Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 17 Jan 2016 17:41

I said it before,Babudom wants to marginalise the services.The NSG coming under the MHA is more easily to control in an op than the services who would bluntly tell the babus where to get off if they dared to tell them how to fight a war.PKot was not some "police action".It was a suicide mission with heavily armed jihadis akin to commandos/special forces,which needed heavy firepower to neutralise.
That years after 26/11 the NSG "cannot fight at night" because they do not possess the desired eqpt. is a scathing indictment on the ministry and babus responsible for the same.They should be an investigation/inquiry as to how and why the NSG has been denied this vital eqpt.

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 17:59

^^

I think everyone understands that the civilian bureaucrat lobby has been working to marginalize and downgrade the Armed Forces ever since the Independence. What's unfortunate is the fact that a supposedly nationalistic government has allowed the civilian bureaucrat lobby to call the roost yet again.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 18:20

SRoy wrote:^^I also don't buy the argument that NSG was sent to handle a hostage situation.
What does that mean if we take a simplistic analogy? Garuds are not good enough to rescue our drowned pilots captured by enemy? IA SF are not good enough to rescue some senior ranks held up as POW somewhere behind the enemy lines?

NSG has specialized folks for hostage negotiation and several other tasks. The SF don't.
NSG was created for HRT functions. SF is trained to kill, operate behind enemy lines, do another bunch of tasks first and foremost, there was a crucial difference in way both units were tasked. Post 26/11, common taskings were done to alleviate the obvious issue of NSG travel time, # of targets etc. But ideally, NSG should be the first responders or the primary ones (if available).

Next, all this turf war rubbish being gleefully created by a MSM.

The fact is NSG was created to avoid a replication of Blue Star, where an IA is asked to attack a shrine belonging to a certain group which contributed a sizeable proportion of its own soldiers and hence suffered blowback - desertions and even assassination of its own COAS (Gen Vaidya).

The NSG was created to insulate IA from such contentious decisions of internal policing and IA was happy with it.

There is a recurring theme unfortunately in all of many of these rtd folks articles which ignores the context entirely.

NSG not having equipment etc is due to the convoluted nature of the IA-NSG RFP process.

Are the IA units choc a bloc with kit??

I just posted a report which noted that IA-MOD are still engaged in an exercise from October 2013 (a year plus already) to decide the revised scales for NVGs in IA.

IA TI issue for T-90s is not fixed yet. IA went and purchased T-90S's as their frontline MBT with K-5 ERA. Guess what US did? They gave Pakistan ~2800 TOW-2As.

Point is the flaw with NSG is as systemic as those with IA. MOD disinterest, corruption, fancy GSQRs and then asking for moon and endless trials. Add UPA corruption and laziness plus penny pinching for defense and there is no surprise all these issues occur.

Most of these trials wagehra would be by IA folks deputed to NSG BTW.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 18:26

SRoy wrote:^^

I think everyone understands that the civilian bureaucrat lobby has been working to marginalize and downgrade the Armed Forces ever since the Independence. What's unfortunate is the fact that a supposedly nationalistic government has allowed the civilian bureaucrat lobby to call the roost yet again.

NSG creation was no "marginalize and downgrade" the Armed Forces sort of issue and no, its not the job of any nationalistic govt to fall prey to such CT too. It was plain and simple common sense replicating the nature of WW HRT teams.

US: FBI- HRT
Germany: GSG-9
France: GIGN

In short, the babus would take the blame if another Golden Temple sort of op occurred, not the IA which was loudly berated, and cursed for Blue Star.

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 18:35

^^

Op Bluestar is three decades old, training and tactics have evolved a lot since then. More about it later.

The argument that NSG was created for HRT role and hence they alone should call the shots in AFS Pathankot like situation is a very weak argument.

One, there is no hard and fast logic that prevents any of the 3 SFs to be trained for HRT role undertaking ops inside military facilities.

Two, in wars either there won't any NSG for rescue operations or they will act under the Army's command and control (as so all CPFs during such times). So, no turf wars there.

>>

Back to Op Bluestar. Retired Generals wouldn't be cribbing so much if it were another Op Bluestar (or shrine of you choice).

Not good for morale building.

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 18:41

Karan,

I'm not arguing about the kitting part.

The issue is about too much civilian interference, which is detested by everyone across rank and file.

About the "marginalize and downgrade" part, it is broader issue. I don't how terms like "CT" come here. If it were CT then vets would not have been returning medals over OROP issue.

Your remark on "internal policing" ... tell you what ... hypothetically if had it been RR or Assam Rifles (although they report to MHA) then the Generals would not have been cribbing at all.

Servicemen don't like policemen, don't trust them and least of all like to take orders from them.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 18:57

SRoy wrote:^^

Op Bluestar is three decades old, training and tactics have evolved a lot since then. More about it later.

Blue Star may be 3 decades old. The concerns remain. A secular army is always concerned of being called into ANY contentious civil unrest situation with good reason.

A few years back we had a huge uproar in Rajasthan by one group for reservations. Sends people to IA.

A few months back another motivated joker tried to make it a war between his community and Gujarat state.

The argument that NSG was created for HRT role and hence they alone should call the shots in AFS Pathankot like situation is a very weak argument.

You should have made that statement to the COAS when he along with the CCS discussed the NSG deployment and decided on their deployment.

We have to either trust their competence or look at evidence that IA SF was better for the task of HRT in AFS Pathankot especially when both leaders of NSG ops were previously from the area, ex IA and knew the area well. There are also concerns about the number of people involved from the SF side for such a role. More below.

One, there is no hard and fast logic that prevents any of the 3 SFs to be trained for HRT role undertaking ops inside military facilities.

Boss, this is the kind of media driven quarterbacking that is pointless.

Question is HAVE THEY? Have they trained for this inside Pathankot? Given the directionless slog we have seen over the past decade, I would not be surprised if IA SF was as "new" to the op as NSG was, and quite frankly, IA SF has to be far more than just HRT in terms of its competency and specialization.

NSG maintains the entire SAG (~600 soldiers) purely trained for HRT ops alone. There were some 1000 families inside the AFS per reports.

How many would one SF unit dedicate to this single task. I wouldn't be surprised if the current training/SOP for SF /NSG drills actually mandates that nearest SF units are first responders, stabilize the situation but hunt & destroy ops are still the realm of the larger NSG which is single tasked for this purpose and drills for this one task, day in and night out.

IA deputee to NSG BTW noted he fired more rounds in NSG active status than during his entire IA career till date. Things may have changed for IA SF after that. But IA SF has many more tasks than the HRT function for which NSG is super specialized.

Two, in wars either there won't any NSG for rescue operations or they will act under the Army's command and control (as so all CPFs during such times). So, no turf wars there.

In wars, the terrorists PR battle and their concerns are not an issue either.

Back to Op Bluestar. Retired Generals wouldn't be cribbing so much if it were another Op Bluestar (or shrine of you choice).

Not good for morale building.

Some Rtd Generals would be cribbing about anything since they have made a habit out of being voluble and non stop running down of sister services and occasionally even their own peers.

While some concerns are warranted, the non stop breast beating in public on dicey reports gets tiresome.

The latest media report on "NSG weakness" for instance does not even get the name of the DSC soldier who grappled with the terrorist and killed him, right.

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 19:03

^^

Please understand the root cause - Armed Forces don't welcome civilians in their own turf - media tomfoolery notwithstanding.

This is not going away, so the political leadership should be savvy with stakeholder management.

Sister services rivalry is outside the scope of this thread, so lets keep it out.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 19:04

SRoy wrote:Karan,

I'm not arguing about the kitting part.

The issue is about too much civilian interference, which is detested by everyone across rank and file.

About the "marginalize and downgrade" part, it is broader issue. I don't how terms like "CT" come here. If it were CT then vets would not have been returning medals over OROP issue.

Your remark on "internal policing" ... tell you what ... hypothetically if had it been RR or Assam Rifles (although they report to MHA) then the Generals would not have been cribbing at all.

Servicemen don't like policemen, don't trust them and least of all like to take orders from them.

Similarly, I don't know how valid points were being dismissed as "weak arguments" without even considering the deeper training, doctrinal issues.

Now we have got that out of the way, if the servicemen don't like policemen and don't trust them & not take orders from them, then that's the crux of the issue and they should be honest enough to admit that.

Right now, what we have is finger pointing at NSG (Staffed by IA) merely because they come under the "police/HM" side and a lot of jarnails jumping to a conclusion that hence automatically NSG were not upto the task, whereas "their boys", the IA SF would have managed everything diddly quick.

Similar chaps were busy doing similar stuff in 26/11 as well. The NSG ops there had multiple IA types - including a GOC come into the Ops place - announce with grandeur and bravura, now all will be well & then attempt to pressure the IA deputed NSG commandos who were actually fighting.

Unfortunately, this petty bickering is senseless and damages national interests.

By all means they should provide some positive points:

Joint training, drills etc & try to meet/discuss with their NSG deputed counterparts.

Unfortunately though, many engage in sniping post event running down the achievement of their own peers, which is the sad part.

d_berwal · Post by **d_berwal** » 17 Jan 2016 19:06

my viewpoint, must watch for this thread
"The three myths of terrorism"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9IaKWWVW6Y

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 19:08

SRoy wrote:^^

Please understand the root cause - Armed Forces don't welcome civilians in their own turf - media tomfoolery notwithstanding.

This is not going away, so the political leadership should be savvy with stakeholder management.

To what extent? If the NSA meets the COAS and the other chiefs and its agreed to send the NSG in, what else is he supposed to do? He has to trust these very people and it seems even after these chaps all agree, there are enough motivated sorts who rush to the MSM at the first instance and use it to second guess the executive and even their own existing hierarchy!

You were stating the "nationalist Govt" should do better. Well, if they speak to the folks and make the decisions, they are darned. If SF was deployed and turned out to be too few to sanitize 1000+ families, then what? They'd be cursed again.

This is the difference the "nationalist Govt" made in this case. Compared to 26/11.

The Black Cats created a forensic account of every minute wasted and submitted it to the Home Ministry. It is an astonishing document that still makes soldiers angry and details how a combined task force was unofficially mobilized at 10:05 pm on Wed, 26 Nov 2008, just 22 min after the first shots were fired in Leopolds. By 10:30 pm, the Black Cats were ready to deploy to the technical area at Palam, but it would take another 70 min for the Cabinet Sec, the highest civil servant in the land, to contact the NSG Chief Dutt, warning of a mobilization without giving the go ahead, or revealing the transport arrangements.

At 00:12, the Joint Sec(Pol) called the NSG also warning the mobilization was likely, without giving the green light..
...and it goes on to say the NSG finally left at 2:30 am. And in between another cause of delay, detour to pick up the Home Secretary from the residence.

The difference in speed of response speaks for itself.

Sister services rivalry is outside the scope of this thread, so lets keep it out.

Its no different. If a select few "political" IA jarnails can take potshots at poorly trained Garuds (who aren't), rag tag DSC, it just shows the depth to which this point scoring has got.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 17 Jan 2016 19:10

SRoy wrote:hypothetically if had it been RR or Assam Rifles (although they report to MHA) then the Generals would not have been cribbing at all.

Thought RR and AR are only funded through MHA budget but do not report to MHA?

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 19:13

Karan agreed on the media bias towards NSG fed by some vets.

NSG seems to getting the flak due to the shadow boxing.

Did you see the joint drill part? Exactly the PR fire fight to put down any hint of military civilian friction.

Sorry, no General would admit in open that the real issue is taking orders from policemen. NSA being ex cop has just amplified the issue.

Off topic, this runs across rank and file. Just ask a Sepoy or a Major what does he thinks about his police counterpart. This goes all the way up, reinforced by general police behaviour everyday.

d_berwal · Post by **d_berwal** » 17 Jan 2016 19:17

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZ-IBRGfJyY

To Understand NSG 26/11 must watch... video... the 2 video's give enough perspective to normal humans to stop bashing IA/ NSG and GOI

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 19:21

ShauryaT wrote:
SRoy wrote:hypothetically if had it been RR or Assam Rifles (although they report to MHA) then the Generals would not have been cribbing at all.
Thought RR and AR are only funded through MHA budget but do not report to MHA?

Assam Rifles report to MHA.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 19:29

SRoy wrote:Karan agreed on the media bias towards NSG fed by some vets.

NSG seems to getting the flak due to the shadow boxing.

Did you see the joint drill part? Exactly the PR fire fight to put down any hint of military civilian friction.

Sorry, no General would admit in open that the real issue is taking orders from policemen. NSA being ex cop has just amplified the issue.

Off topic, this runs across rank and file. Just ask a Sepoy or a Major what does he thinks about his police counterpart. This goes all the way up, reinforced by general police behaviour everyday.

I understand the distrust and I don't blame them. We just learnt what went on with the BSF.

But what is the Govt to do then? Roll up the NSG function into the IA? That has serious political ramifications though organizationally it'd simplify things.

Or replace the IPS head with an IA guy? Seems like pointless empire building, but perhaps move NSG from MHA to MOD and have it led by an IA chain through and through like RR but funded by MHA, notionally a paramil org.

Joint drills yes, but I wonder whether that (though operationally very required), will still stop all the media led motivated babble.

Ultimately, the issue is more of being defensive in our own territory, but leaving that aside, the squabbling between our own people is so unseemly.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 17 Jan 2016 19:36

NS finally admitting that the ball is in their court now and he has just found it

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 17 Jan 2016 19:47

and this only adds to the confusion

CNN-IBN NewsVerified account
‏@ibnlive
Army Chief on #PathankotAttack: It was under the command of army commander who was monitoring Pathankot ops on my behalf
RETWEETS 7 LIKES 6

10:56 PM - 12 Jan 2016

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 19:54

chetak wrote:and this only adds to the confusion

CNN-IBN NewsVerified account
‏@ibnlive
Army Chief on #PathankotAttack: It was under the command of army commander who was monitoring Pathankot ops on my behalf
RETWEETS 7 LIKES 6

10:56 PM - 12 Jan 2016

Why the need for such clarifications? Who is the audience? A lay civilian with no understanding of C&C issues? Biased media who will never come around, no matter what?

The tweet is targeted towards the rank and file.

People should just join the dots to understand from where retired generals are coming from.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2016 20:08

d_berwal wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZ-IBRGfJyY

To Understand NSG 26/11 must watch... video... the 2 video's give enough perspective to normal humans to stop bashing IA/ NSG and GOI

Brilliant. Thanks for posting this.

I'd request everyone to see this video.

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 17 Jan 2016 20:15

Pathankot airbase attack brings spotlight on IAF Garud commandos force

The role of elite Garud commandos of the Indian Air Force has come in sharp focus in the wake of the terror attack on Pathankot airbase, which left seven security personnel dead, including one Garud.

Corporal Gursevak Singh, a Garud commando, laid down his life on the line of duty while battling with six heavily armed terrorists on Jan 2.

"Garuds are specially trained to be a Quick Reaction Force at important IAF bases, protect IAF high value assets, conduct search and rescue during the peace and war, and undertake counter-terrorism tasks and special missions," said an IAF official, explaining Garund's mandate.

The Garuds (Special Forces of the IAF) were formed in 2003 towards providing specific in-house role capabilities to the IAF.

The initial Garuds,over 1000 of them were trained in Commando Courses with the Indian Army, Indian Navy, ITBP, NSG and Special Frontier Force, imbibing best capabilities by their varied exposure.

These Garuds were deployed in the Kashmir Valley for direct on-the-job exposure as well. Having built on the experience gained over the last 12 years, Garuds are now trained in-house by the IAF at the Garud Regimental Training Centre.

Garuds are regularly tasked to assist civil authorities for disaster relief operations during calamities. They have been effectively employed in Indian missions in support of the UN and during extrication of Indian nationals from war zones.

Small batches of Garuds are also trained for specialist roles with other Services and Para-Military organizations. This special force of the IAF has participated in exercises with foreign special forces and was given a good account of their training and capabilities.

With their exposure to the best special force capabilities on land, at sea and in air, the Garuds are a valuable force multiplier in all kinds of combat and counter terrorism operations and are always a much- sought asset in difficult situations.

After attempts by terrorists to attack air bases in Jammu and Kashmir in 2001, top brass of the IAF had mooted an idea of raising a specialized force to protect their installations.

The initial plans called for a specialized force with 2000 commandos. The Union Government approved a proposal to raise a 1080 strong force on the lines of the Para commandos of the army and MARCOS of the Indian Navy.

The first batch of Garuds came into existence in Feb 2004 when 62 Commandos completed their training.

The Garuds were presented first time before the public when they participated during the Air Force Day celebrations in the national capital on October 8, 2004.More UNI MK ADG 1200

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Jan 2016 21:48

Philip and SRoy, I do agree that babus vs military has long history.

However I submit that was not there in PAFB.

PAFB shows need to get over the past or we will get nuked by non state actors.

And still fight turf battles.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 17 Jan 2016 21:53

Pathankot attack was the moment of reckoning for the Garuds - it was raised to meet precisely this scenario. In those few minutes, had commandos Gurusewak and Gaur killed those jehadis, the force would be heralded by all. But this is war and luck was not on their side.

Having said that, the fact that Garuds were avaialble on site and made the first contact to me itself is commendable.

PC Katoch: However, the then IG (operations) NSG conveyed to him that should the Male airfield be occupied by the coup d'état forces, our aircraft would turn back and that, therefore, it would be better to allot the task to the army’s parachute brigade, which can deploy troopers if required. There was no one-upmanship.

Titbit: NSG contingent did take off in a ARC An-12 but was never deployed.

uring the hijack of IC-184 and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the MHA was blissfully unaware that one special group (on army deputation) was fully trained in anti-hijack and counter terrorism and had their own aircraft, unlike NSG deployments, which are invariably delayed because of lack of aircraft.

I think the obsessive secrecy is to blame for this. The public at large and specifically bureaucracy need to know Special Group exists and they are the "go to" team for X tasks. What is the point of SG training in HRT if nobody even f*in knows they exist?

The alphabet soup of special forces will continue to present this dilemma in future as well as the situations on ground can have infinite permutations and every time we end up wondering who is responsible for what. We have seen this before in Kargil (viz Intelligence agencies) and 26/11 (viz coastal security).

I think prompt creation of the Special Operations Division and CDS will mitigate this issue to an extent.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 17 Jan 2016 21:56

many careers <poof>

nothing like military justice, swift and impartial, mostly.

Jugal R Purohit ‏@jrpur Jan 16

#Breaking: IAF staff, including seniors @ #Pathankot, to face the music. Sources reveal MoD's assessment shows the force in a poor light.

7 retweets 3 likes

Rajput · Post by **Rajput** » 17 Jan 2016 22:10

Faced with a coup d'état in 1998, when Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom asked for Indian assistance, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted the NSG to be launched.

I hate to break it to the good general, but Rajiv Gandhi was long gone by 1998.

One of the things that bothers me about many Indians is that everyone thinks they can do a job better than the person doing it. I have lived in 5 other countries since leaving India, and never seen such prevalence of this attitude anywhere else.

When an incident like Pathankot happens, all of these voices appear out of nowhere, criticizing the doers from any angle they can find. The goal is to criticize; so it doesn't really matter what the details are. When the SF struck inside Burma after th AR ambush, the criticism was "why did we violate the IB with Burma?", of all things. (And there were others too, but I deleted them from memory for my own sanity). More importantly, these same people who are criticizing today don't bother to offer up support or a pat on the back.

I don't want to go through the General's points (and with all due respect), but points like

a journalist rang up army headquarters to ascertain the ground situation in the IAF base. He was told that he should ring up the Ministry of Home Affairs which controlled the operation through the NSG.

make absolutely no sense. Maybe this AHQ person did not want to talk. Maybe he was tired of taking questions from random journalists. Maybe he didn't himself know. It could be anything. And yet we're taking some 3rd party conversation as the gospel truth. SMH...

• Are Garuds tasked and trained for such tasks? What was the need to put them on the frontline, holding back special sorces present in the base?

Maybe because the Garuds, being local to the base, were very familiar with it? I'm sure the good General has seen enough ****** to know that in such situations, having knowledge of the terrain and layout is invaluable.

He does make good points about the command structure, and the MoD bureaucracy is legendary and needs fixing.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 17 Jan 2016 22:11

Karan M wrote:
d_berwal wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZ-IBRGfJyY
To Understand NSG 26/11 must watch... video... the 2 video's give enough perspective to normal humans to stop bashing IA/ NSG and GOI
Brilliant. Thanks for posting this.
I'd request everyone to see this video.

Thanks for the pointer. Learned something that I need to deploy coming Tuesday for a corporate-combat scenario. I'll use this strategy.

There is another ?CT? going on that the attack on PKot was ChIA seeded to enable few other strategic counter-defense initiatives for the massan non-strategic/tactical mindsets.

KLNMurthy · Post by **KLNMurthy** » 17 Jan 2016 22:23

d_berwal wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZ-IBRGfJyY

To Understand NSG 26/11 must watch... video... the 2 video's give enough perspective to normal humans to stop bashing IA/ NSG and GOI

Excellent.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 17 Jan 2016 23:02

Rajput wrote:
One of the things that bothers me about many Indians is that everyone thinks they can do a job better than the person doing it. I have lived in 5 other countries since leaving India, and never seen such prevalence of this attitude anywhere else.

When an incident like Pathankot happens, all of these voices appear out of nowhere, criticizing the doers from any angle they can find. The goal is to criticize; so it doesn't really matter what the details are. When the SF struck inside Burma after th AR ambush, the criticism was "why did we violate the IB with Burma?", of all things. (And there were others too, but I deleted them from memory for my own sanity). More importantly, these same people who are criticizing today don't bother to offer up support or a pat on the back.

I don't want to go through the General's points (and with all due respect),

Mental subversion
Indian media and the leftist critical anti govt attitude built over 40 years has resulted in Indians questioning all such actions esp national security. This brings in negative attitude and inward view of the society instead of looking at the broader picture.
They dont see the forest when looking at the tree

Sagarika Ghosh is a classic example where her statement is supporting Pak state

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 17 Jan 2016 23:07

REVAMP NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD

REVAMP NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD
Monday, 18 January 2016 | Deepak Sinha | in Oped

The NSG’s performance has been marred by flaws and controversies. Rather than lack of expertise, it is the lack of understanding of its potential and capabilities, even among its own leaders, that has led to its shoddy employment

The last two counter-terror operations conducted by the National Security Guard, at Mumbai during 26/11 and the recent one at Pathankot, have been marred by serious flaws and controversies. Rather than lack of expertise, though that aspect requires examination, it has been the utter lack of understanding of its potential and capabilities, even within its own senior hierarchy, that has led to its shoddy employment.

The NSG was established in 1986 under the NSG Act (Act 47 of 1986) and is tasked with handling counter-terrorism, anti-kidnapping, anti-sabotage, anti-hijacking and hostage rescue. Interestingly, VIP protection is not within its charter, though that has become its main focus over the years, as it gives added perks to all concerned within the organisation because of direct access to influential people. This has had a debilitating impact on the organisation.

The NSG was a unique and unusual attempt at establishing a specialised force by utilising personnel on deputation from the Army and the Central Armed Police Forces/Central Police Organisations, both with distinctly differing standards of training, discipline, ethics, culture and ethos. Synergy was attempted by keeping its assault elements and their technical and logistic support, the Special Action Groups, Bomb Disposal Teams, Communications and Transportation, completely within the ambit of the Army.

The Special Ranger Groups, manned by personnel from the CAPF and CPO, are responsible for isolation and security of the target area where the SAG would carry out intervention operations so as to ensure no terrorist can either escape from or attempt to get into the area. It is the SRGs that informally provide personnel for VIP protection.

The NSG Headquarters and the Academy are manned by a mix of personnel from all the forces. Aspects pertaining to training and operations are the domain of Army personnel while budgeting and logistics are dealt with by personnel from the CPO/CAPF. The organisation is headed by Director General belonging to the IPS supported by an Inspector General (Operations) from the Army. The Army was required to provide manpower for only a limited period till the CPO/CAPF were able to train sufficient manpower to relieve them. This, however, has not happened till date.

While differing cultural and professional outlooks create their own set of problems, it is the fact that the DG is a Police Officer with limited practical experience in handling counter- terror or irregular warfare operations that is the biggest drawback, since he is no position to provide the Government with specialist advice. The NSG’s inept employment at Pathankot is a perfect example of this aspect. These are institutional issues which can be overcome by modifying organisational hierarchy, but over the years there has been a quantum change in how terrorists operate.

While there may be occasions when they will continue to take hostages with the aim of getting their own people in exchange as was the case during the hijacking of IC814, most terrorist actions aim at causing maximum damage and casualties, as 26/11 and numerous other actions over the years, the world over, have shown. Thus the utility of a centrally-located counter-terror force specialised in anti- hostage/hijacking/ kidnapping tasks is questionable, though maintaining such a capability is certainly still required.

On the other hand, it has become critical to have quick reaction forces. This requires emphasis on speed of reaction rather than numbers or the quality of the first responders, though they certainly need to be better trained and armed than local police. Here local Special Weapons and Tactics Squads can play a crucial role.

This calls for a complete revaluation of the NSG and a elook at our counter-terror strategy and doctrine. With the reported decision to establish a tri-services Special Operations Command, it may be the opportune moment to place the SAGs and their support and logistics element directly under this command. This element could be retained to carry out specialised intervention operations when necessary, though its quantum could be reduced while its reaction capabilities could be speeded up with air transport. The US and the UK have such forces as integral elements of their military.

The NSG could then be given the responsibility of training and handling all VIP protection and SWAT elements throughout the country. This will require an increase in the number of SRGs which can coordinate with police forces. It will ensure that a single entity is responsible for responding to any terrorist attack. It will also ensure standardised training, tactics, organisational and equipment profiles and also help in ensuring centralised procurement of specialised weapons and equipment — a major problem at the present time.

(The author is a military veteran and consultant with the Observer Research Foundation)

SRoy · Post by **SRoy** » 17 Jan 2016 23:15

chetak wrote:REVAMP NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD

REVAMP NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD
Monday, 18 January 2016 | Deepak Sinha | in Oped

This calls for a complete revaluation of the NSG and a elook at our counter-terror strategy and doctrine. With the reported decision to establish a tri-services Special Operations Command, it may be the opportune moment to place the SAGs and their support and logistics element directly under this command. This element could be retained to carry out specialised intervention operations when necessary, though its quantum could be reduced while its reaction capabilities could be speeded up with air transport. The US and the UK have such forces as integral elements of their military.

The NSG could then be given the responsibility of training and handling all VIP protection and SWAT elements throughout the country. This will require an increase in the number of SRGs which can coordinate with police forces. It will ensure that a single entity is responsible for responding to any terrorist attack. It will also ensure standardised training, tactics, organisational and equipment profiles and also help in ensuring centralised procurement of specialised weapons and equipment — a major problem at the present time.

(The author is a military veteran and consultant with the Observer Research Foundation)

What he is saying in other words ... separate the Army and the Police components and keep the Police components for NSG. Leave the rest to us.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 Jan 2016 06:39

d_berwal wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZ-IBRGfJyY

To Understand NSG 26/11 must watch... video... the 2 video's give enough perspective to normal humans to stop bashing IA/ NSG and GOI

This needs to be visible on the forum

Sid · Post by **Sid** » 18 Jan 2016 07:19

^^^
Excellent speech. Should be pinned to BR main site. All naysayers should watch it.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 18 Jan 2016 21:13

India Today: The blunders of Pathankot

Shameek · Post by **Shameek** » 18 Jan 2016 22:44

There is no end to this fault finding is there? We just cannot focus on the positives of the operation and leave the introspection to be done by the forces involved. I'm sure the NSG and Garuds are the best judges of the reasons behind their loss. Let them deal with it as they see fit. It's not like they are sitting around scratching their heads and looking for media suggestions on how to improve. Why don't we interview the people who won the day for us and ask them how proud they felt when the last terrorist was killed? Or why not ensure that the families of those killed are being taken care of?
I hate comparing to the US, but after the OBL mission, imagine the headlines being 'Secret helicopter parts left behind in biggest blunder by elite SEALs'

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Jan 2016 23:33

Austin wrote:India Today: The blunders of Pathankot

One of the most pathetic pieces of journalism I have seen.

I hoped since its written SandeepU I would learn something insightful..Its a litany of rants from Col. Blimps who would have won it all by themselves with pop guns and josh.

More over they would have used the four divisions and flattened PAFB. What advice!!!
How did they graduate to command positions?

And the "rag-tag" tag is still being said to DSC who had killed one of the terrorists right at the beginning of the attack!!

I guess paid hacks have no shame. And worse their informers.

Also why do they call them as fidayeen when they are plain old suicide terrorists. Like forlorn hope.

And the authors dare to teach bomb disposal to an officer who by his chief's statement had handled 3500 kg of explosives.

Shameek · Post by **Shameek** » 19 Jan 2016 00:14

^^ That article even takes a dig at the 26/11 operations using general rants about lack of coordination that are not true since all the named forces did not operate simultaneously. Their solution is of course simple: Appoint one person to lead them all. How dumb are our armed forces that they could not think of that!
I had some respect for Mr. Sandeep U after reading his book but this is deplorable.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 19 Jan 2016 01:29

A terror strike, a misdirected debate

Written by Abhinav Kumar
The writer is a serving IPS officer. Views are personal.
Updated: Jan 13, 2016, 0:17

Going by this viewpoint, the army is the sole repository of competence and commitment in anti-terror operations in the country.

In any democracy, a healthy debate on security issues is not merely expected, but is an imperative for successful policymaking and implementation. However, reactions to the recently concluded Pathankot operation, especially from a section of the Indian army, suggest that in the name of debate, we are seeing an unscrupulous propagation of turf interests and institutional egos in the shoddiest possible manner.

Lieutenant General (retired) H.S. Panag, writing in The Indian Express (‘Pathankot attack: A terror strike, some hard truths’, January 11), has based his criticism of the Pathankot operation on half truths, skilfully blended with outright speculation and typical fauji bluster. It is entirely in line with recent trends by retired army officers to bulldoze public opinion on any issue, including Orop, by questioning the patriotism and, at other times, the professionalism of those opposed to their views. Going by this viewpoint, the army is the sole repository of competence and commitment in anti-terror operations in the country. All other institutions, especially the police and the paramilitary, must recognise this “fact”, even if this “fact” flies in the face of the history of anti-terror operations in India.

Criticism of the Pathankot operation is based on two arguments. First, there was credible actionable intelligence about the attack on the airbase. Second, the airbase commander and his superiors in the Indian Air Force and in the government of India made an error of judgement in not relying on local army assets and calling for the National Security Guard (NSG) instead.

Dealing with the second issue first, according to Panag, placing armed forces troops under the command of the NSG has an “adverse effect on morale”. I guess concern for the morale of the army, as defined by its retired generals, should take precedence over the security of our national assets and the safety of our citizens. God help us if this dictum was to become the foundation of our national security policy.

One would expect Panag to be aware that the IG operations of the NSG is himself a serving major general of the Indian army. Why the morale of the army should be lowered by this arrangement is baffling to say the least. Or, is it Panag’s case that the army sends substandard officers on deputation to an organisation such as the NSG that is of such vital importance to the country? If that is the case, perhaps there needs to be an external audit of the HR practices of the Indian army.

According to Panag, a unified command, headed naturally by an army officer, is the panacea for all anti-terror situations. Does the Indian army readily share its standard operating procedure (SOP) on anti-terror operations and vital installation security with other agencies? How frequently do the units of the Indian army carry out mock drills with other agencies to test these SOPs? The answer is very little. Having served as police chief of Haridwar and Dehradun, two districts with a substantial presence of the armed forces, I can categorically state that this is not the case. Other than units that are specifically earmarked for counter-insurgency operations, the Indian army is an extremely rigid institution to deal with fast-emerging anti-terrorist situations that call for speed and flexibility and inter-operability with other agencies. The NSG is an agency where the armed forces, paramilitary and police officers work together and train together — precisely for such exigencies.

For army officers, both serving and retired, to question the wisdom of deploying the NSG in the Pathankot operation is institutional cussedness and myopia of the worst kind. Also, as the successful experience of Punjab militancy and anti-Naxal operations suggest, there is no substitute for a well-equipped and well-motivated police force in tackling both counter-insurgency and individual terror operations. The contrasting experiences of Operation Bluestar and Operation Black Thunder are a case in point. The gung ho military approach often may be a cure worse than
the disease.

Coming to the issue of advance warning, the role of SP Gurdaspur is under investigation, and quite rightly so. Unless Panag is privy to information that the rest of us are not, it is extremely irresponsible on his part to allege that there was specific credible warning of the attack. The Indian army itself has faced attacks on its bases in recent times, such as the 2002 attack on Kaluchak, which have taken it by surprise initially and then a similar timeframe was required to isolate and neutralise the terrorists, as was done in the Pathankot operation. Institutional memory is short in our country and practically non-existent when it comes to examining one’s own failings.

Of late, morale has become a catch-all phrase for our generals. It is a measure of how out-of-date some of our soldiers are, that an operation that showcased cooperation in the best possible manner between the armed forces and civilian agencies, that resulted in limited casualties and no loss of strategic assets, is being decried by them as a failure because they didn’t get an exclusive opportunity to strut their stuff. Surely, the armed forces are not that short of real enemies so as to create and tilt at windmills.

The author is a serving IPS officer.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 19 Jan 2016 03:04

ramana ji, some of the weapon details that you had asked for earlier...

shown below are some of the weapons carried by the pigs in their Pathankot attack.

checkout the two AK-47s with silencers (??) fitted on them. are these normal, for such jehadi ops?? the jehadis seemed to prefer night engagement

did these two weapons belong to the first group of two who snuck in much earlier to the second group of four?? if so, what was their exact role in the strike??

that UBGL is pretty crude looking, is it standard issue?? or some peshawari gunsmith's innovation or is it the "mortar" like contraption that was being talked about??

sum · Post by **sum** » 19 Jan 2016 03:26

I hate comparing to the US, but after the OBL mission, imagine the headlines being 'Secret helicopter parts left behind in biggest blunder by elite SEALs'

+1...

Our DDM and folks in general( even retd/serving defence folks) do not seem to understand the meaning of "freedom of expression" and really overdo everything

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Jan 2016 03:47

chetak, Great catch. So what type of rounds were found: 51 mm or 40 mm. Former would be the 2" mortar round. I got the impression mortar recoil is horrendous.

Could be a jugad to fire 40mm grenades from an AK-47.

Also the two later terrorists were supposed to have melted as the explosives cooked off. Would their weapons survive that process?