Russian Weapons & Military Technology

[Karan M]

Good stuff. So the IAFs ask for a 75% serviceability from the much newer Su-30 MKI was reasonable. So far, highest publicly known number (from 2014) has been 59%.
If the MiG-29K numbers are actually detailed, the Su-30 MKI will appear to be much better in comparison. However, MKI numbers are likely to rise, given the effort being put in making the fleet fully ready.

[Austin]

What is the yardstick of comparison? What is the availibility of Mirage 2000 fleet?

Check serviceability %s posted by me about USAF etc some time back. Mirage 2000 serviceability has been ~80% per reports, which dropped over last years of UPA rule due to delay in signing service contracts.

Karan, Do You have any official recent CAG number on M2K serviceability ?

I knew some one on M2K squadron at Gwalior few and he mentioned to me that M2K was nursed like babies for unmentioned reason and it had some nifty capability unknown outside done with Israel's assistance

[John]

From russian experiance mig 29 typically enjoyed close to twice the serviceability as rate compared to Su 27. I can't speak for Mig 29k but its new aircraft. It took russians decade to fully bring Su 33 to operation even then it was plagued with problems.

[brar_w]

^ Once you have availability to a steady supply of spares your mission capability rates are largely a factor of the cost of operation of a particular system. For example you can easily calculate what your downtimes will be based on your depot capacity to overhaul your aircraft. You can then add depot capacity to improve that number if your cost-benefit trade allows for it. Larger, more heavier fighters generally tend to cost more. When money is tight it is generally easier to maintain high readiness at a lower cost for a fleet that has simpler, lighter weight and less complex systems (the USP for the F-16, mig-21, F-5, F-20, and JAS-39A-C). A classic example is the Pentagon's strategic decisions to soften some of the effects of the budget control act of 2010. The USAF, USN and USMC responded to the budget sequester in 2010 (automatic budget cuts across the pentagon that shaved $1 Trillion over 10 years) by trading off a bit of readiness for modernization i.e. they willingly understaffed their units, and kept depot capacity down so as to fully fund modernization. A lot of air-forces around the world have done similar things over the years to balance their budget. Generally operators will develop a model where they know what the sweet spot is between what they spend on the fleet to operate it during peacetime, and what Mission capability rates they obtain within that budget. Hitting 90% with an F-15 or Su-30 sized aircraft during peacetime is going to be extremely expensive, whereas it may be possible with a cheaper and less complex aircraft like a new F-16V, LCA, FA-50, or Gripen. One thing that has changed is that over the years even the lighter aircraft have had to absorb a lot of technology (deemed as mission critical) whereas earlier they were much simpler systems. Systems (avionics) wise a block 60 F-16, or a hypothetical mig-35 is not any less complex than an F-15SG or Su-30 so the difference in cost isn't as dramatic as it once was since a lot of your cost now days is avionics and sub-systems related.

The problem however, with the MKI serviceability is not with the IAF's ability to keep it high but the ability of the OEM to respond in a timely fashion to demand for spares and if I recall some issues with reliability with the engines may also be a contributor. This points to just a poor logistics and supply chain management which many western OEM's have improved by leaps and bounds over the last few decades by simply adopting commercial best-practices and processes. It helps that most of these OEM's also have a strong presence in the commercial side of aerospace & defense and that beyond a few 'locked' markets they compete fiercely with each other for business. 10-15 years ago no one in their right mind would offer a Performance Based Logistic type of deal for a combat fighter. Nowadays, OEM's are willing to do that very early into the development cycle (1-2 years post the first squadron IOC for example) thanks to a data driven approaches in how they manage their supply chain and monitor utilization and how quickly they use that data to improve component level reliability. If your system is not reliable, you will loose a lot of money in your PBL, or will be forced to offer one at prices that no buyer will be willing to accept. The tactical and strategic lift side for example has now completely shifted to a nearly commercial aircraft fleet management type solutions and the results are quite impressive. With the C-17 boeing contractually guarantees a supply of spares to meet 80% mission availability rates (with a contractual guarantee extending to per annum fleet flight hours) , and actual rates for many operators are even higher (87% for the USAF for example).

[John]

Good points Brar_w i concur with your statements especially about the spares that's why i wanted to emphasize we cannot compare Mig-29k serviceability with even Mig-29 till we have few years of operation.

[Karan M]

Mig-29 serviceability in the IAF itself has been next to pathetic until IAF itself started making its own spares. The MiG-29K time will tell, but its teething problems are legion. We took the Gorshkov and got saddled with the 29K as well.

[Philip]

The IN is quite happy being "saddled" with the MIG-29K.Read the latest VAYU for details about its performance aboard the VikA,which is far and above the original IAF 29s purchased two decades ago.In fact the IAF's 29s being upgraded ,all 60+ for just under $1B,make them superior or at least equiv to the M2Ks ,40+ upgrades going on for a staggering cost of $2.5B! For that price,and we got our 29Ks at $30M apiece,we could get at least 4 sqds of 29Ks.
The latest issue also features the IN's Hawks at Dega.

[Austin]

[Nick_S]

^ Mi-38 ?

[andy B]

Platypus from Hell aka Hell Duck
Very TFTA cockpit indeed nice.

[Nick_S]

Thanks AndyB.

[Prem]

http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160107/ ... scope.html
Super Scope: Russian Snipers to Become 'Invisible'

Russian snipers will soon become invisible to the enemy with the help of an innovative new rangefinder, being developed by a Moscow-based company.“We are developing rangefinders that will allow more efficient use of infrared and night vision gear. These new rangefinders will be working on a wavelength, which makes the sniper invisible to the enemy,” Argus-NV Company’s general director Anton Safin told RIA Novosti news agency.The company earlier said that their latest all-weather night and day scopes had successfully been tested by the Russian military.The Argus-NV gear is lightweight, small and sturdy with its powerful batteries ensuring fail-proof operation with heavy weapons under adverse weather conditions.The company specializes in the development of infrared caps placed in front of a rifle’s day scope so that the sniper does not have to lose time taking it off.Argus-NV uses special brackets to install their scopes and caps on various types of weapons, including the VSS and SVD sniper rifles, Kalashnikov assault rifles and Pecheneg machineguns.A words-free intuitive menu ensures quick selection of necessary operational modes and functions.

[deejay]

Not weapons or military technology but Russian Military news so posting here

https://www.rt.com/news/328648-russia-n ... divisions/

Western defense: Russia to form 3 new army divisions in 2016

Three new army divisions will be formed this year to reinforce the Russian military in the western part of the country, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said. The new units will be formed amid NATO’s continuing build-up across Eastern and Central Europe.
"I cannot but mention such a critical task which is the formation of three divisions in the western theater. The task is extremely important," TASS reported Shoigu as telling journalists.

Shoigu also added that alongside the creation of the new divisions, the army will have to set up proper infrastructure including barracks, firing ranges and military hardware depots.

While details of the new formations are unknown, the minister’s announcement came amid a US and NATO military build-up in Central and Eastern Europe – against what Washington and its allies call “Russian aggression.”
...

[Philip]

Though an old report,once all 4 Kirocv class BCGs are modernised the RuN will have very formidable surface warfare capital ships. Being N-powered,their range and endurance too will be enhanced.

http://www.naval-technology.com/news/ne ... capability

Russia’s fourth Kirov-class warship demonstrates missile defence capability
Pyotr Veliky nuclear-powered cruiser

The Russian Navy's fourth Kirov-class heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky has demonstrated its missile defence capabilities during a patrol-and-training mission in the Arctic.

A defence ministry source told Izvestia that Pyotr Veliky conducted missile defence drills on the Northern Sea route along Russia's Arctic coast, as part of the sea-based segment of the country's missile defence shield.

"The missile defence drills in the Arctic are very important because they cover the trajectories of potential strikes by land-based US ballistic missiles," the source added.

Originally named as Yuri Andropov, Pyotr Veliky is the flagship of Russia's Northern Fleet and is the only frigate with the capability to provide defence against cruise and ballistic missile attacks.

"The missile defence drills in the Arctic are very important because they cover the trajectories of potential strikes by land-based US ballistic missiles."

The ship is equipped with weaponry that includes the 48 S-300F Fort and 46 S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) medium-range surface-to-air missiles with effective range of up to 200km, 128 3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) short-range SAMs, and six CADS-N-1 Kashtan gun/missile systems.

Kirov-class frigates can provide air and submarine attack capabilities, as well as the ability to strike large surface ships, while carrying three Kamov Ka-27PL or Ka-25RT helicopters.

With a displacement capacity of between 24,000t-26,000t, the 251m-long Russian warship can cruise at speeds up to 31k and accommodate a crew of more than 700.

The frigate features radars that can detect and track targets in the air at an altitude of 30km and a range of 300km.

Russia is aiming to modernise its three mothballed Kirov-class missile cruisers by 2020, under the sea-based segment of national missile defence network development programme.

[Austin]

More Details on Kalbir http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-818.html

[Singha]

russians are funding RS28 SARMAT - a new silo based liquid fuel heavy icbm to replace the SS18.
it will have 10-15 MIRV capability and enough range to fly over the south pole to attack north america from the south.
done by Makeyev the SLBM specialists who also fixed the Bulava program.

it is on the verge of IOC.

the other key next gen missiles nearing IOC are RS26 Rubezh (with hypersonic marv) to supplement the TELAR based RS24 yars and the RSM56 Bulava which is FOC and going into the 7 Borei class subs (3 in service)

the have finally arrested and are fixing the decline in the quality and uptime of their strategic rockets and delivery systems. Yasen class subs have been funded to protect the boreis and deltas.

the next round of funding will likely go into building some more Tu160, more precision long range/JDAMski type weapons for central asian/black sea tactical wars and the PAKFA/PAKDA twins.

[Austin]

russians are funding RS28 SARMAT - a new silo based liquid fuel heavy icbm to replace the SS18.
it will have 10-15 MIRV capability and enough range to fly over the south pole to attack north america from the south.
done by Makeyev the SLBM specialists who also fixed the Bulava program.

SARMAT has not received any designation except that its heavy ICBM with 8 T throw up weight and 10 MIRV with 1 MT each
Its not verge of IOC , it will come on from 2020 onwards the just did some dummy throw up test recently , SS-18 is expected to remain operation till 2025 so more decade of operation , ofcouse SS-18 can also fly from north pole function of energy

[member_29294]

SARMAT really confuses me.

I thought liquid fueled rockets had a long preparation time, hence why nearly all ICBMs use solid fueled rockets now.

For what purpose does one want to go back to liquid fueled ICBMs?

[Austin]

For what purpose does one want to go back to liquid fueled ICBMs?

Larger Volume for Payload ( Warhead and Countermeasures ) , Larger Throw Up Weight , Energy to shape any Trajectory from any direction North or South Pole. These days they wont opt for liquid fuel but Liquid Gel that can be stored for longer time

[Austin]

http://gelio.livejournal.com/213883.html

Good photo-report of production @ Aviastar-SP, Russia's biggest aviation plant. Aviastar now produces the Il-76MD-90 family and derivatives, Tu-204, repairs An-124s, and also are part of the SSJ and MS-21 production chains. The plant employs around 10,000 people.

[member_28756]

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2 ... ard-to-do/

It’s Russia’s turn to learn that stealth warplanes are hard to do
By David AxeJanuary 20, 2016

After confronting serious technical and economic difficulties, Russia has dramatically cut back its air force program to field its first radar-evading “stealth” fighter jet. By delaying large-scale acquisition of the Sukhoi T-50 fighter, the Kremlin is tacitly acknowledging a truth that the U.S. military learned decades ago — and that China might also learn in coming years: developing stealth fighters is hard.

But fortunately for the Russian air force, and unfortunately for Washington and its allied air arms that are Russia’s chief rivals, Moscow has a backup plan. Instead of counting on a new stealth jet to outfit its fighter squadrons, the Russian government is buying heavily upgraded versions of older planes — an approach the Pentagon has dismissed as wasteful. It could, however, help Russia maintain its aerial edge.

The T-50, like practically all stealth aircraft before it, has proved expensive to develop, although exactly how expensive remains a closely guarded secret. Radar-evading warplanes require careful design work, extensive testing and exotic materials for their construction — all features that can double or triple their cost compared to conventional, non-stealthy planes.

Even with their high cost, air forces all over the world are scrambling to acquire stealth aircraft because their ability to avoid detection can, in theory, offer a big advantage in air-to-air combat and during bombing runs.

But a competing theory of aerial warfare argues that stealth is overrated — and it’s better to buy greater numbers of cheaper, non-stealthy planes. Moscow’s troubles in developing the T-50 have compelled it to adhere to the competing philosophy.

Russia arrived late to the stealth-warplane party. The U.S. Air Force fielded its first radar-evading warplane — the F-117 attack jet — in 1983. It added the B-2 stealth bomber to its inventory in 1997 and then the F-22 stealth fighter in 2005. The Marine Corps, meanwhile, was the first U.S. military branch to introduce the latest F-35 stealth fighter, in July 2015. The Air Force anticipates declaring its own F-35s operational in 2016.

The F-117 retired in 2008, but the Pentagon still possesses hundreds of stealth planes and plans to acquire hundreds more in coming years via large-scale purchases of F-35s and the new Long-Range Strike Bomber, a successor to the B-2. Its economy and military crippled by the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, Russia didn’t begin serious work on the T-50 until 2002. The first prototype took off on its inaugural flight in January 2010, a year before China’s first stealth prototype — the J-20 — made its debut.

All the U.S., Russian and Chinese stealth aircraft possess special features for minimizing their detectability on radar and other sensors. These include rounded or angular shaping that can scatter radar waves, plus special materials that absorb radar instead of deflecting it.

Stealth plane design is a balancing act. The aircraft must be able to avoid detection while also flying fast and far enough, and carrying a big enough payload, to make them militarily useful. They cannot be so expensive that an air force can’t actually afford to buy them in meaningful numbers. In the 40 years it has been working on stealth technology, the United States has never stopped struggling with this balance.

The B-2 is hard to detect and flies well, but at more than $2 billion each, it proved too expensive for mass purchase. The U.S. Air Force managed to buy 21 of the bat-shaped planes from manufacturer Northrop Grumman. Lockheed Martin designed the F-35 to be affordable, but that compelled the company to cut back on the fighter’s stealth features. In any event, developmental difficulties have driven up the F-35’s cost to more than $100 million a plane — hardly cheap.

Neither the Russian government nor Sukhoi, the company that makes the T-50, have said how much the twin-engine, single-seat supersonic fighter has cost to develop or how much it might cost to buy once the design is complete. It’s safe to say, however, that development could consume tens of billions of dollars. And each plane could set back the buyer $100 million.

And that’s assuming the T-50 actually works. There are signs that it doesn’t — at least not very well. In six years, the six T-50 prototypes have completed just 700 test flights, according to a recent article in Combat Aircraft magazine by Piotr Butowski, an expert in Russian military aviation. By comparison, Lockheed and the U.S. Air Force built eight F-22 test planes and flew them 3,500 times between 1997 and 2005. It looks like the T-50s aren’t even reliable enough to undergo intensive testing.

That was dramatically apparent on June 10, 2014, when the fifth T-50 prototype — then less than a year old — suffered a catastrophic engine fire while taxiing on the ground. The damage was so bad that Sukhoi had to halt production of the sixth prototype and use its parts to rebuild the burned plane. The Indian air force, which is considering buying a version of the T-50, complained of “shortfalls … in terms of performance and other technical features

Events overtook the T-50’s slow and costly development. With many foreign governments imposing sanctions in the wake of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea, and oil prices plummeting amid a global supply glut, in 2015 Russia entered a recession that saw its economy shrink 3 percent in one year. Perhaps not surprisingly, in March 2015, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov announced that Russia would reduce its order. The Kremlin said it would buy just a dozen T-50s by 2020, instead of the 60 it originally planned.

By then the United States should have more than 500 stealth planes in frontline service. China finished the first production-standard J-20 in December 2015 and is expected to acquire dozens more in the next few years — though it’s unclear how much the J-20 costs and how happy Beijing is with its performance.

To make up for the cuts to Russia’s T-50 program, the Kremlin has boosted production of the Su-35 and Su-30, the latest upgraded versions of the Cold War-vintage Su-27, a powerful twin-engine fighter whose various models are now the standard warplanes of the Russian, Chinese and Indian air arms. The Su-35 and Su-30 aren’t stealthy, but they are fast, far-flying and capable of carrying heavy payloads of missiles and bombs.

The Su-35, in particular, is a very capable warplane. Moscow ordered 48 planes in 2009 and is widely expected to soon place a second order for another 48. “It would be fair to describe this aircraft as the pinnacle of current conventional-fighter design,” wrote Carlo Kopp, an analyst with the Air Power Australia think tank, “blending a superb basic aerodynamic design with advanced engine, flight control and avionic technology”

Based on a proven design, the Su-35 is reliable. It’s also comparatively cheap, as low as $50 million a plane. Which is half as much as a T-50 or F-35. An upgraded classic fighter is at a disadvantage compared to a stealth plane in one regard: the ability to avoid detection under certain circumstances. But the classic fighter actually holds the advantage over a stealth plane when it comes to reliability and cost and some performance parameters, including maneuverability and payload.

Whether the stealth jet’s advantage is worth its disadvantages is a philosophical question for military planners. The Pentagon decided in favor of stealth planes, even cancelling upgrades to older F-15s and F-16s to free up more money for more F-35s. In Russia, circumstances largely settled the issue, forcing the Kremlin to bet on classic fighters over their stealth counterparts.

The world might never know who’s right unless Russia and the United States go to war against each other — a proof of concept no one actually welcomes

.

[member_29294]

^

Only 12 PakFA by 2020 sounds like a disaster. I have to question if FGFA will ever see the light of day. Neither IAF or IN has seen very keen on procuring Russian aircraft nowadays beyond their current orders and upgrades. IAF has turned down MiG-35 and Su-35S, while IN has ruled out more MiG-29Ks for INS Vishal. On Rafale thread there is even discussion of IN buying Rafale-M now.

For what purpose does one want to go back to liquid fueled ICBMs?

Larger Volume for Payload ( Warhead and Countermeasures ) , Larger Throw Up Weight , Energy to shape any Trajectory from any direction North or South Pole. These days they wont opt for liquid fuel but Liquid Gel that can be stored for longer time

Sounds very interesting. I was not aware of such a substance. Could be a game changer if it is cheap and could be used on other rockets like A2A missiles and rocket artillery. I hope DRDO also is developing such propellants.

[Singha]

the cancelled Crusader 155mm uber-SP tracked howitzer of the us army was supposed to use liquid gel propellants, perhaps giving the ability to impart a wider variety of ranges & less barrel elevation changes than using fixed 'charge' propellant cylinders.

[brar_w]

For what purpose does one want to go back to liquid fueled ICBMs?

Larger Volume for Payload ( Warhead and Countermeasures ) , Larger Throw Up Weight , Energy to shape any Trajectory from any direction North or South Pole. These days they wont opt for liquid fuel but Liquid Gel that can be stored for longer time

Have they confirmed a gel based fuel for the rocket?

[Nick_S]

Tu-95 explodes (June 2015)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkG4ltu_UGQ

[Austin]

More details about the crash

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1688422.html

Official results of investigations into the causes of the crash are not made public, but the most common circulating unofficial version is to break during takeoff Hydromount one of the main landing gear, pieces of which struck the fuel tank, followed by fire and explosion. As a result of the crash of the Tu-95MS bombers killed navigator and commander of the crew.

Surprising the navigator and commander died in 1-2 months after the crash but two other crew member in Tu-95MS escaped without a scratch.

[Austin]

Have they confirmed a gel based fuel for the rocket?

They mentioned two option either Gel Based one or conventional high energy fuel , Makeyev Design Bureau maker of Sineva apprently has experience with liquid fuel that does not need to be defuelled for a long time and remains sealed inside the fuel tank as is case with Sineva/Liner SLBM.

[brar_w]

Have they confirmed a gel based fuel for the rocket?

They mentioned two option either Gel Based one or conventional high energy fuel , Makeyev Design Bureau maker of Sineva apprently has experience with liquid fuel that does not need to be defuelled for a long time and remains sealed inside the fuel tank as is case with Sineva/Liner SLBM.

Thanks !!

[Austin]

Russian Navy: noise submarines type "Lada" is 10 times lower than that of the project 636 submarines

http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2592426

MOSCOW, Jan. 16. / TASS /. Noise of non-nuclear submarines of the fourth generation of "Lada" (Project 677) is reduced by 10 times compared to their predecessors 636 project. This is the radio "Russian news service," said the head of the Russian Navy ship captain Vladimir rag-pickers.

"There adequately designed submarine 677 project" Harmony ". She is now undergoing trial operation in the Northern Fleet. Any questions, but when they are closed, finished trial operation, adjusted the working design documentation, the operating instructions - this is a serious underwater boat, which will have the noise level is lower than the currently possess submarines 636 project ", - he said the rag-pickers, speaking of the head submarine" Saint Petersburg ". "And now we are building in parallel two other submarines of this project. This is the" Great Luke "and" Kronstadt ", which are constructed taking into account those comments, which are revealed in the trial operation of the head of the boat," - said the representative of the fleet. show more

[Austin]

The picture story about the first flights of Il-76MD-90A as a part of military transport aviation in Russia

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1693474.html

[VinodTK]

COLUMN-It's Russia's turn to learn that stealth warplanes are hard to do

an 22 After confronting serious technical and economic difficulties, Russia has dramatically cut back its air force program to field its first radar-evading "stealth" fighter jet. By delaying large-scale acquisition of the Sukhoi T-50 fighter, the Kremlin is tacitly acknowledging a truth that the U.S. military learned decades ago - and that China might also learn in coming years: developing stealth fighters is hard.

But fortunately for the Russian air force, and unfortunately for Washington and its allied air arms that are Russia's chief rivals, Moscow has a backup plan. Instead of counting on a new stealth jet to outfit its fighter squadrons, the Russian government is buying heavily upgraded versions of older planes - an approach the Pentagon has dismissed as wasteful. It could, however, help Russia maintain its aerial edge.

The T-50, like practically all stealth aircraft before it, has proved expensive to develop, although exactly how expensive remains a closely guarded secret. Radar-evading warplanes require careful design work, extensive testing and exotic materials for their construction - all features that can double or triple their cost compared to conventional, non-stealthy planes.

Even with their high cost, air forces all over the world are scrambling to acquire stealth aircraft because their ability to avoid detection can, in theory, offer a big advantage in air-to-air combat and during bombing runs.

But a competing theory of aerial warfare argues that stealth is overrated - and it's better to buy greater numbers of cheaper, non-stealthy planes. Moscow's troubles in developing the T-50 have compelled it to adhere to the competing philosophy.

Russia arrived late to the stealth-warplane party. The U.S. Air Force fielded its first radar-evading warplane - the F-117 attack jet - in 1983. It added the B-2 stealth bomber to its inventory in 1997 and then the F-22 stealth fighter in 2005. The Marine Corps, meanwhile, was the first U.S. military branch to introduce the latest F-35 stealth fighter, in July 2015. The Air Force anticipates declaring its own F-35s operational in 2016.

The F-117 retired in 2008, but the Pentagon still possesses hundreds of stealth planes and plans to acquire hundreds more in coming years via large-scale purchases of F-35s and the new Long-Range Strike Bomber, a successor to the B-2. Its economy and military crippled by the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse, Russia didn't begin serious work on the T-50 until 2002. The first prototype took off on its inaugural flight in January 2010, a year before China's first stealth prototype - the J-20 - made its debut.

All the U.S., Russian and Chinese stealth aircraft possess special features for minimizing their detectability on radar and other sensors. These include rounded or angular shaping that can scatter radar waves, plus special materials that absorb radar instead of deflecting it.

Stealth plane design is a balancing act. The aircraft must be able to avoid detection while also flying fast and far enough, and carrying a big enough payload, to make them militarily useful. They cannot be so expensive that an air force can't actually afford to buy them in meaningful numbers. In the 40 years it has been working on stealth technology, the United States has never stopped struggling with this balance.

The B-2 is hard to detect and flies well, but at more than $2 billion each, it proved too expensive for mass purchase. The U.S. Air Force managed to buy 21 of the bat-shaped planes from manufacturer Northrop Grumman. Lockheed Martin designed the F-35 to be affordable, but that compelled the company to cut back on the fighter's stealth features. In any event, developmental difficulties have driven up the F-35's cost to more than $100 million a plane - hardly cheap.

Neither the Russian government nor Sukhoi, the company that makes the T-50, have said how much the twin-engine, single-seat supersonic fighter has cost to develop or how much it might cost to buy once the design is complete. It's safe to say, however, that development could consume tens of billions of dollars. And each plane could set back the buyer $100 million.

And that's assuming the T-50 actually works. There are signs that it doesn't - at least not very well. In six years, the six T-50 prototypes have completed just 700 test flights, according to a recent article in Combat Aircraft magazine by Piotr Butowski, an expert in Russian military aviation. By comparison, Lockheed and the U.S. Air Force built eight F-22 test planes and flew them 3,500 times between 1997 and 2005. It looks like the T-50s aren't even reliable enough to undergo intensive testing.

That was dramatically apparent on June 10, 2014, when the fifth T-50 prototype - then less than a year old - suffered a catastrophic engine fire while taxiing on the ground. The damage was so bad that Sukhoi had to halt production of the sixth prototype and use its parts to rebuild the burned plane. The Indian air force, which is considering buying a version of the T-50, complained of "shortfalls  in terms of performance and other technical features

Events overtook the T-50's slow and costly development. With many foreign governments imposing sanctions in the wake of Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea, and oil prices plummeting amid a global supply glut, in 2015 Russia entered a recession that saw its economy shrink 3 percent in one year. Perhaps not surprisingly, in March 2015, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov announced that Russia would reduce its order. The Kremlin said it would buy just a dozen T-50s by 2020, instead of the 60 it originally planned.

By then the United States should have more than 500 stealth planes in frontline service. China finished the first production-standard J-20 in December 2015 and is expected to acquire dozens more in the next few years - though it's unclear how much the J-20 costs and how happy Beijing is with its performance.

To make up for the cuts to Russia's T-50 program, the Kremlin has boosted production of the Su-35 and Su-30, the latest upgraded versions of the Cold War-vintage Su-27, a powerful twin-engine fighter whose various models are now the standard warplanes of the Russian, Chinese and Indian air arms. The Su-35 and Su-30 aren't stealthy, but they are fast, far-flying and capable of carrying heavy payloads of missiles and bombs.

The Su-35, in particular, is a very capable warplane. Moscow ordered 48 planes in 2009 and is widely expected to soon place a second order for another 48. "It would be fair to describe this aircraft as the pinnacle of current conventional-fighter design," wrote Carlo Kopp, an analyst with the Air Power Australia think tank, "blending a superb basic aerodynamic design with advanced engine, flight control and avionic technology"

Based on a proven design, the Su-35 is reliable. It's also comparatively cheap, as low as $50 million a plane. Which is half as much as a T-50 or F-35. An upgraded classic fighter is at a disadvantage compared to a stealth plane in one regard: the ability to avoid detection under certain circumstances. But the classic fighter actually holds the advantage over a stealth plane when it comes to reliability and cost and some performance parameters, including maneuverability and payload.

Whether the stealth jet's advantage is worth its disadvantages is a philosophical question for military planners. The Pentagon decided in favor of stealth planes, even cancelling upgrades to older F-15s and F-16s to free up more money for more F-35s. In Russia, circumstances largely settled the issue, forcing the Kremlin to bet on classic fighters over their stealth counterparts.

The world might never know who's right unless Russia and the United States go to war against each other - a proof of concept no one actually welcomes. (David Axe)

[VijayN]

Not sure if this was posted here, article on the Armata T 14 tank and Video, supposedly first time classified stuff being demo'd

http://www.popularmechanics.com/militar ... uchscreen/

Forgot to add: For your pleasure Phillip

[Austin]

One more for our esteemed member Phlip

Official corporate calendar "Uralvagonzavod" for 2016

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1690281.html

[Singha]

sweet. the armata most resembles a merkava (high hull profile) with a small heavily armoured turret on top.
and those features look good.

the cost will however be equivalent to a western heavy, so RuA is moving from the masses of "tough, crude and cheap" tank philosophy to the 'western' one just like RuAF and RuN

[Philip]

Tough,crude and cheap were Cold War dictates, where the Soviets required massive numerical superiority to overcome the NATO qualitative advantage.This was from their WW2 experience against the Germans.The T-34 was actually also a better tank than German ones.

India too benefited from this philosophy during the '71 war.We had large numbers of Russian MIG-21s which for decades gave us an advantage over the Pakis.sadly,the LCA supposed to replace the MIG-21 still hasn't arrived in sqd. service and our MIG-21s still soldier on for ...50 yrs! The Soviet/Russian philosophy allows you greater numbers for a lesser cost and even if the reliability factor is lkess than a sophisticated western product,the greater numbers have a quality of their own. This is evident today in the IA,where we have thousands of MBTs tx to the cheaper costs of T-72s and T-90s compared with Arjun.Arjun is 20 t heavier than a T-90.Read the comments about Arjun from an IA general who was dy-head of the Arjun porgramme in the latest Week mag.

Now here's an int. development.Russia is to limit Amur/Ladas to those already built. Future conventional sub construction will be of the Kalina class.I hinted at this poss. of the Kalina for India for the P-75I req. not too long ago,which will feature a new-tech for the AIP system. It upgraded appears that Russia is very happy with more upgraded Kilos of the 636.3 type,which are being churned out at speed like sausages for just $350M or thereabouts. More such Kilos are being inducted for the RuN and for export.

This will definitely affect the Ru offer of a sub type for the P-75I req.Russia not building more Amurs will seriously affect its chances of the IN buying any. The Germans,who are reportedly trailing in the "Great Oz sub chase",may find India a better bet.

Russia Scraps Plans of Additional Project 677 Submarines Construction
12:53 19.01.2016
The Russian Navy decided not to build Lada-class diesel-electric submarines (Project 677) since the funding will be spent on Kalina-class ships, a senior Russian Navy’s official said Tuesday.

Hunt You Down: Russian Navy to Receive Modern Anti-Submarine Aircraft
MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Construction of the Sankt Peterburg, the lead ship of the Project 677, began in December 1997. It was introduced into the Navy for trial operations in April 2010. Two other ships of the class have already been laid down.

"The Navy has decided to complete the construction of two Lada-class boats and stop the work on the project. All three boats of this project will join the Baltic Fleet. Funding will be directed to the Kalina project," the official told RIA Novosti.

He added that a Russian design bureau, Rubin, was working on the project of the submarines equipped with anaerobic (air-independent) power units, dubbed Kalina-class. Their construction is expected to be launched after 2020.

Air-independent, closed cycle submarines, which usually use hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells, are quieter than conventional diesel-electric boats and do not have to surface or use snorkel tubes to breathe air, thereby exposing themselves to detection by radar and other sensors.

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160119/ ... z3yBcEHPtF

[Viv S]

India too benefited from this philosophy during the '71 war.We had large numbers of Russian MIG-21s which for decades gave us an advantage over the Pakis.

Err.. no. Only six of the IAF's 34 fighter squadrons were equipped with the MiG-21, which (at the time) was the most expensive fighter jet in the IAF's inventory.

[Austin]

First & Only Video of T-14 ARMATA Tank Firing

[Austin]

Angara-5P: Russia's next manned rocket

http://www.russianspaceweb.com/angara5p.html#2015

[Austin]

Interview commander of the Strategic Missile Forces appointment of Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev. ( use translator )

"Sarmat" replace "Voivode"

http://vpk-news.ru/articles/28908

[Austin]

Philip Sir post that in appropriate thread no need to post this in all threads and it has nothing to do with Weapons and Technology but history