Deterrence

[NRao]

Such debates are not unique to India:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1964846

[shiv]

way I see it, in India the final call on retaliation will have to be political.

Imagine this scenario - after a nuke attack, the PM decides not to retaliate. What will anybody else do? stage a coup?

A doctrine is a statement of intent, and intent needs to backed by will. Going by our track record of "mooh tod jawab denge" i think it is a fair extrapolation that our political class might lack the cojones to launch massive retaliation on Pak in case of nuclear provocation in non civilian context, especially in Kashmir.

Ofcourse, if there is a hidden mechanism that automatically activates the SFC bypassing a political go ahead this above scenario is moot. However, I doubt it very much.

Two questions. The first one is easier (IMHO)
1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?

2. Suppose our forces are nuked because we attacked them in response to a dastardly teror attack on Mumbai scale. PM decides not to nuke back. Will PM then call off an attack and prevent our forces from avenging their dead brothers (and the terror attack that started the Indian attack) and being seen as having failed to punish Pakistan and having lost the war. Or will he continue attacking because only a few tanks were lost and risk more nukes? And what will he do if more nukes are used?

Let me post my view here answering my own question
1. Pakistan's tactical nuclear threat wil definitely make an Indian PM think twice about attacking Pakistan
2. But if Pakistan still conducts a horrendous raid then an Indian PM will have no option but to set retaliation into motion with the attendant risk that unless Pakistan is punished there can be no way out. That means the pressure will be on Pakistan to use a nuke and expect to be nuked to houristan. The Indian PM really does have a choice of not devastating all of Pakistan - but simply taking out 15-20 choice targets. So I would not assume that the Indian PM who starts a war after a terrible attack (say another 100 Indian killed in a market) will back out.

But I get the sense that Pakistan accepted responsibility this time because India might well have retaliated - especially if civilians had been killed and assets destroyed. Then they would be responsible for starting nuclear war and they would not be in a position to make excuses like "non state actors dun it" . I presume there has been much pressure on them from US and China.

[member_28990]

Nrao ji, I am happy that you have such faith in the existence of and the iron guarantee that SOPs built in our doctrine will ensure massive retaliation, regardless of political leadership. I take faith from your faith (faith, as in even you do not know what mechanisms are built in or not).

Good day.

[member_28990]

1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?

absolutely, and therein lies the rub. Considering the type of democracy India is, are we to understand that there exists a SOP to conduct a nuclear strike bypassing or disregarding political go ahead? And that our political leadership approved such a SOP?

[shiv]

1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?

absolutely, and therein lies the rub. Considering the type of democracy India is, are we to understand that there exists a SOP to conduct a nuclear strike bypassing or disregarding political go ahead? And that our political leadership approved such a SOP?

Thanks.

I wouldn't put all this in the doctrine. I meant this:

Going by our track record of "mooh tod jawab denge" i think it is a fair extrapolation that our political class might lack the cojones to launch massive retaliation on Pak in case of nuclear provocation in non civilian context, especially in Kashmir.

[NRao]

1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?

absolutely, and therein lies the rub. Considering the type of democracy India is, are we to understand that there exists a SOP to conduct a nuclear strike bypassing or disregarding political go ahead? And that our political leadership approved such a SOP?

I think you are confusing two totally different situations and the way the SOP is set up.

So, there is the normal and the abnormal situations.

The prior is under the constitution, *all* parties get together and agree on what the SOP is going to be (this is not a closely held secret with a nation - actually among many nations). The SOP provides a detailed set of instructions on what to do under certain situations. That is the "type of democracy India is" bhashan - SOP under the constitution/democracy. Simple as that.

Now the abnormal situation - under a nuclear attack. The constitution is suspended, the political party in power - on behalf of the nation - morphs into a system that supports the doctrine (which was agreed to be everyone in times of peace). The PM ceases to exist - and becomes for that period of time the first pawn of the SOP. The nation goes into a dictatorial mode for a period of time. There is absolutely nothing undemocratic or unconstitutional about it - the SOP is vetted, declared and published.

The SOP has a concept of "Next man up". If anyone refuses to perform the bullet point item s/he is tasked, they are removed (force-ably if need be), until the SOP (doctrine) is executed.

Which is why there is "faith" in it.

[NRao]

Here is why I feel India is stuck with the current doctrine:

Some BJP leaders hinted that the NFU posture would also be reviewed. However, sensing the international criticism that was bound to follow, Narendra Modi, BJP’s candidate for prime minister, emphasized that there would be “no compromise” on no first use. Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to examining and revalidating their key features.

I think other nations, especially in the West, have formed their stands based on the assumption that India will not test again (as promised - no one asked India for that) and the Indian doctrine.

Changing the doctrine *will absolutely mean* that these nations will reevaluate their stand - cannot say which way it will go, but if I had to bet it will be a -ve for India. This is something India cannot afford.

Until ....................... perhaps now. With Russia being pressured by China to act against India things just may have titled in India's favor. Ever so slightly.

But will the West want to re-balance the nuclear equation between India and China? Cannot say for sure, so, for the immediate future I very much doubt anything will change.

WRT Pakistan, it will be a bigger problem for others, IMHO. India does nto need to worry too much in the near future.

[ldev]

To bring some numbers to this debate, maybe not exact numbers, but they are at least hopefully somewhere in the general ball park.

Global mega tonnage (deployed + in storage and reserves) 6400 MT

US deployed: 1025 MTs- enough according to estimates to kill 650 million if targeting populated areas.

India deployed: say 120 weapons, assume (optimistically) 100 x 200kt + 20 x 20kt = 20.4 MT

Pakistan deployed: say 100 weapons, assume all 100 x 20kt = 2 MT.

20 largest cities in India:

Mumbai
New Delhi
Bangalore
Hyderabad
Chennai
Ahmedabad
Kolkata
Surat
Pune
Jaipur
Lucknow
Kanpur
Nagpur
Indore
Vishakapatnam
Thane
Bhopal
Pimpri-Chinchwad
Patna
Vadodara

Total population of these cities, say 100 million, percentage of Indian GDP derived from these cities, say 75%.(open to correction here, this is just my estimate).

Pakistan largest 10 cities:

Karachi
Lahore
Faisalabad
Rawalpindi
Multan
Hyderabad
Gujranwala
Peshawar
Quetta
Muzaffarabad

Estimated population, say 50 million, estimated GDP derived from these cities, say 80%. (again, just my estimate)

Now look at a scenario that there is a very large scale terror attack in India and 1000 Indians die in a large city such as Mumbai. GOI orders a strike into Pakistan targeting terror camps. This however results in a border war with Indian forces pushing some distance into Pakistan. Pakistan retaliates with the use of tactical nuke on Indian forces on the border. The effects of the explosion are partially in Pakistan and partially in India i.e. it's right on the border.

What does GOI do? So, let's say they decide to go per the stated policy of massive retaliation. And let's say they retaliate with all of the 20 kt weapons and 50 of the 200 kt weapons, holding the remaining 50 kt warheads in reserve in case of China. These 70 warheads target the 10 largest Pakistani cities. With the limited number of weapons that both sides possess, neither can go for a counter force strike. So each of these 10 largest Pakistani cities gets hit with about 1 MT each distributed among 5-8 warheads. Given the concentrated nature of the population in the cities in the subcontinent, casualties per MT will be higher than the US studies which assume a much more dispersed and spread out city population in the West/Russia. So let's assume that 50% of the population dies with the blast effect and the others are hit with radiation poisoning. So an immediate casualty figure of 25 million + 80% of the economy destroyed. Pakistan is destroyed as a country, but how many of it's 100 nuclear warheads are destroyed?. Chances are very few if any at all, given that they will be dispersed and hidden to survive just such an Indian strike.

And after absorbing this Indian strike Pakistan decides to retaliate with all of its 100 warheads each with an explosive power of 20 kt. These 100 warheads target the 20 largest Indian cities listed above so an average of 5 warheads per city, some of the larger cities could be targeted with 7-10 warheads, smaller cities with 1-2 warheads. For the sake of simplicity I am assuming that all Pakistani and Indian strikes go through (no intercepts). Each 20 kt warhead hitting a populated city will kill at least 100,000 people immediately given the crowded nature of most cities. So you are looking at about 10 million dead immediately, maybe 20-30 million hit with radiation poisoning and 20 city centers destroyed for all economic purposes. What will be India's economic condition after this exchange? Pakistan will be destroyed, but India's economy will also be virtually destroyed.

My lesson from the above:

Develop and deploy a strong ABM and anti aircraft defence system. If the bulk of the Indian economy and military installations are protected, India will be able to react to Pakistani sponsored terror attacks, confident in the knowledge that should Pakistan escalate to a nuclear exchange, India will be largely protected.

[member_28990]

Primary target of Indian retaliation will be all known pakistani nuclear sites and hideouts. Cities (except perhaps Islamabad/Pindi and Karachi) will be coming much later in the priority list.

[ldev]

Primary target of Indian retaliation will be all known pakistani nuclear sites and hideouts. Cities (except perhaps Islamabad/Pindi and Karachi) will be coming much later in the priority list.

I was reading somewhere that during the cold war the US in it's counter force targeting had assigned certain high priority targets such as the Soviet hardened buried underground command bunkers outside Moscow as many as 28 warheads EACH. And most of those 28 warheads were 1 MT monsters. And yet they were not certain they would be able to decapitate Soviet command and control because of the presence of known and unknown secondary and backup command centers.

How many of Pakistan's 100 weapons will India be confident of destroying given such odds? And how much destruction will the remaining weapons cause in India?

[ldev]

Let's further assume that India tests a TN device and now has 100 weapons of 1 MT each and India's massive retaliation against Pakistan is to throw 50 of those 1 MT warheads at Pakistan. So Pakistan casualty figures will be say 60 million dead because of the immediate blast and another 60 million casualties from radiation. Pakistan is totally destroyed. BUT what if 80 Pakistan nuclear warheads have survived and they are only 20 kt each and Pakistan is able to strike back with those 80 warheads on those 20 Indian cities? The result being say the 15 largest Indian cities with 65% of India GDP destroyed and radiation poisoning on the ground in those cities?

The moral of the story is what is important is not how completely you can destroy your enemy but how much destruction can you bear yourself, and to what extent can you protect yourself against the destruction (ABM, anti aircraft defence etc.)

[member_28990]

second moral is nobody wins in an all out nuclear exchange

[ramdas]

I think other nations, especially in the West, have formed their stands based on the assumption that India will not test again (as promised - no one asked India for that) and the Indian doctrine.

Changing the doctrine *will absolutely mean* that these nations will reevaluate their stand - cannot say which way it will go, but if I had to bet it will be a -ve for India. This is something India cannot afford.

Of course, any changes to our doctrine/testing will elicit a negative reaction from the west. Why do you think we cannot afford that ? Nothing positive has emerged on the ground thanks to the ``good boy" image that we have with the west. Any negative action from the west would not exceed what they did in 1974/1998. Our economy did not collapse as a result of their outrage.

Tailoring our doctrine to suit the west's taste amounts to subordinating our national interest for some intangible benefits from the west. This is at a time when the west is also involved in subversion of our society through several (albeit nonviolent) means.

Nevertheless, with the apparent slowdown even in ballistic missile testing since the last few UPA years, it appears that the current GoI has brought this snake oil of ``partnership" with the west by dancing to their tunes. It is time they realized that a several dozen operational Agni V's would do far more for our national security than any partnership with the weat or Russia for that matter.

[member_29190]

The moral of the story is what is important is not how completely you can destroy your enemy but how much destruction can you bear yourself, and to what extent can you protect yourself against the destruction (ABM, anti aircraft defence etc.)

I think the question should be will Pak be ready to loose 10 cities?

The people who will make this decision are PA Generals. What can we done to make PA Generals love Pakistan?

They will not let it go waste until the goose lays golden eggs. Paki Abduls eatting grass and funding PA General's kid study in US Universities, we are fine.

[ldev]

The moral of the story is what is important is not how completely you can destroy your enemy but how much destruction can you bear yourself, and to what extent can you protect yourself against the destruction (ABM, anti aircraft defence etc.)

I think the question should be will Pak be ready to loose 10 cities?

The people who will make this decision are PA Generals. What can we done to make PA Generals love Pakistan?

They will not let it go waste until the goose lays golden eggs. Paki Abduls eatting grass and funding PA General's kid study in US Universities, we are fine.

My premise is that Pakistan is not a rational nuclear actor vs India. All other nuclear relations are rational. But in the Pakistani psyche, India occupies a special place of hatred. And so vis a vis India, Pakistan's threshold is different. In comparison the India-China nuclear relationship is subject to rational deterrence.

[member_29190]

My premise is that Pakistan is not a rational nuclear actor vs India. All other nuclear relations are rational. But in the Pakistani psyche, India occupies a special place of hatred. And so vis a vis India, Pakistan's threshold is different. In comparison the India-China nuclear relationship is subject to rational deterrence.

There are quite a few example that could question that assumption. Of course they hate us, but do that hate us so much that they are ready to sacrifice themselves?

Pak supposedly had a device since 1982. They could have tested their device any time after 82 with the purpose of using it. Why did they wait till 98?

Some one in Pak was not even ready to take the consequences of a nuke test. Note just a test, which we were ready to in 98.

[ldev]

^^
Pakistan did not need to test since they were handed over a tested design by China and the HEU alongwith it. Maybe they were given complete devices. They only tested, actually they did not test, what they did was to explode a tested, proofed design as a demonstration to India that India should not feel that it could take liberties with Pakistan after the Indian tests.

Re, Pakistan hate for India. Think about it. What are the chances of a border skirmish with China escalating to a nuclear exchange and what are the chances of a skirmish with Pakistan escalating to a nuclear exchange? Why was India during Kargil so scrupulous in ensuring that it did not cross over into Pakistan including IAF jets conducting air to ground operations?

Whether Pakistan is really irrational or only play acting irrational is an open question. My belief is that they are irrational but only vs India for reasons well known. But what is in no doubt is that various Indian Governments since 1987 at least have believed in that irationality. The last major exercise vis a vis Pakistan was Brasstacks in 1987. There was a belief that India could have gone to war then.

[Amber G.]

AmberG/KLPD, Does TSP have the luxury of fielding the amount of wasteful use of fissile material as required by all those Nasr payloads?
Such low yields are of nature very inefficient use of fissile materials.
Every where one would expect more efficient use of such materials.
Does TSP have such resources?

And if the state fractures what is the security of those payloads?

Ramana - for Pak - the bottle neck is not fissile material. It has quite a lot (both HEU and Pu) but for it more important is still other technology - detonation & delivery apparatus ityadi...For terrorists too, finding fissile material ((Smuggling/buying Pu or even HEU)) is much easier, making a implosion device which works, and delivery vehicles are much bigger challenges. Pak will run out of other things much before it runs out of fissile material.

Just one additional comment regarding if the state fractures and yahoos get access to lot of Pu -- the danger of crude dirty-bomb is much less than many people think.. Mueller wrote a nice article a few years ago analyzing this (he was on Obama's panel to study the technical aspect -post reports of Osama being interested in such technology). Basically the bomb to explode the radioactive material will do most of the damage except for panic value.

[Rishirishi]

1
The one who starts the first wave of "full" strike, will be able to take out a substantial part of the other sides weapons. India can take out most of the airbases as well as many of the missile sites of TSP.

2
It is outright STUPID to attack with a single tactial nuclear wapon, becase the risk of a fullscale attack from the other side is very great. Hence TSP cant really use this option.

3
Pakistan is too weak to fight a convential war with India. It will be slaughtered. Hence they have left with a very difficult choice. Use a tactial weapon and risk total destruction. If they do not they get badly humiliated.

4
Either way TSP loose. But this is very bad for India, as it will bring bad publicity.

5
TSP has made some very hard compromises. 1 It has accepted to fence off the border. 2 Terrorist strikes are down.

India has to assure that TSP dosent get a chance to destroy Indias nuclear infrastructure. TSP army generals may be tempted to a strike. For them the life of the planet is just a testing phase. Their real goal is jannat.

[NRao]

Mueller wrote a nice article a few years ago

Can you post a link for it please? Thx.

[ramana]

AmberG, Thanks, ramana

NRao, Even on BRF we realized this without that much marquee value behind it.
A dirty bum is a radiological issue of clean up and treating people exposed to it.

[NRao]

I cannot recall who it was, but someone had done a study, they chose Seattle as part of it. It was a mess. Wind direction was the main pain. And the "dirty" got into pretty much all buildings in an area of a few blocks.

I a way are we getting desensitized to such events?

[Amber G.]

Mueller wrote a nice article a few years ago

Can you post a link for it please? Thx.

There have been a few good articles. This from MIT technical review is good one. (You may also google, with radiological wepons mueller etc to get some more)
The Dirty Bomb
-- The biggest danger from radiological weapons is the misplaced panic that they would cause.
(I don't know if it requires subscription, so I am pasting few excerpts below)

(By Richard A. Muller )
Terrorists might attack the U.S. homeland again this summer, the Justice Department and the FBI warned last month. The same day, the Department of Energy announced a $450 million plan to counter terrorist nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. And shortly afterwards, the Justice Department released some details about Jose Padilla, the one-time street thug who had received extensive al Qaeda training and had hoped to explode a dirty bomb in the United States.

But according to the Justice Department announcement, al Qaeda had doubted that Padillas proposal to build a dirty bomb was practical. They directed him instead to blow up two apartment buildings using natural gas. They apparently felt that such an action would have a greater chance of spreading death and destruction than would a radiological weapon. { Actually it was reported in one of the declassified reports - that during the deposition Padillas told his interrogators that he was told , “Forget the dirty bomb, rent several apartments in Chicago and explode them with natural gas.” }


Al Qaeda was right. Perhaps that should scare you. Al Qaeda appears to understand the limitations of these devices better than do many government leaders, newspapers, and even many scientists.

Our experience with radiological weapons the fancier name for dirty bombs is limited. They do not require a chain reaction like fission or fusion weapons, but instead use ordinary explosives to spread pre-existing radioactive material. Saddam Hussein reportedly tested such a weapon in 1987, but abandoned the effort when he saw how poorly it worked. In 1995, Chechen rebels buried dynamite and a small amount of the radioactive isotope cesium-137 in Moscows Ismailovsky park. They then told a TV station where to dig it up. Perhaps they recognized the truth: that the bombs news value could be greater if it were discovered before it went off. For such weapons, the psychological impact can be greater than the limited harm they are likely to cause.

I don't mean to suggest that radioactive materials are harmless. Indeed, consider the story of scavengers in Goiania, Brazil, who found and dismantled an abandoned radiotherapy machine in 1987. { or Delhi episode which had a brf dhaga} The machine contained 1,400 curies of cesium-137. (A curie is the radioactivity of one gram of radium.) Two men, one woman, and one child died from acute radiation poisoning; 250 additional people were contaminated. Several of the 41 houses evacuated could not be cleaned adequately and were demolished.

Imagine now if that radiation weren't confined to a few houses, but were spread over the city by an explosion. Wouldn't fatalities be higher? The surprising answer is: No. If the radioactivity were dispersed in that way, larger area would have to be evacuated, yet in all probability no specific deaths could be attributed to the event.

To understand the details, lets walk through the design of a dirty bomb similar to what Padilla wanted to build. Ill assume the same amount of radioactive material as was in Goiania: 1,400 curies of cesium-137. Radiation damage is measured in units called rem, and if you stand one meter from that source, youll absorb 450 rems in less than an hour. Thats called LD50, for lethal dose 50 percent. Untreated, youll have a 50 percent chance of dying in the next few months from that exposure.

To try do enhance the damage, lets use explosives to spread our 1,400 curies over a larger area, say a neighborhood one kilometer square. That will result in a radioactivity of 1.4 millicuries per square meter, and a careful calculation shows that residents will get a dose of 140 rems per year. But radiation illness is nonlinear. For extended exposures, the lethal dose increases by the fourth root of time, to approximately 1,250 rems for a one-year exposure and 2,500 rems for a 16-year exposure. So 140 rems per year is not enough to trigger radiation illness, even if you stayed there 24/7 for a decade. Radioactive contamination may be the one case for which the solution to pollution really is dilution.

There will be no dead bodies at the scene, unless someone is killed by the explosion itself. I suspect thats why al Qaeda instructed Jose Padilla to abandon the dirty bomb concept and try to plan a natural gas explosion instead.

But even a dirty bomb without casualties could spread nuclear panic, based on the danger of long-term cancer. For doses in the 100-rem range, results from historical exposures suggest the increased risk of cancer is about 0.04 percent per rem. Thats a 6 percent increase in your chance of dying from cancer for each year you spend in the square kilometer. If the radioactivity were spread over a larger area, e.g., a 10- by 10-kilometer square, then the dose would be lower (12.6 rems per year) and so would the added risk of cancer: 0.06 percent per year of exposure. (I am assuming, conservatively, that risk is proportional to dose, even at low doses.

With such contamination, would I evacuate my home? Not if I were allowed to stay. To me, the increased riskfrom the pre-existing average risk of cancer of about 20 percent per year to, say, 20.06 percentis not significant.


But I wouldnt be given the choice. The exposure of 12.6 rems per year is 126 times more than the yearly limit allowed to the public. In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency decontamination standard is 0.025 rems per year, meaning that 98 percent of the radioactivity would have to be removed before I would be allowed to return to my home.

In the September 11 attacks, the terrorists took advantage of U.S. policy and prejudices. They knew they didnt need guns to take control because pilots had been instructed to cooperate with hijackers; nobody expected hijackers to turn planes into weapons. Similarly, a terrorist today might use a radiological weapon, not because of its actual damage, but in anticipation the out-of-scale panic and ensuing economic disruption that the weapon could trigger.

Could other radiological attacks be more potent than our hypothesized cesium-137 example? Electrical generators powered by the decay of radioisotopes, found in abandoned lighthouses in Russia, held 400,000 curies of strontium-90. But strontium-90 emits virtually no gamma rays; it is harmful only if you breathe it or ingest it. A cloud of aerosolized Sr-90 can killbut it does not stay in the air for long. For the same reason, even a radiological bomb made using plutonium is unlikely to be dangerous. Anthrax would be deadlier, and much easier to obtain and transport. Nuclear waste storage facilities and nuclear reactors contain vastly more radioactivity, and the danger from them is substantial, if their radioactivity can be released.

If small dirty bombs threaten so little harm, why are they lumped in with true weapons of mass destruction? The reason is: its the law, as written in the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 104-201) and other places, including California penal code 11417. Defining them this way was a mistake that could lead to misallocation of resources and a general overreaction if such weapons were used. I hope, and expect, that most of the $450 million to be spent on the anti-nuclear initiative announced last month will be used to protect us from nuclear explosives and attacks on nuclear storage areas, and not specifically from radiological weapons.

If terrorists do attack this summer using a dirty bomb, the resulting death might come from automobile accidents as people flee. Dirty bombs are not weapons of mass destruction, but weapons of mass disruption. Their success depends on public and government overreaction. Beware not radioactivity but nuclear panic. The main thing we have to fear from a dirty bomb is fear itself.
r

[shiv]

What does GOI do? So, let's say they decide to go per the stated policy of massive retaliation. And let's say they retaliate with all of the 20 kt weapons and 50 of the 200 kt weapons, holding the remaining 50 kt warheads in reserve in case of China. These 70 warheads target the 10 largest Pakistani cities. With the limited number of weapons that both sides possess, neither can go for a counter force strike. So each of these 10 largest Pakistani cities gets hit with about 1 MT each distributed among 5-8 warheads. Given the concentrated nature of the population in the cities in the subcontinent, casualties per MT will be higher than the US studies which assume a much more dispersed and spread out city population in the West/Russia. So let's assume that 50% of the population dies with the blast effect and the others are hit with radiation poisoning. So an immediate casualty figure of 25 million + 80% of the economy destroyed. Pakistan is destroyed as a country, but how many of it's 100 nuclear warheads are destroyed?. Chances are very few if any at all, given that they will be dispersed and hidden to survive just such an Indian strike.

And after absorbing this Indian strike Pakistan decides to retaliate with all of its 100 warheads each with an explosive power of 20 kt. These 100 warheads target the 20 largest Indian cities listed above so an average of 5 warheads per city, some of the larger cities could be targeted with 7-10 warheads, smaller cities with 1-2 warheads. For the sake of simplicity I am assuming that all Pakistani and Indian strikes go through (no intercepts). Each 20 kt warhead hitting a populated city will kill at least 100,000 people immediately given the crowded nature of most cities. So you are looking at about 10 million dead immediately, maybe 20-30 million hit with radiation poisoning and 20 city centers destroyed for all economic purposes. What will be India's economic condition after this exchange? Pakistan will be destroyed, but India's economy will also be virtually destroyed.

My lesson from the above:

Develop and deploy a strong ABM and anti aircraft defence system. If the bulk of the Indian economy and military installations are protected, India will be able to react to Pakistani sponsored terror attacks, confident in the knowledge that should Pakistan escalate to a nuclear exchange, India will be largely protected.

My suggestion for deterrence

Hit the buggers with all we have - laugh loudly and say "Ha Ha you're finished" Then sit and wait for the retaliation and worry about it afterwards. If you are alive.

[shiv]

How many of Pakistan's 100 weapons will India be confident of destroying given such odds? And how much destruction will the remaining weapons cause in India?

No guarantees about this. But if we must nuke them, we must nuke them and not worry about the consequences forwe are nuking them because they need to be nuked to hell. Qaid E Duh

Thinking about what happens after reduces deterrence. Being ready to be dead helps deterrence.

[NRao]

Thinking reduces deterrence.

Discussions reduces deterrence.

The US/Russia may indulge in such things, no need for India to do that.

[member_29190]

^^
Pakistan did not need to test since they were handed over a tested design by China and the HEU alongwith it. Maybe they were given complete devices. They only tested, actually they did not test, what they did was to explode a tested, proofed design as a demonstration to India that India should not feel that it could take liberties with Pakistan after the Indian tests.

Re, Pakistan hate for India. Think about it. What are the chances of a border skirmish with China escalating to a nuclear exchange and what are the chances of a skirmish with Pakistan escalating to a nuclear exchange? Why was India during Kargil so scrupulous in ensuring that it did not cross over into Pakistan including IAF jets conducting air to ground operations?

Whether Pakistan is really irrational or only play acting irrational is an open question. My belief is that they are irrational but only vs India for reasons well known. But what is in no doubt is that various Indian Governments since 1987 at least have believed in that irationality. The last major exercise vis a vis Pakistan was Brasstacks in 1987. There was a belief that India could have gone to war then.

Despite been given a warhead design (CHIC-4), the Pak device fizziled in 98 and that too HEU.They stuffed low grade U235 on some of the devices as they did not want to waste warheads. Pak wants to use PU TNW Missile warhead without testing!

The last major excerise against Pak was 2001 Ops Parakaram. Even Brasstack did not have almost entire Indian Army on battle stations. Looks like IA does not believe in Pak nuke threats. So the prime target of Paki nukes is ready to take the bluff.

If Pakis are absolutely b*** crazy, then we should spread this irrationality. Encourage Pak to built more nukes. Make it a world problem.

I would sit back and watch what Israel does, when Paki nuke subs with irrational Captian is in Persian Gulf . Or reaction of Europeans when PN wants to visit French Riveria.

[member_29190]

This is a wonderful video on the Command & Control Issues of TNW.



Another thing to notice is how intrusive PAL system. It is not just a Access Management, but is designed to disable a nuke !

Didn't the US put PAL on it's "PAL" Pakistan's crown jewels?

[NRao]

This absolutely wild .........................

They (US and europe) pretty much went through the exact discussion in the 50s that we are going through now. Watch:

This is a wonderful video on the Command & Control Issues of TNW.

At around 8:45 the US guys state that the French de gaulle was not sure that the US would retaliate against teh Soviets if Europe was invaded.

That he had this doubt since the US would/could chicken out.

Life gets funnier and funnier.

[member_29190]

There are two more parts to the videos, which show the amount of effort that needs to be put for a nuke missile warhead.

Exploding a device in a test is the easiest part.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lN4TLVgoVYA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtDpLq-9mlk

[Amber G.]

^^^ Nit, thanks for the links.

[NRao]

Need to keep fissile material, not nukes away from extremists: Pak expert

It is important to protect fissile material from extremists in Pakistan more than nuclear bombs because the latter has multi-layer security unlike the former, a senior Pakistani nuclear expert said on Saturday.

Pervez Hoodbhoy, a professor of Physics and Mathematics at Forman Christian College University in Lahore, said there was no need of India and Pakistan to test the nuclear bomb in 1998 as both knew the capacity of the atomic weapon they possessed.

Speaking about the threat of extremists to nuclear warheads in Pakistan, Hoodbhoy said, "Even if Taliban or other extremists organisations can get the weapons, which is not impossible, the nuclear weapons have several locks and passwords. I hope Pakistani weapons too have the Permissible Action Limit (PALs) to ensure the security of weapons.

"But it is the fissile material which should be protected. However, to make a bomb out of it one requires 80-90 kgs of enriched uranium. However, even in this case, it will be very primitive," he said.

Hoodbhoy was delivering a lecture on future of India-Pakistan relations and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit's impact on it. The lecture was organised by Centre for Policy Analysis.

Noting that testing of atomic bomb by any nation is for sending "political messages", he said it could have been avoided.

"India could have avoided testing the (nuclear) bomb. Pakistan too could have avoided not responding to it. It is fairly simple matter to understand the magnitude. The amount of material and purity of material and the core of the uranium bomb. Any PhD Student would have estimated the yield of the bomb.

[member_29325]

It is important to protect fissile material from extremists in Pakistan more than nuclear bombs because the latter has multi-layer security unlike the former, a senior Pakistani nuclear expert said on Saturday.

"Multi-layer" security provided by a bunch of jihadi numbnuts in the paki army is as good as no security, one would think...how long with the US be able to train Pakis in the US and have the guard pakistan's nuclear jewels, if the pakis stop wanting to do that at some point?

Pervez Hoodbhoy seems to have the wrong end of the stick here:- seems to think India tests missiles and nukes as a "political message", just like the pakis do when they run out of goats or blue pills that they require for testing upright missiles.

Noting that testing of atomic bomb by any nation is for sending "political messages", he said it could have been avoided.

"India could have avoided testing the (nuclear) bomb. Pakistan too could have avoided not responding to it. It is fairly simple matter to understand the magnitude. The amount of material and purity of material and the core of the uranium bomb. Any PhD Student would have estimated the yield of the bomb.

[ramana]

He wants to have cake and eat it too. Clinton offered all kinds of inducements and as Pak had already tested bomb if they took it India would be the fall guy. Good of Advani to go belligerent and force Pak testing.

[member_29325]

True, Pakis had to react to "India will conduct hot pursuit into pakistan while chasing terrorists" statement by LKA, once India had tested and pakis had to keep their honor and dignity intact. Even then, India tested to ensure that the CTBT "coming into force even for non signatories" did not reduce its options down the line, while that pakis did so because they were pakis and were seeking parity with India. The sanctions that followed did a lot less damage to India than it did to the pakis, though post-9/11, signing up as a foremost ally in the US's Global Offesive Against Terror (GOAT) reversed all the sanctions put in place in 1998.

[member_26535]

Looks like a another hit job

http://www.newsweek.com/india-pakistan- ... rms-416328

[NRao]

Looks like a another hit job

http://www.newsweek.com/india-pakistan- ... rms-416328

posted a page or two ago.

[NRao]

Pakistan's nuke warheads aimed at deterring India: US report

Washington, Jan 20: Pakistan's nuclear warheads, which are estimated to be between 110-130 are aimed at deterring India from taking military action against it, a latest Congressional report has said. The report also expressed concern that Islamabad's "full spectrum deterrence" doctrine has increased risk of nuclear conflict between the two South Asian neighbours. "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles," Congressional Research Service (CRS) said in its latest report. Pakistan warheads In its 28-page report, the CRS noted that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against it, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal.

CRS is the independent research wing of the US Congress, which prepares periodic reports by eminent experts on a wide range of issues so as to help lawmakers take informed decisions. Reports of CRS are not considered as an official view of the US Congress. "Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal," said the CRS report authored by Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. Moreover, Pakistani and US officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A Q Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials, it said. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programmes, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security, the CRS said. "However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex," the CRS said

[ramana]

BS from US.

[shaun]

Defence Policy: Getting Our Defence Policy Right

by Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) Delhi Edition:January 17, 2016

New global geo-political realignments, rapid technological shift in arms and armed forces' preparedness call for a relook at India's defence policy. India might still be primarily Pakistan-and-China focused, but tomorrow's enemy may not necessarily be the proximate enemy. Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff and former Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, outlines how to prepare for the new adversary.

When 20th century French Premier George Clemenceau said, "War is too important a matter to be left to the generals," he was not disparaging the military, but merely emphasising the political character of war; a thesis mooted by German strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Terming war as 'an instrument of policy', and a 'branch of political activity', Clausewitz placed the onus of responsibility for conduct of war squarely on the politician's shoulders.

The Indian politician, in spite of his strident emphasis on the principle of 'civilian control' over the military, prefers to accord priority to electoral politics. He has, thus, failed to provide strategic guidance to the armed forces and wriggled out of his responsibilities by handing over control to the bureaucracy. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) bureaucracy, unfortunately, consists of itinerant non-specialists who barely begin to grasp complex military issues before they move on to another ministry. The powerful bureaucrats have, however, fought tooth and nail to exclude the military from the MoD, as a consequence of which, India's national security and higher defence management are in disarray.

This overriding preoccupation of our ruling elite with electoral politics is also the reason why India's massive defence budget has rarely been debated in Parliament. A further cause for dismay is the fact that the observations and recommendations of the watchdog, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, are generally rejected or disregarded by the MoD with total impunity.

India is a nuclear weapon state with conventional forces that count among the largest in the world. The 2015/16 defence Budget was $40 billion, and a somewhat lesser amount was probably spent on strategic missiles, nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and on other projects. The home ministry, too, maintains nearly one million-strong central armed police forces to guard the borders and undertake internal security tasks. All found, India possibly spends close to $100 billion on national security annually.
While coercion may not be our style, India has not even been able to leverage its armed might to deter or dissuade any country from undertaking actions inimical to Indian interests. The international community may applaud inaction on Indias part in the face of grave provocations, such as the 2008 Mumbai terror episode, but the Indian taxpayer is entitled to ask whether the annual expenditure of $100 billion is not too heavy a price for merely demonstrating 'strategic restraint'?
A totalitarian China, resolutely surging forward on the back of a burgeoning economy, is now within sight of great-power status. India's unique brand of democracy, on the other hand, continuously throws up impediments to progress on all fronts. The decade of UPA rule saw indecisive leadership, policy-paralysis and economic slowdown with long-term repercussions for national security. The early promise held out by the NDA regime, of visionary and resolute governance has, so far, proved illusory. With a log-jammed Parliament and palpable lack of vision within its ranks, the government seems to have meekly capitulated to a trenchant bureaucracy. This bodes ill for India's national security arena where bold and imaginative leadership is badly needed.

Lest the writer be accused of being alarmist, a brief look at whether India's security environment is in order. The nature of conflict has been changing rapidly and India's national security framework faces threats spread across a much broader spectrum. While the possibility of inter-state conflicts is said to be receding elsewhere, India's two revisionist neighbours, Pakistan and China, continue to stake territorial claims, backed by nuclear intimidation. At the same time, threats from non-traditional sources, such as terrorism, maritime crime as well as health pandemics and natural disasters, continue to pose security challenges. The development of cyber and space warfare capabilities in our neighborhood and the availability of weapons of mass destruction add a menacing dimension to existing threats.

Apart from Pakistan-inspired cross-border terrorism, India faces other threats emanating from non-state entities. Al-Qaeda remains a deadly threat. A far more savage mutation, the ISIS, is now on the rampage in the Middle East and has declared that a cataclysmic battle, the Ghazwa-e-Hind, will soon be fought for control of India and establishment of a Caliphate.
At the grand-strategic level, while a diminished US plays a waiting game, we face Pakistani machinations for domination of Afghanistan, at India's expense, and China's quest for regional hegemony through its one-road-one-belt geo-economic gambit. These challenges promise to become the crucible for testing India's strategic acumen and diplomatic skills. With few cards - economic or military - to play, India would need to employ a skilful hedging strategy and buy a breathing spell while it builds economic and military muscle.
Given such a fragile strategic environment, the NDA government needs to bring sharp focus to bear on national security issues, which have suffered egregious neglect for the past seven decades. The most alarming consequence of this neglect is that India is the world's largest importer of arms and defence hardware. This not only undermines our security but renders all talk of 'strategic autonomy' quite meaningless.
Ironically, India has a vast defence-industrial complex comprising thousands of talented scientists working in a network of sophisticated DRDO laboratories. It is backed by advanced production facilities of the government-owned ordinance factories and defence public sector undertakings (DPSU). Among India's major technological achievements in the military field are nuclear weapons, a family of ballistic missiles and a nuclear-powered submarine. Our shipyards have delivered over a hundred modern warships, with many more, including an aircraft-carrier, under construction.

India's failure to attain self-sufficiency in weapons, despite these achievements, is rooted in three unpalatable realities. One, much of the hardware, claimed as 'indigenous', either uses borrowed foreign technology or is produced under licence; with few inputs by Indian scientists or industry. Two, DRDO scientists have often been over-optimistic in their estimates. Finally, misguided policies have deliberately excluded India's efficient private sector from defence production. Consequently, at the heart of every ship, aircraft, tank or missile produced in India, there are key items that are sourced from abroad, which creates a dangerous dependency for the life-time of the equipment on an unreliable foreign source and also takes away India's option to undertake military actions at a time of its choosing.
The term 'revolution in military affairs' was coined in the 1980s, when radical technologies relating to computers, guided weapons and surveillance emerging in the US promised to become 'killer applications' on the battlefield. Today's world is in the midst of the 'third industrial revolution', enabled by developments in information and communications technology (ICT). India's $100-billion IT industry, continuously throwing up innovations, demonstrates that India has the talent and, in tandem with other emerging technologies, can bring about a revolution in the Indian military.

A few examples of such 'game-changing' or 'disruptive' technologies that Indian scientists should be pursuing are: additive printing (3-D printing) to transform military logistics; autonomous or unmanned combat systems using robotics, artificial intelligence and wireless networks; directed energy weapons using millimetric waves that have huge offensive and defensive capabilities; advanced cyber warfare techniques and nano-technology that will permit tiny military devices with enormous capabilities.
None of the promises held out by the government, so far, whether it is Make in India, FDI in defence production or expeditious clearing of defence acquisition cases, can fructify in anything less than five to 10 years. India's national security structure needs urgent reforms. I list out five things that India needs to do urgently to get 'our defence policy right'.
One, the Indian politician must acquire comprehension of security issues and involve himself directly rather than depending on an ignorant and obdurate bureaucracy.

Two, we must know the destination before we can chart a path to it. In seven decades of Independence, neither the government nor Parlia-ment has considered it necessary to issue a defence white paper, or undertake a strategic defence review. Long-term strategic planning is just not possible in such a vacuum, and the defence budget is spent in an ad-hoc and wasteful manner by individual Services satisfying their hardware 'wish-lists'. There is an urgent need for the government to articulate national aims and interests and to promulgate a national security strategy to attain them. The appropriate and required military capabilities will emerge from this process.
Three, the imperative need for re-structuring of our laggard military-industrial complex must be faced squarely. The 'holy grail' of indigenisation can be attained only if the vast resources of the DRDO and DPSUs are disaggregated and re-cast along the lines of successful models that exist in countries like the UK, Israel or Singapore. A DRDO-centred, incremental approach will not succeed. The Prime Minister needs to reach out to young Indians, like those who shine in Silicon Valley and Google, or those who created Aadhaar, Flipkart and Snapdeal; and mobilise them to undertake cutting-edge defence research.
Four, let us train and equip our defence-bureaucracy for its onerous responsibilities. With defence budgets likely to shrink, in real terms, there is not only a need for prioritising requirements projected by the Services, but also of ensuring every rupee is spent with prudence and probity. This calls for the urgent creation of a cadre, within the MoD, composed of civilian and military officers formally trained in equipment selection, acquisition processes, contract negotiation and contract implementation.
Finally, the current political establishment must show the courage to shed a toxic Congress-era legacy: paranoid suspicion of the armed forces and deliberate whittling down of their status through successive pay commissions. Ironically, by its clumsy handling of the one-rank-one-pension issue, a 'nationalist' BJP government may have outdone the Congress in alienating the military as well as its veteran community.
Whether it is Swachh Bharat, Make in India or Digital India, such dreams can prosper only within the paradigm of a Secure India, guaranteed by a confident and motivated military. A sagacious leadership would grasp this opportunity and boldly implement two of the national security reforms, promised in BJP'S 2014 election manifesto. One is to integrate the armed forces HQ with the MoD and eliminate the friction that delays decision-making and has stalled military modernisation. The other would be to put in place, the most critical component of a 21st century higher defence management structure; a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, thus creating a 'single-point source of military advice', so badly needed, for the political leadership.
India's national security has been endangered on many occasions due to a deep-rooted systemic inability to learn from past mistakes and implement timely corrective measures. Corroboration lies in the fact that every single post-independence military crisis has caught us by surprise. As our neighbourhood gears up for nuclear, cyber, space and integrated all-arms warfare, another Kargil could cost us dear. So, if history is not to repeat itself, it is vital that we get our defence policy right.

http://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/co ... 27493.html