Pakistan arms sales, ops, doctrine, etc

[nirav]

So the assumption is that we will take offensive action - a.k.a. Cold Start. They will retalliate - Tactical nukes. We will second strike - Total annihilation. Great.

But it begins with our offensive action over enemy territory. So we will go on the offensive?

we should be calling out Paki bluff of using nukes instead of second guessing our nuclear doctrine/response.

[Karan M]

Another note. Pakistani SPD itself estimated 68-70 nukes are required for 10 targets. So that's 7 nukes per target. Of course, if an Indian battery can deploy (say) 56 ready to launch missiles, with 4/incoming missile, that just halved the number of Pakistani targets, doubling their missile req per target.

So all this will obviously go bottoms-up once Indian BMD is deployed plus systems like S-4XX wagehra and layers of SAMs. Pakistan can produce a max of 30 nukes worth of fissile material (Pu) per estimates and is said to have 200 weapons already (optimistic). So the more we deploy BMD systems, the more we attrit Pakistani capability.

Important point to note: Investing in domestic BMD/SAM capability, directly feeds into our MIC and strengthens our conventional warfighting capability too - radars, datalinks, missile tech which is in fact more complex than the average SSM/BM - same can't necessarily be said of Pakistan's nuke missile only strategy (which will be more and more the policy they will have to employ, IAF estimated a single nuke aircraft mission can take three squadrons in support. PAF is nowhere at that level).

While GDP is a theoretical construct, it shows the depth of challenge facing Pakistan in its attempt to match, let alone outpace India.

GDP of India is 8.19 and 8.36 times more than Pakistan at nominal and ppp terms, respectively.

Link

This is currently the state where effectively half of India is contributing infra and ecosystem (Maha, south) while north has manpower but infra and capex investment has been stuck due to bad politics. As that is resolved, the comparison becomes even worse.

India has many levers. Problem has always been the lack of a leadership willing to work to activate those levers and use them effectively. Even without assiduous leadership in many cases, we have a situation where we can afford far more than we have purchased (returning money back to Fin Min thanks to delayed procurement; poured into boondoggles like NREGA).

Thats not necessarily the case going forward.

[Austin]

Deejay saar, I think under modi, the answer is more likely to be yes than with any other. One problem with a nuke scenario is that india might suffer heavily in economic terms, Chinese will be real winners.

It is for this reason that less escalatory destabilizing tit for tat actions are more likely..

Nothing will change under Modi much like it did before , There is enough pressure from Business Houses against any war , During Kargil times there was news report that Ambani has cut deal with Paki and India estb to not target Refineries in Jamnagar incase we ever went for war , War is not good for business community they would just force the government to accept some solution short of war.

Probably Modi would take courage to break diplomatic relation with Pakistan and close ther embassy in India and cut all business ties etc something along those line which would seem tougher compared to what previous GOI has done. Beyond that we would see the same routine played as it was in 1999 , 2001 and 26/11.

Its not in India's control to stop a war once it starts and no one know what the consequences would be and where it would stop ,Its difficult to guess how much N weapons pakistan has or how it will be deployed in times of war , its much complex because the other side would also take extraordinary measure to hide it as much as we would like to track it with our asset.

No amount of doctrine has stopped pakistan doing a 26/11 which was like 6-7 years after Parliament strike , I think the GOI would be put to test sooner or later and we will come to know what they can do and their doctrine will be put to test.

[Karan M]

It is sheer silliness to assume that Modi will launch a war just so that anyone can vouch for whether a doctrine will be followed or not. That does not mean Pakistan will not pay otherwise or that in case there is a war, Pakistan will escape if it launches nukes.

There lies the difference.

Under Man Mohan Singh & his cretins, India did not employ either covert ops or tough "ten heads for an eye" policy at the border either at peacetime. Modi has those options to employ & he most certainly will.

The issue is of developing them. A decade of neglect will not disappear overnight.

After all, he wants India to make money, yet beat up Pakistan (as and when he needs to). So he will do what meets that need.

If that means smiling at Nawaz in the US and asking BSF to hit back hard the next day, so be it. Which is what he has done.

Much to the dismay of those who want to portray the GOI as being some monolithic never changing entity as versus one which responds as the leadership of the day wants it to.

[deejay]

Well I do not think the reason why we won't go on offensive is because of what Austin says or the Nuclear deterrence or more precisely "just" those.

We will not go offensive unless military men can assure 100% the civilians authorities with whom the decision rests that
a) We will win
b) We will obtain all objectives
c) The costs will be low
d) There will be no nuclear fall out
e) The war will be over before China jumps in
f) The war will be over before the "International Community" can put pressure on us
g) We are not violating any Treaties, IPR, TOT regimes etc by fighting the war
h) Very few civilians lives are lost
i) Pakistan do not suffer any collateral damage
j) We have adequate stock of all weapons and ammo
k) IAF has 42 sqns
l) Navy has 02 aircraft carriers
m) Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata have their missile defence shields
etc
etc

This may come off as sarcasm on some points but all these points in varying weight-age play their parts in decision making.

[nirav]

Deejay saar, I think under modi, the answer is more likely to be yes than with any other. One problem with a nuke scenario is that india might suffer heavily in economic terms, Chinese will be real winners.

It is for this reason that less escalatory destabilizing tit for tat actions are more likely..

Nothing will change under Modi much like it did before , There is enough pressure from Business Houses against any war , During Kargil times there was news report that Ambani has cut deal with Paki and India estb to not target Refineries in Jamnagar incase we ever went for war , War is not good for business community they would just force the government to accept some solution short of war.

Probably Modi would take courage to break diplomatic relation with Pakistan and close ther embassy in India and cut all business ties etc something along those line which would seem tougher compared to what previous GOI has done. Beyond that we would see the same routine played as it was in 1999 , 2001 and 26/11.

Its not in India's control to stop a war once it starts and no one know what the consequences would be and where it would stop ,Its difficult to guess how much N weapons pakistan has or how it will be deployed in times of war , its much complex because the other side would also take extraordinary measure to hide it as much as we would like to track it with our asset.

No amount of doctrine has stopped pakistan doing a 26/11 which was like 6-7 years after Parliament strike , I think the GOI would be put to test sooner or later and we will come to know what they can do and their doctrine will be put to test.

Austin ji,

you do realize that going for an all out war is an extremely complex decision and must be taken after all available means to get something done have been exhausted.

Also Indias doctrine is pretty clear. Its on Pak to weigh in the opportunity cost of using a tactical nuke on India or its armed forces.

Its upto them if they want to risk the existence of their country/army for protecting some terrorists who caused IA to attack Pak in the first place..


as for Paki perfidy, whos to say India didnt reply in kind post 26/11 in Pakistan ? We dont "take responsibility" for the mayhem in Pakiland, but theres now way of knowing if we are actually paying Pakis back in kind for acts of terrorism in India.

[Karan M]

Well I do not think the reason why we won't go on offensive is because of what Austin says or the Nuclear deterrence or more precisely "just" those. We will not go offensive unless military men can assure 100% the civilians authorities with whom the decision rests that....
This may come off as sarcasm on some points but all these points in varying weight-age play their parts in decision making.

Which is why the sledgehammer aka the brahmastra aka Cold Start is invariably going to be the last but not the first option.

Capabilities take time to build up and risk assurance is critical to any such "all out option".

Cold Start itself came out of the limitations of the Strike Corp. The point is we are learning & if there are better ways (cheaper, less risky) to get something done, then they should be. The moral imperative of protecting Indian citizens (military and civilian) while preserving the sanctity of the state's sovereignty, is the key aim.

Given the buzz, IMO, airpower, covert ops and arty will be the new focus areas. And IA will dovetail capabilities it acquires for dual-use.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/fil ... 58-190.pdf

Although uncertainty still surrounds the actual
objectives of Operation Parakram, at a minimum, India clearly intended to sig
-
nal to Pakistan that, nuclear weapons or not, it was willing to go to war to end
Pakistani support for militants in Kashmir.
12
Unfortunately for India’s efforts,
the decisiveness of its message was undercut by the inability of the Indian
Army to present a timely threat to Pakistan.
From the time the mobilization order was given, the armored columns of the
strike corps took nearly three weeks to make their way to the international
border area. In this intervening period, the Pakistan Army was able to
countermobilize on the border, and more important, Western powers became
increasingly concerned by the extent of India’s military mobilization. Al-
though initially sympathetic to India in the wake of the December 13 attack,
the United States, which was conducting military operations in Afghanistan
from support bases in Pakistan, was troubled by New Delhi’s increasing force-
fulness. This concern translated into U.S. involvement in the escalating conºict
as an intermediary, counseling restraint on both sides of the border. The U.S.
ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, urged the Indian government to refrain
from military action until President Musharraf delivered his “about turn”
speech on January 12, 2002, where in a nationwide address he denounced ter
-
rorism in the name of Kashmir and pledged a renewed crackdown on militangroups in Pakistan.
13
As a result of Musharraf’s declaration, by the time the
strike corps reached the border region, India’s political justiªcation for military
action had been signiªcantly reduced. Although tensions remained high over
the coming months, and war still appeared likely in the early summer of 2002,
Operation Parakram quickly lost momentum. The result was a ten-month
standoff that ended with India’s quiet withdrawal rather than a military clash.
Musharraf’s public statements aside, India had failed to achieve an end to
Pakistani support for terrorism within India. This failure was made clear in the
years following Operation Parakram as the death toll from terrorist attacks in
Kashmir continued to rise.
14
The Indian Army’s postmortem analyses of Operation Parakram sought to
understand why India had been unable to achieve signiªcant political aims
through its military deployment.
15
Part of the blame fell to the Indian political
leadership, which failed to deªne any strategic objectives for the mobilization,
making it impossible to deªne victory or defeat for the operation.
16
Defense
analysts, however, pointed to the long delay between the mobilization order
and the actual deployment of the strike corps as a key window that allowed
Pakistan to appeal to its allies, particularly the United States, to intervene be-
fore India could bring military force to bear. It has also been argued that the
delay created enough of a gap between mobilization and commencement of
military operations for India’s political leadership to lose its nerve. Such weak-
ened resolve could have subsequently been responsible for India’s decision to
back down in the face of international pressure.
17

Regardless of the cause of Operation Parakram’s failure, strategic thinkers
within India’s defense establishment came to acknowledge serious ºaws with
the Sundarji doctrine. A war-ªghting strategy that called for massive armored
thrusts to dismember Pakistan, they argued, was too crude and inºexible a
tool to respond to terrorist attacks and other indirect challenges.

[Aditya G]

....
http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside- ... tan-twice/

....

Post 26/11 attack, the Indian mood was ugly but there was no plan on the table to attack Pakistan or Lashkar headquarters at Muridke, Lahore even though Mukherjee read the riot act to Islamabad. When Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major talked about a missile strike or air strike on Pakistan post 26/11 at a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting, he was dismissed as being too emotional.

....

I am correlating above piece by Shishir Gupta with what Sandeep U has reported:

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/why- ... 98952.html

...

Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major held out the only option for swift retribution. The IAF could carry out air strikes on terrorist camps inside PoK within 16 hours, he said. But for the attacks to be successful and avoid collateral damage to civilians, he would need the exact coordinates of the terrorist training camps. The intelligence agencies did not have such precise information. The military option was postponed.

...

[/quote]

The two sources agree that Air Force was willing to go in, but differ on why it wasn't allowed to. He seems to have demanded attack coordinates from the Intelligence agencies, but was probably told off for being irrational

[kmkraoind]

Wonderful posts and knowledge spreading spree by Karan garu.

[Karan M]

I am correlating above piece by Shishir Gupta with what Sandeep U has reported:

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/why- ... 98952.html

The two sources agree that Air Force was willing to go in, but differ on why it wasn't allowed to. He seems to have demanded attack coordinates from the Intelligence agencies, but was probably told off for being irrational

Exactly Aditya!

I am glad that you are doing this, because this is how we figure out "what happened" and things that are changing, as slow as it may be to some of us.

And it also counters the claim "kuch nahin ho sakta" etc etc.

Whats interesting is to see how military options were off the table in the UPA case to begin with, but then were brought back (in limited fashion, with pyrrhic aims; only POK) later. The Armed Forces were basically also ignored & weren't in shape to prosecute a war.

So when Modi got in power - ammunition, equipment etc.
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/ind ... tells-modi

Sources said the War Room briefing for Modi lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes. The Army is hoping that its severe readiness deficit registered on the Prime Minister.

So then this happened - ammunition.
4 Steps including orders, new roadmap etc - the 2nd is the most important.
http://archive.defencenews.in/defence-n ... BJbwmIUMU=
OFB production up
http://www.firstpost.com/india/ammuniti ... 56988.html
There has been AON for over 100,000 Crores worth of procurement - half of which was stuck in policy paralysis.
Parrikar speaking of common sense basics like Su-30 serviceability.

We have the other news about private sector licenses, R&D budget for DRDO up for 2 years now and so forth.

In short, this is a Govt that "gets" national security and is not looking under its bed every night for soldiers planning coups and trying to trim their wings. That by itself is a huge plus.

[Aditya_V]

I think these Terror camps are a waste of time for airforce, Pakis itself see these jobless unemployed cannon fodder. if we can hit them with artillery and causualties yes.

Similarly, taking out artillery and killing number of Pakis in Border exchanges, with Mortors, CLGM type anti tank missiles, antimaterial rifles in large numbers and artillery in numbers with good Micro UAV's to take out Paki artillery, plus anti aircraft weaponary to take out UAV, light planes pakis might use for targeting is the need of the hour.

This will remove the cheap Paki option of firing on border when they like.

[Karan M]

Wonderful posts and knowledge spreading spree by Karan garu.

Thanks

[Austin]

Well I do not think the reason why we won't go on offensive is because of what Austin says or the Nuclear deterrence or more precisely "just" those.

We will not go offensive unless military men can assure 100% the civilians authorities with whom the decision rests that
a) We will win
b) We will obtain all objectives
c) The costs will be low
d) There will be no nuclear fall out
e) The war will be over before China jumps in
f) The war will be over before the "International Community" can put pressure on us
g) We are not violating any Treaties, IPR, TOT regimes etc by fighting the war
h) Very few civilians lives are lost
i) Pakistan do not suffer any collateral damage
j) We have adequate stock of all weapons and ammo
k) IAF has 42 sqns
l) Navy has 02 aircraft carriers
m) Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata have their missile defence shields
etc
etc

This may come off as sarcasm on some points but all these points in varying weight-age play their parts in decision making.

+ 1 these are very valid question for the political leadership specially point b and point f

You should also add the economic aspect eg what if sanctions are put on banking sector of Indian economy and if US decides to freeze all the US bonds that India owns or money in Western Bank are frozen similar to Iran frozen bank account. What Steps RBI has taken to mitigate it. These thing would put immediate strain on Indian Economy and Business Class , sanctions on Defence Equipment like we saw during Kargil from West takes time for impact to be felt and we have to resort to cannibalization but it can be mitigated over time with some some cost.

Any use of even tactical nukes from both sides would also increase pressure from NPT/IAEA ,P-5 etc to denuclearise both nation to make world a safer place else sanction would be put on both

[Austin]

CIA chief's hacked email: Pakistan uses Taliban to counter India in Afghanistan

[Austin]

as for Paki perfidy, whos to say India didnt reply in kind post 26/11 in Pakistan ? We dont "take responsibility" for the mayhem in Pakiland, but theres now way of knowing if we are actually paying Pakis back in kind for acts of terrorism in India.

Well we didnt bomb those Terror Camps in POK and we know for the fact that most people involved in this crimes are enjoying state patronage in Pakistan , The only person we managed to catch alive is Kasab for 26/11 the remaining got killed and the others are in Pakistan , In short Pakistan was not punished for the crime overtly in any way.

Paki mayhem is Paki Logic of India responsible for all terror attack in pakistan and then we are equal equal suffering for it , when we dont support any terror activity and the reason for paki terror is well know.

[Karan M]

All this bank account stuff, US will do this, that and India of course, is weak and cannot act for itself is just plain fear mongering. Of course, not only is the Army Chief a bluffer, but suddenly GOI has no professionals who can evaluate these issues and make judgements.

Its quite clear that on the one hand its easy to pretend that GOI cannot do anything.

When it did attempt to do more, or its pointed out that it can with evidence and the set of specific circumstances why it didn't, then change the goalposts bring in Sun, Moon, this, that and pretend that India cannot do anything.

Lets shine some more light on how decisions regarding economic concerns were actually made at a time when India's economy was far weaker and how, decision making in the GOI actually proceeds.

India evaluated its options & did what it must. It didn't sit & merely do some salaam to US or whutever some folks might try to push.

Net, GOI has options. Which options it exercises and how it does, depend on how well the GOI of the day has arranged those options for itself and what constitute maximum return for the risk it is willing to bear.

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/twic ... 18109.html

December 23, 2002
When India came close to war
Twice in 2002, India was on the verge of striking against Pakistan. Here's why it didn't
Shishir Gupta NA, December 23, 2002 | UPDATED 14:39 IST

Last Christmas, fighter pilots of the Indian Air Force's No. 1 Tiger Squadron of Mirage-2000 H aircraft were not in celebratory mode. Moved a week earlier from home base Gwalior to the forward base Adampur near Jalandhar, the Tigers packed pistols, high-protein Swiss chocolates and a quarter-inch map of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

These would come in handy in case any of them was shot down behind enemy lines. Their comrades in arms, the Indian Army's para-commandos, looked like the US marines with war paint, MP-5 sub-machine guns, infrared night-vision devices, Kevlar bulletproof jackets and hi-tech frequency-hopping radio sets. For the past week, the two elite forces had been secretly conducting mock raids in the hills of Jammu and Kashmir. This was not a routine exercise. It was preparation for war.

Just how close India actually came to war, not once but twice, is emerging only now, and INDIA TODAY was able to piece together key details. It all began on December 13, 2001, when Pakistan-based terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Indian Parliament, killing nine people. As the real intent of the strike sunk in and evidence of Pakistan's involvement mounted, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee made it clear that India's patience had worn thin.

At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the three service chiefs on December 15, Vajpayee asked the service chiefs, "Can we do something quickly?" All three responded in the affirmative. The CCS - comprising Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, finance minister Yashwant Sinha, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Planning Commission Chairman K.C. Pant and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra - agreed on a strike against PoK-based terrorists.

FIRST CHANCE
Orders were immediately issued to mobilise troops - more than those in the run-up to the 1971 war. Considering that it would take three to four weeks for deployment on the western borders, the armed forces planned action for the second week of January 2002. After much debate, the service chiefs opted for a limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in PoK.

It would essentially entail air force strikes to pulverise zones with a high concentration of camps - that's where the Tiger Squadron came in. A limited ground offensive by special forces of the army would further neutralise the camps and help occupy dominant positions on the LoC. D-day was tentatively fixed for January 14.

In Delhi's war calculus, limited action in PoK made sense as it would not only convey the Indian resolve to Pakistan but also keep international retribution to manageable levels. India, after all, was only taking a leaf out of the ongoing US action against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan. The daunting prospect of Pakistan launching an all-out offensive in response to the Indian action weighed heavily on the CCS.


But the intelligence assessment that the Pakistani Army was not well prepared loaded the dice in India's favour. This meant that the chances of Pakistan launching a full-scale war were minimal. The Indian plans were also backed by a sound economy that was bolstered by low inflation, high forex and petroleum reserves. Sinha went on record saying the economy was prepared for war even though it was the last option. A limited strike was a clever tactical option. The build-up indicated to the world, especially the US, that India was serious.

If Pakistan wasn't reined in, India would have no option. Delhi also stepped up the diplomatic offensive, recalling its high commissioner and banning civilian flights from Pakistan. Picking up the war signals, Pakistan went into hypermode: it began mobilising forces and exchanged frantic calls with the US, getting President George W. Bush into the act.

Secretary of State Colin Powell called India and Pakistan to cool down temperatures. British Prime Minister Tony Blair even flew to India in the first week of January to say that they were leaning on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. As proof, the US declared LeT and JeM as terrorist groups. Advani, meanwhile, flew to the US on January 8, where he was briefed on the contents of Musharraf 's impending landmark speech. The speech finally came on January 12, when Musharraf declared that terrorism in the name of Kashmir was unjustified.

Practically giving in to Indian demands, he also announced plans to regulate madarsas and ban known terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan. Besides Musharraf 's speech, there was another factor that shot down the CCS plans of an immediate war when it met on moved out most terrorist training camps from PoK in January, implying that the Indian forces would have to cross the international borders to achieve militarily significant results.

This was risky as it would show India as an aggressor and could invite global intervention on Kashmir. So the CCS decided to give Musharraf another chance but keep the armed forces fully mobilised for war. And in a symbolic gesture on January 14, the Tiger Squadron destroyed an "enemy" bunker at Pokhran in Rajasthan with a laser-guided bomb.

JUNE 10, 2002
FLY ANOTHER DAY The Mirage fighters were tasked with pulverising the PoK zones that had a high concentration of terrorist camps
SECOND SHOT
The readiness strategy paid off when Pakistan's terrorist groups struck again on May 14. Storming into the army residential quarters at Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu, they killed 22 women and children. Even before the killings, India had accused Pakistan of failing to keep its promise on ending cross-border terrorism. A day after the massacre, a visibly tense Vajpayee told Parliament, "Hamein pratikar karna hoga(We will have to counter it)."

On May 18, Vajpayee, along with Fernandes, was briefed on military preparedness by Director-General Military Operations Lt-General S.S. Chahal and Military Intelligence Chief Lt-General O.S. Lochab. Later, after a two-hour meeting, the CCS favoured military action against terrorists in Pakistan. The political leadership apparently wanted limited action similar to the one in January.

But after evaluating various military options, it was decided that action in PoK was not viable as Pakistan had beefed up its forces across the LoC. Any action limited to forays across the LoC would translate into minimum military gains and would risk attrition in the Indian forces. The military, however, favoured an all-out offensive that would stretch Pakistani troops across the international borders and give India an opening in PoK.

So the armed forces came up with a daring plan: destroy Pakistan's war-waging potential and pulverise the terror factories in PoK. The June canvas was bigger than the January one, since Pakistan had packed areas north of Chenab with forces and military logic dictated the battle should not be confined to the LoC. But there were serious limitations to the plans that worried the political bosses.

With the monsoons imminent, the armed forces warned that the window for attack was extremely narrow. Any miscalculation could see the offensive bogged down with disastrous consequences. Even as the debate raged, the military made its plans. The launch of the offensive was entrusted to Strike Corps I led by Lt-General J.J. Singh, who had directed military operations in Kargil war.
June 10, 2002: Second Chance
Click here to Enlarge

The IAF, along with Strike Corps I, would initiate action in the Shakargarh bulge and engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) spread from Muzaffarabad in PoK to the Shekhopura-Lahore area. The idea was to lock Pakistan's key strike corp in battle that was essentially a boxer's feint. The real offensive would be in PoK by strike formations moved in from the east and tasked to capture strategic points used by Pakistan to push in terrorists.

The period considered for limited strikes was between May 23 and June 10. On May 22, at Kupwara brigade headquarters near the LoC Vajpayee declared that "it was time for a decisive battle". A day later, the CCS met to assess the readiness of the country's key sectors in the event of a war.

An economic review was also undertaken: Sinha said India's economy was a hundred times stronger than Pakistan's to bear hostilities, and RBI Governor Bimal Jalan pointed to a low inflation rate of 1.56 per cent and all-time high forex reserves of $55 billion (Rs 2,64,000 crore) to tide over the crisis.

The crude oil and petroleum stock reserves, which should sustain the country for more than a month in a war, were also sufficient. With the CCS endorsing a strike, Vajpayee wrote to Bush, Blair, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Jacques Chirac, saying Musharraf had failed to deliver on his January 12 speech and that India's patience was running out.

Hectic diplomacy followed as Bush, Putin, Blair and even Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called and pleaded with Vajpayee not to take the extreme step. The global community conveyed to Delhi that it would impress on Musharraf to clarify his promise on stopping cross-border infiltration. That June was an option considered seriously by the Vajpayee Government is borne out by the Defence Ministry's SOS for defence supplies to Israel during the month.

But the global community urged restraint as it was worried Pakistan would use the nuclear card to address its conventional asymmetry against the Indian armed forces. Musharraf had already played the nuclear brinkmanship - hinting he would use nukes against India - in an interview to German magazine Der Spiegel in April.

Pakistan had even tested three missiles - Ghauri (N-capable), Ghaznavi and Abdali - between May 25 and 28 as a deterrent to India's posture. This belligerence forced India to review its N-capability to strike back - Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Defence Research and Development Organisation Secretary V.K. Aatre reportedly participated in a CCS meeting in late May.

Vajpayee in Kupwara warned of the impending battle even as Musharraf played on the world's nuclear fears
In the absence of any formalised strategic force command, the nuclear strategy was handled on a need-to-know basis by Mishra, who reportedly attended an AEC meeting on May 24 in Chennai and later flew to Manali to brief Vajpayee. Pakistan's nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him.

Bush sent Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistan on June 5. He apparently asked Musharraf three times whether he would "permanently" end cross-border infiltration and help dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. He conveyed Musharraf 's commitment to Powell while flying to Delhi on June 6, and to India, on arriving.

On June 10, Powell disclosed Musharraf 's promise to the world, by which time India had already called off its strike plans. The political logic was understandable as a full-frontal attack would translate into war. It was better to give Musharraf another chance. Or perhaps, the build-up was a shrewd ploy by India, not only in June but also in January, to force Pakistan as well as the world community into action.

Last week, Fernandes denied (to INDIA TODAY) that India had been on the brink of war, claiming that at no point had the CCS given directions to the armed forces to take action against Pakistan. He, however, did not put it beyond the army generals to prepare for contingency plans. Mishra, on the other hand, reiterated that India had indeed been "close to war" in January and May.

While refusing to disclose dates, he pointed out that on June 23, Vajpayee had said in an interview to the Washington Post that it was a "touch and go affair". The Tiger Squadron, on its part, did have its share of action. On August 2, four Mirage fighters evicted Pakistani intruders 800 m across the LoC in Machhil sector of Kashmir. In Washington, it was dubbed Kargil II. The Tigers know that given the murky Indo-Pak relations, all it will take is another carnage for them to be back in air, in action.

[nirav]

as for Paki perfidy, whos to say India didnt reply in kind post 26/11 in Pakistan ? We dont "take responsibility" for the mayhem in Pakiland, but theres now way of knowing if we are actually paying Pakis back in kind for acts of terrorism in India.

Well we didnt bomb those Terror Camps in POK and we know for the fact that most people involved in this crimes are enjoying state patronage in Pakistan , The only person we managed to catch alive is Kasab for 26/11 the remaining got killed and the others are in Pakistan , In short Pakistan was not punished for the crime overtly in any way.

Paki mayhem is Paki Logic of India responsible for all terror attack in pakistan and then we are equal equal suffering for it , when we dont support any terror activity and the reason for paki terror is well know.

bombing a terror camp is just symbolic. nothing tangible is going to come out of it. IA/BSF neutralize more abduls on the fence while infiltrating than we can take out with bombing terror camps ..

also, the 'bluff' of "wont tolerate mumbai type attacks" worked, didnt it ?

[Karan M]

compare and contrast.
2002
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020520/main1.htm
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, who briefed newspersons about the decision taken at the CCS meeting, said the Indian forces would retaliate whenever there was mortar or artillery attack on Indian targets from the Pakistani side.“The Indian Army will conduct immediate retaliatory fire assaults everytime any such incident takes place from the Pakistan side along the LoC and international border,” he said.

2005
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050122/a ... 284251.asp
Army sources said Indian troops were under strict instructions to be on a high level of alert but not to retaliate. Retaliation would escalate tensions at a time when the political leadership in New Delhi feels talking peace with Pakistan is more advantageous than returning to the stage of no-peace no-war that ended with the ceasefire that began on Id-ul-Fitr in 2003.

Guess who was in Delhi in 2005..

2014
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141020 ... s-pakistan
Pakistan wasn’t fully prepared for the robust reaction from India – which first called off the peace talks and then retaliated strongly to the firing. Pakistan had deliberately and wilfully targeted the civilian population in Arnia. This forced India to respond robustly. India also made well-calibrated moves by staging forward some strike reserves and activating fire assault units. This clear signalling unnerved Pakistan and it immediately de-escalated in Arnia.

[Sid]

Well we didnt bomb those Terror Camps in POK and we know for the fact that most people involved in this crimes are enjoying state patronage in Pakistan , The only person we managed to catch alive is Kasab for 26/11 the remaining got killed and the others are in Pakistan , In short Pakistan was not punished for the crime overtly in any way.

Paki mayhem is Paki Logic of India responsible for all terror attack in pakistan and then we are equal equal suffering for it , when we dont support any terror activity and the reason for paki terror is well know.

bombing a terror camp is just symbolic. nothing tangible is going to come out of it. IA/BSF neutralize more abduls on the fence while infiltrating than we can take out with bombing terror camps ..

also, the 'bluff' of "wont tolerate mumbai type attacks" worked, didnt it ?

I will side with Austin on this. Actions speaks louder then words. The reason why Pakistan always "miscalculate" and conducts a "misadventures", is because in their notebook we don't have a spine (at-least the political leadership) nor there has been any history to reflect that we ever had one.

Above lines might sound un-jingoistic, but that's the fact.

And knowing the above facts Pakistan "will" conduct a nuclear strike assuming there won't be any response from India. And why they will attack a column of advancing tanks with nukes? Why not field HQ or a forward airbase? Why are we assuming a linear attack strategy from "reasonable" Pakistan?

And when it will happen, do our politicians have the guts to pull the trigger to condemn millions in Pakistan and similarly in India? There is no reason to believe we can completely destroy their ability to strike back.

Nuke responses are big talk, baby steps first.

[member_22539]

I will side with Austin on this. Actions speaks louder then words.

The porkis thought the same back in 1965, after their adventures in Rann of Kutch went unanswered.

India may appear soft, but it is only up to a point, when things change drastically (something that has slapped the porki face time and again, yet they forget on every generational transition).

India is like a mango (I am going full pappu mode ), Bite in thinking the soft exterior goes all the way through and end up losing some of your teeth.

[Karan M]

I suspect more than the Pakistanis, it is some Indians who are into shivering and doubting India's deterrence. As India never had a spine or its political leadership, I suspect each and every war fought in the backdrop of international pressure was an outlier, including 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh was by the United States and Russia, not India. In short, Indians seem to want big talk and fancy flourishes, irrespective of actual events at the border or elsewhere. If such is the 24x7 fear and complete lack of faith in Indian structures, logic has no place to play in the debate.

[Sid]

We are not talking about the absolute response but the deterrence factor. Nor its about dhoti shivering.

We are talking about a scenario where there is every chance that they will use it and we might not. Does not matter what's written on paper or being said in public.

Do we really think our PM will obliterate their nation and kill all Indian major metros because a field HQ got blown up in desert?

They might have something which will have battlefield usage.

[deejay]

I will side with Austin on this. Actions speaks louder then words.

The porkis thought the same back in 1965, after their adventures in Rann of Kutch went unanswered.

India may appear soft, but it is only up to a point, when things change drastically (something that has slapped the porki face time and again, yet they forget on every generational transition).

India is like a mango (I am going full pappu mode ), Bite in thinking the soft exterior goes all the way through and end up losing some of your teeth.

Arun Menon ji, this is exactly the point I am making. India will respond but only when there is a full frontal assault. In self defence.

The challenge in responding to terror attacks is that our 'decision makers' will have to initiate an offensive. Be it '48, '65, '99 we were responding.

The gains of '65 or '71 were engineered by the military and not a political decision. The return of those gains was a political decision.

If ' 71 is viewed as an offensive decision, it is because we attacked in the East. On the Western front the Pakis attacked. On the Eastern Front victory was easier (militarily speaking in comparison to the Western front). Even this decision happened because two strong leaders manned the Executive and Army together.

The issue is not capability but will. Political Will is not a function of politicians in control but more of an entire national approach to military use. I do not have the exact words for this but we Indians really do not wish to use our military options. It is not the fact that Pakis have nukes, it is because we don't want to initiate a fight.

But we will respond and protect our territory. We will defend but this should not be confused with offensive action.

We are not talking about the absolute response but the deterrence factor. Nor its about dhoti shivering.

We are talking about a scenario where there is every chance that they will use it and we might not. Does not matter what's written on paper or being said in public.

Do we really think our PM will obliterate their nation and kill all Indian major metros because a field HQ got blown up in desert?

They might have something which will have battlefield usage.

Wow!

And this is exactly the attitude why India lacks a will to take the fight to the enemy. After all a "field HQ" is expendable but no hits on civilian population centers.

[nirav]

We are not talking about the absolute response but the deterrence factor. Nor its about dhoti shivering.

We are talking about a scenario where there is every chance that they will use it and we might not. Does not matter what's written on paper or being said in public.

Do we really think our PM will obliterate their nation and kill all Indian major metros because a field HQ got blown up in desert?

They might have something which will have battlefield usage.

The underlined part itself is dhoti shiver. Indias Nuclear stance is unambiguous.

If Pakis launch even 1, theres a scope for them to launch more.Which cant be allowed.Hence the clear stance, we wont differentiate between bada and chota nuke. They nuke India or its forces, we *will* retaliate massively.

To equate responses to localised terror attacks to a Nuke attack and its response is silly.

Wow!

And this is exactly the attitude why India lacks a will to take the fight to the enemy. After all a "field HQ" is expendable but no hits on civilian population centers.

Deejay Ji,
Its not GoIs view,thankfully.

Its is getting ridiculous btw. "Based on previous responses to terror attacks, India wont nuke Pakis even after they nuke IA."

What folks are forgetting is that if IAs IBGs start entering Pak, means that shit has already hit the fan. To suggest that GoI under those conditions will let the Pakis nuke our boys and wont respond in kind or like its stated policy, massively, is highest quality dhoti shiver.

[sudeepj]

The 'dhoti shiver' is more from a point of view of who controls the nukes in Pak than their yield. What Paks are implying (but not saying openly) is that they will *deploy* Tac Nukes with short ranges with core commanders or Army commanders. So if a corps is being systematically destroyed (or cutoff), the commander will have an option of using these to stop a flanking move, or stop one or more waves of attack. The decision and escalation logic is taken away from an individual who will have to weigh the loss of pindi/isloo for killing a few tanks and put into the hands of a person who is fighting for his life and the decision is to be weighed between losing his own life, and that of his corps vs an Indian counter force attack.

This is not unprecedented, it was done by Nato in the cold war with 'nuke artillery' etc. but it is destabilizing and increase the risk of a limited war escalating into full blown war.

Indians dont need to give their corps commanders nukes in the Western theater, the only thing we need to do is to restore the calculation of an exchange between a few tanks and a Pak city, preferably Pindi by making it clear in public/private statements.

The second thing is to field proven short range BMD SAMs, such as S400.

The third is to move extremely fast and occupy Pak population centers with heavy armor.

The fourth is to take the conflict to a domain where nukes are not so easy to target: i.e. the ocean and a blockade.

Fifth is to conduct an assault without occupying territory.

For all its faults, giving nukes to corps commanders is a proven deterrent strategy and we should do the same, albeit in the eastern sector. Ultimately, a war between a weak state and a strong one cant be won by the weak, if the strong state is willing to respond to every escalation by an equal or greater escalation.

[Sid]

The underlined part itself is dhoti shiver. Indias Nuclear stance is unambiguous.

If Pakis launch even 1, theres a scope for them to launch more.Which cant be allowed.Hence the clear stance, we wont differentiate between bada and chota nuke. They nuke India or its forces, we *will* retaliate massively.

To equate responses to localised terror attacks to a Nuke attack and its response is silly.

You have been talking about what we will "absolutely" do, and I am totally with you. We will obliterate them. Done. Lets talk about what they will do. If India responds with Cold Start doctrine, what should be done? Why tactical nukes were introduced in an already volatile equation?

1. Conventionally they cannot win. There is no mistake on this part.
2. Then if tact nukes are used, its a death warrant as they will cease to exist.

If 1 and 2 reaches the same conclusion then why not simply nuke using IRBMs/SLBMs, as they end result will still be the same. Why put their targets at risk of first strike?

Now the only reason they chose to introduce tact nukes can be -

a. They already have miscalculated our reaction to it.
b. They think there is some acceptable nuclear threshold.

Only way to reach above conclusions -

i. Our deterrence is not working on them, i.e. they think we are bluffing.

Now is there a better way to make our deterrence real of people its meant for? Maybe, maybe not? You can call it dhoti shivering or whatever you want, but its not working.

[Sid]

Wow!

And this is exactly the attitude why India lacks a will to take the fight to the enemy. After all a "field HQ" is expendable but no hits on civilian population centers.

Its a scenario we are discussion, not something which I personally advocate. Personally I don't think our babus/netas can make the tough call. If a time comes to choose between their a$$ or make them pay at any cost, they will save their behinds.

To me we should have gutted them after 2002 itself. Now its a different story.

[Prem]

So the assumption is that we will take offensive action - a.k.a. Cold Start. They will retalliate - Tactical nukes. We will second strike - Total annihilation. Great.
But it begins with our offensive action over enemy territory. So we will go on the offensive?

Cold Metal will initiate the Cold Start by thousands of tons moving in pakistan first before the offensive Corp go into Pakistan i.e Corp will go in only to cover the territory et , Paki will be long gone before riding flying Donkeys to Ranch al Hoor Upon AssMan. Hypersonic missiles capable of blessing whole Pakiland under a minute. Who is gonna miss them on this planet?

[nirav]

Only way to reach above conclusions -

i. Our deterrence is not working on them, i.e. they think we are bluffing.

Now is there a better way to make our deterrence real of people its meant for? Maybe, maybe not? You can call it dhoti shivering or whatever you want, but its not working.

Deterrence can be called as 'failed' or 'not working' only when they actually use the damn Tac nuke.

Pakis say all sorts of things. To say that our deterrence failed just cause Paki says he will bomb himself or Pakiland is ridiculous.

What I find weird is the suggestion that since we didnt go across LoC in kargil or didnt strike terror camps in PoK post 26/11, we wont initiate a nuclear response in case of a Paki attack on us.

Its just wayyy too much pessimism/shivering w.r.t Indias resolve.

[deejay]

Wow!

And this is exactly the attitude why India lacks a will to take the fight to the enemy. After all a "field HQ" is expendable but no hits on civilian population centers.

Its a scenario we are discussion, not something which I personally advocate. Personally I don't think our babus/netas can make the tough call. If a time comes to choose between their a$$ or make them pay at any cost, they will save their behinds.

To me we should have gutted them after 2002 itself. Now its a different story.

Ok, got it. I agree with you on that. The GOI is full of these people and they are afraid their Dilli secretariat will be destroyed.

[RoyG]

Using nukes on armored columns never really made sense to me especially given that we'll only be punching 10-20 km max into Pakistan.

Part of our nuclear inventory will be electronically mated as soon as the go is given.

They'll suffer complete annihilation.

They'll use their tactical nukes on the provinces that decide to secede after we kick the door down.

The threat of 50-60 1-2 kt on balochi, kashmiri, sindhi population centers will allow the PA to shift more of their assets to the Eastern border.

They don't want a repeat of 1971.

[nirav]

Wow!

And this is exactly the attitude why India lacks a will to take the fight to the enemy. After all a "field HQ" is expendable but no hits on civilian population centers.

Its a scenario we are discussion, not something which I personally advocate. Personally I don't think our babus/netas can make the tough call. If a time comes to choose between their a$$ or make them pay at any cost, they will save their behinds.

To me we should have gutted them after 2002 itself. Now its a different story.

Saar,

MMS is long gone.

[Sid]

Saar,

MMS is long gone.

Good, and I am glad that jerk/party is not in power. But as one of the largest/powerful countries in the world, our deterrence posture should not be dictated by Gov in power. It should be by process.

We think of Modi/Dhoval as some Batman/Robin team, but whats next? Do porkies have to sit out for just next 5 years before they execute their next (mis)adventure?

Cold start was created as a conventional deterrence against frequent Porky activities, for which they created this even more destabilizing response.

[Karan M]

We are not talking about the absolute response but the deterrence factor. Nor its about dhoti shivering.

We are talking about a scenario where there is every chance that they will use it and we might not. Does not matter what's written on paper or being said in public.

Do we really think our PM will obliterate their nation and kill all Indian major metros because a field HQ got blown up in desert?

They might have something which will have battlefield usage.

Two things which is again getting lost in your claims of weak PM etc & similar stuff.

1. Whether we attack with nukes or not is IMMATERIAL from the POV of Pakistan. The discussion started with your claims that Cold Start is being dissuaded or stopped by Pakistani strikes. There is now ample evidence to state you were wrong and that by themselves, the nukes cannot stop a Cold Start type attack because Pakistan will literally have to nuke itself to bits to use nukes for warfighting against multiple strikes. Cold Start/IBGs are designed to counter the use of TNWs. For crying out loud, read! The primary sources are posted & repeating the same stuff again & again is simply pointless.
If you have to use NWs in the quantity to deter an Indian Army division, then Pakistan is destroying itself!

2. The doctrine states that massive retaliation will occur after a Pakistani strike. That you can't even understand how much leeway is involved in the term shows how glibly you are taking this debate. Who said for instance in response to a TNW: our PM will obliterate their nation and kill all Indian major metros & that is the ONLY way of massive retaliation? India may well choose to respond with a massive strategic campaign against infrastructure targets (conventional) and use a handful of nukes against military targets with airburst altitudes adjusted to ensure differing yields proportional to what the Pakistanis deploy.
If Pakistan chooses to attack Indian civilian targets to counter Cold Start, then ANY Indian PM will devastate Pakistan. It is that straightforward. At that point its an issue of survival and every military planner would point out attacking Pakistani targets military especially with maximal force (especially launch areas) would be in our interest.

[Karan M]

Only way to reach above conclusions -

i. Our deterrence is not working on them, i.e. they think we are bluffing.

Now is there a better way to make our deterrence real of people its meant for? Maybe, maybe not? You can call it dhoti shivering or whatever you want, but its not working.

Deterrence can be called as 'failed' or 'not working' only when they actually use the damn Tac nuke.

Pakis say all sorts of things. To say that our deterrence failed just cause Paki says he will bomb himself or Pakiland is ridiculous.

What I find weird is the suggestion that since we didnt go across LoC in kargil or didnt strike terror camps in PoK post 26/11, we wont initiate a nuclear response in case of a Paki attack on us.

Its just wayyy too much pessimism/shivering w.r.t Indias resolve.

It is complete shivering without even making an iota of effort to understand what Cold Start is & what India's options are.

Cold Start wont work. Pakistanis have nukes. Ignore the evidence that the strategy was designed to overwhelm the application of TNWs & strike across multiple locations.

Then, we won't nuke them to bits in an apocalyptic fashion, so we have lost. Not that we can respond proportionately if we have to.

[nirav]

Saar,

MMS is long gone.

Good, and I am glad that jerk/party is not in power. But as one of the largest/powerful countries in the world, our deterrence posture should not be dictated by Gov in power. It should be by process.

We think of Modi/Dhoval as some Batman/Robin team, but whats next? Do porkies have to sit out for just next 5 years before they execute their next (mis)adventure?

Cold start was created as a conventional deterrence against frequent Porky activities, for which they created this even more destabilizing response.

iirc cold start was created to address short comings of the erstwhile Sundarji doctrine and mobilization related issues.

Anyway, since going nuclear and operationalizing it, the option of a full scale war on the Paks is gone.

Whats not gone is the option to give them severe conventional jhapads ... Pakis dont have the aukaat to start a conventional war with India.

Its btw taking shape already with effective BSF action.

only visible scope for hostilities is either on the border or in response to a terror attack. It'll still all be localized.

[Karan M]

Saar,

MMS is long gone.

Good, and I am glad that jerk/party is not in power. But as one of the largest/powerful countries in the world, our deterrence posture should not be dictated by Gov in power. It should be by process.

We think of Modi/Dhoval as some Batman/Robin team, but whats next? Do porkies have to sit out for just next 5 years before they execute their next (mis)adventure?

Cold start was created as a conventional deterrence against frequent Porky activities, for which they created this even more destabilizing response.

My goodness, now you ask where's the process.

I have already posted Saran's detailed explanation of our process.

On the one hand you claim, nothing that's written/said is worth anything.

Then you say we need a process - if this is not shivering what is? Call it distrust if you must.

Fundamentally, your concern or belief is that irrespective of the process, the Indian Govt or politician is weak and not to be trusted.

In which case, there is nothing to be said but that keep electing nationalist leaders so that your own belief changes!

[Karan M]

iirc cold start was created to address short comings of the erstwhile Sundarji doctrine and mobilization related issues.

Anyway, since going nuclear and operationalizing it, the option of a full scale war on the Paks is gone..

Cold Start was created to engage Pakistan even in the presence of nuclear weapons. It is positioned (for public consumption) as merely intended to destroy infrastructure (how nice) and not hold ground (how nice). However, operating in an integrated fashion with the IAF, and with upto 10 IBGs, properly equipped, the attack can overwhelm Pakistani defence lines, and destroy/attrit Pakistan's Army Reserves (their names for their Strike Corp eqvts).

In short, they can dismember Pakistan & hence they are the GOI's ultimate weapon of sanction.

Repeat:

How effective is NASR or TNW against any Indian Cold Start?
https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-s ... istans.pdf

The limited military utility of Pakistan’s battle -field use of nuclear weapons in response to large-scale Indian conventional attack

General Deepak Kapoor, India‟s army chief, claimed in December 2009 that the army had made progress in operationalising a strategy for rapid mobilization of conventional military forces capable of mounting a decisive attack on Pakistan .
3
The strategy, dubbed „Cold Start ,‟can be traced to the unexpectedly slow pace of mobilization and deployment of Indian forces to the border with Pakistan after the December 2001 attacks on India‟s parliament by militants believed to be linked to Pakistan.
4
It involves the creation of eight to ten „integrated battle groups‟ (IBGs) of army, air force and special forces intended “to destroy and not to hold or
capture territory.”
5
As part of this doctrine, India‟s armed forces have been rehearsing large scale manoeuvres, the most significant of which came in a May 2006
military exercise close to the border with Pakistan.
6
The Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) exercise brought together strike aircraft, tanks, and over 40,000 soldiers from the 2nd Strike Corps in a war game whose purpose was described by an Indian commander as “to test our 2004 war doctrine to dismember a not-so-friendly nation effectively and at the shortest possible time.”
7
General Daulat Shekhawat, Commander of the Corps, explained that “We firmly believe that there is room for a swift strike even in case of a nuclear attack, and it is to validate this doctrine that we conducted this operation.”

India seems to have anticipated the possibility of Pakistani leaders using nuclear weapons against Indian military forces. Since the early 1980s, confronted with the prospect of possible Pakistani use of nuclear weapons on the battle-field, Indian forces have prepared to survive and prevail.

Indian Army Chief General K. Sundarji claimed in early 1987 “We in the armed forces are gearing our organization, training and equipment in such a manner that in the unlikely event of the use of nuclear weapons by the adversary in the combat zone, we will limit the damage, both psychological and physical.”

The year-long Brasstacks exercise in 1986 involved Indian tanks and other armoured vehicles practising procedures for moving through an area that had been subject to nuclear attack.

The May 2001 Indian military exercises Poorna Vijay (Complete Victory) gave every indication that Indian planners anticipate Pakistan‟s battle-field use
of nuclear weapons.
15
The exercises were aimed at testing equipment, troops and maneuvers in a situation where nuclear weapons were used against them, with an Indian official confirming that “Drills and procedures to meet the challenges of a nuclear, chemical or biological strike are also being practiced.”
16
Among the options worked through were a Pakistani nuclear attack on a bridgehead or bridge, armored forces and troops.
17
A year later, India‟s Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt.-General Raj Kadyan, confirmed that the Indian army was continuing to train to cope with a nuclear strike on the battle-field.

Limited use against armor

For a tank spacing of 100 meters, one 15 kT weapon could destroy about 55 tanks. To destroy this many tanks if they were spaced 300 meters part woul
d take 8 weapons of 15 kiloton yield each. To destroy by blast alone roughly half of a force of 1000 tanks that were well dispersed would require on the order of
100 nuclear weapons of 15 kiloton yield.

the attack is organised around tank divisions of 330 tanks, with each division moving forward on a 10 kilometer long front, then the 1000 tanks would occupy a 30 km long front. The depth of the formation would be determined by the spacing of the tanks. As noted earlier, an attacking tank formation following U.S.
tactics might have tanks that are 50 meters apart in rows separated by 250 meters (the effective spacing would be 120 meters).

A force of tanks prepared for a possible nuclear strike might have larger distances between individual tanks.

[Aditya G]

This piece by Raja Mohan is relevant to the debate. perhaps article by Shyam Saran is in response to this.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a ... 602609.ece

India intends to deter nuclear use by Pakistan while Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to compensate for conventional arms asymmetry.

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon does not, as a senior Indian Minister in 1998 claimed, create credible deterrence. Deterrence is entirely a matter of perceptions, a mental effect that is created on the adversary that nuclear use will entail assured retaliatory holocaust. The possibility of nuclear use is thereby pre-empted. The Indian nuclear doctrine, in that sense, is well articulated — on paper. Since 1998, more than 15 years have passed and in the Indian sub-continent, nuclear arsenals have grown far beyond the small nuclear ambitions that were articulated then. Yet there is an increasing fund of world literature being published, pointing to structural and operational weaknesses in the Indian nuclear arsenal. The question is not whether India has built enough nuclear bombs. Hardly anyone questions this basic fact, but the ideational systems that will ensure the ‘massive’ retaliation promised in the doctrine are being increasingly questioned by scholars and analysts worldwide. Pakistani observers cannot help but be swayed and dangerously influenced by such literature, thereby inducing them to think the unthinkable. What does not help in encouraging sober thinking is the fact that since the end of the Second World War, South Asia has seen the largest number of shooting wars in the world. So the questions of nuclear use will not arise in the quiet peace of neighbourly relations, but in the stress of combat over the Line of Control or the international border.

The 1998 test

Critics of the credibility of India’s nuclear arsenal begin with their doubts on the success of the thermo-nuclear test of 1998, which they claim was a ‘fizzle.’ There has been much toing-and-froing in technical journals, of the veracity, accuracy and interpretation of seismic readings. There has also been an occasional closed door briefing by select bomb makers — but surprisingly there has not been, to date, a clear unambiguous public statement from the right source about the country’s thermo-nuclear capacity being fielded in India’s nuclear arsenal. This is a matter of some negligence, considering that the only members of the scientific community who have spoken on this issue are deeply sceptical of the success of the thermo-nuclear test.

The command and control of nuclear forces are another area of criticism, and not surprisingly so, since India is the only nuclear weapon country without a Chief of Defence Staff to act as the interface between the Prime Minister, the National Command Authority and the military who ‘own’ the weapons — at least most of it. In the guise of safety, India’s nuclear weapons are not only ‘de-mated’ and the core and ignition device separated from the warhead, but the separate components are under different departmental control. The actual reason for this bizarre arrangement is quite obvious. There is a petty turf war, and neither the Department of Atomic Energy nor the DRDO is willing to let go of the controlling part of the bomb, even if it means a cumbersome and unnecessary loss of control. Needless to say, between the military, the DAE and the DRDO, none of them has any hierarchical control over the other two.

Other critics have written to say that having opted for road or rail mobile launching arrangements, India does not have the robust transport, road and rail infrastructure to move the missiles, warheads and cores from safe storage to launch hideouts and dispersal points with confidence and alacrity.

These weaknesses have led to critics stating that India’s nuclear capability is disaggregated and with weak institutional features. In the case of China, it is conceded that India feels more threatened by Chinese nuclear delivery than vice-versa. Yet, in the absence of the Agni long-range missiles, it is vaguely surmised that the Indian retaliatory capacity is based on air delivery weapons, which could mean anything — Mirages, Jaguars, Su 30s. The absence of the CDS results in even knowledgeable Indians conjecturing that the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) will completely bypass the military chain of command and operate directly under the PMO. This, of course, raises other more serious problems.

In the case of deterrence with Pakistan, it is accepted that the doctrines of the two countries are mismatched. India intends to deter nuclear use by Pakistan while Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to compensate for conventional arms asymmetry. At the same time, Pakistan relies on 20,000 LeT cadres as an extension of its armed forces to create terror strikes, to which the Indian answer is to punish the Pakistani state with conventional war. Thus arises the vague and elastic concept of a nuclear threshold. Yet, the Indian National Command Authority is ill designed to manage the inevitable South Asian transition from conventional war to a possible nuclear exchange — or the frantic strategic signalling that is bound to occur as the threshold approaches.

If, for instance, the threshold was to materialise as a result of an armoured incursion, the Indian NCA by its location, composition and infrastructure would be entirely unaware of the impending catastrophe. Hanging untethered to any commanding authority, civilian or military, would be the Integrated Defence Staff, a well-staffed organisation designed for the civilian-military interface, but currently without a head, nor with any links to the SFC.

After much persuasion, there now exists a skeleton nuclear staff under the NSA, normally headed by the retired SFC. But while its Pakistani counterpart, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is highly active both on the domestic and international conference circuit, its Indian counterpart seems to be totally tongue tied, non-participatory and holed up at its desk. Foreign critics have noted the introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s arsenal and raised doubts of the likelihood of ‘massive’ retaliation in response to a small ‘warning’ shot by Islamabad. This is what the Indian doctrine promises. Life for the leaders of the strategic community would be easy if a doctrine, once written on paper, could be left unchanged for decades without reinforcement, to prove its validity.

That unfortunately is not the case in a dynamic field where the stakes are the survival of nations. Even K. Subramanyam had warned that ‘massive’ retaliation was an outmoded concept and difficult to enforce without periodic reinforcement. So this article is inspired not because India is not continuing to arm itself with bombs and missiles. This piece is inspired by the increasing clamour in international literature that India’s penchant for secrecy is ill-suited to conveying the stabilising threat of nuclear deterrence. Against China where our capabilities are undeveloped, a certain amount of ambiguity is sensible, but against a country which is openly wedded to first use, and is introducing battlefield weapons, an untended 10-year-old piece of paper is inadequate.

Signalling, overdue
Something needs to be done to reassure both the domestic and international audience that with high pressure terrorism lurking across the border, it is not just India’s strategic restraint that will keep the peace — as it did after Mumbai and the attack on Parliament. Nuclear signalling from the Indian government is hugely overdue, so much so that it will take some effort to restore stability to South Asian deterrence. The first target should be the Indian strategic community and there are enough discussions and conferences where officers from the SFC and nuclear staff could provide discrete assurances that things are not anarchic with India’s nuclear command and control.

The strategic community in turn will carry the message abroad or to foreign observers that in the face of Indian official silence, they need not imagine the worst. The establishment needs to do more than arrogantly refer to the doctrine as being the sole answer to all questions. In deterrence, only perceptions matter and there is a disturbing build-up of literature indicating that the disbelief of others in our nuclear command and control is in urgent need of correction.

(Raja Menon is a strategic analyst)

[nirav]

GoI did signal that usage of tactical nukes is unacceptable.

Think that's enough of a message.we can't really have an RTI kind of approach to our doctrine.