Saudi Arabia has been secretly obtaining help from Pakistan for its missile and nuclear program, the analysts report. Riyadh helped finance Pakistan's nuclear program precisely to ensure that the royal family will have a bomb in case of an emergency.

The Saudis have already obtained the perfect delivery system for nuclear warheads – the CSS-2 missile from China. Pakistan helped arrange the purchase of up to 60 CSS-2 missiles during the late 1980s. The missiles have a range of more than 1,500 kilometers – with some reports asserting that they can reach 3,000 kilometers.

...

Saudi Arabia has neither the time nor the expertise for a nuclear program. The Saudis saw how Israel knocked out the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981 and set back Baghdad's program by a decade. Instead, the Saudis are expected to merely buy complete warheads and obtain Pakistani experts to maintain and operate the systems.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 20 Jun 2003 04:47

R., just saw your note about Nucleonics. Here is one from January 16, 2003.
<hr>
Nucleonics Week

January 16, 2003

SECTION: Vol. 44, No. 16; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 571 words

HEADLINE: IRAN OBTAINED ENRICHMENT KNOW-HOW FROM PAKISTAN, INTELLIGENCE SAYS

BODY:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has obtained design information to develop and construct gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment from Pakistan's nuclear program, according to Western intelligence sources.

Based on its design information, Iran has put together a procurement program to purchase materials and equipment to build the centrifuges, Western officials said. It is believed that several years are still needed before Iran can be ready to embark on full-scale uranium enrichment using the centrifuges. The procurement program is being closely monitored by customs intelligence agencies in member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Sources said that experts in Pakistan who Western governments believe shared the know-how with Iran had, during the 1990s, made decisions virtually independently of Pakistan's civilian government, although civilian leaders were apprised of the transactions.

Since allegations surfaced in October that Pakistan aided a uranium enrichment program in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has steadfastly denied having sold any of the country's sensitive nuclear knowledge to outsiders. The U.S., which has compiled extensive information on the matter in its intelligence agencies and national nuclear laboratories, has refused to confirm or deny the allegations on diplomatic grounds. The U.S. has depended on Pakistani cooperation during its military incursion into Afghanistan.

On Feb. 25, the IAEA will visit the site in Natanz of what U.S. government agencies describe as a complex to house a uranium enrichment plant utilizing gas centrifuges. Diplomatic sources said last week that Iran may have identified the project to the IAEA as a future uranium enrichment facility but has not provided design information on the project for safeguards purposes to the Vienna agency. It is believed that IAEA will find structures set up to house cascades but empty of installed centrifuge rotor assemblies.

Beginning in the late 1980s, Iran restarted its nuclear energy program after years of dormancy following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. According to reports from German intelligence from the early 1990s, it was suspected then that Iran had tried to purchase centrifuge know-how from Pakistan, which that country purloined years before from the Urenco uranium enrichment program in Germany and the Netherlands (NuclearFuel, 23 Nov. '93, 4).

Sources disclosed this month that Western intelligence agencies are now satisfied that Iran succeeded in obtaining design information on gas centrifuges from Pakistan.

According to sources, during the 1990s experts from Pakistan's centrifuge development program, at the Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta, had virtual autonomy and were able to sell centrifuge know-how to parties outside Pakistan. The sales, they said, included the deal which transferred to the DPRK during the late 1 990s a complete design package for an older but proven subcritical centrifuge (NF, 25 Nov. '02, 1), plus what one source this month described as a starter kit comprising complete rotor assemblies conforming to design blueprints for the Pakistani machine. -- Mark Hibbs, Bonn An in-depth report on Iran's uranium enrichment program including its procurement of centrifuge design information will be provided in the Jan. 20 issue of Platts' NuclearFuel.
URL: http://www.platts.com

Neshant · Post by **Neshant** » 21 Jun 2003 21:54

Since its not in Russia's interest that iran aquire nukes either, there must be some behind the scenes cooperation between Russia & US about when to bomb those 2 reactors.

Same scam was pulled by France & Israel on Iraq.

Neshant · Post by **Neshant** » 22 Jun 2003 08:45

They are attempting to take the same backdoor path to developing nukes as Iraq did. That is to gain mastery over the entire fuel cycle. That way they can do things in secret without IAEA finding out.

-------

Iran: We'll Work With U.N. Nuclear Agency

By ALI AKBAR DAREINI, Associated Press Writer

TEHRAN, Iran - Iran will cooperate more with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the country's atomic chief said Saturday, but he suggested Tehran will ignore one agency request by maintaining plans to enrich uranium — a key step in making atomic bombs.

Meanwhile, the head of the U.N. agency said in Jordan he was assured Saturday that Iran was "ready to cooperate fully."

The United States suspects Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb — a charge Iran denies. Tehran says its nuclear operations are meant to provide electricity, particularly after oil reserves run dry.

The International Atomic Energy Agency urged Iran last week to allow continued inspections of its suspect facilities and to desist from enriching nuclear fuel.

On Saturday, Iran's nuclear chief, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, told reporters, "We will try to step up our cooperation with the IAEA. Our cooperation with the agency will be comprehensive and at a level acceptable to the agency."

Asked whether Iran would heed the IAEA's call to stop efforts to enrich uranium, Aghazadeh said Iran will go ahead with its nuclear plans.

"The IAEA has not asked us to stop plans to enrich uranium. It was the opinion of some countries, not the agency, to only delay shipment of materials to Natanz plant," he said.

Natanz, which is about 200 miles south of Tehran, is where a centrifuge plant is being built.

In Jordan, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said he was assured of Iran's full cooperation. ElBaradei was attending a meeting of business and political leaders on Mideast issues.

"It would not be helpful at all if they did not have full transparency and full cooperation with the agency," ElBaradei told Associated Press Television News.

"The more transparency they show, the more cooperation they show, the more confidence we can create within the international community about the peaceful nature of their program."

Aghazadeh suggested Saturday he was standing behind earlier statements that Iran would not permit environmental sampling at "some locations" because it was "contrary to agreements signed (between Iran and the IAEA)."

"We will continue any sort of cooperation with IAEA within the framework of regulations. It doesn't mean that we have adopted a new position toward IAEA," he said.

Iran wants to control the whole fuel cycle, from mining uranium ore to enriching uranium at a centrifuge plant under construction in Natanz, central Iran. That site was inspected in February by ElBaradei.

Read rest at :

<a href="http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=s ... 6">link</a>

Roop · Post by **Roop** » 22 Jun 2003 10:55

...but he suggested Tehran will ignore one agency request by maintaining plans to enrich uranium — a key step in making atomic bombs.

A technical question for the nuke gurus on the forum: is bomb-making the only reason to enrich uranium? IOW, could someone say, "But we are only enriching uranium because our X-Y-Z powerplant needs it, not for bombs" and not be laughed out of the room?

T.I.A.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 22 Jun 2003 11:25

90% of the reactors in the world (PWR,BWR) use enriched Uranium. The enrichment needed for bomb making is slightly higher than for use in a reactor. India (and Canada) is one of the few countries that does not use enriched Ur as a fuel (except in the 2 BWR Tarapur reactors supplied by GE).

Iran is perfectly within its rights claiming that the enriched Ur is for its reactors. What is not credible however is for iran to claim that it needs Nuclear reactors for energy production, since it has enough Oil to last for the next 100 years.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Jun 2003 18:07

Originally posted by Mohan Raju:
A technical question for the nuke gurus on the forum: is bomb-making the only reason to enrich uranium? IOW, could someone say, "But we are only enriching uranium because our X-Y-Z powerplant needs it, not for bombs" and not be laughed out of the room?

T.I.A.

Natural Uranium = 0,72% U235. rest U238

Reactors need Low Enriched Uranium 235 - from 2-5%. Not more than 20% at any rate

Bombs need U235 enriched more than 90% - HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

Neshant · Post by **Neshant** » 22 Jun 2003 22:18

Since they are mining the uranium themselves, they can cook the books when it comes to accounting for it. IAEA won't know how much they have mined. Some of it can then be diverted for enrichment (secretly).

Or they can do as Japan does and insist that the processed fuel be stationed on their soil. In fact they have a stronger case than Japan since the uranium is mined in their own country. Japan has build up a huge inventory of processed fuel which could one day be diverted to a nuclear weapons program as some Japanese politicians have suggested.

The cheapest option for Iran generating elecricity is not oil but gas which they have in abundance (~800tcf).

US is now trying to catch them via IAEA regulations and declare them in violation so another osirak can be performed. Hence the need to rush through the palestinian-israeli peace process and put hamas out of business (?)