Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby chetak » 14 Jan 2016 16:44

TOO MANY SLIP-UPS FOR COMFORT IN PATHANKOT

TOO MANY SLIP-UPS FOR COMFORT IN PATHANKOT
Tuesday, 12 January 2016 | Sandhya Jain | in Edit

Non-professionals took control of the anti-terror operations and then completely messed up the situation. Prime Minister Modi must ensure that henceforth vital institutions and their commands are not slighted

The pre-dawn strike inside the Pathankot Air Force base on January 2 was a Tragedy of Errors. Never before has such specific, actionable intelligence been available in real time, and the concerned operatives deserve our heartiest appreciation. Yet, information for which men may have risked their lives did not give us the desired advantage due to serial lapses, especially the reliance on charisma rather than institutional mechanisms.

A strike like that in Pathankot would have taken several weeks to plan; hence we may conclude it was not a reaction to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Christmas stopover in Lahore. Nevertheless, it represents a major challenge to Mr Modi’s energetic and innovative attempts to engage Pakistan. New Delhi’s measured response to the attack was necessary to protect the resurrected dialogue process, especially as the Afghanistan peace process is intricately linked to the India-Pakistan talks. Given the near simultaneous attack on the Indian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan) and another blast near the consulate in Jalalabad, it appears that Islamabad continues to think of its western neighbour as ‘strategic depth’.

A little-noticed aspect of the problem is the cavalier attitude of the military’s estate department. In 2008, two high-level Army officers were indicted for their role in issuing a no-objection certificate to a private realtor to build an educational institution on land adjacent to the Sukhna military station in Darjeeling district, West Bengal. A five-star hotel has come up across a military training camp in another State, precisely due to such laxity (read corruption).

Under the British-era Works of Defence Act, no structure can be erected in the vicinity of a defence establishment, regardless of land ownership, so that an operational area is available in the event of an attack. The Act empowers the military estate officer to raze unwanted structures flat; complicity allows encroachment of defence lands also.

The Border Security Force is reluctant to admit that the infiltrators crossed the line of control disguised as drug smugglers, but their route into the air base is perfectly clear. They climbed a eucalyptus tree whose branches overhung the 11-foot high perimeter wall of the airbase, swung down on a rope, cut the concertina wires and pulled up their weaponry. The fact that the floodlights in that stretch of wall were turned upwards, creating a zone of darkness, suggests internal complicity. Doubtless this will come to light in the inquiry, as will the role of Superintendent of Police, Salvinder Singh, murdered taxi driver Ikagar Singh, and others.

Larger questions remain. When the intelligence alert was fairly specific, and fighter aircraft and military helicopters were shifted as a wise precaution, why did overall defences remain poor? Why weren’t the Army’s Special Forces, standing nearby, asked to secure the perimeter wall from outside, which could have nixed the assault in the bud? Why was there no electronic surveillance system; why were trees allowed to hug the wall and facilitate entry?

Why was elephant grass allowed to grow so high outside and inside the base that armed men could move with impunity, carrying around 50kg of ammunition, 30kg of grenades and assault weapons? Why were poorly trained and equipped Defence Security Corps personnel the first responders when the National Security Guards and Army units had been moved into the airbase on Friday? The campaign was badly handled and the loss of seven security personnel (including an NSG Lt Col tackling a booby-trapped body), was avoidable.

Political consequences are inevitable, as institutions were pushed around. There was no clear chain of command; the Army’s area sub-commander, who has intimate ground knowledge and resources, was best suited to conduct the operation. Instead, an NSG commander with no organic command and control structure was brought in, and multiplicity of agencies compromised the principle of accountability.

Both the Air Force and the Army are unhappy (read furious) that the Director General of the NSG is a police officer. Experts claim that micro-management from Delhi caused a four-hour operation to drag on till the fourth day, during which period the Union Home Minister and Defence Minister were misled to prematurely declare the action over. During the operation, both travelled outside Delhi for official engagements, and Mr Rajnath Singh remained absent when the Cabinet met to discuss the incident on January 6 — a sign of discontent.

On the positive side, the international community believes the attack was launched from the Pakistani side, even though the United Jihad Council (of Kashmir) has claimed responsibility. A note reportedly found in the police officer’s car, which hinted the attack was retaliation for the decision to hang Afzal Guru for his role in the 2001 Parliament attack, suggests that Jaish-e-Mohammed could be the mastermind. In conversations between Prime Minister Modi and his counterpart Nawaz Sharif, and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and his counterpart General Naseer Khan Janjua, India provided ‘specific and actionable’ information on the attack, including call intercepts, names of handlers in Bahawalpur and GPS data showing complicity with persons across the border.

The finger of suspicion points to the ‘Gang of Seven’, including Jaish founder Maulana Masood Azhar, his brother Mufti Abdur Rauf Asghar, Maulana Ashfaq, Haji Shakqur, trainer Jaan Ali Kasif, and Saifullah and Iftikhar (both of Shakargarh). The Defence Minister has stated that some of the equipment used by the terrorists were made in Pakistan, as also painkillers found on the bodies. India’s plan to send Pakistan the DNA samples of the terrorists will be clinching evidence, particularly in the case of the man who called his mother and told her that he was on a fidayeen mission. Should she decide to go public, as Ajmal Kasab’s family did after the Mumbai attack of 2008, it would bolster India’s case.

This time, the world is on our side. France and Japan have condemned the attack and US Secretary of State John Kerry is pressuring Islamabad for action against the guilty. For once, the Pakistani response has been muted; it has publicly condemned the attack and is wondering how to wriggle out of the hot seat.

India, too, has lessons to learn. At Pathankot, non-professionals took control and messed up a simple operation. In the run-up to the parliamentary election in 2014, Mr Modi had decried the UPA’s tendency to denude institutions of strength through interference or by encroaching upon their authority. Now, vital institutions and even Cabinet colleagues feel slighted; his visit to Pathankot was partly to restore morale but mainly to soothe ruffled feathers. As Prime Minister, the onus is on him to restore institutional authority and responsibility across the spectrum.
Last edited by ramana on 14 Jan 2016 22:35, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Added bold for important points. ramana

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby rohitvats » 14 Jan 2016 18:34

^^^Our 'strategic experts' and columnists seem to be too eager to hit the keyboard and post an 'analysis' basis whatever they remember reading from other secondary sources. No rigorous analysis, no insight. Just plain stupidity! While the epic rant of Lt General Panag takes the cake, the above is prime example of casual thought process on line of gossip over a tea-cup, presented as some expert analysis and insight!

What utter rubbish.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby vishvak » 14 Jan 2016 18:40


A lot of things, reminds of last year's terror boat from heaven. Most of the coverage was about Indian side, and few data coming out in parts from source. It is like investigating victims, and not criminals, and this was a direct attack even with casualties on the Indian side. As usual, not much info from terrorists' side at all except some arrests for show.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Sid » 14 Jan 2016 19:26

In this incident few other things are happening which never "ever" happened before -

1> No official comments from GOI or other side of border calling for SF/airstrikes/WW 3 etc. Even Mr. Parriker held back by calling out action "only" against individuals/organizations, instead of blaming a state. He did not even said neighboring state.
2> Media entirely focused on India/IA/IAF/NSG. NSG used to be their darling, but this time they are treated like outsiders.
3> Swift investigation and arrests in Pak (or protective custody if we want to be realistic).
4> Allowing investigators from other side to join. Now this step might involve intelligence sharing, which ofcouse might not be possible.
5> Pak agreeing to integrete Gilgit/Northern territories in their nation formally. This is a big/major step.

All the above steps happening when two nations were not even talking few months back and heat was soaring on border. But heat is still soaring in Afghanistan, as another Indian consulate almost came under attack. I know its too early to be sure or optimistic, but something changed this time.

Point (5) might also be an indication of Pak ready to accept LOC as permanent border in some near future and giving up on their drama on Kashmiri freedom.

Is Sharif gambling with his life or we are gambling with our luck till next parliament attack happens?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby deejay » 14 Jan 2016 19:34

Aditya G wrote:OT, but regarding the conversation regarding use of gunships in COIN:

For records.

http://indianexpress.com/article/explai ... state-too/

...

Following the success of armed helicopters in the Kargil War, it was decided, in 2000, to use helicopter gunships against terrorists in the Kashmir Valley. Two Mi-35s were prepared for the role — but after a couple of failed attempts at coordinating with the Army officer who could not be accommodated in the cockpit, a decision was taken to use the bigger Mi-17s instead. An Mi-17 crew did, on one occasion, fire at militants on the ground, but the results could not be ascertained.

In Kargil, the Pakistanis were on snow-bound terrain with no vegetation, far from inhabited areas. During Valley missions, on the other hand, helicopters had to operate close to populated areas with vegetation that was dense at places — providing terrorists cover, and making it very difficult to distinguish friend from foe from the air. The experiment was quickly abandoned.

...


The article seems to be referring to the operation in Doda in 2000:

http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/other-armed ... shmir.html


The Mi 25 / 35 found it difficult to cross Banihal. However, they did cross Banihal, somehow. Without going into specifics 02 of them were operating in the valley. One developed problems and had to land in an emergency in a hot area. An Op was launched to first rescue the crew and then the aircraft, both successfully.

The Mi 17 firing - memory fails me but from what I remember the mission was aborted before firing or that is what is known to me. The first gun trials from the Mi 17 IV's were done on a range (Mahajan). The thing was so inaccurate that we did not even bother checking scores with the RSO.

Anti Naxal Ops can see uses of armed helicopters in certain situations and in some I feel the IAF should allow the crew to fire in self defence at least. Last year Wg Cdr Sandeep Singh (a course mate), was decorated with Shaurya Chakra for his gallantry in anti Naxal Ops where he flew in to rescue Para Mil personnel under Naxal fire.

One may read the official stories on net, one such link:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/uttarakhand/community/iaf-pilot-awarded-shaurya-chakra-for-courage/120560.html

The story from the horses mouth is different on some points from the official version and if I ever manage the permissions I will post the story but this was one of those where suppressing fire could have made a lot of difference. There are many places and opportunities where there is no danger of hurting villagers / non combatants while firing from air. Anyways, if helicopters cannot fire accurately, use of fighters and their guns is an option.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby shiv » 14 Jan 2016 20:40

deejay wrote:The story from the horses mouth is different on some points from the official version and if I ever manage the permissions I will post the story but this was one of those where suppressing fire could have made a lot of difference. There are many places and opportunities where there is no danger of hurting villagers / non combatants while firing from air. Anyways, if helicopters cannot fire accurately, use of fighters and their guns is an option.

Hoping armed ALH and LCH make a difference here. In future looking forward to a prop driven COIN a/c like HTT 40

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby shiv » 14 Jan 2016 20:45

chetak wrote:
Larger questions remain. When the intelligence alert was fairly specific


I once tried to find the value of Pi. I got a fairly specific value - 3

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 14 Jan 2016 21:38

chetak wrote:
sum wrote:Wonder who is the guy who asked this? Must be from the valley or a certain peaceful guy ( or a nutcase commie, of course)


TISS, the organisation was chosen carefully, it is chockful of sickulars, naxal sympathizers and commies.


Why do we need those good for nothing buffoons and parasites in India? What use are these good for nothing organizations?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 14 Jan 2016 21:40

Arun Menon wrote:
mraghu wrote:Article claims the SP was paid in diamonds and the jeweller was being used to authenticat them : http://www.bangaloremirror.com/news/ind ... 566862.cms


This guy needs to be hung for treason.


Bigger question is why is all this coming out via media and why is this joker not in jail yet?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Amber G. » 14 Jan 2016 21:43

shiv wrote:
chetak wrote:
Larger questions remain. When the intelligence alert was fairly specific


I once tried to find the value of Pi. I got a fairly specific value - 3

But.. those who are interested in 'specific' value in answer to a "larger question" once tried to fix the value as pi=4. No I am not making it up, Arkansas tried to do it once.

Indiana ALMOST passed a LAW to FIX its value to 3.2 in the famous Indian Pi Bill.

Some things remains the same.. :roll:
***
I remember one American Physicist was talking about how US army was angry at the scientists in Manhattan Project because they can not tell the army exactly how many Kg of U (or other things like pure graphite etc) they will need.
(Calculations in those days gave only rough idea -- anywhere between few Kg to few hundred Kgs)..
He told the general :
It is not like your next party where you have to know exactly how many guests you will be inviting.


Good thing is that these kind of questions to know 'specific values' were not asked in the media.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Vayutuvan » 14 Jan 2016 21:57

Karan M wrote:
chetak wrote:TISS, the organisation was chosen carefully, it is chockful of sickulars, naxal sympathizers and commies.


Why do we need those good for nothing buffoons and parasites in India? What use are these good for nothing organizations?

Lot of Labor Relations Officers in the industry (used to?) come from TISS/XLRI. They serve as the go-between for Unions and Management. They also look after working conditions, as oversight for non-exploitation, worker safety regulations, holidays, proper pay and benefits etc. It is nature of their job to know the social psychology of workers. Of course, some are used for union busting as well.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby saip » 14 Jan 2016 21:59

Amber G. wrote:
Larger questions remain. When the intelligence alert was fairly specific

I once tried to find the value of Pi. I got a fairly specific value - 3
But.. those who are interested in 'specific' value in answer to a "larger question" once tried to fix the value as pi=4. No I am not making it up, Arkansas tried to do it once.

Indiana ALMOST passed a LAW to FIX its value to 3.2 in the famous Indian Pi Bill.

Some things remains the same.. :roll:
***
I remember one American Physicist was talking about how US army was angry at the scientists in Manhattan Project because they can not tell the army exactly how many Kg of U (or other things like pure graphite etc) they will need.
(Calculations in those days gave only rough idea -- anywhere between few Kg to few hundred Kgs)..
He told the general :
It is not like your next party where you have to know exactly how many guests you will be inviting.


Good thing is that these kind of questions to know 'specific values' were not asked in the media.


It is INDIANA , right?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 14 Jan 2016 22:39

AmberG, I asked you question in Deterrence thread.....

PH related.....

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 14 Jan 2016 22:47

Can someone look for the Chinese made wireless set pictures from Internet? Thanks, ramana

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Prem Kumar » 15 Jan 2016 00:51

Aditya G wrote:OT, but regarding the conversation regarding use of gunships in COIN: For records. The article seems to be referring to the operation in Doda in 2000:

http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/other-armed ... shmir.html


AdityaG: thanks for digging this up. Busts a common myth on this forum about India unwilling to use air-power within own territory. The IA/IAF are judicious in its use (civilian areas) because they are sensible & decent. But its not like air-power for COIN is a "no go" area.

With LCH & Rudra coming in, I hope these are used in conjunction with UAVs in halal'ing pigs at the LOC with minimal loss to own forces.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Amber G. » 15 Jan 2016 04:22


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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 15 Jan 2016 04:58

vayu tuvan wrote:
Karan M wrote:Why do we need those good for nothing buffoons and parasites in India? What use are these good for nothing organizations?

Lot of Labor Relations Officers in the industry (used to?) come from TISS/XLRI. They serve as the go-between for Unions and Management. They also look after working conditions, as oversight for non-exploitation, worker safety regulations, holidays, proper pay and benefits etc. It is nature of their job to know the social psychology of workers. Of course, some are used for union busting as well.


Thank you for the details VT saar. Of late, all I see of TISS are the next generation of eggsperts in my SM profile, complaining about Hindu this, Hindu that, fascist this, fascist that and acting like small naxals. Good to hear some good use comes of TISS as well but I wonder if these guys are not actually inciting the workers and actually acting like a bridge.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Austin » 15 Jan 2016 08:45

Musharraf warns India against any 'mischief'

"In case India perpetrates something wrong against Pakistan, we will give such a fitting response that will always haunt India," Musharraf was quoted by SAMAA TV as saying. He said India should refrain from embarking on any "mischief" against Pakistan, it said.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby SSridhar » 15 Jan 2016 09:57

Has Pakistan registered an FIR regarding the Pathankot attack? - Vijaita Singh, The Hindu
Has Pakistan registered a criminal case against the perpetrators of the Pathankot attack?

Senior government officials say the Pakistani proposal to send a special investigation team (SIT) to India for investigations can receive legal cooperation here only if it is investigating a criminal case registered under a Pakistani law. The only other option for India to exchange information with the Pakistani SIT in the absence of a case would be informal and would carry no legal sanctity.

Former Home Secretary R.K Singh said that in the absence of any criminal case, the SIT was just like any other “inquiry committee”, which did not have any prosecution powers.

“If no case has been registered by Pakistan regarding the Pathankot attack, the SIT will have no power to investigate; at best, they can come here to inquire. Based on the information gathered, it will not be possible to prosecute anybody in Pakistan. The information cannot be used to send somebody to jail,” Mr. Singh said.

India has welcomed the formation of the SIT, but the terms and conditions are still not clear. Unconfirmed reports from Pakistan say Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Maulana Masood Azhar, accused of masterminding the Pathankot terror attack, has been detained, but under what sections of law, it is not clear yet.{Normally, Pakistan does so under its Maintenance of Public Security act under which detentions can be made for two months or so. We have earlier seen the same tactic against Hafeez Saeed after 26/11. The Lahore HC ordered teh state to give a monthly stipend to his family while he was being detained!} “Will India give the visiting Pakistani delegation access to the Pathankot airbase, a strategic asset? Are we willing to share investigations details of the NIA,” a government official asked.

Another official said that Pakistan was yet to take any stringent action against the accused named by India in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack case, though the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) registered a case. As reported by The Hindu earlier, the investigation done by the FIA had 22 glaring gaps.

A legal officer who did not wish to be identified said, “Unless a record is created, either in the form of a preliminary inquiry or an FIR, how could an SIT come here and investigate. The ideal situation would be that the accused belonging to the terrorist outfit named by India are extradited and are made to serve the sentence here.” Another government official said, “The other scenario under which a Pakistani investigation team can come here is when India sends a letter rogatory to Pakistan to produce the accused in an Indian court in relation to the ongoing trial. A judicial team from the country can choose to come here, not investigators.”

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Philip » 15 Jan 2016 10:19

Mush-a-Rat the Bandicoot talking about "mischief"? A contract should've been put on his head!
The sh*tworm is lucky that he was even invited to India post Kargil.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby rkhanna » 15 Jan 2016 10:25

For what its worth

Image

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Prem Kumar » 15 Jan 2016 10:32

By using "talks", "arrest", "FIR", "Joint Probe" and all that nonsense, India and Pakistan have together created a strategic-space between Pathankot terror attack and any retaliation.

Any thoughts of retaliation will be met with: "But it will disrupt the FIR process in Pakistan"

I still have hope that Modi/Doval will retaliate, but that hope is fading slowly

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Vayutuvan » 15 Jan 2016 10:33

Karan bhai, let us continue in a corner. I have more on this - very personal stuff.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 15 Jan 2016 11:41

Firing from helicopters in Naxal areas is now a matter of time as the air force has established a full fledged task force and is equipped and trained for this. Forces on ground are supporting the same. Hopefully Garuds will notch up first kills as well. 8)

However, the on ground control needs to be sorted - if IAF and IA cannot coordinate then forget about CRPF.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city ... 488740.cms

RAIPUR: "Recent decision of Indian Air Force's and Chhattisgarh police to carry out attacks from air in 'self defense' at Maoist insurgent Bastar, was aimed at boosting the morale of forces deployed in red zones and dissuade rebels from attacking choppers," newly appointed Air Marshal SBP Sinha, air officer commanding-in-chief Central Air Command told TOI on his first visit to Raipur and Jagdalpur after assuming command at Anti-Naxal Task Force (ANTF) of Indian Air Force on Thursday.

ANTF spearheads Operation Triveni of Indian Air Force, which is one of the largest sustained helicopter operations ever undertaken by the Indian Air Force, spanning as many as eight states namely Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal.

In an exclusive chat with TOI, Sinha said, "The first thought that comes to any soldier's mind when attack takes place is that he ought to do something to save lives. There have been few instances in the past where state and IAF choppers were fired at by Maoists and by giving them permission to fire in defense would maintain the morale needed at an insurgent place."

....


http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... s-addl-dg/

...

Additional DG (anti-Naxal operations) R K Vij told The Indian Express: “Maoists have often fired at Mi-17s (helicopters). We have lost personnel and people, but we have never retaliated. The law has never stopped us from retaliation. We have conducted exercises. Garud commandos of the Indian Air Force practised firing from Mi-17. We are not sitting ducks, we can also attack them. It will help us handle the situation better.”

While the official statement is that the IAF will attack only in retaliation or self-defence, it gives enormous edge to security forces battling the Maoists.

IAF officers in Chhattisgarh confirmed the change in strategy.

The IAF has been operating Mi-17s in the Bastar region for several years. The Maoists have been able to hit these helicopters quite often. So far, the state establishment and the IAF had been against air strikes.

“To counter this situation (Maoist attack on helicopters), senior officers of Chhattisgarh police and IAF held a joint meeting and formulated a strategy. As part of this strategy, exercises were conducted in remote areas of Bijapur,” Vij said.

Maoists have large bases in Bijapur as they dominate vast area across this district of southwest Bastar.

“On October 13, three IAF helicopters flew over a specified area of Bijapur and practised strafing. Senior officers of the IAF and anti-Naxal operations of the state police participated in the exercise,” Vij said

...


This is what it is going to look like:

Image

IMHO it is high time we deploy Akbars with at least with MMG mounts in Naxal areas. Even Gen. Hasnain suggested that in one of his recent pieces.

Regarding induction of LCH & Rudra. My view is that they only represent a newer technology - we are reticient to employ air power even though we have options today (for very good reasons like minimum force). Army already operates LAH Lancers and MMG mounted on Cheetaks.

deejay; as an aside - recent Mi-17s have come with clam shell rear doors instead of ramps. What is the general view of ramp vs clam shell?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby deejay » 15 Jan 2016 14:57

The ramps are good for un/loading heavier (in some situations only) stuff but removing and attaching them again takes more time. As such there is no specific advantage / disadvantage felt while operating. Made for a great shot in Lakshya movie where one can see the ramp shut after helicopter is airborne.

The first ramp versions came with Mi 17IVs and here we had almost a 50 -50 split between ramp and clam shell door version. Most of the time, we flew for air maintenance with both clam shell or ramp removed. :)

Clam Shell version
Image
Ramp Version
Image

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 15 Jan 2016 17:25

Clamshell cannot do this 8)

Image

The chopper lands on a desolate spot in the thar desert .... out of nowhere 10 Para SF gypsy emerges and disappears into its belly. Tied up at the back is Dawood Ibrahim ....

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby deejay » 15 Jan 2016 17:33

^Yes, true.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Singha » 15 Jan 2016 21:18

Image

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Prem Kumar » 15 Jan 2016 21:23

Special Instigation Team

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 15 Jan 2016 21:51

Deejay how was the serviceability of the Mi-17s and Mi-8s? Was it at the required IAF 75% and above level or even there, did tardy Russian spares etc cause an issue?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 15 Jan 2016 22:07

Guys helicopter questions should not be here

thanks,
ramana

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 15 Jan 2016 22:57

Deejay sir, if you can, please reply here:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=6918&start=760

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 16 Jan 2016 10:05

Deejay and KaranM
A lot of weaponry was used in PAFB incident. Any report/feedback about effectiveness?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby member_29089 » 16 Jan 2016 10:20

Why no info on the ID's of the Pathankot terrorists?
(Until then what's the use of SIT etc visiting Pathankot?, what can they possibly do there?)

Once their ID and their Paki native places are confirmed and their families start giving interviews... fun should begin.

perhaps paki news channels this time around are discouraged from snooping into PakJabi villages to meet their families?

As a minimum, as early as possible ... establish that
a) they are muslims
b) they are paki muslims
c) their names and native places in Bakistan

(a, and b is well known to everyone but solid evidence would be fun to have to embarrass the pakis for many moons to come)

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Yagnasri » 16 Jan 2016 10:51

We may not know their names and other details so easily this time. Pakis sent well trained and organised people this time. One can be sure that there will no open and shut case this time.

Pakis obviously trying to gain time with a drama of investigation. The only question is what we will do. Is our response going to be the same as MMS and ABV time or something new?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 16 Jan 2016 19:09

Was looking at reports of attack on 31 Field Regiment Camp @ Mohura - Dec 2014.

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... -still-on/

...Officers at the army headquarters in New Delhi said the foreign militants were “well trained” and sent from across the border to target Army installations to “make a statement” amidst high voter turnout in the assembly elections.

...

Officials said that after crossing the LoC, the militants, who were dressed in army fatigues, fired on an army patrol and then killed three guards at the gate of the camp. While one militant took position at the gate, five others went inside and opened fire, killing two more personnel of the artillery unit.
The militant at the gate, on the other hand, attacked a police party led by Uri’s Sub Divisional Police Officer, which came near the camp, killing three policemen, including an assistant sub inspector.
kashmir

A defence spokesperson in Srinagar said, “Troops in the camp retaliated immediately and engaged the militants. Neighbouring units immediately mobilised their Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) and surrounded the area.”

An army spokesman said as QRT vehicles from the neighbouring 24 Punjab Battalion reached the camp, the militant at the gate opened fire on them. A couple of vehicles went off the road and overturned, killing three army personnel, including Lt Colonel Sankalp Kumar (40), Havaldar Subhash Chand (40) and Lance Naik Gurmail Singh (36). While the family of Kumar, who was the second-in-command of his unit, lives in Danapur Cantt, Chand was from Chamba district of Himachal Pradesh and Singh from Makhanpur in Jammu.

...

The fact that the militants split in groups — with one taking position at the gate to counter the reaction teams — showed “planning and training”, said Army sources in Delhi. The army said six automatic rifles with 55 magazines, two shotguns, two night-vision binoculars, four radio sets, 32 unused grenades, a medical kit and and a large quantity of warlike stores that could have sustained them for four or five days were recovered from the slain militants. Sources said the attackers, who had possibly planned a seige and take hostages, knew the topography of the area


...


http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... tack-army/

...“To say it was a routine infiltration would be improper. The sequence in which the events have happened and if you see the numbers and levels of training that has gone in to preparing these people, it is not an ordinary infiltration. It is linked to the larger events that are taking place here,” he said, referring to ongoing elections and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Srinagar tomorrow. - ......


One gets a sense that the enemy across the border is learning, trialling and escalating each attack.

Image

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Amber G. » 17 Jan 2016 11:28

This New Yorker article asks:

Since 9/11, according to congressional reports, U.S. taxpayers have given Pakistan at least eighteen billion dollars, much of it to the military. Last year alone, the U.S. gave Pakistan $1.5 billion dollars. Isn’t it about time we asked ourselves whether this is a good idea?

I don't think it is posted here, so posting it. Nice article, written in an well-known newsmedia for US audience.
(Along with Bruce Riedel's it's nice article for American Audience)

The Pakistani Dystopia
newyorker.com
The Pakistani Dystopia
Jan. 15, 2016 4 min read original
(A picture)An Indian soldier stands guard near the Pathankot airbase, shortly after the base was seized by Pakistani militants.

Imagine a country that is embroiled in a long and bloody conflict with its neighbor, and each time its democratically elected Prime Minister tries to reach out and make peace, his own army launches an attack to make sure the peace doesn’t take hold. You might think you were trapped inside a dystopian movie. Unless, of course, you’ve been to Pakistan, where this happens all the time.

This week, Pakistani officials said they had detained Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, a militant group, for his alleged role in overseeing the attack on an Indian airbase in the city of Pathankot earlier this month. The attack left seven Indians dead. Jaish-e-Mohammed is one of several Pakistani militant groups whose members routinely cross into India and carry out attacks there, for the ostensible purpose of prying loose Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state.

Azhar’s detention is almost certainly a farce, staged to placate foreign leaders. If the past is any guide, Azhar, who has been detained many times before, will soon be free and able to carry out more attacks. This is the way it has worked in Pakistan for years.

The attack on the airbase in Pathankot, on January 2nd, came little more than a week after the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, flew to Lahore to meet the Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, for a surprise summit. It was the first visit by an Indian leader to Pakistan in twelve years. By all accounts, the meeting went well. That’s an unqualified good; both countries possess nuclear weapons, and their unresolved disputes, especially over Kashmir, could have terrifying consequences. India and Pakistan have already been to war with each other four times.

So why would Pakistani-based fighters follow up a feel-good summit with a cross-border attack? Well, it wouldn’t be the first time, or the second, or even the third.

In 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee took a bus across the border to meet Sharif, and the two men pledged that peace would prevail between their two countries. Less than three months later, Pakistani soldiers, dressed up like jihadis, crossed the Indian border in the Himalayas and captured several Indian army posts. The Indian army repelled the invaders but the fighting, centered around the town of Kargil, came dangerously close to spinning out of control. It doesn’t appear that the Pakistani military, which orchestrated the attack, ever bothered to ask Sharif for permission.

In July, 2001, Vajpayee invited the Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf, who had recently declared himself Chief Executive after seizing power from Sharif in a military coup, to the Indian city of Agra to talk peace. Three months later, Pakistani-based guerrillas mounted an assault on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly building, and two months after that they launched a brazen attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Indian troops were nearly ordered to cross the border, but the crisis was defused.

In September, 2008, Pakistan’s first elected leader in nine years, President Asif Zardari, made a series of peaceful overtures to India. Two months later, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and other targets in Mumbai, killing more than a hundred and fifty people and wounding more than three hundred.

I’m not the first person to notice that Pakistani militants regularly try to sabotage peaceful relations between their country and India. Aparna Pande, at the Hudson Institute, has put together a chronology of these attacks.

But the important point is who backs, trains, tolerates and supports those militants: the Pakistani military and, most particularly, its spy service, known as the Inter-Services Intelligence, or the I.S.I.

For decades, the Pakistani military has backed insurgent groups whose express aim is to cross into India and fight. (The I.S.I. has also done this in Afghanistan, helping to create and sustain the Taliban.) The ostensible aim of these militant groups, and of the I.S.I., is to bleed India into ceding control over Kashmir. This has never been more than a fantasy, but it keeps the country of Pakistan focussed on something other than its intractable domestic problems, and it justifies the military’s bloated budgets.

That the I.S.I. plays godfather to groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed, which appears to have carried out the Pathankot attack, and Lashkar-e-Toiba, which launched the operation in Mumbai—the assault on the Indian Parliament appears to have been a joint operation of the two—is beyond doubt. It has been chronicled in great detail by the Pakistani journalist Ahmad Rashid, the former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani, and the former C.I.A. and N.S.C. analyst Bruce Riedel. Indeed, in the attacks on Mumbai and the Parliament, there was evidence that I.S.I. officials had provided direct support.

The attack on the base in Pathankot has especially lurid implications. Masood Azhar, who appears to have overseen it, was once imprisoned in India on charges of kidnapping Westerners there. In 1999, he was released at the demand of a group of terrorists—from yet another Pakistani-backed group—who hijacked Indian Airlines flight 814 and landed it in Afghanistan, which was then under Taliban rule. Once Azhar was released, I.S.I. encouraged him to set up his group Jaish-e-Mohammed, according to Rashid. (Among the others released from the Indian prison that day was Omar Saeed, the British-Pakistani militant who was later convicted for kidnapping and murdering the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.) Shortly after Azhar’s release, with the I.S.I. at his side, he toured Pakistan, raising money for the jihad against India.

Did the Pakistani military order Azhar to attack the Indian airbase in Pathankot? Maybe, maybe not. “The Pakistan Army feels like they can control these groups, but they have a mind of their own,” Haqqani told me. “They do what they want. Do they get a wink and a nod from the military? It seems quite likely.”

When Pakistani officials announced this week that they had detained Azhar on suspicion of involvement in the Pathankot attack, it raised the obvious question: How did they know where he was?

What is most remarkable is that the pattern never changes. The Pakistani military keeps backing militant groups, like Jaish-e-Mohammed, that keep pushing the subcontinent to the brink of war, and that keep undermining Pakistan’s fledgling democratic institutions.

Since 9/11, according to congressional reports, U.S. taxpayers have given Pakistan at least eighteen billion dollars, much of it to the military. Last year alone, the U.S. gave Pakistan $1.5 billion dollars. Isn’t it about time we asked ourselves whether this is a good idea?



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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Amber G. » 17 Jan 2016 12:06

Raheel, not Nawaz, Sharif Holds the Key to the India-Pakistan Peace Mystery
thewire.in
Raheel, not Nawaz, Sharif Holds the Key to the India-Pakistan Peace Mystery
by Ayesha Siddiqa Jan. 17, 2016 6 min read original
Diplomacy
The idea of improving relations with India does occur to the Pakistani army but it is not sure about the terms of engagement
Pakistan's army chief, Raheel Sharif, during a recent visit to Washington, DC. Credit: Ash Carter/Flickr
Pakistan’s army chief, Raheel Sharif, during a recent visit to Washington, DC. Credit: Ash Carter/Flickr
The news of Masood Azhar’s possible detention in Pakistan left me with the same feeling I had when reading a story in my childhood about Sheikh Chilli, a man who built castles in the air. What if he hadn’t shaken his head so violently that the basket of eggs didn’t come crashing down, as did his dreams?

Even as I sat down for an interview soon after, Pakistan’s federal minister for privatisation claimed the news of the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief’s detention was not verified. He had come from a meeting with other ministers in which none vouched for the news of the arrest. In fact, the minister stated that the Ministry of Interior had advised him to be non-committal. The statement from the office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke of action against the JeM but was guarded about any specifics. So why did someone in authority leak the news of Azhar’s detention to the Pakistani media?

All quiet in Bahawalpur

By the end of the evening of January 15, it was clear that the story needed to be approached with great caution. Sources from Bahawalpur, where the JeM is stationed, talked about the authorities taking 13 JeM members into custody from various cities in Punjab. However, what is more interesting is the report of Masood Azhar and his brother Mufti Rauf being picked up from Islamabad. Didn’t the government say for years that Azhar did not live anywhere in Punjab but had disappeared somewhere in the tribal areas?

Despite the news, his men in Bahawalpur seemed calm and contained. Though news came of the JeM’s offices being shut down, one wondered what they were talking about since the JeM has no office. It is not a political party which would require an office. Its entire business is conducted from the madrassa Usman-o-Ali in Bahawalpur and another huge madrassa being built on the main highway outside the city. Closing down these seminaries would draw attention and create excitement that was not observable. It certainly makes one wonder if the news was a trial balloon to see India’s reaction– just like some believe the Pathankot attack was meant to test New Delhi’s red lines.

Jaish madrasa bahawalpur
File photo of the madrassa Usman-o-Ali in Bahawalpur
The JeM folks were of the view that all of this will wash away in another ten days. Throughout the evening when news was spread about the Pakistan government taking action, there was nothing happening in Bahawalpur. The only thing which has happened thus far is that JeM’s website and magazine are no longer available online, which is very different from what happened with LeT/JuD.

The difference in civil-military perspectives on handling India-centric militancy is clear. It seems that while Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is keen to have peace and like a timid chicken sticks his neck out every now and then, the military would like to remain more cautious. It isn’t that Raheel Sharif’s army is not interested in talks but that it is not keen to have a conversation between civilians or to allow personal camaraderie to develop between the two prime ministers. Although Pakistan military’s involvement in Pathankot is not proven, whoever planned the show was aware of GHQ Rawalpindi’s unhappiness with how the December 25 Modi visit played out in Pakistan – the two leaders seemed to be building personal ties without the army being centre-stage.

Pathankot certainly did not happen from nowhere but it seems to have followed a predictable pattern: an attack not big enough to provoke a huge response like targeting militant headquarters across the border but which generates enough hue and cry to postpone a conversation.

Despite that, Islamabad keeps talking about the threat of India’s ‘cold start’ military strategy. It appears that the generals are quite conscious of the fact that Delhi may not be close to activating such a plan if it needed to. Its not about weapons but changes in doctrines and force structures that could manage a swift and sharp response. Also, post-Pathankot, the comparative caution in the Indian reaction was palpable. This was construed as Delhi having too much at stake this time or that politically Narendra Modi had committed himself to the peace process to a degree that he could not allow the same kind of reaction as the BJP displayed under Congress rule. Then there are those who are outrightly skeptical about the incident and argue that the Indian government’s restraint is because it does not have sufficient evidence regarding JeM’s involvement.

From the perspective of an average Pakistani, this is all a bit like being on a seesaw. There is the public, which would like to have improved relations but has not turned into a critical mass or developed enough political clout to become noticeable to the military. On the other hand, there is the political and ideological right-wing represented by both the military and religious lobby that remains super-cautious and disinterested in building links. But the problem any analyst is likely to face during these times is confusion regarding the military’s stance.

Where the army stands

Was Pakistan’s army chief on board during Modi’s impromptu visit to Lahore? Most likely, yes. It is almost unimaginable that he was not in the decision-making loop. But this is also where one ought to draw a line. After the Ufa debacle, Nawaz Sharif would certainly not have wanted to appear to be alone in wanting to talk. However, this does not mean that the army chief approves of the larger game plan of improving ties with India, especially an enemy who, according to the post-Raheel Shareef popular narrative, is responsible for most acts of violence in Pakistan. The brutal death of 140 children at the Army Public School in Peshawar is etched in memory of the entire country and so is the narrative that the killers were sponsored by Indian intelligence.

Since the beginning of Zarb-e-Azb operation, the focus has shifted from internal insecurity as the primary threat back to India as the main security issue. To recollect, the former army chief, General (retd) Ashfaq Pervez Kayani gave several speeches before the end of his extended tenure emphasising the primacy of the internal. Given Kayani’s unpopularity in getting an extension from the PPP government and the alleged corruption of his brothers, his departure and Raheel Sharif’s appointment as the chief was welcomed by bulk of the army. General Sharif is viewed as conservative and professional, a chief who brought the organisation back on track – including on the issue of threat assessment. The armed forces also have reservations as far as India’s presence in Afghanistan is concerned. Therefore, it can be concluded that like any professionally structured military, Pakistan’s has not diverged from its emphasis on India.

However, its not that the military is entirely closed to the idea of developing ties with India. There are other considerations as well, such as American influence or less dramatic pressure from China to improve ties with New Delhi. The officer cadre in particular has good working relations with the Pentagon. Beijing, on the other hand, would like India-Pakistan bilateral relations to become manageable. Pakistan, in any case, has been rapidly moving into China’s sphere of influence which means that its military and economic dependency in likely to grow. Strategically, this translates into China extending its protective umbrella to Islamabad. Initially, one had expected that Nawaz Sharif would be punished with a coup for his overzealous overtures to India. The fact that he wasn’t may not necessarily be an indicator of the enhanced strength or capability of the political government but also a willingness of the armed forces to let it continue. Apparently, while talking to people in a private gathering, General Raheel Sharif spoke about the army giving the government space to breathe.

From an India-Pakistan perspective, this means that

The generals are not keen to rush into a linkage that would then be tantamount to neutralising the military’s influence in power politics or threatening Pakistan’s ideological and political relevance. The act of holding on to selected non-state actors creates that bubble in which the establishment feels secure, especially when it is unsure about the consequences of Hindutva-dominated politics in India.

Seen in this context, the entire post-Pathankot handling of the Jaish looks like a bit of a test case. Something did happen for some part of the government to have taken Masood Azhar into custody. Its not that there is any plan to hand him over to India or urgently curtail the organization’s power. In fact, during my visit to my hometown in Bahawalpur on January 16, I did not see any signs of a clampdown on the organisation or its headquarters. In any case, it may not be doable since the headquarter is basically a madrassa with an attached mosque which cannot be closed until there is an immediate provocation. However, can Delhi just give-up on confidence building? Peace is a long term plan which will probably come about with small and incremental steps.

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent social scientist based in Islamabad and author of Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy



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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby chetak » 17 Jan 2016 16:50

Here are the questions that were never asked about the Pathankot terror attack



Jan 17, 2016
Here are the questions that were never asked about the Pathankot terror attack

By Lieutenant General Prakash Katoch (retired)
Much has been written about the recent terror strike in Pathankot and more such material will be produced. The discovery of US Army military binoculars used by terrorists makes it obvious that they were trained and equipped by the Pakistani army. The discussion in media has veered toward massive deficiencies in equipping National Security Guard (NSG) commandos. Some of these shortcomings stood out during the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. Following the blasts at Zhaveri Bazaar in Mumbai, and Delhi High Court, the focus was on CCTVs not working.

This time, it is equipping the NSG; will we then forget Pathankot till the next terror strike? Ironically, among the many questions about command and control, coordination and time taken in responding to the Pathankot attack, some fundamental questions were never asked and some systemic deficiencies remain unaddressed.

Following reports of infiltration across the International Border (IB) and indications of terrorists heading towards Pathankot, the Indian Air Force base was correctly assessed as the prime target and the strategic assets moved out before terrorists entered the base on 1 January, which merits high commendation. The mechanics of our response with NSG as the lead force is public knowledge by now but some facts would still be of interest, like:

1. On the fourth day of the operation, a journalist rang up army headquarters to ascertain the ground situation in the IAF base. He was told that he should ring up the Ministry of Home Affairs which controlled the operation through the NSG.

2. During his press briefing at Pathankot base on 5 January, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar said the NSG would have the final word in the operation.

3. Following the operation, a journalist asking a senior NSG officer (name withheld) why the operation took that long, and was tersely told, “the NSG does not operate at night”, besides other reasons; an NSG officer (who was part of the force sent to Pathankot) says the group is meant for hostage rescue situations. Significantly, a media report indicates that despite being sanctioned crores for equipment after 26/11, the NSG is deficient of 72 items, including night vision.

Faced with a coup d'état in 1998, when Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom asked for Indian assistance, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted the NSG to be launched. However, the then IG (operations) NSG conveyed to him that should the Male airfield be occupied by the coup d'état forces, our aircraft would turn back and that, therefore, it would be better to allot the task to the army’s parachute brigade, which can deploy troopers if required. There was no one-upmanship. It is a different issue that the paratroopers had to go in using a tourist map, which was all that Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) could supply; even today the Survey of India and Military Survey is some 30 years behind in updating maps of areas within the country.
But here are some questions that have not been posed:

• Would the military ask for NSG assistance if a military commander is taken hostage tomorrow?

• If not, did the two service chiefs, who met the NSA for a briefing, feel the military was incapable to cope with four to six terrorists striking the IAF base?

• Did the service chiefs tell the National Security Adviser that army (special forces) assets, both in western and northern commands, were located much closer to Pathankot than the NSG? And that the special forces routinely exercise the tackling of military bases (including IAF) and are regularly engaged in live terrorist situations?

• Did the NSG inform the NSA they were inadequately equipped with long-range night vision to operate by night?

• Wasn’t the quantum of army troops asked for insufficient – only two columns initially?

• The NSG arrived at the IAF base at 8.30 pm on 1 January and was unable to operate in hours of darkness. Why then was the operation not handed over to the army?

• Are Garuds tasked and trained for such tasks? What was the need to put them on the frontline, holding back special sorces present in the base?

• Was the NSG bomb disposal squad equipped with suits and were the personnel wearing them during the operation?

• Did the defense minister’s statement on 5 January that the last word rests with the NSG not convey that he saw no such role for the IAF base commander?
Apart from removing strategic assets in time, readers can assess whether the counter-terrorist operation itself was a success, a botch up or a royal botch up, and whether this was or was not a case of forcing a square peg into a round hole, cover up statements notwithstanding.

Set aside reports of “many blasts heard later” and “body parts found” and you have four terrorists that held you up for many days. The reasoning being provided — that the Inspector General (operations) NSG controlling the operation was also an army officer — doesn’t cut any ice, as he takes orders from his DG who is an Indian Police Service officer. During the hijack of IC-184 and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the MHA was blissfully unaware that one special group (on army deputation) was fully trained in anti-hijack and counter terrorism and had their own aircraft, unlike NSG deployments, which are invariably delayed because of lack of aircraft. In this case, the NSG capabilities vis-à-vis special forces including deployments of the latter on 1 January were not taken into account.

The NSG, raised in 1986, has had all 28 DGs from the IPS under the euphemism of ‘civilian control’, which makes no sense because the group itself is under the MHA. If an IPS officer is a must for exercising ‘civilian control’ then logically the Assam Rifles too under MHA should have had a DG from IPS but this is not the case.

This is not about army versus the Indian Police Service but the fact is that the specialisation of the latter is ‘law and order’. When combat units of NSG conducting counterterrorism and anti-hijack operations are commanded by army officers, why do they need a DG from the IPS? Also, two-thirds of the NSG comprises Special Ranger Groups (SRG) whose operational task is securing the perimeter before the Special Action Group (SAG) undertakes hostage rescue. But SRGs have never been deployed other than for VVIP security, where besides other perks, they earn two and a half times their dearness allowance per day. Is there any reason why a bulk of the SRGs should not merge with the SPG?

There are other systemic faults that need addressing. A chief of defense staff is required more to synergise the military than to be a single point adviser. The proposed permanent chairman, chiefs of army staff committee, if denied operational powers, cannot ensure the strategy required. Air bases have been struck by terrorists in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and now in India. More attempts will be made. Much more military synergy is required. China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) has just one civilian in charge: President Xi Jinping. In contrast, our ministry of defense is manned by civilian bureaucrats and is without military professionals. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is the designated lead force for counter-insurgency but has no additional director general or director general-level officers; it is CRPF cadre officers who should be handing out advice instead of the IPS; a similar grouse is nurtured by the Border Security Force and Indo Tibetan Border Police Force. These are issues that need to be addressed.

(The author is former director general, information systems of the Indian Army, and a special forces officer.)

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby SRoy » 17 Jan 2016 17:04

^^

Okay so it boils down to turf war. It is an important consideration and a valid one.

It is fair to consider that NSG must be kept out of future ops in and around military facilities.

If I were in Gen. Katoch's shoes I would also have the same argument. Organizational morale and buy in of key stakeholders is important.

I also don't buy the argument that NSG was sent to handle a hostage situation.
What does that mean if we take a simplistic analogy? Garuds are not good enough to rescue our drowned pilots captured by enemy? IA SF are not good enough to rescue some senior ranks held up as POW somewhere behind the enemy lines?
Last edited by SRoy on 17 Jan 2016 17:52, edited 1 time in total.


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