Deterrence

[shiv]

The question is how to establish that a nuke attack happened or was attempted when there are no casualties since they are only warning shots in remote areas? world community will be asking us to de-escalate and all the phony promises of prosecuting the terrorists follow.

if they escalate from this point on, sure massive retaliation logic follows. Here Bharat Karnads talk had a couple of points that I want to highlight,

The flaw as I see it in this game (if that is what Karnad has said) is that if Indian tanks have crossed the border they will not be stopped by reports of some small blast in some faraway place. Pakistan will actually have to nuke them directly. Verification of that blast faraway blast can continue but so will an Indian attack. Pakistan must either stop that attack and get nuked back, or stop pretending and back down.

[shiv]

Shivji,

The SPD isn't stupid and knows that an escalation ladder doesn't exist once TNW are used. They won't wait for a nuclear authorization order from the PMO to the SFC. They will degranulate like a mast cell. This is why it will take less than 2-3 hours. It's not possible for a nuke to be used without the PA knowing about it.

Perhaps it may be better to analyze the real reason behind TNW deployment. I think it has more to do with keeping the provinces together with minimal fallout in the event of a breakdown of relations with Punjab +/- cold start. Majority of Balochistan and Sindh are villages and towns. TNW are ideal and give the PA deployment flexibility.

If you really think about it, they haven't hit at India's overt options but our covert ones. These weapons are meant to hold their own people hostage. In a sense, the PA is pointing a gun at itself. Just not at its head.

I agree completely. Pakistan's puny nukes must be seen in the context of holding on to the Kabila.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: What Karnad has responded to a question asked on, if India's doctrine of massive retaliation should change in response to pakistan's TNW. Karnad is not exercised about the TNW but here are his comments on MR.

The original doctrine had the words "punitive retaliation" and it was changed to massive retaliation by the powers that be led by Brajesh Mishra. The draft committee, which he was a member of opposed this. To a further question, if NFU should go, he said yes, India is not going to wait to absorb a first strike. He was also surprised that the doctrine was ever made public, again a decision of the then government, which he opposed.

So, Karnad, who was asked for input in the recent 2014 BJP manifesto on the nuclear issue, has advocated a reversal to the original draft doctrine, which seeks to use the words punitive retaliation and disband NFU as a pledge but adhere to its principle. It would also entail that the revised doctrine is not in the public domain.

In his view Massive Retaliation is not credible. All of it is there in the clip I have posted, I may have missed something so the above is from memory.

[RoyG]

say its just India and TSP for now, here are the first contact scenarios with cold start,

1) Even as the Indian armored columns are approaching border, the Pakis raise shrill voices and probably use tactical nuke in the vicinity but within their political boundary

2) Same as above but this time we track their TEL movement and before they get to fire a warning shot we destroy it

3) We crossed the border, the above scenarios can be repeated

The question is how to establish that a nuke attack happened or was attempted when there are no casualties since they are only warning shots in remote areas? world community will be asking us to de-escalate and all the phony promises of prosecuting the terrorists follow.

if they escalate from this point on, sure massive retaliation logic follows. Here Bharat Karnads talk had a couple of points that I want to highlight,

With the massive retaliation argument, the credibility is lost and hence pokes a dent into the deterrence

Then Indian state's 'Will of Security' vs. 'Will of power', we primarily focus on the former such that when a Kargil happens, the response is overwhelming while projection of power lets say on PoK which is minimally ambitious doesn't rally us as much

The question you have to ask yourself is: When it comes to nuclear warfare, how does one prevent counter value exchange? You simply cant. All this 'will of security' vs 'will of power' simply doesn't matter when the balloon goes up.

Moreover, what kind of pressure from the world is going to make us buckle within 2-3 weeks? If we cold start, we'll be in and out relatively quickly. These Pakis are bullsh*tting and everyone knows it. TNW is an admission that they no longer see us as a principal threat. TNW simply adds nothing to deterrence wrt to India, but does deter their own people from leaving. This is the dimension that we need to explore if we want to understand their true value.

[RoyG]

Shiv ji: What Karnad has responded to a question asked on, if India's doctrine of massive retaliation should change in response to pakistan's TNW. Karnad is not exercised about the TNW but here are his comments on MR.

The original doctrine had the words "punitive retaliation" and it was changed to massive retaliation by the powers that be led by Brajesh Mishra. The draft committee, which he was a member of opposed this. To a further question, if NFU should go, he said yes, India is not going to wait to absorb a first strike. He was also surprised that the doctrine was ever made public, again a decision of the then government, which he opposed.

So, Karnad, who was asked for input in the recent 2014 BJP manifesto on the nuclear issue, has advocated a reversal to the original draft doctrine, which seeks to use the words punitive retaliation and disband NFU as a pledge but adhere to its principle. It would also entail that the revised doctrine is not in the public domain.

In his view Massive Retaliation is not credible. All of it is there in the clip I have posted, I may have missed something so the above is from memory.

That's all fine. But still, the fundamentals of the game haven't changed. Punitive always ends up massive.

[ramana]

Pak does not understand 'punitive'.
They understand very well 'massive'.

Original doctrine is a rehash of the old KS-LTGKS-AVMJG-RADMRM-RC-APJK doctrine of the mid 1980s.

Punitive might mean something to Wren Martin graduates but massive is very clear in street language.
Hiding doctrine lends to opacity.
One of the big problems in past was lack of transparency.
Hence they decided to publish.
The earlier thinking was n+1 syndrome would avoid war with PRC reining in TSP in their own interests.
But further thinking came to realize to confine the retaliation to reciprocal is best option and emphasize massive.

[shiv]

Pak does not understand 'punitive'.
They understand very well 'massive'.

Interesting point - did not occur to me. Also punitive sounds like puny

[member_29247]

Punitive is to reform

Massive is to fell

Pakis are beyond redemption

Webster
Fell

a : to cut, knock, or bring down
b : kill

[wig]

Pakistan’s Islamic bomb- Multi-pronged approach must to deal with its nuclear illusions, by G Parthasarathy

IN his prison memoirs, while awaiting execution, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto lamented in 1977 that while the “Christian, Jewish and Hindu” civilisations had nuclear weapons capability, it was the “Islamic civilisation” alone that did not possess “full nuclear capability”. Saudi Arabia, Libya and others initially financed fulfilment of this Bhutto dream and aspirations. Bhutto’s successors were liberal in transferring nuclear weapons technology and designs to Libya and Iran and offering such technology to Iraq. These pan-Islamic views were and are shared by a number of Pakistan’s nuclear scientists. Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist strikes, two senior Pakistani nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood and Chaudhri Abdul Majeed, were charged with helping the Al-Qaeda acquire nuclear weapons. Two other scientists, Suleiman Asad and Ali Mukhtar, wanted for questioning about their links with the Al-Qaeda and Taliban, mysteriously disappeared while on a visit to Myanmar.
A “fact sheet” published by the White House then stated that both Asad and Mukhtar had meetings with Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden during repeated visits to Kandahar, prior to 9/11. It is no secret that AQ Khan’s successor, Samar Mubarak Mand, is also a hard-core Islamist, no less India obsessed than AQ Khan. Pakistan’s contacts and partners for nuclear proliferation extended to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and even North Korea, with which it struck a deal for supplying enrichment technology in exchange for liquid fuelled Nodong missiles. It is not surprising that, given this dubious track record on nuclear proliferation, Pakistan has few backers for receiving an Indian style “nuclear deal”, in the international community, apart from its “all-weather friend” and partner in nuclear proliferation, the Peoples Republic of China.
Having acquired nuclear weapons, Pakistan was initially at a loss to spell out its nuclear doctrine, apart from repeating the mantra that its nuclear deterrent was exclusively “India centric”. About a decade ago, Lt General Khalid Kidwai, the longtime head of Strategic Planning of Pakistan’s National (Nuclear) Command Authority, declared that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistani territory, or destroys a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons if India attempted to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation.
In the decade that has elapsed since General Kidwai spoke, Pakistan has used its plutonium reactors and reprocessing plants in Khushab, located 200 km south of Islamabad, which have been supplied by China, to build light, relatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, mounted on short-range Nasr missiles. Pakistan describes this development as indicating that it now has “full spectrum nuclear capability” to launch low- yield tactical weapons against Indian army formations along the international border. On October 21, Pakistan Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry proclaimed: “Pakistan has built the infrastructure to launch a quick response to Indian aggression…Usage of low-yield nuclear weapons would make it difficult for India to launch an attack against Pakistan.” While this may appear to make sense in the Rajasthan-Sind region, it is certainly not feasible in Punjab, where the border areas in Pakistan are densely populated. Surely, the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan army does not intend to use its inability to fight a conventional war, to nuke its own Punjabi brethren, on its borders with India.
India’s nuclear doctrine, first officially enunciated in January 2003, asserts that it intends to build and maintain a “credible nuclear deterrent”. While adopting a policy of “no first use”, it clarifies that its nuclear weapons will be used against an attack on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which nuclear, or chemical weapons are used. There is no ambiguity about the Indian doctrine. An attack on its territory, or armed forces, in which nuclear weapons are used, irrespective of whether they are low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, or strategic high-yield nukes, will face a massive nuclear response. The Pakistani civilian and military elite in Punjab will find the costs of an Indian response, to Pakistan’s use of low- yield tactical nuclear weapons against Indian forces anywhere, not merely “unacceptable”, but also “unbearable”. Pakistan will be very foolish to test out Indian resolve to respond massively to its use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Pakistan will be particularly well advised to bear the reality in mind that its Punjab province, where both its civilian and military elite live, is densely populated. Its cantonments facing India are in this province. Moreover, Pakistan’s army has mounted military operations, involving the use of air power in certain cases, in populated areas of its three other provinces — Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and Sind. Thousands of innocent Pakistani civilians have perished in the damage the army has inflicted. The Punjabi army elite evidently regards people in these provinces as less than equal — a mindset that cost them dearly in Bangladesh. In seeking to dominate the Pashtuns in their homeland, the Punjabi-dominated army seems to forget that historically, it is only the Sikhs in Punjab who have prevailed over the Pashtuns, till the Khyber Pass. It is self-evident that Gen Raheel Sharif is no Hari Singh Nalwa, who led the forces of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.
Dealing with Pakistani nuclear illusions and delusions needs a multi-pronged approach. First and foremost, Pakistan should be presented a stark picture of what would happen to its Punjab province, if it resorts foolishly to nuclear adventurism, whether tactical or strategic. Diplomatically, India should expose the consequences to global nuclear safety and security of Pakistan’s refusal to join the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. Given the Islamist inclinations of its nuclear scientists and a wide cross section of its Punjabi military-nuclear establishment, and their past proliferation record, it will be necessary, for responsible countries, to seriously take note of the dangerous implications of Pakistan’s nukes falling into wrong hands. An equally serious effort needs to be undertaken to expose China’s role in the development and expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile arsenal. China, which has violated every international norm to curtail proliferation of missile and nuclear weapons technology, believes it is not accountable to anyone, because it is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. This arrogance, by a country that professes to be a votary of peace, needs to be exposed.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/commen ... 59884.html

[SSridhar]

Pak does not understand 'punitive'.
They understand very well 'massive'.

Interesting point - did not occur to me. Also punitive sounds like puny

After the U2 incident, Khrushchev used a Russian word that was translated as 'obliterate'. That really got the Pakistanis trembling.

[ShauryaT]

Pak does not understand 'punitive'.
They understand very well 'massive'.

Original doctrine is a rehash of the old KS-LTGKS-AVMJG-RADMRM-RC-APJK doctrine of the mid 1980s.

Punitive might mean something to Wren Martin graduates but massive is very clear in street language.
Hiding doctrine lends to opacity.
One of the big problems in past was lack of transparency.
Hence they decided to publish.
The earlier thinking was n+1 syndrome would avoid war with PRC reining in TSP in their own interests.
But further thinking came to realize to confine the retaliation to reciprocal is best option and emphasize massive.

I see the issue differently. NFU with MR has allowed the political executive to relatively absolve themselves from exercising white matter on the issue of use of nuclear weapons, its associated postures, doctrines, war games, etc and leave the matter largely to professionals. SFC then builds its plans according to stated doctrine. But, when pressured and asked will India always wait for the first strike, then the answers start getting muddled. Some say yes, some say no, if it is imminent, we will strike first. The question is how do we know it is imminent and how does one define this level of imminence. Just one example amongst others that will throw up many different scenarios, where the purpose of using the ultimate weapon of war is to attain political objectives. Objectives that refuse definition in the Indian milieu, except defensive ones when attacked. By definition, the use of the military to attain political objectives is precluded, let alone the objectives of a nuclear war.

The overall consensus amongst many seems to be massive retaliation ALONE is not credible for all situations. Now some want to preserve NFU along with a change of massive retaliation and some like Karnad want to drop NFU in the process. Two entirely different approaches.

[kit]

are the Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons deployed on their air launched ASM 's ???.. if so a huge game changer for them !

[shiv]

are the Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons deployed on their air launched ASM 's ???.. if so a huge game changer for them !

I am sure the Pakis would like us to believe it so that we can panic and say "Huge game changer"

What air launched ASMs do Pakistan have?

And it what way is the game changed?

[ramana]

Shaurya, ABV who promulgated doctrine said India wont wait to be struck by nukes. So go figure.

kit, What game changer?

[Austin]

FAS: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015

http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ ... -FINAL.pdf

[vasu raya]

cross-posting...

Pakistan must be presented with stark pictures of not only countervalue but also counterforce destruction. For the PA, a few million momin is no big deal but a brigade would be unacceptable. India must present a picture of how several brigades would be wiped out and how GHQ would be gone. India must also make known its unwavering determination to wipe out Pakistan even if one TNW attack is made on Indian forces. Up until the incumbent government assumed power, Pakistan had a poor opinion of such an Indian determination because it simply extrapolated Indian reaction to Pakistani jihadi terror attacks to the nuclear realm as well. That was perhaps a costly mistake on Pakistan's part because I would not believe that any Indian government would take a nuke attack and remain docile. But, the actions of the present government have conveyed that this is an altogether different ball game now. If we can activate cold start at some point of time in retaliation to a future terrorist attack, that will call the Pakistani bluff of terrorism under a nuclear umbrella. Pakistan will be truly nuke nude then.

Of course, Pakistan would try to bluster its way through by presenting a counter narrative on how India would be attacked by Pakistani nukes. It is for this reason that it has been projecting an exaggerated figure of 130 warheads and still counting etc. Some American thinktanks are part of this Project Exaggeration to intimidate India. I am pretty sure that GoI has a more or less accurate value of the number of warheads Pakistan possesses which is most certainly not in such high numbers.

This is a good summarization, in addition the American narrative has been South Asian nuclear flashpoint leading to a large numbers of casualties, what it amounts to is they are projecting the Counter value after effect to the world when in reality it might just end up as Counter force or even small scale. We bought the American line atleast during the Kargil crisis, probably a reason for not crossing the border. Since then our own Intel might have caught up to the real state of the Paki nukes.

we tend to identify the PA as a distinct entity within Pakistan, and know it as the real power center with a mind of its own. what is it to say that entire Paki armed forces and their nukes would be wiped out as they are the prime sponsors of terrorism in India in Counter force retaliation? to avoid a post-Saddam Iraq kind of mess, the civvy political circles are made the real power center for once.

sure there will be noises of escalation and thats where we are denying them the credibility of having any nukes worth of Counter value or any remnant delivery means. Part of it is to deny the strategic depth as well. And this also helps with not nuking their own provinces that are seceding.

[ramana]

Soon after Kargil, Jaswant Singh and other experts called Prithvi as destabilizing and called for Agni-I to be developed and fielded.

In hindsight did this delay the real deterrent A-II series as resources were diverted to A-I?

[vasu raya]

Even before we get to the shoot part covering all of Af-Pak region, we need the RISAT series constellation with more numbers for 24*7 observation. In which ever way the strategy is devised sensors are needed.

[ramana]

Book review:

Seminar : http://www.india-seminar.com/2015/675/675_books.htm

AFTER THE BOMB: Reflections on India’s Nuclear Journey by Achin Vanaik. Orient Blackswan, Delhi, 2015.

THIS is a timely book, for 17 years have passed since India became an overt nuclear weapon power. The promise by the pro-weapon lobby at the time was that India and Pakistan would benefit from bringing the bomb out of the basement, establish a minimum credible deterrent with no possibility of a nuclear arms race, and live in nuclear stability. Achin Vanaik is a leading member of the anti-weapon lobby which believes otherwise and surely 17 years is long enough to permit a reality check.

The author is of the opinion that the two countries are far from achieving any kind of nuclear stability and that the Kargil and Parakram crises have brought the countries to the brink of nuclear instability. He has a point in that during the Cold War, over a 45 year nuclear stand-off in Central Europe, the closest analogy to the India-Pakistan scenario, there was only one small arms firing incident between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, whereas in the subcontinent firing never ceases between the two uniformed forces guarding the LoC and the IBL. Not surprisingly, other powers have termed the subcontinent the most dangerous place on earth. This much is true. But would it have been any different had India and Pakistan not tested weapons in 1998? Hardly likely, for the Pakistanis had a deliverable weapon in 1987 as leaked by A.Q. Khan to Kuldip Nayar, and the Kashmir insurgency was initiated in 1989 under the cover of nuclear weapons.

Did nuclear weapons have any effect on the outcome of the Kargil war and Operation Parakram? The Pakistanis are adamant that they did, for why else did Prime Minister Vajpayee restrain the Indian Army and Air Force from crossing the LoC? And again, why did India not attack Pakistan in 2002, either in January or in May after the Kalu Chak incident? The author has no answers to these questions, as indeed no one does, other than some Pakistani generals who believe that their nuclear weapons compensate for their conventional inferiority against India. The real question is whether the danger in the subcontinent is posed by the mere presence of nuclear weapons, or by Pakistan’s bizarre strategy of combining terrorism with a nuclear weapons.

In hindsight, after A.Q. Khan’s statement to Kuldip Nayar in 1987, there was no chance that India would not make the bomb, and after the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came up for indefinite extension in 1995 with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), there was little possibility that India would not test. It is true all this is realpolitik, a concept that the author vilifies as something that Indian observers don’t truly understand. However, realpolitik intrudes heavily into the entire story. The US turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s weaponization during the Afghan war due to realpolitik, and China assists Pakistan hugely in becoming a weapon power out of realpolitik. Indeed, the story of China’s deceitful help to Pakistan in its nuclear and missile programme is one of the more glaring omissions of Vanaik’s book.

It is unlikely that Pakistan would have had a bomb as early as 1987 without China’s help, which became even more substantial thereafter with an entire missile factory being transferred to manufacture the Shaheen-1s. There is also the collusion between China, North Korea and Pakistan in the transfer of the No-Dong (Ghauri) to Islamabad. This assistance continues in full military flow to keep India tied down South of the Himalayas. So while it is undeniable that the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship is a dyad, the constant presence of China necessitates that India take a wider stance on the whole issue beyond the dyad. Fortunately, India was given the nuclear deal in 2005, another source of unhappiness for the author. But the 30 year old technology sanctions on India were lifted by the US in a most generous deal, which has mistakenly been named the Civil Nuclear Deal even when there has been no transfer of civil nuclear assets.

Though the US comes in for much criticism in the book, the author is unable to differentiate between the US Cold War behaviour and its post-Cold War attitudes to nuclear weapons. In the post-Cold War world, the US has taken on the mantle of the world’s policeman when it comes to the NPT, and however much this attitude is brought on by self-interest, it is a role that one must concede to the US. The book unfortunately came out before the Iran nuclear deal which, all things considered, is the best deal under the circumstances. All countries, even India, stand to benefit from the deal, barring perhaps the Israelis.

Many of Vanaik’s arguments against the bomb were made in 1998 and considering that the subcontinent has gone well past weaponizing, it would have made better sense not to go over well trodden ground once again, claiming as to how much better it would have been without the tests. This deficiency is in part addressed by discussing what can be done ‘now’. The author may be surprised to learn that some of the points he has recommended are precisely what are being discussed by retired military and diplomatic people from the two countries on Track II. So there is no inherent conflict between disarmament as an ideal, and possessing nuclear weapons to defend one’s country.

The author is correct in some of the observations he makes about nuclear weapons in South Asia. First, there is a degree of elitism among those who feel they are entrusted with nuclear deterrence. This elitism goes along with a degree of arrogance, which the early strategists worked against by writing an inoffensive nuclear doctrine. But admittedly under the control of the doctrine there is some scope for militarism, and that is the second useful point that Vanaik makes. There is no all-encompassing anti-militaristic, anti-weapon lobby in India or, if there is one, it is weak and muted. For these reasons this book continues to be a kind of conscience keeper for realpolitik inclined strategic thinkers and analysts about the greater role of ethics and morality in international relations.

Raja Menon

Rear Admiral (retd.), Indian Navy, Delhi

[ramana]

North Korea claims hydrogen bomb.
TSP will get eventually.

[SSridhar]

Deleted an incorrect post.

[Aditya_V]

SSridhar, A-1 was developed from A-II, the earlier Agni missile or A-0(fired early 90's and then suspended under US pressure in 1994) was a totally different liquid fueled missile not to be confused with A-1.

A-1 was developed since liquid fueled Prithvi with 150Km range was considered as vulnerable, it basically used stage I of Agni-II

[SSridhar]

Aditya_V, you are right. I have deleted my post.

[panduranghari]

That's old Prof emeritus.
wind bag.

From May 2015. I did search and it hasn't been posted.

Abe's visit to India might be for Indo-Japan nuclear deal as unless we sign one with Japan, we can't implement the one with US. If Abe signs the deal, then Obama and Abe could pressurise Westinghouse-GE and Toshiba-Hitachi to agree to the nuclear liability clause as presented by GOI and General Insurance Corp. of India.

[SSridhar]

X-post from STFUP-TSP thread

I made a rough transcript below of the Atlantic Council discussion on inducting Pakistan into international nuclear regime

Toby Dalton

• Why should there be a consideration of a nuclear deal with Pakistan? That is because there is a growing nuclear danger, nuclear terrorism or nuclear war because of Pakistan. Perception of this threat has changed recently even though its nuclear security has improved. It is a threat to peace & security and Pakistan is being scrutinized.
• Many things contribute to this increased awareness of nuclear threat such as Pakistan’s TNW programme, testing of longer range systems and sea-based nuclear weapons etc.
• The scrutiny has led to some sense of a need to think through options vis-à-vis Pakistan. The options are not good if one looks at incentives vs. leverage. On the leverage side there is very little. The US record of ‘punitive sanctions’ especially against n-weapon holding countries is not particularly good.
• If one talks to Pakistani officials, they are satisfied with their nuclear posture, with where they are today in terms of n-weapons.
• The ‘reputation’ of Pakistan comes into play when it comes to joining international nuclear regime. Pakistan’s first priority is to keep India out of NSG , second is if India joins NSG the Pakistan also does so. This, then, gives a leverage to ‘negotiate’ with Pakistan on that basis. For this, there has to be a change in internal logic in Pakistan.
• So long as there is a military-driven logic for n-weapons, it is not possible for Pakistan to take measures needed to join international nuclear regimes. We had a discussion with Pakistan a year ago about it joining NSG. When asked abou how they intended to go about that, they said that they would do exactly what the Indians did. This is a cognitive dissonance by Pakistan because Pakistan is not exactly India.
• We postulated two futures for Pakistan. One, the ‘status quo’ in which Pakistan will continue to produce weapons, (a prediction based upon the fissile material capacity suggests 350 weapons) {though Toby Dalton did not mention the timeframe for these many weapons}. This is because the Pakistani military would want a nuclear arsenal whenever there is a qualitative or quantitative gap in conventional military capabilities between the two countries.
• The question also arises then at what point the additional n-weapons become meaningless. Therefore, there is an alternative second future which says that if the additional weapons are not going to provide n-deterrence, and if Pakistan feels secure, then it opens up certain possibilities for leverage. The leverage is to prescribe a nuclear force structure for Pakistan.
• We have suggested five things for Pakistan to do. These are exemplars, not prescriptions or demands. Changes in its declaratory policy, formalizing its recessed nuclear posture, thinking about numerical and geographical constraints on its TNWs, limiting fissile material production and signing CTBT without waiting for India to do so with the caveat that if India tests again, Pakistan could exercise its ‘supreme national interest’ clause to wriggle out.
• Is it wise to seek this path with Pakistan? We have also received criticism that we only looked at Pakistan and not India.
• If there is an open-door for India and a closed-door for Pakistan, then it limits our policy options. There is therefore wisdom in thinking about a bargain with Pakistan.

Sameer Lalwani

• I see a a lot of potential good for both the US and India in the report of Toby Dalton & Micheal Krepon if Pakistan were to implement their suggestions
• There will be a reduction in nuclear risk in South Asia. For example, the gravest danger comes from TNWs and if Pakistan can be persuaded to limit the number of such weapons and their deployment, it could help in crisis management that could come from a terrorist attack or a ‘misattribution’ of an attack or a simple escalation on the LoC firing which happens on a routine basis. A recessed posture would strengthen crisis stability.
• Greatest crisis scenarios in Pakistan come from a compromised command& control, unauthorized launch,theft or capture of n-weapon. These are exacerbated by TNWs.If incentives are offered to Pakistan to ‘restrict’ TNWs that would be useful for all parties involved or anybody who cares for nuclear proliferation.
• Measures suggested by Toby Dalton & Michael Krepon would be beneficial to India because they are aspiring to be a ‘great power’ and they can pursue that policy rather than being engaged in a competition with Pakistan.
• For Pakistan, this shows a path out of isolation. This would also stop Pakistan from taking ‘provocative actions’ to pull people to the table
• There are two criticisms I have heard. One that it rewards Pakistan’s quest for parity with India and the other that it could setback India-US relation. But reward is incorrect because there would be no ‘material balance’ with India (What is this material balance?} because signing CTBT or FMCT or restrictions on TNWs would be costly and negate the parity. As for impact on India-US relationship, the US is deft enough to manage any fallouts. For example Greece-Turkey or Japana-South Korea or Japan-China.

Gaurav Kampani

• The idea of accepting Pakistan has been in the air since 2010. This gained prominent effort from the US after the successful Iran deal.
• Pakistan wants a deal similar to India-US deal and it does not want any compromise on its FMCT & CTBT postures.
• Within the Beltway, outside of the US administration, the three concerns on Pakistan are its rapidly expanding arsenal, the scope and ambition of its weapons programme and the possibility of an implosion of the state.
• The Carnegie Endowment & Stimson Centre approach misses a fundamental point that there is an underlying link between Pakistan’s grand strategy and its nuclear trajectory. One of the reasons for the India-US deal is that India is a status-quoist and a ‘normal’ power. By contrast, Pakistan is a revisionist state and it is a power that believes in radical ideology to up-end the international status-quo and its instruments are non-state actors with radical Islamist ideology. So, there is a link between Pakistan revisionism, its arsenal size, posture and the threat to Pakistan’s internal stability. Faced with Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail using non-state actors, India has threatened to use conventional forces and this in turn lead to Pakistan deploying TNWs as well as adopting a ‘full spectrum’ deterrence. Hence the idea that we can persuade Pakistan to move from ‘full spectrum deterrence’ to a more moderate ‘strategic deterrence’ will not work. We are wasting our time in asking Pakistan to change its nuclear deterrence strategy
• If Pakistan were to become a ‘normal’ state, India would not have to threaten it with conventional forces and Pakistan would not have to deploy TNWs
• There is an argument to use Obama administration’s strategy in Iran of asking it to set aside its radical groups in lieu for a nuclear deal is seductive but flawed with respect to Pakistan. One, Iran was still ambivalent about its n-weapons and this opened the door for negotiations. Within Pakistan’s strategic community, there is no ambivalence on TNWs or full spectrum deterrence. Second, in the case of Iran, there was no linkage between the state’s support of terrorism and its pursuit of n-weapons. In Pakistan’s case, n-weapons are a keystone in its revisionist and radical grand strategy (28:00Min). Hence, while it made sense to negotiate with Iran independent of the radical nature of the Iranian state, the same approach is invalid in the case of Pakistan. We have to address the nettlesome task of addressing the Pakistani revisionism as part of a grand nuclear deal.
• In perspective, the US goals since WW II have been to promote democracy, market capitalism and stop revisionist powers. Any approach in which we divorce the revisionism of Pakistan from its nuclear-weapons programme would end up treating the symptom rather than the disease.

[ShauryaT]

What real nuclear war looks like and this is from the 50's. At its height each side had about 30,000 warheads.
U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time

According to 1956 Plan, H-Bombs were to be Used Against Priority “Air Power” Targets in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe

Major Cities in Soviet Bloc, Including East Berlin, Were High Priorities in “Systematic Destruction” for Atomic Bombings

Plans to Target People (“Population”) Violated International Legal Norms

SAC Wanted a 60 Megaton Bomb, Equivalent to over 4,000 Hiroshima Atomic Weapons

Here is the really crazy part.

Discussion of ultra-high yield thermonuclear weapons continued during the 1950s and early 1960s so the concept of 60 megatons was not out of the ordinary in Air Force circles. Indeed, in a moment of enthusiasm Edward Teller proposed a 10-gigaton device, and in the early 1960s, in another outburst, he suggested yields up to a 1,000 megatons. A 25-megaton bomb, the B-41, had the largest yield of any weapon in the U.S. stockpile and it stayed in service until the 1970s. The Soviets staged the largest nuclear test in history in late October 1961 with the 50-megaton “Tsar bomba.”

[member_22733]

10 gigaton!!!

I was learning about thermonuclear weapons over the last few days. Each stage of the TN device acts as a waveguide/lens of the initial gamma ray flash (which turn into X-Rays, by the time they hit the "waveguides"). They have to be machined to perfection and be able to withstand the initial explosion for a few nanoseconds, and that means you need strong, heavy lenses that grow exponential in size with each "stage".

10 Gigaton bomb would have the size of a 5 story building.

[NRao]

As for impact on India-US relationship, the US is deft enough to manage any fallouts. For example Greece-Turkey or Japana-South Korea or Japan-China

Hmmmmmm............

None of those are nuke-nuke relationships.

In addition, none of them have suicidal elements within them (as far as I know).

I think the original thought of giving peace a chance still remains. Pakistan and logic will never go together. However, Pakistan will keep some, in the US, employed (doing what is TBD) for a long time.

[shiv]

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12 ... ef=d-river

Pakistan’s Race to Build Tiny Nukes Is Going to Backfire

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12 ... ef=d-river

[ShauryaT]

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12 ... ef=d-river

Pakistan’s Race to Build Tiny Nukes Is Going to Backfire

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12 ... ef=d-river

Good article by Fair. The only thing is she has not factored in the "assumptions" made by the Pakistani generals, namely.

1. India will not respond massively to a token TNW strike on Indian forces within Pakistani territory, despite its doctrine

2. The International community will restrain India from responding in exchange for whatever is promised at that time

Added: One more thing is the yield presumed for a TNW is 30 KT, seems high and also presumes detonation in built up areas. Another option for the PA is to detonate something far smaller in fairly non-built up areas of the desert for demonstration purposes only and let the SDRE Bania shiver in his dhoti, might be the thinking.

[shiv]

1. India will not respond massively to a token TNW strike on Indian forces within Pakistani territory, despite its doctrine

2. The International community will restrain India from responding in exchange for whatever is promised at that time

Shaurya are points above stated Indian government policy, or Bharat Karnad's opinion on stated Indian policy?

[ShauryaT]

1. India will not respond massively to a token TNW strike on Indian forces within Pakistani territory, despite its doctrine

2. The International community will restrain India from responding in exchange for whatever is promised at that time

Shaurya are points above stated Indian government policy, or Bharat Karnad's opinion on stated Indian policy?

Those are my views based on my readings of the thinking of the PA. For Karnad specific views, you will have to look at his works. On point 1, the overwhelming general consensus of all the serious observers of the space have articulated a similar concern and hence the demand to drop the "massive" portions from the doctrine, you can just go through the list of people who have expressed a similar demand.

[NRao]

One more thing is the yield presumed for a TNW is 30 KT, seems high

That is supposedly the yield needed to destroy a certain %age of the Indian force.

Pakistan would have to use a 30-kiloton weapon on its own soil, as this is the minimum required to render ineffective fifty percent of an armored unit

It is an assumption, so a smaller yield could be used, but then it would result in a lesser dent on the advancing Indian forces, per this assumption.

Certain is Janat - up or down do not know. Hoors certainly not.

[SSridhar]

It is an assumption, so a smaller yield could be used, but then it would result in a lesser dent on the advancing Indian forces, per this assumption.

NRao, Pakistan does not have the sophistication to build 'variable-yield' weapons. I am not sure if China has and it is willing to pass it on to 'sweeter-than-honey' Pakistanis. What if Uyghurs get hold of one?

[abhik]

BTW has anybody quantified what 'massive response' with respect to pakistan is? What are the objectives - destroy what % of the population, industry and military? And how many warheads (of what yield) would be required to achieve this?

[ramana]

Hit them with our best shots. No tit for tat.

[ramana]

Also going back to Chagai 1998 the biggest yield was less than 20kt. George Fernandes called them ping pong balls.

So where did this 30kt come from?

PIROMA project!

[NRao]

It is an assumption, so a smaller yield could be used, but then it would result in a lesser dent on the advancing Indian forces, per this assumption.

NRao, Pakistan does not have the sophistication to build 'variable-yield' weapons. I am not sure if China has and it is willing to pass it on to 'sweeter-than-honey' Pakistanis. What if Uyghurs get hold of one?

Well, the article also mentions a 15 kt.

I wonder what is a small or tactical nuke in their dictionary. Need to research it a wee bit.

[shiv]

It is an assumption, so a smaller yield could be used, but then it would result in a lesser dent on the advancing Indian forces, per this assumption.

NRao, Pakistan does not have the sophistication to build 'variable-yield' weapons. I am not sure if China has and it is willing to pass it on to 'sweeter-than-honey' Pakistanis. What if Uyghurs get hold of one?

True that Sridhar.

In fact there is open source information that American "dial a yield" weapons have the same 12 kiloton fission core and the yield can go up to 500 kilotons by putting in the fusion components. But I don't think it can be made from 12 to 30 kt. It is probably something like 12 kt basic, 100 kt, 200 kt or 500 kt. Need to refer to the large volumes of stuff I downloaded as my personal archives

[shiv]

Shaurya are points above stated Indian government policy, or Bharat Karnad's opinion on stated Indian policy?

Those are my views based on my readings of the thinking of the PA. For Karnad specific views, you will have to look at his works. On point 1, the overwhelming general consensus of all the serious observers of the space have articulated a similar concern and hence the demand to drop the "massive" portions from the doctrine, you can just go through the list of people who have expressed a similar demand.

Thanks for pointing that out.

But it can be anyone's opinion of what the Indian government may or may not do. Stated policy is different.

When stated policy is massive retaliation, and a rainbow of "experts" have their own view of what stated policy means I personally like to think about what Pakistanis (who presumably have their own views on this) think. Do they think India does not have the guts to carry out its stated policy as you opine. Or do they believe that India will carry it out?

Pakistani statements and actions suggest that they do believe the Indian threat will work if they attack within Indian territory, but they have released this trial balloon saying that are willing to use a nuke within their own territory in the hope that India will not retaliate as long as the nukes are simply aimed at an attacking force within Pakistan. In other words Pakistan hopes to confound Indian policy in a gamble. This is only a mind game. No one knows what may really happen in a war.

But from the viewpoint of Indian interests it is necessary for official Indian defence policymakers to make no comment other than point at the nuclear policy and say that Pakistan will face massive (or punitive?) retaliation even if they use nukes on Indian forces in Pakistan. The logic here is simple and I am sure you do understand. India cannot send her forces into Pakistan and be thwarted by threat of a Pakistani nukes - telling our forces in effect that they should try an attack, but if nuked we will simply pull out and say sorry. Whether we actually use a nuke or not in that situation cannot be predicted by anyone - we can only stick to our stated policy. This litany of "experts" who dispute this are in my view a bunch of people who might be trying to dilute Indian political resolve by suggesting that perhaps poor Pakistan might not really really deserve a nuclear response if they nuke Indians in Pakistan. Even if this is not their intent - they are clearly pooh-poohing the policy by declaring it as wrong, unworkable or excessive.

Surely the purpose of deterrence is to create doubt and fear and not reassure. That purpose gets diluted by responding to Pakistan's tac nuke threat or to taunts by the horde of experts that you quote.

But what CFair has written goes way beyond all that. She is pointing out that this whole threat of using tactical nukes is stupid for so many reasons. She has no need to take into account the views of every Tom, Dick and Harry who wants to put in his two paise about whether India may or may not retaliate and hence has simply stated Indian policy as is. I support her view because her article is not aimed as a debate with every two bit and bigger bit nuclear expert on what India might or might not do. Her article is about Pakistan