Iran rated on Pakis
Libya rated on Pakis
Koreans are worried and ready to negotiate?
Ans
Paki stuff doesnt work.
why
they cant figure out when they buy stuff like this
But Perkin Elmer irreparably disabled the devices first.
But Perkin Elmer irreparably disabled the devices first.
If they had developed working nukes of their own, why did they need to order these, ah, surgical items?If Pakistan is “Nuke Nood” then this crosses one more proliferation red line besides raising the question as to who is the ultimate beneficiary.
Alternatively Pakistan is not “Nuke Nood”. I am inclined to this view.
Last year, the Iraqi government ordered half a dozen lithotripters, which are state-of-the-art machines for getting rid of kidney stones. (The word "lithotripter" comes from the Greek for "stone breaker.") A lithotripter uses a shock wave to pulverize these painful objects without surgery. Machines like the ones Iraq bought require a high-precision electronic switch that triggers a powerful burst of electricity. In addition to the lithotripters, Iraq wanted to buy a hundred and twenty extra switches. That is at least a hundred more than the machines would ever need.
...
According to a knowledgeable U.N. inspector, each bomb of the type that Iraq is trying to build requires thirty-two switches. Thus, a hundred of them would outfit three bombs. It is hardly a coincidence that, as the former U.N. inspector Scott Ritter testified at a Senate hearing last year, the inspectors had "intelligence information which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist" in Iraq.
So were these SD experts trying to distract us from asking the right questions?Originally posted by John Umrao:
mohan raju>> you are on the dot, then there was the spin that Indian tests vented and the samples obtained over Chagai were actually Indian Pu. In the ancient city tubelightabad, anything spins.
Then wallace came down charging shouting Indian Fusion failed, Indian test yields were less than claimed etc etc etc
ourman uneven Cohen, allbrights, kreepons timothys etc etc started variations of the same spin.
Frank Gaffney, US Center for Security Policy, said: "Unfortunately, it's no surprise that we are finding, now that we are getting insights into the Libyan programme, that it had ties to the Pakistani programme. This is in fact a piece with obvious connections, with Pakistani scientists, and I suspect, with the Pakistani government."
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President Musharraf vowed his nation was committed to nuclear non-proliferation.
However, Western officials familiar with the investigation into Libya's nuclear programme said it had all the hallmarks of a Pakistani system, and it appears the assistance came after President Musharraf made his promises.
Mr Gaffney added: "Unfortunately, no matter how you cut it, the evidence of Libya's access to Pakistan's nuclear technology does not reflect well on President Musharraf, who has been, I think, by-and-large, a remarkably courageous and stand-up guy in the war against terror.
"But whether he knew and he allowed that transfer of technology or he did not know, it suggests that he is not entirely reliable in this war on terror."
The Bush administration appears to be willing to give its key regional ally the benefit of the doubt.
SEOUL -- North Korea said on Saturday that it showed its 'nuclear deterrent' to an unofficial US delegation that visited the communist country's disputed Yongbyon nuclear facility.
'As is known, the United States compelled us to make a nuclear deterrent force, which we displayed to Lewis and his group,' North Korea's official KCNA news agency quoted a foreign ministry spokesman as saying.
It is a good thing that TSP tested within 2 weeks of India.Originally posted by John Umrao:
If you ever wanted to find jokers in the Non proliferation crusaders, read this part form the above mentioned report
"One expert said that the conclusion of U.S. intelligence analysts that Indian tests two years ago vented plutonium might be construed as a technical violation of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which India signed in 1963."
another aspect that needs to be investigated is that wind patterns, weather conditions subsequent to the test in Pokharan. In all probablity the wind patterns would not be towards North/North west to gently waft over Chagai for CIA to pick up.
If by chance the drift be true then we have to test again with real good venting so that areal plume settles over Islamabad too.
The first challenge is to forge new relationships with countries so far passed over by the Nunn-Lugar program. The most obvious candidate on this list is Pakistan: There is little reason to trust President Pervez Musharraf when he insists that his nuclear technology is secure, and there is even less reason to trust that his leadership itself is stable, especially after two assassination attempts in the last few weeks alone.
But the reason the United States has not yet taken major steps to secure the Pakistani arsenal is not money; it's a lack of diplomatic creativity. Time and again, American emissaries have offered to physically protect Pakistani weapons--as a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington described it, the United States had offered to baby-sit their bombs. Not only did the Pakistanis find such offers insulting, they also found them dangerous, as they would have required giving Americans access to Pakistan's secrecy-shrouded arsenal. A wiser American administration would shift tacks with Pakistan and develop ways to enable the Pakistanis to secure their arsenal themselves. <u>It would also be more careful to assuage the Pakistanis' egos.</u>
Keeping a Nuke Peddler in Line
By Jon B. Wolfsthal
Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He is co-author of "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction."
January 11, 2004
WASHINGTON — It's been a poorly kept secret for several years that Pakistan helped develop nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and probably in Libya. For the United States, however, Pakistan's help in the war on terror has been more important than its peddling of nuclear technology to rogue states. As a result, Islamabad has felt no significant U.S. pressure to impose tighter controls on Pakistani nuclear experts, expertise or equipment. But as evidence of Pakistan's role in nuclear proliferation mounts, that's no longer an acceptable trade-off. A country that arrests terrorists one day and sells nuclear technology the next is not contributing to greater U.S. security.
After Sept. 11, 2001, news reports revealed that two Pakistani scientists had direct contacts with Osama bin Laden while he was operating in Afghanistan. Investigators later alleged that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, had traveled almost a dozen times to North Korea to help Pyongyang develop a uranium-enrichment program. And International Atomic Energy Agency officials reported that uranium-enrichment equipment inspected in Iran was identical to that found in Pakistan. Now, Pakistani officials confirm that several of the country's top nuclear experts are being questioned for providing nuclear technologies to other countries. And there is a growing possibility that Libya's nuclear program, which Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi recently pledged to shut down, bears Pakistan's nuclear signature.
The U.S. has had little success in convincing high-level Pakistani officials to safeguard the country's nuclear materials and technology. Last year, for example, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell raised the issue with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, offering U.S. assistance. The Pakistani response was the equivalent of: "Butt out, we can handle our own affairs." Last month's announcement that the Pakistani army was assuming control of the country's nuclear program was strictly a public-relations move.
It's possible that the Pakistani scientists being questioned were operating without government permission. But Pakistan had a heads-up about such contacts from the U.S. two years ago, which should have prompted authorities to be more vigilant about monitoring nuclear personnel. It's also possible that Pakistani nuclear experts helped Iran and North Korea as part of official policy. Pakistan received intermediate-range missiles from North Korea, but it was never clear how cash-strapped Islamabad could afford them. Similarly, cash and oil from Iran may have been lures for Pakistan's nuclear technology.
Regardless of why its scientists peddled nuclear assistance, Pakistan has a problem it cannot or will not control: It has become the world's No. 1 nuclear proliferator.
Accordingly, some say that Pakistan should be sanctioned or treated as a rogue state. It's unclear, however, that punishment — or the threat of punishment — would stop Pakistan from selling nuclear technology or compel it to monitor its nuclear facilities more closely. Instead, it might increase economic pressures and destabilize Pakistan, reducing even its nominal control over nuclear weapons and facilities.
There's a better course.
The U.S. should make clear at the presidential level that Pakistan's past nuclear misconduct has damaged American security, and that to ensure its partnership with Washington, Islamabad must satisfy U.S. concerns about its nuclear program. This would have to include acceptance of American assistance to establish a personnel-reliability program, which would include use of background checks, polygraphs and drug tests; to improve physical protection of nuclear weapons, materials and equipment by deploying modern security systems; and to adopt international standards on the protection of nuclear materials at production and storage sites.
At the same time, Washington must emphasize that its top priority in its relations with Pakistan is nuclear proliferators, not assistance in the pursuit of Bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda. Concern is already running high in Pakistan that the U.S., just as it did after the Soviets had left Afghanistan, will cut its ties after Bin Laden is captured. Making nuclear nonproliferation the goal might reduce this fear because it would require the U.S. to work with Pakistan over the long haul, including helping to reform its economy. Furthermore, India's and Pakistan's agreement to talk peace could give Islamabad more leeway to work with Washington to secure its arsenal.
The belief in Pakistan is that the U.S. cannot fight the war on terror without its help. But the price for such cooperation cannot be Pakistan's continuing complicity in spreading nuclear technology to rogue states. That price is simply too high.
Washington has promised a brighter future for Kadafi because he has abandoned his nuclear ambitions. It should do the same for Pakistan as long as Islamabad acts responsibly and stops selling its nuclear knowledge to the highest bidders.
From: http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/mazdak.htmA few months before the invasion of Iraq Saddam Hussein submitted a 10,000-page dossier to the UN containing a plethora of documents pertaining to his weapons programmes. One of these was a memo from an Iraqi undercover operative in which he reported that he had been approached by a Pakistani who claimed he represented a top nuclear scientist (currently being 'debriefed' in Islamabad) and offering to sell Iraq nuclear blueprints. Although this report surfaced briefly in the western media, not much was made of it at the time in the rush of events.
Right after the Libyan charade, Washington opened a major new campaign to deprive Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. media trumpeted leaked government reports alleging Pakistan had secretly supplied Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technology. These reports blurred the lines between exports of civilian and military nuclear technology.
Washington accused Pakistan of being a major nuclear proliferator. Pakistan nervously admitted some of its nuclear scientists may have privately aided neighbour Iran, which has sought nuclear weapons for the past 28 years.
So far, accusations that past or current Pakistani governments were involved with covert nuclear weapons exports remain unproven.
Whatever the case, this whole business is worthy of Alice in Wonderland. Who came down from the mountain to ordain that only the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, China, North Korea, India and Israel are allowed to possess nuclear weapons or sell nuclear technology?
The U.S. is about to build a new generation of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons. China and Russia are working on new nuclear systems.
India is building a very powerful nuclear arsenal and developing intercontinental missiles.
Israel has sold India advanced nuclear warhead and missile technology.
Muslim nations, it appears, are the only ones not allowed to possess WMD.
India used to rightly call this "nuclear apartheid" until President Bush allowed Delhi into the nuclear club.
Now that Iraq has been crushed, the White House's next targets are clearly Iran and Pakistan.
Neither pose any threat to the U.S.
Political and economic pressure on Pakistan will intensify.
President Pervez Musharraf, who has been unfailingly responsive to U.S. demands (GUBO-in-Chief), may soon be asked to place Pakistan's nuclear weapons under joint U.S.-Pakistani control, a prelude to the total elimination of its nuclear arsenal, scientists, and weapons manufacturing capability.
What a nincompoop . Hey Eric, we'd like you to repeat that statement when AQ detonates a Paki bomb in NY or LA.Originally posted by L Dev:
Eric Margolis upto his dirty tricks again
Now that Iraq has been crushed, the White House's next targets are clearly Iran and Pakistan.
Neither pose any threat to the U.S.
:pSo far, accusations that past or current Pakistani governments were involved with covert nuclear weapons exports remain unproven. A director general of Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, once told me Iran had offered to pay Pakistan's entire defence budget for 10 years in exchange for nuclear technology, but Islamabad refused.
Now Khan is earning new renown as the godfather of nuclear proliferation, a dangerous salesman who helped bring the Bomb within closer reach of other eager powers. Since Iran and Libya were exposed in recent months as nuclear-weapon owners in the making, Khan and more than six other scientists who worked with him, plus an undisclosed number of Pakistani diplomats and intelligence agents posted abroad, have been under investigation in Islamabad for sharing the playbook of atomic weapons with those states, well-placed foreign intelligence sources tell TIME. Khan has long been suspected of orchestrating Pakistan's nukes-for-missiles swap with North Korea, and his name even appeared in a 1990 letter from a Dubai middleman to Saddam Hussein offering to sell Iraq the scientist's nuclear know-how.
U.S. intelligence officers have joined the Pakistani probe, Investigators in Islamabad tell TIME that a handful of scientists now being interrogated were selling the nation's nuclear secrets for their own profit or for ideological reasons. Those investigators absolve the government and steer clear of fingering Khan as the ringleader. Eager to keep Musharraf in power and a partner in the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration also tiptoes around the issue of Pakistan's official role. Yet some proliferation experts in the U.S. doubt that rogue scientists and their cronies in the security services could have arranged such supersecret, high-level deals without government approval.
U.S. officials are convinced that Khan was the key player in the barters that Pakistan made with North Korea. A 1994 agreement with the U.S. froze work at Pyongyang's nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant. Three years later, in exchange for the design of the centrifuges plus components to enrich uranium, Pakistan obtained from North Korea 600mile-range, nuclear-capable Nodong missiles that Khan's lab retooled and renamed the Ghauri. U.S. intelligence alleges he made a dozen or so visits to Pyongyang over several years.
...The U.S. thinks oil-rich Libya first began funding Pakistan's nuclear development in the 1970s and periodically supplied raw uranium. Washington officials say Gaddafi was eventually rewarded with Pakistan's centrifuge designs and secret supplies of essential materiel that helped Libya close in on nuclear-fuel production.
...The investigators tell TIME that Khan acknowledges "authorizing" some of their trips to Libya, Iran and North Korea but says he had "no idea" whether they were conducting clandestine business on their own. But Khan is widely regarded as the man with the knowledge and the authority to make the big deals. He was in complete, unchallenged control of KRL until 2001. A former colleague of his claims that Khan could fly anywhere without permission, make any deal he wanted. The tall, silver-haired scientist amassed a personal fortune that pays for a lavish lifestyle. His position and revered status would earn plenty of perks. But many, including U.S. intelligence officials, believe he acquired those riches peddling his nuclear expertise.
...Khan's travel has been restricted, and even inside Pakistan, he is always accompanied by two military officers. He rarely leaves his Islamabad mansion except to venture out to feed wild monkeys that swing down in the nearby forest. Officials in Washington meanwhile cross their fingers that Musharraf can and will make sure that with Khan sealed away, Pakistan's nuclear giveaway is over.
It looks like they were monitoring AQK and trying to nail all the govts which were lining up to do business. AQK was a handyman as long as it lasted.Originally posted by ramana:
One thing to wonder is if AQK was so dangerous then where is the Israeli reaction? For he would endanger it the most by prolif to Libya and Iran. Lesser threats like Bull got what was coming to them.